EAST AFRICA AND NORTH AND WEST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

JULY 1, 2019-SEPTEMBER 30, 2019

Classified By: Michael S. Child, Sr., Deputy Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations
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(U) ABOUT THIS REPORT

(U) In January 2013, legislation was enacted creating the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. This legislation, which amended the Inspector General Act, requires the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide quarterly reports to Congress on active overseas contingency operations.

(U) The DoD Inspector General (IG) was designated as the Lead IG for the East Africa Overseas Contingency Operation and the North and West Africa Overseas Contingency Operation. The DoS IG is the Associate IG for these two operations. The USAID IG also participates in oversight for the operations.

(U) These operations seek to degrade al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-affiliated terrorists in specific regions of Africa, are classified. There are no unclassified reports on these operations. This classified report constitutes the entirety of Lead IG reporting on these operations and is provided to relevant agencies and congressional committees.

(U) The Offices of Inspector General of the DoD, DoS, and USAID are referred to in this report as the Lead IG agencies. Other partner agencies also contribute to oversight of these two operations.

(U) The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out their statutory missions to:

- (U) Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the contingency operation.
- (U) Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and evaluations.
- (U) Report quarterly to Congress and the public on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead IG agencies.

(U) METHODOLOGY

(U) To produce this quarterly report, the Lead IG agencies submit requests for information to the DoD, DoS, and USAID about these two classified counterterorrism operations and related programs. The Lead IG agencies also gather data and information from open sources, including congressional testimony, policy research organizations, press conferences, think tanks, and media reports.

(U) The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of formal audits, inspections, or evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the data and information provided by the agencies. For further details on the methodology for this report, see Appendix A.

[redacted]

(U) FOREWORD

(U) We are pleased to submit the Lead Inspector General quarterly report to the U.S. Congress on the East Africa Counterterrorism Operation and the North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operation, pursuant to the Inspector General Act.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(d) [redacted]

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(d) [redacted].

~~(S//NF)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(d) [redacted].

(U) This report's Quarter in Review section provides information on major developments related to these operations this quarter, the status of violent extremist organizations, diplomatic and political developments, and humanitarian assistance for civilians affected by the conflict and natural disasters in the region.

(U) This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG Offices of the Inspector General and our partner oversight agencies during the period from July 1, 2019, through September 30, 2019.

(U) Working in close collaboration, we remain committed to providing comprehensive oversight and timely reporting on these counterterrorism operations.

Glenn A. Fine
Principal Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties
of Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense

Steve A. Linick
Inspector General
U.S. Department of State
and U.S. Agency for
Global Media

Ann Calvaresi Barr
Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International
Development

(U) CLASSIFICATION KEY

(U) The following classification markers are featured in this report:

(U) U.S. Classifications

(U): Unclassified

(C): Confidential

(S): Secret

(U) Dissemination Controls

(U//FOUO): Unclassified//For Official Use Only

(U//SBU): Unclassified//Sensitive but Unclassified

(S//NF): Secret//Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

(//RELIDO): //Releasable by Information Disclosure Official

(S//REL TO USA, NOR): Releasable to USA, Norway

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY): //Releasable to USA, Five Eyes (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United States, and United Kingdom)

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA): Secret//Releasable to USA, Five Eyes//Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

(S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY): Secret//Releasable to USA, France, and Five Eyes

(S//FGI ETH//NF): Secret//Foreign Government Classified Information, Ethiopia// Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

(U) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) or FISA-Derived Information

(U) The information in this report is provided for intelligence purposes only, but may be used to develop potential investigative leads. No information contained in this report, nor any information derived therefrom, may be used in any proceeding (whether criminal or civil), to include any trial, hearing, or other proceeding before any court, department, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States without the advance approval of the attorney general and/or the agency or department which originated the information contained in this report. These restrictions apply to any information extracted from this document and used in derivative publications or briefings.

On the Cover

(U) Malian special forces soldier tactically clears rooms during a training exercise in Burkina Faso. (USAFRICOM photo); Young girls line up at a feeding center in Mogadishu. (United Nations photo); C-130J Super Hercules unloads cargo at an airfield in Somalia. (U.S. Air Force photo)

(U) MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL

Glenn A. Fine

(U) This is the 5th Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report on the status of the East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, and the North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operation. This classified report summarizes this quarter's events and describes Lead IG and partner agency oversight work related to these two operations.

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d) [redacted]

~~(S)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d) [redacted].

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d) [redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(d) [redacted]

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [redacted].

We will to continue to report on these operations and seek to obtain more detailed funding information in future quarters. My colleagues and I remain committed to providing quarterly reports on activities related to these ongoing operations, consistent with the requirements of the IG Act.

Glenn A Fine

Glenn A. Fine
Principal Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense





(U) Peacekeepers from Senegal serving with the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) patrol areas in central Mali. (United Nations photo)

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(U) Aftermath of hotel bombing in Kismayo, Somalia. (Human Rights video screen capture)

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d)(g) [redacted]

(U) EAST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATION

(~~S//NF~~) Al Shabaab Attacks Demonstrate that it Remains a Threat

(~~S//NF~~) This quarter, al Shabaab carried out several complex attacks. In July, al Shabaab attacked a hotel in Kismayo, killing at least 26, including 2 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) implementer staff members. In August, the Mayor of Mogadishu was killed in an al Shabaab suicide attack. In September, al Shabaab launched vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks against Baledogle Military Airfield where U.S. forces are based, and against Italian forces in Mogadishu.[2]

(U)

(U) Mogadishu mayor, Abdirahman Omar Osman, was killed in al Shabaab attack. (U.S. Army photo)

(~~S/REL TO USA/FISA~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c) [redacted]

(~~S~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(d) [redacted]

(~~S~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c) [redacted]

(U//~~SBU~~) Embassies in Region Implement Programs to Counter al Shabaab

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U)

(U) A Somalia woman washes clothes with scarce water. (USAID photo) (U)

USAID (b)(7)(E)

[redacted]

(U) Humanitarian Organizations Increase Response in Somalia

(U) USAID reported that drought conditions in Somalia that began in late 2018 have displaced approximately 112,000 people. Additionally, protracted and continued displacement is another driver of the humanitarian crisis. Somalia now has approximately 2.6 million people—or 1 in 5 Somalis—who are internally displaced, and more than 730,000 are refugees in neighboring countries.[14]

(U) USAID's Famine Early Warning Systems Network reported that humanitarian organizations have increased sustained emergency food assistance in Somalia to "prevent worse outcomes, reduce food gaps, and mitigate the depletion of livestock assets."[15] In July, 1.9 million people in Somalia received food assistance, up from 1.2 million in May, according to USAID.[16]

(U) NORTH AND WEST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATION

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) USAFRICOM told the DoD OIG, however, that the absence of U.S. forces in Libya degrades its ability to maintain critical military-to-military contacts and tactical counterterrorism intelligence sharing.[24] USAFRICOM also reported that in the absence of a U.S. presence, it relied on Libyan security forces such as the Misrata militias and the Libyan National Army (LNA) to keep pressure on VEO networks.[25]

(U) Libyan Civil Conflict in Stalemate

(~~S//NF~~) This quarter, the civil war in Libya between the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and the LNA expanded beyond Tripoli to port cities along the Mediterranean coast and parts of central Libya.[26] However, the conflict remained at a stalemate through the end of the quarter with a military victory by either side unlikely, according to USAFRICOM.[27]

(~~S//NF~~) USAFRICOM reported that external support from the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, France, and Russia sustains the LNA's ability to attack the GNA.[28]

(~~S//NF~~) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d) [redacted]

(~~S~~) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d) [redacted]

(U//~~SBU~~) Local Partners Struggle to Support Counterterrorism Operations in Sahel

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) USAREUR (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted] According to USAFRICOM, in Burkina Faso, the military struggles with internal dissension.[35]

(~~S//RELIDO~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(b) [redacted]

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID reported that the Nigerian military increasingly hindered aid delivery to vulnerable populations this quarter through restrictions, interference, and a media campaign aimed at discrediting humanitarian organizations by falsely asserting that they provide support to Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa.[37]

(U) OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

(~~S~~) This quarter, Lead IG agencies completed seven reports related to the East Africa and North and West Africa counterterrorism operations. The reports examined USAFRICOM and Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) procedures for determining and meeting priority intelligence requirements, and accountability in humanitarian assistance programs throughout Africa.

(U) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) THE QUARTER IN REVIEW

(U) ISIS Fighters Return to Africa in Small Numbers

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(U) Limited Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Hinders USAFRICOM's Ability to Degrade VEOs

(~~S~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(d)(g) [redacted]

(~~S~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(g) [redacted]

(~~S~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(g) [redacted]

(U)

(U) A C-130J Super Hercules unloads cargo at an airfield in Somalia. (U.S. Air Force photo)

(U) THE QUARTER IN REVIEW

(U) EAST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATION

(U) STATUS OF THE CONFLICT

(U) Al Shabaab Attacks U.S. Training Base in Somalia

(~~S//NF~~) On September 30, 2019, al Shabaab attacked the Baledogle Military Airfield, a military installation used by U.S. forces. USAFRICOM reported to the DoD OIG that this is the first instance of a large-scale complex attack on the base. USAFRICOM told the DoD OIG that the militants attacked the gate with three vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and small arms fire. The first VBIED exploded prematurely, and the second VBIED destroyed a gate. A third vehicle attempted to penetrate the remnants of the gate with approximately 10 fighters. USAFRICOM reported that local security forces engaged the enemy combatants with direct fire and 60mm mortars, killing at least eight al Shabaab fighters. USAFRICOM also reported that there were no friendly casualties and no aircraft were damaged during the attack.[1]

(U)

(U) About the East Africa Counterterrorism Operation

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[redacted]

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[redacted]

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[redacted]

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted] U.S. and partner forces responded with two airstrikes that killed 10 suspected militants, according to USAFRICOM.[3]

(~~S//NF~~) USAFRICOM told the DoD OIG that Baledogle Military Airfield continues to be a long-term target for al Shabaab and will very likely remain the focus of additional attack plotting.[4] USAFRICOM assessed that this attack was likely in response to U.S. airstrikes against key al Shabaab personnel, and that it expected future attacks by al Shabaab against U.S. and Western assets throughout Africa.[5]

(U) A training camp in Somalia where al Shabaab trains fighters from various regions. (Channel 4 video screen capture)

(U)

(U) Al Shabaab Attacks Local and International Targets

(U) Also on September 30, al Shabaab militants attacked an Italian military convoy in Mogadishu, according to media reports. Major General William Gayler, USAFRICOM Director of Operations, stated to the media that, "though ineffective, [the attack] demonstrates the direct threat al Shabaab poses to Americans, our allies, and interests in the region." Italy's Ministry of Defense reported that none of its troops were injured.[11]

(U)

(U) Somalis pay respects to the Mayor of Mogadishu, who died following a suicide attack. (Human Rights video capture)

(~~S//NF~~) In July, an al Shabaab suicide attack killed the Mayor of Mogadishu. USAFRICOM reported to the DoD OIG that the United Nations envoy, James Swan (a U.S. citizen), was the likely intended target. According to USAFRICOM, al Shabaab employed two female suicide bombers in the attack—a rare but likely increasing tactic due to the probable security leniency shown toward females. USAFRICOM reported that al Shabaab also employed a female suicide bomber in the Gedo region in early August 2019, but that attack was thwarted when police killed the suicide bomber before she could detonate her explosive belt.[12]

(~~S//NF~~) USAFRICOM reported that during the quarter, al Shabaab increased its operations in Somalia's Jubaland federal member state in an effort to disrupt the August 2019 political elections. In July, al Shabaab attacked the Asasey Hotel in Kismayo, killing at least 26, including Somali-Canadian journalist, Hodan Nalayeh.[13] Al Shabaab targeted Westerners and members of the Jubaland cabinet. In July, al Shabaab targeted clan elders in Galmudug who were involved in federal and local elections.[14]

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(U) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [redacted]

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(U) STATUS OF VEOS IN EAST AFRICA

(U) Al Shabaab Maintains Operational Capabilities

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//RELIDO~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S//FGI ETH//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(U) Figure 1.

(U) Al Shabaab Security Challenge

~~(S//NF)~~

(U) Al Shabaab: A Viable Security Challenge

~~(S//NF)~~ Al Shabaab continues to be the primary terrorist threat in Somalia, occupying 20 percent of the country. Al Shabaab has carried out near daily attacks across Somalia in 2019, killing more than 1,600 people.

LEADERSHIP

(U) Qualified mid-grade leaders

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

[redacted]

OBJECTIVES

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

[redacted]

SIZE

(U) Al Shabaab stability in the past quarters

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

[redacted]

FINANCING

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

[redacted]

OPERATIONS

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

[redacted]

(U) Aftermath of Asasey Hotel car bombing attack in Somalia.

(U) Mayor of Mogadishu Abdirahman Omar Osman died following a suicide attack.

~~(S//NF)~~

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c)
[redacted]

(U) Al Shabaab Recruits Throughout East Africa and in Religious Schools

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)
[redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)
[redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c)
[redacted]

(U) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)
[redacted]

(U) According to a USAFRICOM spokesman, al Shabaab is "generally successful using threats and violence to intimidate clans and locals into paying taxes." The Somali minister of finance acknowledged that the government is largely unable to prevent business owners from paying these taxes.[35]

(U) ISIS-Somalia Lacks Capability for Large-Scale Operations

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c)
[redacted]

(U) OVERSEAS COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

(U) Figure 2.

(U) VEO Presence in Somalia

~~(S//NF)~~

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[redacted]

~~(S//RELIDO)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

[redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

[redacted]

(U) USAFRICOM EAST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS

(U) USAFRICOM Ground Operations and Airstrikes Decrease

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted].

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(U) Figure 3.

(U) U.S. Airstrikes in Somalia

(U)

U.S. Airstrikes Against Al Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia

JULY 27 *Golis Mountain Region*
ASSESSMENT:
1 ISIS-Somalia fighter KIA *(Killed in action)*

AUG 19 *Qunyo Barrow*
ASSESSMENT:
1 al Shabab fighter KIA

SEPT 3 *Jilib (2 strikes)*
ASSESSMENT: **1 EKIA**

SEPT 17 *Malayle*
ASSESSMENT:
2 EKIA, 3 SNA wounded

SEPT 24 *Ugungi*
ASSESSMENT: **1 air defense artillery system**

SEPT 30 *Baledogle Military Airfield*
ASSESSMENT: **1 VBIED**

Qunyo Barrow
ASSESSMENT: **1 al Shabaab official**

Source: USAFRICOM

(U)

(U) OVERSEAS COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

(U)

(U) U.S. Air Force airman and U.S. Air Force Africa incorporate multiple recovery and evacuation skills during a week-long training program in Kenya. (U.S. Air Force photo)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d) [redacted]

(~~S~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(U) Preventing VEOs from Destabilizing Somalia

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S~~) CONDITION: AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S~~) USAFRICOM ASSESSMENT: AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S~~) CONDITION: AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S~~) USAFRICOM ASSESSMENT: AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S~~) CONDITION: AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S~~) USAFRICOM ASSESSMENT: AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S~~) CONDITION: AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S~~) USAFRICOM ASSESSMENT: AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S~~) CONDITION: AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S~~) USAFRICOM ASSESSMENT: AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(U) Figure 4.

(U) Company-level Metrics for IOC and FOC Danab Brigade

~~(S//NF)~~

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)



Source: USAFRICOM

~~(S//NF)~~

(U) BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

(U) Danab Brigade in Development

(U) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

- (~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]
- (~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]
- (~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(U) Figure 5.

(U) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d) [redacted]

(U) USAID reported that, in response to the operation, stabilization programming has increased in the Lower Shabelle. Activities include the installation of—and maintenance workshops for—solar streetlights, brush clearing, the provision of non-food items, and the rehabilitation and improvement of key roads.[69]

(U) DIPLOMACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

(U) Embassies in Region Implement Programs to Counter al Shabaab

(U) SOMALIA

(U//~~SBU~~) The U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu told the DoS OIG that it continues to engage closely with the Somali government and international partners to help drive Somali-led progress on building an effective Somali security sector. The U.S. embassy reported that in September 2019, the Somali government announced the second phase of military reform, which included additional appointments of reform-minded individuals to key posts in the SNA.[70]

(U//~~SBU~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U) KENYA

(U//~~SBU~~) The U.S. Embassy in Nairobi told the DoS OIG that it continued to work with the DoS Bureau of Counterterrorism to improve the ability of Kenyan security forces to respond to possible terrorist incidents. USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d) [redacted]

(U) UGANDA

(U//~~SBU~~) The U.S. Embassy in Kampala reported to the DoS OIG that the U.S. Government's support to the Ugandan security forces totals approximately $150 million per year and focuses on two lines of effort: peacekeeping and force development. The U.S. embassy reported that security assistance is provided under both Title 10 and Title 22 authorities and, in FY 2019, included a helicopter training program, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) sustainment package, and an expeditionary refueling capability.[74]

(U)

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted].

(U) Military officers serving under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army (SNA), attend training in Mogadishu. (AMISOM photo)

(U//~~SBU~~) The U.S. Embassy in Kampala reported that the prevalence of poverty and unemployment in Uganda and the region keep much of the youth idle during the day, increasing their vulnerability to radicalization. The embassy also reported that overcrowding and a lack of resources for Uganda's prisons could allow them to become sites for the spread of extremist views or terrorist networks. The embassy reported that the Ugandan government often feels left out of decision-making related to AMISOM, on topics such as troop drawdowns, which could lead the Ugandan government to become less cooperative as a partner in stabilizing Somalia.[76]

(U) ETHIOPIA

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d) [redacted]

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)

[redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)

[redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)

[redacted]

(U) DoS Sponsors Weapons Removal and Abatement Activities in East Africa

(U) USAID (b)(7)(E)

[redacted]

(U) USAID (b)(7)(E)

[redacted]

(U) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U)

There are approximately **2.6M** internally displaced persons in Somalia

(U)

(U) U.S. Government Completes Stabilization Strategy for Somalia

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

(U) Humanitarian Organizations Increase Response in Somalia

(U) Drought conditions in Somalia, which began in late 2018, continue to cause food insecurity and displacement.[87] USAID's Famine Early Warning Systems Network reported that the number of people who are experiencing "food consumption gaps, high acute malnutrition, or depletion of assets" or worse outcomes in Somalia has risen from 1.7 million people in June to 2.1 million in September.[88] It is also estimated that one million children under five will be acutely malnourished through mid-2020.[89] The drought has displaced approximately 112,000 people from January to August.[90]

(U)



(U) Drought conditions cause food insecurities. Young girls line up at a feeding center in Mogadishu. (United Nations photo)

(U) Protracted and continued displacement is another driver of the humanitarian crisis. Somalia now has approximately 2.6 million people—or 1 in 5 Somalis—who are internally displaced, and more than 730,000 are refugees in neighboring countries.[91] USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U) The Famine Early Warning Systems Network reported that humanitarian organizations have increased sustained emergency food assistance in Somalia to "prevent worse outcomes, reduce food gaps, and mitigate the depletion of livestock assets."[93] In July, 1.9 million people in Somalia received food assistance, up from 1.2 million in May.[94] The Famine Early Warning Systems Network reported that the increased assistance is preventing further food insecurity in many areas.[95]

(U) USAID reported to the USAID OIG that the United States provides approximately 40 percent of emergency food assistance, in the form of vouchers, and cash transfers for food. While cash transfers, usually conducted through mobile money, are unrestricted, monitoring has shown that recipients spend 70 to 80 percent of the transfer amount on food.[96]

(U) In addition to food assistance, USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance provides health, water and sanitation, and nutrition interventions. Because of the drought conditions, USAID told the USAID OIG that it focused programming in locations with high levels of acute malnutrition and risks for cholera.[97] USAID said that its implementers work closely with Somali non-governmental organizations to build their capacity to provide assistance.[98]

(U) USAID told the USAID OIG that the Somali government has made efforts to assume greater responsibility of humanitarian challenges. However, local ownership is hindered by low capacity and poor relationships between federal and local and regional authorities.[99]

(U) U.S. Government Provides Nearly $257 Million as Funding Shortfall Continues

(U) According to USAID, the U.S. Government is concerned about the low levels of funding for the drought response and is encouraging other donors to provide additional funding in order to ensure the conditions do not worsen and to build resilience to future shocks.[100] According to the United Nations, despite the greater need this year, funding levels have been hundreds of millions of dollars lower than in previous years. In order to meet the funding requirements through December 2019, an additional $500 million is needed.[101]

(U) The U.S. Government has been the largest donor of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. At the end of FY 2019, the U.S. Government provided an additional $257 million in humanitarian assistance, increasing the total amount of funding for the Somalia response during the year to $498 million. The additional assistance will provide life-saving food assistance and safe water, emergency health care, education, and protection to people inside Somalia and to Somali refugees in neighboring countries.[102]

(U) Child Recruitment, Sexual Violence, and Abduction in Somalia Highest in the World

(U) A June 2019 United Nations report found that Somalia has the highest level of child recruitment, abduction, and sexual violence by VEOs and state security institutions in the world. The report found that al Shabaab has recruited more than 2,300 boys and girls as young as eight years old and that the SNA also recruited 155 children.[103]

(U) This quarter, the USAID OIG asked USAID how it ensures the protection of children through its programming in Somalia. USAID reported to the USAID OIG that USAID implementers conduct awareness raising activities on children protection violations and gender-based violence and create child-friendly spaces in health facilities and internally displaced persons sites.[104] The implementers deliver specific protection activities while also mainstreaming protection considerations across programming. USAID implementers also provide community outreach activities to prevent gender-based violence and identify those in need of protection services.[105]

(U) EAST AFRICA

(U) OVERSEAS COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS IN AFRICA



(U) Niger Armed Forces members run into a building during a training exercise in Agadez, Niger. (U.S. Air Force photo)

(U)

(U) NORTH AND WEST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATION

STATUS OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTH AFRICA

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d) [redacted]

(U) About the North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operation

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(U) Renewed Strike Campaign Deals ISIS-Libya "Significant Blow"

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

[redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

[redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

[redacted]

(U) USAFRICOM: Unlikely to Achieve Mission Objectives in Desired Timeframe

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(g)

[redacted]

(U) Figure 6.

(U) U.S. Airstrikes Against ISIS-Libya

(~~S//NF~~)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

[redacted]

(U) U.S. Airstrikes in Libya

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

[redacted]

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

[redacted]

Source: USAFRICOM

(~~S//NF~~)

media entities within Libya.[22]

(U) Libyan Civil Conflict in Stalemate

(~~S//NF~~) According to USAFRICOM and open sources, the civil conflict in Libya remained at a stalemate through the end of the quarter.[23] In early April 2019, the LNA launched an assault to capture Libya's capital city of Tripoli. The siege was quickly repelled by pro-GNA forces. This quarter, fighting expanded beyond Tripoli to the port city of Misrata, and to the cities of Sirte and Jufra in central Libya, according to a news report.[24]

(~~S//NF~~) On September 25, GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj told the UN General Assembly that the civil war had escalated into a "serious crisis" fueled by foreign interference.[25] Both the GNA and LNA receive foreign financial support and military resources, such as intelligence, materiel, fighters and weapons—despite a UN arms embargo on Libya—from outside countries, DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d) [redacted]

(U) Civilian casualties continued to rise due to the conflict. Open-source reporting estimated that 1,100 to 3,000 people have been killed since early April as a result of the Libyan civil conflict, including "hundreds" of civilians.[30] An August 8 car bomb in Benghazi killed three UN staffers and two other mission members, according to news reports. The attack came as the LNA and GNA agreed to a temporary cease-fire in advance of a Muslim holiday. As of the end of the quarter, no group had claimed responsibility for the attack.[31]

(~~C~~) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d); USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U) U.S. Holds Peace Talks With Libyan Leaders; No Political Resolution Reached

(~~S~~) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d) [redacted]

(~~C~~) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d); USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U) Russia Loses Up to 35 Paramilitary Forces in GNA Airstrike

(~~S//NF~~) USAFRICOM reported that a September 25 Libyan GNA airstrike near Tripoli killed an unknown number of Russian paramilitary forces.[37] According to a news report, the paramilitary forces were linked to the Wagner Group, a private military company run by a Russian oligarch with ties to President Vladimir Putin.[38] USAFRICOM told the DoD OIG that it could not confirm that Russians were directly targeted or the reported casualty numbers, but estimated that at least 15 to 35 Russians were killed in September while supporting the LNA.[39]

(~~S//RELIDO~~) According to USAFRICOM and media sources, approximately 100 Wagner Group personnel arrived in Libya in late August and early September to support LNA forces by conducting sniper operations, and assisting with air strikes. General Stephen Townsend said in April that the Wagner Group is closely aligned with the Russian government, and trains alongside Russian armed forces.[40] USAFRICOM stated that no U.S. personnel were involved in any of the deaths of Russian paramilitary forces.[41]

(~~S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY~~) USAFRICOM told the DoD OIG that Russia likely prioritizes security engagements to project power across the Mediterranean and Red Seas and pressure NATO's southern flank.[42] Russia's interest in Libya includes the potential for deep-water ports on the Mediterranean, control of oil supplies to Europe, and massive reconstruction contracts, according to open sources.[43]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(g) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(U)

(U) General Stephen Townsend, Commander, U.S. Africa Command visited Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in September. (U.S. AFRICOM photo)

(U) STATUS OF VEOS IN NORTH AFRICA

(U) ISIS-LIBYA: UNABLE TO SUSTAIN ATTACK RESURGENCE

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted] DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) [redacted] ISIS-Libya has carried out 13 operations in 2019, as of mid-September, compared to 21 total attacks in 2018.[48]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c), DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(U) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c), DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c) [redacted]

(U) STATUS OF CONFLICT IN WEST AFRICA

(U) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c) [redacted] deteriorating security environment in the Sahel, primarily Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria, as publicly reported in June by the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command-Africa.[62]

(~~S//NF~~) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted] the DoD OIG that violence in West Africa increased significantly in the last year due primarily to DoD OIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted], rampant criminality, and expanding capabilities of VEOs in the region.[63] AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DoD OIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted]

(U) NIGER: FORCES IN NEED OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

(~~S//NF~~) USAREUR (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) USAREUR (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) USAREUR (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) USAFRICOM reported that U.S. forces were being withdrawn in the Tillabéri region of Niger due to force protection concerns.[72] Approximately 750 miles to the east, USAFRICOM reported to the DoD OIG that a lack of consistent U.S. Special Forces presence in Diffa has led to a reduction in capabilities of Niger's security forces and Multi-National Joint Task Force partners.[73]

(U) BURKINA FASO: MILITARY STRUGGLES WITH DISSENSION

(~~S//NF~~) This quarter, French and U.S. special forces conducted a combined assessment of key facilities within the Burkina Faso military to better understand its security forces and threat situation in the region following a VEO attack in August on a military outpost in Koutougou.[74] [redacted]
AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) USAFRICOM reported that surviving Burkina Faso army soldiers withdrew to Camp Guillaume in Ouagadougou, where they barricaded themselves, detained officers, and rioted.[76]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(U) NIGERIA: FORCES TARGETED BY ISIS-WEST AFRICA

(~~S//NF~~) An August DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted] ISIS-West Africa is likely to expand its operating area and increase influence in northeastern Nigeria over the next 2 years. The report indicated that DoD OIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted], stagnant economic development, and environmental challenges make the local population susceptible to radicalization and provides refuge for ISIS-West Africa.[80]

(~~S//RELIDO~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d); DoD OIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted]

(~~S//RELIDO~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted]

(U) STATUS OF VEOS IN WEST AFRICA

(U) ISIS-WEST AFRICA: GROWING IN STRENGTH AND INFLUENCE

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(U) Figure 7.

(U) VEO presences in Northwest Africa

~~(S//NF)~~

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d) [redacted]

(~~S//RELIDO~~)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S//RELIDO~~)

(U) JNIM: EXPANDING INFLUENCE

(~~S//NF~~) JNIM is the dominant VEO in the Sahel DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]. The group expanded its influence this quarter by exploiting ethnic tensions and offering security for populations DoD OIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted] AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted] this was part of a JNIM campaign to win public support by appealing to the local population that it seeks to avoid civilian casualties while conducting attacks to remove oppressive occupiers.[92]

(~~S//NF~~) According to DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i), JNIM's primary targets are France, the United States, regional governments, contributors to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, and those who support France's counterterrorism efforts.[93] AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(U) BOKO HARAM: CLASHES WITH ISIS INCREASE

(~~S//NF~~) Boko Haram engages in criminal and guerrilla warfare tactics across the Lake Chad Region of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted]. Boko Haram's attacks primarily target civilians. From January to June 2019, its activity decreased 50 percent compared to this same period last year, DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) the DoD OIG that clashes between ISIS-West Africa and Boko Haram have spiked since July. DoD OIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted]

(U) In addition, local officials in Nigeria blamed Boko Haram for a deadly attack in July that killed at least 65 mourners at a funeral in northeastern Nigeria.[98]

(U) ISIS IN THE GREATER SAHARA: A CAPABLE THREAT

(~~S//NF~~) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) ISIS in the Greater Sahara as a "capable" threat to civilians and security forces in the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso border region DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]. ISIS in the Greater Sahara shifts operations across the porous borders to avoid consistent counterterrorism pressure from regional and international security forces.[99]

(~~S//NF~~) This quarter, ISIS in the Greater Sahara was very active in Burkina Faso, conducting attacks against local civilians, security forces and government officials, DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted]. ISIS in the Greater Sahara is attempting to establish itself as a "champion of the marginalized," a model that has been successful for the group thus far.[100] AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted] In early July, ISIS-West Africa claimed responsibility for an attack against a Nigerien military base. AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [redacted]

(U) DIPLOMACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

(U) Weapons Removal and Abatement Efforts Improve Security in Chad and Mali for Host Nation Security Forces

(U//~~SBU~~) The DoS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, reported to the DoS OIG that it sponsored activities in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger, with the goal of building host-nation security forces' capacity to prevent the illicit diversion of state-held munitions stockpiles to VEOs and other malign actors. The office reported that it also sponsored humanitarian mine action activities in Libya and Senegal to improve civilian security and enable socio-economic development.[103]

(U//~~SBU~~) The DoS reported several successes in these efforts, such as the construction of armories and weapons storehouses in Chad and Mali. In Libya, efforts this quarter focused on clearing explosive remnants of war from priority sites in Sirte, where internally displaced persons (IDPs) are now able to return.[104]

(U) New Stabilization Strategies to be Implemented in Mali, Niger

(U//~~SBU~~) During the quarter, the DoS, in collaboration with USAID and the DoD, finalized stabilization annexes for the integrated country strategies for Mali and Niger. These stabilization strategy documents identify interagency stabilization objectives and set out key tasks to accomplish these objectives. These stabilization annexes are effective immediately, according to the DoS.[105]

(U//~~SBU~~) The stabilization annex to the U.S. Embassy in Bamako's integrated country strategy for Mali identifies four interagency stabilization objectives:

- (U//~~SBU~~) Improved civilian protection results in fewer attacks and impedes VEO presence and influence in the central Mali;
- (U//~~SBU~~) The Malian government makes progress in implementing political and institutional reforms called for in the Algiers Peace Accord;
- (U//~~SBU~~) Responsive and accountable local service delivery and security are increased improving public confidence in the Malian government's efficacy;
- (U//~~SBU~~) Coordination with national and international partners on the delivery of stabilization assistance is improved to achieve the "Chief of Mission vision," which consists of four goals relating to peace and stability in Mali.[106]

(U//~~SBU~~) For each of the four stabilization objectives, the stabilization annex identifies a number of key tasks that the U.S. Government intends to undertake to reduce instability in Mali. In particular, the annex emphasizes the importance of coordinating security activities with French forces, an European Union (EU) training mission, and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. The annex also states an intention to accelerate the completion of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration activities already underway, and to begin targeted development projects in the north and central regions of Mali.[107]

(U//~~SBU~~) The stabilization annex to the U.S. Embassy in Niamey's integrated country strategy for Niger identifies four interagency stabilization objectives:

- (U//~~SBU~~) Increased Nigerien institutional and tactical capacity to enhance its security presence in Diffa and Tillabéri and build community trust and engagement with security forces in order to deny transnational VEOs the space to grow, operate, and exploit intercommunal tensions;

(U)

(U) Peacekeepers from Senegal serving with the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali speak with the local population during patrols. (United Nations photo)

- (U//~~SBU~~) Expand access to justice in Diffa and Tillabéri and reduce community grievances;
- (U//~~SBU~~) Encourage and assist the government of Niger to develop and adopt policies and legal frameworks to advance counterterrorism and de-confliction efforts in Diffa and Tillabéri;
- (U//~~SBU~~) Reinforce community resiliencies in Diffa and Tillabéri to identify and address conflicts locally.[108]

(U//~~SBU~~) For each of the four stabilization objectives, the stabilization annex identifies a number of key tasks that the U.S. Government intends to undertake to reduce instability in Niger. For example, one task is to provide training and equipment to the Nigerien military so that they have the capacity to conduct operations in Diffa and Tillabéri. Other tasks include working with the Nigerien government to better implement its 2018 penal code amendment for defectors from Boko Haram in Diffa; supporting the Nigerien government in formalizing its counterterrorism and de-confliction strategy for Tillabéri by applying lessons learned from Diffa; and support local Nigerien governments in evaluating their implementation of the state of emergency to address negative side effects.[109]

(U) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

(U) Nigerian Government Undermines Humanitarian Assistance

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID reported that the Nigerian military has continued to discredit humanitarian organizations by asserting that they provide or allow support to Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa, and has placed restrictions on their activity in the country. These restrictions, combined with a worsening security situation due to continual military setbacks, have created the conditions for a humanitarian catastrophe, according to USAID.[110]

(U//~~SBU~~) According to USAID, the Nigerian military halted the operations of two USAID implementers in northeast Nigeria without prior official communication from either the military or civilian officials:[111]

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID reported that the closure of the two organizations will affect an estimated 4.5 million vulnerable individuals in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states.[116] In response to the closures, USAID reported it is coordinating with humanitarian actors and other donors to address the allegations made against humanitarian organizations.

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID also reported that the Nigerian military has restricted humanitarian organizations to approximately 1,000 liters of fuel per week, per organization, and per location. Given the lack of power provision in northeast Nigeria, implementers use fuel for generators to power operations.[117] For example, fuel restrictions affected eight USAID-supported health care facilities in Monguno, Borno. Health facilities continue to operate with emergency fuel supplies, but one implementer has communicated to USAID that it may need to suspend services in the coming weeks.[118]

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID reported that humanitarian activities have also been hampered by a decrease in, and routine cancellation of, military escorts for humanitarian convoys and new military inspection requirements for vehicles transporting commodities.[119] To address the restrictions, Abuja-based USAID staff have collaborated with the Chargée d'Affaires and diplomatic community to engage the Nigerian government on reducing military restrictions on humanitarian operations.

(U//~~SBU~~) Nigerian Military's 'Super Camp' Strategy Results in Increased Attacks and Humanitarian Concerns

(U//~~SBU~~) In July, the Nigerian military announced a new "super camp" strategy in northeast Nigeria, by which it redeploys troops from forward operating bases to fortified positions, according to media reports. The strategy reportedly is designed to allow troops to rapidly respond to threats from a secure location.[120] However, according to USAID, the concentration of troops within the "super camps" has coincided with an increase of attacks and concerns that humanitarian organizations may need to reduce operations in response.[121]

(U//~~SBU~~) According to media reports, VEOs have been able to take advantage of the "super camp" strategy to move freely among the unprotected towns, which has resulted in USAID implementers suspending activities and placed vulnerable populations in areas where both military and extremist groups vie for influence.[122] For instance, USAID reported a temporary suspension of activities in Gajigana in Borno state, following an increase of VEO attacks attributed to the "super camp" strategy. In a seven-day period, there were six reported attacks that resulted in civilian deaths and looting.[123]

(U//~~SBU~~) Humanitarian organizations, according to USAID, are concerned that the closure of forward operating bases in moving to "super camps" will reduce their operations, as similar military movements over the past year have done. Specifically, from July 2018 to July 2019, when there were recurrent closures of forward operating bases, the number of inaccessible people in northeast Nigeria rose from 823,000 to more than 1.1 million people.[124] According to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, areas that are inaccessible or hard to reach are likely to experience severe food insecurity, including a risk of famine.[125]

(U) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted] From January to July 2019, three other aid workers were killed in Nigeria, making it the seventh-most deadly country in the world for aid workers, according to open-source reporting.[128]

(U) USAID: 1.8 Million Receive Food Aid

(U) Table 1.

(U) Food Assistance Recipients and Food Insecure Population, as of August 2019

	Estimated People in Need	Food-Insecure Population	People Targeted by USAID Assistance
Nigeria	7.1 million	3 million	1,471,800
Cameroon	1.9 million	316,000	181,500
Chad	500,000	145,000	87,500
Niger	461,000	121,000	108,300

(U) Source: USAID

(U)

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U) USAID Administrator Mark Green met with religious and community leaders in Nigeria. (USAID photo)

(U) USAID reported that there are few examples of local ownership of assistance and recovery efforts, despite USAID's work with the Nigerian government on local ownership. For instance, the Nigerian government donated food that benefitted approximately 690,000. USAID funded the administrative and logistical costs of this assistance, and the. World Food Programme managed its distribution. USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance funded a program to train Nigeria's emergency management agencies in the skills required to manage future disaster response.[130]

(U) New USAID Approach Seeks to Counter and Prevent Violent Extremism

(U//~~SBU~~) In August, USAID approved the Sahel Development Partnership, a new framework for containing and preventing violent extremism in regions of Niger and Burkina Faso. Running for two years, the Sahel Development Partnership, is intended to have a measurable impact on countering violence extremism through coordinated programs that have specific, time-based milestones, according to the implementation plan.

(U//~~SBU~~) According to the implementation plan, the Sahel Development Partnership is designed to counter the appeal of extremists through three lines of effort:

- **(U//~~SBU~~)** USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted].
- **(U//~~SBU~~)** USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]
- **(U//~~SBU~~)** USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U) OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

(U) This section of the report provides information on Lead IG and partner agencies' oversight work related to East Africa, and North and West Africa counterterrorism operations. The oversight work includes audits, inspections, evaluations, and Lead IG investigative activities from July 1 through September 30, 2019.

(U) STRATEGIC PLANNING

(U) Pursuant to Section 8L of the Inspector General Act, the Lead IG develops and implements a joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations for each overseas contingency operation. This effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed oversight, management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects. The Lead IG agencies issue an annual joint strategic plan for each operation.

(U) FY 2020 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan Activities

(U) The Inspectors General for the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are required by the Inspector General Act to conduct comprehensive independent oversight of programs and operations in support of designated overseas contingency operations. The law also requires the development of joint strategic plans to conduct comprehensive oversight and quarterly reports on the status of each overseas contingency operation.

(U) The Lead Inspector General *Fiscal Year 2020 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations* classified appendix contains oversight plans for the East Africa and North and West Africa counterterrorism operations. For these classified operations, the Inspectors General for the DoD, the DoS, and USAID coordinate oversight activities with the U.S. Army Audit Agency, the Naval Audit Service, and the U.S. Air Force Audit Agency.

(U) The oversight plan, effective as of October 1, 2019, organizes oversight projects into three strategic oversight areas: 1) Military Operations and Security Cooperation; 2) Governance, Humanitarian Assistance, and Development; and 3) Support to Mission.

FY 2020 Classified Appendix to the Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations

(U) FY2020 Lead IG Strategic Oversight Areas

(U) MILITARY OPERATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION

(U) Military Operations and Security Cooperation focuses on determining the degree to which the contingency operation is accomplishing its security mission. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- (U) Counterterrorism operations
- (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Advance force operations to refine the location of terrorist targets and develop the operational environment
- (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Cyber operations
- (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Communications activities, special technical operations, military information support, military deception, electronic warfare, and train, advise, and assist operations
- (U) Security assistance

(U) GOVERNANCE, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT

(U) Governance, Humanitarian Assistance, and Development focuses on some of the root causes of violent extremism. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- (U) Providing food, water, medical care, emergency relief, and shelter to people affected by crisis
- (U) Assisting and protecting internally displaced persons and returning refugees
- (U) Building or enhancing host-nation governance capacity
- (U) Countering and reducing corruption, social inequality, and extremism

(U) SUPPORT TO MISSION

(U) Support to Mission focuses on focuses on U.S. administrative, logistical, and management efforts that enable military operations and non-military programs. Activities that fall under this strategic oversight area include:

- (U) Managing government grants and contracts supporting the logistical needs of U.S. Government installations, building and repairing U.S. Government facilities and infrastructure, and maintaining U.S. Government equipment and property
- (U) Improving the cost, schedule, and performance expectations for major acquisition programs
- (U) Ensuring applicable contracts and grant programs achieve intended objectives and policy goals
- (U) Managing financial resources

(continued on next page)

(U) FY 2020 Lead IG Strategic Oversight Areas

(continued from previous page)

- (U) Managing financial agreements with host nations
- (U) Ensuring use of OCO funding complies with laws and regulations
- (U) Administering U.S. Government programs
- (U) Providing for the occupational health and safety of personnel
- (U) Countering trafficking in persons
- (U) Ensuring the security of U.S. personnel and property
- (U) Mobilizing staff and resources

(U) AUDIT, INSPECTION, AND EVALUATION ACTIVITY

(S) This quarter, Lead IG agencies completed seven reports related to the East Africa, and North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations. The reports were related to U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) procedures for determining and meeting priority intelligence requirements; and accountability in humanitarian assistance programs throughout Africa.

(U) FINAL REPORTS BY LEAD IG AGENCIES

(U) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) Evaluation of USAFRICOM's and SOCAFRICA's Processes for Determining and Fulfilling Intelligence Requirements for Counterterrorism

(U) DODIG-2019-111; August 13, 2019

(U) The DoD OIG conducted this evaluation to determine whether USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA followed established DoD guidance for identifying and prioritizing intelligence requirements and whether SOCAFRICA was capable of satisfying USAFRICOM's priority intelligence requirements for counterterrorism.

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d) [redacted]

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d) [redacted].

(~~S~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [redacted].

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [redacted].

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [redacted]

(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [redacted]

(U) U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) USAID's Award Oversight Is Insufficient to Hold Implementers Accountable for Achieving Results

(U) 9-000-19-006-P; September 25, 2019

(U) USAID OIG conducted this audit to determine whether USAID implementing partners delivered award results as initially intended and to assess USAID's award management process.

(U) USAID programs foreign assistance through awards to implementers around the world, including throughout Africa. USAID OIG determined that USAID's award management process lacks the rigor needed to ensure results are achieved. For example, USAID OIG determined that almost half of awards in the statistical sample did not achieve expected results, but that even on underperforming awards implementers were generally paid full amounts. Regarding the award process, USAID OIG found pervasive problems in many areas including: selection, monitoring, and assessment of implementers; competing award management roles and responsibilities; and poor recordkeeping practices.

(U) USAID OIG made 10 recommendations to strengthen the award management process and enforce accountability of those charged with oversight. Following information provided to USAID OIG in response to the draft report, six recommendations were closed and four were resolved, but remain open pending completion of planned activities.

(U) On September 30, the USAID Administrator issued an agency-wide notice detailing the audit report and its recommendations, calling the report a valuable opportunity to assess and improve USAID policies, procedures, and programs.

(U) Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of the USAID resources managed by Act Change Transform (Act!) for the period January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018

(U) 4-615-19-110-R; July 23, 2019

(U) Act! is a Kenyan non-governmental organization and implementer for a USAID/Kenya and East Africa Mission in Kenya in 2018. Act! was implementing a conflict and countering violent extremism initiative.

(U) Act! contracted with an independent audit firm to conduct an annual audit of its systems in line with USAID award requirements and USAID OIG reviewed the report for conformance with professional standards.

(U) Auditors examined more than $1.2 million in expenditures, and concluded that Act!'s fund accountability statement presented fairly, in all material respects. The auditors did identify $1,369 in ineligible questioned costs, three instances of material noncompliance related to those questioned costs, and one additional material weakness in internal control and instance of material noncompliance unrelated to the questioned costs. USAID OIG made two recommendations to correct the material weakness and compliance.

(U) Audit of USAID Resources Managed by African Development Solutions in Multiple Countries Under Multiple Awards, January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2016

(U) 4-000-19-129-R; September 26, 2019

(U) The non-governmental organization African Development Solutions (Adeso) implemented USAID humanitarian assistance projects in 2015 and 2016. Most of the projects included in this audit were implemented in Somalia.

(U) Adeso contracted with an independent audit firm to conduct an annual audit of its systems in line with USAID award requirements and USAID OIG reviewed the report for conformance with professional standards.

(U) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U) Auditors examined more than $12 million in expenditures, and concluded that Adeso's fund accountability statement presented fairly, in all material respects, except for approximately $2.5 million in ineligible total questioned costs. The auditors also identified one material weakness in internal control and four instances of material noncompliance. USAID OIG made four recommendations to correct the material weaknesses, questioned costs, and to recover any unallowed amounts.

(U//~~SBU~~) Audit of USAID Resources Managed by USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted] ***Under Multiple USAID Agreements Implemented in Multiple Countries, for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2017***

(U) 4-000-19-119-R; August 2, 2019

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U//~~SBU~~) USAID (b)(7)(E) [redacted]

(U) OVERSEAS COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

USAID (b)(7)(E)

[redacted].

(U) Audit of USAID Resources Managed by Cooperazione Internazionale in Multiple Countries Under Multiple Awards, January 1 to December 31, 2017

(U) 4-000-19-120-R; August 7, 2019

(U) Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI) is an Italian non-governmental organization that implemented USAID humanitarian assistance projects in multiple countries—including Chad, Niger, and Nigeria—in 2017.

(U) COOPI contracted with an independent audit firm to conduct an annual audit of its systems in line with USAID award requirements, and USAID OIG reviewed the report for conformance with professional standards.

(U) Auditors examined more than $1.5 million in expenditures, and concluded that COOPI's fund accountability statement presented fairly, in all material respects. The audit firm did not report any material weaknesses in internal control and did not identify any instances of material noncompliance.

(U) Audit of USAID Resources Managed by Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in Multiple Countries Under Multiple Awards, January 1 to December 31, 2017

(U) Report No. 4-624-19-128-R; September 19, 2019

(U) The Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), headquartered in Burkina Faso, implemented multiple humanitarian assistance and other projects for USAID, in countries that included Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Chad, and Benin in 2017.

(U) CILSS contracted with an independent audit firm to conduct an annual audit of its systems in line with USAID award requirements, and USAID OIG reviewed the report for conformance with professional standards.

(U) Auditors examined more than $7.2 million in expenditures, and concluded that CILSS's fund accountability statement presented fairly, in all material respects. The auditors did not identify any questioned costs, material weaknesses in internal control, nor material instances of noncompliance. The auditors did find three significant deficiencies in internal control. There were no recommendations

(U) ONGOING AND PLANNED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

(U) As of September 30, 2019, 17 projects related to the East Africa, and North and West Africa counterterrorism operations were ongoing, and 17 were planned. The ongoing projects are related to readiness, security, foreign assistance, and support to U.S. missions.

(U) Tables 2 through 4 list the title and objective for Lead IG and partner agencies' ongoing and planned oversight projects.

(U) Table 2.
(U) Ongoing Oversight Projects by Lead IG Agencies, as of September 30, 2019

Project Title	Objective
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL	
(U) Evaluation of Niger Air Base 201 Military Construction	(U) To determine whether the U.S. Air Force effectively planned, designed, and implemented Air Base 201 to provide airfield and base support infrastructure.
(U) Audit of Readiness of Mobile Medical Teams Supporting Contingency Operations in the U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Areas of Responsibility	(U) To determine whether the Defense Health Agency and the military services are providing effective training to mobile medical teams prior to deploying to U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command areas of responsibility in order to improve trauma care.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL	
(U) Inspection of Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism	(U) To inspect the Washington-based activities of the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism.
(U) Inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security Office of Antiterrorism Assistance	(U) To inspect the Washington-based activities of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Training, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance.
(U) Audit of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program	(U) To determine whether the Bureau of African Affairs is monitoring and coordinating activities of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership in accordance with Federal and DoS requirements.
(U) Audit of Global Engagement Center's Execution of its Mandate to Coordinate Federal Government Efforts to Counter Disinformation and Propaganda Designed to Undermine the United States	(U) To determine whether the Global Engagement Center has demonstrated progress towards achieving its statutory mission of leading, synchronizing, and coordinating U.S. Government efforts to counter foreign-state and non-state actors' propaganda and misinformation.
(U) Inspection of Embassy Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso	(U) To evaluate the programs and operations of the Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso embassy.
(U) Inspection of Embassy Yaounde, Cameroon and branch office	(U) To evaluate the programs and operations of the Yaounde, Cameroon embassy and Douala Cameroon branch office.

Project Title	Objective
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL	
(U) Audit of USAID's Initiative Against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse	(U) To determine to what extent USAID has taken action to prevent and detect sexual exploitation and abuse; and assess USAID's process for responding to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.
(U) Audit of USAID's Award Management	(U) To determine if implementers are delivering results as initially intended; assess USAID's awards management process.
(U) Audit of USAID's Workforce Transformation and Data Use	(U) To determine how USAID accounts for its workforce; evaluate how USAID uses information to strategically plan and make workforce decisions; assess how Human Resources Transformation Strategy activities support strategic workforce planning.
(U) Audit of USAID's Self-Reliance Initiative	(U) To determine to what extent are USAID's self-reliance metrics incorporated into its development programming strategy; what challenges does USAID face in implementing development activities as envisioned under the Journey to Self-Reliance Initiative.
(U) Audit of USAID's Response to the Lake Chad Basin Complex Emergency	(U) To determine the extent to which USAID has overseen its humanitarian assistance activities in the Lake Chad Basin; adopted measures to mitigate the risks associated with implementers using waivers from competition in procurement in the Lake Chad Basin; and adopted and verified that measures to prevent the diversion of aid from its intended beneficiaries are being followed in the Lake Chad Basin.

(U) Table 3.

(U) Ongoing Oversight Projects by Lead IG Partner Agencies, as of September 30, 2019

Project Title	Objective
ARMY AUDIT AGENCY	
(U) Audit of Funding and Accountability of Property Supporting Operation Observant Compass	(U) To determine whether U.S. Army Africa/Southern European Task Force established sufficient procedures to validate and closeout funding requirements in support of Operation Observant Compass; established sufficient procedures to account for government-owned property; and executed U.S. Government property transfers in accordance with established policies and transfer authorities.
AIR FORCE AUDIT AGENCY	
(U) Medical Equipment Management	(U) To determine whether Air Force personnel in Niger procured and managed medical equipment in accordance with guidance.

(U) Table 4.

(U) Planned Oversight Projects by Lead IG Agencies, as of September 30, 2019

Project Title	Objective
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL	
(U) Audit of Military Information Support Operations in Support of U.S. Africa Command Operations	(U) To determine whether U.S. Africa Command personnel planned and executed Military Information Support Operations to degrade the enemy's relative combat power, reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral damage, and maximize the local population's support for operations.
(U) Evaluation of U.S. Special Operations Command Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center	(U) To determine whether U.S. Special Operations Command's Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center provides U.S. combatant commanders the increased capability to conduct Internet-based information operations globally to support the East Africa and North and West Africa counterterrorism operations.
(U) Evaluation of U.S. Special Operations Command Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center	(U) To determine whether U.S. Special Operations Command's Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center provides U.S. combatant commanders the increased capability to conduct Internet-based information operations globally.
(U) Evaluation of DoD Counter Threat Finance Activities in Support of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. European Command Priorities	(U) To determine whether U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S European Command have established the capabilities to conduct Counter Threat Finance; to deny, disrupt, or defeat and degrade adversaries' ability to use global financial networks.
(U) Evaluation of the U.S. Africa Command Support to Foreign Partners for Counterterrorism Operations	(~~S//NF~~) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [redacted]
(U) Evaluation of Tactical Signals Intelligence Processing	(U) To determine whether Theater Support Activity's tactical signals intelligence processing is sufficient to satisfy priority intelligence requirements to support the North and West Africa counterterrorism operation.
(U) Audit of Oversight of the Base Operations Support Services Contract for U.S. Africa Command Bases	(U) To determine whether Naval Facilities Engineering Command Atlantic is overseeing the U.S. Africa Command Base Operations Support Services contract to ensure the contractor is providing proper support services.
(U) Audit of the African Surface Distribution Services Contract	(U) To determine whether the DoD managed the African Surface Distribution Services contract to ensure ground distribution and transportation performance objectives were met.

(U) OVERSEAS COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

(U//~~FOUO~~) Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques Used by U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Interrogators	(U//~~FOUO~~) To determine whether U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command oversight of intelligence interrogations adheres to applicable DoD policies and regulations, and the overall effect of these policies and regulations on the interrogation process.
(U//~~FOUO~~) Evaluation of Kinetic Targeting Processes in the U.S. Africa Command Area of Responsibility	(U//~~FOUO~~) To evaluate U.S. Africa Command's target development and prosecution processes, as well as post-strike collateral damage and civilian casualty assessment activities.

Project Title	Objective
DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL	
(U) Audit of Construction of New Office Annexes at U.S. Embassies Amman and Nairobi	(U) To evaluate the construction of new office buildings at U.S. Embassies Amman and Nairobi.
(U) Compliance Follow-up-Review Inspection of Africa Foreign Assistance	(U) To determine whether the actions taken by the Bureau of African Affairs and other responsible Bureaus fully addressed the deficiencies identified in an October 2017 report.
(U) Audit of Remote Mission Operations in Contingency Environments	(U) To review the functions and operations of the Libya External Office in Tunis, the Yemen Affairs Unit in Riyadh, and the U.S. Mission to Somalia, partially operating from Nairobi.
(U) Audit of DoS Management of Awards to International Organizations	(U) To determine whether the DoS monitored and coordinated awards to international organizations in accordance with Federal and DoS regulations.
(U) Audit of DoS Implementation of National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security	(U) To determine the extent to which the DoS implemented the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security.
(U) Inspection of Embassy Nouakchott, Mauritania	(U) To evaluate the programs and operations of the Nouakchott, Mauritania embassy.
(U) Inspection of Embassy N'Djamena, Chad	(U) To evaluate the programs and operations of the N'Djamena, Chad embassy.
(U) Inspection of Embassy Abuja, Nigeria	(U) To evaluate the programs and operations of the Abuja, Nigeria embassy and Lagos, Nigeria, consulate.
(U) Inspection of the Libya External Office	(U) To evaluate the programs and operations of the Libya External Office in Tunis.
(U) Inspection of Embassy Cotonou, Benin	(U) To evaluate the programs and operations of the Cotonou, Benin Embassy.

(U) INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

(U) The Lead IG agencies and partners continue to coordinate their investigative efforts through the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group, which consists of representatives from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS, the DoD OIG's criminal investigative division), the DoS OIG, USAID OIG, the Army Criminal Investigative Command, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. During the quarter, these organizations coordinated on five open investigations related to the East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, and two open investigations related to the North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operation. The open investigations involve procurement and grant fraud, and human trafficking.

(U) ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

Acronym	
(U) AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
(U) AQIM	al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(U) DoD OIG (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [redacted]	
(U) DoD	Department of Defense
(U) DoS	Department of State
(U) EXORD	Execute Order
(U) GNA	Government of National Accord
(U) IDP	Internally Displaced Person
(U) IG	Inspector General
(U) IOM	International Organization for Migration
(U) ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
(U) IS	Islamic State
(U) JAK-T	Jund al Khilafah-Tunisia
(U) JNIM	Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen
(U) LNA	Libyan National Army
(U) OIG	Office of Inspector General
(U) PRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
(U) SNA	Somali National Army
(U) SOCAFRICA	Special Operations Command Africa
(U) UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(U) USAFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
(U) USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
(U) USARF	U.S. Army Africa
(U) USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
(U) USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
(U) VEO	Violent Extremist Organization

(U) APPENDIX A

(U) Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Quarterly Report

(~~S//NF~~) This report complies with sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, which requires that the designated Lead Inspector General (IG) provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on an overseas contingency operation. The Department of Defense (DoD) IG is designated as the Lead IG for the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) East Africa Overseas Contingency Operation, and the North and West Africa Overseas Contingency Operation. These operations are classified, so public reporting is not possible. This classified report constitutes the entirely of Lead IG reporting on these classified contingency operations. The Department of State (DoS) IG is the Associate Lead IG for the operation.

(U) This report contains information from the three Lead IG agencies—DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG), DoS OIG, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) OIG—as well as from partner oversight agencies. This report covers the period from July 1 through September 30, 2019.

(U) To fulfill its congressional mandate to produce a quarterly report on these two classified contingency operations, the Lead IG gathers data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of formal audits, inspections, or evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the information collected through open source research or requests for information to Federal agencies.

(U) INFORMATION COLLECTION

(U) Each quarter, the Lead IG gathers information from Federal agencies about their programs and operations related to the East Africa Overseas Contingency Operation, and the North and West Africa Overseas Contingency Operation. The Lead IG agencies use responses to these requests for information to develop sections of the quarterly report for these two classified contingency operations, and conduct oversight planning.

(U) Various DoD, DoS, and USAID offices participated in information collection for the East Africa Overseas Contingency Operation, and the North and West Africa Overseas Contingency Operation this quarter.

(U) OPEN-SOURCE RESEARCH

(U) This report also draws on the most current, publicly available information from reputable sources. Sources used in this report include the following:

- (U) Congressional testimony
- (U) Press conferences, official U.S. Government briefings
- (U) United Nations reports
- (U) Reports issued by nongovernmental organizations and think tanks
- (U) Media reports

(U) Materials collected through open-source research provide information to describe the status of the operation and help the Lead IG agencies assess information provided in their agency information collection process.

(U) REPORT PRODUCTION

(U) The DoD OIG, as the Lead IG, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG draft the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies. The Lead IG agencies then provide those offices that provided information with opportunities to verify and comment on the content of the report.

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(U) Figure 7.

(U) Map of East Africa

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(U) **Source:** National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

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(U) Figure 8.

(U) Map of Northwest Africa

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(U) **Source:** National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

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(U) ENDNOTES

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