


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# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

MARCH 16, 2026



## (U) Audit of the Army's Management of Repairs to Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Meet U.S. Army Europe and Africa Mission Requirements

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: (CUI)

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

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CUI Category: Procure, SSEL, OPSEC  
Distribution/Discernation Control: FEDCON  
POC: [REDACTED]

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INDEPENDENCE ★ INTEGRITY ★ EXCELLENCE ★ TRANSPARENCY

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# (U) Results in Brief

## *(U) Audit of the Army's Management of Repairs to Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Meet U.S. Army Europe and Africa Mission Requirements*

March 16, 2026

### (U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the Army's management of repairs to ensure that Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) transferred to U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) units met mission requirements.

### (U) Background

~~(CUI)~~ BFVs are tracked, armored vehicles that provide protected transport of an infantry squad to critical points on the battlefield and perform cavalry scout and other essential missions. The Army is undergoing a modernization of its BFVs by replacing existing BFVs currently assigned to units with newer models. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Army intends to add those BFVs to the Army Prepositioned Stock (APS)-2 inventory once the modernization to a newer vehicle is complete.

### (U) Finding

~~(CUI)~~ The Army did not effectively manage the repairs of the BFVs and [REDACTED]

This occurred because:

- (U) the unit departing the area of responsibility did not adequately maintain BFVs, turned in non-mission capable BFVs, and improperly reported the condition of the BFVs turned in as fully mission capable, and
- ~~(CUI)~~ [REDACTED]

### (U) Finding (cont'd)

~~(S)~~ As a result, the Army pulled stock from APS-2 inventories to cover ongoing mission needs, [REDACTED]

### (U) Recommendations

(U) We made four recommendations to address the finding in this report. We recommend that the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, determine whether shortages and capabilities of maintenance and logistics personnel are systemic issues among deployed units turning in equipment to APS locations and whether the Army's maintenance standard in Army Regulation 750-1 is achievable by deployed units. If the standard is not achievable, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, should take appropriate action to address the problem. In addition, we recommend that the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, revise applicable Army regulations to consistently define operational readiness statuses. In addition, we recommend that the Executive Director, Army Contracting Command-Rock Island, require contracting officers to increase the frequency of contracting officer's representative surveillance and reporting on future task orders. Furthermore, we recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa, conduct a study to determine what in-theater BFV repair capabilities are needed to meet mission requirements, then develop and implement a plan to address any capability gaps identified in the study.

### (U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) Management agreed with three recommendations and neither agreed nor disagreed with one recommendation. We consider two recommendations resolved and open and two recommendations unresolved because management did not fully address them. We request that management provide additional comments on the unresolved recommendations within 30 days of the final report.

***(U) Recommendations Table***

(U) Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4	1.a	1.b	None
Executive Director, Army Contracting Command–Rock Island	2	None	None
Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa	None	3	None

(U)

(U) Please provide Management Comments by April 15, 2026.

**(U) Note:** The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendations.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendations or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed-upon corrective actions were implemented.



**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

March 16, 2026

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND  
SUSTAINMENT

COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND  
COMMANDER, ARMY CONTRACTING COMMAND  
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: (U) Audit of the Army's Management of Repairs to Bradley  
Fighting Vehicles to Meet U.S. Army Europe and Africa Mission  
Requirements (Report No. DODIG-2026-065)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's audit. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations.

(U) This report contains two recommendations that we consider unresolved because the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, and Executive Director, Army Contracting Command–Rock Island, did not fully address them. Therefore, the recommendations remain open. We will track these recommendations until the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, and Executive Director, Army Contracting Command–Rock Island, have agreed to take actions that we determine to be sufficient to meet the intent of the recommendations and provide adequate documentation showing that all agreed-upon action to implement the recommendations are completed.

(U) The report also contains two recommendations that we consider resolved and open. We will close them when the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, and Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa, provide adequate documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendations are completed.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Send your response to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] if unclassified or [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] if classified SECRET.

~~SECRET~~

(U) If you have any questions, please contact me at [REDACTED]

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Carmen J. Malone". The signature is fluid and cursive.

Carmen J. Malone  
Assistant Inspector General of Audit  
Acquisition, Contracting, and Sustainment

~~SECRET~~

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## **(U) Introduction**

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### **(U) Objective**

(U) The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the Army's management of repairs to ensure that Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) transferred to U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) units met mission requirements.<sup>1</sup> See Appendix A for the scope and methodology and prior coverage related to the objective.

### **(U) Background**

(U) BFVs are tracked, armored vehicles that provide protected transport of an infantry squad to critical points on the battlefield and performs cavalry scout and other essential missions. See Figure 1 for the BFVs located at the Coleman Worksite in Mannheim, Germany.

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<sup>1</sup> (U) This report contains information that has been redacted because it was identified by the Department of Defense as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) that is not releasable to the public. CUI is Government-created or owned unclassified information that allows for, or requires, safeguarding and dissemination controls in accordance with laws, regulations, or Government-wide policies.

(U) Figure 1. BFVs at the Coleman Worksite, Pictures Taken by the DoD OIG in January 2025



(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

### (U) USAREUR-AF Rotational Requirements

(CUH) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Once all units have rotated

<sup>2</sup> (CUH) [REDACTED]

<sup>3</sup> (U) Army Regulation 750-1 states that the Army has only one maintenance standard, which is defined by the Army Technical Manual 10 and 20 series, and equipment meets this standard when the equipment is fully mission capable and all faults have been identified and addressed. Throughout this report when we refer to the Army's maintenance standard, we are referring to the Army's 10/20 maintenance standard.

~~(CUI)~~ through the USAREUR-AF theater of operation, USAREUR-AF will transfer the 117 BFVs into the Army Prepositioned Stock (APS)-2 inventories, where the BFVs will be used to fulfill theater mission requirements.

### **(U) Army Prepositioned Stock–2**


~~(CUI)~~ The APS program strategically positions sets of equipment, such as BFVs and weapon systems, to reduce deployment response times for major combat operations and response to humanitarian crises. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Army Field Support Battalion–Germany (AFSBn-Germany), which oversees the APS-2 in Germany, is responsible for preventative care maintenance for equipment stored in the APS-2 inventories.

### **(U) Roles and Responsibilities for the Repairs of the BFVs**

(U) The repairs of the 117 BFVs involved coordination between several Army organizations. While each organization had a different role, all shared a responsibility in repairing the BFVs to meet mission requirements. Figure 2 lists the roles and responsibilities for the repairs of BFVs. See Appendix B for additional roles and responsibilities for all the organizations involved in the BFV repairs.

(U) Figure 2. Roles and Responsibilities for the Repairs of the BFVs



(U)

\*(U) Army Regulation 750-1 outlines the conditions equipment must meet to comply with the maintenance standard defined in equipment-specific technical manuals.

**(U) Legend**

- (U) AFSB            Army Field Support Brigade
- (U) TLSC-E        Theater Logistics Support Center–Europe
- (U) TSC            Theater Sustainment Command
- (U) Source: The Army.

**(U) Contracts to Repair the BFVs**

(U) The Army used two separate contracts for repair services for the BFVs, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program V (LOGCAP V) contract and the APS-2 Enhanced Army Global Logistics Enterprise Contract.

***(U) Logistics Civil Augmentation Program V Contract***

(U) The LOGCAP V contract is designed to provide contracted capabilities to plan for and rapidly provide the sustainment capabilities necessary to support theater operations in USAREUR-AF. The LOGCAP V contract has broad requirements that the Army can activate to provide contractor support for a variety of functions including maintenance, transportation, and base operations. In September 2023, the Army Contracting Command–Rock Island modified task order W52P1J-19-F-0394 to include a BFV repair requirement for KBR, Inc. (KBR) to repair 107 of 117 BFVs with an estimated value of \$3.3 million and a period of performance of September 25, 2023, through March 29, 2024.<sup>4</sup> Ultimately, the Army increased the maximum obligation to \$10.4 million. On March 21, 2024, the Army modified the contract to remove 50 of 107 BFVs from KBR's possession. On May 23, 2024, the Army updated the period of performance to stop work on the remaining 57 of 107 BFVs and ended the KBR BFV repair requirement. See Figure 4 for a timeline of BFVs repairs and transfers.

***(U) APS-2 Enhanced Army Global Logistics Enterprise Contract***

(U) The APS-2 Enhanced Army Global Logistics Enterprise Contract is designed to provide contractor support for APS-2 equipment to include preventative maintenance, storage, and issuance. On March 29, 2024, the Army Contracting Command–Rock Island modified task order W52P1J-12-G-0028-0002 with Amentum Services, Inc. (Amentum) to include the repair of 50 of 107 BFVs.

***(U) What We Reviewed***

(U) We reviewed the Army's management of BFV repairs to ensure that BFVs transferred to USAREUR-AF units met mission requirements. Specifically, we reviewed the status of the 2/1 CD's equipment at the time of turn-in of 117 BFVs and the Army's management of repairs of the 117 BFVs.

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<sup>4</sup> (U) Originally, the Army contracted KBR to repair 108 BFVs; however, the Army reduced the number to 107. The Army transferred 10 of the 117 BFVs to the TLSC-E for repair in October 2023.

## (U) Finding

### (U) The Army Did Not Effectively Manage the Repairs of the BFVs to Meet USAREUR-AF Mission Requirements

~~(CU)~~ The Army did not effectively manage the repairs of the BFVs and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This occurred because:

- (U) the unit departing the area of responsibility did not adequately maintain BFVs, turned in non-mission capable BFVs, and improperly reported the condition of the BFVs turned in as fully mission capable; and
- ~~(CU)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ As a result, the Army pulled stock from APS-2 inventories to cover ongoing mission needs, [REDACTED]

### ~~(CU)~~ The Army Did Not Effectively Manage the Repairs of BFVs and [REDACTED]

~~(CU)~~ The Army did not effectively manage the repairs of the BFVs and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The 2/1 CD personnel turned in the 117 BFVs to the 405th AFSB that the 2/1 CD did not repair in accordance with the Army's maintenance standard in Army Regulation 750-1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Army Regulation 750-1 states that the Army's maintenance standard is the Army's only maintenance standard, and equipment meets the Army's maintenance standard when the equipment is fully mission capable and all faults have been identified and addressed. At the time of turn-in, according to the Global Combat Support System–Army (GCSS-Army) data, the 2/1 CD reported that

(~~CU~~) 96 (82 percent) of 117 BFVs were fully mission capable.<sup>5</sup> However, when the 2/1 CD turned in the BFVs, the 2/1 CD and contractor personnel performed a joint technical inspection and determined that none of the 117 BFVs were fully mission capable. For example, the joint technical inspection identified 36 faults on one of the BFVs that the 2/1 CD reported was fully mission capable in the GCSS-Army. These faults rendered the BFV inoperable. See Figure 3 for examples of faults identified during the joint technical inspections.

**(U) When the 2/1 CD turned in the BFVs...none of the 117 BFVs were fully mission capable.**

(U) Figure 3. Faults Found During Joint Technical Inspections, Pictures Provided to the DoD OIG in January 2025



(U) Source: The 405th AFSB.

(S) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Because the

<sup>5</sup> (U) The GCSS-Army is the Army's information system that services supply, maintenance, property accountability, and records equipment readiness as well as financial system records for the Army.

~~(S)~~ 2/1 CD did not turn in the 117 BFVs to the Army's maintenance standard, the Army contracted for the repair of 107 BFVs with KBR and provided 10 BFVs to the TLSC-E for repair. However, KBR and TLSC-E personnel were unable to repair any of the BFVs to the Army's maintenance standard in time for issuance to the next inbound unit in the third quarter of FY 2024.

~~(CUI)~~ Because the Army was unable to meet the deadline for issuing the BFVs to the inbound unit, the Army issued 97 BFVs from the APS-2 equipment set.<sup>6</sup> The Army directed KBR to stop work on the BFVs and to transfer 57 BFVs to TLSC-E and 50 BFVs to AFSBn-Germany to repair the 117 BFVs to the Army's maintenance standard by February 2025.<sup>7</sup> However, TLSC-E and AFSBn-Germany were unable to meet the February 2025 requirement. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] As of July 2025, the Army repaired 51 (44 percent) of 117 BFVs to meet the Army's maintenance standard. See Figure 4 for the timeline of BFVs repairs, transfers, and mission requirements.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

<sup>7</sup> ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

<sup>8</sup> (U) The Army's status of BFVs repairs fluctuate monthly due to maintenance schedules and maintenance faults identified during preparation for issuance from storage.

~~(S)~~ Figure 4. BFV Repairs and Transfers Timeline



(U) Source: The Army and the DoD OIG.

## **(U) The 2/1 CD Did Not Adequately Maintain and Improperly Reported the Condition of the BFVs Turned In**

(U) The 2/1 CD lacked the personnel and capabilities to repair the BFVs to the Army's maintenance standard during turn-in. In addition, the 2/1 CD improperly reported the condition of the BFVs turned in during its deployment. Specifically, the Army issued conflicting guidance on defining fully mission capable status which led the 2/1 CD to improperly report the condition of the BFVs.

### ***(U) The 2/1 CD Lacked the Personnel and Capabilities to Repair the BFVs to the Army's Maintenance Standard***

~~(CUI)~~ [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] The 2/1 CD Commander stated that the Army's maintenance standard is well beyond the 2/1 CD's capacity to achieve. The 2/1 CD Commander explained that when the 2/1 CD deployed it was at approximately 70-percent staffing levels for BFV mechanics and logistics specialists because of a lack of deployable personnel. The 2/1 CD Commander stated that the reduced staffing levels increased the time it took to perform maintenance on the BFVs. In addition, the 2/1 CD Commander stated that the reduced staffing levels could add 50 percent or more to the time needed to complete the maintenance of the BFVs.

~~(S)~~ The 2/1 CD Operations Officer also stated that 2/1 CD personnel were dispersed across multiple geographic regions during their deployment in USAREUR-AF, which added to the difficulties of performing maintenance on the BFVs.<sup>9</sup> The 2/1 CD Commander stated that the 2/1 CD performed technical inspections in June 2023 and identified 16,000 faults on the BFVs, and the 2/1 CD repaired only 4,000 of the faults before turning in the BFVs on September 30, 2023. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

<sup>9</sup> (U) This individual was the 2/1 CD Operations Officer at the time the BFVs were turned in on September 2023. As of April 2025, this individual was in a different role with the 2/1 CD.

(S) [Redacted]

(U) Furthermore, the 2/1 CD Commander stated that the Army’s maintenance standard turn-in condition was unattainable because pristine vehicles with no faults is not possible or even desirable in a unit that is deployed and training. The 2/1 CD Commander stated the goal while deployed was not to have pristine vehicles, but to maintain the fleet for use. The 2/1 CD Commander also stated that the Army’s maintenance standard is an impossible standard because if the BFVs were repaired to the Army maintenance standard, routine use would render the BFVs as non-mission capable. Therefore, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, should determine whether shortages and capabilities of maintenance and logistics personnel are systemic issues among deployed units turning in equipment to APS locations and whether the Army’s maintenance standard in Army Regulation 750-1 is achievable by deployed units. If the standard is not achievable, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, should take appropriate action to address the problem.

**(U) The 2/1 CD Commander stated that the Army’s maintenance standard turn-in condition was unattainable...in a unit that is deployed and training.**

***(U) The Army Issued Conflicting and Unclear Policies for Reporting Operational Readiness and Status of Maintenance of the BFVs***

(U) The Army issued conflicting and unclear policies for reporting the readiness and maintenance status of the BFVs in the GCSS-Army. Army Regulation 700-138 establishes policies and procedures for collecting and reporting the physical condition of Army equipment. Army Regulation 750-1 establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for the maintenance of Army equipment and states that it is the only maintenance standard. However, each Army regulation defines fully mission capable equipment differently, as shown in Table.

*(U) Table. Fully Mission Capable Definitions in Army Regulations*

<b>(U)</b> Army Regulation 700-138	Army Regulation 750-1
Equipment is fully mission capable when it is safe and correctly configured and the equipment can perform all of its combat missions.	Fully mission capable is a materiel condition indicating that equipment is safe and has all mission-essential subsystems installed and operating and has no faults that are listed in the “not fully mission capable ready if” columns of the technical manual 10/20 preventive maintenance checks and services tables. <b>(U)</b>

(U) Source: The Army.

(~~CUI~~) The 2/1 CD Commander stated that the 2/1 CD followed Army Regulation 700-138 for reporting the operational readiness and status of maintenance of the BFVs in the GCSS-Army. According to the GCSS-Army data, between June 12, 2020, and September 6, 2023, the 2/1 CD reported that 96 (82 percent) of 117 BFVs were fully mission capable. The 2/1 CD Commander stated that the 2/1 CD conducted a technical inspection on the BFVs in June 2023 and started repairing the identified faults. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, the 2/1 CD did not update the BFV operational status in the GCSS-Army to reflect the existence of the faults and still considered these vehicles fully mission capable. According to the 2/1 CD Commander, during the 2/1 CD's deployment, most of the BFVs were able to run, shoot, and communicate. Therefore, the Commander considered the BFVs fully mission capable in accordance with the definition in Army Regulation 700-138.

However, if the Army defined fully mission capable in Army Regulation 700-138 as the Army defined it in Army Regulation 750-1, then 116 of the 117 BFVs would have been noted in the GCSS-Army as non-mission capable. Personnel from the 405th AFSB and KBR stated that the incorrect readiness status of the BFVs provided a false readiness level in the GCSS-Army and gave the impression that the BFVs would not need extensive repairs. Therefore, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, should revise applicable Army regulations to consistently define operational readiness statuses.

**(U) Personnel stated that the incorrect readiness status of the BFVs provided a false readiness level...and gave the impression that the BFVs would not need extensive repairs.**

(~~CUI~~) [REDACTED]

(~~CUI~~) [REDACTED]

Specifically, during the contract period of performance, KBR lacked sufficient qualified mechanics with BFV platform experience and qualified personnel trained on the use of the GCSS-Army. In addition, the Army did not have the capacity and capabilities to repair the BFVs to the Army's maintenance standard.

(~~CUI~~) [REDACTED]

(~~CUI~~) [REDACTED] Specifically, the BFV repair requirement in the LOGCAP V contract required KBR to repair the 107 BFVs to the Army's maintenance standard within the contract period of performance of September 25, 2023, to March 29, 2024. The Federal Acquisition Regulation and the DoD Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) Guidebook require the Army to conduct surveillance to ensure that the contractor is meeting contract

(~~CU~~) requirements.<sup>10</sup> In addition, the LOGCAP V Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan required the COR to conduct monthly surveillance and provide the reports to the Procuring Contracting Officer.<sup>11</sup> The CORs conducted surveillance monthly between November 2023 and May 2024 for the BFV repair requirement.<sup>12</sup>

(~~CU~~) On February 12, 2024, the COR reported that KBR lacked the capabilities to repair the 107 BFVs within the contract period of performance. Specifically, KBR did not have sufficient qualified personnel available to meet the BFV repair requirement. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(~~CU~~) Furthermore, KBR personnel accepted mechanic applicants without BFV platform expertise, which resulted in the workforce not having the proper skillset to repair the BFVs. [REDACTED]

**(U) KBR personnel accepted mechanic applicants without BFV platform expertise, which resulted in the workforce not having the proper skillset to repair the BFVs.**

[REDACTED] BFV mechanics and M1 Abrams tank mechanics require different skillsets in the Army. Furthermore, the COR stated that out of 16 KBR mechanics assigned to work on the 107 BFVs at the time he conducted surveillance, only 2 were BFV mechanics and the other 14 were M1 Abrams tank mechanics. During price negotiations after the maintenance requirement ended, KBR personnel acknowledged that the number of personnel onsite did not match the number of personnel in the proposal and took responsibility for the staffing challenges.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>10</sup> (U) Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 46, "Quality Assurance," Subpart 46.4, "Government Contract Quality Assurance," Section 46.401, "General." "Department of Defense Contracting Officer's Representatives Guidebook," October, 2022, Chapter 7, "Monitoring and Documenting Contractor Performance," Section 7.5, "Assessing and Documenting Contractor Performance."

<sup>11</sup> (U) The LOGCAP V contract has a general Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan for use with all LOGCAP V services.

<sup>12</sup> (U) The 409th Contracting Support Brigade stated that the COR did not complete a monthly surveillance report for February 2024 because the COR was on leave and transitioning to a new position.

<sup>13</sup> (~~CU~~) [REDACTED]

<sup>14</sup> (U) The Price Negotiation Memorandum signed by the LOGCAP Procuring Contracting Officer and Branch Chief at the Army Contracting Command–Rock Island finalized changes made to the LOGCAP V contract including the final negotiations of the fixed fee paid to KBR for the BFV repair requirement.

(~~CU~~) [REDACTED] despite the LOGCAP V Performance Work Statement requiring that the contractor use the GCSS-Army as the primary means of maintenance management. According to Army personnel, KBR hired unit supply specialists who had no experience with the GCSS-Army. As a result, KBR personnel were unable to input maintenance actions into the GCSS-Army, resulting in repair delays. According to the COR, the KBR unit supply specialists' inexperience led to delays in their ability to enter more than 8,000 lines of received parts into the GCSS-Army, taking from November 2023 to March 2024.<sup>15</sup>

(~~CU~~) [REDACTED] The COR stated that because KBR personnel were not adding the received parts to the existing BFV work orders, KBR mechanics did not know that the parts for the vehicles they were working on had arrived and were ready for installation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The COR stated that KBR did not have personnel in place to add parts to the work orders until March 2024, more than 5 months after the contract period of performance started. In KBR's response to a March 18, 2024 level 2 corrective action request, KBR personnel stated that delays in the creation of work orders occurred when there was a lack of sufficient KBR GCSS-Army personnel.<sup>16</sup>

(U) The COR's monthly status report on February 12, 2024, documented concerns that KBR would not finish the BFVs by the deadline because KBR lacked the qualified mechanics to repair the BFVs. Based on the COR's contract surveillance, the Army issued a letter of concern on February 13, 2024, to correct the deficiencies. In addition to observing and documenting deficiencies, the CORs stated that they briefed stakeholders during weekly meetings about the progress of the BFV repairs.

(U) Federal Acquisition Regulation 42.1104 requires the contract administration office to determine the extent of surveillance based on criticality of the services and the contract performance schedule.<sup>17</sup> In addition, the COR Guidebook states that the COR should promptly notify the contracting officer whenever unsatisfactory contract performance is identified so remedial steps can be taken. Throughout the contract, KBR did not have experienced BFV mechanics or GCSS-Army personnel and the staffing levels as required

<sup>15</sup> (U) One line of parts could be a single item or multiple items depending on how items are packaged and sold.

<sup>16</sup> (U) Corrective action requests are classified into three levels of escalating severity from minor nonconformance to critical nonconformance. The LOGCAP V Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan defines a level 2 corrective action request as a major nonconformance that is not critical but is likely to result in failure or reduce the usability of supplies and services.

<sup>17</sup> (U) Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 42, "Contract Administration and Audit Services," Subpart 42.11, "Production Surveillance and Reporting," Section 42.1104, "Surveillance Requirements."

(U) in their concept of operations plan. However, the COR did not identify and report these concerns as a deficiency until February 12, 2024, approximately 5 months after contract award and less than 2 months before the 107 BFVs were required to be repaired. Because the task order was time-sensitive with mission-critical requirements, increasing the contracting surveillance and reporting could have enabled personnel to identify and report deficiencies in contractor performance earlier, resulting in earlier corrective actions. Therefore, the Army Contracting Command–Rock Island Executive Director should require contracting officers to increase the frequency of COR surveillance and reporting on task orders with time-sensitive, mission-critical requirements to facilitate earlier identification of issues with contractor performance and progress.

(U) Because KBR was unable to repair the 107 BFVs to meet the Army’s maintenance standard, on March 21, 2024, the Army modified the contract to:

- (U) remove 50 of 107 BFVs from KBR’s possession,
- (U) update the period of performance to stop work on the remaining 57 of 107 BFVs by May 27, 2024, and
- (U) end the KBR BFV repair requirement by June 21, 2024.

(U) Additionally, the Army renegotiated the fees paid to KBR, and according to the Army, determined the renegotiation to be in the best interest of the Government. During these negotiations, KBR acknowledged and took responsibility for the staffing challenges and acknowledged a lack of trained KBR GCSS-Army personnel. Ultimately, KBR and the Army agreed to reduce the fixed fee paid to KBR by 50 percent. Including the reduced fixed fee, the Army paid a total of \$10.1 million to KBR for contract performance. Because the renegotiations were agreed upon and determined to be in the best interest of the Government, we are not making a recommendation.

### ***(U) The Army Lacked the Capacity and Capabilities to Repair the BFVs***

(U) The Army lacked the capacity and capabilities to repair the 117 BFVs. Specifically, the AFSBn-Germany did not have the capacity in September 2023 to perform maintenance on the 117 BFVs because of competing priorities at the time of the turn-in from the 2/1 CD. Although the AFSBn-Germany had contractor BFV mechanics in USAREUR-AF, the mechanics had to fulfill other mission needs, such as a Presidential Draw Down Authority supporting Ukraine and issuing APS-2 equipment to support rotational mission requirements. Therefore, USAREUR-AF could not repair the 117 BFVs when the 2/1 CD turned in the BFVs.

(U) According to 405th AFSB personnel, the 21st TSC Commander identified a need to redevelop the TLSC-E's ability to perform in-theater repairs of BFVs and other tracked vehicles. To begin redevelopment of the maintenance capability for BFVs, the Commander directed the Army to transfer 10 of the 117 non-mission capable BFVs on October 23, 2023.<sup>18</sup> Although the TLSC-E had not completed all the repairs on the initial 10 BFVs, on June 21, 2024, the Army completed the transfer of 57 of the 107 BFVs from KBR to the TLSC-E at the Maintenance Activity Kaiserslautern.

(U) While the TLSC-E temporarily increased its work force with support from contractor personnel and Army Depot personnel from the United States to help redevelop the maintenance capability, the TLSC-E encountered learning curves and delays during the BFV repair process. TLSC-E personnel stated that they had only 19 qualified mechanics with various levels of experience with BFVs when the 2/1 CD transferred the 10 BFVs and KBR transferred the remaining 57 BFVs. As a result, the TLSC-E had to hire additional qualified personnel with specific skillsets to help repair the BFVs. As of June 24, 2025, the TLSC-E personnel stated that TLSC-E had 50 qualified BFV mechanics. In addition, the TLSC-E faced challenges with receiving parts because of long lead times, which caused delays in repairing the BFVs.

(U) Although the 21st TSC Commander took initiative to identify the need for the capability in-theater, personnel from the 21st TSC could not repair the BFVs to meet mission deadlines and were unable to provide the number of BFV or tracked vehicle mechanics needed to fulfil the USAREUR-AF missions. Specifically, between November 30, 2023, and July 29, 2025, the TLSC-E repaired only 11 (16 percent) of the 67 BFVs to the Army's maintenance standard.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, the USAREUR-AF Commander should conduct a study to determine what in-theater BFV repair capabilities are needed to meet mission requirements, develop and implement a plan to address any capability gaps identified in the study to build and sustain capabilities for in-theater BFV repairs to meet mission requirements and support operational readiness.

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<sup>18</sup> (U) Tracked vehicles use a continuous track system for propulsion instead of wheels to move.

<sup>19</sup> (U) In addition to the 67 BFVs, TSLC-E repaired additional BFVs, outside the scope of this audit, to fulfill 3/1 CD mission requirements and other USAREUR-AF missions.

(CUI) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(CUI) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Finally, according to AFSBn-Germany personnel, AFSBn-Germany has been dedicating its resources to fix the BFVs, resulting in limited resources available to perform preventative maintenance on other APS-2 equipment. AFSBn-Germany personnel do not expect to complete [REDACTED] further reducing the readiness of APS-2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

## (U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### (U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4:

- a. (U) Determine whether shortages and capabilities of maintenance and logistics personnel are systemic issues among deployed units turning in equipment to Army Prepositioned Stock locations and whether the Army's maintenance standard in Army Regulation 750-1, "Army Materiel Policy," February 2, 2023, is achievable by deployed units. If the standard is not achievable, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, should take appropriate action to address the problem.

### (U) Headquarters Department of the Army, G-4 Comments

(U) The Materiel Management Director, Headquarters Department of the Army, G-4, responding for the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, agreed with the recommendation and stated that the maintenance challenges noted during the audit were a result of temporary, Army-wide recruiting shortfalls and are not systemic. Specifically, the Director stated that manning for 91M (BFV System Maintainer) is now at 80 percent, and manning for 92A (Automated Logistical Specialist) is now at 107 percent, providing

(U) adequate personnel to meet and sustain the Army's 10/20 maintenance standard. The Director stated that they would provide the historical manpower data from 2022 by March 2026.

(U) In addition, the Director stated that the Army's 10/20 maintenance standard prescribed in Army Regulation 750-1 is achievable for deployed units. The Director stated that the Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems validated this standard through extensive logistics demonstrations and technical manual verifications that confirmed the mean time to repair BFV systems. These events confirmed that maintenance tasks are achievable at the specified level of repair. The Director also stated that Army Regulation 750-1 also grants commanders the authority to employ fully mission capable equipment with non-critical faults to ensure mission success.

### *(U) Our Response*

(U) Comments from the Material Management Director, Headquarters Department of the Army, G-4, partially addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, it is unresolved. Although the Director provided documentation on how the Army addressed personnel and capability shortages, the supporting documentation did not demonstrate how the Army determined that deployed units could repair equipment to the Army's 10/20 maintenance standard within the operational constraints of a deployed environment. The Director stated that the Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems validated the Army's 10/20 maintenance standard through logistics demonstrations and technical manual verifications. However, the supporting documentation the Director provided showed only that the Army was able to achieve key reliability metrics during operation of Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle and the supportability of the BFVs. The documentation does not validate that the deployed Army units were able to repair the BFVs to the Army's 10/20 maintenance standard that was required during equipment turn-in.

~~(CUI)~~ Furthermore, although commanders have the authority to employ fully mission capable equipment with non-critical faults for missions, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We found that the vehicle inspections performed during the turn-in of the BFVs found that all the BFVs had faults that made them non-mission capable. As a result, the BFVs did not meet the Army's 10/20 maintenance standard outlined in Army Regulation 750-1. Furthermore, in their comments on the report, the USAREUR-AF Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, acknowledged that resourcing, operational tempo, and timeline constraints for rotational units make it a challenge to achieve the Army's 10/20 maintenance standard. We request that within 30 days

(~~CU~~) of this report, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, clarify how the Army validated whether the deployed units can achieve the Army's 10/20 maintenance standard for turning in equipment to APS locations.

- b. (U) Revise applicable Army regulations to consistently define operational readiness statuses.**

### ***(U) Headquarters Department of the Army, G-4 Comments***

(U) The Material Management Director, Headquarters Department of the Army, G-4, responding for the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, agreed with the recommendation and stated that Army Regulation 750-1 and Army Regulation 700-138 are being revised to ensure alignment between the Army's 10/20 maintenance standard and fully mission capable verbiage. The Director stated that the projected publication dates for Army Regulations 750-1 and 700-138 are third quarter FY 2026 and second quarter FY 2027, respectively.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the Director addressed all specifics of the recommendation; therefore, it is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that Army Regulation 750-1 and Army Regulation 700-138 are updated to consistently define the Army's 10/20 maintenance standard and fully mission capable requirements.

### ***(U) Recommendation 2***

**(U) We recommend that the Executive Director, Army Contracting Command-Rock Island, require contracting officers to increase the frequency of contracting officer's representative surveillance and reporting on future task orders with time-sensitive, mission-critical requirements to facilitate earlier identification of issues with contractor performance and progress.**

### ***(U) U.S. Army Materiel Command and U.S. Army Contracting Command Comments***

(U) The Executive Deputy to the Commanding General, Army Materiel Command, and the Commanding General, Army Contracting Command, reviewed and endorsed the audit finding and Recommendation 2 in the report.

### ***(U) U.S. Army Contracting Command-Rock Island Comments***

(U) The Executive Director, Army Contracting Command-Rock Island, agreed with the recommendation and stated that the report outlined the current repair timeline for the BFVs that is drastically later than the timeline required under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program task order with KBR Services, LLC. The Executive Director

(U) stated that although Army Contracting Command-Rock Island does not find it likely that this timeline would be significantly reduced had it received more timely COR reports for this mission, they do believe that earlier identification of performance issues on any contract, especially those considered mission critical, is in the best interest of the U.S. Government.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the Executive Director partially addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, it is unresolved. Although the Executive Director agreed that early identification of performance issues is in the best interest of the U.S. Government, the Executive Director did not provide details on how they plan to implement the recommendation. Therefore, we request that the Executive Director clarify how they plan to require contracting officers to increase the frequency of COR surveillance and reporting on future task orders with time-sensitive, mission-critical requirements to facilitate earlier identification of issues with contractor performance and progress.

### ***(U) Recommendation 3***

**(U) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa, conduct a study to determine what in-theater Bradley Fighting Vehicle repair capabilities are needed to meet mission requirements, develop and implement a plan to address any capability gaps identified in the study to build and sustain capabilities for in-theater Bradley Fighting Vehicle repairs to meet mission requirements and support operational readiness.**

### ***(U) U.S. Army Europe and Africa Comments***

(U) The USAREUR-AF Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, responding for the USAREUR-AF Commander, neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation and stated that units often have insufficient time between training events and their deployment dates. The Deputy Chief of Staff explained that this severely limits their ability to fully reconstitute combat power, leading to a persistent readiness challenge that must be managed throughout their operational tour. In addition, the Deputy Chief of Staff stated that systemic manning shortfalls in critical maintenance personnel materially impacted the ability of units to meet established maintenance standards. Given the resourcing, operational tempo, and timeline constraints for rotational units, the Army Regulation 750-1 maintenance standard is a challenging standard for units to achieve. The Deputy Chief of Staff stated that USAREUR-AF has implemented several initiatives to address these challenges and improve the operational readiness of the BFV fleet within the theater. USAREUR-AF has established a forward-stationed Maintenance Augmentation Team, which comprises qualified BFV mechanics and can be tasked to provide surge support, augmenting a unit's organic maintenance capacity when operational readiness

(U) rates fall below acceptable thresholds. In addition, the Deputy Chief of Staff stated that USAREUR-AF now provides oversight to identify and mitigate critical maintenance personnel shortages before deployment to ensure units deploy with sufficient manning to meet their operational requirements. Additionally, the Theater Logistic Support Center–Europe is enhancing the technical expertise of its civilian workforce to better assist rotational units with fleet maintenance challenges.

(U) The Deputy Chief of Staff also stated that USAREUR-AF is prepared to conduct an assessment to analyze the capabilities necessary to perform BFV maintenance and identify any capability gaps. The Deputy Chief of Staff estimates that the study will take approximately 90 days to complete and will include a review of historical BFV maintenance data, maintenance activity surveys, unit engagements, and concurrent analysis. The timeline for the projected study is from March 1, 2026, to May 29, 2026.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the Deputy Chief of Staff addressed all specifics of the recommendation; therefore, it is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the assessment to analyze the capabilities necessary to perform BFV maintenance and identify any capability gaps has been completed and that USAREUR-AF developed and implemented a plan to address any capability gaps identified in the study.

## (U) Appendix A

### (U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from November 2024 through December 2025 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) Furthermore, we reviewed the following applicable DoD and Army criteria and technical manuals to determine whether the Army properly repaired BFVs to meet USAREUR-AF mission requirements.

- (U) “Department of Defense Contracting Officer Representatives Guidebook,” October 2022
- (U) Army Regulation 750-1, “Army Materiel Maintenance,” February 2, 2023
- (U) Army Regulation 710-1, “Centralized Inventory Management of the Army Supply System,” November 28, 2016
- (U) Army Regulation 700-138, “Army Logistics Readiness and Sustainability,” April 23, 2018
- (U) Specific Army technical manuals for the BFV

(U) We reviewed the LOGCAP V and APS-2 contract maintenance requirements and performance work statements to determine the contractor’s requirements and oversight responsibilities for repairing BFVs to meet USAREUR-AF mission requirements. In addition, we reviewed letters of technical direction and execution orders that directed the BFV repair plans. We also reviewed contract surveillance documentation and corrective actions taken for the LOGCAP V contract, including COR performance assessment checklists, corrective action requests, and a letter of concern.

(U) We conducted site visits to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, and Kaiserslautern, Germany, from December 2024 through January 2025 to interview key personnel involved in the repairs of the 117 BFVs under the LOGCAP V and APS-2 contract maintenance requirements. During our site visit to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, we met with Army Sustainment Command and Army Contracting Command personnel to learn about their roles and responsibilities and involvement with the oversight and execution for both contracts (LOGCAP V and APS-2 contracts).

(U) During our site visit to Kaiserslautern, Germany, we met with personnel from USAREUR-AF, the 21st TSC, the 409th Contracting Support Brigade, the 405th AFSB, the TLSC-E, and AFSBn-Germany. As part of our site visit, we interviewed personnel to determine roles and responsibilities, determine status of the repairs, and learn about the involvement each component had with the 117 BFVs.

(U) This report was reviewed by the DoD Components associated with this audit to identify whether any of their reported information, including legacy FOUO information, should be safeguarded and marked in accordance with the DoD CUI Program. In preparing and marking this report, we considered any comments submitted by the DoD Components about the CUI treatment of their information. If the DoD Components failed to provide any or sufficient comments about the CUI treatment of their information, we marked the report based on our assessment of the available information.

## **(U) Internal Control Assessment and Compliance**

(U) We assessed internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations necessary to satisfy the audit objective. In particular, we assessed the Army's internal controls and underlying principles for the repairs of the BFVs. Specifically, we assessed the control activities and implementation of the control activities related to the maintenance of BFVs. In addition, we assessed the monitoring and performing monitoring activities as it relates to the repairs of the BFVs and contract oversight. However, because our review was limited to these internal control components and underlying principles, it may not have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of this audit.

## **(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data**

(U) We used computer-processed data from the GCSS-Army to obtain the 2/1 CD's historical readiness reporting of the BFVs. In addition, we used the GCSS-Army to select a sample of BFVs to verify the operational readiness rates and status of the BFVs by analyzing the data from interviews, joint technical inspections, and other supporting documentation the audit client provided. We determined that the data from the GCSS-Army were sufficiently reliable to support the audit findings and conclusions.

## **(U) Prior Coverage**

(U) During the last 5 years, the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued two reports discussing the sustainment of BFVs. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/>. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>.

**(U) DoD OIG**

(U) Report No. DODIG-2024-057, "Evaluation of the DoD's Sustainment Plan for Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams Armored Weapon Systems Transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces," February 15, 2024

(U) The DoD OIG determined that the DoD had not developed or implemented a plan for sustaining the BFVs, Strykers, and Abrams provided to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The DoD provided supply packages containing consumables and spare parts, as well as personnel and facilities to conduct field-level maintenance through the end of FY 2024, consistent with the challenges of fiscal authorities. However, DoD personnel acknowledged that existing efforts did not constitute a sustainment plan and had not yet identified sustainment efforts to facilitate Ukraine's sustainment beyond the end of FY 2024.

**(U) GAO**

(U) Report No. GAO-24-107566, "Army Modernization Actions Needed to Support Fielding New Equipment," July 2024

(U) The GAO found that initial equipment sets transferred under the Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model included numerous items in poor condition. As a result, the GAO identified that the Army National Guard incurred unexpected costs for spare parts and labor hours and experienced training delays to restore the BFVs to fully mission capable status. The GAO found that the problem was generally due to unit commander decisions, and that the Army does not hold unit commanders accountable for not taking care of equipment despite units already being funded to maintain equipment to condition standards as required by guidance. Finally, the GAO found that if equipment does not meet condition standards when transferred, receiving units will continue to be at risk of incurring unexpected costs.

## **(U) Appendix B**

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### **(U) Roles and Responsibilities for the Repair of the BFVs**

(U) The repairs of the BFVs involve coordination between several Army organizations. While each organization has a different role, all share a responsibility in meeting mission requirements. See Figure 5 for the Army's Maintenance roles and responsibilities.

(U) Figure 5. The Army's Maintenance Roles and Responsibilities



**(U) Legend**

- (U) 409th CSB      409th Contracting Support Brigade
- (U) ACC-RI        Army Contracting Command–Rock Island
- (U) AMC            Army Materiel Command
- (U) ASC            Army Sustainment Command
- (U) Source: The Army.

## (U) Management Comments

### (U) Materiel Management Director, Headquarters Department of the Army, G-4



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF G-4  
500 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0500

DALO-MM

29 January 2026

MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22350.

SUBJECT: Response to DoDIG Draft Report (Project No. D2025-D000AH-0030.000) on Army Management of Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) Repairs

#### 1. Reference

a. DoDIG Draft Report Project No D2025-D000AH-0030.000. Army's Management of repairs to Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV) to Meet U.S. Army Europe and Africa Mission Requirements, 11 December 2025.

b. Army Regulation (AR) 750-1, Army Material Maintenance Policy.

c. AR 700-138, Army Logistics Readiness and Sustainability.

2. HQDA G-4 concurs with Recommendation 1a. The maintenance challenges noted during the 2022 audit were a result of temporary, Army-wide recruiting shortfalls and are not systemic. Manning for 91M (BFV System Maintainer) is now at 80% and manning for 92A (Automated Logistical Specialist) is now at 107%, providing adequate personnel to meet and sustain the Army's 10/20 maintenance standard. Historical manpower data from 2022 will be provided to your office by March 2026.

3. The 10/20 maintenance standard prescribed in AR 750-1 is achievable for deployed units. Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems validated this standard through extensive logistics demonstrations and technical manual verifications which confirmed the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) BFV systems. These events confirm that maintenance tasks are achievable at the specified level of repair. AR 750-1 also grants commanders the authority to employ Fully Mission Capable (FMC) equipment with non-critical faults to ensure mission success.

4. HQDA G-4 concurs with Recommendation 1b. AR 750-1 and AR 700-138 are being revised to ensure alignment between the 10/20 standard and FMC verbiage. The projected publication dates are 3QFY26 for AR 750-1 and 2QFY27 for AR 700-138. The DoDIG will be provided copies upon publication.

5. The Point of Contact for this memorandum is HQDA G4, Sustainment Maintenance, [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

SMITH.SYDNEY.A [REDACTED]  
NNE [REDACTED]

SYDNEY SMITH  
Director, Materiel Management

## (U) Executive Deputy to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND  
4400 MARTIN ROAD  
REDSTONE ARSENAL, AL 35898-5000

AMIR

27-Jan-2026

MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG/Ms. Carmen J. Malone), Assistant Inspector General for Audit Acquisition, Contracting, and Sustainment, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: Command Comments to Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Draft Report: Audit of Army's Management of Repairs to Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Meet U.S. Army Europe and Africa Mission Requirements, Project: D2025-D000AH-0030.000

1. The U.S. Army Materiel Command has reviewed the subject draft report and endorses the response from U.S. Army Contracting Command. Detailed comments are enclosed.

2. The U.S. Army Materiel Command point of contact is [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] or email: [REDACTED].

MIRANDA.LIZ.S [REDACTED]  
LIZ S. MIRANDA  
Executive Deputy to the  
Commanding General

Encl

## (U) Commanding General, U.S. Army Contracting Command



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES ARMY CONTRACTING COMMAND  
4505 MARTIN ROAD  
REDSTONE ARSENAL, AL 35898-5000

AMCC-IR (RN-11-7a)

23 DEC 2025

MEMORANDUM Internal Review and Compliance Office, Headquarters, U.S. Army Materiel Command, 4500 Martin Road, Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898-5000

SUBJECT: Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Draft Report – Audit of Army's Management of Repairs to Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Meet U.S. Army Europe and Africa Mission Requirements (Project No. D2025-D000AH-0030.000)

1. Reference: Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Draft Report – Audit of Army's Management of Repairs to Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Meet U.S. Army Europe and Africa Mission Requirements (Project No. D2025-D000AH-0030.000)
2. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Contracting Command (ACC) has reviewed and endorses the subject draft report and recommendation 2 response as written. Detailed comments are enclosed.
3. The ACC Point of Contact for this memorandum is [REDACTED] Director of Internal Review and Audit and Compliance Office, at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED].

Encl

[REDACTED]  
DOUGLAS S. LOWREY  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

## (U) Executive Director, U.S. Army Contracting Command–Rock Island



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
ARMY CONTRACTING COMMAND – ROCK ISLAND  
3055 RODMAN AVENUE  
ROCK ISLAND, IL 61299-8000

19 December 2025

### MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

**SUBJECT:** Army Contracting Command – Rock Island (ACC-RI) Response to Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Draft Report - Audit of Army's Management of Repairs to Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Meet U.S. Army Europe and Africa Mission Requirements (Project No. D2025-D000AH-0030.000)

This is the ACC-RI response to the DoD OIG Draft Report - Audit of Army's Management of Repairs to Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Meet U.S. Army Europe and Africa Mission Requirements (Project No. D2025-D000AH-0030.000). See below for a summary of the DoD OIG recommendations and ACC-RI responses.

**RECOMMENDATION 2:** We recommend that the Executive Director, ACC-RI, require contracting officers to increase the frequency of contracting officer's representative (COR) surveillance and reporting on future task orders with time-sensitive, mission critical requirements to facilitate earlier identification of issues with contractor performance and progress.

**RESPONSE:** ACC-RI concurs with Recommendation 2. The DoD OIG findings outlines a current repair timeline for the Bradley Fighting Vehicles that is drastically later than the timeline required under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program task order with KBR Services, LLC. Although ACC-RI does not find it likely that this timeline would be significantly reduced had it received more timely COR reports for this particular mission, ACC-RI does believe that earlier identification of performance issues on any contract, especially those considered mission critical, is in the best interest of the United States Government.

The point of contact for this response is [REDACTED], Procuring Contracting Officer, ACC-RI, [REDACTED]; [REDACTED].

ARMER.LYNDA.R  
EENE [REDACTED]

LYNDA R. ARMER  
Executive Director  
ACC-RI

## (U) Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE & AFRICA  
UNIT 29351  
APO AE 09014-9351

AELG

08 January 2026

### MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: DoDIG Draft Report: Army's Management of Repairs to Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Meet U.S. Army Europe and Africa Mission Requirements

1. Analysis of Findings and Operational Context. USAREUR-AF acknowledges the DODIG's findings that are within the referenced memorandum. Our initial assessment has identified several underlying factors that provide critical context for the readiness challenges observed.

a. A significant contributing factor to equipment readiness deficits is the compressed force generation cycle. Units often have insufficient dwell time between culminating training events at Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and their deployment dates. This severely curtails their ability to fully reconstitute combat power, leading to a persistent readiness challenge that must be managed throughout their operational tour.

b. Systemic manning shortfalls in critical maintenance Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) to include Bradley Fighting Vehicle maintainers, maintenance warrant officers, and senior maintenance Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) materially impacted the ability of units to meet established maintenance standards.

c. The memorandum correctly notes units are not meeting the AR 750-1 maintenance standard. It must be understood that while AR 750-1 establishes the doctrinal goal for Army maintenance; however, given resourcing, operational tempo, and timeline constraints for rotational units, it is a standard that is challenging to achieve.

2. Current and Future Mitigation Strategies. USAREUR-AF has implemented, and is refining, several initiatives to address these challenges and improve the operational readiness of the Bradley fleet within the theater. To provide immediate intervention capability, USAREUR-AF has established a forward-stationed Maintenance Augmentation Team. This specialized unit is comprised of qualified Bradley mechanics and can be dynamically tasked to provide surge support, augmenting a unit's organic maintenance capacity when operational readiness rates fall below acceptable thresholds.

a. Through an enhanced mission command structure, USAREUR-AF now exercises authority over deploying units from both III Corps and V Corps. This provides the necessary oversight to identify and mitigate critical maintenance personnel shortages

## (U) Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa (cont'd)

AELG

SUBJECT: DoDIG Draft Report: Army's Management of Repairs to Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Meet U.S. Army Europe and Africa Mission Requirements

prior to deployment by leveraging the entirety of the Corps to ensure units deploy with sufficient manning to meet their operational requirements. Additionally, the Theater Logistic Support Center – Europe (TLSC-E) is executing a deliberate professional development program to enhance the technical expertise of its civilian workforce. This initiative is building a repository of advanced knowledge to better assist rotational units with complex fleet maintenance challenges.

b. USAREUR-AF acknowledges that operational readiness is persistently impacted by the inconsistent availability of Bradley repair parts within the global supply system, which is largely managed by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The USAREUR-AF G4 (Logistics) Ground Maintenance Branch is engaged in continuous collaboration with the relevant Life Cycle Management Commands (LCMCs) and DLA to prioritize and expedite the delivery of mission-critical parts to the European theater, ensuring they are allocated to achieve the greatest possible impact on readiness.

c. The limited time available from the publication of these draft findings to the suspense for a response did not permit for the time needed to conduct the in-depth analysis necessary to develop a comprehensive, data-driven plan to address long-term maintenance capability requirements. The command is prepared to conduct a deliberate, extensive assessment to fully analyze the capabilities necessary to perform BFV maintenance and identify any capability gaps. It is estimated that the study will take approximately 90 days to complete and will include a review of historical BFV maintenance data, maintenance activity surveys, unit engagements, and concurrent analysis. The timeline for the projected study is 01 MAR 2026 – 29 MAY 2026.

3. Point of Contact is the USAREUR-AF, DCoS G4, COL Todd J. Allison at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

ALLISON, TODD JER  
EM [REDACTED]  
TODD J. ALLISON  
COL, LG  
DCoS G4

## **(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations**

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<b>2/1 CD</b>	2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Cavalry Division
<b>AFSB</b>	Army Field Support Brigade
<b>AFSBn</b>	Army Field Support Battalion
<b>APS</b>	Army Prepositioned Stock
<b>BFV</b>	Bradley Fighting Vehicle
<b>COR</b>	Contracting Officer's Representative
<b>GCSS</b>	Global Combat Support System
<b>LOGCAP</b>	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
<b>TLSC-E</b>	Theater Logistics Support Center–Europe
<b>TSC</b>	Theater Sustainment Command
<b>USAREUR-AF</b>	U.S. Army Europe and Africa

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### **U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

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