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INSPECTOR GENERAL

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Special Report: Lessons Learned From Security Cooperation Activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa



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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

September 29, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Special Report: Lessons Learned From Security Cooperation Activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa (Report No. DODIG-2022-142)

This special report summarizes and provides lessons learned identified in 37 reports from the DoD Office of Inspector General, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) for security cooperation activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa. This report is intended to highlight the challenges and known lessons learned across a broad body of oversight reporting on the conduct of security cooperation activities.

We conducted this evaluation from June 2022 through August 2022 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations," published in December 2020 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Since this is a special report, it contains no findings or recommendations; therefore, we did not provide a draft report for management comment.

If you have any questions or would like to discuss the evaluation, please contact [redacted]

Bryan Clark

Bryan T. Clark
Program Director for Evaluations
Overseas Contingency Operations

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Objective

The objective of this evaluation was to summarize previous oversight reports related to security cooperation activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa.

Executive Summary

This report provides a summary evaluation of 22 DoD OIG, 11 Government Accountability Office (GAO), and 4 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) oversight reports from 2015 to 2021 relating to U.S. and Coalition efforts to provide security cooperation to foreign partners in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa. These oversight reports identified several areas where challenges remain, as well as lessons learned that may inform and assist current and future U.S. security cooperation activities worldwide.

During our review, we determined that some previously identified issues may have been partially addressed. For example, multiple reports cited a lack of experience in the security cooperation workforce, stating that the workforce lacked appropriate training in cultural awareness and funding processes. In response, the DoD developed a program to professionalize the security cooperation organization (SCO) workforce and provide enhanced training through the Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU). The DoD also formally introduced a security cooperation workforce certification program to enable workforce personnel the opportunity to develop and become credentialed in the full array of skills required in their jobs.[1] Additionally, the U.S. Army established security force assistance brigades to provide forces that are readily proficient in advising and assisting partner nations (PNs) and that receive the appropriate regionally-aligned training.

However, many challenges remain. For example, continued issues with accountability and control of U.S.-provided equipment could result in loss of sensitive equipment that is susceptible to theft, misuse, or diversion. Additionally, systemic challenges with training and advising that resulted in PN over-reliance on U.S. and Coalition forces to execute essential functions, such as logistics, maintenance, and support, remain a problem. We also identified other systemic challenges that remain in the following areas:

- training and equipping partner nation security forces and ministries,
- providing advisory assistance in support of partner nations,
- developing and sustaining logistics,
- ensuring accountability and control of U.S.-supplied equipment, and
- managing U.S. contracts.

[1] DoD Instruction 5132.15, "Implementation of the Security Cooperation Workforce Certification Program," May 7, 2021.

Background

Security Cooperation and Security Cooperation Organizations

DoD Directive (DoDD) 5132.03 defines security cooperation as "all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and PN military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and PNs."[2] Section 333, title 10, United States Code, authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with concurrence from the Secretary of State, to conduct or support programs to provide training and equipment to foreign countries to build partner capacity (BPC). BPC cases are funded with U.S. Government appropriations and administered within the foreign military sales infrastructure.

DoD security cooperation includes the DoD-administered security assistance programs and international armaments cooperation. Security assistance is one element of security cooperation and is funded and authorized by the Department of State (DOS) and administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Security assistance programs, authorized under title 22, United States Code, enable the United States to provide defense articles, military education and training, and other defense-related services to PNs by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

DoDD 5132.03 defines SCOs as all DoD organizations, regardless of actual title, located in foreign countries that are responsible for carrying out security cooperation management functions under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. SCOs are the in-country DoD elements that manage the United States' foreign military financing and foreign military sales programs. SCOs operate under the direct authority of the Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy and are managed by the geographic combatant command (GCC). The GCC directs the planning and execution of security cooperation activities in alignment with DoD policies and priorities and combatant command theater campaign plans. The GCC's country-specific security cooperation plans identify lines of effort that articulate specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound objectives in support of security cooperation initiatives. These plans place DoD security cooperation within a deliberate and inclusive whole-of-government approach and also consider activities of allies, PNs, and international organizations.

[2] DoDD 5132.03, "DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation," December 29, 2016.

SCOs generally operate under a Senior Defense Official-Defense Attaché (SDO-DATT), who is appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The SDO-DATT serves as the principal DoD official at U.S. embassies and is responsible for advising the U.S. Ambassador on all defense and security matters. SCOs are tailored for each country and may include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, and Offices of Defense and Military Cooperation in order to perform security cooperation functions.

According to DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5132.13, the GCCs are responsible for developing and recommending the size and composition for SCOs under their command to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a review and recommendation to the DSCA Director.[3] The DSCA establishes the overall requirements, criteria, and procedures for the selection and training of personnel engaged in security cooperation and assistance activities and approves SCO joint manpower programs or changes in the number of manpower authorizations. According to DoDI 5132.15, DoD military and civilian personnel who routinely perform security cooperation functions—in other words, members of the security cooperation workforce—require professional certification. The Secretaries of the Military Departments recommend fully qualified individuals for SCO assignments and ensure that approved Service members complete SCO preparatory training, which includes language, antiterrorism, and DSCU courses. SCOs require defense acquisition personnel certified in the International Acquisition career path to manage international armaments cooperation.

The following sections describe SCOs and activities that U.S. and Coalition partners established in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa to build defense relationships and develop PN military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.

Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan

The DoD established the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in April 2006 to replace the Office of Security Cooperation–Afghanistan. The CSTC-A Campaign Plan identified three lines of effort: build and develop Afghan ministerial institutional capability; generate fielded forces; and develop those fielded forces. In April 2009, the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan was activated with the mission to oversee NATO training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), parallel to the U.S. train, advise, and assist effort led by CSTC-A. At its peak structure, CSTC-A/NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan was an 8,000-member advisor/mentor command and was recognized as an Army

[3] DoDI 5132.13, "Staffing of Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) and the Selection and Training of Security Cooperation Personnel," January 9, 2009 (Incorporating Change 1, June 6, 2017).

Corps-level Headquarters. In June 2021, CSTC-A was deactivated and many of its responsibilities transitioned to the Defense Security Cooperation Management Office–Afghanistan (DSCMO-A).

Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq

The Office of Security Cooperation Iraq (OSC-I) was established in December 2011 to operate as the SCO in Iraq. The OSC-I consisted of 59 personnel with the mission of building Iraqi operational and institutional capacity through security cooperation activities, targeted reform efforts, and leveraging U.S. partners to advance U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) priorities and U.S. foreign policy objectives. The OSC-I administered foreign military sales cases for Iraqi acquisition of U.S. defense articles and serviced via the combination of Government of Iraq national funds and foreign military financing and executed programs for building partner capacity. The OSC-I activities included exercises and engagements and education, training, and professional military education with Iraqi security forces. The OSC-I coordinated its efforts with the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve, a DoD-led coalition of PNs, which provided training, equipment, advice, and assistance to Iraq's security forces to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

Africa Security Cooperation and Security Assistance

U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) conducts BPC activities to complement DOS programs, which are planned with the U.S. embassy country teams and PNs. To execute security cooperation, USAFRICOM oversees DoD SCOs at approximately 49 Offices of Security Cooperation located at U.S. embassies throughout Africa. In addition, the State Partnership Program is a key U.S. security cooperation tool that facilitates cooperation for all aspects of international civil-military affairs. The State Partnership Program, managed by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, supports USAFRICOM BPC objectives in 16 Africa state partnerships.

USAFRICOM security cooperation complements other U.S. Government agency programs, such as the DOS-led and funded African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA). The DOS established ACOTA in 1997 to improve African governments' ability to respond quickly to crises by providing selected militaries with the training and equipment required to execute humanitarian or peace support operations. ACOTA supports peacekeeping operations in Africa by conducting initial and refresher training of African soldiers, overseeing exercises and operations, and providing equipment. Once trained and equipped, forces can be deployed in multinational units to conduct operations under the

African Union, the United Nations, or regional security organizations. USAFRICOM supports ACOTA by providing military mentors, trainers, and advisors, at the request of the DOS.

Baseline Summary Report on Security Cooperation Lessons Learned in Iraq and Afghanistan and Our Review of 36 Other Reports

Report no. DODIG-2015-093 was a DoD OIG summary report of 30 OIG oversight reports completed between July 1, 2008, and January 30, 2015, and is the baseline for this report.[4] DODIG-2015-093 focused on the key observations and recommendations related to security cooperation. DODIG-2015-093 identified lessons learned that could apply to future contingency operations and security cooperation activities of combatant commands and their SCOs at the individual country level. This summary report does the same.

In addition to reviewing DODIG-2015-093, we reviewed and summarized 36 more oversight reports issued by the DoD OIG, GAO, and SIGAR from February 1, 2015, through October 2021, to determine continuing systemic issues, areas of concern, and new challenges relating to security cooperation activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa.

[4] DODIG-2015-093, "Summary of Lessons Learned – DoD IG Assessment of Oversight of 'Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip' Operations by U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan," March 31, 2015.

Systemic Challenges Hampered U.S. Security Cooperation Activities

Our review of 37 oversight reports from the DoD OIG, GAO, and SIGAR found that since 2008 U.S. and Coalition security cooperation activities have continued to face systemic challenges. While the oversight reports made many recommendations and provided lessons learned to improve security cooperation activities, most of the systemic challenge areas continued to be identified in reports as late as 2021. The 2015 DoD OIG summary report identified five systemic challenge areas with related lessons learned, which serve as our baseline for this summary report. Oversight reports from 2015 to 2021 showed that U.S. and Coalition security cooperation activities continued to be challenged in these five areas, in addition to a few newly identified areas. These challenge areas are:

- training and equipping of partner nation security forces and ministries,
- providing advisory assistance in support of partner nations,
- developing and sustaining logistics,
- ensuring accountability and control of U.S.-supplied equipment,
- managing U.S. contracts,
- managing and overseeing U.S. security cooperation funds,
- screening and vetting, and
- training foreign security forces on human rights.

In the following sections we first recap the enduring challenges from the DODIG-2015-093 summary report and more recent oversight reports. We then introduce a few new challenges identified in oversight reports produced since 2015. A complete list of all the oversight reports that were reviewed and cited in this summary report is located in the Scope and Methodology section.

Enduring Challenges from Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Operations by U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan (July 2008 – August 2022)

DODIG-2015-093 identified five systemic challenges and problem areas, with related lessons learned, in the U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop PN security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The reports we reviewed from 2015 through 2021 demonstrated that these five systemic challenge areas endured.

Challenge. Training and Equipping of Partner Nation Security Forces and Ministries

Multiple oversight reports issued from 2008 to 2015 assessed the challenges U.S. forces encountered in their protracted effort to rebuild the Afghanistan and Iraq security ministries and train and equip their police and military forces.

Training and Organization of Security Ministries

The security ministries of Iraq and Afghanistan did not have the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) capability necessary to plan and provide timely resource support, such as maintenance and repair parts, to their respective security forces to sustain combat operations. Weaknesses in PPBE processes, along with supply chain dysfunction, contributed to chronic shortages of critically needed operational equipment, such as vehicles, weapons, and weapon systems for the Iraqi Security Forces. Similarly the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Staff PPBE processes were unable to identify requirements and acquire equipment and material necessary to sustain the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The inability of PN security forces and ministries to carry out their support responsibilities, including PPBE processes, hindered the development of an operational and self-sustaining security force structure.

Lesson learned: Security cooperation activities should include an early emphasis on development of security ministries' support capabilities, to include PPBE, logistics, and accountable resource management systems.

Training and Equipping of Security Forces

U.S. and Coalition training and equipping initiatives sometimes lagged behind the operational needs of PN security forces. For example, the Afghan National Police (ANP) did not have sufficient training and counter-improvised explosive device equipment, despite improvised explosive devices producing the majority of ANP casualties. In addition, U.S. and Coalition forces delayed development of combat-enabler capabilities, such as intelligence, logistics, medical, engineer units, and counter-improvised explosive device support to focus initially on formation of basic combat units. Additionally, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and ANP were unprepared to maintain and repair U.S.-provided equipment after contractor logistics support ended. This caused PNs to become reliant on U.S. and Coalition-provided enablers, which hindered the PNs' progress in becoming self-sufficient.

Training of PN security forces continued to be a challenge well beyond 2015. For example, in DODIG-2019-110, we determined that U.S. and Coalition efforts to train, advise, and assist Afghan tactical air coordinators (ATACs) did not fully meet operational objectives for ATACs to provide independent air-to-ground integration support to Afghan ground forces, with minimal casualties and fratricide. U.S. and Coalition advisors did not train on the entire curriculum, did not track the operational effectiveness of deployed ATACs and targeting officers, and did not create a plan with objectives and milestones to develop ATACs and targeting officers. The report recommended that the appropriate commanders develop plans with specific objectives and milestones for development of PN forces, identify and collect operational data, and use the data to inform and adjust train, advise, assist, and equip efforts.

In DODIG-2017-074, we identified that the U.S. and Coalition mission to train, advise, and assist the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service training courses did not contain well-defined standards of evaluation, and the Iraqi trainees did not receive live-fire training on all weapon systems they were expected to use in combat. The report recommended that advisors incorporate objectives and measurable training evaluation criteria and standards for all tasks trained and develop a resource plan to provide weapons, ammunition, and range facilities for live-fire training for all weapons required in combat.

Furthermore, GAO-19-116 found that the DoD continued to face challenges in developing a self-sustaining ANSF. While the DoD reported that the ANSF had improved in several capability areas, the ANSF continued to face critical capability gaps in country-wide vehicle maintenance, logistics, and training efforts. These gaps impeded the ANSF's ability to maintain security and stability in Afghanistan independent of U.S. and Coalition forces. Moreover, the DoD lacked reliable information about the degree to which conventional forces—which made up about

three-quarters of the ANSF—were able to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. This occurred because U.S. and coalition forces did not collect firsthand information on the conventional forces' tactical abilities, but rather relied on those forces' self-reporting. This limited the DoD's ability to fully evaluate the success of its train, advise, assist, and equip efforts in Afghanistan. The GAO recommended that the DoD develop and, as appropriate, implement options for collecting reliable information on the ANSF conventional forces' ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment.

DODIG-2018-058, GAO-16-368, GAO-17-687SP, GAO-18-449, and GAO-21-32R identified similar concerns with training and equipping of PN security forces and ministries, including publishing a strategic plan that sets goals and metrics to ensure plans are synchronized with Coalition campaign plans.

Lessons learned: Train and equip security forces to counter actual and potential threats to forces, civilians, and government stability. Additionally, develop enabler capabilities concurrently with basic security force unit formation, not after basic security force units are organized and equipped. Ensure all maintenance and supply-related contracts in support of security forces contain requirements for training PN mechanics, supply technicians, and logistics managers.

Command and Control

PN command and control (C2) capabilities were hampered by multiple impediments. For example, senior ANA commanders perceived that they were unable to remove their subordinate officers for misconduct, negligence, or loss of confidence in their officers' ability to perform their assigned duties. This occurred because the ANA lacked formal processes to remove military personnel and because of political influence within the Afghanistan military hierarchy. In addition, PNs were not always able to use and sustain C2 technology provided by U.S. and Coalition forces due to limited technical capability.

Lesson learned: Identify impediments to the development of partner C2 capability, including personnel management. Develop a mitigation plan to address those impediments and provide PNs with C2 equipment that can be sustained and used without substantial U.S. and Coalition support.

Challenge. Advisory Assistance in Support of Partner Nation Security Forces and Ministries

The U.S. and Coalition embedded military and civilian mentors and advisors throughout the military forces and within the security ministries of Iraq and Afghanistan to develop institutional, personnel, and leadership capacity.

U.S. and Coalition Advisors, Mentors, and Trainers

Multiple oversight reports concluded that Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq and CSTC-A lacked sufficient security assistance personnel to mentor PN personnel, and those who were available did not possess the requisite security assistance training, skills, and experience. Mentors in Afghanistan reported that their pre-deployment training focused largely on combat survival skills, without sufficient emphasis on Afghan-centric mentoring and training skills specific to their assignments, including logistics and weapons accountability. A lack of coordination and inconsistent mentoring standards between the U.S. and Coalition mentoring teams was also problematic. Finally, reports noted tour length disparity of 3 to 9 months among advisors drawn from U.S. military Services and Coalition nations. Since the effectiveness of mentors, advisors, and trainers often depends on developing a personal relationship with PN counterparts, the report recommended that tour lengths be standardized to a length sufficient for this to occur.

Challenges regarding the size of the training mission and training of advisory personnel, as well as security concerns, have continued to hamper U.S. security cooperation efforts since 2015. For example, in DODIG-2019-096, we reported that USAFRICOM Regionally Aligned Forces allocated to that combatant command did not receive adequate regionally-aligned training to meet their mission requirements. The Regionally Aligned Forces lacked cultural awareness training, including training on PN's militaries and the environments in which they operate. The Forces also lacked instructor training to enable them to teach and advise tactics to PNs. The lack of training resulted in degraded effectiveness of the Regionally Aligned Force's missions. The report also highlighted that the introduction of Security Force Assistance Brigades may be a better option in the future, instead of the use of Brigade Combat Teams, since the Security Force Assistance Brigades' core mission is training and advising allies and PNs.

SIGAR 19-39-LL found similar issues with training U.S. advisors. U.S. Army pre-deployment training for all military personnel assigned as advisors to the Afghan and Iraqi security forces focused primarily on combat skills, force protection, and tactical training. The training placed little attention on developing culture, language, and counterinsurgency training. SIGAR noted that field advisors in Afghanistan often did not receive foreign weapons training and received no information on Afghan systems or processes. One advisor commented that pre-deployment training "did not teach [U.S. advisors] anything about the systems that the [ANA and ANP] use for personnel, intelligence, operations, or supply. Ninety percent of mentoring is spent working with [their] systems." To some advisors, these training gaps hindered their ability to be immediately effective in the field.

Furthermore, SIGAR 17-62-LL found that the constant turnover of U.S. and NATO trainers impaired the training mission's institutional memory and hindered the relationship-building and effective monitoring and evaluation required in security sector assistance missions. U.S. military units frequently transitioned into and out of Afghanistan, forcing ANDSF units to adapt to new U.S. trainers and advisors and establish new relationships. Often times, as relationships and trust between the ANDSF and U.S. units deepened, a new U.S. unit arrived and the cycle started again. Furthermore, high turnover of advisory personal had a negative impact on the U.S. military's ability to properly provide long-term forecasting for ANDSF development and correctly assess ANDSF capabilities against readiness milestones.

Additionally, DODIG-2018-090 and SIGAR 17-62-LL found that staffing was inadequate due to the inability for both the U.S. and NATO PNs to fulfill their pledges for the required number of trainers. DODIG-2017-105 and SIGAR 19-39-LL also identified a shortage in sourcing advisors with the required training and experience in areas such as ministerial internal control programs.

Lessons learned: Establish consistent staffing requirements with adequate numbers of fully trained and experienced advisors. Develop standards, performance metrics, and clearly defined advisor objectives in plans at the beginning of advisor tours.

Leader Development and Personnel Management

The ANA lacked a comprehensive and effective personnel management system to support merit-based promotion and assignments. ANA issues included a highly centralized decision authority for personnel actions, incomplete paper-based records, no functioning retirement system, and a climate that allowed nepotism and favoritism to taint assignment and promotion processes. Additionally, personnel did not regularly receive their pay, which could have a negative impact on force morale and result in higher rates of attrition and corruption. Furthermore, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were not delegated the authority and responsibility commensurate with their level of training and capability. This occurred due to both the historically insignificant role of NCOs in ANA units, which required a cultural change in officer attitudes, but also because ANA officer training did not include a review of the roles and responsibilities of NCOs that was included in NCO training. These issues caused uncertainty for many soldiers regarding career development and retirement prospects and limited the ANA's ability to reduce attrition and increase retention of younger, higher performing soldiers.

Lesson learned: Ensure a true merit-based personnel promotion and assignment system to enhance the development of a core group of competent NCO and officer leaders. In addition, the NCO corps must be fully supported by officers, with clear roles and responsibilities.

Medical System Development

Because security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan operated independently across vast distances, including remote and rugged terrain, unit personnel needed the ability to render first aid to themselves and others while they waited for medical evacuation. However, the ANP did not have the capability to render effective point-of-injury care because they lacked individual first aid kits, did not have a sufficient number of medics, and the U.S. and Coalition's planning and advisory resources were not sufficient to develop their point-of-injury care. In addition, security forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan depended on U.S. and Coalition casualty evacuation support. This reliance hampered the ability of PNs to develop and implement their own sustainable healthcare delivery system. Furthermore, Afghan acquisition, technology, and logistics personnel did not have significant experience with medical acquisition because they relied on the U.S. supply chain for procurement of medical supplies. Finally, the U.S. and Coalition advisor programs did not develop effective inventory controls within the ANA, which led to misappropriation and diversion of critical medical materiel.

Lesson learned: Focus on point-of-injury care, develop adequate PN casualty evacuation flight capacity, and develop self-sustaining security force medical capabilities.

Challenge. Logistics Development and Sustainment

Logistics consists of the efforts to procure, transport, resupply, repair, and retrograde materiel. It also includes the movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel and the provision of facilities and services necessary to sustain the operational capability of the forces.

Partner Nation Logistical System Development

U.S. and Coalition commands in Iraq and Afghanistan did not initially have a single integrated logistical development plan for the PN security forces and did not assign a specific officer or office responsible for the PN security forces. In Iraq, the logistical centers were organized to provide support to assigned Army divisions, but the centers were not under the control of those divisions. The process of routing requests for logistical support were cumbersome and time-consuming, with weak supporting and supported links to their respective Iraqi Army divisions.

In Afghanistan, U.S. and Coalition plans for development of ANSF logistics sustainment did not provide a time-phased, conditions-based approach for accomplishing end state objectives in which the Afghanistan ministries and the ANSF would be capable of independently carrying out logistics operations without further reliance on U.S. and Coalition forces. In addition, organization and execution of PN logistical procedures were highly centralized and, as a result, were incapable of responding flexibly and responsively to the supply requirements of dispersed security forces in the field.

Finally, previous oversight reports found that the U.S. and Coalition commands did not have sufficient advisory personnel with the requisite skills to provide necessary logistical mentoring assistance.

In DODIG-2017-033, we found that the U.S. and Coalition's mission to train, advise, assist, and equip the Kurdish Security Forces (KSF) lacked a comprehensive written plan to sustain the two brigade equipment sets that the United States intended to provide to the KSF, which could have resulted in equipment deterioration. The KSF also lacked visibility of U.S.-transported equipment (both U.S.-purchased and Coalition-donated) in the U.S.-managed supply chain, which could lead to duplicate acquisition and potential loss of accountability. The report recommended that USCENTCOM determine requirements, issue a written sustainment plan for KSF equipment sets, and conduct periodic reviews to monitor and sustain readiness of the equipment.

In DODIG-2018-058, we identified that the contractor logistics support agreements for the Afghanistan Air Force limited the progression and transfer of maintenance responsibilities to Afghanistan Air Force members because the agreements did not contain either a plan or a timeline for transitioning maintenance responsibilities. The report recommended that CSTC-A modify contract agreements to put more emphasis on building the Afghan aircraft maintenance capability, increasing their responsibility for daily aircraft maintenance, and identifying the transition criteria for Afghan-led maintenance.

Additionally, SIGAR 17-62-LL found that the basic logistics supply and sustainment plan was not well thought out. U.S. and Coalition provision of advanced NATO weapons and management systems to a mostly illiterate and uneducated force without appropriate training and institutional infrastructure created long-term dependencies, required increased U.S. fiscal support, and extended sustainability timelines. The SIGAR report noted that from 2002 to 2008, the United States outfitted the ANDSF with equipment donated by former Soviet-bloc nations and from seized Taliban caches. This led to a lack of uniformity in weapons systems and equipment within ANDSF units. Then, in 2008, the United States began to equip the force with NATO-standard weapons and equipment. This transformation led to increased long-term dependency on international donors for both funding and maintenance.

Lessons learned: Develop a single, integrated plan to coordinate logistics development initiatives for security forces concurrent with the development of combat capabilities. In addition, develop a demand-driven supply system with sufficient number of properly trained logistics advisors to provide mid- to senior-level national force officers with adequate and timely training in logistical management skills.

Challenge. Accountability and Control of U.S.-Supplied Equipment

U.S. law requires U.S. forces to maintain accountability and control of sensitive equipment, such as weapons, ammunition, and night vision devices, through turnover to the PN security forces and, in some cases, accountability after turnover through end use monitoring (EUM).[5] Without proper accountability and control, U.S.-supplied weapons and equipment may be subject to misplacement, loss, or theft and could be acquired by insurgents.

Multiple oversight reports identified a lack of policies and procedures for the accountability of sensitive items. U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq did not issue written procedures for accountability and control of arms and ammunition to Iraqi Security Forces. Similarly, in Afghanistan, neither CSTC-A nor USCENTCOM issued written guidance that addressed coordination between U.S. commands to set standards for accountability, control, or final disposition of U.S. equipment or weapons that were captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, or turned-in. In addition, U.S. forces did not always maintain an unbroken chain of custody for U.S.-controlled arms and ammunition, to include recording of serial numbers. For example, U.S. forces in Iraq were not able to account for, by serial number, all night vision devices procured for and given to the Iraqi Security Forces.

Lessons learned: Develop and enforce applicable policy and procedures with PN security forces for the issuance, accountability, and control of sensitive equipment, with an unbroken chain of custody by serial number. This includes conducting required EUM inspections for sensitive equipment items, such as under the DoD Golden Sentry program.

Oversight reports also identified a lack of policy and procedures for oversight of sensitive equipment within the PN security forces. For example, within the ANA and the ANP, there was a general perception of impunity because there were no consequences for negligent destruction or loss of equipment. Additionally, Afghan commanders did not uniformly enforce existing Afghanistan ministries' policies requiring a determination of accountability for negligence resulting in damage, destruction, loss, or theft of ANSF equipment. Likewise, Iraqi ministries did not develop formal written policies to establish internal control processes for sensitive items.

Lesson learned: Advise and assist PN security forces to develop a professional culture of accountability and control for military equipment and supplies and oversight of sensitive equipment items.

[5] According to DCSA Manual 5105.38-M, "The Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)," all equipment and services transferred by the U.S. Government to a PN are subject to EUM under DCSA's Golden Sentry program. There are two type of EUM—routine and enhanced. Routine EUM is required quarterly while enhanced EUM is required within 90 days of equipment transfer and annually thereafter for sensitive equipment such as night vision devices, missiles, and unmanned aerial systems.

Accountability, control, and EUM of U.S.-transferred equipment continued to be a challenge for security cooperation organizations (SCOs) and other U.S. forces well beyond 2015. For example, in DoDIG-2021-102, we found that SCOs in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility did not account for 9 of 12 BPC cases in which all or part of equipment was transferred, or conduct routine EUM 42 percent of the time. No enhanced EUM was conducted for a significant portion of sensitive equipment, and accurate documentation of transfer and receipt documents and annual inventories were not annotated in the appropriate Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) database in a timely manner. As a result, the DCSA did not have an accurate inventory of all equipment in the possession of PNs and was more reliant on the records of the PNs. Without reliable records, enhanced EUM-designated equipment is more susceptible to loss, theft, misuse, or diversion.

Additionally, SIGAR 21-11-AR found that the DoD did not conduct required monitoring of military equipment transferred to the Afghan government to account for sensitive articles. CSTC-A officials told SIGAR representatives that the command has never met its 100-percent inventory requirement and was unlikely to ever do so because the security situation in Afghanistan prevented some inventories from taking place.

Furthermore, GAO-17-433 reported that the DoD's ability to maintain visibility and accountability over the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)-funded equipment was limited. The DoD designed the SCIP to help DoD Components maintain end-to-end visibility of DoD equipment, including ITEF-funded equipment, but DoD Components did not use the SCIP as intended because of potential interoperability and date reporting issues within the SCIP. In addition, missing and incomplete ITEF-funded equipment transfer documentation further affected the DoD's ability to maintain complete visibility and accountability over ITEF-funded equipment. Since personnel rotate about every 9 months, the GAO recommended that the DoD develop standard operating procedures that reflect significant changes to the DoD's processes for ensuring the accountability of ITEF-funded equipment. This included a requirement for the DoD to document unique identifiers on transfer documentation so that personnel are able to properly record ITEF-funded transfer dates in the SCIP. Without timely and accurate transit information on the status of ITEF-funded equipment, the DoD cannot ensure that the equipment has reached its intended destination and DoD program managers cannot conduct effective oversight of the ITEF program.

Additionally, DODIG-2020-061, DODIG-2017-122, DODIG-2017-058, DODIG-2017-041, DODIG-2016-040, DODIG-2015-108, DODIG-2015-107, GAO-17-703, GAO-20-309, and GAO-21-32R also identified concerns with accountability and control of U.S.-supplied items, including weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and fuel.

Challenge. U.S. Contract Management

Contractor services played an important role in contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, including security forces training, infrastructure construction, maintenance, security, materiel provision, and the development of PN logistics systems and capacity within the security ministries.

U.S. Contractor Alignment with Campaign Plan Accomplishment

DoD OIG oversight identified that operational and contracting commands did not have an integrated planning and execution approach that effectively linked contract requirements and performance to accomplishment of campaign strategic and operational goals. In Afghanistan, the organizational reporting system of contractors hampered quick and effective communication of critical issues to the on-the-ground military commanders. In addition, military commanders had no C2 authority over contract personnel or the contracting officer's representative.

Lesson learned: Ensure contracting requirements and performance support are integrated with U.S. strategic and operational objectives.

Contract Oversight

The United States provided extensive financial resources to pay for PN development efforts through the Iraq and Afghanistan Security Force funds. However, there were an insufficient number of trained and qualified U.S. contracting officers and contracting officer's representatives to provide adequate contract oversight. The failure to monitor contracts can result in critical supplies and support services being late, deficient, and outside the scope of contract requirements. In addition, Afghan officials were not uniformly performing contract oversight, contractors were not aware of U.S. Government policy with respect to the Federal Acquisition Regulation on combating trafficking in persons (CTIP), and USCENTCOM subordinate commands in Afghanistan had not developed localized CTIP policies, procedures, or training.

Lesson learned: Ensure sufficient numbers of trained and qualified U.S. contracting personnel are made available to provide adequate contract oversight. In addition, U.S. forces should include a quality assurance surveillance plan and CTIP clauses in contracts before they are transferred to PN control and direct periodic inspections to ensure DoD contractors and subcontractors meet CTIP requirements.

Contract management remained a challenge in Afghanistan after 2015. For example, in DODIG-2020-061, we reported that CSTC-A had not documented or communicated contractor non-performance, maintained contract documentation, or ensured receipt of required contract deliverables for the Afghan Personnel and Pay System. The report recommended that CSTC-A develop and implement procedures to increase oversight and controls to ensure implementation of the contract system.

Additionally, in DODIG-2019-110, we found that U.S. and Coalition efforts to train, advise, and assist Afghan air liaison officers and Afghan air targeting officers were not fully meeting operational objectives, in part, because they lacked a detailed training curriculum. U.S. and Coalition advisors did not provide adequate oversight of the contracted advisors to verify they developed a detailed curriculum. The report recommended that advisors enforce the contract and require the contractor to develop a detailed training curriculum that includes, at a minimum, training objectives, source content, and competencies required to pass the course.

Furthermore, GAO-16-105 stated that the DoD is more frequently relying on contractor support for a range of operations to provide logistical, transportation, and intelligence support of USAFRICOM's missions. The enhanced capabilities offered by operational contract support (OCS) can be a significant force multiplier. However, USAFRICOM faced challenges in areas such as development of OCS structures, assessments of subordinate command capabilities, accounting for the total number of contractor personnel, and contractor vetting. Several of USAFRICOM's subordinate commands lacked organizational structures, such as OCS integration cells to manage and plan for OCS. A cell would have been helpful in joint environments due to the number of Military Service contracting elements operating at the same location with potentially limited resources. Additionally, the GAO found that clearly defined assessment standards could help USAFRICOM more accurately assess OCS actions taken.

Summary of New Challenges and Recommendations from Security Assistance Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa (February 2015 – August 2022)

In addition to the enduring challenges in the five security cooperation areas that we summarized in this report, our review identified three additional challenges for security cooperation presented in reports issued since 2015. These new challenges include managing and overseeing funding for PN operational readiness, screening and vetting processes for PN security forces and vendors, and human rights training. We do not identify lessons learned for the new challenges because the individual reports did not provide any lessons learned, and we did not verify the status of the recommendations or determine whether actions taken to address the recommendations were effective.

Challenge. Management and Oversight of U.S. Security Cooperation Funding

We identified a new systemic challenge with managing and overseeing U.S. security cooperation funding based on our review two DoD OIG reports, one of which was a summary of seven reports; a SIGAR report; and a GAO report.

In DODIG-2018-090, we summarized the systemic challenge associated with CSTC-A's oversight of Afghanistan Security Forces Funds (ASFF), as covered in seven prior audit reports (DODIG-2017-122; DODIG-2017-041; DODIG-2017-027; DODIG-2016-040; DODIG-2015-108; DODIG-2015-107; and DODIG-2015-082). The 2018 summary report identified a systemic challenge with CSTC-A officials' management of U.S. direct funding to the Afghanistan ministries for obtaining and maintaining products such as fuel, ammunition, and vehicles. CSTC-A did not effectively manage U.S. direct funding provided to the MoD and Ministry of the Interior because CSTC-A did not consistently establish realistic and achievable conditions for the ministries within their Bilateral Financial Commitment Letters. Additionally, CSTC-A did not enforce noncompliance penalties in the commitment letters because of the potential negative impact on the ANSF's operational readiness. As a result, CSTC-A did not have assurance that U.S. direct funding was used entirely for the intended purposes, and the ministries did not obtain self-sufficiency in developing future needs for commodities, such as fuel and ammunition. The report recommended the establishment of more realistic and achievable terms and conditions for the ministries to accomplish and show improvement and develop a formal documented process for assessing penalties for non-compliance.

In DODIG-2017-099, we found problems with SCO personnel management and reporting for BPC funds used by the DoD to provide PNs with equipment, training, and services to enhance their capabilities.[6] Similarly, SIGAR 22-04-AR found that DoD and CSTC-A did not fulfill Afghan National Army Trust Fund monitoring and oversight requirements, did not evaluate project outcomes, and did not align projects with the Afghan Army's requirements plans. While CSTC-A had memorandums of agreement in 2014 and 2018 that required monitoring and accounting of these funds, SIGAR found that required quarterly and annual reports were rarely completed.

[6] The DoD Global Train and Equip Program was created pursuant to Public Law 109-163, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006, Section 1206, to BPC. Section 1206 funds became codified in December 2014, as section 2282, title 10, United States Code (10 U.S.C. § 2282). Section 2282 was later repealed and incorporated into 10 U.S.C. § 333, Chapter 16, Security Cooperation.

Furthermore, GAO-20-99 highlighted that the DoD had varying degrees of visibility over ASFF-procured contracts. DoD officials stated that they had visibility at the broadest level of the overall execution of the ASFF budget, including funding associated with ANA training. At the individual contract level, the Military Services' contracting commands developed and maintained contract and task order files, but the DoD did not have a centralized system or reporting mechanism for tracking all ASFF contracts, and the Services' systems did not interface with one another. Consequently, the DoD had to request a list of all ASFF-procured training contracts from the Military Services. The DoD identified 40 contracts and task orders, totaling over $483 million in estimated value, but acknowledged that the list was likely incomplete.

Challenge. Screening and Vetting of Foreign Forces and Vendors

We identified a new systemic challenge with screening and vetting foreign Service members and foreign vendors based on our review of two GAO reports. In GAO-17-687SP, the GAO reviewed the DoD's vetting process to ensure that training, equipment, or other assistance is not provided to forces for which there exists credible information of a gross violation of human rights and that eligible security forces have been appropriately vetted for associations with terrorist organizations and groups associated with the government of Iran.[7] The GAO found that DoD record-keeping of vetted units and Iraqi security force personnel was not accurate or reliable and recommended that the DOS update its agency-wide vetting policy and that the DoD improve its vetting records.

Additionally, GAO-16-105 found that USAFRICOM had not established a foreign vendor vetting process to identify vendors that support criminal, terrorist, or other un-sanctioned organizations. Not all of the USAFRICOM forward operating sites were incorporating additional screening measures according to specific risks at each site. The GAO recommended development of a vetting process and risk-based employee screening measures to help USAFRICOM determine appropriate levels for vendor vetting and contractor employee screening on the African continent.

[7] According to DOS Fact Sheet, "About the Leahy Law," January 20, 2021, 10 U.S.C. § 362 (also known as the Leahy Law), requires that DoD-appropriated funds not be used for any training, equipment, or other assistance for a foreign security force unit if the Secretary of Defense has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. The law also allows for some exceptions.

Challenge. Human Rights Training for Foreign Security Forces

We identified a new systemic challenge with human rights training for foreign security forces based on our review of a GAO report. In GAO-19-554, the GAO stated that instilling respect for human rights in our foreign partners is important to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals. Human rights training that the DoD provides is one means to do so, but the DoD was unable to provide a comprehensive accounting of the full array of human rights training it supports. The GAO stated that a process to ensure training information is systematically tracked would provide the DoD greater assurance that it is complying with the statutory requirement to provide human rights training as a component of 10 U.S.C. § 333 assistance.

Furthermore, the DoD was not able to provide stakeholders, including Congress, with an evaluation of the effectiveness of human rights training the DoD agencies support. Without monitoring and evaluation, decision-makers may not be able to identify whether human rights training, provided through 10 U.S.C. § 333 and other authorities, such as the International Military Education and Training, are achieving objectives and whether training efforts could be adjusted for greater effectiveness.[8] The GAO recommended that the DoD establish a process to ensure 10 U.S.C. § 333 information for mandated human rights training is systematically entered into tracking systems and to develop a timeline for implementing DoD activities to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of human rights training for foreign security forces.

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this evaluation from June 2022 through September 2022 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in December 2020 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the conclusions. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the conclusions.

We reviewed oversight reports focusing on security cooperation activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa. Specifically, we reviewed DODIG-2015-093, which summarized 30 oversight reports for security cooperation activities from

[8] According to GAO-19-554, the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act enacted a new chapter in Title 10 of the United States Code requiring that programs include elements to promote the observance of and respect for human rights. Before the 2017 update, there was a similar requirement under the Global Train and Equip program, codified in 10 U.S.C. § 2282. Additionally, in 1976, Congress established the International Military Education and Training program, codified within Title 22 of the United States Code, providing foreign military personnel with training to increase respect for human rights.

July 1, 2008, to January 30, 2015. We also reviewed and summarized 36 additional oversight reports issued by the DoD OIG, the GAO, and SIGAR from February 2015, to October 2021, to determine the systemic issues, challenges, lessons learned, and areas of concern relating to security cooperation activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa.

The following oversight reports were reviewed and referenced in this summary report:

- DODIG-2015-082, "The Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's Controls Over the Contract Management Process for U.S. Direct Assistance Need Improvement," February 25, 2015
- DODIG-2015-093, "Summary of Lessons Learned – DoD IG Assessment of Oversight of 'Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip' Operations by U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan," March 31, 2015
- DODIG-2015-107, "Challenges Exist for Asset Accountability and Maintenance and Sustainment of Vehicles Within the Afghan National Security Forces," April 17, 2015
- DODIG-2015-108, "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Sufficiency of Afghan National Security Forces' Policies, Processes, and Procedures for the Management and Accountability of Class III (Fuel) and V (Ammunition)," April 30, 2015
- DODIG-2016-040, "Controls Over Ministry of Interior Fuel Contracts Could Be Improved," January 20, 2016
- DODIG-2017-027, "The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Needs to Strengthen the Controls Over U.S. Direct Assistance Funding," December 1, 2016
- DODIG-2017-033, "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Kurdish Security Forces in Iraq," December 14, 2016
- DODIG-2017-041, "Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Improved Controls Over U.S.-Funded Ministry of Defense Fuel Contracts, but Further Improvements are Needed," January 11, 2017
- DODIG-2017-058, "Iraq Train and Equip Fund Weapons Not Properly Inventoried and Secured in Kuwait and Iraq," February 16, 2017
- DODIG-2017-074, "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans and Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service and the Iraqi Special Operations Forces," April 19, 2017
- DODIG-2017-099, "Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Build Counterterrorism and Stability Operations Capacity of Foreign Military Forces with Section 1206/2282 Funding," July 21, 2017

- DODIG-2017-105, "(U) Evaluation of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Enable the Afghan Ministry of Defense to Develop Its Oversight and Internal Control Capability," August 4, 2017
- DODIG-2017-122, "CSTC-A Oversight of Ammunition Provided to Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces," September 22, 2017
- DODIG-2018-058, "Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air Force," January 4, 2018
- DODIG-2018-090, "Summary Report on U.S. Direct Funding Provided to Afghanistan," March 21, 2018
- DODIG-2019-057, "Iraqi Border Guard Equipment," February 13, 2019
- DODIG-2019-096, "(U) Audit of the Training of the Army's Regionally Aligned Forces in the U.S. Africa Command," June 18, 2019
- DODIG-2019-110, "Evaluation of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators, Air Liaison Officers, and Afghan Air Targeting Officers," August 8, 2019
- DODIG-2019-115, "Audit of the Planning for and Implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System," August 15, 2019
- DODIG-2020-061, "(U) Audit of the DoD's Accountability of Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund Equipment Designated for Syria," February 13, 2020
- DODIG-2020-104, "Audit of Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan's Implementation of the Core Inventory Management System Within the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces," July 10, 2020
- DODIG-2021-102, "(U) Audit of the DoD's Management of Global Train and Equip Program Resources Provided to U.S. Africa Command Partner Nations," July 21, 2021
- GAO-16-105, "Operational Contract Support: Additional Actions Needed to Manage, Account for, and Vet Defense Contractors in Africa," December 17, 2015
- GAO-16-368, "Counterterrorism: DoD Should Enhance Management of and Reporting on Its Global Train and Equip Program," April 18, 2016
- GAO-17-433, "Iraq: DoD Needs to Improve Visibility Over Equipment Provided to Iraq's Security Forces," May 25, 2017
- GAO-17-687SP, "Countering ISIS and its Effects: Key Issues for Oversight," July 18, 2017
- GAO-17-703, "Foreign Military Sales: DoD Needs to Improve Its Use of Performance Information to Manage the Program," August 22, 2017

- GAO-18-449, "Counterterrorism: DoD Should Fully Address Security Assistance Planning Elements in Global Train and Equip Project Proposals," May 30, 2018
- GAO-19-116, "Afghanistan Security: Some Improvements Reported in Afghan Forces' Capabilities, but Actions Needed to Enhance DoD Oversight of U.S.-Purchased Equipment, October 15, 2018
- GAO-19-554, "Security Assistance: U.S. Agencies Should Improve Oversight of Human Rights Training for Foreign Security Forces," August 12, 2019
- GAO-20-99, "Afghanistan Security Forces Fund: DoD Has Processes for Identifying Training Needs and Maintaining Visibility over Contracts," November 18, 2019
- GAO-20-309, "Defense Logistics Agreements: DoD Should Improve Oversight and Seek Payment from Foreign Partners for Thousands of Orders It Identifies as Overdue," March 4, 2020
- GAO-21-32R, "Afghanistan Reconstruction: GAO Work since 2002 Shows Systemic Internal Control Weaknesses that Increased the Risk of Waste, Fraud, and Abuse," January 27, 2021
- SIGAR 17-62-LL, "Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan," September 2017
- SIGAR 19-39-LL, "Divided Responsibility: Lessons from U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan," June 2019
- SIGAR 21-11-AR Audit Report, "Military Equipment Transferred to the Afghan Government: DoD Did Not Conduct Required Monitoring to Account for Sensitive Articles," December 2020
- SIGAR 22-04-AR Audit Report, "NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund: DoD Did Not Fulfill Monitoring and Oversight Requirements, Evaluate Project Outcomes, or Align Projects With the Former Afghan Army's Requirement Plans," October 2021

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Congressional Liaison
703.604.8324

Media Contact
public.affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

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