




INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

July 22, 2020



(U) Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains

Classified By: ODIG-EVAL
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INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE

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on Friday, May 16, 2025.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains

(U) July 22, 2020

(U) Objective

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Background

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Finding

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Finding (cont'd)

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

¹(U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]



Results in Brief

Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains

(U) Finding (cont'd)

DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DIA (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(3)(10 USC 424) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendations

(S) NDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

² (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

(U) Recommendations (cont'd)

(S) NDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S) NDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]



Results in Brief

Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains

(U) Management Comments and Our Response (cont'd)

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) DIA (b)(3)(10 USC 424), (b)(3)(50 USC 3024(i)) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.

(U) Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations losed
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment	1	None	None
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security	1	None	None
Director, Defense Intelligence gency	4	None	None
Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency	3	None	None
U.S. Army Program Executive Officer, Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors	None	2	None
U.S. Navy Program Executive Officer, Advanced Sensor Technologies	2	None	None
U.S. Air Force Program Executive Officer, Air Force Materiel Command RQ-4 Program Support	None	2	None

(U) Please provide Management Comments by August 24, 2020.

July 22, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND
SUSTAINMENT

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND
SECURITY

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
AGENCY

UNITED STATES ARMY PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEMS

UNITED STATES NAVY PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
ADVANCED SENSOR TECHNOLOGIES

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND RQ-4 PROGRAM SUPPORT

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance Supply Chains (Report No DODIG-2020-106)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) This report contains recommendations that are considered unresolved because the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, the Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, and the Program Executive Officer for the Navy Advanced Sensor Technologies Program Office Program did not address the recommendations.

(U) Therefore, as discussed in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, the recommendations remain open. We will track these recommendations until an agreement is reached on the actions to be taken to address the recommendations, and adequate documentation has been submitted showing that the agreed-upon action has been completed.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Your

response should be sent to either DoD OIG (b)(6) @dodig.mil if unclassified or DoD OIG (b)(6) @dodig.smil.mil if classified SECRET or other systems as appropriate.

(U) If you have any questions, please contact DoD OIG (b)(6) at DoD OIG (b)(6) or DoD OIG (b)(6) at DoD OIG (b)(6).

Michael J. Roark
Deputy Inspector General for
Evaluations

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Background

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

³ (U) USINDOPACOM area of responsibility includes China, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines, Palau, Timor Leste, Northern Mariana islands, Guam, Papua New Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Samoa, American Samoa, Hawaii, Vanuatu, Fiji, Tonga, New Zealand, Australia, and Antarctica.

⁴ (U) DoD Report, "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018," May 16, 2018. DoD Report, "Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States," September 2018. DoD Report, "Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China's Expanding Global Access," December 2018.

⁵ (U) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in support of operations.

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) Table 1. INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Source: DoD OIG.

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

⁶ (U) ISR Sensors are data collection assets on ISR platforms that gather data on a target during the collection phase of an intelligence lifecycle. Supply chain risk is when an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of a system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or operation.

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

(U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

⁷ (U) Huawei is a Chinese company that was banned from use by the U.S. Government and Government contractors by law, signed into effect by the U.S. President as a component of Public Law 115 323, "The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019," August 13, 2018.

⁸ (U) A Special Security Agreement is an arrangement that imposes various industrial security measures to mitigate the risk of foreign ownership, control, or influence as a precondition for a facility security clearance.

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

⁹ (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

¹⁰ (U) Public Law 115 323, "The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019," August 13, 2018.

¹¹ (S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

¹² (S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

*(U) DoD Procurement Requirements for Supply Chain Risk Management –
DFARS Clauses and DoD Instruction 5000.02T*

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

¹³ (U) Section 2339, title 10, United States Code (10 U.S.C. § 2339a [2019]), "Requirements for Information Relating to Supply Chain Risk."

¹⁴ (U) Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Part 239, "Acquisition of Information Technology," Subpart 239.73, "Requirements for Information Relating to Supply Chain Risk," Section 239.7301, "Definitions."

¹⁵ (U) Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Part 239, "Acquisition of Information Technology," Subpart 239.73, "Requirements for Information Relating to Supply Chain Risk," Section 239.7305a c, "Exclusion and Limitation on Disclosure"; Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Part 239, "Acquisition of Information Technology," Subpart 239.73, "Requirements for Information Relating to Supply Chain Risk," Section 239.7302b, "Applicability."

¹⁶ (U) Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Part 252, "Clauses," Subpart 252.209, "Reserved," Section 239.209 7002, "Disclosure Of Ownership Or Control By A Foreign Government."

(U) DoD Requirement for Security Controls – FAR Clauses and DoD Manual 5220.22-M

(U) Contracting officers are required by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 4, "Acquisition and Information Matters," Subpart 4.4, "Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry," Section 4.403, "Responsibilities of Contracting Officers," to complete a Contract Security Classification Specification DD-254 for each classified contract. Contracting officers are required by FAR Part 4, "Acquisition and Information Matters," Subpart 4.4, "Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry," Section 4.404, "Contract Clause," to insert the contract clause at FAR Part 52, "Solicitation Provisions and Contract Clauses," Subpart 52.2, "Text of Provisions and Clauses," Section 52.204-2, "Security Requirements," in solicitations and contracts when the contract may require access to classified information, and this clause requires contractors to comply with DoD Manual 5220.22-M. The DoD Manual 5220.22-M establishes classified information procedures and security control requirements for industry.¹⁷ Specifically, chapter 2, section 3 of DoD Manual 5220.22-M states that, while the U.S. Government allows foreign investment, it must follow DoD policy on FOCI to ensure that foreign firms do not undermine U.S. security to gain unauthorized access to critical technology and classified information. DoD FOCI policy requires contractors to complete a Standard Form 328 (SF-328), and, if there is FOCI, a FOCI Action Plan, which may include a Special Security Agreement.¹⁸

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

(U) DoD Procurement Components (Service Program Offices)

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

¹⁷ (U) DoD Manual 5220.22 M, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM)," February 2006, Incorporating Change 2, May 18, 2016.

¹⁸ (U) The Department of Defense Form 254 (DD 254) is a DoD Contract Security Classification Specification. A Standard Form 328 (SF 328) is a Certificate Pertaining to Foreign Interests. A Special Security Agreement is an arrangement that imposes various industrial security measures, in order to mitigate the risk of foreign ownership, control, or influence as a precondition for a facility security clearance.

¹⁹ (U) Program Managers must manage and monitor program risks as required by DoD Instruction 5000.02T, Enclosure 3, Section 13, parts a and b, "manage" and Enclosure 6, Section 3, part e, "monitor."

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency

(U) The DCSA oversees cleared contractors' compliance with the National Industrial Security Program (NISPOM) security requirements specified in DoD Manual 5220.22-M. Under the NISPOM, the DCSA reviews contractor documents, including classified contract specifications (DD-254) and certificates of foreign ownership (SF-328), and negotiates the mitigation of FOCI with the contractor or subcontractor. The FOCI can include foreign ownership, foreign board representation, foreign contracts, and other channels of foreign ownership, control, or influence. According to DoD Manual 5220.22-M, "Whenever a company has been determined to be under FOCI, the primary consideration shall be the safeguarding of classified information."

(U) Defense Intelligence Agency

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

²⁰ (U) A Criticality analysis is an end to end functional decomposition by systems engineers to identify mission critical functions and components, including identification of system missions; decomposition into the functions to perform those missions; and traceability hardware, software, and firmware components that implement those functions. Criticality is assessed in terms of the impact of function or components failure on the ability of the component to complete the system mission.

²¹ (U) DoD Chief Information Officer Memorandum, "Guidance for the Procurement and Integration of Information and Communications Technology Components into Critical Systems and Networks," March 24, 2016.

²² (U) DIA Directive 5010 100, "Supply Chain Risk Management," May 4, 2018.

²³ (U) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive 731, "Supply Chain Risk Management," December 7, 2013.

(U) Finding

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

²⁴ (U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Enhanced Section 806 Procedures for Supply Chain Risk Management in Support of DoD Trusted Systems and Networks," March 13, 2018, required DoD Components that procure national security systems to implement DFARS 239.73.

DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

- (S//NF) DIA (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(3)(10 USC 424) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

²⁵ (U) Public Law 115 91, "The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018," December 12, 2017.

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / NDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

- (S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

- (S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

- (S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

- (S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]

²⁶ (S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

²⁷ (U) DFARS 239.7301.

²⁸ (U) DFARS 239.7305a c, DFARS 239.7302b.

²⁹ (U) Prior to 2019, DCSA was called Defense Security Service.

(U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

³⁰ (U) Prior to 2019, DCSA was called Defense Security Service.

³¹ (U) DoD Report, "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018," May 16, 2018. DoD Report, "Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States," September 2018. DoD Report, "Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China's Expanding Global Access," December 2018.

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~

DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~

DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g), (b)(4) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~

DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

³² (U) Prior to 2019, the DCSA was called the Defense Security Service. Special Security Agreement (SSA) and Security Control Agreements (SCA) are arrangements that impose various industrial security measures, in order to mitigate the risk of foreign ownership, control, or influence. An SCA is used when a company is not owned or controlled by a foreign interest but may have representation on the company's governing board. An SSA is used when a company is owned or controlled by a foreign interest.

(U) Finding

DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / NDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / NDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Finding

DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

³³ (U) A Form 10 K is an annual report required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission that gives a comprehensive summary of a company's financial performance.

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ DIA (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(3)(10 USC 424) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ DIA (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(3)(10 USC 424) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

³⁴ (U) DIA Directive 5010 100, "Supply Chain Risk Management," May 4, 2018.

³⁵ (U) DoD Chief Information Officer Memorandum, "Response to Section 1659 of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 Evaluation of Supply Chain Vulnerabilities," May 22, 2018.

(U) Finding

DIA (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(3)(10 USC 424) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DIA (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(3)(10 USC 424) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DIA (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(3)(10 USC 424) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

³⁶ (S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

(U) Finding

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) Table 2. INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Source: U.S. Army CSP, U.S. Navy AAS, and USAF MP-RTIP program offices.

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

³⁷ (S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

(S//NF) We received comments on the finding from USD(A&S), DCSA, DIA, and the Army CSP, Navy AAS, and Air Force MP-RTIP program offices. For full text of the comments, see the Management Comments section of the report.

(U) Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency Comments on Network Separation

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

**(U) Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency Comments
on the Definition of "Affiliate"**

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

Our Response

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Army Common Sensor Payload Program Office Comments

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Finding

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Navy Advanced Sensor Technologies Program Office Comments

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

³⁸ (U//FOUO) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Unsolicited Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

(S//NF) USD(A&S) and USINDOPACOM provided unsolicited comments on the finding. For the full text of USD(A&S) and USINDOPACOM comments, see the Management Comments section of the report.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Comments

(U) Comments from the Director of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, on Observation 2 and our response, can be found in a separate, classified Management Comments appendix.

(U) U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Comments

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ *Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment*
Comments

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Management Comments Required

(S//NF) The USD(I&S) did not respond to the recommendation in the report. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We request the USD(I&S) provide comments on the final report.

(U) Recommendation 2

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Army Common Sensor Payload Program Office Comments

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Finding

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Navy Advanced Airborne Sensor Program Office Comments

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Air Force Multipurpose RADAR Technology Insertion Program Office Comments

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendation 3

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency Comments

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / NDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendation 4

(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Defense Intelligence Agency Comments

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) DIA (b)(3)(10 USC 424), (b)(3)(50 USC 3024(i)) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

Our Response

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Finding

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) DIA (b)(3)(10 USC 424), (b)(3)(50 USC 3024(i)) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(U) Observation 1

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Observation 2

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) This observation is covered in a separate classified appendix to this report.

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from March through December 2019 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

³⁹ (U) Evaluation of USAFRICOM and Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) Processes for Determining and Fulfilling Intelligence Requirements for Counterterrorism," August 13, 2019.

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) We performed site visits and interviewed personnel at the following locations:

- (U) USINDOPACOM, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii
- (U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, Washington, D.C.
- (U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Falls Church, Virginia
- (U) DIA SCRM TAC, Quantico, Virginia
- (U) DCSA, Quantico, Virginia
- (U) U.S. Army CSP Program Office, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
- (U) U.S. Navy Advanced Sensor Technologies Program Office, Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland
- (U) U.S. Air MP-RTIP Program Office, Robins AFB, Georgia
- (U) Defense Logistics Agency, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
- (U) National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, Maryland

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Use of Technical Assistance

(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) issued no reports discussing ISR sensor security controls and supply chain risk management.


(U) Appendix B

(U) Navy Advanced Airborne Sensor Program Office Comments and Our Response

Advanced Airborne Sensor Program Office Comments	Our Response
(U) This memorandum provides feedback concerning the Report and Annex.	(U) None.
(S) [REDACTED]	(S//NF) [REDACTED]
(S) [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	(S//NF) [REDACTED]

⁴⁰ [REDACTED]

	<p>INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p> <p>(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p> <p>(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p>
<p>(S) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p>	<p>(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p>








<p>DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g), (b)(4) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p> 	<p>DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / NDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p> <p>(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g), (b)(4) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p> 
<p>(S) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p> 	<p>DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p> 

	INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
(S)	(S//NF)
INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)	INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)	
INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)	
(S)	(S//NF)
INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)	INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

	INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)	(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)	(U) See our response on page 39 of this report.

<div>INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4b)</div> <div>INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)</div> <div>[REDACTED]</div>	<div>(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4b) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</div> <div>[REDACTED]</div>
<div>(U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)</div> <div>[REDACTED]</div>	<div>INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4b) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</div> <div>[REDACTED]</div>

	<div>INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</div>
<div>(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</div>	<div>(S//NF) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</div> <div>INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</div> <div>INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</div>
<div>(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</div>	<div>INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</div>

<p>INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p> 	<p>INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p> 
<p>(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p> 	<p>(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p> 
<p>(S) There is no need for a sensitive addendum.</p>	<p>(S//NF) We acknowledge the Program Manager's response. We will keep the sensitive addendum because of the classification of the documents discussed.</p> <p>(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p> 
<p>(S) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p> 	<p>(S//NF) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</p> 

	<div>INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)</div> <div></div>
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() Management Comments

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment

(U) Comments from the USD A&S can be found in a separate, classified Management Comments appendix.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security



INTELLIGENCE
AND SECURITY


OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-5000

MAY 14 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL, DIRECTOR, OVERSEAS
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS EVALUATIONS
(ATTN: BRYAN T. CLARK)

SUBJECT: DoD Inspector General Evaluation, Project D2019 DISPA5 0127.000

Thank you for the opportunity to review the subject draft report. The requirement for reliable supply chains has never been greater, and this evaluation highlights this fact in detail. That said, this important report would be strengthened in its completeness by including the comments requested from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, and identified Program Executive Officers. I look forward to reviewing the entire report, including these comments, and offering any additional feedback once the report is completed. In the meantime, we agree with the recommendation to [REDACTED]


Garry P. Reid
Director for Defense Intelligence
Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement,
& Security

(U) Director, Defense Intelligence Agency



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100



S 20 0376/CE

JUN 15 2020

To: Office of Inspector General, Department of Defense
4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22350 1500

Subject: ~~(S//NF)~~ Response to "Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains"

References: a. (U) DIAI 5000.002, Intelligence Threat Support for Major Defense Acquisition Programs, June 19, 2018, (Document is UNCLASSIFIED)
b. (U) DoDI 5200.44, Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN), July 27, 2017, (Document is UNCLASSIFIED)
c. (U) DoDIO 5240.24, Counterintelligence (CI) Activities Supporting Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA), October 15, 2013, (Document is UNCLASSIFIED)
d. (U) ICD 731, Supply Chain Risk Management, December 7, 2013, (Document is UNCLASSIFIED)
e. (U) ICS 731 05, Supply Chain Risk Assessments, July 17, 2019, (Document is UNCLASSIFIED)

1. ~~(S//NF)~~ On March 18, 2020, your office issued a proposed report, "(U) Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains," dubbed Project No. D2019 DISPA5 0127.000. The proposal requested feedback from relevant stakeholders.

2. ~~(S//NF)~~ My Office of Counterintelligence (OCI) reviewed this paper and documented what it believes to be significant factual inaccuracies. Those disagreements are described in detail in a response memo (Enclosure) provided to your office.

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ The Defense Intelligence Agency's OCI point of contact for this matter. DIA (b)(3)(10)
USC 424), (b)(6)

ROBERT P. ASHLEY, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

Enclosure:

~~(S//NF)~~ Response Memo S 20 0376/CE. "Recommended Response to the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General Report: 'Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains'," June 10, 2020, (Document is SECRET//NOFORN), 1 cy

Classified by: 184673
Derived from: DO SCG
Declassify on: 30X1-HUM

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S-20 0376/CE

June 10, 2020

~~(S//NF)~~ Recommended Response to the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General Report: "Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains"

~~(S//NF)~~ The Department of Defense Inspector General requested an Office of Counterintelligence (OCI) review of their report, Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Supply Chains.

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

• ~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

• ~~(S//NF)~~ Assertion 1. DIA (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(3)(10 USC 424) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation

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Derived from: DO SCG
Declassify on: 50X1-HUM

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Assertion #2. [INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)]
[REDACTED]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Assertion #3. [INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)]
[REDACTED]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Assertion 4. [DIA (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(3)(10 USC 424) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)]
[REDACTED]

(U) DoD Inspector General (IG) Assertions and DIA Comments:

- (U) Assertion #1: [INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)]
[REDACTED] (page 19).

(U) Comment: [INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)]
[REDACTED]

- o [INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)]
[REDACTED]
- o [INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)]
[REDACTED]

- (U) Assertion #2: [INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)]
[REDACTED] (page 19).

– (U) Comment: (U) [INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)]
[REDACTED]

– [INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)]
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

- (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)
[REDACTED]
- (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)
[REDACTED]
- (U) Assertion #3: INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)
[REDACTED] (page 20).
- (U) Comment: INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)
[REDACTED]
- (U) Assertion #4: DIA (b)(3)(10 USC 424), (50 USC 3024(i)) / Navy (1.7e) / USAF (1.7e)
[REDACTED]
- (U) Comment: INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)
[REDACTED]
- (U) DIA (b)(3)(10 USC 424), (b)(3)(50 USC 3024(i)) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DIA (b)(3)(10 USC 424), (b)(3)(50 USC 3024(i)) / NDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

(U) Recommended DIA Response:

- ~~(S//NF)~~ NDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ NDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)
 - (U) SCRM TAC's mission of producing all source TAs, although critical, is only one component of the overall supply chain risk mitigation process. It is important that stakeholders understand roles and responsibilities for SCRM are shared across the enterprise, with SCRM TAC maintaining the responsibility to conduct requested TAs. NDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)
 - (U) DIA should concur with the recommendation to NDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)
 - (U) The final recommendation should propose that the DoD OIG NDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)
- ~~(S//NF)~~ RECOMMENDATION: That DR, DIA non-concur with comments on the DoD OIG's finding and recommendations by initialing below. NDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Enclosure:

1. (U) DODIG Project No. D2019-DISPA5 0127.000, "Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains," March 18, 2020, (Document is SECRET//NOFORN), 1 cy]

(U) Prepared by: DIA (b)(3)(10 USC 424), (b)(6)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency



DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AGENCY
27130 TELEGRAPH ROAD
QUANTICO, VA 22134-2253

April 22, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
(ATTN: MR. MICHAEL ROARK)

SUBJECT: Comments on Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of Security Controls for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains"

Reference: DoD Manual 5220.22-M, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual,"
February 28, 2006, as amended

The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) has reviewed the subject
draft report from your office. DCSA (b)(1)(1.7e) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

DCSA (b)(1)(1.7e) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

DCSA (b)(1)(1.7e) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

(U) Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (cont'd)

DCSA (b)(1)(1.7e) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

DCSA (b)(1)(1.7e) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

DCSA (b)(1)(1.7e) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

My staff will work closely with your representatives to discuss further. My point of contact is DCSA (b)(6) at DCSA (b)(6)@mail.mil or DCSA (b)(6)

DCSA (b)(6)

[REDACTED]

Critical Technology Protection

(U) U.S. Army Program Executive Officer, Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE
INTELLIGENCE, ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND SENSORS
BUILDING 6002, 6585 SURVEILLANCE LOOP
ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MD 21005-1845

SFAE IEW

MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DOD OIG), 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: DOD OIG Final Report, "Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains" (Project No. D2019 DISPA5-0127.000)

1. Reference: DOD OIG Final Report, "Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains" (Project No. D2019-DISPA5-0127.000)
2. Program Executive Officer Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors (PEO IEW&S) has reviewed the DOD OIG Final Report and provides the following response.

3. INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

4. INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

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(U) U.S. Army Program Executive Officer, Intelligence,
Electronic Warfare and Sensors (cont'd)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//FOIA EXEMPTION 5~~

SFAE-IEW

SUBJECT: DOD OIG Final Report, "Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains" (Project No. D2019-DISPA5 0127.000)

5. INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

6. INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

7. Finally, PEO IEW&S conducted a security classification review of the DOD OIG Final Report. There is nothing in the report that is classified per the AN/AA 53 CSP and AN/DAS-2 Electro-Optic/Infrared/Laser Designator, Security Classification Guide, 12 February 2015.

8. The point of contact for this action is DoD OIG (b)(6) [REDACTED], at comm: DoD OIG (b)(6); or email: DoD OIG (b)(6) @mail.mil.

COLLINS.ROBERT. Morgan
MORGAN
DoD OIG (b)(6)
(S)

Digitally signed by
COLLINS.ROBERT.MORGAN
DoD OIG (b)(6)
Date: 2020.04.16 18:05:14
-04'00'

ROBERT M. COLLINS
Brigadier General, USA
Program Executive Officer
Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//FOIA EXEMPTION 5~~

(U) U.S. Navy Program Executive Officer, Advanced Sensor Technologies



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
ADVANCED SENSOR TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM OFFICE
391 Brookley Avenue Suite 5000
Joint Base Anacostia Bolling
Washington, DC 20373-5000

IN REPLY REFER TO:
1000
1.0
6 Apr 20

From: Program Manager, Advanced Sensors Technologies Program Office
To: DoD OIG (b)(6), Office of Department of Defense, Inspector General

Subj: (U) EVALUATION OF SECURITY CONTROLS FOR INTELLIGENCE,
SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPLY CHAINS

Ref: (a) (U) DoD IG draft report # D2019-DISPAS 0127.000 did 18 March 2020
(b) (U) Sensitive addendum to DoD IG Report # D2019-DISPAS 0127.000

1. (U) This memorandum provides feedback concerning references (a) and (b).

2. (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)
[REDACTED]

3. (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)
[REDACTED]

4. (U) DCSA (b)(1)(1.7e) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) U.S. Navy Program Executive Officer, Advanced
Sensor Technologies (cont'd)**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Subj: (U) EVALUATION OF SECURITY CONTROLS FOR INTELLIGENCE,
SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPLY CHAINS

5. (S) DCSA (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

[REDACTED]

6. (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

7. (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

8. (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

9. (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) U.S. Navy Program Executive Officer, Advanced Sensor Technologies (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Subj: (U) EVALUATION OF SECURITY CONTROLS FOR INTELLIGENCE,
SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPLY CHAINS

INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

10. (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

11. (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

12. (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

13. (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

14. (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

15. (U) All verbiage in reference (b) is unclassified. There is no need for a sensitive addendum.

16. (U) INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**(U) U.S. Navy Program Executive Officer, Advanced
Sensor Technologies (cont'd)**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Subj: (U) EVALUATION OF SECURITY CONTROLS FOR INTELLIGENCE,
SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPLY CHAINS

17. (U) Please direct any further questions regarding this issue to DoD OIG (b)(6) at DoD OIG (b)(6)


T. H. HOOVER

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) U.S. Air Force Program Executive Officer, Air Force Materiel Command RQ-4 Program Support



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT CENTER
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE OHIO

MEMORANDUM FOR DOD OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: AFPEO FOR ISR

SUBJECT: DOD OIG Final Report, "Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains" (Project No. D2019 DISPA5 0217.000, 7 Feb 20)

1. Attached is approved response from the RQ-4B Global Hawk Program to the DOD OIG Report referenced above.
2. My POC is DoD OIG (b)(6) Requirements and Program Execution Division, AFLCMC/WIX, DoD OIG (b)(6).


William S. Rogers, Colonel, USAF
AFPEO for ISR & SOF

1 Atch: (SAR) RQ-4 Program Manager Response to DOD OIG Final Report, "Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains"

(U) U.S. Air Force Program Executive Officer, Air Force Materiel Command RQ-4 Program Support (cont'd)

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Atch 1:

(U) RQ-4B Global Hawk Response to DOD OIG Final Report, "Evaluation of Security Controls for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supply Chains" (Project No. D2019-DISPA5- 0127.000, 7 Feb 20)

1. (U) Of the four recommendations in the report, only Recommendation 2 directly applies to RQ-4.

2. ~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.4c), (b)(1)(1.4g) / Navy (b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(1)(1.4g) / USAF (b)(1)(1.4a)

4. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ INDOPACOM (b)(1)(1.7e) / Navy (b)(1)(1.7e) / USAF (b)(1)(1.7e)

5. (U) The Global Hawk Program conducted a security classification review of the DOD OIG Final Report. Page 3, third paragraph is currently marked releasable to FVEY but should be marked S/NF unless appropriate foreign disclosure approval has been obtained.

6. (U) The point of contact for this action is DoD OIG (b)(6) [redacted], at CommDoD OIG (b)(6) or email: DoD OIG (b)(6)@us.af.mil.

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(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAS	Advanced Airborne Sensor
AOR	Area of Responsibility
CSP	Common Sensor Payload
DCSA	Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency
DFARS	Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DSS	Defense Security Service
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulations
FOCI	Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence
GSA	General Services Administration
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
MP-RTIP	Multipurpose R D R Technology Insertion Program
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NISPOM	National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual
SCRM	Supply Chain Risk Management
SSA	Special Security Agreement
TAC	Threat Analysis Center
USD A&S)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
USD(I&S	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
USINDOPACOM	U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

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