

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~



INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

November 5, 2020

(U) Evaluation of Army's Tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Payload Program

Released by the DoD OIG FOIA Office under
FOIA request DODOIG-2021-000161 on
January 17, 2025.

Classified By: ODIG-EVAL
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20501102

INTEGRITY ★ EFFICIENCY ★ ACCOUNTABILITY ★ EXCELLENCE

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~



~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~



~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~

(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the Army's Tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Payload Program

September 24, 2020

(U) Objective

(U) We determined whether the Army had developed and deployed a Tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Payload (TSP) program for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) that met the intelligence requirements of the Army's operational units.

(U) Background

(U//~~FOUO~~) In 2009, Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) determined that the Army lacked a persistent UAS SIGINT system capable of surveillance, reconnaissance, voice intercept, emitter mapping, and aerial precision geo-location. A 2010 Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) report previously stated that existing Army UAS SIGINT capability was limited to a single technology solution and that aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (AISR) coverage resulted in insufficient direct support to tactical forces, which inhibited or even prohibited completion of their assigned missions.¹ Additionally, according to the 2010 JROC report, the existing UAS SIGINT capability did not have the endurance of the Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS (MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS) conventional electronic warfare support, with the accuracy of aerial precision geo-location and the flexibility and agility of a multi-payload platform.

¹ (U//~~FOUO~~) JROC report, "Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Direct Support Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance," September 9, 2010, reported that HQDA identified and validated the AISR capability gaps through numerous user needs statements, other Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) documents, various AISR studies, and HQDA guidance. (U) The JROC's mission is to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in assessing joint military capabilities, and identifying, approving, and prioritizing gaps in those capabilities to meet applicable requirements in the National Defense Strategy; and reviewing and validating whether a capability proposed by an Armed Force, Defense Agency, or other entity of the DoD fulfills a gap in joint military capabilities.

(U//~~FOUO~~) INSCOM (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

(U//~~FOUO~~) In August 2010, HQDA G-3 (Operations)/5 (Plans)/7 (Training) initiated development of the current TSP program and required the Program Executive Office-Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors (PEO IEW&S) to re-initiate Milestone B for the TSP on the MQ1-C Gray Eagle UAS. On September 28, 2011, the Army awarded BAE Systems the contract for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase of the TSP. The HQDA Acquisition Strategy Report, issued in 2014, stated that the primary objective during the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase was to integrate the TSP airborne components into a pod, deliver the articles for testing, and develop interface control documents to support integration of TSP into the MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS and the Distributed Common Ground System-Army.

(U) Findings

(U//~~FOUO~~) We determined that the TSP still does not meet the Army's AISR SIGINT requirements. Specifically, as of January 2020, the Army had not completed an initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) required by section 2399, Title 10, United States Code and the DoD systems acquisition process for UAS TSP. The IOT&E, originally scheduled for FY 2016, would allow the TSP Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) to determine whether the TSP program meets operational requirements to progress into full rate production.

² (U//~~FOUO~~) The TSP Appendix I to the Extended Range Multi-Purpose (ERMP) UAS CPD, Increment 1 (approved March 24, 2009; JROCM 051-09 approved by HQDA on January 3, 2013) provides details of TSP performance capabilities and characteristics.

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~



~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~

(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the Army's Tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Payload Program

Findings (cont'd)

(U//~~FOUO~~) However, the Army has not yet completed the IOT&E for two reasons. First, the TSP program experienced two major program restructurings, in 2012 and again in 2017. These restructurings slowed down TSP development.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Second the Army Project Manager Sensors-Aerial Intelligence directed 10 assessments and tests, which were conducted by three separate agencies. However, the Army Project Manager Sensors-Aerial Intelligence did not establish assessment criteria, and each agency based its assessment on different criteria. This resulted in contradictory findings. Each assessment revealed developmental and operational deficiencies, as well as performance problems, in the UAS TSP, prompting a second major restructure of the program in 2017. However, the 2017 restructuring did not address or mitigate the developmental and operational test deficiencies identified by the three assessing agencies.

(S//~~NF~~) INSCOM: (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]. In July 2019, the Army General Officer Steering Committee for TSP began a review of the TSP program to determine its future; however, as of January 2020, the TSP General Officer Steering Committee had not made any determinations.

(S//SI//~~NF~~) As a result of not fulfilling the AISR requirements, since 2007 the Army has spent \$267.7 million developing the TSP but still does not have MQ-1C operational. DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) As a result, Army commanders at the tactical level DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

(U) Recommendations

(S//~~NF~~) We recommend that the Army Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager, Aerial, update and revalidate the requirement for a U.S. Army aerial Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Signals Intelligence capability.³

(U) We recommend that the General Officer Steering Committee Chair for the Tactical Signals Intelligence Payload review and determine whether to re-establish the Tactical Signals Intelligence Payload as a program of record, transition the program to a quick reaction capability, or terminate the program.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-2, responding on behalf of the Chair, General Officer Steering Committee for Tactical Signals Intelligence Payload and the Director, Intelligence - Capabilities, Development, and Integration Directorate, Futures and Concepts Center, responding on behalf of the Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager, Aerial, agreed with the recommendations. The comments and planned corrective actions addressed all specifics of the recommendations. Therefore, these recommendations are resolved and remain open. We will close these recommendations when we receive the updated and revalidated SIGINT requirements.

³ The Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager, Aerial, was rebranded as the Army Capability Manager Intelligence Sensors in August 2020.

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~

(U) Recommendations Table

(U) Management	(U) Recommendations Unresolved	(U) Recommendations Resolved	(U) Recommendations Closed
(U) Army Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager, Aerial	None	1	None
(U) Chair, General Officer Steering Committee for Tactical Signals Intelligence Payload	None	2	None

(U) NOTE: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations:

- (U) **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- (U) **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- (U) **Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.



~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~

INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22304-1500

November 5, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of the Army's Tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Payload
Program (Report No. DODIG-2021-005)

(U) We are providing this report for your review. We conducted this evaluation from May 2019 until March 2020 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations," published in January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

(U) We considered management comments on the draft of this report when preparing the final report. Comments from the Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-2, responding on behalf of the Chair, General Officer Steering Committee for Tactical Signals Intelligence Payload and the Director, Intelligence - Capabilities, Development, and Integration Directorate Futures and Concepts Center responding on behalf of the Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager, Aerial, addressed all the specifics of the recommendations and conformed to the requirements of DoD Instruction 7650.03; therefore, we do not require additional comments.

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at [DoD OIG: (b)(6)]
[DoD OIG: (b)(6)], or [DoD OIG: (b)(6)] at [DoD OIG: (b)(6)], DSN [DoD OIG: (b)(6)].

for [Signature]

Randolph R. Stone
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Space, Intelligence, Engineering, and Oversight

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
(U) Objective	1
(U) Background	1
Finding.....	7
(U) The Army's Tactical Signals Intelligence Payload Did Not Meet the Army's Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Signals Intelligence Requirements	7
(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response	15
Appendix A	18
Scope and Methodology	18
Use of Computer-Processed Data.....	19
Use of Technical Assistance.....	19
Prior Coverage	19
Management Comments	21
(U) Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager, Aerial	21
(U) Chairman, General Officer Steering Committee for TSP, Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-2.....	23
Acronyms and Abbreviations	25

Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) We determined whether the Army had developed and deployed a Tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Payload (TSP) program for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) that met the intelligence requirements of the Army's operational units.⁴

(U) Background

(U//~~FOUO~~) Joint Publication 2-0 defines SIGINT as intelligence produced by exploiting foreign communications systems and non-communications emitters. SIGINT provides unique intelligence information, complements intelligence derived from other sources, and is often used for cueing other sensors to potential targets of interest. Persistent and responsive Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AISR) support is critical to the Joint Force Commander's ability to achieve mission objectives and to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and subordinate ground commanders' ability to execute their assigned missions across the full spectrum of operations.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In 2009, Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) determined that the Army lacked a persistent UAS SIGINT system capable of surveillance, reconnaissance, voice intercept, emitter mapping, and aerial precision geo-location. Furthermore, the HQDA Acquisition Strategy Report for the TSP Production and Deployment phase issued in 2014 by the TSP Project Manager, Project Manager Sensors-Aerial Intelligence (PM SAI), also stated that the Army lacked a persistent UAS SIGINT capability sufficient to provide the warfighter with increased situational awareness, direct threat indications and warnings, and accurate target locations. The PM SAI reported that TSP is a multi-payload platform (collection of modular, open architecture, layered technology solutions) that rapidly identifies potential threats and provides precision geo-location to the BCT.⁵

(U//~~FOUO~~) A 2010 JROC report stated that existing Army UAS SIGINT capability was limited to a single technology solution and that the AISR coverage provided tactical

⁴ (U) According to the Defense Acquisition University, Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) is the point in time where manufacturing development is completed and a small-quantity set of articles can be produced to provide for representation at Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). LRIP is conducted during the Production and Deployment (PD) Phase.

(U) IOT&E is conducted on production, or production-representative, articles to determine whether systems are operationally effective and suitable for intended use by representative users to support the decision to proceed beyond LRIP.

⁵ (U//~~FOUO~~) According to the PM SAI- SAI Aerial Intelligence SFAE-IEW-ARS report, "Acquisition Strategy Report for the Tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Payload (TSP) Program Production and Deployment (P&D) Phase," March 26, 2014. TSP's Modular Open architecture is a BAE systems design that is a combination of commercial off the shelf parts and system specific components (network of sensors that is connected through a common interface to the command, control, communications, and computer intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance network) that are interoperable and can talk to each other through "cross cueing of other intelligence collection systems."

forces with insufficient direct support, which inhibits or even prohibits completion of their assigned missions.⁶ Additionally, the existing UAS SIGINT capability did not have the endurance of Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS (MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS) conventional electronic warfare support, with the same accuracy of aerial precision geo-location and the flexibility and agility of a multi-payload platform.

(U//~~FOUO~~) According to a 2010 Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) report, ISR gaps can impact Army tactical commanders by reducing their overall situational awareness, limiting their access to the information and intelligence needed to make informed decisions, and preventing coordinated, in-depth operations across their areas of operation.

(U) TSP Program Design

(U//~~FOUO~~) The TSP system consists of an Airborne TSP pod and a Ground Workstation that includes the software and hardware for control of the SIGINT payload and processing of SIGINT data. Specifically, the TSP uses a modular, open architecture design for software to automatically detect, collect, identify, direction-find, copy, and geo-locate radio frequency emitters by intercepting SIGINT signals.

(U//~~FOUO~~) According to HQDA development documents, the Army planned for TSP to be mounted on the MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS between FY 2013 and 2025, to mitigate the persistent UAS SIGINT capability gaps.⁷ Additionally, HDQA reported that the Army chose to mount the TSP on the MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS platform due to its ability to provide capabilities that are unattainable by current systems. Specifically, the MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS' greater range capabilities and endurance, payload selection and capability, and targeting accuracy will more efficiently support the Joint Force, Corps, and Division UAS mission requirements.

(U) TSP Program Capabilities

(U//~~FOUO~~) INSCOM: (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

⁶ (U//~~FOUO~~) JROC report, "Initial Capabilities document for Joint Direct-Support Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance," September 9, 2010, reported that HQDA identified and validated the AISR capability gaps through numerous user needs statements, other Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) documents, various AISR studies, and HQDA guidance.

(U) The JROC's mission is to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in assessing joint military capabilities, and identifying, approving, and prioritizing gaps in those capabilities to meet applicable requirements in the National Defense Strategy; and reviewing and validating whether a capability proposed by an Armed Force, Defense Agency, or other entity of the DoD fulfills a gap in joint military capabilities.

⁷ (U//~~FOUO~~) HDQA appendix, "Appendix I (Tactical SIGINT Payload (TSP)) to the Capability Production Document for the Extended Range Multi-Purpose (ERMP) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) MQ-1C," January 3, 2013.

INSCOM: (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

.8

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Joint Direct-Support AISR ICD stated that the TSP capabilities were aligned with the required intelligence capabilities described in the ICD. Specifically, the ICD stated that the TSP was designed and produced to address the following intelligence capability gaps.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Situational awareness over wide geographic areas.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Sustained situational awareness over geographic areas.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.7(e) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)
[REDACTED]
- (U) A dynamic, flexible, and timely capability to assist commanders in the employment of their forces.

⁸ (U//~~FOUO~~) TSP Appendix I to the Extended Range Multi-Purpose (ERMP) UAS CPD, Increment 1 (approved March 24, 2009; JROCM 051-09 approved by HQDA on January 3, 2013) provides details of TSP performance capabilities and characteristics.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At a minimum, TSP is intended to perform the nine functions identified in Table 1.

Table is Classified: TS//SI//REF

(U) Table 1 TSP Functions

(U) Function	(U) Functional Description
1	DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)
2	
3	
4	Emitter Mapping: Automatic display of locations of all prosecuted emitters with ability to sort signals based on identification, location, and time.
5	Coarse (non-precision) geolocation of signals derived from direction finding from single TSP-equipped aircraft.
6	Audio recording and forwarding.
7	Co-frequency interference
8	DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)
9	Co-operative geolocation with other SIGINT assets through Theater Net-Centric Geolocation (TNG).

(U) Source: U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command Tactical SIGINT Payload Capabilities and Limitations Report, January 12, 2018.

(U) TSP Program Development

(U//~~FOUO~~) In August 2010, HQDA G-3 (Operations)/5 (Plans)/7 (Training) initiated the current TSP program and required the Program Executive Office-Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors (PEO IEW&S) to re-initiate Milestone B for the TSP on the MQ1-C Gray Eagle UAS.⁹

(U//~~FOUO~~) On September 28, 2011, the Army awarded BAE Systems the contract for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of the TSP.¹⁰ The HQDA Acquisition Strategy Report stated that the primary objective during the EMD phase was to integrate the TSP airborne components into a pod, deliver the articles for testing,

⁹ (U//~~FOUO~~) HQDA G-3/5/7 memorandum, "Tactical Signals Intelligence Payload Capability for the Extended Range Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) Unmanned Aircraft System," August 25, 2010.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Department of the Army Pamphlet 70-3, Research, Development, and Acquisition, "Army Acquisition Procedures," defines a milestone as the decision point that separates the phases of an acquisition program. Milestones include the decisions to authorize entry into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase. Milestone B is a Milestone Decision Authority-led review at the end of the Technology Maturation & Risk Reduction Phase in the Defense Acquisition Process. Its purpose is to make a recommendation or seek approval to enter the Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase. Milestone B is considered the official start of a program.

¹⁰ (U//~~FOUO~~) Defense Acquisition University defines EMD phase as a system that is developed and designed before going into production. The EMD Phases starts after a successful Milestone B, which is considered the formal start of any program.

and develop interface control documents to support integration of TSP into the MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS and the Distributed Common Ground System-Army.¹¹

(U) Key Organizational Responsibilities for TSP Program

(U//~~FOUO~~) There are several Army organizations that have responsibilities for portions of the TSP program. The HQDA Acquisition Strategy Report states that TSP is an Acquisition Category III program (which does not meet the threshold of a major defense acquisition program, or a major system), managed within PM SAI, and which reports directly to the Program Executive Officer for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors (PEO IEW&S). PEO IEW&S is the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), the sole entity authorized to approve the program's entry into each acquisition phase. Other entities with responsibilities for TSP acquisition include:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager (TCM), Intelligence Sensors – provides the conduit to other U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command proponents, ensuring that the stakeholders are fully informed on all aspects of the TSP program
- (U//~~FOUO~~) TCM UAS – ensures TSP is fully compatible issues with the Grey Eagle UAS
- (U//~~FOUO~~) TCM Sensor Processing – ensures that TSP compatibility issues with the Distributed Common Ground System- Army are addressed or mitigated
- (U//~~FOUO~~) U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) – is responsible for managing the overall operational evaluation of the system
- (U//~~FOUO~~) HQDA G-2 (Intelligence Requirement Equities), G-6 (Communications Equities), and G-8 (Financial Equities)
- (U//~~FOUO~~) U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) – provides exploratory assessment and preliminary evaluation of the TSP to inform a fielding/deployment decision.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.7(e) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) In addition, the TSP General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) is composed of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 (TSP GOSC Chair) and G-8/Force Development. The purpose of the TSP GOSC is to provide TSP stakeholders with updates on the status of TSP and provide recommendations for program decisions. The GOSC convenes after TSP tests and assessments are completed to review test results and operational requirements and provide guidance for the path forward for TSP. The GOSC also meets to address DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.7(e) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [REDACTED]

¹¹ (U) HQDA defines the Distributed Common Ground System-Army as a system of systems (network of systems) that connects soldiers to the Intelligence Community, other Services, multiple joint ISR platforms and sensors, and Army Mission Command Systems. The Distributed Common Ground System-Army gives commanders the ability to view ISR information in one place and integrates that information into tools that can support intelligence development.

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~

and the Army's operational Processing Exploitation Dissemination network structure modifications.

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~

Finding

(U) The Army's Tactical Signals Intelligence Payload Did Not Meet the Army's Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Signals Intelligence Requirements

(U//~~FOUO~~) We determined that the TSP does not meet the Army's aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (AISR) signals intelligence (SIGINT) requirements. Specifically, as of January 2020, the Army has not completed an initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) required by section 2399, title 10, United States Code and the DoD systems acquisition process for UAS TSP. The IOT&E, originally scheduled for FY 2016, would allow the MDA to determine whether the TSP program meets operational requirements to progress into full rate production.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Army did not complete IOT&E for two reasons. First, the TSP program experienced two major program restructurings in 2012 and 2017. Additionally, to date, the Army PM SAI directed 10 assessments and tests, which were conducted by three separate agencies, on the TSP program. However, the Army PM SAI did not establish assessment criteria and each agency based its assessment on different criteria, which resulted in contradictory findings. Each of the assessments revealed developmental and operational deficiencies, as well as performance problems with the UAS TSP, prompting a second major restructuring in 2017. However, the 2017 restructure did not address or mitigate the developmental and operational test deficiencies identified by the three assessing agencies.

(S//~~NF~~) INSCOM: (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]. In July 2019, the Army GOSC for TSP began a review of the TSP program to determine its future; however, as of January 2020, the GOSC had not made any determination.

(S//~~SI//NF~~) As a result of not meeting the AISR requirements since 2007, the Army has spent \$267.7 million developing the TSP but still does not have MQ-1C operational. DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) 12 As a result, Army commanders at the tactical level DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [REDACTED]

¹² (U) Funding for RDT&E began in 2007, prior to the official start of the program. The program started at Milestone B.

(U) The Army's TSP Did Not Meet Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Requirements

(S//NF) The Army's TSP still does not meet the Army's AISR SIGINT requirements. Specifically, as of January 2020, the TSP has not met the requirements for a system that provides tactical commanders with a comprehensive picture of electronic communication emitters and the ability to detect, identify, geo-locate, and copy emitters.

(S//NF) The full rate production of the TSP was scheduled for the third quarter of FY 2016, and deployment to select Army units was scheduled in FY 2017. However, in order to proceed to the next phase of acquisition, full rate production, the TSP must pass the IOT&E. As of January 2020, the Army has not completed the IOT&E, which would allow the MDA to determine whether the program met intended operational requirements and should continue to full rate production.

(U//FOUO) According to the TSP acquisition strategy, the IOT&E was scheduled for the first quarter of FY 2016. We determined, through interviews and analysis of documentation, that two main factors prevented the IOT&E from happening:

- (U//FOUO) the TSP program has undergone multiple restructures since 2012; and
- (S//NF) ATEC, INSCOM, and DoD OIG: (b)(1)
1.4(p) and (b)(3) SO
100.202401 have conducted multiple assessments and tests, with differing criteria.

(U) The Army's TSP Program Has Been Restructured Multiple Times

(U//FOUO) The Army did not complete IOT&E in part because the TSP program experienced two major program restructurings in 2012 and 2017. In 2012, the TSP acquisition strategy was restructured as a result of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, the Army decreased the TSP budget by \$14.1 million. The restructure changed the acquisition strategy to the DoD-wide acquisition approach. According to a 2002 DoD acquisition brief, the legacy acquisition approach used since 1996 took too long, cost too much, and was found to be incompatible with modern technology cycles. According to the TSP Acquisition Strategy, the new acquisition approach would enable early fielding of a TSP capability and reduce fielding timelines; however, the full rate production would be moved from FY 2015 to FY 2016.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In addition, due to the multiple deficiencies found during tests and assessments through 2016, the MDA issued a memorandum in January 2017 directing another program restructure to correct software deficiencies and address technical performance problems. According to the test and evaluation master plan, the IOT&E was subsequently delayed until FY 2019. The MDA further stated that the HQDA G-3/5/7 and the Joint Staff were notified that the TSP program would not be able to fulfill its accelerated resource management decision fielding requirements. The MDA also stated that the TSP would not progress into full rate production, pending an Army Requirements Oversight Committee decision to do so or to pursue a new solution by reviewing, reprioritizing, and re-defining future TSP requirements.

(U) Three Organizations Conducted Separate Tests and Assessments Using Different Grading Criteria

(TS//SI//NF) DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i); INSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) These differences in testing occurred because the Test and Evaluation Working-Level Integrated Product Team's Test and Evaluation Master Plan did not specifically state what each organization was required to test. The separate tests and assessments that graded against different criteria led to contradicting findings and test results. Consequently, the TSP failed to progress into IOT&E.

(U) Table 2 illustrates the event list of the different organizations that tested the TSP, the different testing criteria, and the contradictory findings between the organizations.

Table is Classified: ~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~

(U) Table .2 TSP Assessments and Tests, Criteria, and Findings

Classification	Test	Testing Org	Date	Testing Criteria	Findings
U// FOUO	PQT-1	ATEC	Jan 2015	Effectiveness, Suitability, Survivability	Effectiveness - partially effective Suitability- not suitable Survivability - unknown
U// FOUO	PQT-2	ATEC	Jan 2016	Effectiveness, Suitability, Survivability	Effectiveness - partially effective Suitability - not suitable Survivability-unknown
TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN	DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)				
U// FOUO	Development Test	ATEC	Jun 2017	Effectiveness, Suitability, Survivability	Not effective nor suitable for deployment Survivability - good against cyber, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive
U// FOUO	Limited User Test	ATEC	Jun 2017	Effectiveness, Suitability, Survivability	Not effective nor suitable for deployment Survivability - good against cyber, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive
U// FOUO	User Test (Ft. Hood/Ft. Gordon)	INSCOM	NOV 2017	INSCOM (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)	E - partially successful R - successful I - successful
TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN	DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)				
U// FOUO	SOC PAC Assessment	INSCOM	Apr 2019	INSCOM (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)	E - partially successful R - successful I - successful
U// FOUO	AFRICOM Assessment	INSCOM	Aug 2019	INSCOM (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)	E - partially successful R - partially successful I - successful
U// FOUO	CENTCOM Assessment	INSCOM	Nov 2019	INSCOM (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)	Awaiting conclusion of test in Dec 2019

(U) Source: DoD OIG

(U) ATEC Production Qualification Tests 1 and 2 found the TSP to Be Partially Effective and Not Suitable for Deployment

(TS//SI//NF)

DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i); INSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

(U) ATEC Developmental Test and Limited User Test Found the TSP to Be Not Effective Nor Suitable With Good Survivability Against Cyber and CBRNE

(U//~~FOUO~~) According to the November 2017, Operational Test Agency Assessment Report for the TSP, test results from the June 2017 Developmental Test/Limited User Test indicated that the TSP is neither effective nor suitable for operational employment. However, the TSP was found to be survivable against cyber, electro-magnetic environmental effects, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. The survivability finding was an improvement since the two PQTs conducted in 2015 and 2016.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Developmental Test/Limited User Test complemented the previous two PQTs, which were both conducted by ATEC. Although the test noted improvements to survivability, ATEC recommended that the Army not conduct an urgent materiel release for the product. ATEC also recommended that the existing acquisition strategy

³³ (U) Operational Test Agency Assessment Report (OAR) for the Tactical Signals Intelligence Payload, "Operational Assessment Top-level Summary," August, 31, 2016.

(TS//SI//NF) Mission Modes (MM): DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

[REDACTED]

³⁴ (U) OAR, "Operational Assessment Top-level Summary," August, 31, 2016.

DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.7(e) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

¹⁶ However, this conclusion contradicted the finding from the

DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c)
and (b)(3) 50 USC
3024(i)

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) INSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

"17

~~Copyright 2012 Pearson Education, Inc. or its affiliate(s). All rights reserved.~~

INSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) INSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [REDACTED]

(U) The Overall Test Results for the TSP Did Not Satisfy Operational Requirements

(U//FOUO) DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.7(e) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i); INSCOM (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) INSCOM (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) [REDACTED]

DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.7(e) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i); INSCOM (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

(U) The Army's TSP Program Procurement Was Halted and Funding Was Repurposed in 2017

(S//NF) INSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//NF) According to Army G-8, Force Development, Intelligence Directorate personnel, the G-8 officially stopped funding the TSP because PEO IEW&S did not have any plans to correct, upgrade, or amend the TSP equipment. In addition, G-8 Force Development, Intelligence Directorate personnel told us that, although the requirement for SIGINT support to UAS remained, the Army did not plan how to fulfill those requirements. Furthermore, the Army had competing priorities and did not have a pressing need for the program at that time. The G-8 personnel stated that the G-8 would not fund the program unless directed to as a result of the Army General Officer Committee (GOSC) TSP review.

In July 2019, the GOSC for TSP reviewed the program; however, as of January 2020, the GOSC had not made a determination about the future of the TSP program. *Therefore, the TSP GOSC should make a determination to re-establish the TSP as a program of record, transition TSP to a quick reaction capability, or terminate the program altogether. (Recommendation 2)*

(S//NF) The Army Spent \$267.7 Million on TSP Program That Cannot

DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

(S//NF) As a result, since 2007 the Army has spent \$267.7 million developing the TSP and the Army still does not have an MQ-1C operational. DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i). According to

the Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Direct-Support Airborne ISR, the Army should have a capability that provides the warfighter with increased situational awareness, direct threat indications and warnings, and accurate target locations using an architecture payload that rapidly identifies potential threats and provides precision geo-location to the BCT. DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.4(c) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1

~~(S//NF)~~ We recommend that the Army Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager, Aerial, update and revalidate the requirement for a U.S. Army aerial Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Signals Intelligence capability.

(U) Army Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager, Aerial, Comments

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Director of the Intelligence Capabilities, Development, and Integration Directorate, Futures and Concepts Center, responding for the Army Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager, Aerial, agreed with our recommendation and stated that it has already begun updating and revalidating the requirements for the U.S. Army's aerial ISR. Specifically, the Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager, Aerial, was rebranded as the Army Capability Manager Intelligence Sensors in August 2020. The Director stated the Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager, Aerial, and the Army Capability Manager, Intelligence Sensors have worked collaboratively since 2016, with the community of interest, led by the Department of the Army G2 ISR Task Force, to develop an aerial strategy focused on addressing the Army's biggest capability gap, Deep Sensing in Multi Domain Operations. The Director stated that this effort resulted in the Multi Domain Sensing System, the Army intelligence modernization priority dedicated to aerial ISR. The TSP program yielded some relevant lessons learned that were applied to the future strategy; however, TSP is not a component of the Multi Domain Sensing System. The TSP's program requirements were designed to support Counterinsurgency operations. Multi Domain Sensing System is a family of systems approach designed to support Multi Domain Operations.

(U//~~FOUO~~) According to the Director, future Multi Domain Sensing System components may potentially include various sensor-platform pairings that can collect and cross-cue from low earth orbit to low altitude. The aerial ISR fleet of 2035 will include a to-be-

determined mix of manned and unmanned capabilities. The Army Capability Manager, Intelligence Sensors developed draft requirements for several potential systems to collect SIGINT and Geospatial Intelligence. In addition, according to the Director, on August 17, 2020, the Army Futures Command approved a High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System Accelerated Capability Development Document and initiated a framing analysis by the Research and Analysis Center–Leavenworth to further refine the draft requirements for this effort. This analysis is to be completed by May 15, 2021.

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-2 Comments

(U) Although not required to respond to this recommendation, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-2, agreed with the recommendation to have Army Capability Manager, Aerial, modernize Army's SIGINT requirements documents.

(U) Dar Response

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Director of the Intelligence Capabilities, Development, and Integration Directorate, Futures and Concepts Center comments addressed all specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we receive the updated and revalidated SIGINT requirements.

Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the General Officer Steering Committee Chair for the Tactical Signals Intelligence Payload review and determine whether to re-establish the Tactical Signals Intelligence Payload as a program of record, transition the program to a quick reaction capability, or terminate the program.

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-2 Comments

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-2, responding for the GOSC for the Tactical Signals Intelligence Payload, agreed with our recommendation, stating that the Army G-2 directed the GOSC chair to terminate the program of record and transition the program to a quick reaction capability. According to the Deputy Chief of Staff, on May 15, 2020, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology, Deputy for Acquisition and System Management, issued a TSP program termination initiation memorandum that directed the Army to prepare and submit a program termination plan for the Army Acquisition Executive's approval. In addition, the Army G-8 Deputy, Force Development, Intelligence is in the process of developing quick reaction capabilities disposition instructions of TSP in support of a validated operational needs statement.

(U) Our Response

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-2 comments addressed all specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation when we receive the approved TSP program termination plan and the quick reaction capabilities disposition instructions.

Appendix A

Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from May 2019 through March 2020 in accordance with "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.


(U//~~FOUO~~) To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed the following applicable directives, regulations, instructions, and policies to determine relevant guidance for TSP development and deployment.

- (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5123.01H, "Charter of Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)," August 31, 2018
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Research, Development, and Acquisition, Department of the Army Pamphlet 70-3, "Army Acquisition Procedures," September 17, 2018
- (U) Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence," October 22, 2013
- (U) DoD OIG: (b)(1) 1.7(e) and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)
[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) INSCOM (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) We requested and collected data call information about TSP requirements, program design and development, capabilities, governance, tests, evaluations and assessments, and future plans from TSP Army representatives to determine if any gaps exist in TSP system development and deployment. We reviewed and analyzed TSP capabilities and strategy data defined in the following reports developed to comply with JROC requirements.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) JROC, "Initial Capabilities document for Joint Direct-Support Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance," September 9, 2010
- (U//~~FOUO~~) HDQA appendix, "Appendix I (Tactical SIGINT Payload [TSP] to the Capability Production Document for the Extended Range Multi-Purpose (ERMP) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) MQ-1C," January 3, 2013
- (U//~~FOUO~~) PM SAI Aerial Intelligence SFAE-IEW-ARS report, "Acquisition Strategy Report for the Tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Payload (TSP) Program Production and Deployment (P&D) Phase," March 26, 2014

(U//~~FOUO~~) Additionally, we reviewed and analyzed ATEC test, PM SAI assessment and  test documents to identify assessment and test the findings and recommendations to determine TSP's ability to meet Army SIGINT requirements. We did not visit any TSP test or assessment sites. We did not examine financial reporting assessments.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

Use of Technical Assistance

(U) We did not require technical assistance to perform this evaluation.

Prior Coverage

(U) TSP prior coverage included:

(U//~~FOUO~~) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, "Department of Defense Report to Congress on Future Unmanned Aircraft Systems Training, Operations, and Sustainability," April 2012. This report outlined planned force capability growth and forecasted attrition of UAS aircraft through 2017. Within the report, the Military Departments provided their planned inventories, personnel requirements to operate and maintain the systems, planned bases and operating locations, and progress with facilities to support those inventories.

(U//~~FOUO~~) U.S. Government Accountability Office Report to the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, "Defense Acquisitions, DoD Efforts to Adopt Open Systems for Its Unmanned Aircraft Systems Have Progressed Slowly," July 2013. This report examined the DoD's progress in implementing an open systems approach for UAS acquisitions. The open systems approach allows modular design and standard interfaces that allow components of a product to be replaced easily. The report found that, until the DoD ensures that the Services are incorporating an open systems approach from the start of development and programs have the requisite open systems expertise, the DoD will continue to miss opportunities to increase the affordability of its acquisition programs.

Management Comments

(U) Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager, Aerial



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FUTURES COMMAND
FUTURES & CONCEPTS CENTER
INTELLIGENCE - CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT & INTEGRATION DIRECTORATE
550 CIBOLA STREET
FORT HUACHUCA, ARIZONA 85613

REF ID: A77777

FCFC-CI

31 August 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Inspector General, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22350-1500

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) Evaluation of the Army's Tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Payload (TSP) Program

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence concurs with Recommendation #1 of the DoD IG evaluation of the Army's TSP program to update and revalidate the Army's aerial Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) SIGINT requirements. This effort is already well underway.
2. (U//~~FOUO~~) The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capability Manager Aerial (TCM Aerial) rebranded as the Army Capability Manager Intelligence Sensors (ACM IS) in August 2020. TCM Aerial and ACM IS have worked collaboratively since 2016, with the community of interest, led by the Department of the Army (DA) G2 ISR Task Force, to develop an aerial strategy focused on addressing the Army's #1 Capability Gap, Deep Sensing in Multi Domain Operations (MDO). This effort resulted in the Multi Domain Sensing System (MDSS), the Army intelligence modernization priority dedicated to aerial ISR. TSP yielded some relevant lessons learned that were applied to the future strategy, however TSP is not a component of MDSS. TSP's requirements were designed to support Counterinsurgency. MDSS is a Family of Systems approach designed to support MDO.
3. (U//~~FOUO~~) MDSS Family of Systems. Future components may potentially include various sensor-platform pairings that can collect and cross-cue from low earth orbit to low altitude. The aerial ISR fleet of 2035 will include a to-be-determined mix of manned and unmanned capabilities. ACM IS has developed draft requirements for several potential systems to collect Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT).
4. (U//~~FOUO~~) MDSS priorities. The first priority of MDSS development is the High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System (HADES), which will collect at a range of approximately 300km. It is not yet determined whether HADES will be manned or unmanned. The next priority of effort will be MDSS-1000, high altitude collection systems which will fly from 60,000 - 100,000 foot altitude.
5. (U) Key milestones achieved to date in updating Army Aerial ISR requirements:

(U) Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager, Aerial (cont'd)

FCFC-CI

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) Evaluation of the Army's Tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Payload (TSP) Program

- a. (U//~~FOUO~~) 24 February 2020. Multi Domain Sensing System Initial Capability Document (MDSS ICD) approved by GEN Murray, Army Futures Command.
- b. (U//~~FOUO~~) 17 August 2020. High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System Accelerated Capability Development Document (HADES A-CDD) approved by GEN Murray, Army Futures Command.
- c. (U//~~FOUO~~) 17 August 2020. HADES Framing Analysis initiated by The Research and Analysis Center (TRAC) - Leavenworth to further refine the draft requirements in the HADES A-CDD, to be completed by 15 May 2021.
- d. (U//~~FOUO~~) 1 July 2020. A year-long HADES campaign of learning began to help refine the A-CDD requirements. This includes demonstrations with an industry prototype in INDOPACOM and EUCOM, joint learning opportunities, Soldier touchpoints in various exercises, and a sensor evaluation hosted by the Program Executive Office Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors (PEO IEW&S).

6. (U) Point of contact is ~~DoD OIG: (b)(6)~~
~~DoD OIG: (b)(6)~~ @mail.mil, ~~DoD OIG: (b)(6)~~ office, ~~DoD OIG: (b)(6)~~
cell.

2 Encls
MDSS ICD Approval Memo
HADES A-CDD Approval Email

FOX ROY WALT
ER, ~~DoD OIG: (b)(6)~~ Digitally signed by
FOX ROY WALT, DN: ~~DoD OIG: (b)(6)~~
Date: 2020.08.17 09:49:00 -0400

ROY W. FOX
Director, Intelligence - Capabilities
Development and Integration Directorate
Futures and Concepts Center, USAFC

(U) Chairman, General Officer Steering Committee for
TSP, Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-2

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



DAMI-ZGP

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
1033 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL, 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE, SUITE 15G27 ALEXANDRIA, VA 22350-
1500

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Response to Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector
General, Draft Report for the Evaluation of the Army's Tactical Signals Intelligence
Payload Program (Project No. D2019-DISPA-0141.000)

1. (U) References.

a. (U) Memorandum, Program Executive Officer Intelligence, Electronic Warfare
and Sensors, 4 April 2020, subject: Recommend Termination of Tactical Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) Payload (TSP) Program.

b. (U) Memorandum, Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army, 15 May 2020, subject: Tactical Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) Payload (TSP) Program Termination.

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) This memorandum serves as Department of the Army, G-2's response
to the Department of Defense (DoD), Inspector General (IG), Draft Report for the
Evaluation of the Army's Tactical Signals Intelligence Payload (TSP) Program (Project
No. D2019-DISPA-0141.000) recommendations #1 and recommendation #2:

a. (U) I concur with recommendation #1 of the DoD IG evaluation of the Army's
Tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Payload (TSP) Program to have Army Capability
Manager (ACM)-Aerist modernize Army's SIGINT requirements documents.

b. (U) I concur with recommendation #2 of the DoD IG evaluation of the Army's
TSP program to have the General Officer Steering Committee chair for the TSP
terminate program of record and transition program to a quick reaction capability
(QRC).

3. (U) Steps we have taken to comply with DoDIG recommendations:

(U//~~FOUO~~) The ACM-Aerist will modernize the Army's aerist SIGINT
requirements to focus on Multi-Domain Operations.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(U) Chairman, General Officer Steering Committee for
TSP, Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-2 (cont)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

DAM:ZGP

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Response to Department of Defense Office of the Inspector
Draft Report for the Evaluation of the Army's Tactical Signals
Intelligence Payload Program (Project No. D2019-DISPA-0141.000)

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) The ACM-Aerial will place these requirements into the Multi-Domain
Sensing System family of systems to include manned, unmanned, and high altitude
Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance systems.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Program Executive Officer for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and
Sensors initiated program termination memorandum to the Army acquisition executive
via 25 February 2020.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 6 March 2020, the Deputy Chief of Staff G-2 directed the
transition of TSP material solution to a QRC to support operational requirements
against Signals of Interest where the Sensor has proven effective.

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 15 May 2020, the Deputy for Acquisition and System
Management issued a TSP program termination initiation memorandum. The Army is
directed to prepare and submit a program termination plan for the Army Acquisition
Executive's approval.

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) The Army G-8 force development intelligence is in the process of
developing A-KI disposition instructions of TSP in support of validated operational
needs statement.

g. (U//~~FOUO~~) Army Staff (G-2 and G-8) will champion efforts to identify Overseas
Contingency Operations funding to support specified limited mission mode TSP
operational deployments. Army Staff will additionally lead coordination efforts to
prepare and submit procurement appropriations funding to support A-KI purchases for
selected range MQ-1C.

4. (U//~~FOUO~~) The points of contact for this memorandum are DoD OIG: (b)(6) available at
DoD OIG: (b)(6) or DoD OIG: (b)(6) @mail.mil and DoD OIG: (b)(6) available
at DoD OIG: (b)(6) or DoD OIG: (b)(6) @mail.mil.



SCOTT D. BERRIER
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AISR	Army Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ATEC	U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command
DTM	Directive Type Memorandum
EMD	Engineering and Manufacturing Development
HQDA	Headquarters Department of the Army
GEOINT	Geospatial Intelligence
GOSC	General Officer Steering Committee
GSM	Global System for Mobile Communications
ICD	Initial Capabilities Document
INSCOM	Army Intelligence and Security Command
IOT&E	Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JDSA	Joint Direct Support AISR
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
LRIP	Low Rate Initial Production
MDA	Milestone Decision Authority
MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS	Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS
NGA	National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
OTT	Operational Tradecraft and Training
PM SAI	Project Manager Sensors-Aerial Intelligence
PED	Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination
PEO IEW&S	Program Executive Office—Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
TSP	Tactical SIGINT Payload
TEMP	Test and Evaluation Master Plan
UAS	Unmanned Aerial System
USD(I)	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Whistleblower Protection

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Whistleblower Protection safeguards DoD employees against retaliation for protected disclosures that expose possible waste, fraud, and abuse in government programs. For more information, please visit the Whistleblower webpage at <http://www.dodig.mil/Components/Administrative-Investigations/Whistleblower-Reprisal-Investigations/Whistleblower-Reprisal/> or contact the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator at Whistleblowerprotectioncoordinator@dodig.mil

**For more information about DoD OIG
reports or activities, please contact us:**

Congressional Liaison

703.604.8324

Media Contact

public.affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

DoD OIG Mailing Lists

www.dodig.mil/Mailing-Lists/

Twitter

www.twitter.com/DoD_IG

DoD Hotline

www.dodig.mil/hotline

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE | OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22350-1500
www.dodig.mil
DoD Hotline 1.800.424.9098

~~TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN~~