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INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

MAY 28, 2025



(U) Audit of U.S. European Command Force Protection Measures at Installations in Poland that Support Operation Atlantic Resolve

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Assistant Inspector General
for Audit~~

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INDEPENDENCE ★ INTEGRITY ★ EXCELLENCE ★ TRANSPARENCY

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(U) Results in Brief

(U) Audit of U.S. European Command Force Protection Measures at Installations in Poland that Support Operation Atlantic Resolve

(U) May 28, 2025

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine whether the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) implemented force protection measures in accordance with DoD policy at the Jasionka Base Cluster (Jasionka) in Poland. Jasionka is not an agreed facility and area; therefore, personnel at Jasionka are limited in what force protection measures they can implement. As a result, we identified whether DoD personnel completed force protection assessments, implemented corrective actions at this location in accordance with DoD policy, and identified additional force protection concerns since completing initial assessments.

(U) Background

(U) Operation Atlantic Resolve is the U.S. contingency operation to deter Russian aggression against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to reassure and bolster the alliance in the wake of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. To support its mission of providing the Ukrainian Armed Forces with defense articles and services, the DoD relies on installations in the USEUCOM area of responsibility, such as Jasionka, to store, stage, repair, and send equipment to Ukraine. Jasionka is composed of smaller locations, such as Logistical Support Area Eagle, the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center-Ukraine, and the Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) South. Furthermore, Jasionka is located on land owned by a Polish citizen as opposed to the Polish government. As a result, Jasionka is not an agreed facility or area covered by or obligated to adhere to force protection requirements in DoD policy and international agreements between the United States and Poland. Therefore, force protection measures and activities at Jasionka are coordinated with the host nation, Poland.

(U) Findings

(~~CU~~) V Corps personnel completed force protection-related assessments, such as physical security surveys. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(~~CU~~) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This occurred because neither V Corps nor U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) personnel established a process to record, track, and resolve deficiencies identified during physical security surveys as required by Army policy.

(~~CU~~) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Jasionka personnel were not aware of the CIVAs because USAREUR-AF did not issue formal guidance on how to communicate CIVAs to installation commanders and follow up on CIVA recommendations.

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Audit of U.S. European Command Force Protection Measures at Installations in Poland that Support Operation Atlantic Resolve

(U) Findings (cont'd)

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) When Army Components do not track the implementation of corrective actions for force protection recommendations identified in physical security surveys, and do not establish guidance for communicating CIVAs to commanders and following up on recommendations, force protection recommendations could remain unresolved.

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa:

- (U) establish a process for V Corps personnel to record, track, and resolve deficiencies found during

(U) Recommendations (cont'd)

(U) physical security surveys, including the March 2023 physical security survey of Jasionka;

- (U) assess whether other installations in Poland that support Operation Atlantic Resolve have outstanding physical security survey recommendations and are in need of an established process to record, track, and resolve deficiencies;
- (U) develop and implement formal guidance for completing and communicating counterintelligence vulnerability assessments to installation commanders and for following up on counterintelligence vulnerability assessment recommendations;
- (U) ensure that the installation commanders of Army units that are assigned to Jasionka receive and assess counterintelligence vulnerability assessments specific to Jasionka in a timely manner;

- (S//NF) [REDACTED]
- (S//NF) [REDACTED]

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The Deputy Commander, USARUER-AF, responding for the Commander, USAREUR-AF agreed with all six of our recommendations. Furthermore, USAREUR-AF personnel took action to address all recommendations. Specifically, they established physical security survey processes and CIVA guidance, formalized the physical security survey and CIVA recommendation follow up process, and directed a risk assessment of APOD South. Therefore, we determined that all six recommendations in this report are closed.

(U) Recommendations Table

(U) Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa	None	None	A.1.a, A.1.b, B.1.a, B.1.b, C.1.a, C.1.b (U)

(U) The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations:

- (U) **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- (U) **Resolved** – Management has agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- (U) **Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed-upon corrective actions were implemented.



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

May 28, 2025

(U) MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY EUROPE AND AFRICA

SUBJECT: (U) Audit of U.S. European Command Force Protection Measures at
Installations in Poland that Support Operation Atlantic Resolve
(Report No. DODIG-2025-103)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's audit. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management comments in finalizing the report and included them in the report. Management took action sufficient to address the recommendations in this report, and we consider the recommendations closed.

(U) We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the audit. If you have any questions, please contact me at [REDACTED]

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Richard B. Vasquez", is positioned above the printed name.

Richard B. Vasquez
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Readiness and Global Operations

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine whether the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) implemented force protection measures in accordance with DoD policy at the Jasionka Base Cluster (Jasionka) in Poland.¹ Jasionka is not an agreed facility and area; therefore, we identified whether the DoD:

- (U) completed force protection-related assessments, such as physical security surveys and counterintelligence vulnerability assessments (CIVAs);
- (U) implemented corrective actions to mitigate force protection weaknesses specified in these assessments in accordance with DoD policy; and
- (U) identified additional force protection concerns since completing initial physical security surveys and CIVAs.²

(U) Background

(U) Operation Atlantic Resolve is the U.S. contingency operation to deter Russian aggression against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to reassure and bolster the alliance in the wake of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. One component of Operation Atlantic Resolve is the provision of security assistance to Ukraine in the form of defense articles and services.

(U) To support its mission of providing the Ukrainian Armed Forces with defense articles and services, the DoD relies on installations in the USEUCOM area of responsibility, such as Jasionka, to store, stage, repair, and send equipment to Ukraine. Jasionka is composed of smaller locations such as Logistical Support Area (LSA) Eagle, the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center-Ukraine (RDC-U), and the Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) South. Furthermore, Jasionka is located on land owned by a Polish citizen as opposed to the Polish government. As a result, Jasionka is not an agreed facility and area covered by or obligated to adhere to force protection requirements in DoD policy and in international agreements between the United States

¹ (U) This report contains information that has been redacted because it was identified by the Department of Defense as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) that is not releasable to the public. CUI is Government-created or owned classified information that allows for, or requires, safeguarding and dissemination controls in accordance with laws, regulations, or Government-wide policies.

² (U) An agreed facility and area is an area or facility in the territory of the Republic of Poland, owned or managed by the Republic of Poland, and used by U.S. forces with the consent of the Republic of Poland.

(U) and Poland. Therefore, force protection measures and activities at Jasionka are coordinated with the host nation, Poland.


(U) Jasionka Base Cluster

(U) Jasionka is composed of smaller locations, including the:

- (U) LSA Eagle,
- (U) RDC-U,
- (U) AP0D South, and
- (U) Parcel 5.³

(U) Figure 1 provides an aerial view of Jasionka and its locations.

(U) Figure 1. Jasionka and Its Locations



(U) Source: The U.S. Army, V Corps.

~~(S//NF)~~ Each location in Jasionka contains similar force protection characteristics, such as perimeter fences, entry control points, and a base defense operations center (BDOC), which houses counter-small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) and armed guards. [REDACTED]

³ ~~(CU)~~ Parcel 5 is a small storage location near [REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~(CU)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY, NATO)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~(CU)~~ APOD South is located on Rzeszow-Jasionka International Airport to the east of the main runway. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Force Protection Measures and Activities

(U) Due to the personnel and assets located at Jasionka, ensuring that effective force protection measures are in place is critical to the success of Operation Atlantic Resolve. Force protection is a security program executed by commanders and designed to protect personnel, information, equipment, and facilities in all locations and situations, from an attack. Force protection is accomplished through the planned integration of multiple disciplines, such as physical security and counterintelligence.

(U) Physical security is a combination of protective and security measures to safeguard personnel, property, operations, equipment, facilities, and information against loss, misuse, theft, damage, or destruction by activists, criminals, terrorists, saboteurs, and spies. Counterintelligence refers to information gathered or activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against multiple threats, such as espionage or sabotage. Physical security surveys and CIVAs provide personnel in charge of force protection activities with critical information needed to establish effective force protection measures.

(U) Force Protection at Polish Installations

(U) U.S. force protection measures and activities are governed by international agreements between the United States and Poland, such as the Status of Forces Agreement of December 2009 and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement of

(U) August 2020.⁴ These international agreements detail the roles and responsibilities of each nation while the United States has personnel deployed at Polish installations. The agreements state that the United States and Poland will cooperate closely to ensure the protection, safety, and security of U.S. armed forces, and civilian personnel, and their dependents and U.S. contractors. The agreements also state that Poland has overall responsibility to provide security within its territory.

(U) Roles and Responsibilities

(U) The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement also states that U.S. forces have the right to use, operate, and defend agreed facilities. This agreement includes the right to protect U.S. forces when needed. An Implementing Arrangement between the United States and Poland further elaborates that within agreed facilities and areas, U.S. forces are authorized to establish force protection measures, including:

- (U) armed guards, lookouts, and patrols;
- (U) physical obstacles;
- (U) access control measures; and
- (U) apprehension of persons for prompt turnover to the appropriate Polish authorities.⁵

(U) However, Jasionka is not an agreed facility and area covered by the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement because it is not owned by the Polish government. U.S. force protection authority at Jasionka is limited to protection from imminent threats, similar to that which commanders of U.S. forces exercise worldwide. Within the perimeters of the locations at Jasionka, U.S. forces establish force protection measures, such as guard towers, entry control points, and patrols. Outside the locations' perimeters, U.S. forces must rely on Polish police to address force protection concerns. Examples of instances in which U.S. forces must rely on Polish police include individuals observing or recording U.S. activity from outside the Jasionka perimeter through devices such as sUAS and cameras.

(U) U.S. and Polish military personnel also coordinate closely, as Polish military personnel staff some guard towers alongside U.S. personnel at Jasionka. DoD Components, such as USEUCOM, U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF),

⁴ (U) "Defense Status of Forces Agreement Between the United States of America and Poland," December 11, 2009. "Defense Cooperation Agreement Between the U.S. and Poland," August 15, 2020, entered into force on November 13, 2020.

⁵ (U) "Implementing Arrangement Between the U.S. and Poland to the Agreement Between the U.S. and Poland on the Status of Armed Forces of the U.S. in the Territory of Poland Concerning Security," March 22, 2017.

(U) the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U), and subordinate units share responsibilities related to force protection at Jasionka.

(U) U.S. European Command

(U) USEUCOM prepares ready forces, ensures strategic access, deters conflict, enables allies, strengthens partnerships, and counters transnational threats to protect and defend the United States. The Commander of USEUCOM is responsible for enforcing appropriate force protection measures to ensure the protection of all DoD elements and personnel within the USEUCOM area of responsibility, including Poland.⁶ USEUCOM is also responsible for exercising tactical control for force protection over all DoD personnel assigned to the USEUCOM area of responsibility. To meet its responsibilities, USEUCOM issued the USEUCOM Task Order for Delegation of Tactical Control for Force Protection, which delegated tactical control for force protection at Jasionka to USAREUR-AF.⁷

(U) U.S. Army Europe and Africa and Security Assistance Group-Ukraine

(U) USAREUR-AF is a USEUCOM Component Command. It provides ready, combat-credible land forces to deter and defeat aggression from any potential adversary in Europe and Africa. SAG-U falls under USEUCOM's command as well. SAG-U is a dedicated headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany, responsible for coordinating security force assistance to Ukraine. Established on November 4, 2022, SAG-U ensures that the United States is postured to continue supporting Ukraine over the long term in its ongoing defense against Russia's full-scale invasion.

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, FVEY)~~ According to the USEUCOM Task Order, USAREUR-AF's tactical control for force protection consists of the implementation of force protection measures; authority to change, modify, prescribe, and enforce force protection measures; and ability to submit budget requests to fund force protection corrections. To exercise these responsibilities, USAREUR-AF assigned the Commanding General, V Corps as the General Officer of Force Protection for Jasionka. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Operational control includes assigning tasks, designating objectives, and providing authoritative direction to accomplish the mission of supporting Ukraine.

⁶ (U) DoD Instruction 2000.12, "DoD Antiterrorism AT Program," March 1, 2012 (Incorporating Change 3, May 8, 2017).

⁷ (U) USEUCOM TASKORD for Delegation of Tactical Control for Force Protection, July 2023.

(U) V Corps

~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO, FVEY)~~ V Corps conducts mission command and oversight of rotational forces in Europe from its forward headquarters in Poznan, Poland.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ⁸ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ⁹

(U) V Corps completes several assessments of the DoD's force protection posture at Jasionka, including physical security surveys and CIVAs.

- (U) Physical security surveys are formal, recorded assessments of an installation's physical security program. Army Regulation 190-13 states that commanders, directors, and equivalent civilian leaders will conduct physical security surveys in accordance with Army policy.¹⁰ These surveys are used to develop new measures and procedures to improve physical security. According to Army Regulation 190-13, a physical security survey provides commanders with an assessment of the security posture in view of the threat and mission, and informs commanders about the installation physical security strengths and weaknesses.

- ~~(EU)~~ [REDACTED]

Commanders use the CIVA along with other assessments to evaluate risk to the mission.

(U) Upon completion of the assessments, V Corps publishes its findings of force protection weaknesses and makes recommendations to address them. From January 2023 to January 2024, V Corps completed one physical security survey and three CIVAs at Jasionka locations.

⁸ (U) USAREUR-AF Operations Order 0019-23, "Security Assistance Group-Ukraine," December 2022.

⁹ (U) Modification 6 to USAREUR-AF Operations Order 0019-23, "Security Assistance Group-Ukraine," November 2023.

¹⁰ (U) Army Regulation 190-13, "The Army Physical Security Program," June 27, 2019.

(U) 82nd Airborne Division and 3-187th Infantry Regiment

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- (S//NF) [REDACTED]
- (S//NF) [REDACTED]
- (S//NF) [REDACTED]
- (S//NF) [REDACTED]
- (S//NF) [REDACTED]

(U) For the purpose of this report, we will refer to personnel from the 82nd ABN and 3-187th Infantry Regiment, as Jasionka personnel.

(U) Finding A

(U) DoD Personnel Implemented Force Protection Measures, but Weaknesses Exist

(~~CUH~~) V Corps personnel completed force protection-related assessments, such as physical security surveys. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(~~CUH~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] This occurred because neither V Corps nor USAREUR-AF personnel established a process to record, track, and resolve deficiencies identified during physical security surveys as required by Army policy.

(U) When V Corps personnel do not track the implementation of corrective actions for force protection recommendations identified in physical security surveys, V Corps and USAREUR-AF are not aware of the physical security posture of temporary installations in Poland. As a result of not tracking and resolving deficiencies, force protection recommendations identified in physical security surveys and assessments remain unresolved at Jasionka. Unresolved force protection recommendations could put DoD personnel and assets at risk and compromise the success of Operation Atlantic Resolve.

(U) Jasionka Personnel Did Not Implement V Corps Physical Security Survey Recommendations

(~~CUH~~) In March 2023, V Corps conducted a physical security survey of Jasionka in accordance with Army Regulation 190-13 and provided recommendations for LSA Eagle, the RDC-U, and APOD South to the command at Jasionka at that time. Physical security surveys are conducted every 3 years as required by Army Regulation 190-13. V Corps' physical security survey determined that [REDACTED]

¹¹ (U) For the purpose of this report, Jasionka's current command refers to the 82nd Airborne Division, which was deployed to Jasionka from November 2023 through July 2024. Jasionka's prior command was the 10th Mountain Division.

(~~CUH~~) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(~~CUH~~) V Corps’ physical security survey identified a total of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
¹² Table 1 outlines by location the [REDACTED] types of physical security survey equipment we reviewed, the quantity of those [REDACTED] types of equipment, and the number of recommendations made associated with each type of equipment.

(U) Table 1. Physical Security Survey Recommendations

(CUH) Equipment	LSA Eagle Entry Control Point	LSA Eagle	RDC-U	APOD South	Total
[REDACTED]	1	1			1
[REDACTED]	1	1	1		1
[REDACTED]	1	1	1		1
[REDACTED]	1		1		1
[REDACTED]	1				1
[REDACTED]				1	1
[REDACTED]					(CUH)

¹² (U) Under European Union law, equipment that captures images of private individuals, such as cameras, cannot be installed at locations such as Jasionka. However, the DoD allocated resources to identify potential security risks at Jasionka; therefore, the appropriate DoD Component should be tracking the status of the recommendations in Table 1.

(U) [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]				[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] (U)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] During our site visit, we met with Jasionka personnel to determine whether they had implemented the recommendations specified in the physical security survey. Jasionka personnel explained that the division tactical command personnel were aware of the survey and results given to the prior command; however, they had not implemented any of the recommendations. We also confirmed through our observations at Jasionka that the equipment in the physical security survey recommendations was not installed. In addition to following up on the implementation of recommendations contained in the physical security survey that V Corps conducted at Jasionka, we observed force protection measures in place at Jasionka.

(U) Jasionka Personnel Implemented Force Protection Measures

(U) Jasionka personnel generally implemented force protection measures related to physical security at Jasionka. Specifically, we observed force protection measures,

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Jasionka is a unique location and is not a facility and area covered by international agreements. Therefore, personnel at Jasionka do not have the ability to implement force protection measures that personnel in a covered facility and area can generally implement, within the parameters of international agreements. In May 2024, we conducted a site visit to Jasionka to meet with force protection personnel to discuss current force protection measures and to conduct walkthroughs to observe physical security measures. From our site visit, we determined that Army personnel implemented the following force protection measures at Jasionka.

- (U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (U) [REDACTED]
- (U) [REDACTED]
- (U) [REDACTED]

- (CUH) [REDACTED]
- (CUH) [REDACTED]
- (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]¹³
- (CUH) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) During our visit to Jasionka, we observed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

However, security forces personnel encountered some challenges with [REDACTED]

(S//NF) Jasionka personnel stated that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Jasionka personnel also explained that
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Jasionka's current command was aware of the recommendations in the physical security survey; however, the command was not aware of the implementation status of the recommendations. On October 18, 2023, the 10th Mountain Division, Jasionka's prior command, submitted a request for force protection requirements memorandum to SAG-U.

¹³ (U) The Dronebuster is a handheld, non-kinetic piece of equipment designed to counter sUAS used against U.S. military forces.

~~(CUI)~~ This memorandum requested force protection requirements such as additional guard towers, perimeter fencing, bunkers, Dronebusters, and an integrated base defense kit. The integrated base defense kit included most of the equipment that V Corps' March 2023 physical security survey recommended. According to the memorandum, V Corps approved the request for the kit, and it was pending funding. However, the Jasionka personnel who arrived in November 2023 could not provide the status of the prior command's force protection request.

(U) In addition, V Corps G34, Force Protection, personnel stated that they were not aware of the status of the requirements request that the previous Jasionka command submitted. V Corps G34 personnel explained that the requirements request was handled by another V Corps component, V Corps G4, Logistics, which does not report to V Corps G34 personnel. We also met with USAREUR-AF personnel, and they explained that they were tracking an unfunded theater-wide request that included equipment needed to mitigate force protection weaknesses, but not specifically the integrated base defense kit.

~~(CUI)~~ Although Jasionka personnel were not able to provide a status of the integrated base defense kit request, [REDACTED] Jasionka personnel explained that the installation's physical security priorities included securing additional bunkers, barriers, and public announcement systems for LSA Eagle, as well as countering sUAS for all sites at Jasionka. Since arriving in November 2023, the command had installed a guard tower and swing gate at the Entry Control Point of LSA Eagle. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If personnel at V Corps, the component responsible for force protection at Jasionka, were tracking the request for the equipment needed to address the recommendations in the physical security survey, they would have been aware of the physical security posture of Jasionka.

~~(CUI)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(CUI)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In June 2024, we met with a V Corps G34 official to discuss the physical security survey recommendations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The V Corp G34 official rotated into their current position in July 2023; therefore, the March 2023 physical security survey was conducted before the official arrived.

(U) When we met with the V Corps G34 official to inquire about the physical security survey and recommendations, the V Corps G34 official stated that there was no formal process to track recommendations. V Corps G34 personnel explained that they believed physical security survey recommendations would be better tracked at a higher level, for example, at the battalion or brigade level. Higher commands have longer rotations, sometimes 3 to 5 years, and may have more qualified inspectors to oversee physical security inspections and surveys. In contrast, most V Corps personnel were serving in positions on a 1-year rotation. The V Corps G34 official explained that after our site visit to Jasionka in May 2024, Jasionka personnel provided V Corps personnel with an update on the status of physical security survey recommendations.

(~~CUH~~) Specifically, on May 30, 2024, Jasionka personnel reported to V Corps G34 that the DoD Office of Inspector General had [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Regarding the physical security survey, Jasionka personnel reported the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) USAREUR-AF Did Not Establish a Process to Record, Track, or Resolve Physical Security Survey Deficiencies

(~~CUH~~) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] because neither V Corps nor USAREUR-AF personnel established a process to record, track, and resolve deficiencies found during a physical security survey, as required by Army policy. Army Regulation 190-13 requires Army service component commanders to “establish a formal process to record, track, and resolve deficiencies found during physical security inspections and surveys.”

(~~CUH~~) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(c)(1) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(c)(U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 14

Therefore, we recommend that the Commander, USAREUR-AF establish a process for V Corps personnel to record, track, and resolve deficiencies found during physical security surveys, including the March 2023 physical security survey of Jasionka. We also recommend that the Commander, USAREUR-AF assess whether other installations in Poland have outstanding physical security survey recommendations and are in need of an established process to record, track, and resolve deficiencies.

(U) Unresolved Physical Security Weaknesses May Compromise Jasionka's Force Protection Posture

(U) When V Corps personnel do not track the implementation of corrective actions for force protection recommendations identified in physical security surveys, V Corps and USAREUR-AF are not aware of the physical security posture of temporary installations in Poland. As a result of not tracking and resolving deficiencies, force protection recommendations identified in physical security surveys and assessments remain unresolved at Jasionka. Unresolved force protection recommendations could put DoD personnel and assets at risk and compromise the success of Operation Atlantic Resolve.

(U) Management Actions Taken During the Audit

(U) In March 2025, the Commander, USAREUR-AF established a process to record, track, and resolve deficiencies found during physical security surveys at Jasionka. Specifically, the Commander, USAREUR-AF issued [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 15 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

¹⁴ (U) A forward operating site is a location outside the United States and U.S. territories intended for rotational use by operating forces. Forward operating sites support rotational rather than permanently stationed forces and are a focus for bilateral or regional training.

15 (CUI) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] In addition, the Commander, USAREUR-AF [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation A.1

(U) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa:

- a. (U) Establish a process for V Corps personnel to record, track, and resolve deficiencies found during physical security surveys, including the March 2023 physical security survey of Jasionka.

(U) U.S. Army Europe and Africa Comments

(U) The Deputy Commander, USAREUR-AF, responding for the Commander, USAREUR-AF, concurred with our recommendation and stated that USAREUR-AF took corrective action.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Deputy Commander, USAREUR-AF addressed the specifics of the recommendations. We agree with the Deputy Commander and as discussed in the body of the report, the Commander, USAREUR-AF took corrective action during the audit. Therefore, this recommendation is closed.

- b. (U) Assess whether other installations in Poland that support Operation Atlantic Resolve have outstanding physical security survey recommendations and are in need of an established process to record, track, and resolve deficiencies.

(U) U.S. Army Europe and Africa Comments

(U) The Deputy Commander, USAREUR-AF, responding for the Commander, USAREUR-AF, concurred with our recommendation and stated that USAREUR-AF took corrective action.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Deputy Commander, USAREUR-AF addressed the specifics of the recommendations. We agree with the Deputy Commander and as discussed in the body of the report, the Commander, USAREUR-AF took corrective action during the audit. Therefore, this recommendation is closed.

(U) Finding B

(U) Jasionka Personnel Closed Most CIVA Recommendations, but CIVA Process Needs Improvement

(U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These [REDACTED] recommendations were included in three CIVAs that V Corps counterintelligence personnel conducted at the direction of the USAREUR-AF G2X, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence (referred to as USAREUR-AF G2X) on Jasionka from January 2023 through January 2024. Jasionka personnel assumed command of the installation in November 2023 and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During our May 2024 site visit, Jasionka personnel described their current operations and procedures, and explained how those actions addressed most of the CIVA recommendations. We determined that [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] recommendations are “closed” or partially implemented because Jasionka personnel’s operations and procedures met the intent of the recommendations.

(U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] because USAREUR-AF did not issue formal guidance on how to communicate CIVAs to installation commanders and follow up on CIVA recommendations.

(U) The three CIVAs included recommendations to mitigate vulnerabilities that make the installation in Jasionka susceptible to exploitation by a foreign entity. Not having formal guidance to communicate CIVAs and to follow up on the CIVA recommendations resulted in installation personnel not mitigating counterintelligence vulnerabilities. When known vulnerabilities are not mitigated, installation commanders expose their installations to avoidable risks that could compromise their force protection posture. As a result, DoD personnel and assets at Jasionka are more susceptible to harm from foreign entities, which can negatively impact the success of Operation Atlantic Resolve.

(U) Jasionka Personnel’s Business Operations and Procedures Closed Most CIVA Recommendations

(U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These [REDACTED] recommendations were included in three CIVAs that V Corps counterintelligence personnel conducted on Jasionka.

(U) From January 2023 through January 2024, V Corps counterintelligence personnel completed three CIVAs for APOD South (January 2023), RDC-U (October 2023), and LSA Eagle (January 2024) at the direction of the USAREUR-AF G2X.¹⁶ Jasionka personnel assumed command of the installation in November 2023, and they were not in command when the first two CIVAs were completed. The CIVAs included recommendations designed to mitigate Jasionka’s counterintelligence vulnerabilities. Table 2 summarizes the number of vulnerabilities, their criticality, risk to mission, and number of recommendations associated with each vulnerability. Please refer to Appendix B for a list of the vulnerabilities within each CIVA, the recommendations, and the status of each recommendation.

(U) Table 2. Summary of Vulnerabilities, Critical Ratings, Risk to Mission, and Recommendations

(S//NF) CIVA Location	Vulnerability	Criticality Rating	Risk to Mission	Number of Recommendations
LSA Eagle				
RDC-U				
APOD South				

(S//NF)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) We conducted a site visit at Jasionka in May 2024 to determine the status of each recommendation. During our visit, Jasionka personnel stated that they were not aware of the CIVA recommendations before this audit, but they explained how the operations and procedures that they were currently performing addressed most of the recommendations. We analyzed Jasionka personnel’s operations and procedures and used the following categories when determining the status of each CIVA recommendation.

- (U) **Closed:** Jasionka personnel’s operations and procedures met the intent of the recommendation.

¹⁶ (U) USAREUR-AF is the higher headquarters for V Corps. The USAREUR-AF G2X oversees counterintelligence for USAREUR-AF subcommands, and the USAREUR-AF G2X provided the directive to conduct CIVAs at Jasionka.

- (U) **Partially Implemented:** Jasionka personnel's operations and procedures addressed some, but not all, components of the recommendation.
- (U) **Not Implemented:** Jasionka personnel did not take, or plan to take, the corrective action stated in the recommendation.

(~~CUH~~) As seen in Figure 2, we determined that [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] recommendations were closed or partially implemented based on Jasionka personnel's operations and procedures. For example, many of the closed recommendations involve [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(~~CUH~~) We determined that Jasionka personnel's operations and procedures did not address [REDACTED] recommendations. These [REDACTED] recommendations addressed topics such as [REDACTED], using coded messages in group chats about maintenance operations, and [REDACTED]. Jasionka officials stated that they would not implement the [REDACTED] recommendations because of logistical challenges or because there were alternative measures in place that they believed met the intent of the CIVA recommendation.

(U) *Figure 2. Summary of the Implementation Status for CIVA Recommendations*

[REDACTED]

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) USAREUR-AF Did Not Establish Guidance on Communicating CIVAs and Following Up on Recommendations

(~~CUH~~) USAREUR-AF G2X oversees counterintelligence activities for its subordinate commands, including V Corps counterintelligence personnel. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] because USAREUR-AF G2X did not issue formal

~~(CUI)~~ guidance on how to communicate CIVAs to installation commanders or to follow up on the recommendations.

(U) We met with USAREUR-AF G2X counterintelligence personnel to understand the process for communicating CIVAs and their respective recommendations to installation personnel. We explained that according to Jasionka personnel, the V Corps team that completed the LSA Eagle CIVA in January 2024 did not brief Jasionka personnel on the CIVA. Furthermore, V Corps personnel could not confirm whether the CIVA team briefed anyone after completing the CIVAs. USAREUR-AF G2X personnel stated that counterintelligence teams should brief the installation commander on CIVA findings and recommendations once they complete the assessment, but the counterintelligence teams are not responsible for following up on the recommendations. USAREUR-AF G2X personnel stated that it is up to the installation commander to track and implement the CIVA recommendations.

(U) USAREUR-AF G2X personnel stated that USAREUR-AF does not have formal standard operating procedures that address completing CIVAs, briefing the commander on the results, and following up on the recommendations. USAREUR-AF G2X personnel added that personnel from the USAREUR-AF G2X Army Theatre Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority are developing a standard operating procedure that will standardize CIVA processes across all USAREUR-AF elements.¹⁷ Therefore, we recommend that the Commander, USAREUR-AF, develop and implement formal guidance for completing and communicating counterintelligence vulnerability assessments to installation commanders, and for following up on counterintelligence vulnerability assessment recommendations. We also recommend that until USAREUR-AF implements formal guidance, the Commander, USAREUR-AF, should ensure that the installation commanders of Army units that are assigned to Jasionka receive and assess counterintelligence vulnerability assessments specific to Jasionka in a timely manner.

(U) Counterintelligence Vulnerabilities May Persist if Recommendations Are Not Implemented

(U) The three CIVAs included recommendations to mitigate vulnerabilities that make the installation in Jasionka susceptible to exploitation by a foreign entity. Not having formal guidance to communicate CIVAs and to follow up on the CIVA recommendations resulted in installation personnel not mitigating counterintelligence vulnerabilities. When known vulnerabilities are not mitigated, installation commanders expose their installations to avoidable risks that could compromise their force protection posture.

¹⁷ ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

(U) As a result, DoD personnel and assets at Jasionka are more susceptible to harm from foreign entities, which can negatively impact the success of Operation Atlantic Resolve.

(U) Management Actions Taken During the Audit

~~(S//NF)~~ From January 2025 to March 2025, the Commander, USAREUR-AF developed and implemented formal guidance for completing CIVAs and following up on CIVA recommendations. Specifically, the Commander, USAREUR-AF issued [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Therefore, we consider CIVAs a type of protection assessment, and we determined that [REDACTED] applies to CIVAs. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ In addition to [REDACTED] USAREUR-AF personnel provided us [REDACTED] in March 2025, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]¹⁸ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] We determined that [REDACTED] established guidance for completing CIVAs, and [REDACTED] established guidance for communicating CIVAs to the commanders and following up on recommendations.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation B.1

(U) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa:

- a. (U) Develop and implement formal guidance for completing and communicating counterintelligence vulnerability assessments to installation commanders and for following up on counterintelligence vulnerability assessment recommendations.

¹⁸ ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) U.S. Army Europe and Africa Comments

(U) The Deputy Commander, USAREUR-AF, responding for the Commander, USAREUR-AF, concurred with our recommendation and stated that USAREUR-AF took corrective action.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Deputy Commander, USAREUR-AF addressed the specifics of the recommendations. We agree with the Deputy Commander and as discussed in the body of the report, the Commander, USAREUR-AF took corrective action during the audit. Therefore, this recommendation is closed.

- b. (U) Ensure that the installation commanders of Army units that are assigned to Jasionka receive and assess counterintelligence vulnerability assessments specific to Jasionka in a timely manner.**

(U) U.S. Army Europe and Africa Comments

(U) The Deputy Commander, USAREUR-AF, responding for the Commander, USAREUR-AF, concurred with our recommendation and stated that USAREUR-AF took corrective action.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Deputy Commander, USAREUR-AF addressed the specifics of the recommendations. We agree with the Deputy Commander and as discussed in the body of the report, the Commander, USAREUR-AF took corrective action during the audit. Therefore, this recommendation is closed.

~~(S)~~

~~(S//NF)~~~~(S//NF)~~~~(S//NF)~~

~~(S//NF)~~


~~(S//NF)~~

(S//NF)




Figure 3 shows the location of the flight school, taxiway, BDOC, Patriot Air Defense System, and Rzeszow-Jasionka International Airport runway as of June 15, 2024.

(U) Figure 3. APOD South's BDOC and Patriot Air Defense System Located Near the Civilian Flight School and Rzeszow-Jasionka International Airport Runway




(U) Source: USAREUR-AF.

(S//NF) We observed that the flight school had six single-propeller planes stationed outside its hangars. Civilians at the flight school were able to access the hangar through a public road. Once inside the flight school, civilians would then exit the school inside APOD South's perimeter, access their plane, and taxi to the runway. During our site visit, we observed a civilian plane taxiing from the flight school's hangar to the Rzeszow-Jasionka International Airport runway.



(S//NF) [REDACTED] Figure 4 is an image of APOD South on
June 15, 2024, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Figure 4. Civilian Flight School Taxiway and BDOC



(U) Source: USAREUR-AF.

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//REL TO USA, POL, FVEY) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Furthermore, since August 2021, most of the military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine moved through the Rzeszow-Jasionka International Airport. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) Because Jasionka is not an agreed facility and area, USAREUR-AF and USEUCOM could not identify guidance requiring a risk assessment at locations such as Jasionka. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Therefore, we recommend that
the Commander, USAREUR-AF conduct a risk assessment [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S//FGI-POL//NF) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Management Actions Taken During the Audit

(S//NF) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

- (S) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
- (S) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]¹⁹ Furthermore, in March 2025, the Commander
USAREUR-AF, issued [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Deputy Commander, USAREUR-AF, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation C.1

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
a. (S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) U.S. Army Europe and Africa Comments

(U) The Deputy Commander, USAREUR-AF, responding for the Commander,
USAREUR-AF, concurred with our recommendation and stated that USAREUR-AF
took corrective action.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Deputy Commander, USAREUR-AF addressed the specifics of
the recommendations. We agree with the Deputy Commander and as discussed in the
body of the report, USAREUR-AF personnel took corrective action during the audit.
Therefore, this recommendation is closed.

b. (S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

¹⁹ (S//NF) [REDACTED]

(U) U.S. Army Europe and Africa Comments

(U) The Deputy Commander, USAREUR-AF, responding for the Commander, USAREUR-AF, concurred with our recommendation and stated that USAREUR-AF took corrective action.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Deputy Commander, USAREUR-AF addressed the specifics of the recommendations. We agree with the Deputy Commander and as discussed in the body of the report, USAREUR-AF personnel took corrective action during the audit. Therefore, this recommendation is closed.

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from March 2024 through May 2025 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) The scope of this audit included force protection measures at LSA Eagle, the RDC-U, and APOD South (Jasionka) from November 2023 through September 2024. Specifically, our scope included the implementation status of physical security survey and CIVA recommendations at Jasionka.

(U) We conducted a site visit and interviewed personnel at Jasionka, Poland. As a result of our site visit and interviews, we requested and reviewed documentation related to:

- (U) the physical security survey recommendations implementation,
- (U) CIVA recommendations status, and
- (U) APOD South intelligence reports, risk assessments, and force protection measures.

(U) Audit Universe and Sample Selection

(U) To ensure that the DoD implemented force protection measures at Jasionka, we selected a nonstatistical sample of recommendations to mitigate force protection weaknesses at LSA Eagle, the RDC-U, and APOD South. Specifically, we selected a nonstatistical sample of equipment recommended to be installed at Jasionka from the physical security survey. Furthermore, we selected a nonstatistical sample of CIVAs completed at Jasionka and included those CIVA recommendations in our review.

(U) Physical Security Survey Sample Selection

(U) The physical security survey recommended [REDACTED] to be installed at Jasionka. We excluded [REDACTED] From the remaining [REDACTED] we selected a nonstatistical sample of [REDACTED] of equipment to be installed at Jasionka that could be used to [REDACTED] The [REDACTED] pieces of equipment in our nonstatistical sample were recommended to be

(CUI) installed [REDACTED] times across LSA Eagle's Entry Control Point, LSA Eagle, the RDC-U, and APOD South.

(CUI) We did not include the following seven pieces of equipment in our nonstatistical sample because V Corps did not identify them as equipment that could be used to [REDACTED]

- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]

(CUI) We did not include the following [REDACTED] in our nonstatistical sample because [REDACTED]

- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]

(U) We also selected a sample of CIVAs for Jasionka.

(U) CIVA Sample Selection

(CUI) We nonstatistically selected a sample of three out of four CIVAs for LSA Eagle, the RDC-U, and APOD South. The three CIVAs we selected for our sample were the most recent CIVAs for each site. The CIVAs were completed between January 2023 and January 2024. Within the CIVAs in our nonstatistical sample, we identified [REDACTED] recommendations in the assessments that, if complied with, will mitigate force

~~(CUI)~~ protection vulnerabilities to foreign collection intelligence capabilities. Table 3 shows the universe of CIVA recommendations and their status.

(U) Table 3. CIVA Recommendations and Status

(CUI) CIVA Location	Recommendations	Status
LSA Eagle	█	Closed: █ Partially Implemented: █ Not Implemented: █
RDC-U	█	Closed: █ Partially Implemented: █ Not Implemented: █
APOD South	█	Closed: █ Partially Implemented: █ Not Implemented: █
Total	█	Closed: █ Partially Implemented: █ Not Implemented: █ <div>(CUI)</div>

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) Examples of recommendations in the CIVAs in our sample include recommendations to:

- ~~(CUI)~~ █
- ~~(CUI)~~ █
█
- ~~(CUI)~~ █ and
- (U) employ electronic warfare capabilities to conduct regular spectrum management operations to mitigate the negative impact of enemy electromagnetic interference.

~~(CUI)~~ Appendix B includes all █ CIVA recommendations in our sample, as well as their corresponding vulnerability and status.

~~(CUI)~~ To determine whether the DoD implemented force protection measures in our sample at Jasionka, we observed whether Jasionka personnel implemented the physical security survey recommendations, such as █ We also observed whether Jasionka personnel implemented force protection measures recommended in the CIVAs, such as █ After our

~~(CU)~~ observations, we interviewed Jasionka personnel to understand why they did not always implement recommendations from the physical security survey and CIVAs.

(U) This report was reviewed by USAREUR-AF personnel to identify whether any of their reported information should be safeguarded and marked in accordance with the appropriate classification guidance. In preparing and marking this report, we considered any comments from USAREUR-AF personnel about the treatment of their information. If USAREUR-AF personnel did not provide any comments, or sufficient comments about the classified treatment of their information, then we marked the report based on our assessment of the available information.

(U) Internal Control Assessment and Compliance

(U) We assessed internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations necessary to satisfy the audit objective. In particular, we assessed the Army's risk assessment, control activities, and monitoring activities for remediating force protection deficiencies found in the physical security surveys and CIVAs. Specifically, we identified two internal control weaknesses related to the Army's process to track and resolve physical security survey recommendations and lack of standard operating procedures that govern the CIVA process.. However, because our review was limited to these internal control components and underlying principles, it may not have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of this audit.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) No prior coverage has been conducted on force protection in USEUCOM during the last 5 years.

(U) Appendix B

(U) CIVA Recommendations

(U) Our nonstatistical sample of CIVAs is composed of the most recent CIVAs from LSA Eagle, the RDC-U, and APOD South. Each CIVA contained several recommendations that, if implemented, would mitigate vulnerabilities to foreign intelligence entities' intelligence collection attempts. The list of vulnerabilities, recommendations, and status are as follows.

(U) LSA Eagle CIVA

(U) Vulnerability 1: Human Intelligence Vulnerability to LSA Eagle Operations and Personnel

1. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
2. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
3. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
4. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
5. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Vulnerability 2: Surveillance Vulnerability of LSA Eagle Operations and Personnel

6. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
²⁰ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

7. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Vulnerability 3: Sabotage Vulnerability to LSA Eagle Operations

8. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

9. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

10. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

²⁰ (U) Sensitization refers to making someone more aware of something. In the context of the recommendation, it means to make individuals more aware of potential surveillance attempts against them.

11. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

12. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

13. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) RDC-U CIVA

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

14. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

15. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

16. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

17. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

18. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

19. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

20. (S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

21. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

22. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

23. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

24. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

25. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

26. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) APOD South CIVA

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

27. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

28. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

29. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

30. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

31. (S//FGI POL//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

32. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

33. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

34. (CUH) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Appendix C

(U) Classified Sources Used in Preparation of This Report for Record

(U) "Counterintelligence Vulnerability Assessment, Life Support Area Eagle, Jasionka, Poland" (Document Classified SECRET//NOFORN)

(U) Declassify on: 09 January 2049

(U) Date of Source: 10 January 2024

(U) "Counterintelligence Vulnerability Assessment, Remote Maintenance Distribution Center – Ukraine (RDC-U), Jasionka, Poland" (Document Classified SECRET//NOFORN)

(U) Declassify on: 14 October 2048

(U) Date of Source: 15 October 2023

(U) "Counterintelligence Vulnerability Assessment, Rzeszow-Jasionka International Airport (RIA)" (Document Classified SECRET//NOFORN)

(U) Declassify on: 23 January 2048

(U) Date of Source: 23 January 2023

(U) "Army Regulation 381–20, The Army Counterintelligence Program" (Document Classified SECRET//NOFORN)

(U) Declassify on: 09 June 2047

(U) Date of Source: 09 June 2022

(U) "APOD South Tour Memorandum For Record" (Document Classified SECRET)

(U) Declassify on: 6 March 2050

(U) Date of Source: 6 March 2025

(U) "APOD South Images as of June 15, 2024" (Document Classified SECRET//NOFORN)

(U) Declassify on: 24 July 2049

(U) Date of Source: 24 July 2024

(U) "USAREUR-AF G34 Meeting Memorandum For Record" (Document Classified SECRET//NOFORN)

(U) Declassify on: 6 March 2050

(U) Date of Source: 6 March 2025

(U) "Rzeszow-Jasionka International Airport Intelligence Report" (Document Classified SECRET//NOFORN)

(U) Declassify on: 31 December 2048

(U) Date of Source: 15 April 2023

(U) "Jasionka Security Forces Meeting Memorandum For Record"

(Document Classified SECRET)

(U) Declassify on: 6 March 2050

(U) Date of Source: 6 March 2025

(U) "USAREUR-AF OPORD 0019-23 (Security Assistance Group – Ukraine)"

(Document Classified SECRET//REL TO USA, FIN, SWE, NATO, FVEY)

(U) Declassify on: December 2047

(U) Date of Source: December 2022

(U) "Mod 6 to USAREUR-AF OPORD 0019-23 (Security Assistance Group – Ukraine)"

(Document Classified SECRET//REL TO USA, FIN, SWE, NATO, FVEY)

(U) Declassify on: November 2048

(U) Date of Source: November 2023

(U) "Annex A SAG-U COMREL" (Document Classified SECRET//REL TO USA, FIN, SWE, NATO, FVEY)

(U) Declassify on: Not specified in the document

(U) Date of Source: 21 October 2023

(U) "82nd ABN Mission Brief" (Document Classified SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY, NATO)

(U) Declassify on: Not specified in the document

(U) Date of Source: 4 July 2024

(U) Management Comments

(U) U.S. Army Europe and Africa



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE AND AFRICA
UNIT 29351
APO AE 09005-9351

AEOP-PT

20 March 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense,
4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: Response to DOD OIG Audit of U.S. European Command Force Protection
Measures at Installations in Poland that Support Operation Atlantic Resolve

1. ~~(U)~~ I concur with the six recommendations that the Department of Defense Office
of the Inspector General proposes in support of Project No. D2024-D000RH-0101.000.
USAREUR-AF has taken action to implement these recommendations [REDACTED]

2. ~~(U)~~ Recommendations A1a and A1b focus on establishing a process for V Corps
to record, track, and resolve physical security deficiencies identified in previous
surveys at Jasionka and at other locations in Poland. Recommendations B1a and B1b
address processes for completing and communicating the results of counterintelligence
vulnerability assessments; for following up on recommendations; and for providing
specific information to commanders of Army units in Jasionka.

a. ~~(U)~~ [REDACTED]

directs general officers for force protection (GOFP) [REDACTED]

b. ~~(U)~~ [REDACTED]

Classified By: AEOP-PT
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20501231

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) U.S. Army Europe and Africa (cont'd)

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AEOP-PT

SUBJECT: Response to DOD OIG Audit of U.S. European Command Force Protection Measures at Installations in Poland that Support Operation Atlantic Resolve

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendations C1a and C1b are [REDACTED]

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL USA, NATO, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

c. ~~(S//REL USA, NATO, FVEY)~~ [REDACTED]

4. ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

5. (U) The POC is the Deputy, G34 Protect, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]



SEAN C. BERNABE
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Commander

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABN	Airborne Division
APOD	Aerial Port of Debarkation
BDOC	Base Defense Operations Center
CIVA	Counterintelligence Vulnerability Assessment
LSA	Logistical Support Area
RDC-U	Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center-Ukraine
SAG-U	Security Assistance Group-Ukraine
sUAS	Small Unmanned Aerial Systems
USAREUR-AF	U.S. Army Europe and Africa
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command

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