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CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e), USAID (b)(6)



CLASSIFIED OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

APRIL 1, 2019-JUNE 30, 2019

Classified By: Michael S. Child, Sr., Deputy Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations

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(U) ABOUT THIS REPORT

(U) In January 2013, legislation was enacted creating the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. This legislation, which amended the Inspector General Act, requires the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide quarterly reports to Congress on designated contingency operations and the activities of the Lead IG agencies.

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)

(U) These operations, which seek to degrade al Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-affiliated terrorists in the Middle East and specific regions of Africa, are classified; there are no unclassified reports on these operations. This classified report constitutes the entirety of Lead IG reporting on these operations and is provided to relevant agencies and congressional committees.

(U) The Offices of Inspector General of DoD, DoS, and USAID are referred to in this report as the Lead IG agencies. The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out their three statutory missions related to these overseas contingency operations:

- (U) Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over the contingency operation.
- (U) Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations.
- (U) Report quarterly to the Congress and the public on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead IG agencies.

(U) METHODOLOGY

(U) To produce this quarterly report, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from their agencies and open sources, including congressional testimony, policy research organizations, press conferences, think tanks, and media reports. DoD, DoS, and USAID officials also provide written responses to quarterly data call questions from Lead IG agencies. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, or evaluations mentioned or referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited all of the data and information provided by the agencies. For further details on the methodology for this report, see page 59.

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(U) OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

(U) FOREWORD

(U) We are pleased to submit the Lead Inspector General classified quarterly report to the U.S. Congress on the East Africa Overseas Contingency Operation, the North and West Africa Overseas Contingency Operation, and Operation Yukon Journey, pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978.

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(U) This report is divided into four sections. The first three sections provide information on the status of each of the contingency operations—East Africa, North and West Africa, and Yukon Journey—and the U.S. government activities being conducted in their respective regions. The fourth section discusses the completed, ongoing, and planned oversight work conducted by the Lead IG Offices of Inspector General and our partner oversight agencies during the period from April 1, 2019, through June 30, 2019.

(U) Working in close collaboration, we remain committed to providing comprehensive oversight and timely reporting on these contingency operations.



Glenn A. Fine

Glenn A. Fine
Principal Deputy Inspector
General Performing the Duties of
the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense



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International Development

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(U) OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST



(U) CLASSIFICATION KEY

(U) The following classification markers are featured in this report:

(U) U.S. Classifications

(U): Unclassified
(C): U.S. Confidential
(S): Secret

(U) Dissemination Controls

(U//FOUO): Unclassified//For Official Use Only
(U//SBU): Unclassified//Sensitive but Unclassified
(S//NF): Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
(C//REL TO USA, FVEY): Confidential//Releasable to USA, Five Eyes
(Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United States, and United Kingdom)
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY): Secret//Releasable to USA, Five Eyes
(S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY): Secret//Releasable to USA, France and Five Eyes

On the Cover

(U) Left to right: Cameroon soldier trains to protect borders and provide security in Burkina Faso (U.S. Army photo); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAID providing water assistance to help meet the need of Somalis. (USAID photo)

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(U) OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

(U)MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL



Glenn A. Fine

(U) This is the 4th Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report on the status of the East Africa Overseas Contingency Operation, the North and West Africa Overseas Contingency Operation, and Operation Yukon Journey. This classified report summarizes this quarter's events and describes Lead IG and partner agency oversight work related to these three operations.

(S//NF) This report focuses on several key issues related to these counterterrorism operations this quarter. AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(U) Despite these challenges, my colleagues and I remain committed to providing quarterly reports on activities related to these ongoing operations, consistent with the requirements of the IG Act.

Glenn A. Fine

Principal Deputy Inspector General

Performing the Duties of the Inspector General


U.S. Department of Defense

CLASSIFIED LEAD IG REPORT v APRIL 1, 2019-JUNE 30, 2019


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CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



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(U) From left to right: Uganda Wildlife Authority leader clears weapons during trafficking course taught by U.S. soldiers. (U.S. Air Force photo); CENTCOM (b) (1) 1.7(e); Burkina Faso soldier stands watch during a training exercise. (U.S. Army photo)

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(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) EAST AFRICA OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATION

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)(g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)(g)

[REDACTED]



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(U) OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST



(U) Somali woman receives humanitarian assistance from USAID. (USAID photo)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c), DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)(g)

(U) In June, after a 28-year closure, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reopened its mission in Somalia. USAID announced \$185 million in U.S. humanitarian assistance to Somalia intended to address food insecurity, malnutrition, water delivery, and emergency health care. According to USAID, while its mission reopened, travel outside of the mission's airport compound in Mogadishu is restricted due to local insecurity, which raises concerns about how much visibility and oversight USAID will have over the implementation of its programs.⁶

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(U) OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST



(U) Cameroonian Armed Forces provide security during a hostage recovery drill in Lagos, Nigeria. (U.S. Army photo)

(U) NORTH AND WEST AFRICA OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATION

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

7

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

. The DoS reported that it focused its diplomatic efforts toward a ceasefire and political resolution to the conflict. AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)(g)

[REDACTED]

9

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(U) OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

(U//SBU) USAID (b)(1) 1.7(e), (b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

10

(U) According to the United Nations (UN), civilian fatalities, displacement, and food shortages have reached unprecedented levels in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali due to violent extremist activity and ethnic fighting. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), a non-governmental organization funded in part by the DoS, state security is declining and 570 deaths this quarter have been attributed to violent extremism, jihadist rebel groups, tribal conflict, and local militias in the Sahel and Lake Chad Region. ACLED reported that because of the lack of political solutions to deal with jihadist insurgencies and ethnic fighting, violence continues to expand in the region.¹¹

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d)

[REDACTED]

12

(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)

[REDACTED]

13

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

14


(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)

[REDACTED]


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(U) OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)



15

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1)
1.7(e)



(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)



16

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



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(U) OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

17

(U) OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

(U) This quarter, the Lead IG agencies and our oversight partners issued five reports related to these three classified counterterrorism operations. The reports examined, for example, the readiness of USAFRICOM's Regionally Aligned Forces; fuel and safety inspections at U.S. diplomatic facilities; and the accountability of DoS funds for countering violent extremism programs. Lead IG investigations resulted in one contract termination and two debarments. As of June 30, 2019, the Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners had 9 ongoing and 2 planned oversight projects, and coordinated on 13 open investigations related to these 3 overseas contingency operations.



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(U) EAST AFRICA

(U) A military member assigned to the Tanzania People's Defence Force stands security watch during a visit, board, search, and seizure drill. (U.S. Navy photo)



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(U) EAST AFRICA OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATION

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d)

[REDACTED]

(U) According to the USAFRICOM Commander's 2019 Posture Statement, the lack of economic and educational opportunities, a large and disenfranchised youth population, and inadequate natural resources are potential drivers of extremism in Africa. These conditions, coupled with authoritarian, corrupt, or ineffective governments, contribute to persistent instability in East Africa. Two terrorist organizations—al Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia—have taken advantage of these conditions to spread violent extremism. The Commander's statement states that USAFRICOM employs broad-reaching diplomatic, development, and defense approaches to foster interagency efforts and help negate the drivers of conflict and extremism.⁴

(U) International organizations have regularly reported on the fragile and corrupt condition of the Somali state. For example, according to the Fund for Peace 2019 Fragile States Index, Somalia ranks as the world's second most fragile state. The Index's rank is the product of economic, political, and social indicators. Additionally, according to the Corruption Perceptions Index, Somalia ranked as the most corrupt country in the world for the 11th year in a row.⁵

(U) EAST AFRICA

(U) SECURITY

(S//NF)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)

(S//NF)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)

(S//NF)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d)

(S//NF)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)



(U) Members of the Ethiopian National Defense Force and the U.S. Army salute their respective national anthems during a ceremony to strengthen partnerships, promote regional security, and support peacekeeping for AMISOM. (U.S. Army photo)

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

11

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

14

(U) VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION ACTIVITY IN EAST AFRICA

(U) Al Shabaab Conducts Attacks in Mogadishu and the Countryside

(U) Al Shabaab continued attacks in the Somali capital during the quarter. International media reported that al Shabaab claimed responsibility for a May suicide car bomb that killed at least nine people in Mogadishu.¹⁵ On June 15, al Shabaab detonated 2 bombs in Mogadishu, killing 8 and injuring 16.¹⁶

(U) Al Shabaab also remained active in Somalia's rural areas. Media sources reported that al Shabaab claimed responsibility for a June roadside bomb in Wajir County along the Kenya-Somalia border that killed 12 police officers and left 1 wounded. Three Kenyan police reservists were kidnapped in the same district. (Kenyan military forces have occupied part of southern Somalia along the border since 2011). Media sources also reported that al Shabaab executed 18 people in July in south Somalia, where it continues to control significant territory. Victims were accused of being Somali government soldiers, spying for Kenya and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, adultery, and sorcery. Al Shabaab used public stoning and firing squads for these executions.¹⁷

(U) Al Shabaab Remains a Capable and Resilient Organization

(U) According to media reporting, al Shabaab controlled 20 percent of Somalia, particularly in south central Somalia, as of March 2019. Paul Williams, Associate Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, writes that Somalia suffers from three broad categories of violence: (1) the war between the Somali government against al Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia; (2) local clan-related conflicts, usually related to power struggles over lucrative towns, ports, and transport routes; and (3) localized intercommunal violence over access to land, water, or grazing for livestock, which has been exacerbated by climate change and environmental degradation.¹⁸



(U) Paul Williams. (United Nations photo)

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)(g)

[REDACTED]

19

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

[REDACTED]

20

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)(g)

[REDACTED]

21

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)(g)

[REDACTED]

22

(U) This quarter, the DoS reported to the DoS OIG that the DoD's direct action authority and the U.S. Embassy's partnership with AMISOM and the Somali security forces have maintained pressure on al Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia. At the same time, al Shabaab continued to adapt its

S//NF
AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

tactics and adopt new ones, including small group operations, improvised explosive devices, and enforcing extreme security protocols with fighters, equipment, and supplies. The U.S. Embassy in Somalia reported that al Shabaab remained capable of employing a variety of tactics, including ambushes and mortar attacks.²³

~~(S//NF)~~ ISIS-Somalia Under Pressure

~~(S//NF)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

S//NF

24

~~(S//NF)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

[REDACTED]

25

~~(S//NF)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)(g)

[REDACTED]

26

~~(S//NF)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)(g)

[REDACTED]

27

(U) U.S. AND SOMALI COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS

(U) USAFRICOM Airstrikes Target al Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia

(U) This quarter, USAFRICOM reported that it conducted 18 airstrikes against al Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia, resulting in 38 al Shabaab killed and 12 ISIS-Somalia killed, as shown in Figure 1. These strikes were in support of Somali partner forces on the ground.²⁸

~~(S//NF)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)

[REDACTED]

28

~~(S//NF)~~ AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

[REDACTED]

(U) EAST AFRICA

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

30

(U) USAFRICOM reported there were no confirmed civilian casualties as a result of the USAFRICOM calendar year 2019 airstrikes. However, USAFRICOM told the DoD OIG that it identified four civilian casualty allegations related to air strikes. Of the four alleged civilian casualties, USAFRICOM determined that one allegation was not credible and reported that three were currently being assessed.³¹

(U) Somali National Army Begins Operations Against al Shabaab

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d)

32

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

. According to Paul Williams, Associate Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, the success of the operations is notable considering that the SNA has a reputation of being undermanned, poorly equipped, and corrupt. The SNA is also ineligible for U.S. financial support.³³

(S//NF) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)

34

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)

35

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

36

(U) The DoS reported to the DoS OIG that since the launch of military operations in Lower Shabelle in April, the Somali Prime Minister has prioritized reforms designed to remove al Shabaab from strategic areas and establish security through police and stabilization efforts.³⁷

(U) The United Nations reported that the ongoing conflict has caused approximately 30,000 people to be displaced from their homes in Lower Shabelle in April and May.³⁸

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Approxiamtely
**30,000
people**


displaced from
their homes in
Lower Shabelle
in April and May

U

(U) Figure 1.

(U) Airstrikes Against Al Shabaab

(U)



(U) Al Shabaab Degraded by U.S. Airstrikes in Support of Somali Forces

1 LOWER SHABELLE REGION

GAROWLE

April 11, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 2 al Shabaab KIA

BALED AMIN

May 22, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 2 al Shabaab KIA

2 MIDDLE SHABELLE REGION

TORTOROOW

May 5, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 3 al Shabaab KIA

June 5, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 1 al Shabaab KIA

(U) Source: USAFRICOM

QUNYO BARROW

June 25, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 1 al Shabaab KIA

3 MIDDLE JUBA REGION

JILIB

April 9, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 1 al Shabaab KIA

June 16, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 2 al Shabaab KIA

June 24, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 1 al Shabaab KIA

4 LOWER JUBA REGION

JAMAAME

April 19, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 2 al Shabaab KIA

5 BARI REGION

XIRIIO

April 14, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 1 ISIS-Somalia official KIA

6 WOQOCYI GALIBEED REGION

GOLIS MOUNTAINS

April 26, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 3 ISIS-Somalia official KIA

May 8, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 13 al Shabaab KIA

May 9, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 4 al Shabaab KIA

May 22, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 2 ISIS-Somalia official KIA

May 24, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 3 al Shabaab KIA

May 26, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 3 al Shabaab KIA

June 4, 2019

ASSESSMENT: 6 ISIS-Somalia official KIA

(U) BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

(U) The DoD and DoS Build the Somali Danab Infantry Brigade

(U) The DoD and the DoS reported that over the next 8 years, the U.S. Government will recruit, train, and equip the Danab Brigade. The DoD said it expects the Danab Brigade to attain “initial operational capability” by 2024, and “full operational capability” by 2027. USAFRICOM expects its mentorship to continue beyond the build timeline.³⁹

(U) According to a USAFRICOM brief, when fully established, the Somali Danab Brigade will have 5 infantry battalions of 500 soldiers each. The U.S. Ambassador to Somalia and the U.S. Secretary of Defense jointly committed to building the Danab Brigade as part of the May 2017 “London Security Pact for Somalia.”⁴⁰

(U) Media reports described the Danab Brigade as an elite Somali commando unit trained by U.S. special operations forces. USAFRICOM stated it is continuing to develop the Danab Brigade, and U.S. military forces are involved in its training.⁴¹

(U) The DoS reported to the DoS OIG that the United States provides advisory services to Danab trainees, troop medical clinic operations, and civil engineering support. The DoS has also provided Somali partner forces with food, fuel, and other support since at least 2009, totaling more than \$75 million in logistics support to Somali partner forces. As of May 2019, the DoS contracted for rations for approximately 5,190 soldiers annually, including the Danab Brigade. Contractors deliver food rations for SNA operations and maintenance teams and fuel for power generation to the Ministry of Defense and other locations.⁴²


(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d)



43

(U) Danab Brigade forces are recruited and trained with clan considerations in mind, according to USAFRICOM. Danab troops are housed in a compound separated from Somali society, and their military effectiveness is partially a function of their removal from the negative influences of clan-based politicians serving in official posts. USAFRICOM stated that training local forces in this fashion avoids reinforcing warlord-like power structures when the United States departs the country. USAFRICOM said there are no indications of “dual loyalties” within the Danab Brigade.⁴⁴

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d)



⁴³ See Figure 2.



DoS has
provided
\$75M
in logistics
support to
Somalia

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
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(U) EAST AFRICA

(U) Figure 2.

(U) **Danab Brigade Build Plan**

~~(S//NF)~~
AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d)



(U) Derived from USAFRICOM Danab Briefing

~~(S//NF)~~

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(U) OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES

(U) STABILIZATION

(U//~~SECRET~~) USAID Stabilization Program Coordinates with Military in Newly Liberated Areas

(U//~~SECRET~~) According to USAID, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) coordinates stabilization activities with other U.S. Government agencies through an interagency working group.⁴⁶

(U//~~SECRET~~) OTI told USAID OIG that it conducts community consultations to gain insights into local dynamics and identify needs. For example, OTI said that before the SNA operation to liberate towns in Lower Shabelle, it met government and local leaders in Sabiid, one of the liberated towns to understand community needs and inform security considerations. According to USAID, OTI also extended the broadcast range of a local radio station to reach Sabiid, consistent with the previously discussed OTI research findings USAID (b)(7)(E)

(U//~~SECRET~~) USAID told USAID OIG that Somali security forces had attempted to remove al Shabaab from Sabiid six times since 2009. USAID stated that Sabiid residents felt mistreated and neglected by the Somali government due to past predatory actions against civilians and poor performance by the SNA. USAID reported that the U.S. Government has emphasized that military operations should not outpace stabilization in order to ensure the success of stabilization. The DoS reported to the DoS OIG that it has pressured local leaders in the Lower Shabelle region to be politically inclusive, especially across clan lines.⁴⁸

(U) Disengaged Combatants and Reintegration

(U) A recent report from the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives seeks to address the lack of quantifiable information on former combatants in Somalia. The April 2019 report, *From Engagement to Sustainable Reintegration: An In-Depth Analysis of Disengaged Combatants in Somalia*, determined that:⁴⁹

(U) Recruitment: In contrast to community perceptions that members joined for economic incentives or were coerced, most disengaged combatants joined al Shabaab to obtain security, because of al Shabaab's religious ideology, or due to peer network influence. Overall, most disengaged combatants come from rural areas and strongly oppose the government, which they view as unjust and corrupt.

(U) Return: Disenchantment and weariness are common reasons for disengagement. A trigger for leaving al Shabaab is negative information about the group from a trusted source, but disengagement is hindered by fear of retaliation. Joining al Shabaab is

often facilitated through friends, but families often support disengagement.

(U) Reintegration: Family support not only helps al Shabaab combatants return to their communities, but also assists in their social reintegration, according to USAID's report. Larger community acceptance is cautious and conditional but usually improves over time. Ninety percent of disengaged combatants and their families stated that their biggest challenge was a lack of resources. Specifically, disengaged combatants experience higher rates of unemployment and earn lower wages than those who never joined a militant group.⁵⁰

(U) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

(U) USAID Reopens Somalia Mission

(U) On June 17, USAID reopened the USAID mission in Mogadishu. Administrator Mark Green emphasized the continued U.S. commitment to Somalia, support for the Federal Government of Somalia's reforms, and international re-engagement. The mission had been closed since 1991.⁵¹ USAID stated in a press release that the U.S. Government is the largest provider of humanitarian assistance to Somalia. Administrator Green announced \$185 million in U.S. humanitarian assistance to Somalia to address food insecurity, malnutrition, water delivery, and emergency health care.⁵²

(U) USAID reported to USAID OIG, however, that due to security concerns USAID staff are generally not permitted to travel outside of the reopened mission's airport compound in Mogadishu. The restriction limits USAID's ability to assess and monitor programs and meet with local officials. USAID told USAID OIG that it meets with implementing partners at the airport compound, ^{USAID (b)(7)(F)} [REDACTED]

53

(U) USAID Deconflicts Humanitarian and Development Efforts with Military Operations

(U//~~FOUO~~) USAID told USAID OIG that the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has established a Somalia deconfliction process in response to concerns regarding increased U.S. airstrikes in Somalia in 2017. The deconfliction process allows humanitarian and development organizations in Somalia to voluntarily submit site coordinates to OFDA. OFDA then removes organizations' identifying information and submits the site coordinates to the DoD. Additional deconfliction coordination for mobile movements in Somalia has been supported by OFDA humanitarian advisors at USAFRICOM and OFDA field staff on an *ad hoc* basis. Participation in the deconfliction process is not required by USAID but is a voluntary service provided by OFDA to all humanitarian and development organizations in Somalia.⁵⁴

SECRET//NOFORN

(U) NORTH AND WEST AFRICA



(U) Nigerien soldiers train to counter violent extremist organizations, protect their borders, and provide security. (U.S. Army photo)

SECRET//NOFORN

(U) NORTH AND WEST AFRICA OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATION

(U) ABOUT THE OPERATION

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d)

[REDACTED]

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

(U) International organizations have regularly reported on the fragile and corrupt conditions in the states of Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Mali, and Libya. For example, according to the Fund for Peace's 2019 Fragile States Index, Chad ranked as the 7th most fragile state in the world with Nigeria 14th, Cameroon 16th, Niger 18th, Mali 21st, and Libya 28th. The Index's rank is the product of the social, economic, and political pressures that each country faces. Additionally, according to the Corruption Perceptions 2018 Index, Libya ranks as the 5th most corrupt country in the world.⁵

(U) NORTH AND WEST AFRICA

(U) SECURITY

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)
[Redacted]

S//NF

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)
[Redacted]

(U) NORTH AFRICA

(U) USAFRICOM Removes U.S. Forces from Libya

(S) The USAFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan contains two primary military objectives related to counterterrorism operations in Libya:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) By FY 2021, ISIS, AQIM, and other designated priority VEOs in Libya and the Maghreb are degraded and cannot cause significant harm to U.S. interests.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) When conditions permit, forces aligned with the internationally recognized Libyan government maintain security of critical regions and institutions within Libya with minimal external support.

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [REDACTED] 10

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [REDACTED] 11

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [REDACTED] 12

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [REDACTED] 13

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c) [REDACTED]

(U) NORTH AND WEST AFRICA



AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

4

(S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d)

(U) Secretary General Antonio Guterres visits Zara Detention Center in Tripoli, Libya where migrants and refugees face indefinite detention. (United Nations photo)

(U) Libyan National Army Attacks Tripoli

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)

16

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

17

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

18

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

19

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)

20

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

21

(U) According to the United Nations, as of July 2019, approximately 3,300 migrants and refugees were detained in and around Tripoli in what it described as “inhumane conditions.” On July 3, a migrant detention center housing more than 610 people near Tripoli was bombed, leaving at least 44 dead, including women and children. The Government of National Accord and the Italian Interior Minister blamed the Libyan National Army for the attack. A Libyan National Army general denied targeting the migrant detention center, telling the Associated Press it was a nearby militia camp that was the target.²²

(U) ISIS-Libya, AQIM Operations Exploit Libyan Security Vacuum

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

23

(U) NORTH AND WEST AFRICA

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

24

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

25

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)

26

(S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

27

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

28

(U//FOUO) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e); DIA (b)(1) 1.7(e) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

29

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c) & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)


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(U) Figure 3.

(U) Northwest Africa Terrorist Incidents
(S//NF)

(U) Terrorist Incidents from April-June 2019

(U) Casualties of terrorist incidents include immediate deaths and casualties who later died of wounds. The map highlights figures of 20 or more casualties per incident.




Source: Derived from multiple publicly available sources and USAFRICOM

(U) Figure 3 details terrorist incidents during the quarter.

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(U) NORTH AND WEST AFRICA

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)(g)



(S//NF)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) NORTH AND WEST AFRICA

(U) WEST AFRICA AND LAKE CHAD REGION

(U) State of Security is in Rapid Decline

(U) According to UN officials, overall insecurity – civilian fatalities, displacement, and food shortages – reached “unprecedented levels” this quarter in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali due to intensified violent extremist activity and ethnic fighting.³¹

(S) Despite ongoing counterterrorism efforts by the United States and its partners in the region, the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command-Africa, Maj Gen Marcus Hicks, stated publicly in June that the Sahel was a rapidly deteriorating security environment. The previous quarter, according to the Voice of America News, Maj Gen Hicks stated, “At this time, we are not winning,” when asked about the U.S. counterterrorism mission in West Africa. AFRICOM (b)(1)(c)

32

(U) According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), there were 570 civilian deaths due to violent extremism, jihadist rebel groups, tribal conflict, and local militias this quarter in the Sahel and Lake Chad Region. The previous quarter, ACLED reported 531 civilian deaths. ACLED assessed that a lack of political solutions to deal with jihadist insurgencies and ethnic fighting will likely result in an expansion of violence in the Sahel and Lake Chad Region for the foreseeable future.³³

(U) USAFRICOM reported to the DoD OIG that to address the escalating violence in the Lake Chad Region, it partners with the Multinational Joint Task Force to counter Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa. The Multinational Joint Task Force is composed of security forces from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. USAFRICOM stated that it supports the Multinational Joint Task Force through exercises, limited operations, and security assistance. The Multinational Joint Task Force killed 42 suspected ISIS-West Africa fighters on June 21 in Nigeria’s Borno State, according to reporting by Reuters. This was heaviest death toll suffered by the insurgents in the last 6 months, according to Reuters.³⁴

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d)

35

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d)

36

(U) A Belgian special forces soldier (left) observes Nigerian forces during a ground movement and attack on an enemy position in Burkina Faso. (U.S. Army photo)



(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d)
 (S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d)
 [Redacted text block]
 37

- (S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d)
 [Redacted text block]
 38
- (S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d)
 [Redacted text block]
 39
- (S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d)
 [Redacted text block]
 40
- (S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d)
 [Redacted text block]
 41

(U) NORTH AND WEST AFRICA

(U) Multiple VEOs Operate in West Africa and Lake Chad Region

(U) Although VEOs that operate in West Africa and the Lake Chad Region pose no direct threat to the U.S. homeland, according to USAFRICOM, VEOs in the region prioritize attacks in their areas of operation, sometimes working together toward common goals. The following is an assessment of strengths, capabilities, and activities during the quarter of priority VEOs in West Africa and the Lake Chad Region, according to open sources, USAFRICOM, and the DIA.⁴²

(S//REL TO USA, FRA, FVEY//REL/DO) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d)



43

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)



44

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)




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(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)



46

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)(g)



47

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)



48


(U) Regional Stability Declines

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d)




49

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)



50

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d)



SECRET//NOFORN

(U) NORTH AND WEST AFRICA

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)(g)

51

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d)

52

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)

53

(U//FOUO) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

54

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d)

55

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d)

56

S//NF

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

S//NF

SECRET//NOFORN



(U) Members of Cameroonian Armed Forces provide security for a hostage role-player they recovered during a hostage recovery drill on a Nigerian vessel in Lagos, Nigeria. (U.S. Army photo)

(U) USAFRICOM reported that in Cameroon it supports counter-IED training, ISR aircraft maintenance and aircrew training, intelligence capability development, operational law training, and small boat training.⁵⁷

(S//NF)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d)



(U) According to USAFRICOM, in Chad, security cooperation activities support border security capacity building, counter-IED training, Cessna 208 ISR capability development, maintenance and aircrew training, intelligence capability development, and small boat operations.⁵⁹

(U) NORTH AND WEST AFRICA

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(d)



60

(U) USAFRICOM security cooperation activities in Mali support gendarme quick-reaction force expansion and Ministry of Defense level advisors.⁶¹


(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)



62


(U) According to USAFRICOM, in Niger its security cooperation activities support counterterrorism training, counter-IED training, intelligence capability development; Cessna 208 ISR aircraft support, military intelligence training, and small boat operations.⁶³

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)



64

(U) USAFRICOM security cooperation activities in Nigeria support counter-IED training, infantry training, and intelligence capability development.⁶⁵





(U) Dozens of civilians were killed during an attack on the village Sobana De, in central Mali. (United Nations photo)

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)



66

(U) OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES

(U) STABILIZATION

(U) DoS Identifies Challenges to Countering Violent Extremism in Burkina Faso

(S//NF) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)



67

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)



68

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)



69

(U) Benin Requests U.S. Government Assistance

(U//SBU) The DoS reported to the DoS OIG that Benin contributes one company of 150 troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force, the only non-Lake Chad Basin country to do so. This quarter, the DoS reported that it received a formal request from the Benin military to rotate Benin troops participating in the Multinational Joint Task Force in October or November 2019. The U.S. Government previously assisted Benin to deploy its troops in Chad, and assisted with the 2018 rotation. Benin is expected to request continued assistance throughout its mission to Chad, as Benin has no way to transport troops without U.S. support.⁷⁰

(U//SBU) The DoS reported that the DoS provided two, 1 week-long forensic evidence collection and preservation workshops to Benin specialized police units during the quarter: a session in May focused on maritime crimes and a session in June covering a wide range of criminal investigations. In June, Benin investigators and prosecutors met with counterparts from Niger, Nigeria, Togo, and Burkina Faso at a DoS-funded workshop to discuss strategies and case cooperation to address crimes in rural border areas.⁷¹

(U) DoS provides Funds for Humanitarian Assistance

(U//SBU) The DoS reported to the DoS OIG that Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) humanitarian assistance programs in North and West Africa target refugees, returnees, host

U//SBU



Nigerian
security forces
moved

**10,000
residents**
to an IDP camp
due to a military
offensive

U//SBU

communities, and other vulnerable populations, including internally displaced persons (IDP) and other conflict victims. The Bureau carries out these programs through international organizations and non-governmental organizations that provide community-based protection, education, health, and nutrition, water, sanitation, hygiene, shelter, and livelihood assistance.⁷²

(U//SBU) For North Africa, the DoS reported that PRM provided approximately \$33.8 million for programs in Algeria and Libya, and for regional programs. In FY 2019, the Bureau has so far announced \$9.4 million in FY 2019 funding for programs in North Africa, including Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya, and for regional programs. PRM has provided additional FY 2019 funding, not yet publicly announced, to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for Libya.⁷³

(U//SBU) For West Africa, the DoS reported that PRM provided approximately \$118.6 million for programs in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal. The Bureau has so far announced \$24.7 million in funding for programs in West Africa, and has provided additional FY 2019 funding, not yet publicly announced, for West Africa.⁷⁴

(U) In addition to the regional funding noted above, the DoS stated that PRM provided \$209.9 million in FY 2018 in Africa-wide contributions to the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross and has provided \$41.1 million for Africa-wide programs thus far during FY 2019.⁷⁵

(U) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

(U) Lake Chad Basin

(U) STATUS OF ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS COMPLICATES DOS AND USAID PROGRAMMING

(U) More than 2.7 million people are currently displaced in the Lake Chad Basin due to the insecurity caused by Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa, according to the International Organization for Migration. As VEO attacks continue, the length of time, number of times, and number of people who are displaced continues to grow.⁷⁶

(U) INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS FORCIBLY RELOCATED

(U//SBU) An attack on May 23 displaced nearly 15,000 people in Chad's Lac region, according to USAID. Additionally, Nigerian government security forces have begun forcibly relocating civilians in Nigeria while preparing operations against VEOs. A USAID report stated that Nigerian security forces in April moved up to 10,000 residents from their town to an IDP camp due to a military offensive, with only 30 minutes advance warning for the residents and no warning for camp management. Nigerian security forces reportedly moved approximately 10,000 additional residents in May due to a military campaign. Humanitarian organizations were not sufficiently notified by the Nigerian government of the relocation and IDP camps had limited assistance resources available, resulting in approximately 8,600 people sleeping in the open as the result of insufficient shelters.⁷⁷

(U) USAID also reported to USAID OIG that IDPs are experiencing multiple displacements, with 42 percent of IDPs in camps or camp-like settings in northeast Nigeria having been displaced at least twice. Additionally, approximately 25 percent of IDPs in host communities have been displaced at least twice. The situation for IDPs in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger is likely similar,

(U) NORTH AND WEST AFRICA

USAID reported to USAID OIG, but there is limited data on secondary and tertiary movements. According to International Organization for Migration, approximately two-thirds of IDPs in northeast Nigeria were displaced in 2016 or earlier.⁷⁸

(U) USAID AND DOS ASSISTANCE DIRECTED BY STATUS OF POPULATIONS

(U) USAID reported to USAID OIG that ongoing displacement complicates U.S. Government programming, as USAID and DoS funding is directed at different populations. According to USAID, its Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provides assistance primarily to IDPs, while the DoS's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration provides assistance to refugees, conflict victims, and migrants. USAID's Office of Food for Peace (FFP) provides food aid to both IDP and refugee populations. According to a report by the Center for Global Development, U.S. Government humanitarian funding does not reflect assessed needs of IDPs and refugees, but instead reflects the appropriated funds available to each office and whether that office serves IDPs or refugees. Overall, U.S. Government food aid and assistance to refugees are funded at higher levels than IDPs and host populations in similar or even the same locations.⁷⁹

(U) According to USAID, it supports partners in adjusting programming to reflect changes in identified needs. According to PRM, it similarly provides its partners with flexibility to respond to changing needs. While USAID and PRM meet intermittently to share program information, they do not share individualized IDP and refugee beneficiary data. Each agency considers the overall displacement data to craft their programming response within the scope of their mandates.⁸⁰


(U) NIGERIA CHALLENGED IN ITS EFFORTS TO REPATRIATE REFUGEES

(U) According to a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report published in May, the government of Nigeria is seeking to project the image that conditions are improving in northeast Nigeria. Despite ongoing insecurity, the report stated that Nigerian government has pushed the perception of improved conditions and encouraged displaced persons to return home, with President Buhari stating that Boko Haram has been "technically defeated." USAID reported to USAID OIG that the Nigerian government has allocated approximately \$4.2 million to repatriate 4,000 refugees from Cameroon.⁸¹

(U) The African Union facilitated the development of the Kampala Convention, which stipulates that returns for both refugees and IDPs should be safe, dignified, voluntary, well-informed, and sustainable. According to the African Union, four countries have ratified the convention: Chad, Niger, and Nigeria ratified the document prior to its entry on December 2012, and Cameroon ratified the convention in April 2015. USAID reported to USAID OIG that a Tripartite Agreement was signed by the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon, and UNHCR for the voluntary repatriation of Nigerian refugees in Cameroon, and a similar agreement is being discussed with Niger.⁸²

(U) USAID reported to USAID OIG that the Nigerian government has begun efforts to return 2,500 refugees from Cameroon. However, the security situation in Adamawa state, where most refugees would be placed, is still unstable. The humanitarian community has expressed concerns that despite the government of Nigeria's assurances, the returns are not meeting the standard being of well-informed and voluntary, especially since insecurity was the primary driver for displacement into Cameroon.⁸³

U



40%
of the IDP
population
in Nigeria
is located
in camps,
according to the
International
Organization for
Migration

U

(U) According to USAID, the UNHCR reported that the returning refugees are originally from the Borno state in Nigeria, meaning they would require shelter and other assistance when relocated to Adamawa. The overtaxed humanitarian sector may not have the resources to provide the needed assistance, depending on the number of returnees, and the challenges of overcrowded camps that remain.⁸⁴

(U) USAID also told USAID OIG that it continues to advocate with high-level UN and Nigerian government officials to emphasize the legal obligations under humanitarian law for safe, dignified, voluntary, and well-informed returns. In May 2019, the UNHCR, with representatives of partner organizations including the U.S. Government, met to discuss concerns around the refugee returns from Cameroon and other protection issues, such as registration, documentation, and transportation.⁸⁵

(U) OVERCROWDING, HEALTH, AND SAFETY CONCERNS AT IDP CAMPS

(U) According to the International Organization for Migration, 40 percent of the IDP population in Nigeria—nearly 800,000 people—is located in camps. Camps in northeast Nigeria are not meeting the minimum humanitarian standards for living space, as stipulated in the Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response. An estimated 160,000 people, according to the Norwegian Refugee Council, are living in as little as 5 square meters per person. According to USAID, the International Organization for Migration reported that camp overcrowding is so severe in Nigeria's Borno state, that 110,800 people were either sleeping in the open or sharing shelters with other households as of late May, 2019.⁸⁶

(U) USAID reported to USAID OIG that camp overcrowding results in health and safety concerns. Severe overcrowding in these camps, according to USAID, is increasing the risk of fires, with two fires being reported in IDP camps on April 27 alone. USAID reported to USAID OIG that in early April, two fires occurred in the Borno town of Gajiganna and destroyed approximately 2,250 homes, which were primarily temporary structures, partially damaged 750 homes in a nearby town, and damaged assistance supplies at a USAID implementer's warehouse. Overall, four fires occurred in 2 months. Approximately 15,000 people needed urgent assistance, as previously distributed relief supplies had been destroyed, according to USAID. Later in April, community members and IDPs disrupted distributions of assistance by an OFDA implementer by seizing commodity kits intended for others.⁸⁷


(U) OFDA and the FFP reported to USAID OIG that assessments of overcrowding in other camps identified that congestion blocked access to latrines and prevented appropriate waste management, according to USAID. USAID reported that people constructed makeshift latrines inside their shelters, which was a significant public health risk. Additionally, gender-based violence was also a concern due to lack of lighting. Latrine and shower facilities were usually located at the outside perimeters of the camps, leaving people vulnerable when they tried to use them at night.⁸⁸

(U) To address the issue of congestion, USAID reported to USAID OIG that it is advocating that the government of Nigeria either allocate additional land or expand the perimeter of land around military-protected garrison towns for shelters. However, according to USAID, ongoing insecurity, makes either option challenging. USAID reported to USAID OIG that some progress has been made in Borno state, where additional land was allocated in April 2019 for 900 new shelters. However, according to USAID, more than 15,000 people in Borno live in makeshift shelters or out in the open and the thousands of people that have been moved into the new shelters represent only a fraction of the need.⁸⁹

SECRET//NOFORN

(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



SECRET//NOFORN

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

(U) ABOUT THE OPERATION

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)

[REDACTED]

1

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

2

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

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3

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

4

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)

[REDACTED]

5

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)

[REDACTED]

SECRET//NOFORN

(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)

6

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAID (b)(1) 1.7(e), (b)(7)(E)

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) SECURITY

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)

9

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)

10

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)

11

SECRET//NOFORN

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

(U) Figure 4.

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)



(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)

12

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)

13

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SECRET//NOFORN

(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)



14

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)



15

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)



16

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



17

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)



18

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)



19

SECRET//NOFORN

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [REDACTED]

20

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [REDACTED]

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c) [REDACTED]

22

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c) [REDACTED]

(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)
[REDACTED]
25

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)
[REDACTED]
26

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)
[REDACTED]
27

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)
[REDACTED]
28

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)
[REDACTED]
29

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)
[REDACTED]

S//NF
CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g)
[REDACTED]

S//NF

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [REDACTED] 30

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [REDACTED] 31

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [REDACTED] 32

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [REDACTED] 33

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [REDACTED] 34

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [REDACTED] 35

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [REDACTED] 36

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g) [REDACTED]

(U) OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES

(U) GOVERNANCE AND STABILIZATION

(U//SBU) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]

(U//SBU) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]

38

(U//SBU) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]

39

(U//SBU) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]

40

(U) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]

(U//SBU) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted] 41

(U//SBU) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted] 42

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted] 43

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted] 45

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted] 46

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted] 47

(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

48

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

49


(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

50


(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)




51

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



52

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAID (b)(7)(E)



53

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



54

(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

55

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

56

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

57

SECRET//NOFORN

(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY



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(U) OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

(U) This section of the report provides information on Lead IG and partner agencies' oversight work related to the East Africa area of responsibility, the North and West Africa area of responsibility, and Operation Yukon Journey area of responsibility. The oversight work includes audits, inspections, and evaluations, and Lead IG investigative activities from April 1 through June 30, 2019.

(U) AUDIT, INSPECTION, AND EVALUATION ACTIVITY

(S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)



(U) Final Reports by Lead IG Agencies

(U) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) Audit of the Training of the Army's Regionally Aligned Forces in U.S. Africa Command

(U) DODIG-2019-096, June 18, 2019

(U) The DoD OIG conducted this audit to determine whether USAFRICOM Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) were trained to meet RAF mission requirements. The audit focused on whether the regionally aligned training was adequate in preparing RAF personnel for missions in USAFRICOM. A redacted version of the full report was posted on the DoD OIG's publicly available website.

(U) USAFRICOM RAF currently supports two primary operations: crisis-response operations in support of the East Africa Response Force and counter-extremist operations in northern Cameroon. Before deploying for RAF missions, USAFRICOM RAF personnel must complete both mission essential tasks training and regionally aligned training. The mission essential tasks (MET) training focuses on the fundamental capabilities that units should possess in any operational environment. Units execute MET training, and validate collective proficiency of the MET at a combat training center. Regionally aligned training, which includes required and supplemental training, is specific to the RAF mission. This training does not have a standardized training plan, so the unit commander has discretion in deciding which trainings he or she perceives to be necessary for the mission.

(U) The DoD OIG determined that RAF personnel allocated to USAFRICOM did not receive adequate regionally aligned training to meet mission requirements. For example, senior U.S.

(U) OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

officials from country teams, individual RAF personnel, a USAFRICOM branch chief, and an independent Army Asymmetric Warfare Group assessment reported the need for more preparation in several areas, including cultural awareness training, instructor training, and training on partner nation environments or militaries.

(E) In an example relevant to the East Africa area of responsibility, a USAFRICOM branch chief, Asymmetric Warfare Group representative, and the Senior Defense Official on the DoD OIG (b)(1)(1,4)(d) country team, all expressed concern regarding the RAF's understanding of partner nations' militaries. Specifically, they stated that the RAF was trying to train the partner nation to U.S. military standards instead of training to the standards more widely followed in the region.

(E) USAFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)



(U) As a result, the RAF has not been consistently prepared for its deployments to Africa, which has degraded the effectiveness of the RAF.

(U) The DoD OIG recommended that the Army conduct assessments of the USAFRICOM RAF's implementation, its regionally aligned training program, and its overall effectiveness. The DoD OIG also recommended that the USAFRICOM Commander provide the RAF clear instructions to guide after-action reviews and use lessons learned from completed missions and rotations to identify improvements in the regionally aligned training program.

(U) Management agreed with the recommendations.

(U) DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) Audit of the Department of State Implementation of Policies Intended to Counter Violent Extremism

(U) AUD-MERO-19-27, June 26, 2019

(U) The DoS OIG conducted this audit to determine whether the DoS developed goals and objectives for its strategy to counter violent extremism (CVE), achieved desired results, and monitored funds provided to support those goals and objectives.

(U) To achieve its CVE goals and objectives, the DoS provides funds (generally through grants and cooperative agreements) to implementing partners to execute CVE programs and projects. From FY 2015 through FY 2017, the DoS and USAID reported spending almost \$497 million worldwide on CVE programs and projects. The DoS and its bureaus and missions provide grants and cooperative agreements to implement CVE programs and projects in 41 countries and locations.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)



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(U) OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)

(U) Strategic plans form the basis for the DoS's resource planning and the DoS Foreign Affairs Manual stated that performance management efforts should be "sufficiently focused and realistic to facilitate decision-making and align with higher level strategy."

(U) The DoS OIG determined that the DoS had developed goals, objectives, and guidance for its strategy to CVE and highlighted them in several documents, including multiple joint strategies with USAID and the congressionally-mandated Assistance Strategy and Spend Plan for Programs to Counter and Defeat Terrorism and Foreign Fighters Abroad of 2017. In addition, the DoS Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources defined what constitutes a CVE effort. However, the DoS OIG could not affirm that grants and cooperative agreements awarded for efforts to counter violent extremism were achieving desired results and that reporting of funds used to support CVE goals and objectives needed improvement.

(U) The DoS OIG made nine recommendations to improve the accounting and reporting of DoS CVE funds. Of the DoS bureaus to which the recommendations were directed, all but one concurred with the recommendations. The DoS Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources did not state whether or not it concurred with the recommendation, and did not provide information regarding how they would address the recommendation. The DoS OIG considered eight recommendations resolved pending further action and one recommendation unresolved at the time the report was issued.

(U) Classified Inspection of Embassy Kigali, Rwanda

(U) ISP-S-19-15, April 8, 2019

(S//NF) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)

(S//NF) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)

(S//NF) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Ongoing and Planned Oversight Activities

(U) As of June 30, 2019, nine projects related to the East Africa and North and West Africa areas of responsibility were ongoing, and two were planned. The ongoing projects related to readiness, security, foreign assistance, and support to U.S. missions. The following highlights these ongoing and planned projects.

- (U) The DoD OIG is evaluating whether USAFRICOM followed established guidance for identifying and prioritizing intelligence requirements, and whether Special Operations Command–Africa was capable of satisfying USAFRICOM’s priority intelligence requirements.
- (U) The DoD OIG is conducting an audit to determine whether the Defense Health Agency and the military services are providing effective training to mobile medical teams prior to deploying to USAFRICOM area of responsibility.
- (U) The DoD OIG is evaluating whether the Air Force effectively planned, designed, and implemented construction to provide airfield and base support infrastructure for Air Base 201 in Niger.
- (U) The DoS OIG is conducting an audit of the Global Engagement Center’s management of grants and cooperative agreements to counter terrorist messaging and influence.
- (U) The DoS OIG is conducting an inspection of Embassy Nouakchott, Mauritania.
- (U) The DoS OIG is conducting an inspection of Embassy N’Djamena, Chad.
- (U) USAID OIG is conducting an audit to determine the extent that USAID has targeted its activities to meet humanitarian needs of people affected by the Lake Chad Basin complex emergency, and the extent to which that USAID coordinated its internal and external response in the Lake Chad Basin.
- (U) The Army Audit Agency is conducting an audit to determine whether U.S. Army Africa/Southern European Task Force established sufficient procedures to validate and close out funding requirements in support of Operation Observant Compass.
- (U) The Air Force Audit Agency is conducting an audit to determine whether Air Force personnel procured and managed medical equipment in accordance with guidance.

(U) As of June 30, 2019, the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had two planned projects related to the East Africa and North and West areas of responsibility.

- (U) The DoD OIG intends to conduct an audit to determine whether USAFRICOM effectively planned, coordinated, and executed military information support operations to counter the influence of violent extremist organizations within the USAFRICOM area of responsibility.
- The DoD OIG intends to evaluate whether USAFRICOM personnel planned and executed military information support operations to degrade the enemy’s relative combat power, reduce civilian interference, and minimize collateral damage.

(U) OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST



(U) INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

(U) The Lead IG agencies and partners continue to coordinate their investigative efforts through the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group, which consists of representatives from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS, the DoD OIG's criminal investigative division), the DoS OIG, USAID OIG, the Army Criminal Investigative Command (CID), the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. During the quarter, these organizations coordinated on 13 open investigations related to the all three operations.

(U) U.S. service members assigned to CJTF-HOA and a member of USAID build pallets of humanitarian aid. (U.S. Air Force photo)

(S) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)
[REDACTED]


(S) STATE (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)
[REDACTED]

(U) The investigative components of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies coordinated on six open investigations related to the Operation Yukon Journey area of responsibility during the quarter. The open investigations involve procurement fraud, corruption, and theft.

(U) APPENDIX A

(U) Methodology for Preparing Lead IG Quarterly Reports

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(g), STATE (b)(1) 1.2(b)(a)(d)



(U) To fulfill its congressional mandate to produce a quarterly report on these contingency operations, the Lead IG gathers data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of formal audits, inspections, evaluations, or investigations mentioned or referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited all of the data and information provided by the agencies. The humanitarian assistance section is based on public UN documents and information provided by USAID and the DoS.

(U) DATA COLLECTION

(U) Each quarter, the Lead IG agencies direct a series of questions, or data calls, to agencies about their programs and operations related to ongoing contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies use the information provided by their respective agencies for quarterly reports and to determine where to conduct future audits and evaluations.

(U) The agencies that responded to the data call for this quarter included the following:

- (U) Department of Defense
- (U) Department of State
- (U) U.S. Agency for International Development

(U) OPEN-SOURCE RESEARCH

(U) This report also draws on current, publicly available information from reputable sources. Sources used in this report include the following:

- (U) Information publicly released by U.S. agencies
- (U) Congressional testimonies
- (U) Press conferences, especially DoD and DoS briefings
- (U) United Nations (and relevant branches)
- (U) Reports issued by non-governmental or research organizations
- (U) Media reports

(U) Materials collected through open source research provide information to describe the status of the operations and help the Lead IG agencies assess information provided by their agency data calls. However, in light of the operational realities and dynamic nature of contingency operations, the Lead IG agencies have limited time and ability to test, verify, and independently assess the assertions made by these agencies or open sources. This is particularly true where the Lead IG agencies have not yet provided oversight of these assertions through audits, inspections, or evaluations.

(U) REPORT PRODUCTION

(U) The Lead IG is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The DoD OIG coordinates with the DoS OIG and USAID OIG, which drafted sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies. Each Lead IG agency participates in reviewing and editing the entire quarterly report.

(U) The Lead IG agencies provide the offices agencies that have responded to the data call with opportunities to verify and comment on the content of the report. During the first review, the Lead IG asks agencies to correct inaccuracies and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG incorporates agency comments, where appropriate, and sends the report back to the agencies for a final review for accuracy. Each OIG coordinates the review process with its own agency.

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(U) OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST



SECRET//NOFORN

(U) OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST**(U) ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS**

Acronym	
(U) AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)	
(U) AQIM	al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(U) DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
(U) CSO	Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
(U) DoD	Department of Defense
(U) DoS	Department of State
(U) EXORD	Execute Order
(U) FY	Fiscal Year
(U) ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
(U) IDP	Internally Displaced Person
(U) IG	Inspector General
(U) IOM	International Organization for Migration
(U) ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
(U) JAK-T	Jund al Khilafah-Tunisia
(U) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)	
(U) NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
(U) OCO	Overseas Contingency Operation
(U) OIG	Office of Inspector General
(U) OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
(U) PRM	Population, Refugees, and Migration
(U) UAE	United Arab Emirates
(U) UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(U) USAFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
(U) USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
(U) USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
(U) USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
(U) VEO	Violent Extremist Organization
(U) WFP	World Food Programme
(U) WHO	World Health Organization
(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)	

(U) Figure 5.
(U) Map of East Africa
 UNCLASSIFIED



(U) Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

(U) MAPS

(U) Figure 6.

(U) Map of Northwest Africa

UNCLASSIFIED



(U) Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

SECRET//NOFORN

SECRET//NOFORN

(U) MAPS

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Figure 7.
CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

(U) ENDNOTES

Executive Summary

1. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
2. (U) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
3. (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 6/21/2019. (S)
4. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 6/26/2019. (S//NF); (U) DoS U.S. Mission to Somalia, response to DoS OIG request for information, 7/9/2019. (U)
5. (U) USAFRICOM, press release, "Federal Government of Somalia, U.S. Target al-Shabaab," 4/10/2019. (U); (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 6/21/2019. (S//NF); (U) USAFRICOM, press releases, 4/1/2019 to 6/30/2019. (U)
6. (U) USAID, press release, "Opening of USAID Mission Mogadishu," 6/17/2019. (U); (U) USAID, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/17/2019. (U//SBU)
7. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
8. (U) USAFRICOM press release, 4/7/2019 (U); (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 6/25/2019. (S//NF)
9. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 6/25/2019. (S//NF); (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 6/25/2019. (S//NF); (U) Agence France Presse, "Boko Haram Attack Kills at Least 26 in Cameroon," 6/11/2019; (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 6/25/2019 (S//NF); (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 7/3/2019. (S)
10. (U) IOM, "Regional Displacement Tracking Matrix (RTM): Lake Chad Basin Crisis – Monthly Dashboard #11," 6/17/2019; (U//SBU) USAID FFP and OFDA, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/13/2019. (U//SBU)
11. (U) "Sahel Crisis Reaching Unprecedented Levels, Warn Top UN Humanitarian Officials," United Nations, 5/8/2019. (U); (U) Hillary Matfess, "Ten Conflicts to Worry About in 2019," Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, 2/1/2019. (U)
12. (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 7/3/2019. (S)
13. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(o)(g)
14. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
15. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
16. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

17. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

East Africa Overseas Contingency Operation

1. (U) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
2. (U) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
3. (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 3/13/2019. (S)
4. (U) USAFRICOM Commander, "U.S. Africa Command 2019 Posture Statement," 7/10/2019. (U)
5. (U) Fund for Peace, "Fragile States Index," 7/2/2019; Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2018," 7/9/2019. (U)
6. (U) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY); (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 7/31/2019. (S//NF)
7. (U) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
8. (U) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY); (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 7/31/2019. (S//NF)
9. (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 6/21/2019. (S//NF); (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 7/31/2019. (S//NF)
10. (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 6/21/2019. (S//NF); (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 7/31/2019. (S//NF); (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 8/1/2019. (S//NF)
11. (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 6/21/2019; (S) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 7/3/2019. (S)
12. (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 7/3/2019. (S); (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 6/21/2019. (S)
13. (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 6/21/2019. (S)
14. (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 6/21/2019. (S//NF); (U) USAFRICOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 7/31/2019. (S//NF)

(U) OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

15. (U) Abdi Guled, "Suicide Car Bomb Kills at Least 9 in Somalia's Capital," Associated Press, 5/23/2019, (U); (U) Edith Lederer, "UN Chief: Somalia Making Progress but Must Tackle Extremism," Associated Press 5/21/2019, (U); (U) Military Times, "U.S. Troops, Nonprofit Trainers, and a 'Lightening Brigade'," 5/21/2019 (U)
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2. (U) USAFRICOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED] (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
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3. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
4. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) . (S//NF)
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10. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
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49. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
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51. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
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53. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
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54. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
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56. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
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(U) OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

TO REPORT FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE RELATED TO OVERSEAS
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS, CONTACT:



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HOTLINE

dodig.mil/hotline

1-800-424-9098



DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOTLINE

stateoig.gov/hotline

1-800-409-9926 OR 202-647-3320



U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT HOTLINE

ighotline@usaid.gov

1-800-230-6539 OR 202-712-1023

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