



# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

JULY 24, 2024



## (U) Evaluation of DoD Support of the Development of the Iraqi Security Forces Operational Logistics and Sustainment Capabilities

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# Results in Brief

## *Evaluation of DoD Support of the Development of the Iraqi Security Forces Operational Logistics and Sustainment Capabilities*

July 24, 2024

### (U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation is to assess the effectiveness with which the DoD supported the development of the operational logistics and sustainment capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

### (U) Background

(S//REL USA, MESP) In 2014, following the fall of Mosul and Tikrit to Da'esh, the Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) designated the Commander, U.S. Army Central as the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR). The CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan guides USCENTCOM's role as the military component of the global coalition's campaign plan to defeat Da'esh. The military campaign conducted by CJTF-OIR forms part of a wider effort by a global coalition of nations and organizations formed in September 2014 to degrade, dismantle, and defeat Da'esh within a whole-of-governments approach. Following the military defeat of Da'esh by the Iraqi and Kurdish Security Forces in 2017 and Syrian Democratic Forces in 2019, CJTF-OIR transitioned to Campaign Plan Phase IV. CJTF-OIR's Campaign Plan Phase IV had two sub-phases: Phase IVA and Phase IVB. CJTF-OIR completed Phase IVA in 2020, which reduced the Coalition force presence to three core hubs across Iraq, and triggered the transition to Phase IVB in 2022. Once Phase IVB is complete, Coalition forces will conduct a handover of responsibility to the Government of Iraq and withdraw from the theater. This will mark the completion of Operation Inherent Resolve, and U.S. forces will transition to traditional security cooperation activities with Iraq.

(S//REL USA, MESP) CJTF-OIR ceased combat operations in Iraq in 2022, but continues to provide advise, assist, and enable efforts to the ISF through the Military Advisor Group–Iraq (MAG-I). MAG-I provides the ISF with advice

(S//REL USA, MESP) at the operational and strategic levels, working through the Joint Operations Command–Iraq. MAG-I conducts, tracks, and refines partner force development in Iraq in accordance with the MAG-I Partner Force Development Plan (PFDP). The MAG-OIR PFDP defines the key partner forces that MAG-I interacts with, describes the operational concepts behind the application of advise, assist, and enable, and outlines the developmental frameworks that guide partner force development. The MAG-I PFDP provides the developmental framework that identifies effects and the end state linked to partner force objectives in the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan and the Coalition Military Campaign Plan to defeat Da'esh.

### (U) Findings

(S//REL USA, MESP) The DoD achieved limited progress in the development of ISF operational logistics and sustainment capabilities. Specifically, according to CJTF-OIR documents, between September 1, 2022, and February 28, 2023, CJTF-OIR made only minor progress on the established objectives for developing ISF operational logistics and sustainment capabilities. Additionally, CJTF-OIR assessments show that, between March 2023 and August 2023, CJTF-OIR made no progress training the ISF.

(S//REL USA, MESP) This occurred because the CJTF-OIR and MAG-I Campaign and Partner Force Development Plans that establish actions and milestones do not account for the current U.S. operating footprint in Iraq. Specifically, MAG-I was not structured and did not have the capacity to achieve decisive conditions in the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan. For example, only two of the four MAG-I advisors were logistics planners, and the advisors were only able to provide logistics coaching and advice at the ISF strategic level. This prevented MAG-I from providing advice to or assessing operational logistics and sustainment capabilities of lower levels of the ISF.





# Results in Brief

## *Evaluation of DoD Support of the Development of the Iraqi Security Forces Operational Logistics and Sustainment Capabilities*

~~(S//REL USA, FROTH)~~ As a result, the ISF may not develop the ability to sustain combat-ready forces to address internal violent extremist organizations effectively, and the ISF may remain reliant on Coalition resources to prevent a possible Da'esh resurgence.

### **(U) Recommendations**

(U) We recommend that the Commander of USCENTCOM conduct a review of its MAG-I PFDP and the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan to: (1) review and determine if the associated milestones and goals for operational logistics are aligned with the current resourcing and partner force structure to meet the objectives and, if not, (2) develop a plan of action and milestones to make the necessary revisions to the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan.

### **(U) Management Comments and Our Responses**

(U) The Division Chief of USCENTCOM J5 Assessments, responding for the Commander, did not agree or disagree with the recommendation and stated that action to address the recommendation is already underway at CJTF-OIR as part of the process to revise their campaign plan to align it with the current operating environment to include OIR's transition. The Division Chief stated that CJTF-OIR has taken firm steps to address the risk and findings in the report as they develop the campaign plan.

(U) The Division Chief's description of planned actions meets the intent of this recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we obtain and review the revised Campaign Plan, and verify that the associated goals for optional logistics align with the current resourcing and partner force structure.



**Recommendations Table**

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Commander, U.S. Central Command		1	

(U) NOTE: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations.

(U) **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.

(U) **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.

(U) **Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.





**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

July 24, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of DoD Support of the Development of Iraqi  
Security Forces Operational Logistics and Sustainment  
Capabilities (Report No. DODIG-2024-112)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendation.

(U) This report contains a recommendation that is considered resolved because the USCENTCOM J5 Assessments Division Chief's comments of actions to be taken support the intent of this recommendation. Therefore, as discussed in the Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, the recommendation is resolved until the updated campaign plan has been provided to our office, and we verify that it meets the intent of the recommendation.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendation. Send your response to DoD OIG (b)(6) [@dodig.mil](mailto:[redacted]@dodig.mil) and DoD OIG (b)(6) [@dodig.mil](mailto:[redacted]@dodig.mil) if unclassified, or DoD OIG (b)(6) [@dodig.smil.mil](mailto:[redacted]@dodig.smil.mil) and DoD OIG (b)(6) [@dodig.smil.mil](mailto:[redacted]@dodig.smil.mil) if classified SECRET.

(U) If you have any questions, please contact DoD OIG (b)(6) at DoD OIG (b)(6) or DoD OIG (b)(6) at DoD OIG (b)(6). We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the evaluation.

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

*Bryan Clark*

Bryan Clark  
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations  
Programs, Combatant Commands, and Operations



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## (U) Introduction

### (U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation is to assess the effectiveness with which the DoD supported the development of the operational logistics and sustainment capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).<sup>1</sup>

### (U) Background

~~(SECRET//REL)~~ In 2014, following the fall of Mosul and Tikrit to Da'esh, the DoD designated the Commander, U.S. Army Central as the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR). The CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan guides USCENTCOM's role as the military component of the global coalition's Campaign Plan to defeat Da'esh. The Coalition is composed of 77 nations and 5 international organizations, some of which operate in Iraq at the request of the Government of Iraq. According to the CJTF-OIR's supporting Campaign Plan, the primary purpose of CJTF-OIR is to defeat Da'esh and enable partner forces (PFs) in Iraq and Syria to ensure the enduring defeat of Da'esh.

### ***(U) The CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan Outlines the Conditions for the Departure of U.S. Forces***

~~(S//REL USA, MESP)~~ The military campaign conducted by CJTF-OIR forms part of a wider effort by a global coalition of nations and organizations formed in September 2014 to degrade, dismantle, and defeat Da'esh within a whole-of-governments approach. The campaign seeks to protect Coalition homelands and improve regional stability. The CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan has five phases: Phase I–Degrade, Phase II–Dismantle, Phase III–Defeat Da'esh, Phase IV–Normalize, and Phase V–Transition.

~~(S//REL USA, MESP)~~ Following the military defeat of Da'esh by the Partner Forces in Iraq in 2017 and in Syria in 2019, CJTF-OIR transitioned to Campaign Plan Phase IV. CJTF-OIR's Campaign Plan Phase IV had two sub-phases: Phase IVA and Phase IVB. CJTF-OIR completed Phase IVA in 2020, which reduced the Coalition force presence to three core hubs across Iraq, and triggered the transition to Phase IVB in 2022.

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<sup>1</sup> (U) Strategic-level logistics is characterized by the vast capacity of the U.S. industrial base to project and sustain military power across the range of military operations. Strategic-level logistics supports organizing, training, and equipping the forces needed to further U.S. interests. Operational logistics is the art of applying the military resources available to operate forces to achieve the national military objectives in a theater or area of operations.



~~(JOINT SECRET//REL MESP)~~ According to the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan, U.S. and Coalition partners will accomplish Phase IVB by:

- ~~(JOINT SECRET//REL MESP)~~ preventing Da'esh reconstitution in the region,
- ~~(JOINT SECRET//REL MESP)~~ enabling PF operational independence,
- ~~(JOINT SECRET//REL MESP)~~ protecting and enabling Coalition freedom of action, and
- ~~(JOINT SECRET//REL MESP)~~ ensuring an effective security cooperation framework is in place as the Coalition completes its mission.

~~(JOINT SECRET//REL MESP)~~ Once Phase IVB is complete, Coalition forces will conduct a handover of responsibility to the Government of Iraq and subsequently withdraw from the theater. This will mark the completion of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), and U.S. forces will transition to traditional security cooperation activities with Iraq.

## **(U) Roles and Responsibilities**

### **(U) U.S. Central Command**

(U) USCENTCOM directs and enables military operations and activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and stability in support of enduring U.S. interests. USCENTCOM executes military campaign plans across the Central Region area of responsibility through the application of operations, activities, and investments in support of steady state, crisis, and contingency operations. Because of the coalition aspect of OIR, the USCENTCOM Commander also serves as the Combined Forces Commander.

### **(U) CJTF-OIR**

~~(S//REL USA, MESP)~~ CJTF-OIR is a subordinate task force of USCENTCOM, established to defeat Da'esh to enable whole-of-Coalition government actions to increase regional stability. CJTF-OIR ceased combat operations in Iraq in 2022 but continues to provide advise, assist, and enable (A2E) efforts to the ISF through the CJTF-OIR Military Advisor Group-Iraq (MAG-I). CJTF-OIR MAG-I advisors provide the ISF with advice at the operational and strategic levels, working through the Joint Operations Command-Iraq (JOC-I). CJTF-OIR delivers materiel assistance in the form of weapons, vehicles, equipment, supplies, training, and contracted support to the PFs through the Counter-ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), a Title 10 annual funding line authorized by Congress.

***(U) Military Advisor Group–Operation Inherent Resolve***

~~(S//REL USA, MESP)~~ Military Advisor Group-OIR is CJTF-OIR's primary unit, providing A2E to the ISF through JOC-I. Military Advisor Group-OIR conducts, tracks, and refines PF development in Iraq in accordance with the MAG-I Partner Force Development Plan (PFDP).<sup>2</sup> The MAG-I PFDP defines the key PFs that MAG-I interacts with, describes the operational concepts behind the application of A2E, and outlines the developmental frameworks that guide PF development. The MAG-I PFDP provides the developmental framework that identifies effects and PF end states in the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan.<sup>3</sup>

***(U) Partner Forces in Iraq***

~~(S//REL USA, MESP)~~ CJTF-OIR partners with acceptable, U.S. Government-sanctioned, military and security institutions in Iraq. The ISF is sanctioned as a PF in Iraq, comprises the security enterprise of the Government of Iraq, and has forces garrisoned throughout Iraq. The ISF is composed of three ministerial organizations: the Ministry of Defense, the Counter-Terrorism Service, and the Ministry of Interior, whose activities are coordinated by JOC-I, which directly reports to the Prime Minister. However, CJTF-OIR only provides A2E support to the Ministry of Defense and the Counter-Terrorism Service.

***(U) Joint Operations Command–Iraq***

~~(S//REL USA, MESP)~~ JOC-I is the highest level of the Iraqi security and military components. JOC-I employs ISF joint forces to secure the sovereignty and security of Iraq and is the partner of choice for the MAG-I A2E efforts to maintain the defeat of Da'esh.

<sup>2</sup> ~~(S//REL USA, MESP)~~ Military Advisor Group-OIR, "CJTF-OIR Partner Force Development Plan," August 21, 2023.

<sup>3</sup> (U) USECENTCOM Combined Force Command–OIR, "Coalition Military Campaign Plan to Defeat Da'esh," February 17, 2016.

(U) According to Amendment 1 of the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan, the end state is that "PFs are able to independently sustain an enduring defeat of Da'esh in the Combined Joint Operational Area and conditions are set for long-term security cooperation in Iraq."



## (U) Finding

### (U) CJTF-OIR Made Limited Progress on Planned Objectives to Improve ISF Operational Logistics and Sustainment Capabilities

~~(S//REL USA, MESSF)~~ The DoD achieved limited progress in the development of ISF operational logistics and sustainment capabilities. Specifically, according to CJTF-OIR documents, between September 1, 2022, and February 28, 2023, CJTF-OIR made only minor progress on the established objectives for developing ISF operational logistics and sustainment capabilities. Additionally, CJTF-OIR assessments show that, between March and August 2023, CJTF-OIR made no progress training the ISF.

~~(S//REL USA, MESSF)~~ This occurred because the CJTF-OIR and MAG-I campaign and PF development plans that establish actions and milestones do not account for the current U.S. operating footprint in Iraq. Specifically, MAG-I was not structured and did not have the capacity to achieve decisive conditions (DCs) in the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan. For example, only two of the four MAG-I advisors were logistics planners and were only able to provide logistics coaching and advice at the ISF strategic level. This prevented MAG-I from providing advice to or assessing operational logistics and sustainment capabilities of lower levels of the ISF.

~~(S//REL USA, MESSF)~~ As a result, the ISF may not develop the ability to sustain combat-ready forces to address internal violent extremist organizations effectively, and the ISF may remain reliant on Coalition resources to prevent a possible Da'esh resurgence.

### (U) The DoD Made Limited Progress in the Development of ISF Operational Logistics and Sustainment Capabilities

~~(S//REL USA, MESSF)~~ The DoD made limited progress in helping the ISF develop operational logistics and sustainment capabilities. Specifically, from September 1, 2022, to February 28, 2023, CJTF-OIR made only minor progress in the development of ISF operational logistics and sustainment capabilities and, from March 1 to August 31, 2023, made no additional progress in ISF logistics force training. Additionally, MAG-I assessments determined that the ISF continues to require CJTF-OIR A2E and funding to sustain its operational capacity.




## **(U) CJTF-OIR and Coalition Assessments Show Minor Progress in the Development of ISF Operational Logistics Capabilities**

~~(S//REL USA, MESS)~~ CJTF-OIR and coalition assessments showed minor progress in the development of ISF operational logistics capabilities. The CJTF-OIR Campaign Assessment Report is a formal assessment of the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan completed in June 2023. This includes an assessment of CJTF-OIR's A2E of the PF in maintaining defeat of Da'esh, which showed only minor progress. Additionally, Coalition military campaign assessments completed in February and August of 2023 showed minor progress in the development of operational logistics.

~~(S//REL USA, MESS)~~ We considered only the assessed elements in the CJTF-OIR Campaign Assessment Report that were relevant to ISF operational logistics capabilities. For example, for the ISF, Line of Effort 1 is to provide A2E to PFs to maintain the defeat of Da'esh at the operational level. Under Line of Effort 1 are six additional DCs. Specifically, DC 5 under Line of Effort 1 calls for JOC-I to support, generate, and sustain combat-ready forces, which would require developing ISF operational logistics and sustainment capabilities. However, the report showed that, when it comes to developing JOC-I, CJTF-OIR only made minor progress toward Line of Effort 1. Specifically, as shown in Figure 1, the report showed that CJTF-OIR made no progress on DC 5 because of a lack of assessable information and the ISF's continued reliance on U.S. CTEF and foreign military funding instead of Iraqi national funds for equipment.

~~(S//REL USA, MESS)~~ Figure 1. CJTF-OIR Campaign Assessment Report, June 2023



~~(S//REL USA, MESS)~~ Source: Excerpt from the CJTF-OIR Campaign Assessment Report, June 2023.



~~(S//REL USA, MESS)~~ USCENTCOM also produced a coalition military campaign assessment, which measured progress based on desired end states in the Coalition Military Campaign Plan. End State 2 calls for a “sustainable ISF capable of securing Iraq.” We requested that USCENTCOM provide quarterly coalition military campaign assessments from 2022 and 2023, but they only provided assessments covering September 2022 to February 2023 and March 2023 to August 2023.<sup>4</sup> The first assessment from September 2022 to February 2023 showed minor progress in accomplishing End State 2. USCENTCOM’s last approved assessment, from February 2023, indicated minor progress toward the Coalition Military Campaign Plan End State 2 goal of creating an “inclusive and sustainable ISF capable of securing Iraq.” However, USCENTCOM evaluated the specific effect tied to the ISF’s capability to independently sustain itself as “no progress”. According to this assessment, the ISF made no progress in sustainment capabilities because it still required structural changes. The assessment of minor progress towards the end state reflects progress made in other ISF capabilities.

### **(U) CJTF-OIR MAG-I Assessments Show Limited ISF Logistics Capability**

~~(S//REL USA, MESS)~~ MAG-I conducted routine assessments of PF progress to ensure continuous review of A2E efforts, as well as inform both the PFs and external organizations of the progress. According to the MAG-I PFDP, MAG-I assessed the developmental frameworks on a monthly basis and reported the results to CJTF-OIR leadership. The MAG-I assessments established a rating system to determine when the ISF would be “good enough” to maintain the enduring defeat of Da’esh without A2E support. The April 2023 monthly assessment showed that the ISF’s operational logistics capability and capacity did not improve. Additionally, we reviewed MAG-I’s assessment of JOC-I’s ability to manage logistics to sustain combat-ready forces. MAG-I’s April 2023 monthly assessment showed that JOC-I was incapable of planning or conducting sustainment activities for joint operations or accounting for logistics requirements without substantive A2E from Coalition forces. Specifically, the assessment showed that JOC-I had little to no capacity to ensure readiness of vehicles, weapons, or ammunition required by the ISF to conduct joint operations.

### **(U) MAG-I Lacks Capability to Achieve Established Milestones**

~~(S//REL USA, MESS)~~ MAG-I lacks the capability to achieve established milestones. The CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan and MAG-I PFDP that establish actions and milestones do not

<sup>4</sup> (U) We requested assessments covering specific date range, and were provided assessments within the time period but not covering the entire period. We determined that the combined assessments covered enough time with enough consistency to reach reliable conclusions.



~~(S//REL USA, MESP)~~ account for the current U.S. operating footprint in Iraq. Specifically MAG-I was not structured and did not have the capacity to achieve DCs in the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan. For example, only two of the four MAG-I advisors were logistics planners and were only able to provide logistics coaching and advice at the ISF strategic level. This prevented MAG-I from providing advice to or assessing operational logistics and sustainment capabilities of lower levels of the ISF.

### ***(U) MAG-I Did Not Complete ISF Logistics-Related Tasks***

~~(S//REL USA, MESP)~~ MAG-I is the component responsible for advising, assisting, and enabling the ISF's logistics and sustainment capabilities. According to the MAG-I PFDP annexes, MAG-I did not complete 8 of the 10 tasks necessary to achieve the ISF logistic capability objectives. The MAG-I PFDP contains annexes composed of a partner force developmental framework, 180-day task tracker, long-range outlook tracker, and assessment framework. The May 2023 Partner Force Developmental Framework for the ISF established milestones for JOC-I to meet specific capabilities by 2028. For example, JOC-I must be able to conduct and maintain operational sustainment to ensure forces are combat ready.

~~(S//REL USA, MESP)~~ The MAG-I 180-day task tracker identified and tracked activities that MAG-I needed to complete to assist JOC-I in meeting PF objectives. The tracker allowed MAG-I to monitor progress on its ongoing tasks and ensure those tasks were linked to activities that support the requirements within the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan. During our review of the 180-day tracker, dated November 9, 2023, we found multiple developmental tasks related to DC 5 that were not started or were stagnant. For example, according to the long-range outlook tracker, for JOC-I to manage logistics operations to sustain combat-ready forces, they must meet certain milestones. Specifically, JOC-I must implement an Integrated Logistics Picture as part of its overall Common Operational Picture and battle rhythm, have the Ministry of Defense develop an ISF Future Force Concept, and have a CTEF framework that establishes JOC-I long-term priorities and identifies transition points for funded capabilities.<sup>5</sup> Based on the tracker, only two tasks were complete, with two stalled and six in progress. Until JOC-I completes these tasks, MAG-I will be unable to help JOC-I advance to the next set of milestones in the long-range outlook tracker.

~~(S//REL USA, MESP)~~ The most recent monthly assessment for reporting period February 2024 shows that the ISF focuses on operational capability and capacity regressed. Specifically, as of March 2024, DC 5 is mainly stagnant because JOC-I was unable to manage the war-fighting functions because JOC-I was not part of the ISF logistics enterprise. This configuration hindered JOC-I from implementing and supporting the establishment of Ministry of Defense-level policies to sustain the ISF and

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<sup>5</sup> (U) Common Operational Picture is a single, identical display shared by more than one command.



~~(S//REL USA, MESS)~~ communicating operational and training requirements, such as maintenance, ammunition, and procurement.<sup>6</sup>

### **(U) MAG-I Has Limitations Advising and Assisting the ISF**

~~(S//REL USA, MESS)~~ According to CJTF-OIR personnel, MAG-I is limited in its ability to advise and assist the ISF. MAG-I has four advisors at JOC-I to advise and provide recommendations to the ISF and further CJTF-OIR A2E objectives. Two of the advisors are logistician planners within the JOC-I Logistics and Sustainment Directorate. However, according to USCENTCOM personnel, the two logistics planners do not focus on A2E logistics but on collecting CTEF requests and performing other camp administration functions. Additionally, MAG-I logisticians are limited in their ability to influence and understand ISF needs and activities outside of JOC-I. Specifically, no MAG-I representatives outside of JOC-I could provide A2E to the ISF on the necessary actions and activities to develop sustainment capabilities that could allow the ISF to independently sustain operations for more than 3 days. Finally, because no MAG-I staff work with the ISF outside of JOC-I, CJTF-OIR relies on ISF reporting to conduct assessments. This leaves MAG-I unable to assess operational logistics and sustainment capabilities independently of the ISF. *Therefore, the USCENTCOM Commander should conduct a review of its MAG-I PFDP and the Campaign Plan to: (1) determine if the associated milestones and goals for operational logistics are aligned with the current resourcing and PF structure to meet the campaign plan objectives and, if not, (2) develop a plan of action and milestones to make the necessary revision to the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan (Recommendation 1).*

### **(U) CJTF-OIR Is Unlikely to Achieve the ISF Logistics Capability Objectives Associated with the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan**

~~(S//REL)~~ CJTF-OIR is unlikely to achieve the ISF logistics capabilities objectives associated with the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan. For CJTF-OIR to complete Phase IV of their campaign plan, the ISF needs to develop an independent force capable of sustaining operations without Coalition support to maintain defeat of Da'esh. Based on the progress shown in USCENTCOM's assessments, the ISF shows no significant progress toward being able to conduct operational logistics and sustainment activities. Without a sustained, combat-ready force, the ISF will remain reliant on Coalition

<sup>6</sup> ~~(S//REL USA, MESS)~~ We requested that CJTF-OIR Military Advisor Group-OIR provide the most recent Military Advisor Group director monthly assessments, and we were provided assessments covering December 2023, January 2024, and February 2024.

~~(S//REL)~~ resources to prevent a Da'esh resurgence and, therefore, CJTF-OIR cannot complete Phase IV of the CJTF-OIR Campaign Plan.

## **(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### **(U) Recommendation 1**

**(U) We recommend that the Commander of the U.S. Central Command conduct a review of their Military Advisor Group–Operation Inherent Resolve Partner Force Development Plan and the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve Campaign Plan to: (1) determine if the associated milestones and goals for operational logistics are aligned with the current resourcing and partner force structure to meet the Campaign Plan objectives and, if not, (2) develop a plan of action and milestones to make the necessary revisions to the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve Campaign Plan.**

### **(U) U.S. Central Command**

(U) The Division Chief of USCENTCOM J5 Assessments, responding for the USCENTCOM Commander, did not agree or disagree with the recommendation, but stated that action to address the recommendation is already underway at CJTF-OIR as part of the process to revise their campaign plan to align it with the current operating environment, to include OIR's transition. The Division Chief stated that CJTF-OIR has taken firm steps to address the risk and findings in the report as they develop the campaign plan.

### **(U) Our Response**

(U) The Division Chief's description of planned actions meets the intent of this recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we obtain and review the revised Campaign Plan and verify that the associated goals for operational logistics align with the current resourcing and partner force structure.



## (U) Appendix

### (U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from September 2023 through May 2024 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in December 2020 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) We identified and reviewed policies, directives, and orders related to the DoD’s limited role in assessing the effectiveness of the DoD’s support for the development of operational logistics and sustainment capabilities for the ISF. Specifically, we reviewed the following criteria.

- (U) Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, December 19, 2014
- (U) National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-31, December 22, 2023
- (U) DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” December 29, 2016
- (U) Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Justification for FY 2024 Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund (CTEF),” Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, March 2023
- ~~(JOINT SECRET//REL USA, MESSF)~~ USCENTCOM Combined Forces Command-OIR, “Coalition Military Campaign Plan to Defeat Da’esh,” February 17, 2016
- ~~(S//REL USA, MESSF)~~ “Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) Campaign Plan 2022,” Amendment 1, June 7, 2023
- ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ “U.S. Central Command FY 23–27 Country Security Cooperation Plan (CSCP) for Iraq,” Tab A to Appendix 19, “Security Cooperation,” Annex C, “USCENTCOM Campaign Plan (CCP) 1000-21,” Chapter 1, September 30, 2022

- ~~(S//REL USA, MESP)~~ Military Advisor Group OIR, "Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) Partner Force Development Plan," August 21, 2023

(U) We conducted a site visit to USCENTCOM to assess how USCENTCOM and its subordinate commands supported the development of the operational logistics and sustainment capabilities of the ISF. We conducted follow-up interviews with personnel from CJTF-OIR, MAG-I, and JOC-I. In addition, we conducted interviews with the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq Erbil Consulate, the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, and the CJTF MAG-I partners to JOC-I.

(U) We reviewed the following documents provided by USCENTCOM, CJTF-OIR, MAG-I, and JOC-I.

- ~~(SECRET//REL to USA, MESP)~~ USCENTCOM's initial and follow-up RFI responses
- ~~(SECRET//REL to USA, MESP)~~ PFDP Annex C - ISF PFDP 180-day task tracker for November 2023
- ~~(SECRET//REL to USA, MESP)~~ CJTF-OIR's Military Advisor Group director monthly assessment and 180-day outlook update for January, February, and March 2024
- ~~(SECRET//REL to USA, MESP)~~ CJTF-OIR situation report for February and March 2024
- ~~(SECRET//REL to USA, MESP)~~ PFDP Annex D - Assessment Framework for April 2023
- ~~(SECRET//REL to USA, MESP)~~ PFDP Annex A - ISF Partner Force Developmental Framework for May 2023
- ~~(SECRET//REL to USA, MESP)~~ PFDP Annex B – Military Advisor Group PFDP-Long Range Outlook for November 2023

## (U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.



## **(U) Prior Coverage**

(U) During the last 6 years, the DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued four reports discussing the development of partner nation operational logistics and sustainment capabilities.

### **(U) DoD OIG**

(U) DoD OIG Report No, DODIG-2023-086, "Audit of DoD Training of Ukrainian Armed Forces," June 13, 2023

(U) From April through December 2022, the 7th Army Training Command facilitated training for Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel on platforms approved for transfer to Ukraine. Specifically, the 7th Army Training Command facilitated operational and maintenance training for 17 platforms. Based on the DoD OIG's analysis of the training provided and platforms approved for transfer to Ukraine, the DoD OIG did not identify any instance when the 7th Army Training Command did not provide UAF-requested operational or maintenance training.

(U) DoD OIG Report No, DODIG-2022-142, "Special Report: Lessons Learned from Security Cooperation Activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa," September 29, 2022

(U) This report provides a summary evaluation of 22 DoD OIG, 11 Government Accountability Office, and 4 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction oversight reports from 2015 to 2021 related to U.S. and Coalition efforts to provide security cooperation to foreign partners in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa. These oversight reports identified several areas where challenges remain, as well as lessons learned that might inform and assist current and future U.S. security cooperation activities worldwide.

(U) DoD OIG Report No, DODIG-2020-061, "Audit of the DoD's Accountability of Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund Equipment Designated for Syria," February 13, 2020

(U) Special Operations Joint Task Force-OIR and 1st Theater Sustainment Command had deficiencies within the CTEF for Syria program based on the accountability and security of the CTEF for Syria's equipment. Special Operations Joint Task Force-OIR and 1st Theater Sustainment Command personnel created a shared drive portal for all of the documentation for the CTEF for Syria's equipment from procurement through divestment. In addition, 1st Theater Sustainment Command started providing its hand receipts and completed inventory documents to Special Operations Joint Task Force-OIR, and Special Operations Joint Task Force-OIR used this shared drive portal to store documentation for the CTEF for Syria's equipment.

(U) DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2018-147, "U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Iraqi Police Hold Force," September 13, 2018

(U) U.S. and Coalition forces did not provide advise and assist activities to the Iraqi Police Hold Force units conducting hold-force operations because of competing command priorities, which resulted in Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-OIR focusing its advise and assist resources on offensive operations. As a result, the command had limited visibility of Iraqi Police Hold Force operations and could not fully determine Iraqi Police Hold Force unit capabilities or adequately assess future training and equipping requirements.



**(U) Management Comments****(U) USCENTCOM**

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**UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND**  
 7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD  
 MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

June 7, 2024

Office Of Inspector General  
 Department Of Defense  
 4800 Mark Center Drive  
 Alexandria, Virginia 22350-1500

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of DoD Support of the Development of Iraqi Security Forces  
 Operational Logistics and Sustainment Capabilities (Project No. D2023-DEVOPD-0165.000)

(U) Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the subject line report. We found there were many errors contained within the document and request you consider the information provided in the attachments to inform edits and improvements to the report before release.

(U) As to the report's Recommendation 1, this activity is already underway at CJTF-OIR as part of the process to revise their CAMPLAN to align it with the current operating environment to include OIR's transition. This CAMPLAN update is expected to be released shortly. During the development of the CAMPLAN, CJTF-OIR has taken firm steps to address the risk and findings in the report. To date, CJTF-OIR has conducted the following actions:

- (U) Identified who in the ISF is responsible for sustainment.
- (U) Organized meetings with DCOS Log Ops to discuss sustainment.
- (U) Identified potential opportunity to change MAG's SFAB specialist field to Logistics in Oct 2024 when their replacement in place (RIP) occurs.
- (U) Working with OSC-I to use a blend of CTEF/OSC-I funds to stand up a logistics contract, similar to the MAG-N model in Kurdistan.
- (U) MAG has upcoming visits to other echelons and warehouse locations in Federal Iraq.

(U) It should be noted that throughout the HMC process with the Iraqis, the Capabilities Working Group tried to highlight sustainment as a transition risk, only to be told by s/GEN Yarallah (CHOD) himself, "I have been doing this for 40+ years and we don't need the coalition help with sustaining our equipment." There is still much work to do but additional resources will be required to address this deficiency.

Sincerely,

X D. E. Pedersen

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
 Daniel E. Pedersen  
 DAFC, Division Chief  
 USCENTCOM JS Assessments

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Attachments:

- 1 – (U) USCENTCOM Change Recommendation Matrix (S//REL TO MESF)
- 2 – (U) CMCP Assessment - March to August 2022 (S//REL TO MESF)
- 3 – (U) ISF Sustainment Notes (S//NOFORN)
- 4 – (U) Consolidated Logistics data call responses. (S//REL TO MESF)

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## **(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations**

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<b>A2E</b>	Advise, Assist, and Enable
<b>CJTF-OIR</b>	Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve
<b>CTEF</b>	Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund
<b>DC</b>	Decisive Condition
<b>ISF</b>	Iraqi Security Forces
<b>JOC-I</b>	Joint Operations Command—Iraq
<b>MAG-I</b>	Military Advisor Group—Iraq
<b>OIR</b>	Operation Inherent Resolve
<b>PF</b>	Partner Force
<b>PFDP</b>	Partner Force Development Plan
<b>USCENTCOM</b>	U.S. Central Command

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