

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS



OPERATION EPIC FURY



APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026



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On the cover: U.S. Marines board Celestial Sea, an Iranian-flagged commercial oil tanker suspected of attempting to violate the U.S. blockade by transiting toward an Iranian port, on May 20, 2026. (U.S. Marine Corps Photo)



We are pleased to present this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) report to Congress on Operation Epic Fury (OEF). This is our first report on OEF, following the Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency's designation of the Department of War Inspector General as the Lead IG for OEF on May 12, 2026. This report fulfills our quarterly reporting responsibilities pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

This report describes the activities of the U.S. Government in support of OEF as well as the work of the Department of War (DoW), the Department of State (State), and other U.S. Government agencies to further the U.S. Government's policy goals with respect to Iran. It also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG agencies and our partner oversight agencies. This report covers the period through June 30, 2026.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Platte B. Moring, III".

Platte B. Moring, III
Lead Inspector General for OEF
Inspector General
U.S. Department of War

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Arne B. Baker".

Arne B. Baker
Associate Inspector General for OEF
Acting Inspector General
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A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Van Nguyen".

Van Nguyen
Acting Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties of the
Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International
Development



IN THIS REPORT

Mission and Resources

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- U.S. forces launched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) on February 28 to dismantle the Iranian regime’s security apparatus, including its missile production and naval capabilities, and to ensure that Iran never acquires nuclear weapons.
- The DoW estimated the cost of OEF to be \$33.4 billion as of June 29. The estimate includes \$7.4 billion of cumulative obligations (incremental costs) for OEF, \$22.3 billion for expended munitions, and \$3.7 billion in equipment losses, but does not include costs for infrastructure repairs.
- State reported that as of June 2, it had incurred \$113 million in costs related to the conflict with Iran. This includes \$79.2 million to respond to contingencies stemming from the Iran conflict, such as evacuation-related expenses for State personnel and their family members, U.S. citizens, and eligible third-country nationals.
- More than 50,000 U.S. Service members were deployed throughout the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) in support of OEF.
- USCENTCOM dispersed U.S. forces across the AOR, often to new basing locations, with the intent to reduce vulnerability of forces and sustain combat power.
- The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) conducted more than 1,500 air missions, surging to 30 to 40 daily missions directly into the USCENTCOM AOR.

Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Bulkeley fires a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile during operations in support of OEF on February 28, 2026. (U.S. Navy Photo)

U.S. Losses and Sustainment

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- The DoW reported that from February 28 to June 30, seven U.S. Service members were killed in action and seven were killed in non-hostile events during OEF combat operations. During the same period, 417 service members were wounded in action.
- U.S. diplomatic facilities in four countries—Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—suffered physical damage from Iranian strikes. The estimated cost of the damages is approximately \$184 million.
- Between February 23 and June 30, approximately 3,500 diplomatic personnel in the region were either on authorized or ordered departure, or already out of the country.

U.S. Diplomatic and Economic Activity

pp. 5–7, 21–26

- State directly arranged for the departure of approximately 9,000 Americans in the region, and offered security information, travel assistance, and chartered buses. This included arranging 56 flights to evacuate thousands of private U.S. citizens from the Middle East.
- Between January 1 and June 30, State and Treasury took actions against Iran and its proxies, including designating or blocking more than a thousand individuals, entities, and vessels, as well as identifying hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of blocked assets.
- The United States made three emergency declarations under the Arms Export Control Act to expedite urgently needed defense systems to regional partners, totaling \$25.32 billion.
- The United States reached a ceasefire with Iran on April 7 and jointly signed a Memorandum of Understanding on June 17. As of the end of the reporting period, negotiations on outstanding issues had reached a stalemate and hostilities continued.

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Aircraft staged for flight operations on the flight deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln in support of OEF, on March 3, 2026. (U.S. Navy photo)

MISSION AND RESOURCES

INTRODUCTION

On February 28, 2026, U.S. forces launched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) as a U.S.-Israeli partnered campaign to “destroy Iran’s ability to project military power” in the region by striking Iranian nuclear, missile, naval, and regime security targets.¹

According to State, Iran poses the greatest threat to the United States from the Middle East, both directly, in the form of its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, and indirectly, in its funding of terror proxies.² Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said that for decades, Iran has waged an ongoing conflict with the United States that has included lethal attacks against U.S. forces in the Middle East, threats and attacks against regional countries, and support to terrorist proxy organizations.³ After U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites in June 2025, Iran expanded its ballistic missile production to protect its nuclear weapons development program.⁴

MISSION OBJECTIVES

Secretary Hegseth said that through OEF, the United States seeks to destroy Iran’s offensive missiles, missile production, navy, and other security infrastructure, and ensure that Iran never has nuclear weapons.⁵ General Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that more broadly, the OEF mission is to defend the United States and “disrupt, degrade, deny, and destroy Iran’s ability to conduct and sustain combat operations.”⁶ The full OEF mission statement is classified.

The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) reported that it continued to refine and adjust the OEF mission after it began.⁷ U.S. naval operations in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), including those that occurred after the April 7 ceasefire, were part of the OEF mission, USCENTCOM said.⁸

USCENTCOM, with support from multiple U.S. combatant commands, is responsible for executing the OEF campaign. OEF has involved the integration of air, land, sea, cyber, and space components; an extensive, rapid deployment of forces and assets; expansion of basing access; and regionally integrated air defense networks to protect the forces.⁹

EVOLUTION OF THE OEF MISSION


USCENTCOM reported that prior to the start of OEF, the United States had built a regional network of partner access and air defense networks that laid the groundwork for major combat operations.¹⁰ In February 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued National Security Presidential Memorandum-2, directing the Departments of State and the Treasury to exert maximum pressure through sanctions and other financial targeting to disrupt Iran's nuclear ambitions and malign activities.¹¹ In June 2025, the United States executed Operation Midnight Hammer, a series of military strikes that targeted Iran's nuclear capabilities.¹²

The nature of U.S. military activity under the OEF mission evolved over the course of the reporting period in response to the Iranian threat and U.S. diplomatic efforts to end the conflict.

Preparation: In the months leading up to the launch of OEF, the DoW systematically repositioned personnel and key assets to enhance regional deterrence and prepare for a potential contingency operation.¹³ Thousands of Service members from all branches were deployed, along with hundreds of advanced fighter jets, dozens of refueling tankers, the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Groups and their embarked air wings, and a sustained flow of munitions, fuel, and supplies—all supported with command-and-control networks and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.¹⁴

Figure 1.

Evolution of the OEF Mission



Major combat operations: Between February 28 and April 7, U.S. forces launched air and ground-based strikes against a wide set of military targets in Iran.¹⁵ Admiral Brad Cooper, the USCENTCOM Commander, testified in May that U.S. forces struck approximately 13,500 targets. USCENTCOM reported that it conducted approximately 36,000 combat sorties and more than 1,800 fire missions.¹⁶

Strikes during the major combat operations period targeted Iranian ballistic missile garrisons, Iranian air defense sites, storage sites for Iranian cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), command-and-control centers, naval and naval mining assets, and Iran's defense industrial base.¹⁷

USCENTCOM operations also targeted Iranian assets threatening the SoH with strikes on Iranian naval and coastal-defense targets. USCENTCOM conducted defensive counter-air strikes against hostile air threats along the SoH, demonstration transits through the SoH, and unmanned underwater vessel-based mine hunting operations.¹⁸

Mine countermeasure operations: U.S. mine countermeasures operations throughout the reporting period sought to preserve freedom of navigation, protect international commercial shipping, and deter adversary mining while enabling rapid response to suspected or confirmed mine threats.¹⁹

April 7 ceasefire: The United States announced a ceasefire with Iran on April 7 to allow for negotiations, while U.S. forces in the region remained postured to resume combat operations.²⁰ Vice President J.D. Vance led the U.S. delegation. Between April and June, senior Pakistani leaders visited Iran to engage Iranian leadership to advance negotiations, de-escalate hostilities, and reopen the SoH.²¹ As of June 30, the Pakistani government continued its mediation role in U.S.-Iran negotiations.²²

U.S. blockade of Iranian ports: On April 12, USCENTCOM announced a U.S. blockade, beginning on April 13, of all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports and coastal areas.²³ The blockade line stretched from Oman to Iran's southern coast near its border with Pakistan. USCENTCOM said that from April 13 to June 18, U.S. forces redirected more than 140 compliant vessels, disabled 10 non-compliant ships through kinetic action, and allowed more than 50 commercial vessels supporting humanitarian aid to pass through the blockade.²⁴

Maritime interdiction operations: Operating as part of the blockade of Iranian ports and under separate maritime interdiction authorities, U.S. forces intercepted, boarded, or disabled vessels suspected of smuggling military contraband or evading sanctions outside the SoH and Persian Gulf.²⁵

Project Freedom: On May 4, three U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyers—the USS Truxtun, USS Rafael Peralta, and USS Mason—transited the SoH to the Persian Gulf as part of Project Freedom, designed to protect commercial vessels traveling through the SoH.²⁶ On May 5, President Trump paused Project Freedom at the request of Pakistan and other countries, saying at the time that the United States was close to an agreement with Iran to cease hostilities.²⁷

USCENTCOM reported that it conducted approximately 36,000 combat sorties and more than 1,800 fire missions.



President Donald J. Trump signs a Memorandum of Understanding between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, with French President Emmanuel Macron observing, at the Palace of Versailles, France, on June 17, 2026. (State photo)

Memorandum of Understanding: On June 17, President Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU). Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, signed the MoU as the primary mediator between the United States and Iran, State reported.²⁸

The MoU outlined terms between the United States and Iran related to safe navigation in the SoH and proposed an initial 60-day window to negotiate a final deal, State said.²⁹ The text specified that Iran would make arrangements for the safe passage of commercial vessels to transit the SoH “with no charge, for 60 days only.”³⁰ According to State, the United States and Iran also decided, outside of the MoU, to create a hotline between the United States and Iranian militaries to coordinate traffic in and around the SoH.³¹

The United States ended its blockade of Iranian ports on June 18 following the signing of the MoU, only to reinstate it on July 14 following Iranian strikes on commercial ships in the SoH.³²

Negotiations reach a stalemate: After the MoU was signed, Vice President Vance and negotiators from Iran, Pakistan, and Qatar resumed negotiations in Switzerland that focused on outstanding issues, including Iran’s nuclear program.³³ Tensions rose in late June, when Iran objected to a temporary proposal by Oman and the International Maritime Organization to set up transit with no tolls or fees through the SoH near Oman’s coast to help ships depart safely in accord with the MoU and international law.³⁴ On June 25, Iran struck a Singapore-flagged cargo vessel off the coast of Oman. USCENTCOM retaliated with strikes against Iran, and the International Maritime Organization paused vessel evacuation plans for the Strait.³⁵

U.S. commences defensive strikes: On July 7, Iran attacked three ships in the SoH, stating they had not followed Iranian rules of transit. The attack prompted heavy U.S. counterstrikes.³⁶ The same day, Treasury revoked a general license that had temporarily authorized the production, delivery, and sale of Iranian petroleum products.³⁷ On July 8, President Trump declared the MoU was “over.”³⁸ Within days, USCENTCOM resumed daily strike operations against Iran.³⁹



U.S. Navy Sailors conduct at-sea refueling on the flight deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln during OEF, on March 10, 2026. (U.S. Navy photo)

FUNDING

DEPARTMENT OF WAR


The Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer (OUSW[C]) estimated the cost of OEF to be \$33.4 billion as of June 29. The estimate includes \$7.4 billion of cumulative obligations for OEF, \$22.3 billion for expended munitions, and \$3.7 billion in equipment losses. According to the OUSW(C), the estimate for expended munitions and equipment losses were based on replacement cost.⁴⁰ The OUSW(C) estimate did not include costs for infrastructure repairs.⁴¹

Obligations: The \$7.4 billion cumulative obligations for OEF represents incremental costs—the expenses incurred for the contingency operation that exceed USCENTCOM’s normal operations.⁴² Obligations are legally binding agreements or actions that will result in outlays, immediately or in the future.⁴³ Approximately 90 percent of obligations were categorized as Operations and Maintenance, the appropriation category that funds day-to-day military operations, troop support, and equipment upkeep.⁴⁴ (See Figure 2.)

Disbursements: As of June 30, the DoW had disbursed \$4.9 billion or 65 percent of obligated funds. Of the disbursements, the five largest budget line items were for airlift operations (\$929.6 million), the Flying Hour Program (\$691.1 million), mission and other ship operations (\$647.7 million), base support (\$405.0 million), and maneuver units (\$385.3 million).⁴⁵

Open commitments: In addition, the DoW had \$365.1 million in open commitments, as of June 30.⁴⁶ A “commitment” is an administrative reservation of allotted funds, or of

Figure 2.

OEF Obligations by Component and Appropriation Category, as of June 30, 2026

other funds, in anticipation of an obligation. Officials can commit funds only to acquire goods, supplies, and services that meet the time, purpose, and amount for which Congress appropriated funds, or bona fide needs of the period to replace stock used during that period.⁴⁷ On July 13, the DoW OIG announced an audit to a) determine whether DoW Components are validating and managing open FY 2026 funding commitments supporting OEF; and b) identify stale, invalid, or excess commitments eligible for immediate cancellation and use for other critical, unfunded warfighter priorities.⁴⁸

Challenges in calculating costs: Congress did not appropriate funds specifically for OEF in FY 2026.⁴⁹ Instead, the DoW Components have used base budget funds that otherwise would be used for standard operational activities, such as planned training and maintenance activities.⁵⁰ The absence of a dedicated appropriation for OEF means that it can be difficult to calculate the total “cost” of OEF. Speaking before Congress on May 12, the Acting DoW Comptroller stated that he was most confident about the cost of expended munitions.⁵¹ Costs of repairing damaged equipment, on the other hand, could change based on when and if assets are replaced and contract pricing. In addition, he stated that an accurate estimate for repairs requires a full diagnostic review of aircraft and other damaged assets to understand the extent of damage.⁵²

The DoW did not include the cost of military construction for damaged infrastructure in its estimate because the DoW has not determined what its future posture will be in the region, how it will construct its bases, and what percentage of the construction costs Allies and

The absence of a dedicated appropriation for OEF means that it can be difficult to calculate the total “cost” of OEF.

Table 1.

Department of War Supplemental Request, in \$ Millions

Category	Amount
Munitions	\$21,000
Operational Costs	\$17,300
Other Classified Programs	\$12,100
Cybersecurity and Autonomy	\$5,100
Airborne Moving Target Indication and Space Data Network	\$4,000
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)	\$2,400
Readiness	\$1,700
Fuel	\$1,500
Administration Priorities	\$1,200
National Guard Support	\$800
TOTAL	\$67,100

Source: White House, letter to the Honorable Mike Johnson, 6/24/2026.

partners will contribute.⁵³ The OUSW(C) stated that the estimate also does not account for broader economic impacts, such as increased fuel prices, due to Iran’s closure of the SoH.

Supplemental funding request: During Congressional testimony on July 21, Secretary Hegseth stated that without supplemental funds, the DoW could face critical shortfalls that would threaten the DoW’s ability to pay Service members, replenish some of the equipment and munitions consumed during contingency operations, and sustain vital global operations.⁵⁴

On June 24, the White House submitted to Congress a request for \$87.6 billion in supplemental funding. This emergency supplemental funding request included \$67.1 billion for the DoW, mostly to support needs for OEF.⁵⁵ (See Table 1.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

State reported that as of June 2, it had incurred \$113 million in costs related to OEF and stated that as it continues to assess damage, costs are likely to rise.⁵⁶

Emergency American citizen support: As of June 2, State charged \$79.2 million to the Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service Fund to respond to contingencies stemming from OEF, depleting the fund. The fund covered evacuation-related expenses for State personnel and their family members, U.S. citizens, and eligible third-country nationals. In addition, \$1.3 million in Diplomatic Programs Ongoing Operations funds were used for lodging and transportation costs.⁵⁷

State reported that as of June 2, it had incurred \$113 million in costs related to OEF and stated that as it continues to assess damage, costs are likely to rise.

Table 2.

Department of State Supplemental Request, in \$ Millions

Category	Amount
Diplomatic Programs	\$1,522
International Humanitarian Assistance	\$800
Global Health Programs	\$550
Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance	\$300
Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service	\$190
TOTAL	\$3,362

Source: White House, letter to the Honorable Mike Johnson, 6/24/2026.

Diplomatic mission damage: As of June 30, State estimated the damage to U.S. embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic facilities resulting from the conflict to be about \$184 million.⁵⁸ (See Table 6.)

State supplemental funding request: On June 24, State submitted an OEF supplemental request that includes \$100 million for emergency aid provided by the Diplomatic and Consular Support Fund account.⁵⁹ (See Table 2.)

The supplemental request also includes \$300 million for State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations. Although State's Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance account has sufficient liquidity to cover damages to facilities and contract delay costs, State will need to redirect funds from other projects unless the requested supplemental is enacted.⁶⁰

State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security did not have sufficient funding to absorb costs related to OEF. The supplemental request includes \$1.4 billion for the Worldwide Security Protection Program, including \$850 million for airspace awareness and protection.⁶¹ State also requested supplemental funding for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Post Assignment Travel account to cover operational costs related to OEF.⁶²

As of June 30, State estimated the damage to U.S. embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic facilities resulting from the conflict to be about \$184 million.

PERSONNEL AND FORCE STRUCTURE

U.S. FORCES IN SUPPORT OF OEF

More than 50,000 U.S. Service Members were deployed throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) in support of OEF.⁶³ Force flows continued into the region in the days after major combat operations began.⁶⁴ USCENTCOM reported that force presence and disposition have changed throughout the conflict.⁶⁵

USCENTCOM postured forces to deter an Iranian attempt to close the SoH, a key access point for global oil and commercial shipping that Iran has historically threatened as leverage against countries or parties that have disrupted its interests.⁶⁶

Assets: At the height of conflict, U.S. forces supporting OEF included more than a dozen each of fighter squadrons, destroyers, and air defense batteries, as well as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense batteries, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), and a partial deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division. Additional counter-UAS systems and air defense teams also deployed to bases throughout the region.⁶⁷

USCENTCOM positioned air and maritime assets to create a layered operational framework that included carrier strike group forces, escort combatants, submarines, persistent ISR, defensive counter-air, and staged mine countermeasure assets.⁶⁸

U.S. maritime forces: Two carrier strike groups supported OEF throughout the quarter, along with their embarked carrier air wings and accompanying destroyer squadrons.⁶⁹ USS Abraham Lincoln provided the initial carrier presence, and the USS Gerald R. Ford arrived in late February.⁷⁰ The USS George H.W. Bush arrived in late April, briefly overlapping with the USS Gerald R. Ford in theater, but only to support turnover and maintain continuous two-carrier coverage without a gap in combat power, USCENTCOM said.⁷¹ The USS Gerald R. Ford returned to its home port in Norfolk, Virginia, on May 16, after a 326-day deployment that saw service in the North Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean Sea, and the Red Sea.⁷²

Two Marine Expeditionary Units also supported OEF, along with their embarked forces, and associated air and other combat support teams and equipment.⁷³

Medical support: USCENTCOM developed an integrated healthcare system for U.S. forces supporting OEF that leveraged host nation capabilities. Every U.S. military basing location in the region had at least Role 1 care (initial emergency and trauma treatment). Role 2 surgical capable units (more advanced emergency care) were established at bases in Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with additional units afloat in the Red Sea and North Arabian Sea. For all U.S. forces in the USCENTCOM AOR, Role 3 care (advanced, hospital level care) was only available through host nation hospitals.⁷⁴

U.S. forces relied on host nation hospitals for Role 3 care due to the resource and force protection challenges of establishing deployable hospitals in the region that would require a 6.5- to 11-acre footprint. USCENTCOM asserted that it was impractical to establish these largely immobile facilities across the USCENTCOM AOR when host nation hospitals were readily available near U.S. bases.⁷⁵

Army rotary wing medical evacuation coverage was available in Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait at the beginning of OEF, but these assets moved out of Kuwait and Iraq due to force protection considerations after Iranian strikes. Due to the nature of operations during OEF, most medical evacuations have been carried out by ground, including local ambulances, to local treatment facilities as well as fixed-wing aeromedical evacuation out of theater for higher levels of care.⁷⁶

U.S. BASING AND DISPOSITION

USCENTCOM reported that it designed its force distribution for OEF to sustain combat power while considering taking into account Iranian ballistic missiles, one-way unmanned aircraft systems (OWUAS), and maritime threats.⁷⁷ During OEF, USCENTCOM shifted personnel, assets, and storage facilities as locations came under Iranian and proxy attacks.⁷⁸

At the height of conflict, U.S. forces supporting OEF included more than a dozen each of fighter squadrons, destroyers, and air defense batteries, as well as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense ballistic missile defense batteries, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and a partial deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division.

U.S. Forces flew as many as 5,000 sorties in support of OEF from European bases, according to the NATO Secretary-General.

USCENTCOM said that it constantly evaluated the threat to base and force locations as the threat level evolved throughout the campaign, and adjusted counter-UAS and other air defense assets’ location, placement, and posture based on that assessment. USCENTCOM convened decision boards to provide recommendations to the air defense commander for the appropriate adjustments.⁷⁹

The Office for the Undersecretary of War for Policy (OUSW[P]) said that partners in the Middle East and Europe provided significant access, basing, and overflight permission to execute OEF.⁸⁰ U.S. Forces flew as many as 5,000 sorties in support of OEF from European bases, according to the NATO Secretary-General.⁸¹

LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINMENT

Moving assets to the USCENTCOM AOR: The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) was responsible for global lift and logistics support to theater, as well as aircraft flushing—the rapid removal of air assets from an area under attack or threat.⁸²

To support OEF, USTRANSCOM projected and sustained combat power by executing continuous worldwide deployment, sustainment, and maneuver of joint military forces and resources, the movement of heavy equipment and large numbers of personnel, and secure distribution capabilities. (See Table 3.) Key tasks included tracking movement requirements for general cargo, personnel, and munitions, and phasing capabilities to align with USCENTCOM posture requirements.⁸³

Additionally, USTRANSCOM executed tactical lane realignments for force protection. This included restructuring cargo channels to consolidate and expand throughput to Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, and redirecting personnel traffic through the USCENTCOM AOR.⁸⁴

As of June 30, Transportation Working Capital Fund obligations in support of OEF totaled \$2.36 billion. While these obligations have been largely reimbursed by the Military Services to date, USTRANSCOM reported that it anticipates delayed payments moving forward as Service funding is depleted without a supplemental appropriation.⁸⁵

Table 3.
USTRANSCOM Volume and Movements during OEF

Air Movements	- Conducted more than 1,500 air missions. - During peak OEF times, airlift surged to 30 to 40 daily missions directly into the USCENTCOM AOR, with an additional 20 to 30 daily aircraft pushing into the USEUCOM AOR for transload operations.
Surface Movements	Transported approximately 300,000 square feet of cargo across a number of vessels to support regional operations.
Commercial Cargo	- The volume of commercial cargo during OEF surged from 9,000 to 74,000 cases—or 2 million pounds—monthly, a 722 percent surge. - USTRANSCOM made rapid operational adjustments to preserve handling efficiency and maintain security, including the adjustment of established transport routes.

Source: USTRANSCOM, response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3 OEF 014, 7/27/2026.

Regional logistics: Prior to OEF, Bahrain had been U.S. Navy Central’s (USNAVCENT) main logistics hub to sustain operations in the Persian Gulf region, USCENTCOM said. During major combat operations, Iran targeted Bahrain with OWUAS and ballistic missile strikes.⁸⁶ USCENTCOM stated that it initially shifted naval sustainment resources from Bahrain to alternate hubs.

USCENTCOM reported that it selected new logistics support hubs in places where it could expand capacity to support fuel, munitions, the repair of parts, and access to the necessary sea and aerial ports of debarkation necessary to transfer the goods to meet fleet requirements.⁸⁷ USCENTCOM coordinated with the Defense Logistics Agency and other combatant commands for sustainment enablers such as additional commercial or government-chartered tankers and oiler vessels outfitted for consolidated cargo replenishment-at-sea, as well as air transportation and support crew.⁸⁸

The establishment of adequate naval bases and support ports posed significant challenges before and during OEF, arising from complexities and due to uncertainties with host nation access permissions to utilize ports for fleet resupply, USCENTCOM said.⁸⁹

An issue with shifting logistics support and infrastructure to Diego Garcia has been distance, with extended sea transit requiring 14- to 18-day logistics cycles, USCENTCOM said.⁹⁰

At least six U.S. warships were re-tasked from the Pacific to the Middle East to support OEF.

COMBATANT COMMAND SUPPORT TO OEF

Multiple U.S. combatant commands provided support to OEF.⁹¹

The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM): USEUCOM served as a principal enabler for USCENTCOM operations and the European AOR served as the launch platform and sustainment backbone for OEF.⁹² USEUCOM basing, logistics, and access networks also enabled rapid employment of forces into the USCENTCOM AOR. USEUCOM reported that it transferred munitions, equipment, aircraft and personnel, and requisitioned and distributed fuel, food, and medical supplies.⁹³ The Command enabled the storage and distribution of munitions, ensured operational readiness by maintaining warfighting assets, and served as a reception and staging area for forward deploying personnel and evacuating civilians and military families.⁹⁴ USEUCOM also provided basing, global lift support (heavy cargo and personnel transport), and was responsible for a contingency plan for noncombatant evacuation operations from Lebanon, should that become necessary.⁹⁵

In addition, USEUCOM secured key bases as well as sea and air lines of communications critical to deployment and sustainment operations in support of OEF. Forward-deployed joint USEUCOM capabilities operating in the European theater—including advanced fighter aircraft, ballistic missile defense destroyers, and forward-deployed air and missile defense and counter-UAS systems—protected the joint force from threats emanating from Iran and its proxies.⁹⁶

The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM): USPACOM provided support to OEF maritime interdiction operations and blockade support and maritime ship tracking.⁹⁷ At least six U.S. warships were re-tasked from the Pacific to the Middle East to support OEF. This included the Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group and components of the Japan-based

USCYBERCOM and USSPACECOM provided non-kinetic effects on selected targets, as well as monitoring electromagnetic warfare interference and jamming sources over Iran.

Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group, with the embarked 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit.⁹⁸ Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean provided sustainment resources for the U.S. Navy as the conflict unfolded.⁹⁹

The U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM):

USCYBERCOM and USSPACECOM provided non-kinetic effects on selected targets, as well as monitoring electromagnetic warfare interference and jamming sources over Iran.¹⁰⁰ Speaking during a press conference on March 2, General Caine said that coordinated space and cyber operations against Iran, beginning on the first days of combat operations, disrupted communications and sensor networks, leaving Iran “without the ability to see, coordinate, or respond effectively.”¹⁰¹

The U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM): USSTRATCOM provided global strike capabilities from the continental United States and other forward basing as required.¹⁰² This included dozens of 2,000-pound penetrating guided bombs, which were dropped on deeply buried missile launchers across Iran’s southern flank in the first 11 days of combat, according to General Caine.¹⁰³

REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

Israel: During OEF, the United States partnered with Israeli forces, coordinating OEF activities with Israel’s Operation Roaring Lion, which had similar objectives.¹⁰⁴ The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Mike Waltz, said that the United States cooperated with Israel to take “necessary and appropriate” actions in support of Israel’s self-defense as reflected in Article 51 of the UN charter.¹⁰⁵

Coordinated air and missile defense with Israel was also substantial, with U.S. Patriot and THAAD systems operating alongside Israeli Arrow, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome systems. The United States and Israel maintained shared awareness and recurring reporting on readiness and intercept activity via embedded liaison officers in the Israeli military headquarters in Tel Aviv, known as HaKirya.¹⁰⁶

Regional self-defense: As Iran targeted its neighbors in response to OEF, impacting numerous military and civilian targets.¹⁰⁷ The OUSW(P) said that the United States has been helping grow the sovereign military defense of Gulf partners for decades to counter Iranian attacks and safeguard regional stability. This has included the provision of military sales, training, and information-sharing to Gulf partners.¹⁰⁸

The OUSW(P) said that Gulf partners demonstrated significant air defense capabilities in response to Iranian attacks, collectively intercepting thousands of Iranian missiles and UASs. U.S. forces embedded in partner air operations centers across the region, which supported coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization of air defense efforts.¹⁰⁹ The Middle East Defense network—an integrated missile defense architecture in the region—intercepted more than 6,000 OWUAS and more than 1,500 ballistic missiles that targeted U.S. and partner forces.¹¹⁰



U.S. Army Soldiers conduct operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility during OEF, on March 27, 2026. (U.S. Army photo)

U.S. LOSSES AND SUSTAINMENT

During major combat operations, Iran and its proxies launched thousands of missiles and one-way UAS (OWUAS) against regional states, commercial shipping, and U.S. military bases and ships.¹¹¹

U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL

The DoW reported that from February 28 to June 30, seven U.S. Service members were killed in action and seven were killed in non-hostile events during OEF combat operations. During the same period, 417 service members were wounded in action. Four additional Service members were killed in action in July.¹¹² (See Table 4.)

EXPENDED MUNITIONS

The Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSW[A&S]) said that the munitions expenditure in OEF has resulted in strategic inventory shortfalls and revealed industrial base bottlenecks for munitions resupply. To mitigate these constraints, the OUSW(A&S) said that the DoW is working to streamline procurement processes and production lead times, and to stockpile critical materials, components, and selected munitions to respond rapidly to a contingency.¹¹³

Table 4.
U.S. Forces Deaths during OEF

Incident	Killed in Action	Non-hostile Deaths	TOTAL
Port Shuaiba, Kuwait (March 1)	6	—	6
Saudi Arabia (March 1)	1	—	1
KC-135 Crash, Iraq (March 12)	—	6	6
MH-60S Helicopter Crash, Arabian Sea (July 1)	—	1	1
Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base, Jordan (July 17)	3	—	3
Erbil Air Base, Iraq (July 19)	1	—	1
TOTAL	11	7	18

Note: The Defense Casualty Analysis System lists all casualties before July 7 as part of OEF, while casualties after this date are identified as having occurred during “overseas operations.” Data as of August 26, 2026.

Source: Defense Casualty Analysis System, “Operation Epic Fury (OEFU)” and “Overseas Operations,” accessed 8/27/2026.

DoW efforts prioritize accelerating active production lines, leveraging statutory authorities to expand industrial base facility capacity, securing critical supply chains, and integrating with allied partners to offset U.S. inventory drawdowns, the OUSW(A&S) said.¹¹⁴ While the DoW has begun to implement mitigation strategies, the defense industrial base requires “significant lead time” to expand production capacities, the OUSW(A&S) said.¹¹⁵ The most persistent bottlenecks remain in the production of solid rocket motors, the availability of



U.S. Sailors conduct a routine ordnance inspection on the flight deck of the USS Gerald R. Ford, on March 17, 2026. (U.S. Navy photo)

high-grade explosives and propellants, and the recruitment of skilled manufacturing labor. The OUSW(A&S) said that the DoW is working on reallocating funding to alleviate constraints and chokepoints as they arise.¹¹⁶

The Congressional Research Service noted that the volume and financial cost of U.S. munitions expended during OEF directly illustrate the magnitude and complexity of the target set posed by Iran. Iran has the largest armed forces in the region and spent decades of intense focus developing and expanding its own domestic defense industry.¹¹⁷ Iran has also focused heavily on passive defense measures to protect its military capabilities, including extensive underground facilities, dispersal of munitions inventories, concealment and deception to mask equipment, and mobile launch platforms.¹¹⁸

U.S. MILITARY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

USCENTCOM reported that Iranian strikes damaged and destroyed hundreds of buildings and structures at U.S. bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, and Jordan during the conflict.¹¹⁹ In addition, dozens of U.S. aircraft were destroyed or damaged during OEF.¹²⁰ (See Table 5.)

Table 5.

U.S. Aircraft Damaged or Destroyed During OEF

Platform	Damage
F-15E	4 destroyed (3 from friendly fire and 1 from enemy fire)
F-35A	1 damaged due to enemy fire over Iran
A-10	1 destroyed, jettisoned due to damage on return from CSAR mission
KC-135 refueling aircraft	7 damaged or destroyed (1 damaged and 1 destroyed in collision over Iraq, 5 damaged or destroyed on the ground in Saudi Arabia by Iranian munitions)
E-3 airborne early-warning-and-control system	1 damaged on the ground in Saudi Arabia by Iranian strikes
HH-60W helicopter	1 damaged during CSAR operations
MQ-4C high-altitude long-endurance uncrewed aircraft	1 reported crashed
AH-6 helicopter	4 destroyed by U.S. forces as unrecoverable during CSAR operations
AH-64 helicopter	1 shot down over the SoH
MH-60 helicopter	1 crashed over the Arabian Sea
MQ-9 ISR	As many as 30 destroyed in various circumstances.

Source: Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Aircraft Combat Losses in Operation Epic Fury: Considerations for Congress,” 5/13/2026; USCENTCOM, vetting comment, 8/24/2026.

U.S. diplomatic facilities in four countries suffered physical damage from Iranian strikes, with an estimated total cost of about \$184 million.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES

U.S. diplomatic facilities in four countries suffered physical damage from Iranian strikes, with an estimated total cost of about \$184 million.¹²¹ (See Table 6.) In addition, State reported an estimated \$24.5 million per month in construction project delays due to ordered departures and travel restrictions in Baghdad, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, Kuwait City, and Muscat.¹²²

Iraq: Mission Iraq experienced more than 600 attacks during the reporting period. The U.S. Consulate General in Erbil’s new consulate compound suffered damage to multiple buildings. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad suffered damage but to a lesser extent. The Baghdad Diplomatic Support Compound, located near Baghdad International Airport, suffered extensive damage, but the facility was already in the process of closing due to a decision that was made before the current conflict began.¹²³

Kuwait: On March 5, the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City suspended operations due to “regional tensions,” strikes, and damage to embassy facilities. Attacks forced the embassy’s immediate closure and personnel departures.¹²⁴ On June 24, Secretary of State Marco Rubio traveled to Kuwait and reopened the embassy, which resumed providing limited emergency services for U.S. citizens as well as consular support. However, as of June 30, the majority of embassy staff remained on ordered departure, State reported.¹²⁵

Saudi Arabia: On March 3, two Iranian OWUAS struck the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, causing material damage. After the attack, the embassy issued an order to “shelter-in-place” to staff in Jeddah, Riyadh, and Dhahran and warned the public to “avoid the Embassy until further notice due to an attack on the facility.” Embassy guidance noted threats against locations where American citizens gather and advised U.S. citizens that hotels and other gathering points, including U.S. educational institutions, may be potential targets.¹²⁶

UAE: The U.S. Consulate General in Dubai sustained damage to a utility building, State reported.¹²⁷

Table 6.
Estimated Damage to Diplomatic Missions Since the Start of OEF, in \$ Millions, as of June 30

Country	Cost
Iraq	\$157.35
Kuwait	\$14.75
Saudi Arabia	\$11.50
UAE	\$0.125

Note: U.S. diplomatic facilities in Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Oman did not sustain any damage.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026.

Host Country Support: State said that most host country governments in the Middle East provided support for State diplomatic facilities. Support included additional host country personnel assigned to State’s diplomatic facilities and protection programs.¹²⁸ In late March, Mission Iraq criticized the Iraqi government for failing to take action to prevent Iran-aligned militia attacks against diplomatic facilities since the start of OEF.¹²⁹ Since then, the Iraqi government has shown stronger support for Mission Iraq, State said.¹³⁰

U.S. DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL

Iranian strikes in the Middle East resulted in the departure of U.S. diplomatic personnel and family members, evacuations of U.S. citizens, and damage to and closure of some U.S. diplomatic facilities during the reporting period, State reported.¹³¹

Between February 23 and March 3, 12 U.S. missions in the Middle East and Europe initiated requests for staff to go on authorized departure or ordered departure. By June 30, nine missions remained on ordered departure—with personnel and families returning to post only at the U.S. Consulate General in Adana, Türkiye, and the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia, Cyprus. The U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City, which suspended operations on March 5, reopened in June. However, most of the embassy staff remained on ordered departure.¹³²

Between February 23 and June 30, the maximum number of diplomatic personnel who were either on authorized or ordered departure, or already out of the country was approximately 3,500. Those numbers varied from 51 in Lebanon to 976 in the UAE.¹³³ In most circumstances, the departure orders did not apply to third-party contractors.¹³⁴

All embassy services in the region were affected during OEF, depending on the severity of hostility directed toward particular posts, State reported. In all cases, posts maintained a minimum of emergency services for American citizens, including support provided remotely and by neighboring posts. Some posts were also able to maintain limited immigrant visa and non-immigrant visa services throughout the period of reduced operations.¹³⁵ However, several facilities closed or suspended operations in March, including the U.S. embassies in Baghdad, Beirut, Kuwait City, and Riyadh, and the consulates in Erbil and Peshawar.¹³⁶

Between February 23 and June 30, the maximum number of diplomatic personnel who were either on authorized or ordered departure, or already out of the country was approximately 3,500.



State reported after major combat operations began, it directly arranged for the departure of approximately 9,000 Americans abroad, offering security information, travel assistance, and chartering 56 flights in addition to buses to safely evacuate thousands of U.S. citizens from the Middle East.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

ASSISTANCE TO U.S. CITIZENS

On March 2, Secretary Rubio urged Americans to “depart now” from 14 countries in the Middle East using available commercial transportation, due to “serious safety risks.”¹³⁷

State reported after major combat operations began, it directly arranged for the departure of approximately 9,000 Americans abroad, offering security information, travel assistance, and chartering 56 flights in addition to buses to safely evacuate thousands of U.S. citizens from the Middle East.¹³⁸

As of June 30, State travel advisories for Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE remained at Level 3 (Reconsider Travel) and State travel advisories for Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen remained at Level 4 (Do Not Travel).¹³⁹

Consular outreach and coordination: State’s Middle East Task Force, which operated 24/7 through the end of March, coordinated crisis-related support to U.S. citizens and consular messaging.¹⁴⁰ Separately, State’s Consular Coordination group prepared boarding lists for assisted departure flights, urged U.S. citizens to depart on their own and provided updated information on border crossing regulations and availability.¹⁴¹ State’s 24/7 call center handled public inquiries and remained in place as of June 30.¹⁴²

Logistics: On February 28, State established a Middle East Task Force Logistics Cell to secure aviation capabilities across DoW aircraft and commercial charters and deliver evacuation services for Chief of Mission personnel and U.S. citizens. The logistics cell included senior officials from State, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, DoW’s Air Mobility Liaison Officers, State Diplomatic Security’s Air Evacuation Unit, and the Federal Aviation Administration. The cell also tracked commercial flight availability to facilitate dedicated seats and monitored airspace closures to sustain uninterrupted access for U.S. operations.¹⁴³

State said that it used commercial charter companies to facilitate departures from affected countries where environments were permissive for commercial operations.¹⁴⁴ In non-permissive environments, such as Baghdad, Iraq, the U.S. Government used military aircraft for departures of Chief of Mission personnel, U.S. citizens, and third-country nationals.¹⁴⁵

In addition to air transportation, State reported that it worked closely with regional partners to arrange charter buses to facilitate departures from affected areas. These included movements from Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar to Saudi Arabia, as well as from Israel to Egypt and Jordan.¹⁴⁶

Table 7.

Approximate Number of U.S. Citizens Evacuated Due to OEF

Country	Number of U.S. Citizens	Destination(s)	Cost
Armenia	3	USA	\$2,000
Bahrain	16	Riyadh	N/A
Cyprus	0	N/A	\$39,500
Iraq	N/A	Amman, Cyprus, Athens	\$3,453,518
Israel	6,500	Sofia, Athens, Amman, Taba, Miami, New York, Los Angeles	\$158,026
Jordan	50	Athens, Washington	\$2,412,000
Kuwait	157	Riyadh	N/A
Oman	200	Washington, Athens	\$675,000
Qatar	850	Sofia, Athens, Riyadh	N/A
Saudi Arabia	100	Istanbul, Athens, Washington	\$675,000
Türkiye	0	Türkiye assisted evacuations from other countries	\$85,300
UAE	1,200	Istanbul, Athens, Washington	\$4,107,988

Note: All evacuations for Bahrain and Kuwait were carried out from Saudi Arabia the costs are included in the Saudi Arabia evacuation cost.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/27/2026; State, vetting comment, 8/25/2026.

Consular flyaway teams of additional State consular officers deployed to the region to assist with consular operations and flights. Flyaway team members were equipped with mobile technology to assist in areas with low connectivity and brought additional consular supplies, such as blank emergency passport books and documents, to the region.¹⁴⁷

U.S. citizen evacuations: State said that it evacuated approximately 9,000 private U.S. citizens from countries in the Middle East and Europe, at a total cost of \$11.6 million during the reporting period.¹⁴⁸ (See Table 7.) While some flights evacuated private U.S. citizens directly to the United States, others arrived in third countries for transit onward to the United States if that was their preference.¹⁴⁹ State determined that consular officers would not be able to fully document travel itineraries required to seek reimbursement from evacuees and therefore it would be impracticable to seek reimbursement from them.¹⁵⁰

State noted that several citizens did not take evacuation flights because of ineligibility of non-U.S. citizen immediate family members, difficult or inconvenient flight times, and luggage and pet restrictions.¹⁵¹ State said that given the large number of no-show passengers, more seats were available than the number of U.S. citizens who ultimately arrived for each flight.¹⁵²

ECONOMIC FURY

Economic Fury (or “Operation Economic Fury”) refers to economic-related actions that complement U.S. actions in OEF.¹⁵³ Economic Fury targets Iran’s ability to generate, move, and repatriate funds.¹⁵⁴ This includes specific Iranian individuals and institutions that support the regime, as well as organizations, companies, individuals, and vessels that support Iran’s economy through the sale and purchase of crude oil and petrochemical industry, including Iran’s vast “shadow fleet” of tankers that transport illicit oil and shadow banking networks. Economic Fury also targeted Iranian weapons procurement networks, as well as satellite imagery providers responsible for enabling Iran’s military strikes against U.S. forces.¹⁵⁵

U.S. diplomatic actions: Between January 1 and June 30, the United States engaged in a sustained diplomatic campaign across multiple United Nations (UN) forums to promote compliance with reinstated sanctions on Iran and counter obstruction by some UN Security Council Member States, State reported.¹⁵⁶

Sanctions and designations: Between January 1 and June 30, State and Treasury took actions against Iran and its proxies, including designating or blocking more than a thousand individuals, entities, and vessels, as well as identifying hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of blocked assets.¹⁵⁷ Since February, State sanctioned 111 entities, 13 individuals, and 68 vessels for engagement in the Iranian energy and financial sectors.¹⁵⁸ (See Table 9 on page 29.)

U.S. forces patrol the Arabian Sea near M/V Touska, on April 20, 2026, after the Iranian-flagged vessel attempted to violate the U.S. naval blockade. (U.S. Navy photo)



Exceptions to sanctions: In response to global market conditions and at the Administration’s direction, Treasury issued General Licenses U and X in March and June, respectively. General License X, which temporarily authorized the sale of Iranian-origin oil, petroleum, and in the case of General License X, petrochemical products.¹⁵⁹ General License X would have been valid through August 21, though on July 7, Treasury replaced General License X with General License X1, which revoked and superseded General License X in its entirety, but allowed parties to only conduct transactions necessary to “wind down” activities related to the sale, delivery, or offloading of crude oil, petrochemical products, or petroleum products of Iranian origin until July 17.¹⁶⁰ Payments on those transactions were made into a blocked account in the United States.¹⁶¹

Countering Iranian Proxies: State said that it used all tools at its disposal to counter Iranian support of its proxies, including sanctions, coordinating through multilateral fora—like the Countering Transnational Terrorism Forum and the Law Enforcement Coordination Group—and working bilaterally with partners and allies.¹⁶² On April 17, State announced terrorist designations against seven commanders of Iran-aligned militia groups involved in attacks threatening U.S. personnel, facilities, and interests in Iraq.¹⁶³ (See Table 8.)

Rewards for Justice: State offered a reward of up to \$10 million for information on the whereabouts of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and other Iranian leaders.¹⁶⁴ As of the end of the reporting period, State reported that it had paused any upcoming Rewards for Justice actions due to the implementation of the MoU and the 60-day negotiating period.¹⁶⁵

Financial intelligence: Treasury said that it continued to provide ongoing support to interagency law enforcement and national security partners, including analyzing Bank Secrecy Act data to identify potential Iran-related activity (for example, funding streams and procurement networks supporting Iran’s military and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and financial activity potentially benefiting Iran proxy groups).¹⁶⁶

Treasury also worked to identify and outline risks associated with Iranian illicit activity to private sector stakeholders to ensure they are providing high-quality reporting on this topic.¹⁶⁷ Treasury routinely engages foreign counterparts to increase awareness and advise them of illicit Iranian finance, sanctions evasion, and secondary sanctions exposure. These efforts include engaging with foreign jurisdictions to encourage stronger anti-money laundering and financing of terrorism controls and targeted disruptions against Iranian illicit finance or sanctions evasion networks.¹⁶⁸

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

State reported that Secretary Rubio made three emergency determinations under the Arms Export Control Act to expedite urgently needed defense systems to regional partners, totaling \$25.32 billion.¹⁶⁹ As part of State’s certification process, State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs confirmed “no adverse impact” on U.S. defense readiness as a result of the sales State approved.¹⁷⁰

In addition to emergency arms sales (that bypass standard congressional review), State reported its intent to sell an additional \$19.19 billion in non-emergency arms to regional partners. (See Table 8.) In some cases, because of OEF requirements, the U.S. Government held or postponed delivery of defense articles purchased by other partners or allies, which led to some domestic political friction, State reported.¹⁷¹

Table 8.

Emergency and Non-Emergency Arms Sales for Allies and Partners in the Middle East, January-June 2026

Country	Date of Sale	Weapon(s)	Total Cost (\$ Billions)
Israel	January 30	Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) ¹⁷²	\$1.98
	January 30	AH-64E Apache Helicopters ¹⁷³	3.80
	January 30	Namer Armored Personnel Carrier Power Packs ¹⁷⁴	0.74
	January 30	AW119Kx Light Utility Helicopters ¹⁷⁵	0.15
	March 6	*Munitions and Munitions Support ¹⁷⁶	0.15
	May 1	*Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System to buy 10,000 APKWS-II All Up Round ¹⁷⁷	0.99
ISRAEL TOTAL			\$7.81
Jordan	February 26	Ku Band Multi- Function Radio Frequency System Radar ¹⁷⁸	\$0.28
	March 19	*Aircraft repair, return, and spares ¹⁷⁹	0.07
JORDAN TOTAL			\$0.35
Kuwait	March 19	*Air and Missile Defense Radars ¹⁸⁰	8.00
	May 1	*Integrated Battle Command System ¹⁸¹	2.50
	June 5	Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems Platforms and related equipment ¹⁸²	0.002
	June 15	KC-130J Aircraft Follow-on Sustainment Support ¹⁸³	0.24
KUWAIT TOTAL			\$10.74
Qatar	May 1	*Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System ¹⁸⁴	0.99
	May 1	*Patriot Missile Replenishment ¹⁸⁵	4.01
QATAR TOTAL			\$5.00
Saudi Arabia	January 30	Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement Missiles ¹⁸⁶	9.00
	February 3	F-15 Sustainment ¹⁸⁷	3.00
SAUDI ARABIA TOTAL			\$12.00
UAE	March 19	*Long-Range Discrimination Radar with Terminal High Altitude Defense Integration ¹⁸⁸	\$4.50
	March 19	*Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMS) ¹⁸⁹	1.22
	March 19	*Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System ¹⁹⁰	2.10
	March 19	*F-16 Munitions and Upgrades ¹⁹¹	0.64
	May 1	*Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System ¹⁹²	0.15
UAE TOTAL			\$8.61
TOTAL SALES			\$44.51

*Emergency sales that bypass congressional review. Table total may differ from the narrative due to rounding.

IMPACT ON U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Security threats associated with OEF had an immediate negative impact on U.S. assistance awards across the Middle East in the areas of agriculture, food, livelihood, health, nutrition, protection, shelter, infrastructure, and water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance.¹⁹³ Across the region, the ordered departure of embassy staff made coordination and cooperation with implementers more challenging.¹⁹⁴ The United States did not have any active assistance programs inside Iran, though it funds programs that target Iran from outside its borders, including through broadcasting.¹⁹⁵

State reported that its implementers continued to provide emergency assistance, pivoting as needed to meet humanitarian needs driven by emerging crises.¹⁹⁶ According to State, OEF significantly disrupted award timelines and operational capacity, halted fieldwork, monitoring, activities, and limited participant engagement due to regional instability.¹⁹⁷ Disruptions primarily occurred in Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, and Lebanon. Program staff worked to reschedule events, including those that target American business opportunities, with the potential to move events to countries less affected by the conflict, such as Morocco and Tunisia. In some cases, new Middle East Regional Cooperation projects were impacted by institution-level sensitivities associated with regional cooperation with Israel.¹⁹⁸

U.S. Broadcasting into Iran

The U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) reported that its FY 2026 program plan budgeted \$18.6 million for Iran-related programs: \$10.9 million for Voice of America (VOA) Persian programs, \$4.2 million for Radio Farda, and \$3.4 million for a transmitting station in Kuwait.¹⁹⁹

VOA Persian: Programming includes a 24/7 satellite TV channel, radio simulcast, a multimedia website, and six branded social media platforms. VOA Persian consistently ranks among the top three Iran broadcasters, with digital platforms showing strong growth, according to USAGM.²⁰⁰ During the reporting period, VOA Persian's social media audience reached 10.2 million followers, adding 480,000 new followers—a 5.1 percent increase over the previous period, USAGM stated.²⁰¹

Radio Farda: Radio Farda, a Persian-language service, has operated continuously since 2002. USAGM ended terrestrial broadcast support in March 2025.²⁰² However, USAGM distribution support resumed in February, with shortwave transmissions and leased AM frequencies added.²⁰³ In June, Radio Farda sites received 368 million video views from inside of Iran, 333 percent more than the previous month when Internet service was suspended in Iran.²⁰⁴

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

Classified Appendix to this Report

A classified appendix to this report provides additional information on Operation Epic Fury (OEF). The appendix will be delivered to relevant agencies and congressional committees.

APPENDIX B

About the Lead Inspector General

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (codified at 5 U.S.C. Sections 401-424), established in section 419 the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies are the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of War (DoW), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Section 419 requires the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to appoint a Lead IG from among the Inspectors General of the Lead IG agencies upon the commencement or designation of a military operation that exceeds 60 days as an overseas contingency operation or receipt of notification thereof.

The Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency designated the DoW IG as the Lead IG for OEF. The Lead IG appointed the State IG to be the Associate IG for OEF.

Lead IG oversight of the operation “sunset” at the end of the first fiscal year after commencement or designation in which the total amount appropriated for the operation is less than \$100,000,000.

The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out the Lead IG statutory responsibilities to:

- Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis a report on the contingency operation and to make that report available to the public.
- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations.

The Overseas Contingency Operations Joint Planning Group serves as a primary venue to coordinate audits, inspections, and evaluations of U.S. Government-funded activities supporting overseas contingency operations.

The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees, as well as contractors, to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and provide consolidated planning and reporting on the status of overseas contingency operations.

APPENDIX C

Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Report

To fulfill the congressional mandate to report on OEF, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from their respective agencies and other Federal agencies about activities related to the operation. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the information collected from Federal agencies, and the information provided represents the view of the source cited in each instance.

The DoW IG, as the Lead IG for this operation, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The DoW OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG drafted the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once assembled, each OIG coordinates a two-phase review process of the report within its own agency. During the first review, the Lead IG agencies ask relevant offices within their agencies to comment, correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG agencies incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review prior to publication. The final report reflects the editorial view of the DoW OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG as independent oversight agencies.



APPENDIX D

Table 9.

State and Treasury Sanctions, Designations, and other Actions Against Iran ,February–June 2026

Date	Target
February 6	Sanctioned illicit traders of Iranian oil and shadow fleet to support terrorism abroad. ²⁰⁵
February 10	Sanctioned Iran-backed Hezbollah operatives exploiting Lebanon's informal financial sector. ²⁰⁶
February 25	Sanctioned actors involved in weapons procurement network in Iraq, Türkiye, and UAE supporting Iran's missile and weapons development and shadow fleet. ²⁰⁷
April 15	Sanctioned designated Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani's oil smuggling empire and oil-for-gold network financing designated Hezbollah and IRGC-Qods Force. ²⁰⁸
April 17	Designated seven commanders of IAMGs who planned and directed attacks against U.S. personnel, facilities, and interests in Iraq. ²⁰⁹
April 21	Sanctioned eight individuals, entities, and aircraft based in Iran Türkiye, and the UAE for their involvement in procurement networks supporting Iran's UAV and ballistic missile programs. ²¹⁰
April 24	Sanctioned a Chinese-based independent teapot refinery, one of Iran's largest customers for crude oil and other petroleum products. Also sanctioned 40 shipping firms and vessels that operate as part of Iran's shadow fleet. ²¹¹
April 28	Action against 35 actors who operate Iran's covert financial network that supports the IRGC to access the international financial system. ²¹² Treasury alerted financial institutions to sanctions risks associated with independent teapot oil refineries in China, primarily in Shandong Province, given their continued role in importing and refining Iranian crude oil. ²¹³
May 1	Sanctioned Chinese petroleum operator and actors for importing sanctioned Iranian petroleum and petroleum and petrochemical products. ²¹⁴ Sanctioned three Iranian foreign currency exchange houses and their associated front companies. ²¹⁵
May 7	Sanctioned Iran-aligned actors who exploit Iraq's oil wealth to fund Iranian terrorist activities. ²¹⁶
May 8	Sanctioned satellite imagery providers enabling Iran's military strikes against U.S. forces. ²¹⁷ Also sanctioned 10 individuals and companies in the Middle East, Asia, and Eastern Europe enabling Iran's military procurement networks. ²¹⁸
May 11	Sanctioned financial networks enabling illegal Iranian oil sales on behalf of IRGC. ²¹⁹
May 19	Sanctioned Iranian financial and shipping networks that enable Iran to evade international sanctions. ²²⁰
May 21	Sanctioned nine individuals who enable Hezbollah to undermine Lebanon's sovereignty. ²²¹
May 27	Sanctioned the Iranian-run Persian Gulf Strait Authority, associated with the IRGC. ²²²
May 28	Sanctioned actors that make up Iran's illicit oil economy that supports the IRGC and Iran's military apparatus. ²²³
May 29	Sanctioned Iranian-affiliated fraud network targeting American companies. ²²⁴
June 2	Sanctioned Iran's largest digital asset exchanges and leadership for supporting Iran's terrorist activities. ²²⁵
June 5	Sanctioned a network of individuals, entities, and vessels involved in shipping Iranian liquid petroleum gas and evading U.S. sanctions. ²²⁶
June 10	Designated four Iran- and Belarus-based entities for procurement of arms for Iran's military and weapons programs. ²²⁷

APPENDIX E

Final Reports by Lead IG Agencies

From the start of OEF to June 30, 2026, there were no oversight reports completed related to OEF. Reports issued by the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs and other oversight agencies are available on their respective websites.

APPENDIX F

Ongoing Oversight Projects

Table 10 lists the titles and objectives for Lead IG and partner agencies’ ongoing oversight projects related to OEF.

Table 10.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OEF by the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs, as of June 30, 2026

DEPARTMENT OF WAR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Evaluation of the Interoperability of DoW Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) (Project no. D2026-DEV0SR-0085.000)

To determine the gaps in DoW C-UAS interoperability, and the corrective actions needed to standardize C-UAS interoperability.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Inspection of Embassy Yerevan, Armenia (Project no. 26ISP021.00)

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan, Armenia.

Classified Inspection of Embassy Yerevan, Armenia (Project no. 26ISP021.01)

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan, Armenia.



APPENDIX G

Planned Oversight Projects

Table 11 lists the titles and objectives for Lead IG and partner agencies’ planned oversight projects related to OEF.

Table 11.

Planned Projects Related to OEF by the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs, as of June 30, 2026

DEPARTMENT OF WAR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Evaluation of DoW Efforts to Collect and Integrate Signals Intelligence Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned from the Iran Conflict To determine the effectiveness of selected DoW Service cryptologic components’ collection and sharing of observations, insights, and lessons learned from the Iran conflict’s signal intelligence operations to inform future DoW doctrine, planning, training, and equipping.
Audit of U.S. Navy’s Ability to Sustain Maritime Security Capabilities for Naval Forces Operating in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility To determine whether the U.S. Navy has established adequate theater sustainment capability to execute emergent ship maintenance and battle-damage repairs for naval forces supporting maritime security operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.
Evaluation of the U.S. Air Force’s Sustainment Efforts for the KC-135 Aerial Refueling Fleet to Meet Global Requirements To determine the effectiveness of the Department of the Air Force’s KC-135 Stratotanker sustainment efforts in supporting fleet mission capability, by assessing the administration of required maintenance processes, parts procurement, and infrastructure needed to meet current and projected global aerial refueling demands.
Audit of Base Operations Support for U.S. Special Operations Forces To determine the adequacy of base operating support for U.S. special operations forces operating in support of geographic combatant commands.
Evaluation of the Defense Health Agency’s Deployment of the Joint Operational Medicine Information System (JOMIS) To determine how effectively the Defense Health Agency is fielding Joint Operational Medicine Information System (JOMIS) as an effective and timely joint medical information system that meets the longstanding needs for interoperability across Military Services and Combatant Commands.
Audit of Open Commitments for Operation Epic Fury To determine whether DoW Components are validating and managing open FY 2026 funding commitments supporting Operation Epic Fury, and to identify stale, invalid, or excess commitments eligible for immediate cancellation and use for other critical, unfunded warfighter priorities.



APPENDIX H

Hotline and Investigations

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority.

During the quarter, the DoW OIG Hotline received nine allegations related to OEF and referred five cases related to OEF to Lead IG agencies and other investigative organizations. In some instances, a case may contain multiple subjects and allegations. State OIG received one allegation related to OEF and referred that allegation for investigation. USAID OIG received 88 allegations related to OEF.

The DoW OIG's criminal investigative component, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), worked on cases related to OEF from offices in Europe and the United States. State OIG and USAID OIG investigators worked on cases related to OEF from Washington, D.C., El Salvador, Germany, Israel, South Africa, and Thailand.

During this quarter, investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies ended with eleven open investigations, while four investigations were closed; three referrals were made to the Department of Justice, there were three convictions, one arrest, and one suspension from government contracts.

The Lead IG agencies and their partners coordinate investigative activities, deconflict potential or common targets, and interact for logistical and legal support. The investigative partner agencies consist of representatives from DCIS, State OIG, USAID OIG, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.



ACRONYMS

Acronym	
AOR	area of responsibility
CSAR	combat search and rescue
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoW	Department of War
FY	fiscal year
HIMARS	High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
Lead IG	Lead Inspector General
Lead IG agencies	DoW, State, and USAID OIGs
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Units
MIO	maritime interdiction operations
MOU	memorandum of understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OEF	Operation Epic Fury
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OUSW(A&S)	Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment
OUSW(C)	Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
OUSW(P)	Office of the Under Secretary of War for Policy

Acronym	
OWUAS	one-way UAS
State	Department of State
SoH	Strait of Hormuz
THAAD	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAS	unmanned aircraft systems
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States
USAGM	U.S. Agency for Global Media
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	The U.S. Central Command
USCYBERCOM	The U.S. Cyber Command
USEUCOM	The U.S. European Command
USNAVCENT	U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
USPACOM	The U.S. Pacific Command
USS	United States Ship
USSPACECOM	The U.S. Space Command
USTRANSCOM	The U.S. Transportation Command
VOA	Voice of America



Map of Iran



Map of Strait of Hormuz



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