LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

AND OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO IRAQ & SYRIA

APRIL 1, 2026–JUNE 30, 2026

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On the cover: Refugee and local students enroll in a UNHCR-constructed school in Domiz town, located near Iraq's largest Syrian refugee camp, on April 16, 2026. (UNHCR photo)

We are pleased to present this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) report to Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). This report fulfills our quarterly reporting responsibilities pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

The United States launched OIR in 2014 to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), while setting the conditions for follow-on activities to increase regional stability. The U.S. Government strategy to defeat ISIS includes military operations and support for local security forces, diplomacy, governance, humanitarian assistance, and stabilization programs.

This report describes the activities of the U.S. Government in support of OIR as well as the work of the Department of War (DoW), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to further the U.S. Government's policy goals in Iraq and Syria. This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG agencies—the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs—and our partner oversight agencies. This report covers the period April 1 through June 30, 2026.

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IN THIS REPORT

Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) continued to adapt its force posture and activities in response to Operation Epic Fury and threats from Iran-aligned militias.

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- CJTF-OIR transitioned its headquarters to Jordan to continue its counterterrorism mission. The United States transferred its last open base in Syria to the Syrian government in April and maintained a limited presence in Iraq.
- In both Iraq and Syria, the United States remained focused on preventing ISIS's reorganization and disrupting its external operations capabilities, protecting U.S. personnel, and maintaining the ability of local security forces to conduct counterterrorism activities with limited or no direct U.S. tactical partnering.
- On July 14, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth confirmed that the OIR mission will end by September 30, 2026.

Posture changes and the security environment in Iraq and Syria continued to limit OIR activities.

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- CJTF-OIR coordinated engagements with the Syrian government from Jordan but was constrained by the lack of a permanent U.S. presence in Damascus.
- State continued to assess options for a future diplomatic presence in Syria, including the potential resumption of operations of the U.S. Embassy in Damascus.
- State managed 34 assistance awards in Iraq valued at $163.06 million and 28 assistance awards in Syria valued at $468.22 million during the quarter.

The United States urged Iraq to rein in Iran-aligned militias after they launched hundreds of attacks on U.S. facilities.

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- Although attacks on U.S. forces and facilities decreased after the ceasefire with Iran on April 7, the United States remained focused on ensuring that the Iraqi government does not further accommodate Iran-aligned elements in its politics and security forces.
- In April, the United States paused training for the Iraqi Security Forces and shipments of U.S. dollars to Iraq to pressure the Iraqi government to reduce the ability of Iran and its militias to attack U.S. interests. As of June 30, the United States had resumed the dollar shipments but the training pause remained in effect.

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President Donald J. Trump meets with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi in the Cabinet Room on July 14, 2026. (White House photo)

MISSION UPDATE

OVERVIEW

Since 2014, the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission has been to advise, assist, and enable partner forces until they can independently maintain the enduring defeat of ISIS in Iraq and designated areas of Syria, and to set conditions for long-term security cooperation frameworks with partners in those countries.[1] OIR has three lines of effort.[2] (See Table 1.)

Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) executes the OIR mission.[3] CJTF-OIR is a component of the 90-member U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.[4]

U.S. Policy: U.S. policy for Iraq and Syria did not fundamentally change during the quarter.[5] The Office of the Under Secretary of War for Policy (OUSW[P]) said that regional security developments, including threats from Iran-aligned actors, continued to affect the operating environment for U.S. counterterrorism activities. In both Iraq and Syria, the United States remained focused on preventing ISIS's reorganization, protecting U.S. personnel, disrupting ISIS's external operations capabilities, and maintaining the ability of local security forces to conduct counterterrorism activities with limited or no direct U.S. tactical partnering.[6] More broadly, U.S. diplomatic activity and assistance programs continued to promote stability, transitional justice, inclusive governance, and economic growth in Iraq and Syria.[7]

Table 1.

OIR Lines of Effort

LOE 1: Deny ISIS within the Combined Joint Operating Area
LOE 2: Build Partner Force Capability and Capacity
LOE 3: Sustain the Global Coalition

Source: CJTF-OIR, response to DoW OIG request for information, 25.4 OIR 003, 9/10/2025.

In July, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth confirmed that the OIR mission will end by September 30, 2026.

The ISIS threat: The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported that the ISIS threat in Iraq and Syria remained limited.[8] Speaking before the Senate Committee on Armed Services in May, Admiral Brad Cooper, Commander of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), stated that ISIS attacks were at their lowest levels in both countries since 2013 and reduced by 70 percent since 2023.[9] The DIA reported that in Iraq, ISIS almost certainly remains severely degraded, focused on its own survival, and unable to exploit instability arising from Operation Epic Fury (OEF).[10] In Syria, ISIS attacks declined following the departure of U.S. forces from Syria in April, though ISIS continued to target Syrian government forces, demonstrating its continued lethality, the DIA said.[11]

In July, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth confirmed that the OIR mission will end by September 30, 2026.[12]

FUNDING

The Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer (OUSW[C]) reported that of the approximately $15.9 billion enacted for OIR in FY 2024, FY 2025, and FY 2026, $11.1 billion had been obligated as of June 30, 2026.[13]

Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF): CTEF is the primary vehicle that CJTF-OIR uses to support partner forces in Syria and Iraq. (See Table 2.) This quarter, the OUSW(C) reported a $50 million rescission from the FY 2025-2026 CTEF allocation. While the OUSW(C) reported no fund reprogramming actions to Congress, the OUSW(C) noted that the pace of spending slowed during the quarter due to OEF.[14]

Foreign Military Financing (FMF): Separate from OIR, Congress appropriated $1.35 billion for FMF for Iraq from FY 2020 through FY 2025. Of this amount, State said that it redirected $109.6 million in FY 2025 appropriations to another country's FMF account.[15] As of June 30, $973.0 million (78 percent) of available funds had been spent. State said that it does not anticipate any FMF obligations for Iraq in FY 2026.[16]

Table 2.

CTEF Funding for Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, in $ Millions, as of June 30, 2026

	FY 2024/2025		FY 2025		FY 2026		FY 2027
	Enacted	Obligated	Enacted	Obligated	Enacted	Obligated	Requested
Iraq	$241.95	$216.10	$333.36	$96.30	$212.50	$0.0	$118.90
Syria	102.80	93.90	143.84	52.60	130.00	0.0	130.00
Lebanon	3.20	2.70	1.50	0.0	0.0	0.0	36.00
Jordan	—	—	—	—	—	—	18.20
TOTAL	**$348.00**	**$312.70**	**$478.70**	**$148.90**	**$342.50**	**$0.0**	**$303.10**

Note: Totals may differ slightly due to rounding.

Source: OUSW(C), response to DoW OIG request for information, 26.3 OIR 008 and 26.3 OIR 009B, 7/22/2026.

Table 3.

U.S. Assistance Programs in Iraq and Syria as of June 2026, in $ Millions

Bureau	Total Award Value
Iraq	
Humanitarian Assistance	**$82.90**
Counterterrorism	**32.85**
Near Eastern Affairs	**27.84**
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor	**19.47**
IRAQ TOTAL	**$163.06**
Syria	
Humanitarian Assistance	**$377.90**
Stabilization	**51.40**
Political-Military Affairs/Weapons Removal and Abatement	**22.55**
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor	**16.37**
SYRIA TOTAL	**$468.22**

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/10/2026; State, vetting comment, 8/10/2026.

U.S. Assistance: State managed 34 assistance awards in Iraq valued at $163.06 million and 28 assistance awards in Syria valued at $468.22 million during the quarter. (See Table 3, and pages 18-22.)

PERSONNEL AND FORCE POSTURE

During the quarter, CJTF-OIR continued to adapt its force posture in response to OEF. In preparation for combat operations, which began on February 28, CJTF-OIR reduced and relocated forces. CJTF-OIR's priorities shifted to force protection, countering Iran-aligned militias, and assisting USCENTCOM with theater-wide strategic and operational requirements.[17]

Jordan: U.S. forces transitioned headquarters to support counterterrorism operations from Amman. Admiral Cooper testified that the move enables redeployment of personnel and assets from Iraq and allows OIR to continue to play a small enabling and convening role while partner security forces do most of the counterterrorism work.[18]

Iraq: U.S. forces operated largely from Erbil Air Base and the Erbil Diplomatic Support Center in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). U.S. forces maintained a presence at the U.S. embassy compound in Baghdad.[19]

On March 2, State approved the U.S. Mission Iraq's request for the ordered departure for non-emergency U.S. direct hire employees and all eligible family members at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and the Consulate General in Erbil. Locally employed staff were directed to telework following the start of OEF. However, by the end of the quarter, the embassy's locally employed staff had returned to the office full-time.[20]

In April, the United States completely withdrew its forces from Syria and transferred its last open base, the Northern Landing Zone, to the Syrian government.

Syria: In April, the United States completely withdrew its forces from Syria and transferred its last open base, the Northern Landing Zone, to the Syrian government. The transfer marked an end to more than a decade of CJTF-OIR presence in the country.[21] State said that it continued to assess options for future diplomatic presence in Syria, including the potential resumption of operations of the U.S. Embassy in Damascus.[22]

ACTIVITY IN IRAQ

The United States continued to engage Iraq on the future bilateral security relationship beyond the OIR mission.[23] These discussions occurred as a new Iraqi government formed in May with the designation of Ali al-Zaidi as prime minister.[24] State reported that the new government faces a complex security and economic environment, marked by U.S. pressure to rein in Iran-aligned militias operating within Iraqi borders; the continuous requirement to counter active ISIS operations; and managing a severe contraction in national oil export revenues, due primarily by the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz.[25]

However, the DIA noted that deep-seated partisan divisions between regional factions continue to undermine successful government formation within the IKR, complicate essential coordination with the federal government in Baghdad, and slow progress toward the creation of a unified, non-partisan security force.[26]

U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITY

The OUSW(P) reported that posture changes and the volatile security environment in Iraq and Syria continued to hinder the execution of CTEF-supported activities. Reduced physical access, heightened force protection constraints, and changes in both the location and scale of the U.S. military presence have degraded the DoW's ability to conduct onsite monitoring of partner-nation units and equipment end-use, assess future material and training needs for partner forces, and carry out certain train-and-equip activities.[27]

USCENTCOM said that as CJTF-OIR approaches its scheduled sunset and force reductions associated with broader regional drawdown efforts proceed, direct U.S. support and oversight capabilities will become more limited. USCENTCOM said that this transition underscores the necessity of robust bilateral planning and the rapid assumption of security responsibilities by host-nation forces.[28]

Support to the Iraqi Security Forces: Following the reduction of its advisory mission in federal Iraq last quarter, CJTF-OIR transitioned several of its responsibilities to the U.S. Military Group-Iraq (USMILGRP-I).[29] Operating out of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, USMILGRP-I is a joint team of U.S. military and U.S. Government civilians. This transition shifts the operational oversight of security cooperation activities in Iraq from temporary military task force command to established Title 22 authorities administered by State.[30]

Support to the Peshmerga: In the IKR, CJTF-OIR temporarily suspended advisory support to the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs and Peshmerga last quarter due to urgent force protection issues associated with OEF.[31] The current memorandum of understanding for advisory support with the ministry is due to expire in September, though the United States will be able to continue support after that date.[32]

USCENTCOM assessed that while the Kurdistan Regional Government is making progress on Peshmerga reform, it is not yet capable of fully absorbing responsibilities previously supported through CTEF. The Kurdistan Regional Government's capacity to independently manage training, readiness, and salaries is considered limited and uneven.[33]

End-use Monitoring (EUM): Defense articles and materiel provided to Iraq under the Arms Export Control Act are subject to EUM to ensure compliance with the terms of the transfer agreement. Monitors from USMILGRP-I conduct EUM. Routine EUM is a requirement that occurs in conjunction with other security cooperation events during which the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Counter Terrorism Service, and the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs account for thousands of defense articles in quarterly reports.[34]

Enhanced EUM is a requirement for annual, in-person accounting of enhanced-designated articles. In Iraq, night-vision devices and Stinger missiles comprise 95 percent of the nearly 5,900 enhanced-designated articles. When security conditions prevent monitors from traveling to conduct in-person accounting where the items are normally stored, Iraqi partners aggregate items at locations accessible to U.S. personnel. This allows the serial numbers of designated articles to be verified, ensuring compliance with regulations and applicable transfer agreements.[35]

Between the spring of 2024 and March 2026, U.S. personnel verified 6,362 defense articles during physical inspection visits, State said. However, since U.S. Mission Iraq returned to ordered departure status in March 2026, degraded security conditions and site access constraints have prevented U.S. personnel from conducting physical inspections. Instead, Iraqi partners have conducted EUM operations compliant with EUM regulations. Despite these challenges, USMILGRP-I achieved 97.7 percent EUM compliance from June 10 to June 30.[36]

Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR): State's NADR account supports security-related programs that reduce threats posed by international terrorist activities, explosive remnants of war, and stockpiles of excess conventional weapons and munitions, among other activities.[37]

NADR-supported conventional weapons destruction programs surveyed and cleared U.S.-origin munitions in southern Iraq, explosive remnants of war residual contamination in northern Iraq and the IKR, and explosive hazards contamination in areas liberated from ISIS. Additionally, NADR's antiterrorism assistance programs sought to strengthen Iraq's investigations, prosecutions, border security, crisis response, case management, and forensics capabilities.[38]

NADR's global threat reduction programs allocated approximately $976,000 to secure chemical and biological materials, dual-use technologies, and to counter threats from unmanned aerial systems (UAS) used by Iranian-aligned proxies against U.S. forces and regional partners. Also, NADR continued to fund security assistance programs to enhance Iraq's border security at Baghdad International Airport and various land crossings.[39]

Force Protection in Iraq

The DIA reported that since the start of OEF, Iran-aligned militias have launched hundreds of attacks against U.S. forces and U.S. diplomatic facilities in Iraq.[40] The OUSW(P) said that the United States remained focused on preventing Iran-aligned elements from gaining further influence within Iraq's government and security forces.[41] According to State, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, who assumed the role on May 14, understands that U.S. support comes with the expectation for immediate tangible steps to disarm Iran-aligned militia groups and improved U.S.-Iraq relations.[42]

Prime Minister al-Zaidi gave the militias a September 30 deadline to surrender their weapons. Two prominent Iran-aligned armed groups agreed to turn in their weapons by the deadline. Other armed groups have refused to comply. CJTF-OIR said that these groups retain inventories of rockets, missiles, UAS, and in some cases, air defense systems that are capable of threatening U.S. personnel and facilities in Iraq and the region.[43]

In April, before Ali al-Zaidi's selection as prime minister, the United States paused training for the Iraqi Security Forces and suspended shipments of U.S. dollars to Iraq to pressure the Iraqi government to reduce the ability of Iran and its militias to attack U.S. interests. In late June, the United States resumed the dollar shipments but training remained suspended.[44]

In April, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) announced sanctions against 7 senior militia commanders for roles in directing attacks against U.S. forces. In May, Treasury designated Iraq's Deputy Minister of Oil and three senior leaders of Iran—aligned militias for illicit activities. Treasury said that it designated the Deputy Minister of Oil for abusing his position to facilitate the diversion of Iraqi oil revenues for the benefit of the Iranian regime and its proxy militias in Iraq.[45]

U.S. ASSISTANCE

State reported that international organizations continued to implement U.S. Government humanitarian awards during the quarter.[46] State reported that non-U.S. international donor funding for development and civil society in Iraq remained insufficient relative to the country's significant development needs, limiting the capacity of civil society organizations, State said.[47] The World Food Program noted that, despite heightened food insecurity, funding shortfalls required the discontinuation of cash payments to more than 300,000 displaced Syrians in Iraq in favor of increased support to vulnerable Iraqis.[48]

Al-Amal Camp: The United States funds several international partners to provide assistance to displaced Iraqis at the al-Amal camp.[49] A grant to the World Food Program provided food assistance to 4,187 residents as of June 23. This program, which also supported the modernization of Iraqi government social protection systems, continued uninterrupted despite regional tensions.[50] A separate grant to the International Organization for Migration provided emergency housing, medical treatment, and trauma recovery services for 100,000 displaced Iraqis, including those who returned from al-Hol.[51]

Within the camp, U.S. funding supports the International Organization for Migration's delivery of camp management services and mapping and the UN Children's Agency (UNICEF) programs providing water and sanitation.[52]

Satisfaction surveys indicate positive feedback on the International Organization for Migration's implementation of essential services overall. However, significant barriers prevent residents from leaving the camp and returning to their homes. These challenges include a lack of civil documentation (affecting more than half of the returnees), movement restrictions, social stigma, housing and income insecurity, and limited access to government compensation for destroyed property.[53]

Monitoring of U.S. Assistance: State continues to manage a regional third-party monitoring award that covers both Syria and Iraq.[54] State said that access to sites and the ability to monitor and evaluate U.S. programs remained steady during the quarter.[55] Monitoring staff in Syria visited 29 sites in 5 governorates to evaluate 6 implementing partners across 6 sectors, according to State.[56] In Iraq, the third-party monitor reported allegations of goods improperly transported to recipients' homes.[57] The implementer committed to updating its procedures to resolve this issue in the future, and State reported that it would follow-up with the implementer during normally scheduled biweekly check-ins.[58]

Monitoring staff in Syria visited 29 sites in 5 governorates to evaluate 6 implementing partners across 6 sectors, according to State.

ACTIVITY IN SYRIA

In Syria, absent a U.S. embassy or persistent U.S. military presence, the United States continued to engage the new government of Ahmed al-Shara'a, mainly from Jordan and Türkiye. During the quarter, the Syrian government focused on several issues, including the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—the longtime U.S. security partner—into the new government's military. Concurrently, the United States worked to address ongoing Israeli military activity in southern Syria, reintegrate the country into the global financial system, and mitigate a persistent humanitarian crisis.[59]

U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITY

U.S. direct action: USCENTCOM reported that U.S. forces killed an ISIS leader in an airstrike in Syria in June.[60]

Engagement with the Syrian government: The U.S. military worked to establish closer military-to-military alignment with Syrian government forces, though USCENTCOM said that this effort has not involved plans for a permanent presence in Damascus.[61] The U.S. military coordinates most engagements with the Syrian government through the Damascus Coordination Center, co-located with the Joint Training Center in Jordan.[62]

CJTF-OIR and the Combined Special Operations Joint Task Force-Central said that they coordinated with Syrian ministries and intelligence services to enable mine-clearance, training operations, force protection, and counter-ISIS operations. These efforts facilitated government concurrence for specific operations and enhanced operational access, though approval processes and political sensitivities continued to shape the scope and tempo of partnered activities.[63] U.S. special operations forces do not conduct partnered operations with Syrian government elements.[64]

Ibrahim Olabi, Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, briefs on the situation in Syria, on April 24, 2026. (UN photo)

The OUSW(P) said that any future counterterrorism-related engagement in Syria would depend on broader U.S. Government policy decisions and authorities, as well as partner force viability and conditions on the ground.[65] The OUSW(P) said that vetting of partner security forces remains an ongoing issue in Syria, and that the end of the U.S. military presence and resulting access constraints complicate the identification, assessment, and vetting of potential counter-ISIS partners.[66]

U.S. DIPLOMACY

State's Syria Regional Platform, located in both the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul and the U.S. Embassy in Amman, continued to support U.S. policy priorities related to Syria—including in-person diplomatic engagements in Damascus—despite some staff operating on ordered departure due to OEF.[67] State said that it continued to assess options for a future diplomatic presence in Syria, including the potential resumption of operations of the U.S. Embassy in Damascus.[68] Last quarter, State informed Congress of its intention to implement a "phased approach" to potentially resume embassy operations, including robust support for security.[69]

The U.S. Interests Section at the Czech embassy in Damascus continued to manage specific consular and legal matters in Syria. In its capacity as the U.S. Protecting Power, the Czech government performs two primary functions: it responds to inquiries from U.S. citizens in Syria and directs them to the Consular Section at the U.S. Embassy in Amman as appropriate for assistance, and transmits U.S. court documents to the Syrian government.[70]

Diplomatic engagement with the Syrian government: During the quarter, State reported that it continued high-level engagement and coordination with the Syrian government to address needs and identify capacity gaps.[71] In late May, U.S. President Donald J. Trump spoke by phone with Syrian President al-Shara'a.[72]

State continued to monitor the implementation of the January 29 agreement to integrate the SDF into the Syrian government.[73] U.S. officials mediated the agreement between the parties.[74] As of the end of the quarter, most provisions of the agreement were completed or on track, State said.[75]

In June, U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye, Thomas Barrack, was named Special Presidential Envoy to Iraq and Syria. In his new role, Ambassador Barrack will cover cross-cutting policy issues that involve both countries, State said.[76] (See Table 4.)

U.S. diplomacy with international partners: State said that it continued to engage with allies and partners across the region and within the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS to encourage support for security needs and economic growth in Syria.[77] By joining the Global Coalition on November 10, 2025, the Syrian government aligned itself with the international community's mission to eradicate ISIS remnants, signaling a commitment to intelligence-sharing, border security, and joint operations that make both Syrians and Americans safer, State said.[78]

During the reporting period, the Syrian government consolidated control across the country and further developed its ability to counter terrorist threats. In addition, State continued diplomatic efforts to strengthen the Syrian's government's security relationships with other countries in the region.[79]

Ambassador Barrack continued to meet with Syrian and Israeli leaders to broker a security arrangement between the two countries; however, most efforts were on hold due to Operation Epic Fury.[80] During the quarter, Israel continued its military activities in southern Syria.[81]

Table 4.

U.S. Diplomatic Engagement with Syria, April–June 2026

April 9: Ambassador Barrack met with Foreign Minister Assad Hassan al-Shaibani in Ankara.
April 16: Ambassador Barrack met with President al-Shara'a in Türkiye.
May 13: Ambassador Barrack met with Mohammad Kantari, Chargé d 'Affaires of the Syrian Embassy in Washington D.C.
May 17: Ambassador Barrack and President al-Shara'a met in Damascus.
May 31: President Trump and President al-Shara'a spoke by phone.
June 8: U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright met with Minister of Energy Mohammad al-Bashir in Washington, D.C., to discuss investment opportunities in Syria's energy and infrastructure sectors.
June 14: Ambassador Barrack and Foreign Minister al-Shaibani met in Istanbul to discuss stability in the Middle East and U.S.-Syria relations.
June 16: Ambassador Barrack met with Iraq Prime Minister al-Zaidi, discussed Iraq-Syria cooperation.
June 18: Ambassador Barrack met with SDF leader Mazloum Abdi in Erbil, Iraq.

Source: State, vetting comment, 8/10/2026.

In early July, the Trump Administration announced its intent to rescind Syria's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism following counterterrorism actions taken by President al-Sharaa's government.

In January, a joint fusion mechanism was set up between Syria and Israel to facilitate coordination on military de-escalation, diplomatic engagement, intelligence sharing, and commercial opportunities under the supervision of the United States.[82]

The United States continued to engage with Türkiye on Syria, including to support dialogue between the Syrian government and the SDF aimed at integrating the SDF into the Syrian military. According to State, the U.S. forces' departure from Syria has not affected diplomatic coordination with Türkiye.[83] The DIA said that Türkiye supports the integration of the SDF into the Syrian military to enhance stability in Syria and contribute to Türkiye's own peace process with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist group.[84] This move would place the SDF under Syrian state control, mitigating what Türkiye views as a security threat along its southern border.[85]

State Sponsor of Terrorism designation: In early July, the Trump Administration announced its intent to rescind Syria's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism following counterterrorism actions taken by President al-Shara'a's government. Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that the decision to rescind the designation "marks a significant milestone" in the U.S.-Syria relationship.[86] The termination of the designation, which has been in place since 1979, would remove a significant final barrier to U.S. investment in Syria and remove an obstacle to further partnership with Syrian military forces in operations against ISIS.[87]

Separately, on May 7, State removed Syria from its annual certification list of countries it determined were not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.[88]

Integration of Syria into the global financial system: State continued to work with the Syrian government to reintegrate Syria into the global financial system.[89] State said that it pushed for banking solutions and regulatory clarity, and supported investment guides for companies looking to invest in Syria.[90] Treasury reported that Syria's Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Syria committed to reforming the country's anti-money laundering laws and to countering the financing of terrorism.[91]

Demining, chemical weapons, and counternarcotics: State's Conventional Weapons Destruction strategy in Syria focuses on demining operations to reduce threats posed by landmines, improvised explosive devices, and unexploded ordnance. This strategy includes support for the surveillance and clearance of contaminated areas to make sites safe for use.[92]

Additionally, State continued to work with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to support the complete and verifiable destruction of any remnants of the former Syrian regime's chemical weapons program.[93]

State also manages one community security project in Syria that plans to support the Syrian government's counternarcotics efforts in southern Syria.[94] During the quarter, the Syrian government undertook numerous operations to disrupt captagon trafficking, a key Hezbollah source of financing, State reported.[95]

Korean rice dispatched and distributed by a World Food Programme partner in Syria, on March 10, 2026. (World Food Programme photo)

Syrians in the United States: On June 25, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Trump Administration can cancel temporary protected status for aliens from Syrian living legally in the United States, citing the end of the Syrian civil war. In September 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security terminated temporary protected status for approximately 6,000 Syrians.[96] State accredited a consul at the Syrian embassy in Washington, D.C., to perform consular services to Syrians residing in the United States.[97]

Syrian Support for Operation Epic Fury: Since the start of OEF, the Syrian government took additional steps to fortify its borders and prevent Hezbollah and Iran-backed militias from entering Syria.[98] State reported that it now considers Syria a partner for stability across the entire Levant, aligned not just against ISIS, but also against Hezbollah, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and other terrorist groups.[99] During the quarter, the Syrian government undertook a series of security measures against Hezbollah-linked cells in Syria.[100]

U.S. ASSISTANCE

According to State, humanitarian assistance needs in Syria remained the same as last quarter, although the UN Security Council noted needs might increase in 2026 with the arrival in Syria of some 400,000 people fleeing Lebanon since early March.[101] Approximately 15 million people in Syria required assistance, the United Nations reported in May, as crisis levels of hunger persisted across much of the country.[102]

As of June 30, the U.S. Government was the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Syria, State reported.[103] Last quarter, the U.S. Government pledged $150 million to the Syria Humanitarian Fund, a fund managed by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to provide rapid, flexible financing to international and national NGOs and UN agencies in Syria to deliver lifesaving aid.[104] The fund prioritizes the highest needs in water, sanitation, and hygiene; health; shelter; protection; and food assistance throughout the country, State reported.[105]

State reported that, as of June 30, only one award transferred to State management from USAID remained active in Syria, focused on emergency food, protection, and medical assistance.[106] State said that it had awarded four new grants totaling $4 million during the quarter.[107] Each of these new awards has a 2-month period of performance (June 1 through July 31) intended to bridge the gap between the end of existing State and former USAID awards in Syria and the start of activities under OCHA's pooled funds, according to State.[108]

State said that with the closure of al-Hol camp in February, most remaining funds for the camp had been reallocated.[109] The approximately $1 million in equipment and commodities pending disposition from expired or otherwise terminated programs will be addressed as part of the normal award closeout process.[110]

Humanitarian access: Implementers pulled some international staff out of Syria due to OEF.[111] Additionally, flooding along the Euphrates River in May damaged cropland and irrigation in Dayr az-Zawr and Raqqah provinces, which required U.S. implementers to divert resources to address effects of the flood.[112]

Assistance monitoring: State continued to manage multiple third-party monitoring contracts for its humanitarian and stabilization assistance awards in Syria. The monitors visited sites in-person and presented areas for improvement.[113]

SDF-guarded Detention Centers and Displaced Persons Camps

With the Syrian government's takeover of northeastern Syria in January, the SDF retreated from approximately a dozen detention facilities and displacement camps where they had been providing security with U.S. forces' support.[114]

As a result, about 200 ISIS-affiliated detainees held at the Shaddadi facility escaped and as many as 20,000 displaced people residing at the al-Hol camp departed. While most of the escaped detainees from Shaddadi were recaptured, al-Hol closed in February, and most former residents' whereabouts remain unknown, although most remained in Syria, according to the DIA.[115]

The DIA reported that the Syrian government closed several detention centers during the quarter and plans to consolidate others under the Ministry of the Interior. The Syrian government said that it would vet detainees for ISIS affiliation, according to the DIA.[116]

As of the end of the quarter, the SDF continued to administer and provide security for Roj camp, housing approximately 2,400 people.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A
Classified Appendix to this Report

A classified appendix to this report provides additional information on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The appendix will be delivered to relevant agencies and congressional committees.

APPENDIX B
About the Lead Inspector General

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (codified at 5 U.S.C. Sections 401-424), established in section 419 the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies are the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of War (DoW), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Section 419 requires the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to appoint a Lead Inspector General from among the inspectors general of the Lead IG agencies upon the commencement or designation of a military operation that exceeds 60 days as an overseas contingency operation: or receipt of notification thereof.

Lead IG oversight of the operation "sunsets" at the end of the first fiscal year after commencement or designation in which the total amount appropriated for the operation is less than $100 million.

The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out Lead IG statutory responsibilities to:

- Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis a report on the contingency operation and to make that report available to the public.
- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations.

The Overseas Contingency Operations Joint Planning Group serves as a primary venue to coordinate audits, inspections, and evaluations of U.S. Government-funded activities supporting overseas contingency operations, including those relating to the Middle East.

The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees, as well as contractors, to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and provide consolidated planning and reporting on the status of overseas contingency operations.

APPENDIX C
Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Report

To fulfill the congressional mandate to report on OIR, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not independently verified or audited the information collected through open-source research or from Federal agencies, and the information provided represents the view of the source cited in each instance.

The DoW IG, as the Lead IG for this operation, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The Lead IG agencies draft input to the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once assembled, each OIG coordinates a two-phase review process of the report within its own agency. During the first review, the Lead IG agencies ask relevant offices within their agencies to comment, correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG agencies incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review prior to publication. The final report reflects the editorial view of the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs as independent oversight agencies.

APPENDIX D
U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs in Iraq and Syria

Table 5.

State Humanitarian Awards in Iraq, as of June 2026

Award Title	Award Value ($ millions)	Period of Performance
Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Assistance to Returnees from NE Syria at Al-Amal Camp	**$49.40**	Sep 2024–Dec 2026
Emergency Response and Essential Services to Victims of Armed Conflict	**$14.90**	Jan 2026–Dec 2026
Unconditional Food Assistance Through e-Vouchers to Returnees from Northeast Syria*	**$8.30**	Feb 2024–Jun 2026
Providing Integrated Humanitarian Assistance to Displaced Population in Iraq–Phase II	**$6.70**	Oct 2024–Sep 2026
Essential Services for Children Returning from NE Syria at Al-Amal Camp	**$3.60**	Sep 2025–Dec 2026

*Transferred from USAID to State management on 7/1/2025.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/10/2026.

Table 6.

State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Awards in Iraq, as of June 2026

Award Title	Award Value ($ millions)	Period of Performance
School-based Civic Engagement for Reconciliation	**$3.00**	Sep 2022–Jun 2026
Filling the Gap: Sustaining Accountability for International Crimes	**$2.00**	Sep 2024–Sep 2026
Iraqi Changemakers	**$1.78**	Sep 2024–Sep 2026
Empowering the C4RJ to Effectively Monitor and Support Efforts to Advance Transitional Justice in Iraq	**$1.75**	Sep 2022–Sep 2026
Restorative/Transitional Justice: Truth-Telling, Memorialization, and Reconciliation	**$1.70**	Sep 2024–Sep 2028
You are the Voice	**$1.70**	Sep 2024–Sep 2026
Supporting Land Management and Natural Resources Good Governance	**$1.30**	Sep 2024–Sep 2026
You Are the Change	**$1.30**	Sep 2024–Sep 2026
Justice for the Shabak	**$1.00**	Sep 2024–Sep 2026
Protect	**$1.00**	Sep 2024–Sep 2026

Award Title	Award Value ($ millions)	Period of Performance
SAFA	**$1.00**	Sep 2024–Sep 2026
Promoting Governmental and Civil Society Partnership in Human Rights	**$1.00**	Sep 2023–Sep 2026
Advanced Local Approach in Service Provision for Survivors	**$0.94**	Sep 2024–Sep 2026

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/10/2026.

Table 7.

State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Awards in Iraq, Non–Humanitarian, as of June 2026

Award Title	Award Value ($ millions)	Period of Performance
Building Tomorrow STEM and Opportunity	**$5.14**	Sep 2023–Sep 2028
U.S. Department of State NEA/Office of Assistance Coordination and Department of Commerce	**$4.20**	Sep 2023–Sep 2026
Supporting American-Style Higher Education	**$3.75**	Oct 2023–Sep 2028
Strengthening American-Style Higher Education	**$2.55**	Oct 2022–Sep 2027
Developing a New College of Education at AUIB	**$2.50**	Oct 2022– Sep 2027
Advancing American-Style Education in Iraq Through the Center for the Advancement of Higher Education in Iraq and the Innovation Lab for Artificial Intelligence and Digital Engineering	**$2.10**	Oct 2024–Sep 2026
Promoting American-Style Higher Education at the Catholic University in Erbil: Investing in Women's Leadership and English Language Excellence	**$1.97**	Oct 2023–Sep 2027
Strategic Pathways to Excellence in CUE's Accreditation and Social Inclusion Efforts	**$1.90**	Oct 2024–Sep 2026
Strengthening Institutional Capacity	**$1.50**	Oct 2022–Sep 2026
Beyond Material Support: Promoting Accountability in Iraq	**$1.45**	Oct 2021–Sep 2026
Yezidi Strategic Litigation Initiative	**$0.80**	Oct 2024–Sep 2026

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/10/2026; State, vetting comment, 8/10/2026.

Table 8.

State Bureau of Counterterrorism Awards in Iraq, as of June 2026

Award Title	Award Value ($ millions)	Period of Performance
Preventing the Resurgence of ISIS in Syria	**$25.00**	Sep 2025–Sep 2027
Strengthening Terrorism Investigations and Courtroom Effectiveness in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region	**$3.42**	Sep 2025–Sep 2027
Forensic Advisory Support to Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service (ICTS) Continuation	**$2.00**	Sep 2025–Sep 2027
Forensic Advisory Support to Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service (ICTS)	**$1.30**	Sep 2024–Sep 2026
Strengthening the Rehabilitation and Reintegrating of Iraqi Returnees from Northeast Syria	**$1.13**	Sep 2024–Sep 2026

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/10/2026; State, vetting comment, 8/10/2026.

Table 9.

State Humanitarian Awards in Syria, as of June 2026

Award Title	Award Value ($ millions)	Period of Performance
UNOCHA Syria Humanitarian Fund	**$150.00**	Feb 2026–Dec 2026
Lifesaving Interventions for Emergencies*	**$88.10**	Jul 2023–Sep 2026
2025 Global Appeal/Emergency Appeal for Syria	**$51.40**	Jan 2025–Sep 2026
2026 Global Appeal	**$33.00**	Jan 2026–Dec 2026
Suwayda Emergency Response	**$23.40**	Oct 2025–Jul 2026
Al-Hol and Roj Camps in NE Syria	**$13.00**	Sep 2025–Mar 2027
Lifesaving Services and Safe Returns from al-Hol	**$7.10**	Sep 2025– Mar 2027
Humanitarian Assistance to Palestinians	**$5.00**	Oct 2024–Jun 2026
Third Party NEA Humanitarian (shared regionally across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon)	**$4.50**	Oct 2025–Sept 2026
Integrated Education and Protection Services for At-Risk Children, Youth and their Families at al-Hol camp (paused due to al-Hol closure)	**$2.90**	Sep 2023–Sep 2026
Life-saving Assistance to Vulnerable Populations in NES	**$1.50**	Jun 2026–Jul 2026
Integrated Life Saving Emergency Assistance for Conflict-Affected Populations	**$1.25**	Jun 2026–Jul 2026
Strengthening Access to Life-Saving Primary Healthcare Services for Vulnerable Conflict Affected Populations in Idlib and Aleppo	**$0.75**	Jun 2026–Jul 2026

Award Title	Award Value ($ millions)	Period of Performance
Third Party Monitoring	**$0.68**	Sep 2025–Sep 2026
Operation Lifeline	**$0.50**	Jun 2026–Jul 2026

*Transferred from USAID to State management on 7/1/2025.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/10/2026.

Table 10.

State Stabilization Awards in Syria, as of June 2026

Award Title	Award Value ($ millions)	Period of Performance
Supporting Local Governance and Essential Services in Syria (inclusive of foreign donor funding)	**$26.90**	May 2023–Dec 2026
Supporting Community Security in Syria (inclusive of foreign donor funding)	**$24.50**	Oct 2023–Sep 2026
Third Party Monitoring-NEA Stabilization	**$3.05**	Sep 2021–Sep 2026

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/10/2026; State, vetting comment, 8/10/2026.

Table 11.

State PM/WRA Award in Syria, as of June 2026

Award Title	Award Value ($ millions)	Period of Performance
Mine Action in Northeast Syria	**$22.55**	April 2023–May 2027

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/10/2026.

Table 12.

State Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Awards in Syria, as of June 2026

Award Title	Award Value ($ millions)	Period of Performance
Empowered Local Organizations are Resilient Ambassadors Advocating for Human Rights in Northeast and Northwest Syria	**$3.20**	Sep 2021–Apr 2026
Addressing the Crisis of the Missing Detainees	**$2.40**	Sep 2023–Sep 2026
Enhancing the Bureaucracy of Disappearance	**$1.60**	Sep 2023–Mar 2027
Exposing the Bureaucracy of Disappearance	**$1.60**	Sep 2023 –Mar 2027
Voices of Syria: Justice and Accountability	**$1.20**	Oct 2023–Apr 2026
Investigating Starvation	**$1.00**	Sep 2024–Apr 2026
Support to Survivors of Torture, Gender-Based Violence, and Other Atrocities	**$1.00**	Sep 2024–Sep 2026
Pathway to Peace	**$1.00**	Sep 2024–Sep 2026
Protecting Civic Space through Digital Resilience	**$1.00**	Sep 2024–Oct 2026
Safe Children	**$0.87**	Sep 2024–Dec 2026
Digital Archiving Promotes Accountability	**$0.75**	Sep 2023–Sep 2026
Strengthening IDPs and Marginalized Groups	**$0.75**	Sep 2023–Aug 2026

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 7/10/2026; State, vetting comment, 8/10/2026.

APPENDIX E
Completed Oversight Projects

From April 1 to June 30, 2026, the Lead IG agencies and partner agencies did not issue any reports related to OIR.

APPENDIX F
Ongoing Oversight Projects

Tables 13 and 14 list the titles and objectives for Lead IG and partner agencies' ongoing oversight projects related to OIR.

Table 13.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OIR by Lead IG Agencies, as of June 30, 2026

DEPARTMENT OF WAR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Audit of the DoW's Management of the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) Program Resources for Detention Facilities and Displaced Persons Camps (Project No. D2025-D000RJ-0044.000) To assess the effectiveness of the DoW's management of CTEF program resources for the improvement of security and humane conditions at detention facilities and displaced persons camps for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria detainees.
Audit of the DoW's Oversight of Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund Equipment Designated for Iraq (Project No. D2025-D000RJ-0093.000) To assess the effectiveness of the DoW's oversight of CTEF equipment designated for Iraq. To assess the effectiveness with which the DoW implemented the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan and whether the implementation was in accordance with the Secretary of War's guidance and directed timelines.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Evaluation of Department of State Administration of Foreign Assistance Programs Transferred from the U.S. Agency for International Development (Project No. 25AUD049) To describe State's administration of USAID foreign assistance programs and associated awards transferred to State.
Audit of the Department of State's Vetting Processes to Mitigate Terrorist Financing Risks in the Near East (Project No. 25AUD053) To determine whether State designed and implemented its risk-management and vetting processes to mitigate the risk of terrorist organizations benefiting from U.S. foreign assistance funds in the Near East.
Audit of the Department of State's Administration of U.S. Contributions to the Global Fund (Project No. 26AUD047) To determine whether State has 1) taken necessary steps to address risks associated with administering U.S. contributions to the Global Fund and 2) established effective monitoring and reporting mechanisms to promote oversight and accountability of U.S. contributions to the Global Fund.
Evaluation of the Department of State's Data Reliability of Foreign Assistance Awards (Project No. 26ISP051) To determine the extent to which integrated USAID and State financial and award data are reliable and sufficient for State bureaus to make informed decisions, and to identify potential opportunities for State to expand its oversight of assistance awards.
Evaluation of the Department of State's Regional Bureaus' Administration of Foreign Assistance Programs (Project No. 26ISP007) To 1) determine the extent to which State's regional bureaus are administering foreign assistance; and 2) assess State's regional bureaus' administration of foreign assistance.

Table 14.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OIR by Lead IG Partner Agencies, as of June 30, 2026

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
USCIS Priority-2 (P-2) Direct Access Program (DAP) for U.S. Affiliated Iraqis (Project No. 25-027-ISP-USCIS, ICE) To determine whether U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) have taken corrective actions on potentially improper refugee resettlement determinations under the Priority-2 (P-2) Direct Access Program (DAP) for U.S.-affiliated Iraqis, and USCIS has implemented controls to detect and prevent fraud in the program.

APPENDIX G
Planned Oversight Projects

Table 15 lists the titles and objectives for Lead IG and partner agencies' planned oversight projects related to OIR.

Table 15.

Planned Oversight Projects Related to OIR by Lead IG Agencies, as of June 30, 2026

DEPARTMENT OF WAR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Evaluation of the U.S. Central Command's Integration of Artificial Intelligence To determine the extent to which the U.S. Central Command's current Artificial Intelligence integration strategies are contributing to operational effectiveness across key functional areas, including intelligence analysis, logistics, and cybersecurity.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Evaluation of the Department of State's Administration of Its Continuing Foreign Assistance Programs To describe State's administration of foreign assistance programs and associated awards approved to continue following the reviews required by Executive orders.
Evaluation of the Department's Establishment and Management of the Syria Mission Platform To evaluate State's establishment and management of the Syria Mission Platform.
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Evaluation of USAID's Capacity to Manage Risks Associated with Award Terminations To describe changes to USAID's organizational capacity to process award terminations since January 2025 and determine the extent to which USAID has staffing, policies, and procedures in place to mitigate risks associated with award terminations.
Audit of Chemonics International's Termination Settlement Proposals for Terminated Awards To determine the allowability, allocability, and reasonableness of costs claimed in a sample of Chemonics' TSPs in accordance with Federal regulations.

APPENDIX H
Hotline and Investigations

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority.

During this quarter, the DoD OIG Hotline received 26 allegations and referred 17 cases related to OIR to Lead IG agencies and other investigative organizations. In some instances, a case may contain multiple subjects and allegations. State OIG received 37 allegations related to OIR and referred 27 for investigation. USAID OIG received 3 allegations related to OIR.

The DoW OIG's criminal investigative component, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), worked on cases related to OIR from offices in Europe and the United States. State OIG and USAID OIG investigators worked on cases related to OIR from Washington, D.C., El Salvador, Germany, Israel, South Africa, and Thailand.

During this quarter, investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies ended with 22 open investigations, while 3 investigations were closed during the quarter. No referrals were made to the Department of Justice during the quarter.

The Lead IG agencies and their partners coordinate investigative activities, deconflict potential or common targets, and interact for logistical and legal support. The investigative partner agencies consist of representatives from DCIS, State OIG, USAID OIG, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

ACRONYMS

Acronym	
CJTF-OIR	Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve
CTEF	Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoW	Department of War
EUM	end-use monitoring
FMF	foreign military financing
IKR	Iraqi Kurdistan Region
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
Lead IG	Lead Inspector General
LoE	Line of Effort
NADR	Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OEF	Operation Epic Fury

Acronym	
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OIR	Operation Inherent Resolve
OUSW(C)	Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
OUSW(P)	Office of the Under Secretary of War for Policy
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
SFA	Syrian Free Army
State	Department of State
UAS	unmanned aerial system
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USMILGRP-I	U.S. Military Group-Iraq

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