

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS



OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE

**INCLUDING U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO
UKRAINE**



OCTOBER 1, 2024–DECEMBER 31, 2024



On the cover: A U.S. Army Soldier drives a Bradley Fighting Vehicle off a ship to be logged into a system at a checkpoint at the port of Setúbal, Portugal, in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. (DoD photo)



We are pleased to present this Special Inspector General report to Congress on Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR). This report discharges our quarterly reporting responsibilities pursuant to Section 1250B of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2024 and Lead IG reporting responsibilities under 5 U.S.C. 419.

Section 1250B states that no later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal quarter, the Special Inspector General for OAR shall submit to Congress a report summarizing U.S. funding, programs, and operations for Ukraine with respect to that quarter.

This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the DoD, State, and USAID Offices of Inspector General, as well as the other U.S. oversight agencies that coordinate their activities through the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group.

This report addresses the following topics specified in Section 1250B:

- USEUCOM operations and related support for the U.S. military: pages 30-32, 38-39, 40-48, 90
- Security assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war: pages 40-55
- Economic assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war: pages 33-34, 67-69
- Humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war: pages 78-84
- Operations of other relevant U.S. Government agencies involved in the Ukraine response: pages 55-57, 90-91
- Description of any waste, fraud, or abuse identified by the OIGs: pages 96-104
- Status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits: pages 96-104, 112-114
- Status and results of referrals to the Department of Justice: pages 112-114
- A description of the overall plans for review by the OIGs of such support of Ukraine, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits: pages 105-111


This report covers the period October 1–December 31, 2024. In January 2025, the President issued an Executive Order on Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid. In response, the Secretary of State subsequently paused most U.S. foreign assistance funded by or through State and USAID for review.

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A U.S. Marine prepares a makeshift Bangalore torpedo at a demolition range in support of exercise Freezing Winds 24 in Syndalen, Finland. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)

CONTENTS

OCTOBER 1, 2024–DECEMBER 31, 2024

3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

9 STATUS OF THE WAR

- 10 Security
- 18 Regional Politics and Economics
- 19 Diplomacy

23 STATUS OF FUNDS

- 24 U.S. Government Overview
- 30 Funding for Security Assistance
- 33 Direct Budget Support
- 34 Loans

37 SECURITY ASSISTANCE

- 40 Ukrainian Armed Forces
- 49 Ukrainian Civilian Security Sector

59 DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

- 60 Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance
- 67 Economic Growth
- 70 Health Assistance
- 74 Monitoring and Evaluation

77 HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

- 79 Inside Ukraine
- 82 Outside Ukraine

87 MESSAGING AND MEDIA

- 88 Information Environment
- 88 Messaging
- 90 Global Media

93 APPENDIXES





U.S. Army Soldiers fire a rocket during a live fire exercise near Tapa, Estonia. High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) can fire both Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles. (U.S. Army photo)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since February 2022, Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$182.75 billion for OAR and the broader Ukraine response, of which \$39.58 billion remained available for obligation.¹ Most of the available funds are for the replenishment of DoD stocks, USEUCOM and the European Deterrence Initiative, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.² During the quarter, the United States disbursed a \$20 billion loan to the World Bank for the benefit of Ukraine, part of a \$50 billion loan package by G7 countries, to be repaid by future proceeds of immobilized Russian sovereign assets.³ Most of these loans will provide budgetary support for Ukrainian energy, healthcare, essential services, and economic reconstruction.⁴

As the war in Ukraine passed its 1,000th day, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) suffered one of their greatest periods of territorial loss since the full-scale invasion began.⁵ Russian forces took more than 2,500 square miles of territory in 2024, with more than half of those gains made in September, October, and November.⁶ Russian forces reclaimed 40 percent of the territory initially seized by Ukraine in Russia's Kursk region in August 2024.⁷ Ukrainian officials cited manpower and equipment shortages as key drivers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' (UAF) challenges in defending against Russia's larger and more heavily equipped military.⁸

In November, Western governments authorized the use of donated medium- and long-range munitions to strike targets inside Russia, including the U.S.-provided Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).⁹ Additionally, the DoD announced it would begin providing Ukraine with anti-personnel land mines.¹⁰ Ukraine first used the ATACMS to strike Russian military targets in Kursk on November 19. Russia proceeded to launch a conventionally armed intermediate-range ballistic missile into Ukraine on November 21.¹¹ Due to concerns about the escalatory strike, the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv ceased on-site operations for 1 day and instructed personnel to shelter in place.¹²



Russian attacks during the quarter targeted Ukrainian critical infrastructure, including substations connected to nuclear power plants.¹³ In addition, Russia continued a counter-offensive against the UAF in the Kursk region, bolstered by the arrival in October of up to 12,000 North Korean infantry and special operations troops.¹⁴ The DoD assessed that the North Korean forces have not been effective.¹⁵

Ukraine continued to struggle with official corruption at multiple levels. Ukraine's Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin resigned amid a corruption scandal in which he was not directly implicated.¹⁶ The scandal involved falsification of disability certificates, enabling officials to falsely obtain disability pensions and avoid conscription.¹⁷ The DoD, State, and USAID continued to work with Ukrainian ministries to implement anti-corruption programs, including reforms to defense procurement, medical examination certifications, and the State Customs Service.¹⁸

Russia attempted to influence the election in Moldova and was accused of interfering in the election in Romania. On November 3, Moldovan President Maia Sandu defeated a pro-Russian opponent, and the Moldovan people narrowly voted to join the European Union.¹⁹ Moldovan law enforcement and election observers claimed that Russia had attempted to buy votes and unlawfully use foreign money in the campaign to influence the result of the elections.²⁰ In December, Romania's Constitutional Court annulled the country's presidential election, alleging that Russia engaged in a sweeping campaign of cyberattacks and social media propaganda to promote a candidate previously known for pro-Russia and anti-NATO statements.²¹

Russia's continued aggression disrupted global agricultural markets. Within Ukraine, farming operations near the front line face significant challenges, including manpower shortages, demining needs, supply disruptions, and attacks on infrastructure. Despite those obstacles, Ukraine's agricultural sector exported more than 13 million metric tons of grains, oilseeds, and derivatives between October and mid-December.²²

U.S. Soldiers perform operator qualifications for the Medium Range Reconnaissance systems near Mihail Kogalniceanu Airbase, Romania. (U.S. Army photo)



Defenders of Ukraine are honored on October 1, 2024, by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. (President of Ukraine Flickr photo)

About OAR, the Ukraine Response, and Special IG Oversight

MISSION BACKGROUND

Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) is the Department of Defense (DoD) operation in the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility to deter Russia's aggression against NATO and to reassure and bolster the alliance in the wake of Russia's February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Under OAR, the United States provides security assistance to Ukraine and conducts other military activities to strengthen the collective security of European partners.

OAR began as a USEUCOM effort to provide rotational deployments of combat-credible forces to Europe in the wake of Russia's 2014 invasion of Crimea.²³ Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the OAR mission has evolved in line with U.S. policy objectives. The OAR strategic objectives emphasize the operation's NATO-wide activities.²⁴ (See Table 1.) The OAR mission statement is classified.

In addition to security assistance, the U.S. Government provided financial, material, and technical assistance to Ukrainian institutions and civil society.²⁵

ABOUT THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR OAR

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Section 419) established the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies are the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the DoD State, and USAID.

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About OAR, the Ukraine Response, and Special IG Oversight

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Table 1.

OAR Strategic Objectives

Support NATO and assure NATO allies in Eastern Europe of U.S. commitment to collective security.

- U.S. efforts support NATO-led activities in Eastern Europe.
- NATO allies in Eastern Europe are assured of U.S. commitments to collective defense.

Develop combined defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. and Eastern European NATO allies.

- U.S. and Eastern allies demonstrate interoperable military capabilities.

Russia is deterred from aggression against Eastern European NATO members.

- Russia perceives NATO as a credible alliance committed to the security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of its members.
- Russia perceives U.S. commitment to the NATO alliance and its mission to defend the security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of its members.
- Russia is dissuaded from taking offensive (overt or covert) actions against NATO member states.

Source: USEUCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.2 OAR 007, 4/3/2024.

On August 18, 2023, the DoD designated OAR as an overseas contingency operation, triggering Section 419. The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency selected the DoD IG to be the Lead IG for OAR, effective October 18, 2023. In turn, the DoD IG appointed the State IG as the Associate IG for OAR.

Section 1250B of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2024 re-designated the Lead IG for OAR as the Special Inspector General for OAR. The Lead IG agencies conduct oversight of the Ukraine response individually under their own authorities and collaboratively, to carry out the following whole-of-government responsibilities:

- Submitting to Congress, on a quarterly basis, a report on the contingency operation and making that report available to the public no later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal year quarter.
- Developing a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensuring independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations.



In March 2024, the Special Inspector General for OAR launched a website to promote transparency and accountability in the comprehensive, whole-of-government effort to oversee U.S. security, economic, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. UkraineOversight.gov is a centralized website that consolidates oversight work and reporting from the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs, as well as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and other oversight agencies.

COMPREHENSIVE OVERSIGHT

Since June 2022, oversight organizations from across the U.S. Government have coordinated their activities through the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group. The Working Group ensures open lines of communication and situational awareness across department and agency boundaries to ensure that all areas of the broader effort receive appropriate oversight coverage, and to avoid duplication of effort.

The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs have long-established field offices and personnel in Europe to support audits, evaluations, and investigations of activities related to OAR and the U.S. response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This pre-existing footprint in Europe means that the OIGs have deep familiarity with U.S. Government programs and activities in Europe, including past oversight work on assistance to Ukraine, and established connections with program personnel.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH NON-U.S. OVERSIGHT AGENCIES

The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs have signed memorandums of understanding (MoU) with their Ukrainian counterparts—such as the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), Main Inspectorate, and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO)—and other bilateral and multilateral organizations implementing programming in Ukraine. The MoUs formalize information sharing in support of criminal investigations and oversight work.

For DoD OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG personnel stationed in Washington, D.C., Kyiv, and elsewhere in Europe, those MoUs have helped increase cooperation between the two countries' complementary but structurally dissimilar oversight communities. OIG personnel routinely employ the MoUs as a mechanism for the exchange of information with their Ukrainian counterparts, including the Ministry of Defense Main Inspectorate and Ukrainian law enforcement agencies. The MoUs have resulted in regular meetings between OIG personnel and their Ukrainian partners, including law enforcement, to build relationships, quickly address inquiries and allegations, and work collaboratively to identify potential fraud, waste, and abuse.

The OIGs have also worked to leverage MoUs with international organizations and initiate regular information sharing processes that could be models for other international law enforcement relationships. This information sharing provides enhanced understanding of fraud risks with international oversight partners.

DETAILS ON OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY

Further details about completed, ongoing, and planned work by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs and partner agencies can be found in the following Appendixes.

- **Appendix C:** Final Reports by Lead IG Agencies
- **Appendix D:** Ongoing Oversight Projects
- **Appendix E:** Planned Oversight Projects
- **Appendix F:** Investigations





Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy addresses the UAF on Ukraine's Armed Forces Day, December 6, 2024. (President of Ukraine Flickr photo)

STATUS OF THE WAR

- 10 Security
- 18 Regional Politics and Economics
- 19 Diplomacy

STATUS OF THE WAR

On November 19, Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine marked its 1,000th day.²⁶ (See Table 2.) On November 26, the G7 foreign ministers reaffirmed that “support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence will remain unwavering.”²⁷

SECURITY

This quarter, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) suffered one of the greatest periods of territorial loss since the beginning of the conflict.²⁸ In 2024, Russian forces took more than 2,500 square miles, approximately 1 percent of Ukrainian territory and the Ukrainian-held Kursk region of Russia. Russian forces made more than half of these territorial gains between September and November, according to one analysis.²⁹ Russian advances slowed in December, although the significant increase in Ukrainian territorial losses in the latter portion of the year suggests a shift in momentum in favor of the Russian forces after nearly a year with only incremental movement in the front line in favor of either side.³⁰ (See pages 12-13.)

Russian military leaders prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk province and establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv, but they failed to accomplish those goals during the quarter, despite losses of approximately 400,000 killed and wounded troops, per Ukrainian reporting. The UAF has proven capable of slowing but not stopping incremental Russian advances in those priority sectors, as they continued to struggle with limited manning and Western supplies. According to State, the UAF has exacted a heavy price in Russian manpower and materiel for any territorial gains made.³¹

Table 2.

1,000 Days of War

- More than **43,000 Ukrainian soldiers killed** and **370,000 wounded** (according to Ukrainian government estimates, which are likely low)
- More than **12,300 civilians killed** and more than **27,800 wounded**
- **250 schools and hospitals** destroyed
- Thousands of **children forcibly deported** out of Ukraine
- More than **2,500 missiles and drones** fired into Kyiv
- Kyiv experienced nearly **1,400 air alerts**, which called for sheltering and other protective actions for more than **1,550 hours**

Sources: Veronika Melkozerova, “Kyiv Reveals Total Ukraine Casualties in Putin’s War for First Time,” Politico, 12/8/2024; USAID BHA Ukraine, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/23/2024; State, cable, “USOSCE: Permanent Council Statement on the Russian Federation’s Ongoing Aggression Against Ukraine,” 24 STATE 121704, 11/19/2024; Marc Santora, “U.S. Closes Its Kyiv Embassy, Warning of ‘Significant Air Attack,’” New York Times, 11/20/2024.



A group of Ukrainian soldiers stand in a trench, observed by Lithuanian trainers during a squad leadership course. (NATO photo)



Russia Retakes Territory in Kursk

After a surprise incursion into Russia's Kursk region in August, Ukraine has lost roughly 40 percent of the territory it initially seized due to manpower and equipment shortages, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).³² During the quarter, Ukraine continued to hold approximately 300 square miles of territory in Kursk, which it hopes to leverage in potential negotiations.³³

Though initially slow to respond, Russian forces accumulated more than 50,000 soldiers in Kursk, including up to 12,000 North Koreans, to support the effort to expel Ukrainian forces from the region.³⁴

Ukraine's Kursk incursion did not achieve its objective of stopping Russia's incremental advances along the Donetsk front in Ukraine, according to the DIA. On December 5, President Vladimir Putin appointed a new governor of Kursk after a group of Russian refugees staged a rare protest in early November, expressing their discontent with the Russian government's response to the Ukrainian incursion, according to the DIA.³⁵

UKRAINE CONFLICT TRENDS

During the quarter, the front line of the conflict remained mostly unchanged. According to data compiled by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, armed clashes increased, while artillery, shelling, and missile attacks decreased, and the number of drone attacks was unchanged.

LAND

Russian forces have **retaken a significant percentage of the land Ukraine occupied in Kursk**, while simultaneously achieving **incremental gains** along the front line in Ukraine's eastern provinces, including Donetsk.³⁶ The territory taken by Russia consists mostly of sparsely populated areas.³⁷

The Ukrainian government said it recorded more than 4,800 instances of Russian troops using **chemical weapons** on the battlefield. Some of these attacks used chloropicrin, a World War I-era poison gas, against Ukrainian troops.³⁸

AIR

Russian air strikes focused on targets far beyond the front line, including **hydroelectric and thermal power**

plants. The resulting loss of power generation capacity increased Ukrainians' reliance on nuclear power and portable generators to meet consumption needs.³⁹ New damage to Ukraine's electric power infrastructure in November exceeded damage observed in the prior 3 months.⁴⁰


Russia increasingly focused its attacks on **substations connected to nuclear power plants** in an apparent effort to collapse Ukraine's last major source of power generation capacity without directly striking the reactors.⁴¹ A November 28 strike damaged electricity transmission facilities linked to Ukraine's three remaining nuclear power plants, causing two of the plants to reduce output as a precautionary measure and increased the likelihood of Ukraine's grid fracturing.⁴²

The UAF **concentrated strategic air defense systems** to protect the critical infrastructure near larger Ukrainian cities and enhance the physical protection of vulnerable structures.⁴³


The UAF struck five **Russian energy infrastructure targets**, a decrease from the previous quarter. Those strikes damaged fuel storage tanks at three oil depots and resulted in damage at two refineries.⁴⁴

In early December, Russia completed repairs of a refinery struck by the UAF earlier this year and **resumed operations**. The Russian military implemented protective measures and positioned air defenses around energy infrastructure in response to those strikes.⁴⁵

Attacks by Quarter and Type, February 24, 2022–December 31, 2024



Location of Attacks during the Quarter, October 1, 2024–December 31, 2024



SEA

In early November, a Ukrainian unmanned aircraft system (UAS) attack struck a Russian **naval facility in Kaspisk**, on the Caspian Sea. The attack damaged up to two naval vessels.⁴⁶ UAF strikes on Russian maritime assets were greatly reduced after Russia **relocated its Black Sea Fleet** away from occupied Crimea to sovereign Russian territory last quarter. Russia uses its naval vessels in both the Black and Caspian Sea as platforms from which to launch missiles into Ukraine.⁴⁷

As a result of the repositioning, Russian naval assets were **unable to conduct amphibious assaults and close-range strikes**, but the repositioning has not affected the

Russian Navy's primary role in the conflict, serving as a platform to launch Kalibr cruise missiles against Ukrainian targets ashore.⁴⁸

ABROAD

On December 17, Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, the chief of Russia's nuclear, biological, and chemical protection forces, was **killed by a bomb hidden in a scooter outside his apartment building** in Moscow. Ukraine claimed responsibility for the attack, which took place one day after Ukraine's security service leveled criminal charges against Lt. Gen. Kirillov. The Russian general was under international sanctions for his alleged role in directing the use of banned chemical weapons in Ukraine.⁴⁹

20 percent

of Ukrainian territory lost to Russia, as of November 2024.⁵⁰

70 percent

of Ukraine's domestic energy production capacity destroyed by Russian strikes.⁵¹

4,800

instances of Russian troops using chemical weapons on the battlefield, according to the Ukrainian government.⁵²

North Korean Troops Engage the UAF in Kursk

Starting in mid-October, up to 12,000 North Korean military troops arrived in Russia to support the Russian military's counteroffensive against the UAF in Kursk. The North Korean units consisted mainly of infantry and special operations forces from North Korea's 11th Corps. The North Korean troops underwent a few weeks of training at various military bases in eastern Russia before deploying to Kursk, according to the DIA.⁵³

The 11th Corps includes some of North Korea's most highly trained troops, according to media reporting. Although the troops did not have any combat experience prior to arriving in Russia, they probably had considerably more training and motivation than the new Russian recruits being sent to the front line. According to media reporting, the North Korean troops—most of whom were experiencing life outside North Korea for the first time—were unlikely to defect or desert. In addition to concern for the welfare of their families back in North Korea, members of the 11th Corps are specifically selected for their high levels of political indoctrination and loyalty to the North Korean regime.⁵⁴

Most North Korean troops served alongside Russian units in defensive positions in Kursk, which allowed Russia to reassign its soldiers to conduct offensives along other parts of Kursk, according to the DIA.⁵⁵ However, in December, a National Security Council (NSC) spokesperson noted that some North Korean soldiers were engaged in active combat alongside Russian forces.⁵⁶ There is no evidence of North Koreans fighting in Ukraine, the DIA said.⁵⁷

The DoD assessed that North Korean troops have suffered more than 1,000 casualties in Kursk, and they have generally not proven effective.⁵⁸ An NSC spokesperson noted that there were reports of North Korean soldiers taking their own lives rather than surrendering to Ukrainian forces, likely out of fear of reprisal against their families in North Korea if they were captured.⁵⁹

According to the DIA, North Korea's strategic aims in Russia included enabling its troops to gain combat and military-technical experience and to deepen military cooperation with Russia.⁶⁰ Additionally, U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo told reporters that Russia will provide North Korea with MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter jets in return for sending soldiers.⁶¹ Russia may also provide North Korea with enhanced space launch technology. Officially, North Korea would use this technology to improve its satellite launch capability, but the same technology could also be used to develop North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile program.⁶²

On December 16, the White House announced new sanctions on nine North Korean individuals and seven entities, including banks and shipping companies, in response to North Korean soldiers joining the war in Ukraine. These entities were targeted for sanctions due to their support for North Korea's participation in Russia's war in Ukraine, as well as North Korea's continued ballistic missile testing, according to a White House spokesperson.⁶³

The DoD assessed that North Korean troops have suffered more than 1,000 casualties in Kursk, and they have generally not proven effective.

On November 19, Ukraine conducted the first long-range strike into Russia using Western-provided weapons, using U.S.-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems to damage Russian military targets, according to the DIA.

United States Authorizes Missile Strikes in Russia and Anti-Personnel Mines

Since at least November, Ukrainian officials had cited manpower and equipment shortages as being the driver of the UAF's inability to defend against Russia's larger and more heavily equipped military. Ukraine's air defenses and fighter aircraft are insufficient to defend against Russia's overwhelming missile and UAS attacks, which exacerbate the strain on Kyiv's energy infrastructure and medical facilities, according to the DIA.⁶⁴

In November, Western governments authorized the use of donated medium- and long-range munitions to strike targets inside Russia.⁶⁵ On November 19, Ukraine conducted the first long-range strike into Russia using Western-provided weapons, using U.S.-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) to damage Russian military targets.⁶⁶ According to media reporting, in Ukraine's initial ATACMS salvo, Russian forces shot down several missiles, and at least one damaged a military facility in the Bryansk region, just north of Ukraine.⁶⁷ A week later, the UAF used the ATACMS to damage an S-400 battery, one of Russia's most sophisticated air defense systems, in Lotarevka, northwest of Kursk. UAF officials told reporters that three of the five missiles were shot down, but two reached the target, damaging a radar system and causing casualties.⁶⁸

The ATACMS is a medium-range missile, with a range of just under 200 miles, which enables the UAF to strike Russian military facilities supporting the war in Ukraine, according to media reporting. The ATACMS can be configured with either a single high-explosive warhead or a cluster warhead, and each round costs approximately \$1.5 million. Given the high cost and limited number of ATACMS, the UAF must make judicious use of the munitions.⁶⁹

In response to Ukraine's use of the ATACMS, President Putin announced changes to Russia's long-standing public nuclear doctrine.⁷⁰ Russia also launched a conventionally armed intermediate-range ballistic missile into Ukraine on November 21.⁷¹ The escalatory action resulted in the temporary closure of the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv.⁷² Russia's response also included strikes against Ukraine's energy grid with a combination of UAS and cruise and ballistic missiles.⁷³

This was the first time the Oreshnik missile has been used in combat. The missile can carry a nuclear payload, but the missile that struck Ukraine had six conventional warheads. The strike damaged a Ukrainian munitions plant in Dnipro but did not cause any fatalities. According to media reporting, Russia's use of the Oreshnik was intended to send a message to Ukraine and its Western allies following the ATACMS launch. An Oreshnik missile launched from Russia can reach an air base in Poland in 11 minutes or NATO's headquarters in Belgium in 17 minutes, and it is impossible to determine whether the ballistic missile is carrying a conventional or nuclear payload while it is in flight, according to media reporting.⁷⁴

In November, the DoD announced it would begin providing Ukraine with anti-personnel land mines, having provided anti-tank mines to Ukraine throughout the war. Then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin told reporters that this change in U.S. policy was in response to Russian tactics, including the use of troops in smaller, spread-out squadrons rather than a large massing of tanks and armored vehicles.⁷⁵

Ukraine, unlike the United States, is a party to the UN treaty banning the use of anti-personnel mines.⁷⁶ According to then-Secretary Austin, Ukraine had pledged to use the anti-personnel mines in a way that would limit civilian casualties and only within Ukrainian territory. A U.S. official said that the anti-personnel mines are electrically fused and require battery power to detonate. Once the battery—which lasts between 4 hours and 2 weeks—runs out, the mines are unable to detonate, mitigating the threat of unexploded ordnance.⁷⁷

U.S. Embassy Closes in Response to Missile Threat, Issues Warnings for U.S. Citizens

On November 20, the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv briefly went into a remote work posture and closed to external visitors in response to a potential air attack.⁷⁸ An official embassy message warned of a “potential significant air attack,” saying it had received “specific information” to that effect.⁷⁹ Although air-raid alerts are common in wartime Ukraine, media outlets noted that the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv rarely shuts down or provides such a specific warning.⁸⁰ Greece, Italy, and Spain also closed their embassies in Kyiv on November 20, according to media reporting.⁸¹

In other alerts during the quarter, the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv urged continued caution, preparation for possible loss of electricity and running water, and compliance with U.S. diplomatic and Ukrainian guidance for U.S. citizens present in Ukraine.⁸²

UAF Struggles Due to Lack of Manpower

Ukraine’s warfighting capability was largely unchanged from the last quarter, according to the DIA. Western-provided anti-personnel mines, munitions, aircraft, and expanded strike permissions probably allowed Ukraine to challenge Russian air superiority more effectively, further complicate Russian advances through additional obstacles, and hold select Russian infrastructure at-risk through deep strikes. Ukraine’s maneuver forces conducted a theater-wide area defense, using terrain and obstacles to blunt and counter attacking Russian formations while ceding terrain. However, the UAF remains unable to counterattack Russian forces at scale or resume a theater-wide offensive posture.⁸³

This quarter, President Zelenskyy reshuffled the UAF’s national-level leadership, including the Deputy to the Commander in Chief and the Ground Forces Commander of the UAF. The DIA expected that this will probably not significantly improve the UAF’s capabilities, which continued to be challenged by sustainment issues and unrelenting Russian offensives across the theater.⁸⁴

The UAF personnel management challenges—including desertions, refusals to fight, and undertrained personnel—were especially acute this quarter, the DIA said.⁸⁵ The increased severity of these issues has left the majority of the UAF’s front-line brigades below combat strength. A consistently high tempo of operations against Russia’s overwhelming advantages in indirect fires and personnel numbers led to widespread combat exhaustion among front-line Ukrainian forces.⁸⁶

On November 20, the day after Ukraine used ATACMS inside Russia for the first time, the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv briefly closed and went into a remote work posture in response to a potential air attack.

On December 8, President Zelenskyy posted on social media that approximately 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers had died and approximately 370,000 Ukrainian troops had been wounded since Russia's full-scale invasion began in February 2022.

Precise casualty figures have been difficult to obtain, as neither side releases those statistics publicly. However, on December 8, President Zelenskyy posted on social media that approximately 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers had died and approximately 370,000 Ukrainian troops had been wounded since Russia's full-scale invasion began in February 2022—including both serious and minor injuries. Roughly half of the wounded returned to the fight. Zelenskyy's assessment of Ukrainian war dead was greater than the 31,000 he reported in February 2024 but remained far below estimates by Western intelligence agencies, according to media reporting.⁸⁷

President Zelenskyy's statement did not say how many Ukrainian troops were missing in action, a number believed to be significant, according to media reporting. A Ukrainian defense reporter estimated that 35,000 Ukrainian soldiers were missing in action.⁸⁸ Additionally, the number of Ukrainian deserters may be more than 100,000. Ukrainian commanders told reporters that, in some cases, entire units abandoned their posts, leaving defensive lines vulnerable and accelerating territorial losses.⁸⁹

In response to the wave of troops going absent without leave, Ukraine's parliament passed a bill in November to decriminalize desertion for first offenders, providing the soldiers an option to return and continue serving in the military, in the hopes of enticing those who abandoned their posts to return.⁹⁰

Senior U.S. officials urged the Ukrainian government to expand its conscription law to include younger men, aged 18 to 25, who are currently exempt. "Even with the money, even with the munitions, there have to be people on the front lines to deal with the Russian aggression," then-Secretary of State Antony Blinken said at a December NATO meeting.⁹¹ However, President Zelenskyy has been strongly opposed to lowering the conscription age, saying that doing so would create major challenges for Ukraine's post-war prospects.⁹²

Russian Warfighting Capabilities Prove Effective Despite Heavy Losses

The DIA reported limited changes to Russian warfighting capabilities this quarter. Russian forces' ability to command and control their units did not change significantly: military commanders probably maintained centralized control over their subordinate units, hindering flexibility and innovation that might increase battlefield success while decreasing resource expenditures. Russian forces' inability to effectively control units larger than a company (100 to 250 soldiers) will likely hinder their ability to consolidate gains rapidly and exploit Ukrainian shortfalls, according to the DIA.⁹³

Russian commanders continued to rely on relatively simple tactics, including sending multiple waves of small assault groups to probe and exploit small, vulnerable positions on Ukraine's defensive lines. Those tactics proved successful and allowed Russian forces to steadily seize Ukrainian-held territory, despite suffering significant losses of equipment and personnel. The use of small, disjointed assault groups also does not require the level of training, expertise, and coordination that more advanced forms of maneuver at the battalion and higher echelons require.⁹⁴

Russian forces increased their use of glide bombs since last quarter, which continued to play a critical role on the battlefield because of their low cost, difficulty to intercept, and relative precision compared to other munitions. Glide bombs are launched from aircraft at a distance and then glide to reach their targets, and the Russian military mainly uses them to destroy Ukrainian defensive positions before an assault begins and to strike Ukrainian critical infrastructure.⁹⁵

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REGIONAL POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

Moldovan President Sandu Reelected Despite Reports of Widespread Russian Meddling

On November 3, Moldovan President Maia Sandu won a second 4-year term, defeating an outspoken pro-Russian opponent.⁹⁶ Sandu's victory came after two rounds of voting, on October 20 and November 3, in which Sandu ultimately received more than 55 percent of Moldova's national vote, according to press reports citing the country's Central Election Commission.⁹⁷ During the same voting season, Moldovan voters also narrowly approved a commitment to join the European Union (EU) and associated constitutional changes.⁹⁸ Moldovan nationals residing outside the country were a decisive bloc in the pro-Western move, according to media reports.⁹⁹ Since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Moldova had swung between democratic norms and Russian influence, media reports said.¹⁰⁰

Election observers and civil society groups claimed that irregularities surfaced during the voting season, media said.¹⁰¹ Specifically, observers alleged that Russia had attempted to buy votes and unlawfully use foreign money in the campaign to influence the result of the election as well as the EU referendum, according to press reports.¹⁰² Moldovan law enforcement told reporters that more than \$15 million in Russian funds had been channeled into the bank accounts of more than 130,000 Moldovan citizens in the lead-up to the election.¹⁰³

In a statement, then-President Biden said, "Russia sought to undermine Moldova's democratic institutions and election processes. But Russia failed."¹⁰⁴ Then-President Biden congratulated President Sandu on what he called her "historic reelection" to the Moldovan presidency.¹⁰⁵

Romanian High Court Annuls Election, Alleging Russian Interference

In December, Romania's Constitutional Court annulled the country's presidential election, 2 days before the second and final round of voting, citing foreign interference in the electoral process. The court reached its decision based on documents declassified by Romania's national security council, which allege that the Russian government was responsible for a broad campaign of cyberattacks and social media propaganda to promote Calin Georgescu, a candidate who had previously made pro-Russia and anti-NATO statements. Georgescu unexpectedly came in second in the first round of voting, despite previously being largely unknown. Romania's President requested EU assistance in countering Russian influence before a new election is held in the spring of 2025.¹⁰⁶

A week after the election was postponed, the European Union opened a formal investigation into a People's Republic of China (PRC)-owned social media platform on which it was revealed that 25,000 new accounts backing Georgescu were activated in the weeks leading up to the election. One of those accounts spent \$381,000 to promote pro-Georgescu content, according to media reporting.¹⁰⁷

Ukraine Ends Natural Gas Transit Agreement with Russia

Following the expiration of its 5-year contract with Ukraine on December 31, Russia halted natural gas exports to Europe through Ukraine. Ukraine's natural gas pipeline system had transported Russian natural gas to European consumers for more than 40 years.¹⁰⁸ Since the 2022 full-scale invasion, European nations had begun reducing their reliance on Russian energy, and Druzhba was Russia's last active pipeline serving Europe.¹⁰⁹ While Russia supplied more than 40 percent of the EU's imported gas in 2021, that number fell to less than 15 percent in 2024.¹¹⁰

Under a pre-invasion agreement, Ukraine had continued to collect transit fees for allowing the pipeline to flow through its territory throughout the war. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy celebrated the end of the deal as a defeat for Russia.¹¹¹ Ukraine aimed to limit Russia's ability to leverage oil and gas to manipulate European countries as well as deny Russia a key source of funding for its war effort. Analysts predicted that the closure of the pipeline could reduce Russia's energy revenue by about \$6.5 billion a year.¹¹²

The closure of the pipeline will likely result in increased energy costs for European consumers, especially in Eastern Europe. Austria, Hungary, Moldova, Serbia, and Slovakia had remained major consumers of Russian gas, according to media reporting.¹¹³ Moldova was particularly reliant on Russian energy, and the closure of the pipeline will likely result in an energy crisis in Transnistria, a pro-Russian separatist region located along Moldova's Ukrainian border. Transnistria declared a state of emergency and closed most non-essential industries as they sought to avoid a humanitarian crisis.¹¹⁴ The fact that Russia would risk hurting its own proxies in Transnistria, occupied by Russian troops for more than 30 years, is a measure of how the war in Ukraine has altered Russia's priorities, according to media reporting.¹¹⁵

DIPLOMACY

At their November meeting, held in Italy, the foreign ministers of the G7 countries—including the United States—issued a joint declaration calling Russia's war “illegal, unjustifiable, and unprovoked,” resulting in “immense human suffering and destruction.”¹¹⁶ The ministers reaffirmed that “support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence will remain unwavering.”¹¹⁷

On November 20, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution condemning Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including the use of occupied Crimea to support that aggression and the attempt to illegally annex the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia regions.¹¹⁸ Prior to the vote, Ukraine's delegate to the United Nations said Russian-occupied areas had become lawless zones of human rights violations, including summary executions and torture.¹¹⁹ According to State, Russia had also been using its position in Crimea to threaten, intimidate, and arbitrarily detain members of the historically persecuted Crimean Tatar minority.¹²⁰

OSCE Warsaw Conference Seeks to Address Human Rights Efforts

In October, more than 50 countries, including the United States, attended the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) Warsaw Human Dimension Conference.¹²¹ State said that 51 of 57 participating states sent official delegations. Approximately 1,000 people attended, including 470 from civil society organizations across the OSCE region.¹²² Russia and Belarus did not send delegations.¹²³

According to State, conference participants developed strategies and coalitions to counter negative developments affecting multiple countries in the region. For example, the proliferation of Russia-modeled "foreign agent" laws. Georgia and Kyrgyzstan both passed such laws in 2024, requiring civil society organizations, NGOs, and media outlets that received more than 20 percent of their funding from outside the countries to register as "organizations serving the interest of foreign power."¹²⁴ The Council of Europe's top constitutional law commission has said that these stigmatize foreign entities and provoke a climate of distrust, fear, and hostility.¹²⁵ State said the requirements imposed by such laws have a chilling effect on the work of civil society organizations and independent media.¹²⁶

State noted that although the Warsaw Conference is not a policy-making body, it provides an opportunity for strategic communication of U.S. policy, including on combatting transnational repression in which governments in the region reach across their borders to intimidate and punish critics living abroad.¹²⁷

Russia Hosts Its Largest International Summit Since Full-Scale Invasion Began

In October, Russia hosted a BRICS summit, the largest gathering of world leaders in Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. BRICS—named for its founding members, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—also includes Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as members. In January, Brazil announced that Indonesia would formally join BRICS as a full member. Leaders from 32 nations, including NATO member Türkiye, attended the summit in Kazan, Russia.¹²⁸

In September 2024, Türkiye requested to join BRICS, and in November, the Turkish Trade Minister announced that BRICS had offered Türkiye partner country status in the bloc, which is part of a transition process to joining.¹²⁹ Türkiye is the first NATO country to apply for BRICS membership.¹³⁰

President Putin aimed to use the summit to counter the Western narrative that Russia had become isolated in the world as a result of its war against Ukraine, according to media reporting. The summit focused mainly on issues unrelated to the war, such as the group's goal of moving away from the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency.¹³¹ However, President Putin took the opportunity to publicly thank the UAE for its role in mediating a recent prisoner of war exchange with Ukraine and to praise the emerging strategic partnership between Russia and the UAE.¹³²

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A U.S. Army Soldier drives a Bradley Fighting Vehicle off a ship to be logged at a checkpoint at the port of Setúbal, Portugal, in support of OAR. (DoD photo)

STATUS OF FUNDS

- 24 U.S. Government Overview
- 30 Funding for Security Assistance
- 33 Direct Budget Support
- 34 Loans

STATUS OF FUNDS

In accordance with the Special Inspector General for Operation Atlantic Resolve's (OAR) legislative mandate, this section provides a comprehensive accounting of the amounts appropriated by the United States for the Ukraine response.

The Special IG for OAR collected funding data from all 14 Federal agencies authorized to receive funds through the Ukraine supplemental appropriations acts, including the DoD, State, and USAID.¹³³

U.S. GOVERNMENT OVERVIEW

Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$182.75 billion for OAR and the broader Ukraine response, of which at least \$140.47 billion has been obligated and \$83.43 billion has been disbursed as of the end of the quarter. (See Table 3.)

Congress appropriated \$174.19 billion through the five Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts enacted FY 2022 through FY 2024, of which the Federal government agencies allocated \$163.64 billion for OAR and the Ukraine response, and \$10.55 billion was allocated for other, primarily humanitarian, purposes. Additional funds of \$17.99 billion were allocated from annual agency appropriations and \$1.12 billion was allocated from other supplemental appropriation acts.

The most recent appropriation specifically drafted for OAR and the broader Ukraine response was the Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriation Act, 2024, enacted April 24, 2024, that provided \$60.78 billion in funding. Since that time, additional funds made available in the annual and continuing resolution appropriation acts have been obligated for these purposes.

During FY 2025 Q1, the U.S. Government disbursed \$20.00 billion to a World Bank-managed trust fund for provision to Ukraine. (See page 34.) This transaction involved the transfer by USAID of \$535.25 million from the Economic Support Fund to USAID's Sovereign Credit Program Account at the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), where it was obligated for loan guarantee subsidy costs. Treasury's Federal Financing Bank disbursed the \$20.00 billion loan. This loan is treated for budgetary purposes as a USAID loan.¹³⁴

Security: Nearly three-quarters of the funds appropriated for OAR and the Ukraine response are for security programs administered by the DoD and State. (See Figure 1 and Table 4.) Security-related appropriations have increased each year since the full-scale invasion began and currently total \$130.66 billion.

The largest share of security-related funding consists of \$45.78 billion appropriated to the DoD to replace weapons and materiel donated to Ukraine under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). PDA is not a funding source but rather an authority that allows the President to provide military assistance from existing defense articles in the DoD's stocks,

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Table 3.


Status of U.S. Appropriations for Operation Atlantic Resolve, Including U.S. Government Activities Relating to Ukraine, Grouped by Implementing Agency, FY 2022 to FY 2025 Q1, in \$ Millions

Funds Appropriated by Agency and Account	Appropriated	Obligated	Disbursed
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE			
Replenishment of DoD Stocks	\$45,780.00	\$27,100.69	\$7,044.73
U.S. Military Support, Primarily for U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)	44,849.63	35,987.09	22,567.23
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)	33,212.46	22,302.12	11,151.60
DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG)	16.00	8.20	7.62
Department of Defense, Total	123,858.09	85,398.10	40,771.18
DEPARTMENT OF STATE			
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF)	6,732.02	5,370.02	2,209.82
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	1,416.38	1,371.61	687.59
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	1,190.21	1,190.21	969.19
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	535.06	535.06	345.51
Diplomatic Programs (DP)	496.15	438.66	342.37
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related (NADR)	414.37	295.40	200.45
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia & Central Asia (AEECA)	384.12	361.62	124.09
Global Health Programs (GHP-State)	146.68	36.23	20.15
Embassy Security, Construction & Maintenance (ESCM)	110.00	55.62	54.87
International Military Education & Training (IMET)	81.84	81.84	30.05
Capital Investment Fund (CIF)	44.17	44.04	32.24
State Office of Inspector General (State OIG)	21.50	13.72	12.26
Educational & Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE)	12.74	11.63	2.58
Emergencies in the Diplomatic & Consular Service (EDCS)	5.00	—	—
Department of State, Total	11,590.24	9,805.68	5,031.18
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT			
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	34,103.12	33,355.86	31,075.28
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)	2,859.25	1,690.57	908.71
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	2,575.12	2,575.04	2,013.34
Transition Initiatives (TI)	195.00	191.95	142.23
Operating Expenses (OE)	86.00	56.31	37.38
Global Health Programs (GHP-USAID)	78.29	78.11	32.14
USAID Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG)	23.00	13.26	12.22
USAID, Total	39,919.77	37,961.10	34,221.31
ALL OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES			
U.S. International Development Finance Corp. (DFC)	3,005.85	3,005.85	792.77
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)	1,844.65	1,842.80	738.79
Department of the Treasury (Treasury)	1,034.87	1,028.67	1,020.10
Department of Energy (DOE)	825.55	789.21	451.20
Export-Import Bank of the U.S. (EXIM)	184.46	184.46	—
U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM)	178.37	178.37	172.73
Department of Agriculture (USDA)	150.00	137.89	122.37
Department of Justice (DOJ)	126.40	103.86	84.06
Department of Commerce (DOC)	22.10	22.02	16.46
Government Accountability Office (GAO)	7.50	5.80	5.80
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)	2.71	2.51	2.51
National Security Council (NSC) and Other*	3.58	—	—
Other U.S. Government Agencies, Total	7,386.04	7,301.45	3,406.79
TOTAL FUNDING	\$182,754.15	\$140,466.32	\$83,430.46

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Agency cumulative appropriations, obligations, and disbursements data is provided for funds appropriated or otherwise obligated after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, through December 31, 2024, except for DoD data, which is presented as of November 30, 2024 (EDI), and December 16, 2024 (all other). *DoD OIG did not request information on appropriations to the NSC nor the Intelligence Community Management Account in the Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts.

Sources: See endnote 133 on page 122.

Figure 1.

Cumulative Appropriations by Funding Category as of FY 2025 Q1, in \$ Billions

subject to a statutory cap.¹³⁵ The statutory limit for PDA is \$100 million of weapons and equipment transferred worldwide per year.¹³⁶ However, in response to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Congress increased the cap on PDA to \$11 billion for FY 2022, \$14.50 billion for FY 2023, and \$7.80 billion for FY 2024, providing \$33.30 billion in cumulative PDA.¹³⁷ Supplemental appropriations provided funds for DoD Components to replenish items transferred to Ukraine.¹³⁸

The second largest component of security-related funding is \$44.85 billion for increased U.S. military activity in Europe and the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), which supports the forward deployment of U.S. military forces and prepositioned stocks in Eastern Europe to deter aggression against NATO allies.

Security funds also provide for the procurement of weapons and materiel for Ukraine and other partners and allies through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) and the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Congress created USAI as a means to help Ukraine provide for its self-defense following Russia's 2014 invasion of Crimea. FMF is the U.S. Government's standing program through which State procures, and the DoD delivers weapons, materiel, services, and training requested by partners and allies. (See pages 30-31.) A relatively small portion of total security funding for the Ukraine response—\$6.73 billion—in FMF enables the U.S. Government to backfill partner nations that have depleted their military stocks through donations to Ukraine.

Table 4.

U.S. Appropriations for Operation Atlantic Resolve, Including U.S. Government Activities Relating to Ukraine, Grouped by Funding Category, FY 2022 to FY 2025 Q1, in \$ Millions

Funds Appropriated by Agency and Account	Agency	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024	FY 2025	Total
SECURITY						
Replenishment of DoD Stocks	DoD	\$12,550.00	\$13,380.00	\$19,850.00	\$—	\$45,780.00
U.S. Military Support, Primarily for U.S. European Command						
(USEUCOM) and European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)	DoD	12,059.90	14,656.90	17,852.14	280.70	44,849.63
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)	DoD	6,300.00	12,300.00	14,612.46	—	33,212.46
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	State	4,865.00	142.02	1,725.00	—	6,732.02
International Military Education and Training (IMET)	State	32.11	23.90	25.83	—	81.84
Security, Total		35,807.00	40,502.82	54,065.43	280.70	130,655.95
GOVERNANCE & DEVELOPMENT						
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	Joint ^a	9,380.83	17,408.35	7,849.00	—	34,638.18
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)	Joint ^a	1,143.37	350.00	1,750.00	—	3,243.37
U.S. International Development Finance Corp.	DFC	717.82	1,581.34	606.57	100.12	3,005.85
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	State	710.59	385.79	320.00	—	1,416.38
Multilateral Assistance, International Financial Institutions (IFI)	Treasury	650.00	—	250.00	—	900.00
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related (NADR)	State	159.15	116.92	138.30	—	414.37
Export-Import Bank of the U.S.	EXIM	—	184.46	—	—	184.46
U.S. Agency for Global Media	USAGM	72.96	47.99	46.17	11.26	178.37
Global Health Programs (GHP-State)	State	37.83	53.82	55.03	—	146.68
Global Health Programs (GHP-USAID)	USAID	27.71	35.01	15.57	—	78.29
Educational & Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE)	State	12.74	—	—	—	12.74
Governance & Development, Total		12,913.01	20,163.68	11,030.63	111.38	44,218.69
HUMANITARIAN						
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	USAID	1,652.78	342.88	579.46	—	2,575.12
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	State	596.02	273.22	320.96	—	1,190.21
Transition Initiatives (TI)	USAID	120.00	50.00	25.00	—	195.00
Department of Agriculture	USDA	100.00	50.00	—	—	150.00
Humanitarian, Total		2,468.80	716.10	925.42	—	4,110.33
AGENCY OPERATIONS						
Department of Health and Human Services	HHS	954.00	409.65	481.00	—	1,844.65
Department of Energy	DOE	61.54	491.55	272.46	—	825.55
Diplomatic Programs (DP)	State	299.09	137.05	60.00	—	496.15
Department of the Treasury	Treasury	113.00	—	18.93	2.95	134.87
Department of Justice	DOJ	126.40	—	—	—	126.40
Embassy Security, Construction & Maintenance (ESCM)	State	110.00	—	—	—	110.00
Operating Expenses (OE)	USAID	42.00	5.00	39.00	—	86.00
Capital Investment Fund (CIF)	State	34.17	10.00	—	—	44.17
USAID Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG)	USAID	5.00	8.00	10.00	—	23.00
Department of Commerce	DOC	22.10	—	—	—	22.10
State Office of Inspector General (State OIG)	State	8.00	5.50	8.00	—	21.50
DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG)	DoD	—	8.00	8.00	—	16.00
Government Accountability Office	GAO	—	7.50	—	—	7.50
Emergencies in the Diplomatic & Consular Service (EDCS)	State	5.00	—	—	—	5.00
National Security Council and Other*	NSC	—	1.58	2.00	—	3.58
Nuclear Regulatory Commission	NRC	2.50	—	0.21	—	2.71
Agency Operations, Total		1,782.80	1,083.84	899.59	2.95	3,769.17
TOTAL FUNDING		\$52,971.61	\$62,466.44	\$66,921.07	\$395.02	\$182,754.15

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Agencies have reported funds appropriated or otherwise obligated by fiscal year of appropriation following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, through December 31, 2024, except for the DoD, which has reported its data as of November 30, 2024 (EDI), and December 16, 2024 (all other). ^aState and USAID jointly administer ESF and AEECA appropriations. *DoD OIG did not request information on the \$3.58 million in funds appropriated to the NSC nor to the Intelligence Community Management Account in the Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts.

Sources: See endnote 133 on page 122.

Governance and Development: Of the total appropriations for the Ukraine response, \$44.22 billion is for governance and development programs administered by State, USAID, Treasury, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, U.S. Agency for Global Media, and Export-Import Bank of the United States. More than one-half of this funding has been disbursed for direct budget support, which provides funding—through international intermediaries—to the Ukrainian government to continue operations and provision of public services. USAID, which administers direct budget support programming and funding through the Economic Support Fund, has disbursed \$30.21 billion in direct budget support to Ukraine from 2022 to December 31, 2024.¹³⁹

Key Budget Terms

Appropriation A provision of law authorizing Federal agencies to incur obligations and to make payments out of the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) for specified purposes. Appropriations represent amounts that agencies may obligate during the period of time specified in the respective appropriation acts but do not represent the cash amounts set aside in Treasury for purposes specified in those acts.

Apportionment The action by which the Office of Management and Budget distributes amounts available for obligation, including budgetary reserves established pursuant to law, in an appropriation or fund account. An apportionment divides amounts available for obligation by specific time periods (usually quarters), activities, projects, objects, or a combination thereof.

Obligation Amounts representing orders placed, contracts awarded, services received, or similar transactions during an accounting period that will require payment during the same or a future period.

Disbursement Amounts paid by U.S. federal agencies during the fiscal year to liquidate U.S. Government obligations.

Reprogramming Realignment of budget authority within an appropriation or fund account for purposes other than those contemplated at the time of appropriation, usually to finance an emergent, unfunded requirement.

Transfer The shifting of funds from one appropriation or fund account to another.

Expired Account or Appropriation An appropriation or fund account in which the balance is no longer available for incurring new obligations but is still available to cover upward adjustments to prior year obligations and liquidating valid obligations. The account remains available for such purposes during the 5-year expiration period.

Source: DoD, Financial Management Regulation DoD 7000.14-R, “Glossary,” 9/2021.

Table 5.

Appropriated Funds Remaining Available for Possible Disbursement, Six Largest Accounts and All Others, as of FY 2025 Q1, in \$ Billions

	Cumulative Appropriations	Funds Remaining for Possible Disbursement		
		Appropriated, Not Yet Obligated	Obligated, Not Yet Disbursed	Total Remaining
DoD Stocks Replenishment	\$45.78	\$18.45	\$20.06	\$38.51
U.S. Military Support, Primarily for USEUCOM and EDI	44.85	7.50	13.42	20.92
Economic Support Fund	34.64	—	2.47	2.47
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative	33.21	10.58	11.15	21.73
Foreign Military Financing	6.73	1.36	3.16	4.52
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia & Central Asia	3.24	1.19	1.02	2.21
Subtotal—Six Largest Accounts	168.46	39.10	51.28	90.37
All Other Accounts	14.30	0.49	5.76	6.25
TOTAL	\$182.75	\$39.58	\$57.04	\$96.62

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Agency appropriation, obligation, disbursement, and period of availability for obligation data has been analyzed for funds appropriated or otherwise obligated after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, through December 31, 2024, except for DoD data, which is presented as of November 30, 2024 (EDI), and December 16, 2024 (all other). Funds appropriated, but not obligated exclude expired funds of \$2.70 billion that were not obligated within their period of availability for obligation as set forth in the appropriation laws.

Sources: See endnote 133 on page 122.

Humanitarian Assistance: Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$4.11 billion for humanitarian assistance through State, USAID, and USDA programs. More than half of this funding was appropriated for FY 2022 when the Ukraine refugee situation and disruptions to Ukrainian food production and distribution peaked following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia.


Agency Operations: Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$3.77 billion for agency operations across multiple Federal agencies. This includes \$68.00 million for oversight provided by DoD OIG, State OIG, USAID OIG, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

FUNDING PIPELINE

The status of funds appropriated or otherwise made available for OAR and the Ukraine response of \$182.75 billion consists of four broad categories: 1) funds that have been appropriated and remain available for obligation, but have not yet been obligated, amounting to \$39.58 billion; 2) funds that have been obligated but have not yet been disbursed, amounting to \$57.04 billion; 3) funds that have been disbursed, amounting to \$83.43 billion; and 4) funds that have expired, meaning they are no longer available for obligation, amounting to \$2.70 billion. (See Figure 2.)

The appropriation laws specify the number of years that each appropriation is available for obligation; typically, 1, 2, or 3 years, or until expended, and after this period of availability has ended, unobligated funds are said to “expire.”

Figure 2.

Status of Appropriated Funds as of FY 2025 Q1, in \$ Billions

The rate at which appropriated funds are obligated and disbursed varies greatly across accounts. (See Table 5.) While approximately one-third of the amounts appropriated for DoD Stocks Replenishment and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative remain available for obligation, there are no funds remaining available for obligation with the Economic Support Fund, and nearly all its obligations have been disbursed. Appropriated funds remaining available for possible disbursement of \$96.62 billion represents more than one-half of cumulative appropriations of \$182.75 billion.

FUNDING FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Since February 2022, Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$123.86 billion to the DoD, of which the Army has received the largest share at \$57.79 billion and \$43.16 billion is for Defense-wide accounts. (See Table 6.) These appropriations include funding to support the full range of costs associated with the increased U.S. military presence in Europe, both to support Ukraine and to provide enhanced deterrence in Eastern Europe. The DoD uses these funds to replenish its stocks around the world that have been drawn down to deliver weapons and materiel to Ukraine under PDA and as USAI funding to provide direct support to Ukraine.

Through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, the Secretary of State may supervise and direct financing for military assistance for a specific purpose, usually in response to a request from the recipient country. FMF funds do not belong to the recipient nation but rather are executed by the DoD, and the funded items are transferred to the recipient country.¹⁴⁰

Table 6.

Department of Defense, Funds Apportioned from Ukraine Supplemental Appropriation Acts and Annual Agency Appropriation Acts for Operation Atlantic Resolve, FY 2022 to FY 2025 Q1, \$ in Millions

U.S. Appropriations, Apportioned by Account	Army	Navy	Air Force	Defense-wide	Total
U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT, INCLUDING FOR USEUCOM AND EDI					
Military Personnel	\$1,493.72	\$55.52	\$261.95	\$—	\$1,811.19
Operation & Maintenance	15,808.90	3,779.13	3,065.68	2,694.37	25,348.08
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation	159.68	128.50	860.53	488.72	1,637.43
Procurement	7,865.92	422.62	5,309.40	109.14	13,707.08
Military Construction	347.22	320.63	632.97	—	1,300.82
Defense Production Act Purchases	—	—	—	600.00	600.00
Cooperative Threat Reduction Account	—	—	—	—	—
Defense Health Program	—	—	—	28.00	28.00
Office of the Inspector General	—	—	—	16.00	16.00
Army & Defense Working Capital Funds	7.07	—	—	409.97	417.04
U.S. Military Support, Total	25,682.51	4,706.40	10,130.54	4,346.19	44,865.63
DOD STOCKS REPLENISHMENT					
Operation & Maintenance	960.33	500.34	683.72	5,192.65	7,337.04
Defense Production Act Purchases	—	—	—	146.00	146.00
Procurement	25,840.21	4,280.41	1,478.27	262.51	31,861.39
Procurement Replacement of DoD Stocks	5,308.12	761.45	366.00	—	6,435.57
DoD Stocks Replenishment, Total	32,108.66	5,542.19	2,527.99	5,601.15	45,780.00
UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE INITIATIVE					
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, Total	—	—	—	33,212.46	33,212.46
TOTAL FUNDING	\$57,791.18	\$10,248.59	\$12,658.53	\$43,159.80	\$123,858.09

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Reflects apportionment of appropriated balances for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) as of November 30, 2024, and for appropriated balances from the Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts and other annual Department of Defense appropriations as of December 16, 2024. Procurement Replacement of DoD Stocks consists of the apportionment of Procurement appropriations to the military services in PL 118-50 Div. B for DoD Stocks Replenishment. EDI funding presented above consists of FY 2022-2024 EDI enacted funding of \$11.64 billion, additional FY 2022-2024 base funding for EDI requirements of \$0.30 billion, and FY 25Q1 base funding for FY 2025 EDI execution of \$0.28 billion.

Sources: See endnote 133 on page 122.

Four of the five Ukraine supplemental appropriations provided more than \$6.3 billion in FMF for Ukraine and other countries.¹⁴¹ Those funds allow recipients to seek the purchase of U.S.-made defense articles and U.S.-provided services and trainings through the FMF process.¹⁴² As of December 2024, State had obligated the full \$6.3 billion of the supplemental FMF funds, including more than \$3.7 billion directly to Ukraine to address urgent battlefield needs and ensure the operational readiness of equipment supplied by the United States.¹⁴³ FMF support to Ukraine has included air defense, armored vehicles, anti-armor capabilities, munitions, and donation agreements with partner countries.¹⁴⁴ (See Table 7.)

State said it has also used the FMF supplemental funds to provide other partners with incentives to divest from Russian defense articles through donations of defense articles to Ukraine or to backfill such donations made by countries actively supporting Ukraine's defense requirements.¹⁴⁵ State has primarily engaged European partners to donate Russian-origin defense articles needed by Ukraine to counter Russia's invasion.¹⁴⁶ In addition, State noted that the war in Ukraine has stretched Russia's attention and ability to sustain its

Table 7.

Countries, Value, Disbursements, and Purposes for Foreign Military Financing Programs Using Supplemental Funds as of December 2024, in \$ Thousands

Country	Total Program Value	Total Disbursed	Funding Purpose
Ukraine	\$3,729,580	\$443,940	See page 43.
Other European Countries			
Albania	32,000	15,759	UH-60 helicopter; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) protection equipment
Bulgaria	114,500	45,326	AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder missiles
Croatia	140,000	140,000	UH-60 helicopter; APX-123A Transponders and supplies
Czechia	325,520	300,623	Advanced Targeting Capability; UH-1Y helicopters; AH-1Z helicopters; spare engines
Estonia	164,350	129,500	Practice ammunition; Weapon System Program; M1117 and Aerosonde; CH-47 sustainment; F-35 support
Greece	60,000	12,675	Naval air strike missiles; HIMARS
Latvia	162,700	96,393	Blanket order training; AN/PRC-163; AN/PRC-167; Joint Threat Emitters; JCATS; Simple Key Loaders; NVGs and aiming lasers
Lithuania	162,737	46,888	NVDs; body armor; small arms and ammunition; AN/PAS-13 MTWS and accessories; HMMWV; UAS-ISR; Radars AN; MC6 parachutes
Moldova	41,713	19,872	Cybersecurity services, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) support; NVDs
Montenegro	35,900	20,900	JLTVs; Strykers; Javelin missiles
North Macedonia	123,000	85,706	F-16 engines, M1A1 tanks and support
Poland	395,000	275,000	Cybersecurity services, FOTS and SCOMAR equipment; BAK-12; PUMA AE and UAVs, Virtual battlespace software and support
Romania	281,000	32,271	JLTVs, M4 Rifles/Optics
Slovakia	234,000	207,328	JLTVs, Common Remote Weapons Systems (CROWS)
Slovenia	57,500	33,431	JLTVs, Common Remote Weapons Systems (CROWS)
Other Countries, Total	2,329,920	1,461,672	
Non-European Countries			
Ecuador	100,000	0	
Zambia	80,000	56,239	Bell 412 Helicopters
Non-European Countries, Total	180,000	56,239	
GRAND TOTAL	\$6,132,650	\$1,871,495	

Notes: Ukraine total includes supplemental FMF funds obligated directly to Ukraine and to the Ukraine Defense Enterprise Program. Ecuador funding to be reprogrammed for Nepal pending Congressional approval. Excludes \$120 million in loans for Poland and a \$60 million loan for Romania.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 12/20/2024.

partners and presents opportunities to transition some countries to U.S. rather than Russian military equipment.¹⁴⁷ State said its Transition Off Russian Equipment program aims to deprive Russia’s defense industry of revenues that support Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine by identifying candidate partners with Russian defense articles in stock that might be willing to divest and use FMF to purchase U.S.-made defense articles instead.¹⁴⁸


DIRECT BUDGET SUPPORT

Since 2022, the U.S. Government has provided more than \$30.21 billion for direct budget support to the Ukrainian government, out of the total of \$115.2 billion provided by partner nations and institutions.¹⁴⁹ The Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2024 provided \$7.84 billion for direct budget support.¹⁵⁰ U.S. direct budget support accounted for more than 14 percent of the \$57.5 billion Ukrainian state budget financing received from partner nations and institutions in 2024.¹⁵¹

These funds support assistance for internally displaced persons (IDP), salaries for school employees, disability aid, salaries to civil servants, assistance to low-income families, housing and utility subsidies, salaries to medical workers, and salaries for first responders.¹⁵² Direct budget funds will not be used to reimburse expenditures for pensions, due to the supplemental appropriation’s prohibition on using budget support for these expenditures.¹⁵³ (See Figure 3.)

Figure 3.

Use of USAID funding for Direct Budget Support from the Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2024



LOANS

Since February 2022, the international community has immobilized approximately \$300 billion in Russian sovereign assets held at U.S., European, Canadian, and Japanese financial institutions. Most of the immobilized assets are held in the European Union.¹⁵⁴ This quarter, the G7 nations initiated the extension of \$50 billion in loans—called extraordinary revenue acceleration loans—to Ukraine, to be repaid by future windfall proceeds of those assets.¹⁵⁵ Subject to interest rate changes, the frozen assets will generate proceeds of roughly \$2.6 to \$3.2 billion a year.¹⁵⁶ The loans will provide budget support for the Ukrainian government’s immediate financial needs, while the United Kingdom’s contribution of an estimated \$2.8 billion is earmarked as budget support for military equipment.¹⁵⁷

The United States provided \$20 billion in loans as part of the initiative.¹⁵⁸ Repayment of the loans will be through income earned from investments on immobilized Russian sovereign assets.¹⁵⁹ The assets will not be seized; instead, the European Union will collect and disburse the investment profits that those assets generate to pay back G7 members’ loans.¹⁶⁰ In December, the then-USAID Administrator signed the Loan Guarantee and Repayment Agreement, which provided USAID guarantees to the loan repayment and authorized obligation of approximately \$535 million in subsidy funds for the loan.¹⁶¹ In the event the subsidy funds are insufficient to cover any expenses related to USAID’s guarantee, the Federal Credit Reform Act provides for permanent and indefinite budgetary authority to cover the unsubsidized loan guarantee portions and to satisfy any obligations.¹⁶²

The World Bank’s Ukraine Financial Intermediary Fund will serve as trustee and administrator for the distribution of extraordinary revenue acceleration loan contributions from the United States and several other lenders to Ukraine.¹⁶³ This fund will include direct budget support through the World Bank’s PEACE Fund, financial support for the World Bank’s development policy operations, and project financing carried out by approved implementers like the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.¹⁶⁴

Treasury anticipates that \$15 billion of the \$20 billion loan will be directed from the Financial Intermediary Fund toward the PEACE Fund, \$1 billion will be directed to the World Bank development operations, and \$4 billion will remain in the Financial Intermediary Fund until its governing committee decides on further disbursement.¹⁶⁵

In addition to the extraordinary revenue acceleration loans, the U.S. Government has used \$1.6 billion to secure a \$4.8 billion loan through World Bank’s Special Program for Ukraine and Moldova Recovery and a \$530 million loan through the World Bank’s Economic Resilience Action Program.¹⁶⁶ Ukraine used the Special Program for Ukraine and Moldova Recovery loan to fund many of the types of salaries also supported through direct budget support.¹⁶⁷ (See Table 8.)

Table 8.

Salaries Funded Loan from the World Bank’s Special Program for Ukraine and Moldova Recovery

Medical workers	\$3,143,829,000
Civil servants	1,242,250,000
School employees	203,024,000
First responders	198,897,000
TOTAL	\$4,788,000,000

Source: USAID Ukraine, response to USAID OIG request for information, 12/20/2024.







The driver of an M109 Paladin looks out of his hatch during a NATO exercise on Forward Operating Site Toruń, Poland. (U.S. Army photo)

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

40 Ukrainian Armed Forces

49 Ukrainian Civilian Security Sector

A M88 Recovery Vehicle is inspected before being sent to another checkpoint to be placed in the staging area at the port of Setúbal, Portugal. (DoD photo)




SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Under OAR, the United States seeks to show U.S. commitment to NATO’s collective defense and deter Russian aggression against Eastern Europe. Security assistance to Ukraine remains the main focus of this effort, including support funded through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), replenishment of stocks transferred under PDA, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International Military Education and Training. In addition, the United States supports military deployments and training activities throughout the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility. (See Figure 4.)

Figure 4.

Total Appropriations for Security Assistance, FY 2022 to FY 2025 Q1



USEUCOM reported that the overall number of U.S. military personnel in Europe this quarter was approximately 90,000, including 63,000 steady state personnel and 27,000 deployed and rotational troops.¹⁶⁸ U.S. forces did not participate in any multinational exercises during the quarter that were related to OAR.¹⁶⁹ U.S. forces plan to join several NATO exercises in spring and summer 2025.¹⁷⁰

In June 2024, the United States and Ukraine agreed to a 10-year bilateral security agreement that identified areas of economic, political, and defense cooperation, and prioritized long-term support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and Euro-Atlantic integration.¹⁷¹ The agreement aims to provide a durable framework for future U.S. assistance, bolster Ukrainian and regional security, and serve as a model for other countries.¹⁷² State cited several actions the United States and Ukraine have taken to implement the agreement since it was signed in June.¹⁷³ (See Table 9.)

Table 9.

The U.S. and Ukrainian Governments’ Implementation of the U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Security Agreement

Pillar	Activity
United States Efforts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Committed \$10.6 billion in security assistance to Ukraine to sustain its self-defense. Committed \$1 billion for the development and manufacture of UAS and other defense articles for Ukraine that benefits the U.S. and Ukrainian defense industrial bases
Ukrainian Government Efforts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implemented planning, programming, and budgeting systems to modernize Ukraine’s defense management system, and implemented several standardization agreements to facilitate Ukraine’s long-term interoperability with NATO. Implemented a new model of joint governance to enhance coordination between the Ministry of Defense civilian leadership and the Armed Forces of Ukraine to enhance Ukraine’s command and control system. Improved social and humanitarian services for military personnel and their dependents, including providing psychological assistance for veterans and supporting their transition to civilian life. Began implementing key anti-corruption reforms, including passing a new law to bring the Accounting Chamber’s mandate and independence into compliance with international standards and two anti-bribery laws that were prerequisites for Ukraine’s accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Joint Agreements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Concluded the <i>Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Department of Defense of the United States of America Concerning Coproduction for Battle Damage Repair</i> to enable the coproduction of systems, subsystems, and components damaged by combat activity in Ukraine. Signed the <i>Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the United States of America Regarding Collaboration on Ukrainian Energy System Resilience</i> to support and secure Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure and identifies priority reforms to increase investor confidence and attract more private sector investment to Ukraine.

Source: State, responses to State OIG request for information, 12/13/2024; OUSD(P), vetting comment, 1/26/2025.

UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES

MULTINATIONAL COORDINATION

The United States and its allies and partners coordinate international security assistance to Ukraine through a variety of international mechanisms. (See Table 10.) During the quarter, NATO Security Assistance and Training-Ukraine (NSATU) assumed responsibility for international training, logistics support, sustainment and maintenance, and force development for Ukraine. Announced in July, NSATU will eventually comprise approximately 700 personnel from NATO allied nations and partners.¹⁷⁴

The Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U), the U.S. counterpart to NSATU, reported that it does not expect any challenges related to transfer of institutional knowledge to NSATU. SAG-U said that its training directorate will establish a U.S. component within NSATU. Until that is accomplished, SAG-U training personnel have regular and open communications with their NSATU counterparts. SAG-U said that its training teams record challenges and changes through a lesson-learned program, which SAG-U shares with NATO partners.¹⁷⁵

Table 10.

Coordination of International Assistance to Ukraine

Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. mechanism to coordinate and oversee the full spectrum of U.S. security assistance to the UAF. • Combined, joint service headquarters, established in November 2022. • Located in Wiesbaden, Germany, under the operational control of U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF). • As a Title 10 military command, can and does train and advise the UAF. • Includes SAG-U Operations Kyiv, a small contingent of advisors located in Ukraine, operating under Chief of Mission authority.
NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The primary coordinating body for international training, sustainment, maintenance, and force development for Ukraine. • Successor to the International Donor Coordination Center. • Collocated with SAG-U in Wiesbaden. • The SAG-U commander is also the NSATU commander, but no command-and-control relationship exists between them.
Ukraine Defense Contact Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coalition of representatives, primarily Ministers and Chiefs of Defense, from more than 50 nations that meets approximately once a month to discuss Ukraine's security needs and ways to meet these needs. • First meeting in April 2022.
ODC-Kyiv	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv who assess, inform, prioritize, and execute bilateral security assistance in support of Ukrainian defense and security forces. • Does not train and advise the UAF.

Sources: SAG-U, responses to DoD OIG request for information, 24.1 OAR 026, 12/27/2023; 24.1 OAR 027, 12/27/2023; and 24.3 OAR 025, 7/2/2024; NATO, "NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine," press release, 7/11/2024; NATO, press release, "New NATO Secretary General Visits Shape and NSATU," press release, 10/14/2024; SAG-U, vetting comment, 10/29/2024; ODC-Kyiv, vetting comment, 7/29/2024; OUSD(P), vetting comment, 1/26/2025.




A Lithuanian instructor assists two Ukrainian soldiers standing in a trench during an 8-week training course. (NATO photo)

In addition to SAG-U and NSATU, which focused on near-term requirements for the UAF, eight “capability coalitions” seek to address medium- and longer-term warfighting requirements.¹⁷⁶ The capability coalitions operate under the Ukraine Defense Contact Group.¹⁷⁷

The capability coalitions are collaborative civilian-military bodies established to enable a multinational, capability-centric approach to security assistance for Ukraine, SAG-U said. Each coalition is tasked with building the UAF’s capabilities, including providing equipment, training, and sustainment support. In conjunction with the Ukraine Defense Contact Group’s National Armaments Directors, the capability coalitions also address defense industrial base and production issues. Nations with relevant expertise in a given area lead the coalition on that capability along with Ukrainian partners.¹⁷⁸ (See Figure 5.)

Figure 5.
Capability Coalitions and Lead Member Countries



EQUIPPING

The United States continued to collaborate with coalition partners to provide defense articles and materiel requested by the Ukrainian government.¹⁷⁹ During the quarter, the United States announced \$4 billion of military assistance to be provided to Ukraine through PDA, a significant increase from the \$1.67 billion announced the previous quarter, bringing the total committed under PDA to nearly \$34 billion since 2022. This assistance includes armored vehicles, air defense systems and interceptors, ammunition, and other capabilities.¹⁸⁰ (See Table 11.) FMF support to Ukraine in 2024 has included air defense, armored vehicles, anti-armor capabilities and munitions.¹⁸¹ (See Table 12.)

Table 11.

Defense Items Included in PDA Packages Announced During the Quarter

Air Defense	Anti-armor and Small Arms
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Additional munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) • RIM-7 missiles and support for air defense • Stinger anti-aircraft missiles • Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) equipment and munitions • HAWK air defense munitions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small arms and ammunition • 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortar systems and rounds • 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition • Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles • Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems
Fires	Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Systems
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unmanned Aerial Systems • High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARM) • Air-to-ground munitions
Ground Maneuver	Other Capabilities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) • M113 Armored Personnel Carriers • Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers • Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAP) • Light tactical vehicles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demolitions equipment and munitions • Spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training, and transportation • Satellite communication equipment • Commercial satellite imagery services • Grenades and training equipment • Equipment to protect critical national infrastructure • Medical equipment • Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear protective equipment • Clothing and individual equipment

Source: PDA 67-73, OUSD(C), website, “Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) Announcements,” as of 12/31/2024.

Table 12.

Defense Items Provided to Ukraine via FMF During 2024

<p>Air Defense</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air defense systems (Soviet and NATO) 	<p>Anti-armor and Small Arms</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-NATO standard weapon systems and ammunition • Small arms
<p>Fires</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S./NATO long-range firing equipment, including multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS)/artillery • Rocket-propelled grenade launchers, sniper and counter-sniper equipment 	<p>Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Systems</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fixed-wing capabilities • Armed UAS/counter-UAS • Airfield equipment
<p>Ground Maneuver</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Armored vehicles 	<p>Maritime</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maritime domain awareness and coastal defense capabilities • River patrol boats
<p>Other Capabilities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EDA overhead costs • Night vision devices (NVD) • C2 and cyber capability equipment 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combat care training and equipment including IEDs, laser engagement, targeting and urban operations simulators, and small-scale construction supporting these systems • Professional military training 	

Notes: Ukraine total includes supplemental FMF funds obligated directly to Ukraine and to the Ukraine Defense Enterprise Program.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 12/20/2024.

SAG-U said that the UAF still faces significant materiel shortfalls in several areas of air, ground, and maritime operations due to battlefield losses of equipment. The UAF lacks the recovery equipment necessary to remove large items, such as vehicles and artillery pieces, from the front line when Russian forces push them back, resulting in the battlefield capture of weapon systems.¹⁸²

The UAF continued to request additional Bradley Fighting Vehicles and training programs, emphasizing advanced tactics and maintenance.¹⁸³ In response, the United States and partner nations have increased donations of Bradley Fighting Vehicles and expanded training programs.¹⁸⁴

END-USE MONITORING

Federal law requires end-use monitoring (EUM) of certain transfers of defense equipment and services to foreign entities to ensure that the items are being used in accordance with the terms and conditions of the transfer agreement and applicable Federal law.¹⁸⁵ The DoD, through the Golden Sentry program, conducts EUM of items that were transferred via Foreign Military Sales or other U.S. Government security cooperation programs on a government-to-government basis. State, through the Blue Lantern program, conducts pre- and post-license checks of some articles and services exported through direct commercial

sales that may be funded by means including FMF.¹⁸⁶ State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) tracks the equipment it donates to Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the transfer agreement and applicable Federal law. State INL’s equipment does not fall under the Blue Lantern Program.¹⁸⁷


Certain defense items are subject to enhanced EUM (EEUM) since they incorporate sensitive technology; are particularly vulnerable to diversion or other misuse; or the diversion or other misuse of which could have significant consequences for U.S. national security.¹⁸⁸

Of the 19 types of designated defense articles that required EEUM, 8 had been provided to Ukraine as of the end of the quarter. (See Figure 6).¹⁸⁹

State reported that many of the EUM-designated articles that the U.S. Government has provided to Ukraine are being used in front-line locations where travel is restricted due to security concerns.¹⁹⁰ State INL said its EUM teams met with Ukrainian partners and visited EUM sites to review security procedures and the EUM process this quarter.¹⁹¹ State INL also said it conducted 15 site visits to partner locations outside Kyiv to monitor programming and observe use of EUM-designated equipment.¹⁹² State said it began the process to confirm the locations of EUM-eligible equipment in preparation for monitoring trips and reporting scheduled for the second quarter of FY 2025.¹⁹³

Figure 6.

Disposition of EEUM Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine, as of December 2024



Since 2020, the DoD OIG has issued 13 reports, and State OIG has issued 1 report related to EEUM in Ukraine. This oversight has identified the many challenges associated with conducting EEUM in a wartime environment—EEUM is designed for peacetime—as well as incremental improvements to the processes.

Such programmatic oversight often produces recommendations for agencies to address issues and improve processes or the management of programs and operations. The DoD OIG’s full body of work on EEUM in Ukraine has made 30 recommendations for ways that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), ODC-Kyiv, USEUCOM, and other DoD entities can improve various aspects of the EEUM program. (See Table 13.)

A DoD OIG evaluation published in December found that although ODC-Kyiv was able to perform its EEUM mission during peacetime conditions, it had only rotational military staff available to conduct EEUM, incurring the risk that EEUM-designated items may not be properly inventoried before transfer to Ukraine as the volume of transferred items increases.¹⁹⁴ Another DoD OIG evaluation published during the quarter found that the DoD improved the accuracy and completeness of its EEUM inventories but needed to improve its accountability items transferred by third parties.¹⁹⁵

Similarly, the DoD OIG identified several weaknesses in accountability of defense items (not just EEUM-designated articles). An evaluation published in November found that the DoD did not have effective controls to account for defense items it transferred to Ukraine through Romania. Specifically, for 6 of 16 shipments reviewed, the DoD OIG identified discrepancies among the quantities of items U.S. personnel in Romania signed for and those reported to

Table 13.

Examples of DoD OIG Recommendations Related to EEUM

Closed The agency or entity has completed action sufficient to meet the intent of our recommendation.	Open but Resolved Recommendations for which an agency or entity has agreed to take corrective action but has not completed it yet.	Open and Unresolved Recommendations for which an agency or entity has not agreed to take action sufficient to meet the intent of the recommendation.
The DSCA should withhold its recommendation that Ukraine receive more EEUM-designated night vision devices until the UAF begins providing loss reports in a timely manner.	USEUCOM should update its policy on loss reporting to require the UAF to inform the DoD when EEUM-designated items may have been potentially captured by the enemy.	The OUSD(P) and DSCA should review the challenges identified using barcode scanners for EEUM inventories and implement a plan of action to correct those issues.
ODC-Kyiv should develop and implement additional inventory procedures to better account for EEUM defense articles transferred to the UAF.	DSCA and Military Departments should review and update the list of defense articles that currently require EEUM.	
DSCA should establish a minimum frequency for compliance visits for countries identified as high risk that receive EEUM-designated materiel.	USEUCOM and ODC-Kyiv should establish procedures to review UAF loss reports to determine potential end-use violations of EEUM-designated defense articles.	

other organizations as transferred.¹⁹⁶ Another audit found that the DSCA did not consistently track the status of PDA deliveries to Ukraine.¹⁹⁷ That lack of accountability increases the risk that the DoD may not receive or transfer the agreed-upon, paid-for quantities of defense items to the UAF.¹⁹⁸

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

Since February 2022, the U.S. defense industrial base has significantly increased production of weapon systems used by the UAF, including 155mm ammunition, Javelin anti-tank missiles, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). Despite those increases, Ukraine's expenditure of artillery ammunition has exceeded the ability of its partners, including the United States, to supply Ukraine materiel in quantities sufficient to meet its stated goals, according to the Congressional Research Service.¹⁹⁹

For example, in February 2022, the United States was manufacturing about 14,000 155mm howitzer rounds per month. Over the course of 2 years and with billions of dollars invested in domestic arms manufacturing, the United States was producing 40,000 shells per month as of September 2024, and the DoD has set a goal of producing 100,000 155mm artillery rounds

A U.S. Army PATRIOT launcher deployed in southeastern Poland. (DoD photo)



per month by the end of 2025.²⁰⁰ One estimate says that Ukraine needs around 75,000 to 90,000 artillery shells per month to maintain its defenses and 200,000 to 250,000 to conduct a major offensive, according to the Congressional Research Service.²⁰¹

Admiral Samuel Paparo, the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told reporters that donations of equipment to Ukraine—particularly PATRIOT missiles and air-to-air missiles—and support for operations in the Middle East have reduced DoD stockpiles around the world. “With some of the PATRIOTS that have been employed, some of the air-to-air missiles that have been employed, it’s now eating into stocks and to say otherwise would be dishonest,” Admiral Paparo said.²⁰²

In November, the U.S. Army awarded a contract to a defense contractor to design, build, and commission a TNT production facility in Graham, Kentucky. According to the Army, the award aims to reestablish TNT production at scale on U.S. soil for the first time in decades.²⁰³

Between arms shipments to Ukraine and Israel, as well as providing protection to U.S. troops stationed in conflict zones, the DoD has had to make difficult decisions about where to station its limited supply of mobile air defense systems, such as the Patriot missiles. In October, then-Secretary of the Army Christine E. Wormuth told a public audience that “the air defense, artillery community is the most stressed” in the U.S. Army, given the overwhelming demand for U.S. air defense around the world.²⁰⁴

The relative scarcity of ATACMS may be one reason then-President Biden did not initially support Ukraine’s requests to use the weapon to strike inside Russia. DoD officials believed that the United States would be unable to supply enough missiles to meet Ukrainian demand without depleting stockpiles reserved for U.S. troops to use in possible conflicts in the Middle East and Asia, according to media reporting.²⁰⁵

TRAINING AND ADVISING

The United States and its international partners provide a variety of training to the UAF, including basic, collective, leadership, and platform-specific training.²⁰⁶ SAG-U estimates that most UAF basic training—90 percent—is conducted by Ukrainians in Ukraine.²⁰⁷

U.S. military trainers located at Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany, as well as other locations in Europe and the United States, provide primarily collective, leadership, and equipment training to the UAF.²⁰⁸

During the quarter, the United States and NATO allies trained more than 4,000 UAF personnel in Germany, Poland, Spain, and Kosovo. During the previous quarter, the United States trained hundreds of UAF personnel at sites in Europe.²⁰⁹

SAG-U personnel, including those forward-deployed as part of SAG-U Operations-Kyiv provided advising support to Ukrainian defense leaders, including the UAF and the Ukrainian National Guard.²¹⁰

F-16: The United States, along with other members of the Air Force Capability Coalition, have trained Ukrainian F-16 pilots and support personnel in the United States, Canada, and Europe. The first group of pilots has already been trained and are operating F-16s in

Ukraine. The Ukrainian pilots are being trained on an accelerated timeline compared to U.S. pilots, and the timeframe can fluctuate depending on student experience, English language skills, and progression through the training program. According to the OUSD(P), the current training timeline is on track to support the donations of aircraft scheduled for delivery in 2025.²¹¹

Air and missile defense: U.S. personnel continued to provide air and missile defense training in Germany this quarter. SAG-U reported that this quarter saw the continued improvement of Ukrainian air defense capability to levels beyond any other point in the war. SAG-U attributed high intercept rates during Russia’s air attacks in November to the equipment and training the Ukrainians have received.²¹²

Logistics and maintenance: SAG-U’s logistics team continued to advise and assist UAF counterparts in both maintenance and reconstitution efforts to help the UAF sustain and maintain operational readiness. SAG-U logisticians exchanged information with the UAF, and the Ukrainians participated in onsite staff visits and depot level engagements. SAG-U, which described the UAF as being responsive to U.S. advising efforts, expected UAF logistics capabilities to continue to trend positively.²¹³

SAG-U reported that the UAF was transparent in its working relationship with SAG-U and shared information when operational security permitted and when doing so did not risk the mission or lives of Ukrainian service members. However, the UAF’s staffing and equipment shortages and other limitations may hinder or prevent execution or follow through of U.S. recommendations.²¹⁴

Ukrainian tank crews climb out of Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks following a live-fire training at the Polish Army’s Combined Arms Training Centre in Zagan, Poland. (NATO photo)



UKRAINIAN CIVILIAN SECURITY SECTOR

PROTECTING CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

USEUCOM defines critical national infrastructure as the energy, water, and transportation-related infrastructure that enables governance and the deployment of military capabilities, which are essential to Ukraine's resilience to continue to fight.²¹⁵ Russian attacks during the quarter targeted both energy generation and transmission infrastructure, including thermal power plants, hydroelectric plants, substations and other critical transmission infrastructure, network servers, gas storage facilities, and more, causing billions of dollars in new damage resulting in routine rolling blackouts and unstable energy, heating, and water supply across the country.²¹⁶

Half of Ukraine's energy system has been either damaged or destroyed, including 70 percent of the country's thermal power plants.²¹⁷ In November, the start of Ukraine's heating season, Ukraine's Ministry of Energy announced it would no longer make damage assessments public for security reasons.²¹⁸

During the quarter, the U.S. Government continued to develop protection measures for Ukraine's energy infrastructure and identify critical energy sites for future assistance in protecting them.²¹⁹ U.S. advisors worked with Ukrainian counterparts on hardening critical energy infrastructure, including through installation of passive protection measures where feasible.²²⁰

This quarter, the DoD provided Ukraine with 200 defensive barriers and significant quantities of additional air defense systems, including counter-UAS, and air interceptors. This includes systems designed for point defense of critical national energy infrastructure against incoming cruise missile and long-range attack UAVs, according to the OUSD(P).²²¹

USEUCOM reported that a U.S. Special Operations Forces unit analyzed the effects of potential Russian attacks on hydrological infrastructure to help Ukrainians plan to protect those sites this quarter. Russian forces had previously targeted Ukraine's hydrological infrastructure; those types of strikes can result in significant flooding and loss of power generation for the civilian population.²²²

The U.S. Army's Civil Military Support Element-Ukraine, through its network of partners, monitored changes in critical infrastructure with an emphasis on power and clean drinking water, among the top essential services that the Ukrainian population needs to survive another winter. The regions in which partners operate range from periodic power in major cities such as Kharkiv and Kherson, to no power at all in regions such as Donetsk. Water availability varies from region to region, with humanitarian organizations delivering clean water to frontline communities that lack potable water production, according to USEUCOM.²²³

The Civil Military Support Element-Ukraine does not have its own funding to donate humanitarian aid, so it facilitates donations from partner aid organizations to provide generators to increase resilience in Ukrainian communities. This lack of dedicated funding combined with a lack of physical access to Ukraine has made collaboration with USAID and other U.S. Government agencies essential to supporting the protection of critical national infrastructure in Ukraine, according to USEUCOM.²²⁴

CIVILIAN SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) provides equipping and capacity building for Ukrainian law enforcement and border security partners to maintain civilian security during the conflict. Partners include the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Health, National Guard of Ukraine, National Police of Ukraine (NPU) and the State Border Guard Service (SBGS).²²⁵

Training: During the quarter, State INL and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security facilitated four weapons training courses on the use of M4A1 rifles for 87 NPU and SBGS personnel. State said these training courses supported the use of 2,000 M4A1 NATO standard rifles and ammunition that State INL provided to these agencies.²²⁶ State INL also organized a 4-week polygraph training course for 21 law enforcement officers from several agencies. State said all participants completed the course and are equipped to conduct polygraph examinations within their respective agencies.²²⁷

Training Facilities: State assisted the Ukrainian government in identifying, renovating, restoring, and constructing training facilities. State INL supported efforts to renovate and construct law enforcement training facilities at the NPU's Kyiv and Rivne Patrol Police academies, and several SBGS training centers and offices in Cherkasy, Kyiv, and Lviv.²²⁸ State said the scopes of work for those projects included the restoration and construction of educational campuses, dormitories, and training facilities at a total cost of \$14.5 million.²²⁹ In preparation for a new forensic nursing program, State INL supported the International Association of Forensics Nurses' site visits to health facilities throughout Kyiv to identify a suitable pilot facility.²³⁰

Key Leader Engagements: State reported that in October, State INL supported the participation of four NPU personnel, including the NPU Chief in the International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference in Boston.²³¹ The NPU presented at the conference and participated in sessions on recruitment tactics, competitive selection for higher supervisory positions, and the NPU's challenges and future needs.²³² Additionally, the delegation met with education, forensics and investigation solutions, weapons, communication technologies, and law enforcement software exhibitors.²³³ They also engaged with counterparts at the Boston Police Department and New York State Police, and plan to establish further bilateral cooperation.²³⁴

NONPROLIFERATION, EXPORT CONTROLS, AND BORDER SECURITY

State's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) provides equipment, supplies, expertise, and training to Ukrainian government and regional stakeholders to prevent and roll back the spread of weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats.²³⁵ State ISN also works to enhance the effectiveness of the global Russian and Belarusian sanctions regimes by enabling partners to understand and enforce sanctions and export controls.²³⁶ Lastly, State ISN coordinates with Ukraine and others in the region to increase their capacities to prevent arms diversions and to enhance the capabilities of border security agencies and respond to threats from Russia, arms

During the quarter, State INL and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security facilitated four weapons training courses on the use of M4A1 rifles for 87 NPU and SBGS personnel.

traffickers, and other actors.²³⁷ As of December, State ISN had cumulatively obligated more than \$186 million from both base and Ukraine supplemental appropriations to implement responses in those areas.²³⁸ During the quarter, State ISN obligated \$18.6 million across CBRN response, export controls, and border security.²³⁹ (See Table 14.)

State cited an example of a success from its training with the State Customs Service of Ukraine. State said that during 2023 and 2024, its training focused on enhancing customs enforcement officers’ capabilities to prevent weapons diversion along Ukraine’s borders with Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania.²⁴⁰ During a vehicle inspection on October 21, participants from the program working at the Hungarian border detected concealed compartments with caches of weapons and firearms components being smuggled by a Lithuanian national from Ukraine to the EU.²⁴¹ The cache included a submachine gun with two magazines, three magazines for a TT-33 pistol, components for a K98 carbine, an SA-26 pistol, a PPS-43 submachine gun, and munitions for an MG-42 machine gun.²⁴²

During the quarter the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), part of the Department of Energy (DoE), continued to provide capacity building, crisis management, remote sensing, and resilience services and equipment to help Ukraine with a focus on nuclear and radiological risk reduction, emergency preparedness and response, and infrastructure resilience.²⁴³ (See Table 15.)

Table 14.

State ISN CBRN, Sanctions and Export Controls, and Nonproliferation and Border Security Programs Related to Ukraine

Pillar	Activity
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Scientific Response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In November, led a 5-day workshop on critical infrastructure protection in Kyiv as part of a larger effort to build a cohort of experts to conduct security vulnerability assessments at chemical facilities in Ukraine. Participants used a risk-assessment matrix to develop their own standard operating procedures. In December, provided the first round of medical and decontamination supplies, and operational equipment to the UAF and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) CBRN units. Shipment included 29 pallets of such supplies and equipment to the SBU and 17 pallets to the UAF.
Export Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> With U.S. Customs and Border Protection personnel, conducted multiple field visits on Ukraine’s western borders to examine Ukraine’s mobile enforcement capabilities and complete Critical Gap Analysis Program assessments. The team also assessed equipment and training use and applicability and design of future programming. Provided technical assistance to public and private sector audiences in Southeast Asia on Russia’s evasion of sanctions and export controls to raise awareness and give partners skills and tools to identify and stop diversions. State said the assistance and engagements have “resulted in stopped shipments and other regulatory actions,” though it did not cite specific examples.
Preventing Arms Diversion and Border Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In November, sponsored a World Customs Organization’s Regional Customs Coordination event, at which 15 Customs Officers from Estonia, Czechia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Latvia, and Ukraine shared challenges, best practices, and intelligence related to international terrorism, advanced conventional weapons, a post-conflict Ukraine, and best practices in export controls.

Source: State, responses to State OIG request for information, 12/19/2024.

Table 15.

Selected NNSA Activity During the Quarter

Line of Effort and Objective	Activity During the Quarter
<p>Capacity Building Support Ukraine in emergent and sustained partner capacity for nonproliferation, nuclear and radiological security, counter nuclear smuggling, and emergency preparedness and response.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training: Conducted Search and Secure Training course with State Emergency Service of Ukraine on recovering and securing radiological sources found outside of regulatory control. Hosted a technical exchange on Insider Threat Mitigation for Ukrainian radiological facilities focusing on the challenges of mitigating the insider threat in a war-time environment. Delivered radiation awareness training to the State Security Service of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine in partnership with the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Conducted advanced maintenance training on radiation detection systems at international borders to SBGS. Delivered mobile radiation detection training to the National Guard of Ukraine. • Equipment delivery: Delivered radiation detection equipment and frontier patrol equipment to the SBGS for use on the Ukraine-Belarus and Ukraine-Moldova borders. Completed the installation of long-range cameras at critical points on the Ukraine-Moldova border. Procured and delivered vehicles, backup generators, and Starlink systems to the State Space Agency of Ukraine to augment remote sensing capabilities.
<p>Crisis Management Plan for and prepare to respond to nuclear and radiological incidents in Ukraine.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exercises: Conducted a joint U.S./Ukraine exercise to test the capability to respond to a nuclear detonation within Ukraine. • Crisis response: Worked with Ukrainian responders to enhance the capability for prompt and informed responses to a variety of nuclear incidents, drawing upon modeling capabilities from the National Laboratories.
<p>Remote Sensing Establish, sustain, and evolve capabilities to remotely and rapidly acquire data to deter, prevent, and respond to nuclear and radiological incidents in Ukraine.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dose rate sensors: Developed and deployed a new data management system (MissionEdge) based on the existing U.S. standard system (CBRNResponder) managed by FEMA, but in a new cloud environment for Ukraine. Trained the first group of Ukrainian experts. • Air sampling: Supported deployment of air sampling capability in Ukraine and in neighboring countries to detect reactor leaks and provide radionuclide quantification
<p>Resilience Increase the resilience of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, including, where appropriate, critical nodes of the electrical grid upon which nuclear power plants rely for safe operation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training: Delivered training on insider threat mitigation for nuclear power plant facilities to the SBU and healthcare providers. • Equipment delivery: Delivered 9 Skydio drones during the month of October for the defense of nuclear facilities. • Physical design: Completed physical protection upgrades at the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology. In cooperation with US Army Corps of Engineers, successfully conducted a series of physical tests of the primary components of US Level 2 passive protection design with working level representatives of several Ukrainian energy stakeholders in attendance.

Sources: DoE OIG/NNSA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.1 LIG WOG 009, 25.1 LIG WOG 010, 25.1 LIG WOG 011, 25.1 LIG WOG 012, 25.1 LIG WOG 013, 1/13/2025; NNSA, vetting comment, 1/28/2025.

DEMINING

According to the UN Development Programme, landmines and other unexploded ordnance have caused nearly 1,300 civilian injuries and fatalities since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.²⁴⁴ One-third of Ukraine’s territory may be contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance, and this makes up to 15 percent of Ukraine’s farmland unusable.²⁴⁵ A report issued jointly by the Ukrainian Economy Ministry and the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change



President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy visits the Okhmatdyt National Specialized Children's Hospital, including the department where children are treated for injuries caused by Russian landmines. (President of Ukraine Flickr photo)

estimated that landmines and unexploded ordnance suppressed Ukraine's gross domestic product by \$11.2 billion per year, nearly 6 percent of Ukraine's gross domestic product in 2021, and the value of Ukraine's exports have declined by approximately \$9 billion per year while regional tax revenues declined by more than \$1 billion per year.²⁴⁶

State's Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) has obligated nearly \$228 million for demining operations in Ukraine. State PM/WRA's demining assistance has two general approaches: deploying NGO teams to conduct demining activities and providing the Ukrainian government the capacity to identify and safely dispose of mines and unexploded ordnance itself. State said U.S. assistance has supported the deployment of approximately 90 NGO demining teams across nine Ukrainian regions, though State noted the number fluctuates as projects begin and end.²⁴⁷ Those teams supplement approximately 1,080 Ukrainian government teams comprising 5,400 personnel, State said.²⁴⁸

In addition, since February 2022, State INL has provided \$16 million in equipment and training to the NPU's 26 EOD units across Ukraine to assist officers to safely and effectively expand their work.²⁴⁹ The NPU's demining efforts generally operate near the front lines and in city centers that present dangers to Ukraine's armed forces, law enforcement, and civilians.²⁵⁰ As such, State said, NPU clears the way for crime scene investigators and emergency personnel to conduct rescue and recovery operations.²⁵¹

During the quarter, State PM/WRA obligated approximately \$35.9 million for several new and existing awards and contracts.²⁵² State said PM/WRA awarded, cumulatively, \$18.9 million to three international NGOs to deploy technical and nontechnical survey teams, multi-task clearance teams, mine-detection dog teams, demining machines, and risk education teams to liberated areas of Ukraine to improve civilian security and restore land to productive use.²⁵³ State PM/WRA also added \$1.8 million to an existing award to complete capabilities and needs assessments for local Ukrainian demining NGOs and commercial

companies, and to provide workshops and trainings to help organizations gain greater access to U.S. and other international donor funding.²⁵⁴ Lastly, State said, PM/WRA added approximately \$15.2 million an existing demining train-and-equip contract to exercise a contract option year, and to procure demining equipment for local NGOs and commercial companies.²⁵⁵

Training: A contractor provided training to 338 individuals from Ukraine’s State Special Transport Service (SSTS). The training covered explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), demining and battle area clearance, team leadership, introduction to quality management, technical surveys, detection, and other functions.²⁵⁶ The contractor also provided explosive hazard awareness training to non-EOD personnel from the National Police of Ukraine’s (NPU) EOD Unit who have encountered explosive hazards in the course of their duties. State said this training focused on potential risks and safe behaviors when encountering explosive hazards, especially to personnel that could be deployed to areas with explosive ordnance but may not be tasked for demining operations.²⁵⁷ State said, cumulatively, the contractor has provided explosive hazard awareness training to 940 people from both SSTS and the NPU since the start of the project.²⁵⁸

State INL also supported an FBI-led course focused on advanced techniques for detecting explosives, electronics used for typical improvised explosive devices, and the skills needed to render such devices safe.²⁵⁹

Equipping: PM/WRA also donated demining equipment valued at approximately \$2.5 million. The equipment included 4 armored backhoe loaders, 42 pickup trucks, 129 metal detectors, 167 sets of personal protective equipment, and 147 demining tool kits, provide mainly to the SSTS. PM/WRA also provided supplies to support clearance, non-technical surveys, and quality management operations, including trimmers, blasting machines, wire reel with cable, GPS, binoculars, laser rangefinders, tablet computers, drones, printers and scanners, probes, generators with solar panels, tents, axes, orthopedic spine shields, tactical rescue stretchers, paramedic first aid kits, and individual first-aid kits.²⁶⁰

Key Leader Engagements: State INL supported the NPU EOD Commander’s attendance and participation at the 11th Annual EOD/IED and Countermining Symposium, which highlighted challenges in training and recruitment of EOD personnel, as well as emerging technologies, international cooperation, operations interoperability, and counter-improvised explosive device missions.²⁶¹

Monitoring: State reported that PM/WRA continued to closely monitor and oversee demining programs. State said State INL personnel are not approved to directly monitor EOD efforts at field sites where the NPU EOD units operate. However, State INL receives regular updates from the field and meets with the NPU EOD Commander regularly to discuss progress and planned activities. State INL also accompanies participants on study visits and attends NPU EOD personnel trainings including three during the first quarter of FY 2025.²⁶²

During the quarter, those monitoring practices included weekly reports and bi-weekly telephone conversations with its contractor, reviewing monthly and quarterly reports, and holding ad hoc meetings with its international NGO partners.²⁶³ In addition, State said PM/WRA maintains a cooperative agreement with an NGO to deploy a third-party monitoring

The contractor also provided explosive hazard awareness training to non-EOD personnel from the National Police of Ukraine’s EOD Unit who have encountered explosive hazards in the course of their duties.

The DEA reported that from January through mid-October, Ukrainian law enforcement achieved a “marked increase” in charged offenses, arrests, and seizures related to synthetic drugs.

team, which conducted site visits to U.S.-funded demining programs in Ukraine to verify the accuracy of implementers’ reports and their compliance with the award terms and conditions.²⁶⁴ State PM/WRA’s demining program is also monitored under the MEASURE contract designed to assess whether assistance achieves its intended outcomes.²⁶⁵

Results: State reported that its demining operations have returned nearly 11,600 square miles of Ukrainian land to productive use.²⁶⁶ State said PM/WRA’s demining contractors and NGOs have returned approximately 3.6 million square miles of land to productive use.²⁶⁷ State INL reported that, as of December 31, NPU EOD units had responded to 90,945 calls for assistance and demined 163 square miles of land, clearing the way for crime scene investigators and rendering locations safe for rescue and recovery of civilians.²⁶⁸ State INL also reported that the NPU EOD teams had seized 348,290 pieces of ordnance and disposed of 145,536.²⁶⁹

COUNTERNARCOTICS

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reported that the primary drug threat to Ukrainian society continued to be domestically produced synthetic drugs, with the most notable being amphetamines, methadone, mephedrone, Alpha-PVP, and new psychoactive substances. The drugs are produced in small labs and distributed through online marketplaces, taxi and postal deliveries, and “dead drops.”²⁷⁰

The DEA partners with Ukrainian law enforcement agencies to bilaterally target illicit transnational chemical precursor supply networks involved in the manufacture, sale, and/or transport of the requisite components to knowingly enable the production of synthetic drugs that threaten U.S. and Ukrainian societies.²⁷¹ The DEA also continues to work in partnership with State INL to improve counterdrug investigative capacity via training programs. During the quarter, these agencies collaborated on two trainings for NPU and SBGS officers: an asset forfeitures and money laundering training and a training on tactical safety and planning.²⁷²

The DEA reported that from January through mid-October, Ukrainian law enforcement achieved a “marked increase” in charged offenses, arrests, and seizures related to synthetic drugs.²⁷³ During that period Ukrainian law enforcement authorities reported dismantling 130 drug trafficking organizations—a year-on-year increase of 60.5 percent.²⁷⁴ The DEA defines a drug trafficking organization as an entity of any size that participates in the illegal trafficking of drugs.²⁷⁵

Additionally, Ukrainian authorities reported dismantling 64 clandestine drug laboratories and arresting 92 clandestine laboratory organizers and co-organizers. During the same period, efforts to target the flow of illicit drug proceeds resulted in the initiation of 52 money laundering investigations, a 10.6 percent increase from 2023. Ukrainian police also reported the seizure of approximately \$3 million in drug-related assets, which was more than double the value of assets seized during the same period of 2023.²⁷⁶

The DEA noted that while bilateral efforts have resulted in law enforcement successes in both the U.S. and Ukraine, corruption and information leaks from within Ukraine’s justice sector continue to handicap law enforcement investigations.²⁷⁷

TARGETING RUSSIA'S ECONOMY

The U.S. Government uses sanctions against individuals and entities that are responsible or complicit in Russia's aggression against Ukraine.²⁷⁸ Since 2014, the President has authorized State and Treasury to apply sanctions on Russian government officials and other entities and individuals that support the Russian military or are otherwise complicit in Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Since then, the U.S. Government and international partners have steadily expanded sanctions on Russian entities and individuals, with a recent emphasis on third-party entities and individuals that enable Russia's military campaign.²⁷⁹

The U.S. Government works with allies and partners to share information about potential sanctions, coordinate complementary actions, address impact assessments, and mitigate concerns.²⁸⁰



Financial Sanctions

- **Blocking foreign transactions**
- **Immobilizing foreign assets**
- **Seizure of physical assets of value**



Trade Sanctions

- **Restrictions on export of sensitive technologies**
- **Restrictions ("price cap") on purchase of Russian oil and gas**

Targets of sanctions imposed during the quarter included:

More than 50 Russian Banks, including the prominent Gazprombank: The bank, a Russian state-owned financial institution connected with the state energy company Gazprom, was among the last of Russia's major banks not under U.S. sanction. Treasury said Russia used the bank as a conduit to purchase military materiel and to pay its soldiers, including for combat bonuses, and to compensate the families of Russian soldiers killed fighting Putin's brutal war against Ukraine. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom had previously sanctioned Gazprombank.²⁸¹

Russia's sanctions evasion network: The U.S. Government sanctioned nearly 400 entities and individuals to disrupt the networks and channels through which Russia procures technology and equipment from entities in countries to support its war effort.²⁸² The designations targeted producers, exporters, and importers of items critical to Russia's military-industrial base, including those in countries such as the People's Republic of China (PRC), India, Malaysia, Thailand, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, and Belarus.²⁸³

Producers of Russia's Garpiya long-range attack UAS: These were the first U.S. sanctions imposed on targets in the PRC that directly develop and produce complete weapons systems in partnership with Russian firms.²⁸⁴

Construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline: The U.S. Government re-imposed sanctions on companies, individuals, and vessels involved in construction of the natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany.²⁸⁵

Russia's "shadow fleet": The United Kingdom and the European Union imposed port access bans on dozens of vessels that have helped Russia evade sanctions.²⁸⁶ The United Kingdom also sanctioned insurance companies that enable the fleet.²⁸⁷

585

U.S. Government sanctions applied during the quarter against individuals and entities supporting Russia's aggression in Ukraine.²⁸⁸

5,611

Individuals and entities sanctioned since February 2022.²⁸⁹

More than 80 percent

of Russian banking sector sanctioned.²⁹⁰

Enforcement

Task Force KleptoCapture, an interagency body led by the DoJ, enforces economic sanctions, export restrictions and economic countermeasures imposed by the United States. The task force investigates and prosecutes individuals and entities that support Russia's unlawful war in Ukraine, while working towards seizing and ultimately forfeiting assets that can be transferred to Ukraine.²⁹¹ During the quarter, the task force charged:

- Seven individuals and a corporate entity for **illegal schemes to supply U.S.-origin technology to Russia**;
- A real estate broker for his role in managing and attempting to **transfer multiple Miami-area luxury condominiums ultimately owned by two sanctioned Russians**; and
- Brought a civil forfeiture action against \$3.4 million traced to a **conspiracy to liquidate certain U.S.-based assets of Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska**.²⁹²

Since 2022, the task force has charged more than 100 individuals and entities with criminal violations of U.S. sanctions and export controls and seized, restrained or otherwise obtained forfeiture judgments against nearly \$650 million in assets belonging to Russian oligarchs and others who unlawfully supported the Russian regime and evaded U.S. economic countermeasures.²⁹³

Challenges

The weight of the mounting sanctions has had some negative impacts on Russia's economy and, potentially, its ability to prosecute the war. But Russia's economy has not collapsed, and the conflict continues.

Russia's economy is smaller than it would be without sanctions. Treasury said that Russia's macroeconomic performance has been constrained due to the impact of the war and multilateral sanctions.²⁹⁴ Russia's GDP growth somewhat recovered after an initial contraction in 2022, though quarter-on-quarter growth at the end of the year was declining.²⁹⁵ The value of the ruble has also declined sharply since summer 2024.²⁹⁶

Russia has reoriented its economy to support the war. Russia's increased government spending has been a driver of economic growth since 2022.²⁹⁷ In June, Treasury updated its definition of Russia's military-industrial base to reflect the extent to which the war effort now relies on entities that were previously more oriented toward the civilian economy.²⁹⁸ However, economic data from late 2024 suggests that production fueled by state spending might be slowing.²⁹⁹

Sanctions evasion is widespread. Russia has turned to intermediaries in China, India, Türkiye, and elsewhere to procure and assemble materials for its defense industry.³⁰⁰ One entity targeted during the quarter, TRG Group, sought to exploit cryptocurrencies to evade U.S. and international sanctions.³⁰¹

Russian money continues to flow through alternative financial systems. Sanctions prevent Russian banks from using SWIFT, the interbank messaging system that processes more than 80 percent of international financial

Russian GDP Growth, 2014–2026



transactions. In 2014, Russia founded SPFS, an alternative to SWIFT, to evade sanctions. Banks in China, Iran, Türkiye, and other countries joined SPFS. In November, Treasury alerted international financial institutions that they could face sanctions if they join SPFS.³⁰² Treasury said that its secondary sanctions regime has hindered Russia's attempts to abuse international banks to support its military-industrial base.³⁰³

Russia's oil and gas revenues decreased, but Russia has found other buyers. Revenues decreased following a December 2022 decision by the G7 to cap the price of Russian oil. Since then, the PRC has bought 47 percent of Russia's crude oil, followed by India (37 percent), the European Union (7 percent), and Türkiye (6 percent). At the end of the quarter, more than 80 percent of seaborne crude oil exports from Russia were transported by "shadow tankers" that are not subject to the price cap.³⁰⁴






The World Food Programme and its partners distributed more than 10 million loaves of fresh local bread to Ukrainians in 2024, reaching 300,000 people with bread distributions on average each month. (WFP photo)

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

- 60 Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance
- 67 Economic Growth
- 70 Health Assistance
- 74 Monitoring and Evaluation

Figure 7.

State and USAID FY 2025 Q1 Obligated Development Funding, by Sector



DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

The U.S. Government provides development programs to support the Ukrainian government and people. (See Figure 7.)


DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE

RULE OF LAW AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

State said the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), in coordination with the Department of Justice (DoJ) and other partners, has operated a decades-long anti-corruption program aimed at improving Ukrainian institutions’ capacities to investigate, prosecute, convict, and seize assets of government officials and others engaged in public corruption.³⁰⁵ (See Figure 8.) USAID seeks to strengthen anti-corruption institutional capacity through its Pro-Integrity activity. State INL and USAID monitored their programs through virtual meetings, data collection and analysis, coordination with beneficiary institutions, embedded experts at beneficiary institutions, and oversight visits.³⁰⁶

U.S. officials have emphasized the importance of Ukrainian governance reform to demonstrate the appropriate use of U.S. and international assistance. The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OUSDP) said that while Ukraine has made real improvements in advancing reforms in its military, the government still has significant work to do in anti-corruption and good corporate governance to achieve its Euro-Atlantic integration goals.³⁰⁷

Figure 8.
Ukrainian Anti-Corruption Entities



On October 22, Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin resigned amid a corruption scandal involving prosecutors in the Khmelnytskyi region, though the Mr. Kostin was not implicated. The scandal uncovered falsification of disability certificates, enabling officials to falsely obtain pensions and avoid conscription. State noted that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy subsequently ordered the dissolution of various “expert commissions,” aiming to replace them with a more transparent European model.³⁰⁸

In September, the MoD attempted to merge its Defense Procurement Agency and State Logistics Operator, which are responsible for lethal and non-lethal military procurement, respectively.³⁰⁹ The MoD halted the attempt following public NATO messaging that the agencies should continue to be strengthened and kept separate during wartime, according to State.³¹⁰

In December, the MoD made changes to the agencies’ charters that granted the MoD final authority over most of the Defense Procurement Agency board’s decisions.³¹¹ In January the MoD removed the head of the Defense Procurement Agency, despite the agency’s board recommending that her contract be extended. She was replaced by the head of the State Logistics Operator. State reported that the MoD also moved to dismiss the two state-selected representatives on the Defense Procurement Agency board, setting up a political conflict with no clear outcome.³¹²

These events followed two significant defense procurement scandals in Ukraine that occurred during the quarter. In one, a state-owned defense contractor produced and shipped to the front line 20,000 defective 120mm mortar rounds and a smaller number of 82mm shells.³¹³ The defects were caused by poor quality gunpowder and TNT that led to only 1 in 10 of these shells working properly.³¹⁴

In November, the Cabinet of Ministers, at the behest of the MoD, transferred approximately \$552 million from the Defense Procurement Agency to the State Border Guard Service for munitions to be provided by a Polish firm.³¹⁵ According to media reports, the funding was transferred because the Defense Procurement Agency could not spend all budgeted funds before the end of the year.³¹⁶ The move led to allegations that the munitions in question were overpriced and that the movement of funds may have been done to bypass Defense Procurement Agency scrutiny to benefit a particular company.³¹⁷ According to State, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) has initiated a criminal investigation based on these allegations.³¹⁸

Nonetheless, Ukraine advanced several governance reforms this quarter:³¹⁹

Customs Reform: On October 17, President Zelenskyy signed a law to reform the State Customs Service (SCS), which is responsible for controlling import and export duties at the Ukrainian border.³²⁰ The new law mandates transparency and international participation in the selection of the head of the SCS to ensure political independence. It also allows for an audit to determine grounds for dismissal and to establish requirements for re-certification of SCS employees.³²¹ USAID said that the law could potentially increase Ukrainian government revenues, which would enable the government to invest additional funds in the country’s recovery.³²²

In September, the MoD attempted to merge its Defense Procurement Agency and State Logistics Operator, which are responsible for lethal and non-lethal military procurement, respectively.

In October, State INL awarded a \$4.8 million grant to a nongovernmental organization to increase the capacity of Ukrainian anti-corruption civil society organizations and media to monitor and expose corruption at local, regional, and national levels.

The law incorporates provisions requested by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the EU's Ukraine Facility.³²³ USAID's Pro-Integrity activity and State INL programming supported analysis of the versions of the draft law and convened stakeholders to discuss how to strengthen the legislation.³²⁴ USAID reported that Pro-Integrity is also actively preparing to support the selection of a new head of the SCS and subsequent reform steps.³²⁵

Defense Procurement Reform: A DoD advisor works directly with Ukraine's Ministry of Defense (MoD) Office of Inspector General to assist with the implementation of anti-corruption measures. The DoD also has an MoD acquisition advisor, who collaborates with Ukrainian defense procurement counterparts to improve the acquisition process and support Ukraine's reform efforts. The OUSD(P) said these engagements have helped advance reforms or prevented backsliding in areas such as defense procurement, corporate governance, and logistics.³²⁶

Medical Commission Reform: On December 19, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a bill to dissolve the country's system of medical examination commissions following accusations of corruption schemes used to acquire false disability certifications. Disability status allows Ukrainians to receive an exemption from military service and receive higher pensions as well as other benefits. On October 22, the Security Service of Ukraine announced that it had exposed corruption schemes at medical examination commissions, resulting in the cancellation of 4,106 fraudulent disability status certificates in 2024. The Ukrainian government plans to replace the old medical examination commissions with a new and more transparent system for assessing patients' medical status.³²⁷

Anti-bribery Legislation: On December 4, the Ukrainian parliament approved legislation to improve accountability of companies and amend the country's tax code to combat bribery of foreign officials in international business transactions.³²⁸

In October, State INL awarded a \$4.8 million grant to a nongovernmental organization (NGO) to increase the capacity of Ukrainian anti-corruption civil society organizations and media to monitor and expose corruption at local, regional, and national levels. The program supports civil society organizations and investigative journalists throughout Ukraine to monitor and expose corruption, and to report to NABU and other law enforcement agencies. The grant is in place until September 2026.³²⁹ In addition, State INL undertook several efforts to build capacity to investigate, prosecute, and convict officials engaging in, or suspected of engaging in, public corruption.³³⁰ (See Table 16.)

During the quarter, USAID's Pro-Integrity activity issued four grants to support training of professional personnel in areas including anti-corruption and compliance, transparent and accountable reconstruction, whistleblowing, and investigative journalism.³³¹ Pro-Integrity launched a Local Government Integrity Alliance, with an initial cohort of 22 communities.³³² The aim of this alliance is to increase transparency and accountability in local governance, and it plans to extend its work to 80 municipalities across Ukraine.³³³ This work is intended to help enable civic oversight to prevent, expose, and counter corruption, as well as strengthen the capacity of anti-corruption compliance officers and institutionalize anti-corruption measures and tools in local governments, according to USAID.³³⁴

Table 16.

State INL Anti-Corruption Training and Technical Assistance to the Ukrainian Government

Type of Assistance	Activities Implemented
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Funded 3 trainings for 61 NABU, OPG, and SAPO staff to improve legal writing by replacing outdated legal language with clear, plain language to enhance understanding and transparency. Funded three High Anti-Corruption Court officials' participation in sessions on judicial security, human trafficking, ethics, and work-life balance at the National Association of Women Judges in San Diego, CA. Funded a workshop, organized by DoJ's resident legal advisor at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, that focused on plea bargaining, including examining new Ukrainian legislation on plea bargaining, how DoJ prosecutors and FBI investigators work together on long-term investigations, and how prosecutors value and incorporate input from investigators when crafting plea bargains. Conducted a leadership training for NABU and SAPO managers to discuss how to improve internal communications. Supported FBI-led training for NABU managers and detectives in effective law enforcement management and law enforcement tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Technical Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In coordination with the DoJ's resident legal advisor, led a delegation to Washington, D.C., and New York City for NABU detectives, Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutors Office prosecutors, and High Anti-Corruption Court judges to develop plea bargaining and trial skills. With EU counterparts, nominated international experts to conduct a comprehensive audit of NABU leadership and operational effectiveness. Completed work for a grant that to advance NABU public communications by developing media highlighting NABU's goals, objectives, and current activities.
Other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In coordination with the World Bank's Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, organized a 4-day seminar and roundtable for judges of Ukraine's High Anti-Corruption Court to address ongoing challenges to their work and identify areas for improvement. The seminar featured discussions on topics such as interpreting criminal law in cases of bribery, abuse of power, illicit enrichment, and money laundering. Assisted the Office of the Prosecutor General's ongoing re-attestation of prosecutors, to assist NABU's effort to develop performance evaluation criteria for detectives, and to provide support to the Bureau of Economic Security's new leadership selection commission.

Sources: State, response to State OIG request for information, 12/19/2024; State, vetting comment, 1/28/2025.

Pro-Integrity also supported the National Agency on Corruption Prevention and the National Agency of Ukraine for Civil Service in engaging veterans into the anti-corruption and public sector through internship and public outreach campaigns to help promote and build integrity from within public institutions.³³⁵ This initiative is intended to foster a veteran-friendly work environment to help reintegrate demobilized veterans across state institutions.³³⁶

During the quarter, State INL and its partners undertook two efforts to provide support to anti-corruption institutions in Baltic countries.³³⁷ State said that in October, the State INL-funded DoJ program hosted a high-level Lithuanian delegation in Washington, D.C., and New York City, featuring leaders from Lithuania's Special Investigation Service, Office of the Prosecutor General, and Supreme Court. According to State, the 9-day visit aimed to bolster Lithuania's capacity to address corruption and financial crimes, foster valuable knowledge exchange and strengthen bilateral cooperation against corruption.³³⁸

According to State, approximately 150,000 alleged incidents of aggression and war crimes have been registered with the Ukrainian Office of the Prosecutor General since February 2022, including forced deportations, imprisonment, sexual violence, and summary executions.

In late October, the DoJ hosted an advanced regional workshop in Riga, Latvia, for prosecutors, law enforcement, tax and customs investigators, and financial intelligence unit analysts from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. According to State, the 5-day workshop focused on complex financial investigation technique and public corruption cases. According to State this training equipped attendees with skills for tracing illicit funds, calculating illegal proceeds, and identifying assets for confiscation.³³⁹

HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES

U.S. Government agencies continued to work with Ukraine, other international partners, and civil society organizations to pursue international and national pathways to justice for international crimes Russia's forces and officials have committed against Ukraine.³⁴⁰ According to State, approximately 150,000 alleged incidents of aggression and war crimes have been registered with the Ukrainian Office of the Prosecutor General since February 2022, including forced deportations, imprisonment, sexual violence, and summary executions.³⁴¹

Multilateral Coordination: State participated in discussions on the establishment of a claims commission for Ukraine. State also participated in the Montreal Ministerial Conference on the Human Dimension of Ukraine's Peace Formula, which focused on facilitating the return of Ukrainian prisoners of war, civilian detainees, and forcibly deported and transferred children, as well as measures to hold Russia accountable for its abuses against these populations.³⁴² In addition, State supported the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine's efforts to compile impartial and verified accounts of abuses and violations of international human rights law in Ukraine.³⁴³

Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group for Ukraine: Established by the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, the advisory group seeks to streamline and leverage multilateral technical assistance related to justice for atrocity crimes.³⁴⁴ State reported that the advisory group continued its efforts to provide coordinated strategic advice, capacity building, and operational assistance to Ukraine's Office of Prosecutor General on investigating and prosecuting atrocity crimes in Ukraine.³⁴⁵

War Crimes Accountability Team: The DoJ launched the War Crimes Accountability Team in June 2022 to conduct and support investigations involving human rights abuses, war crimes, and other atrocities. The DoJ reported that it has sought to enhance U.S. and Ukrainian war crime prosecutions by expanding the use of requests for mutual legal assistance. The FBI, in conjunction with the DoD, is also working to exploit materials provided by Ukraine and will provide reports and other evidence that will be used for future war crime prosecutions.³⁴⁶ (See Table 17.)

Litigation: State's Office of Global Criminal Justice supported civil society groups' efforts to close the impunity gap for international crimes Russia has committed by pursuing strategic litigation in Ukraine and third countries.³⁴⁷ These groups use a range of approaches, including field interviews, open-source intelligence, and satellite imagery to identify, investigate, and build case files to help strengthen cases before judicial authorities inside Ukraine as well as

Table 17.

Highlights of War Crimes Accountability Team Activity During the Quarter

Investigations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continued to investigate war crimes that fall within U.S. domestic jurisdiction with the goal of criminal prosecution. Worked with Ukrainian partners to support their investigations of Russian war crimes and other atrocity crimes, which included operational assistance, case-based mentoring, training, and advice regarding evidence collection, forensics, victim witness support, relevant legal analysis, including war crimes in the context of environmental damage and other novel areas of the law. Shared information with Ukrainian and other national authorities related to foreign war crimes investigations, including contributions to Eurojust’s Core International Crimes Evidence Database. Obtained information from Ukraine and other national authorities to assist in on-going U.S. investigations.
Capacity Building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> With the FBI’s Art Crime Team, developed training (to begin in February 2025) that will include case mentoring with a focus on the investigation and prosecution of looting, illicit trafficking, and destruction of cultural property as a war crime. As part of the DoJ’s Access to Justice, supported three virtual expert roundtable trainings in community prosecution best practices and standards.

Sources: DoJ OIG, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.1 LIG WOG 008, 1/3/2025.

pursue cases outside the country in coordination with Ukrainian authorities.³⁴⁸ The Office of Global Criminal Justice and State INL support for these groups enhanced evidence collection, case building, fugitive tracking, and support to victims throughout their engagement with criminal accountability processes, State said.³⁴⁹ Additionally, State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) continued to support civil society legal assistance and documentation efforts for justice and accountability purposes, including on civil society engagement on transfers and deportations of Ukrainian children.³⁵⁰

The DoJ and State reported that there were several challenges to identifying, arresting, and prosecuting human rights violators and war criminals.³⁵¹ According to State, the Ukrainian Office of the Prosecutor General has reported it has received more than 150,000 alleged incidents of crimes, abuses, and damage as of January 2025. State said that Ukrainian law enforcement personnel and prosecutors are overwhelmed investigating and prosecuting such a high volume of cases while their country actively combats Russia’s aggression.³⁵² In addition, limited capacity within Ukraine’s law enforcement system; the difficulty of getting those accused of international crimes into custody; and the lack of safe access for investigators and prosecutors to front-line crime sites to carry out their work also presents challenges.³⁵³ U.S.-based investigations are further challenged by limited jurisdiction and the legal complexities associated with prosecuting such war crimes.³⁵⁴

Victim and Witness Support: State INL, in cooperation with the DoJ resident legal advisor, led a delegation from the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine to Washington, D.C., and New York to learn U.S. best practices on victim and witness coordination, including victim-centered approaches to cases, working with victims and witnesses of sexual violence and crimes against children, and coordinating victim services in the justice system as it relates to war crimes committed in Ukraine.³⁵⁵

According to the Department of Energy, Russia's strikes on energy infrastructure have destroyed 39 percent Ukraine's total pre-war generation capacity.

Missing Persons: State DRL and the International Commission on Missing Persons, an intergovernmental organization, partnered to strengthen Ukraine's Ministry of Internal Affairs' forensic research capabilities and application in criminal proceedings. Under this effort, State DRL supported the establishment of a specialized forensics facility and donations of forensic equipment to help Ukraine meet international forensics standards.³⁵⁶ State DRL also supported prosecutors' offices and mortuaries on sampling human remains, held a week-long workshop on facial recognition technology, and adapted two databases to better track missing persons.³⁵⁷

ECONOMIC GROWTH

REBUILDING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Russian attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure resulted in routine blackouts and unstable energy, heat, and water supply.³⁵⁸ According to the Department of Energy (DoE), Russia's strikes on energy infrastructure have destroyed 39 percent Ukraine's total pre-war generation capacity.³⁵⁹

Planned rolling blackouts ("load shedding") and unplanned outages remain regular occurrences across the country. Load shedding is often strategically rotated among regions or sectors – such as industrial vs. residential consumers – to maximize the benefit of available power at a given time. Many Ukrainian businesses have invested in generators to offset energy losses from the grid.³⁶⁰ Agricultural enterprises in some areas have resorted to solutions such as mobile grain dryers to prepare for the winter harvest.³⁶¹ Kharkiv and other parts of eastern Ukraine remain the hardest hit by power outages.³⁶²

USAID continued to support the repair and rehabilitation of Ukrainian energy infrastructure by providing equipment, materials, and technical assistance to address issues like the continued provision of basic needs to Ukrainian citizens, including electricity, heat, and water, as well as to strengthen the resilience of the grid.³⁶³

In December, the United States announced an additional \$825 million in emergency energy assistance for Ukraine.³⁶⁴ Of this funding, USAID Ukraine reported that it has received \$425 million, of which \$350 million will be used to repair energy infrastructure damaged by Russian attacks and \$75 million for the procurement of distributed generation.³⁶⁵

Energy Equipment Procurement: Through the Energy Security Program and the Securing Power, Advancing Resilience and Connectivity activity, USAID provided autotransformers and generators to power communities; mobile boiler houses to heat critical facilities, such as schools and hospitals; bucket trucks to help repair downed grid lines; and pipes, valves, and cables.³⁶⁶ USAID said that equipment deliveries have increased the speed at which energy workers can repair damage in the aftermath of Russia's attacks, while also building Ukraine's energy resilience for the peak summer cooling and winter heating seasons.³⁶⁷

Nuclear Energy: State's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation continued administering \$32 million in funding to review how small modular reactors may be used to help rebuild Ukraine's damaged infrastructure.³⁶⁸ The effort includes a public-private partnership to deploy a pilot plant to demonstrate commercial-scale hydrogen and ammonia

production using simulated U.S. small modular reactors technology, which uses nuclear power to deliver electricity at a small scale. State said commercial partners from the United States, Japan, and South Korea contribute to this effort.³⁶⁹ Implementers will develop a national-level roadmap, as well as complete a suite of feasibility assessments and technical and advisory services to make recommendations on how U.S. small modular reactors technologies can be used to support Ukraine's ongoing energy security needs.³⁷⁰ In addition, a steel project will review Ukraine's steelmaking industry and engage U.S. industrial partners to demonstrate how small modular reactors can support reliable steelmaking.³⁷¹ The program is scheduled to run through calendar year 2025.³⁷²

Ukraine continues to rely heavily on nuclear energy, generating approximately 70 percent of nighttime energy and 60 percent of daytime energy.³⁷³ Ukraine's nuclear power plants, are operating at increased risk due to Russian attacks, reduced maintenance, lack of spare parts, and the loss of other sources of electricity which help stabilize the grid through disturbances. As a result, there have been four unplanned reactor outages this fall and winter.³⁷⁴

Freight Transit Facilities: On November 19, Ukrainian Railways requested that \$250 million in U.S. funding planned for construction of the Mostyska/Sknyliv Rail Line be used instead to purchase construction equipment and locomotives and for the construction of freight transit facilities. Ukrainian Railways reasoned that its subsidiary construction company could do the work for substantially less and substantially quicker than any U.S. or international firm. USAID reported that it was determining how best to reprogram these resources.³⁷⁵

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture is a large part of Ukraine's economy, and the ongoing attacks have caused significant financial losses.³⁷⁶ On October 14, Russian forces attacked the port of Odesa with ballistic missiles, damaging two civilian vessels, a grain storage facility, cranes, warehouses, machinery, vehicles, and Sea Ports Authority buildings.³⁷⁷ Russian attacks have exacerbated the strain on global agricultural markets, leading to reduced grain supplies, and increased uncertainty about future availability.³⁷⁸ The heightened risk of attacks on ships and ports has temporarily raised insurance premiums for vessels operating in the region and increased the cost of transporting grain.³⁷⁹ In November, exports of agricultural commodities from Ukraine dropped from the previous month to 5.5 million metric tons, primarily due to Russian attacks on the power grid and port facilities.³⁸⁰

Despite these challenges, Ukrainian agricultural exports continued to grow and contribute to Ukraine's economic resilience, according to USAID.³⁸¹ Between January and November 2024, Ukraine generated \$22.6 billion in food export revenue, exceeding the level of the same period of the previous year by 15 percent, and accounting for almost 59 percent of Ukraine's total commodity exports.³⁸² This quarter, Ukraine exported more than 13 million metric tons of grain, oilseeds, and derivatives.³⁸³

Wartime conditions combined with dry weather conditions have led to lower crop yield forecasts for the coming months.³⁸⁴ The U.S. Department of Agriculture forecasts 2024-2025 production to be approximately 78.5 million metric tons of grains and oilseeds, a 10 percent

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USAID reported that for every \$1 the United States has invested as part of the initiative, it has leveraged approximately \$6.45 from donors and private sector investors.

drop from 2023-24 levels, due to below-average precipitation and excessive heat since the start of the season.³⁸⁵ Besides dry weather, other factors that impact Ukrainian agriculture production include low profitability, limited affordability of high-quality inputs and finance, limited insurance instruments, workforce shortage due to war and conscription, limited access to reliable irrigation, and risk-related costs, such as freight and vessel insurance, according to USAID.³⁸⁶

Investment: On October 10, USAID announced a \$1.75 billion expansion of its Agriculture Resilience Initiative-Ukraine, which mobilizes investment to boost production and exports. The expansion includes nine new partners from the private sector, international financial institutions, and other donors, including the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, the International Finance Corporation, and State PM/WRA.³⁸⁷ In total, the initiative has mobilized \$2.26 billion in private sector and partner investments since July 2022.³⁸⁸ USAID reported that for every dollar the United States has invested as part of the initiative, it has leveraged approximately \$6.45 from donors and private sector investors.³⁸⁹

Restoration of Irrigation and Drainage Systems: In November, USAID launched five new projects with Water User Organizations, expanding irrigation to almost 2,000 hectares.³⁹⁰ These co-investment projects aim to modernize Water User Organization engineering facilities and expand the irrigated area by almost 7,000 hectares (almost 7 percent of irrigated areas), and increase yields by at least 50 percent.³⁹¹

Fertilizer Distribution: In August, USAID finished distributing 6,600 tons of fertilizer to 3,577 micro, small, and medium-sized farmers in frontline and liberated areas to facilitate the application of nutrients on 132,000 hectares of winter crops.³⁹² In October, USAID completed the distribution of fertilizer to an additional 9,500 farmers in 16 regions to facilitate nourishment for 95,000 hectares of winter crops.³⁹³

USAID reported that it faces several implementation challenges in the agriculture sector.³⁹⁴ Since 2022, mobilization, migration, and war have caused the workforce to shrink by more than 20 percent to 13 million people.³⁹⁵ Ongoing conscription efforts reduce the availability and mobility of implementer staff and the ability of implementers to operate.³⁹⁶ The dynamic nature of the conflict affects USAID's ability to plan and implement activities.³⁹⁷ Russian troops advancing in the eastern regions of Ukraine impedes USAID's ability to plan and implement activities in those areas.³⁹⁸

Small farms and firms struggle to borrow enough to finance their operations, and financing long-term capital spending is nearly impossible, USAID said.³⁹⁹ The rising costs of doing business have decreased profits, especially for farmers.⁴⁰⁰ Periodic ad hoc border blockades by farmers in the neighboring EU countries, such as Poland, slow border crossings and delay of delivery of equipment procured by USAID for Ukrainian farmers.⁴⁰¹

HEALTH ASSISTANCE

HEALTH SECTOR REFORM

USAID programs seek to address both emergency needs and long-term systemic challenges in Ukraine’s healthcare sector. These efforts include supporting legislation; enhancing public accountability; optimizing evidence-based health financing; combatting corruption in professional development; addressing workforce shortages by empowering nurses and multidisciplinary teams; strengthening cybersecurity and data management; and advancing hospital performance through monitoring and integrated care models.⁴⁰²

The Ukrainian government does not directly fund healthcare services. Local authorities maintain communal facilities, while the central government purchases services from these and private facilities through the Program of Medical Guarantees.⁴⁰³ The Ukrainian government only pays for delivered services, using the National Health Service of Ukraine’s monitoring system to identify discrepancies between reported and actual cases, enabling corrective payments—a step toward accountability and transparency.⁴⁰⁴ Under the 2024 Program of Medical Guarantees, healthcare workforce salaries were funded by donors, including USAID, through a direct budget support program managed by the Ministry of Finance under a trilateral agreement with the World Bank and USAID.⁴⁰⁵

USAID supported independent oversight bodies and made recommendations to guide transparent decision-making by the Ukrainian government in the healthcare sector by providing support and technical assistance in these areas to strengthen governance and accountability.⁴⁰⁶ In addition, the Ukrainian government has engaged key donors, including USAID, for informed decision-making, on whether non-private healthcare providers contracted under the Program of Medical Guarantees will be getting their funding only to so-called non-budget accounts opened with the State Treasury of Ukraine.⁴⁰⁷

HEALTHCARE FACILITIES

This quarter, the Ukrainian Ministry of Health (MoH) reported that 68 healthcare facilities were destroyed by Russian attacks, bringing the total to 289 since the start of the full-scale invasion. An additional 222 facilities were damaged this quarter, bringing the total to 1,878.⁴⁰⁸ As of December 1, USAID and other donors have supported the restoration of 976 facilities, with 565 fully restored, 370 partially restored, and 41 fully restored but destroyed again.⁴⁰⁹

Rolling blackouts have affected the National Health System of Ukraine’s administrative headquarters, a key USAID beneficiary.⁴¹⁰ To mitigate disruptions, USAID’s Health Reform Support activity provided power stations and arranged for the installation of permanent generators.⁴¹¹ Health Reform Support also supported the installation of generators at two healthcare facilities: Chernihiv Oblast Children’s Hospital and Kryvyi Rih Tuberculosis Hospital.⁴¹² USAID worked to identify winterization needs for health facilities and worked to procure power stations, power banks, heaters, and generators.⁴¹³

With USAID support, Health Reform Support assists the MoH’s Health Recovery Project Office monitoring, decision-making, and distributing equipment to healthcare facilities to withstand energy supply disruptions, including power generators and solar panels.⁴¹⁴

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HEALTH STAFFING

Between 2022 and 2024, the number of employees in public healthcare facilities in Ukraine decreased by 58,388—including the loss of 5,941 doctors and 22,903 other staff, including nurses—largely due to healthcare system transformation and job optimization, with some shifting to the private sector.⁴¹⁵ Despite war-driven emigration, the number of doctors and nurses per 100,000 population remained stable, though interregional and specialty disparities persist.⁴¹⁶ Notably, there is a surplus of obstetricians but a shortage of rehabilitation specialists, with the greatest workforce challenges in areas affected by military actions.⁴¹⁷ The Health Reform Support monitors and supports stakeholders to address these issues.⁴¹⁸

In response to the reduction of medical workers, particularly nurses, USAID has supported the MoH with human resources planning.⁴¹⁹ The Health Reform Support activity provided technical assistance to equip the MoH with a tool for analyzing and forecasting workforce needs at the regional level.⁴²⁰ The approach was initially tested in Lviv, and the MoH is expanding it to other oblasts, currently collecting relevant data.⁴²¹ Health Reform Support plans to assist in analyzing the data to help the country better understand workforce needs and plan appropriate actions, including the potential creation of a state order for scarce specialties.⁴²²

USAID supported the development of a strategic planning document that outlines strategies for developing human capital and creating a supportive work environment.⁴²³ It includes regular analysis, planning, and forecasting of nursing needs based on population healthcare demands and demographic trends.⁴²⁴ The strategy was approved by the MoH's board, and a plan for its implementation is currently being developed.⁴²⁵

USAID also supported the launch of a training program for healthcare facility management teams to develop financial and non-financial motivation systems.⁴²⁶ The program targeted 203 healthcare facilities in war-affected regions, including Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, Kherson, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.⁴²⁷ The training aimed to equip management teams with skills to create supportive environments through policies and procedures that enhance healthcare worker retention and engagement.⁴²⁸ As a result, nearly 90 healthcare facilities have already implemented various motivation systems.⁴²⁹

REHABILITATION

USAID activities aim to address several challenges to address rehabilitation needs in Ukraine, including poor coordination among government entities and international stakeholders, insufficient rehabilitative care at the community level, lack of state financing—particularly for assistive technologies, shortages of qualified rehabilitation professionals due to relocation and immigration, and gaps in skills among physical and occupational therapists and prosthetic and orthotic specialists.⁴³⁰

Governance: To help improve governance, USAID reported that it partnered with the World Health Organization, USAID's Rehab4U, and other donors to support the development of formal rehabilitee coordination structures with the Ukrainian government.⁴³¹ The Rehab4U program supports reform of disability assessments to international standards and development of policies to ensure barrier-free access to rehabilitation services.⁴³² The

program is also reviewing and modifying educational programs for physical therapists, occupational therapists, and prosthetic and orthotic specialists at selected universities.⁴³³

Facilities: Through the Strengthening Rehabilitation Services in Health Systems activity, USAID supported the establishment of 13 assistive technology units and one assistive technology hub at health facilities, allowing patients to acquire necessary products and reducing wait times.⁴³⁴ Five universities have set up clinical placement rooms to provide practical training for physical therapists and occupational therapists.⁴³⁵ A spinal cord injury department in Lviv, with a multidisciplinary team, now provides rehabilitation services for this severe injury.⁴³⁶ Additionally, multiple providers, previously unfamiliar with treating amputations, acute burns, and other war-related injuries, have enhanced their capacity to offer these services.⁴³⁷ More than 2,200 people have received assistive technology products.⁴³⁸

PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR

USAID’s pharmaceutical sector reform activity aims to improve access to quality medicines in Ukraine while promoting EU-aligned policies and practices.⁴³⁹ The focus areas include strengthening transparent and accountable governance, optimizing sustainable health financing, and increasing the availability and use of medicines.⁴⁴⁰ USAID also supported the continuity of digital health platforms, which assist in managing the health supply chain.⁴⁴¹

USAID continues to support reforms in the financial and operational planning of the pharmaceutical sector.⁴⁴² The reforms include establishing a National Medicines Verification System to combat counterfeit drugs, creating an independent Health Technology Assessment Agency for transparent priority-setting, optimizing medicines pricing policies, expanding the Affordable Medicines Program, and operationalizing the planned State Control Authority responsible for pharmaceutical regulations and patient safety.⁴⁴³ The challenges in the pharmaceutical sector reform include legislative and operational barriers, difficulties in piloting and implementing new approaches, and ensuring adherence to anti-corruption standards.⁴⁴⁴

HIV/AIDS

The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) program operates in every part of Ukraine. PEPFAR is an interagency program that includes the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the DoD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program, Health Research and Services Administration, Peace Corps, and USAID. The program focuses on prevention and detection, of HIV/AIDS, as well as providing life-saving HIV treatment and support for those who test positive. The agencies and their implementing partners support the local government to provide commodities and mental health support for health care workers and people affected by HIV/AIDS.⁴⁴⁵

PEPFAR has been tracking the evolution of the HIV epidemic in Ukraine, which has been significantly impacted by the war. The conflict has led to a growing number of civilian and military cases, driven by increased risk behaviors among current and former soldiers, as well as disruptions to health services. This dynamic also affects “bridge populations,” including

Through the Strengthening Rehabilitation Services in Health Systems activity, USAID supported the establishment of 13 assistive technology units and one assistive technology hub at health facilities, allowing patients to acquire necessary products and reducing wait times.

victims of domestic violence, sexual partners of those engaging in high-risk behaviors, commercial sex workers, individuals engaging in transactional sex for survival, and other key populations.⁴⁴⁶

As part of an emphasis on prevention, PEPFAR Ukraine was chosen to as pilot country to test injectable pre-exposure prophylaxis using long-acting cabotegravir for HIV prevention.⁴⁴⁷ Cabotegravir is an HIV inhibitor that works to decrease the amount of HIV in the blood.⁴⁴⁸ According to the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, the pilot was successful, resulting 128 participants receiving a first injection and 92 percent of clients scheduling a second injection. Based on these results, PEPFAR Ukraine scaled up the program to make injectable pre-exposure prophylaxis available throughout Ukraine, with a goal to reach 1,000 people in FY 2025.⁴⁴⁹

ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE

Instances of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) have increased in Ukraine due to strains on its healthcare system caused by the war. Identifying and preventing these infections in Ukraine is critical to halting their further spread and the development of even more difficult-to-treat infections, according to State. According to State, the CDC's AMR program in Ukraine addresses life-threatening infections resistant to all available antibiotics at their source. This effort, State said, limits their spread, prevents their proliferation in Ukraine, and reduces the risk of transmission to other countries, including the United States.⁴⁵⁰

State said that since 2022, the CDC, with State's support, has implemented a comprehensive package of AMR detection, response measures, and infection prevention and control protocols across five major public hospitals and regional public health centers, including facilities near the front line in Dnipro.⁴⁵¹

According to State, the program established hospital interdisciplinary teams focused on improving AMR detection, response, and infection prevention control measures, such as hand hygiene and environmental cleaning programs. Investments in laboratory equipment and laboratory information management systems and processes have led to year-over-year improvements in AMR diagnostics, State said. This program has also established Ukraine's first AMR genomic sequencing capabilities at the MoH Public Health Center and at one regional public health laboratory, enabling more precise characterization of AMR threats and the identification of potential outbreaks.⁴⁵²

Through annual point prevalence surveys, the CDC has documented the burden of healthcare-associated infections, including multidrug-resistant cases, providing critical insights for Ukraine, the United States, and international partners. According to State, these efforts contribute to better understanding and addressing the AMR challenges faced in Ukraine and are aligned with the MoH National Action Plan on AMR.⁴⁵³

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Security concerns and related movement restrictions continued to limit operations by personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, particularly their ability to implement and monitor foreign assistance programs.⁴⁵⁴ Other challenges include staff and vehicle availability, power outages, winter conditions, and unsafe road conditions. In addition, most embassy sections conduct virtual monitoring, which requires consistent internet and telephone connectivity.⁴⁵⁵

Security: Security concerns, including increased Russian missile strikes, continued to limit monitoring and evaluation activities.⁴⁵⁶ USAID reported that the embassy’s Regional Security Office did not have the resources to support 14 of USAID’s proposed site visit requests during the quarter. As a result, USAID rescheduled the site visits for a later date. This was similar to the 15 proposed site visits which had to be rescheduled last quarter, due to resource constraints.⁴⁵⁷ Threats also prevented third party monitors from visiting some of their planned sites, as energy infrastructure remains a major focus of third-party monitoring as well as a target for Russian missile and drone strikes, according to USAID.⁴⁵⁸

Movement restrictions: State maintains a movement policy and associated procedures to allow the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv to approve movements in and around Kyiv and in central and western Ukraine without review from State headquarters in Washington.⁴⁵⁹ Movements to other locations controlled by Ukraine but nearer to combat areas, such as in Odesa, Dnipro, and Mykolaiv, may occur, but still require approval from Washington.⁴⁶⁰ Movements to locations in Ukraine controlled by Russia are not authorized.⁴⁶¹


During the quarter, the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv made temporary adjustments to the movement policy, noting that Ukraine’s winter weather increases the likelihood of vehicle wrecks, that Ukraine’s roads are not regularly treated after inclement weather, and that periods of prolonged darkness can exacerbate avoidable risks.⁴⁶² In November, the embassy began requiring that all movements outside of Kyiv occur during daylight hours, that travelers on overnight trips arrive at their destination by sundown, that rural roads be avoided, and that all movements include a support vehicle with a winch.⁴⁶³ The embassy also noted that armored vehicles parked in uncovered locations may need up to 2 hours to clear for safe operations, and that if needed, staff should not expect commercial recovery vehicles to arrive for several hours.⁴⁶⁴ (See Figure 9.)

Conscription: State and USAID implementing partners anticipate that Ukraine’s updated conscription law, which will go into effect at the end of February 2025, could result in the military conscription of some Ukrainian staff.⁴⁶⁵ The new law will pull draftees from a broader range of Ukrainian databases than the previous system, which relied on the social services system alone. The embassy said that, under the new law, it will need to resubmit all conscription exemption documentation, while implementing partner staff may see increased calls for conscription, as staff who were not registered in the social services system may be conscripted due to registration in other, previously excluded databases.⁴⁶⁶

In December, Ukraine limited deferments for international technical assistance projects to 50 percent of male employees eligible for the draft. USAID implementers worked with respective USAID staff to address staffing gaps or challenges that this may create, but no specific reports have yet been made to USAID. Some international implementers retained local counsel to obtain clarification on how the new criteria will be implemented.⁴⁶⁷

Security concerns, including increased Russian missile strikes, continued to limit monitoring and evaluation activities.

Figure 9.

U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Movements by Purpose, January to December 2024

Blackouts: Reduced electricity due to Russian attacks has had a minimal impact on embassy operations. The embassy is fully equipped to continue full operations during a blackout, with autonomous utility generation and ability to house staff if emergencies occur. USAID said that its programs have built-in flexibilities to ensure minimal impact on their operations.⁴⁶⁸

Mitigations: The embassy reported that it has taken several steps to mitigate the impacts of these challenges. First, several embassy sections reported they conduct virtual monitoring and hold recurring teleconferences and videoconferences.⁴⁶⁹ In addition, the embassy maintains the Monitoring, Evaluation, and Audit Services for Ukraine contract to oversee foreign assistance to Ukraine, and USAID has engaged third-party monitors for both its development and humanitarian assistance.⁴⁷⁰

USAID reported that, despite these challenges, its staff conducted 96 site visits this quarter, a significant increase from the 31 conducted the previous quarter or any time since the start of the full-scale invasion.⁴⁷¹ USAID conducts monitoring through the use of the delivery of vouchers, annual reports, regular meetings, virtual site visits, submission of quarterly data, data quality assessments, and performance evaluations, as monitoring tools.⁴⁷²

In addition to direct site visits, embassy offices also use third-party monitoring, the collection of performance monitoring data by a contractor that has not been directly involved in the activity being monitored.⁴⁷³ Third-party monitoring site visits supplement direct site visits in hard to reach locations to verify if the delivery of physical goods, services, or training align with implementer reports.⁴⁷⁴ According to USAID, third-party field monitors conduct standardized surveys and interviews with recipients to check if USAID programming was delivered as intended.⁴⁷⁵ Full implementation of third-party monitoring by USAID Ukraine began in February 2024, 2 years after the full-scale invasion by Russia, and the number of awards covered by third-party monitoring continued to grow during the quarter.⁴⁷⁶ As of December 2024, USAID Ukraine reported that it intended to conduct third-party monitoring of all eligible activities.⁴⁷⁷





A destroyed school building in Kharkiv. (WFP photo)

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

79 Inside Ukraine

82 Outside Ukraine

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has created a significant humanitarian crisis for the Ukrainian population. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as of January 2025, approximately 12.7 million Ukrainians were in need of humanitarian assistance.⁴⁷⁸ In addition, the International Organization (IOM) for Migration reported that as of December 2024, Ukraine hosted approximately 3.7 million internally displaced persons (IDP).⁴⁷⁹ An additional 6.9 million Ukrainians are refugees outside of Ukraine, with approximately 6.3 million Ukrainian refugees recorded in Europe, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.⁴⁸⁰

While the overall number of people in need decreased in 2024 due to improved access to services in urban areas, humanitarian conditions have worsened along the front line and northern border, according to the United Nations.⁴⁸¹ Escalated hostilities and nationwide energy infrastructure attacks have driven thousands to evacuate, increasing demand for multi-sector assistance, particularly shelter, livelihoods, and winter-related support such as backup power, heating equipment, and fuel, amid prolonged and frequent energy outages.⁴⁸²

Since February 2022, the United States has provided approximately \$3.8 billion in humanitarian assistance both within Ukraine and across the region.⁴⁸³ USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) leads the U.S. Government's effort to provide humanitarian assistance within Ukraine. State's Bureau of Population, Migration, and Refugees (PRM) leads the U.S. Government's response for refugees and also provides assistance to IDPs within Ukraine.⁴⁸⁴ (See Table 18.) USAID BHA and State PRM provides support primarily through UN agencies, including IOM, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Food Program (WFP).⁴⁸⁵

State noted that its partners cumulatively have provided humanitarian assistance to hundreds of thousands of refugees from Ukraine in regional countries and displaced persons in Ukraine.⁴⁸⁶ From January to September, partners cumulatively provided child protection services to 274,000 children; mental health and psychosocial support consultations to 113,000 people; specialized gender-based violence programs to 108,000 individuals; livelihood and economic inclusion interventions to 126,000 people; basic needs assistance to 321,000 people; and individual counseling or health education to 292,000 people.⁴⁸⁷

Table 18.

Total U.S. Government Humanitarian Funding for the Ukraine Response as of December 2024

Agency	Funding
USAID BHA	\$2,558,165,123
STATE PRM	\$1,197,734,818
TOTAL	\$3,755,899,941

Source: State, vetting comment, 1/28/2025.

USAID BHA supported ongoing implementation of approximately \$1.1 billion in active awards for humanitarian assistance.

INSIDE UKRAINE


As the security situation along the front line worsened and a long-term stalemate caused Russia to launch attacks deeper into Ukrainian territory, civilians experienced increased casualties, infrastructure damage, mandatory evacuations, and disruptions to public utilities, particularly water and electricity.⁴⁸⁸ Since September, Russian advances along the front line have significantly increased multi-sector humanitarian needs, particularly in front-line regions experiencing the most severe impacts.⁴⁸⁹ During the quarter, the Ukrainian government issued mandatory evacuation orders for children and their caregivers in front-line areas, including the Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Sumy regions.⁴⁹⁰

USAID reported that key humanitarian assistance needs inside Ukraine include health; water, sanitation, and hygiene; shelter; and cash assistance, with the highest demand concentrated in front-line areas.⁴⁹¹ In addition, Ukrainian civilians face physical threats from the conflict, including landmines and explosive ordnance; displacement; restricted movement and employment due to conscription fears; gender-based violence; and psychological distress.⁴⁹² Many Ukrainians require evacuation support, legal assistance, gender-based violence prevention and response, child protection, and psychosocial support.⁴⁹³

This quarter, relief actors, including USAID BHA partners, continued delivering aid across Ukraine, including to front-line areas.⁴⁹⁴ USAID BHA supported ongoing implementation of approximately \$1.1 billion in active awards for humanitarian assistance.⁴⁹⁵

Figure 10.

USAID BHA Funding, by Sector, FY 2025, Q1 Obligations



HEALTH

Disaster-affected populations often face increased vulnerability to waterborne diseases due to limited access to hygiene items, safe drinking water, and sanitation services.⁴⁹⁶ To address these challenges, U.S. Government partners distributed hygiene kits; repaired water, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure; and transported safe drinking water to affected areas.⁴⁹⁷

Humanitarian health partners, supported by USAID BHA and other donors, provided health assistance to 2.7 million people between January and November 2024.⁴⁹⁸ USAID BHA supported the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), IOM, UNICEF, eight international NGO partners, and one Ukrainian NGO to meet water, sanitation, and hygiene needs in Ukraine, while State PRM partners provided additional assistance to Ukrainian IDPs, including emergency shelters, building materials, and basic kitchen and hygiene supplies.⁴⁹⁹

Armed conflict amplifies protection risks, exposing civilians to domestic abuse, exclusion from humanitarian aid, exploitative labor, family separation, and sexual violence.⁵⁰⁰ In response, USAID BHA supported IOM, IFRC, UNICEF, UNFPA, UN Women (via UNDP), ten INGOs, and three Ukrainian NGOs to deliver protection services for conflict-affected populations in Ukraine.⁵⁰¹

USAID BHA partners provided case management and mental health and psychosocial support services to children, persons with disabilities, and older adults, while deploying mobile protection teams to remote areas.⁵⁰² These teams focus on gender-based violence prevention and response, legal assistance, and mental and psychological support.⁵⁰³ In November, UNICEF supported over 110,000 women and girls through gender-based violence prevention, mitigation, and response activities, including mobile teams, safe spaces, and girls' clubs.⁵⁰⁴

With USAID funding and other donor support, UNICEF distributed ten generators to communities in Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Volyn provinces between November and December 2024 to enhance service provision at water, sanitation, and hygiene facilities.⁵⁰⁵ With USAID and other donor funding, UNICEF improved access to safe drinking water for more than 5.2 million people over the same period by maintaining, restoring, and repairing water facilities and networks.⁵⁰⁶

WINTER RESPONSE

The UN 2024/2025 Winter Response Plan aims to assist approximately 1.8 million people with winter-related humanitarian support.⁵⁰⁷ This includes bedding, thermal blankets, sleeping bags, winter clothing, heating appliances (such as generators and fuel), shelter assistance, and multipurpose cash assistance for rent, heating, and other needs.⁵⁰⁸ The United Nations requested \$492.1 million to fund these efforts from October 2024 to March 2025.⁵⁰⁹

USAID BHA provided more than \$168 million to the IFRC, IOM, UNICEF, WFP, and 12 NGOs to address winterization needs for the 2024/2025 winter season.⁵¹⁰ Assistance includes winter-specific household items, thermal blankets, warm clothing, heating appliances, and fuel supplies such as charcoal, coal, wood, and wood pellets to meet immediate and long-

**The UN
2024/2025
Winter
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1.8 million
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winter-related
humanitarian
support.**

An estimated 7.3 million Ukrainians, or 20 percent of the population (excluding those in Russian-occupied areas), face moderate or severe food insecurity, including 1.2 million children and 2 million elderly, according to USAID.

term needs.⁵¹¹ Additionally, USAID BHA supported market-based assistance and shelter repairs to help displaced families and improve living conditions in Ukrainian homes and collective centers.⁵¹²

From August to November, humanitarian organizations, including USAID BHA partners, provided winter-related assistance—such as food, healthcare supplies, shelter, and camp coordination and camp management support—to an estimated 366,000 people.⁵¹³ Additionally, water, sanitation, and hygiene partners, funded by humanitarian donors, including USAID BHA, reached approximately 855,000 people with winter-related assistance as of November.⁵¹⁴

The IFRC and UNICEF distributed cash assistance to IDPs and households in conflict-affected areas to address winter-related needs.⁵¹⁵ Between September 10 and November 15, UNICEF provided cash assistance to approximately 26,400 households—nearly 87,000 people—residing near the front line in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia provinces.⁵¹⁶

During the same period, UNICEF also distributed solid fuel to an estimated 4,400 households in these same regions and repaired district heating networks, including delivering a boiler house to Kharkiv’s Pisochyn settlement, restoring heat to more than 10,000 people.⁵¹⁷ UNICEF rehabilitated child-friendly shelters and provides winter relief items, such as blankets and children’s winter clothing, to vulnerable populations.⁵¹⁸

Between January and November, UNHCR provided emergency shelter and housing support to more than 150,000 people, with more than 12,400 individuals receiving winterization support to improve shelter insulation against winter conditions.⁵¹⁹

State said that its partners have reported no major impacts on their ability to deliver assistance due to reduced electrical generation or distribution capacity resulting from Russia’s attacks.⁵²⁰ State said its partners continue to provide support to populations evacuated from conflict-affected areas, prioritizing winterization support through cash assistance, shelter repair kits, and generators and fuel for IDP temporary shelters.⁵²¹ State also noted that from January through October, UNHCR’s Camp Coordination and Management cluster helped 30,640 people housed in IDP temporary shelters access multiple types of services.⁵²²

FOOD ASSISTANCE

An estimated 7.3 million Ukrainians, or 20 percent of the population (excluding those in Russian-occupied areas), face moderate or severe food insecurity, including 1.2 million children and 2 million elderly, according to USAID.⁵²³ This figure remains unchanged from the previous quarter.⁵²⁴

USAID BHA’s funding during the quarter includes more than \$78 million for in-kind food assistance, \$32 million for cash-for-food, and \$352 million for multipurpose cash assistance.⁵²⁵ USAID, along with the Ukrainian Ministry of Social Policy and other international donor agencies, supports efforts to transition elements of the humanitarian response, particularly cash-based assistance, into an inclusive and shock-responsive national social protection system.⁵²⁶

USAID BHA supported WFP and two international NGOs to deliver food and cash assistance for purchasing food within Ukraine.⁵²⁷ WFP prioritized food distributions in eastern and southern Ukraine, where conflict and supply chain disruptions limit access to food in front-line areas.⁵²⁸ In November, WFP reached 1.4 million people across Ukraine, despite access and security challenges, including strikes on food distribution sites.⁵²⁹ During that month, nearly 792,000 people received in-kind food aid, while more than 642,000 received cash-for-food assistance.⁵³⁰

MONITORING

USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response Team in Kyiv conducted 25 in-person site visits to 11 implementers.⁵³¹ In October, the team monitored rehabilitation and shelter efforts. They also engaged with program beneficiaries in Kyiv and Lviv oblasts.⁵³² November visits included observing training sessions, inspecting a warehouse, and monitoring collective center activities in Kyiv region.⁵³³ In December, the team reviewed protection, shelter, and livelihood activities in the Vinnytsia and Khmelnytskyi regions.⁵³⁴

For areas restricted by the embassy’s regional security office, USAID BHA relies on third-party monitors.⁵³⁵ While the third-party monitors faced access challenges due to shifting ground activity and partner demands from audits and monitoring by other donors, all visits were rescheduled or adjusted to prioritize safety and maintain the integrity of the monitoring process.⁵³⁶

OUTSIDE UKRAINE

State said its partners did not report notable increases in the number of refugees fleeing Ukraine during the quarter, noting that the number of people crossing in and out of Ukraine is consistent with the typical seasonal patterns from previous years.⁵³⁷ State said it continued to work with its partners, typically UN agencies, to provide assistance to Ukrainian refugees.⁵³⁸

In addition, State said that from January to November, UNHCR provided protection information and services to 438,000 Ukrainian refugees.⁵³⁹ Moreover, State said that from January through October, UNHCR provided emergency shelter and housing support to approximately 136,000 people, and it participated in job fairs for Ukrainian refugees in nine Polish cities, offering resume consultations and job-searching resources.⁵⁴⁰ State also cited several examples of assistance its partners provided to Ukrainian refugees during the quarter across three assistance categories: protection services, socio-economic and inclusion assistance, and camp coordination and management.⁵⁴¹ (See Table 19.)

In November, WFP reached 1.4 million people across Ukraine, despite access and security challenges, including strikes on food distribution sites.

Table 19.

State-Funded Humanitarian Assistance Activities Provided by United Nations Agencies Outside of Ukraine

Assistance Cluster/Purpose	Activities
<p>Protection Services To provide protection assistance and to promote equitable access to basic services and human rights to Ukrainian refugees, IDPs, returnees, and other war-affected individuals.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In October, the International Organization for Migration opened a migration integration center in Poland to provide psycho-social support, language classes, and job counseling for Ukrainian refugees. In October, UNHCR conducted interactive training on child protection and mental health for 25 participants at the unaccompanied children’s home near Budapest, Hungary.
<p>Socio-Economic Inclusion Services To boost Ukrainian refugee families’ self-reliance by improving their ability to access jobs and livelihoods opportunities.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In October, UNHCR cosponsored a Job and Entrepreneurship Fair in Warsaw that attracted more than 3,500 participants.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 12/13/2024.

MONITORING

During the quarter, State PRM staff and coordinators posted to U.S. embassies visited program sites and met with partners on the ground. State said that during field visits to partner activity sites, State PRM staff and coordinators interviewed partner staff and their sub-grantees, met with populations of concern, and directly observed protection-related activities.⁵⁴² Oversight visits during the period included:

Bulgaria and Romania: State’s PRM coordinator from the U.S. Embassy in Chisinau, Moldova, met with UNHCR and WHO representatives in Bulgaria and Romania to discuss operational updates. For example, the State PRM coordinator toured UNHCR-supported “RomExpo” center in Romania which provides services to approximately 250 refugees per day. State PRM observed that humanitarian partners paring down facilities and consolidating services to save money while still caring for refugees in need. In addition, the U.S. Ambassador to Romania co-hosted an October UNHCR event to encourage engagement between business leaders, nongovernmental organizations, donors, refugees and host community members, and other organizations.⁵⁴³

Hungary and Slovakia: State’s PRM coordinator from the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, Poland, and a Washington-based program officer met with partners from UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, and the WHO, and visited UNHCR and IOM programs, including a Ukrainian-Hungarian bilingual school, a shelter for displaced Roma refugee families, and a Budapest municipality community center. State said Roma refugees reported that assistance through UNHCR helped them with legal rights and seeking employment. The Warsaw refugee coordinator and program officer also traveled to Bratislava to meet with UNICEF, IOM, WHO, and UNHCR representatives. While there, the refugee coordinator and program officer visited

the Bratislava Blue Dot Hub, jointly managed by UNHCR and UNICEF, which offers safe spaces, immediate support, and services to people fleeing from Ukraine.⁵⁴⁴

Poland: State PRM’s refugee coordinator from the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv and the Warsaw refugee coordinator visited evacuated Ukrainian children and Ukrainian refugees in Poland and met with UNHCR, UNICEF, and IOM officials to assess cross border coordination on Ukrainian populations of concern and winter preparedness.⁵⁴⁵ During meetings with Polish and Ukrainian government counterparts, the State PRM coordinator observed that PRM assistance helped lead interlocutors to undertake individualized, best interest assessments for all institutionalized children Ukraine in Poland, a key program goal.⁵⁴⁶

Ukraine: UNHCR Ukraine hosted a bipartisan Congressional staff delegation to see firsthand the impact of State PRM humanitarian assistance to conflict affected populations in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Dnipro.⁵⁴⁷ In October, the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and State’s PRM coordinator in Kyiv visited an IDP-run organization that provides afterschool programming for displaced children, and that packs humanitarian aid for conflict-affected persons on the frontlines and newly displaced populations in Kyiv.⁵⁴⁸ State PRM observed that partner support improved IDP children’s integration prospects in their new homes and provided parents with opportunities to seek additional assistance, search for jobs, and better integrate.⁵⁴⁹ State PRM also noted the partner’s ability to expand to assistance from private sources to supplement existing non-food item packages, ensuring sustainability of efforts.⁵⁵⁰







Defenders of Ukraine are honored on Ukraine's Armed Forces Day, December 6, 2024. (President of Ukraine Flickr photo)

MESSAGING AND MEDIA

88 Information Environment

88 Messaging

90 Global Media

MESSAGING AND MEDIA

INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Russia employs an array of tools, including malign influence campaigns and illicit cyber activities, to undermine the interests of the United States and its allies and partners, including in Latin America, the Middle East, and Europe. It routinely uses its intelligence services, proxies, and influence tools in these efforts. Russia's influence actors have increasingly adapted their methods to hide their involvement by developing a vast ecosystem of Russian proxy websites, personas, and organizations which give the false appearance of being independent news sources.⁵⁵¹

The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) said that Russia's disinformation campaigns in Europe aim to legitimize Russia's invasion of Ukraine, promote regional instability, and erode Western institutions and their influence in the region.⁵⁵² (See Table 20.)

Pro-Russian narratives garner little support among Ukrainians, as Russian forces continue to occupy about one-fifth of Ukraine's landmass and engage in open war. A USEUCOM survey found that only 6 percent of Ukrainians agreed that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is justified, and three percent believe that Russia protects human rights. Surveyed participants generally expressed disdain for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, noting that, as a result, Russia has negatively contributed to Ukraine's social security services, healthcare, and justice system.⁵⁵³

MESSAGING

Global Engagement Center: On December 23, State's Global Engagement Center terminated by operation of law, according to State.⁵⁵⁴ The center was responsible for coordinating U.S. efforts to counter foreign disinformation.⁵⁵⁵ State said the center addressed disinformation through several lines of effort within the information environment, including coordination between the U.S. Government and international partners; support for independent media and civil society organizations; and broad communication efforts to

Table 20.

Themes of Russian Disinformation Campaigns

Legitimacy	Benevolence	Shaming	Transference
Narratives seek to delegitimize the independence of Kosovo and justify Russia's actions in Ukraine.	Narratives argue that Russia is righteous in its endeavors and provides benefits to other nations.	Narratives argue that the United States leverages its influence in Europe for selfish purposes rather than the benefit of Europeans. These are among the most popular malign narratives employed by Russia.	Narratives blame the West for exacerbating the conflict in Ukraine, xenophobia toward Russians, and failing political structures. They also position Western values as a threat to society and NATO as a threat to Russia's security.

Source: USEUCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 25.1 OAR 014, 12/18/2024.

From October 1 to December 21, the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv held more than 175 trainings, cultural events, and other outreach activities, according to State.

identify, mitigate, and counter Kremlin disinformation campaigns.⁵⁵⁶ The support extended to foreign media organizations that have been exiled, displaced, or otherwise negatively impacted by Russia's full-scale invasion.⁵⁵⁷ According to State, the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs' Counter-Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Hub has assumed management of 12 ongoing cooperative agreements and two contracts, cumulatively valued at \$43 million.⁵⁵⁸

Public Diplomacy: State said that the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv's Public Diplomacy Section used a variety of social media platforms to advance U.S. strategic interests in Ukraine, including promoting good governance and anti-corruption reforms; ensuring U.S. humanitarian, economic, and security assistance delivers effective relief and sustainable results for Ukrainians; and countering disinformation and propaganda.⁵⁵⁹ According to State, the embassy addressed these objectives by disseminating posts, news, and program announcements directed toward the Ukrainian public, journalists, opinion leaders, and government officials. In addition, the embassy maintained strong relations with government ministry press offices to ensure that the embassy's social media accurately represents significant events, such as summits, meetings, and U.S. congressional delegation visits.⁵⁶⁰

From October 1 to December 21, the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv held more than 175 trainings, cultural events, and or other outreach activities, according to State.⁵⁶¹ The events were held in a variety of locations across Ukraine, including in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kropyvnytskyi, Lviv, and Odessa.⁵⁶² The number of people reached varied from fewer than 10 participants at an America House program to 500,000 viewers for an interview with then-USAID Administrator Samantha Power, hosted by a Ukrainian broadcaster.⁵⁶³

Foreign Press Centers: During the quarter, the Foreign Press Centers hosted 22 media events for foreign journalists, including press briefings, roundtables, reporting tours, and media co-ops.⁵⁶⁴ State said that the media events were successful in providing foreign media with access to authoritative information sources about the United States and U.S. policy.⁵⁶⁵ State said the Foreign Press Centers provided five briefings on the U.S. presidential election and the U.S. electoral process.⁵⁶⁶ In addition, State said the centers hosted two concurrent 8-day international tours coinciding with U.S. Election Day that took 32 journalists to one of two electoral battleground states (Arizona and Wisconsin) and then to either Pennsylvania or Florida for Election Day coverage.⁵⁶⁷ Journalists from a wide variety of countries participated in these events, including journalists from Ukraine and Russia.⁵⁶⁸

Educational and Cultural Affairs: State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs continued to support ongoing educational and cultural programs. Through the Ukrainian Academic Fellows Program, 21 Fellows completed exchanges with U.S. academic institutions during 2024. This program seeks to support long-term linkages between U.S. and Ukrainian universities and scholars educating and training professionals who will be critical to Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction initiatives.⁵⁶⁹ In addition, the \$1.5 million Future Leaders Exchange grant has placed 50 Ukrainian high school students in American host communities across the United States for academic year 2024-2025.⁵⁷⁰

During the period, the recipient of the \$675,000 Digital Connections Program award conducted an inbound exchange for 15 young Ukrainian digital content creators to empower Ukrainian digital professionals and influencers and mitigate challenges with social media

misuse, malign influence, and cybersecurity threats. Participants examined various facets of digital communication and activism through meetings, trainings, and workshops in Washington, D.C., New York City, and Atlanta.⁵⁷¹ State said its awards also funded several cultural and educational efforts, including creative writing, filmmaking, music, and journalism, among others.⁵⁷²

Military Messaging: USEUCOM works to counter Russian disinformation in Europe through several initiatives. The Operational Influence Platform, a contracted entity designed to apply commercial marketing techniques to identify and influence targeted audiences through multimedia marketing campaigns that leverage traditional, digital, and other emerging media. During the quarter, this platform conducted campaigns in Bulgaria, Georgia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina with the goal of disrupting Russia’s influence and improving allies’ and partners’ resilience to Russia’s malign activities. In Bulgaria, the Operational Influence Platform conducted information operations in coordination with Bulgaria’s Ministry of Defense to increase the size of the country’s armed forces and improve its posture to deny Russian aggression.⁵⁷³

USEUCOM also uses the Strategic Inform and Influence Platform to develop and manage online platforms that engage with the target audiences through docuseries, infotainment, social media commentary, and by leveraging third-party social media influencers. This contracted platform focused on raising awareness of partnership with the United States and the European Union, it analyzes popular sentiment in several countries, including Russia.⁵⁷⁴

GLOBAL MEDIA

The U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) provides news and information to Europe and Russia, primarily through the broadcasters Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Voice of America (VOA).⁵⁷⁵

Censorship: During the quarter, U.S. technology company Apple removed several RFE/RL apps from Apple’s App Store in Russia following a request from Russia’s media regulator, Roskomnadzor.⁵⁷⁶ In February 2024, Roskomnadzor placed RFE/RL on a list of “undesirable organizations,” and it subsequently notified Apple that it must remove apps that contain materials from organizations designated as such.⁵⁷⁷ In October, Apple removed the apps for the RFE/RL news channel “Current Time” and RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service from the Russian App Store.⁵⁷⁸ In November, Apple removed the RFE/RL Russian Service app, which includes journalism produced by the Russian Service and its regional projects “Siberia.Realities” and “North.Realities.”⁵⁷⁹

In addition, an anti-censorship NGO, which is supported by USAGM’s Open Technology Fund, confirmed that Apple removed the Amnezia Virtual Private Network (VPN) app from Russia’s App Store in October at the behest of the country’s internet regulator for “content that is illegal.”⁵⁸⁰ According to USAGM, people often rely on VPN apps to bypass censorship.⁵⁸¹ However, according to an October media report, Apple had removed nearly 100 VPN apps from its app store in Russia.⁵⁸²

During the quarter, U.S. technology company Apple removed several RFE/RL apps from Apple’s App Store in Russia following a request from Russia’s media regulator, Roskomnadzor.

RFE/RL reported on several other Russian efforts to regulate and control internet content. In November, RFE/RL reported that Russia has slowed some sites, including Facebook, X, and YouTube as means to “filter content and redirect Russian users.”⁵⁸³ RFE/RL said that other efforts to regulate and control internet content in Russia include “sophisticated monitoring hardware, squeezing major internet companies until they are sold to more pliant owners, and ordering global tech giants to ensure servers are accessible to regulators.”⁵⁸⁴

Coverage of regional elections: USAGM said its broadcasters reported on significant elections affecting Ukraine, including in the United States, Moldova, and Georgia. The VOA Eurasia Division as a whole, and particularly the Russian and Ukrainian services provided comprehensive election night coverage of the U.S. election, which dominated the news cycle in the region.⁵⁸⁵ Coverage included analyses, expert interviews, minute-by-minute updates across digital platforms, and live coverage and translations of President Trump’s victory speech and then-Vice President Harris’s concession speech.⁵⁸⁶ According to USAGM, VOA Russian’s 6-hour election-day coverage drew more than three million views across platforms.⁵⁸⁷

RFE/RL reported on the Moldovan presidential election and referendum on the constitutional amendment regarding EU integration, with interviews and analysis leading up to the election and a live blog during election day.⁵⁸⁸ In addition, RFE/RL and a Moldovan television channel organized a debate and co-produced candidate profiles.⁵⁸⁹ USAGM said RFE/RL used social media to highlight the Kremlin and pro-Russian actors’ efforts to influence politics inside the country, and exposed and tracked Russia’s disinformation.⁵⁹⁰

In Georgia, USAGM said, both RFE/RL and VOA covered the country’s October 26 parliamentary elections.⁵⁹¹ USAGM reported that RFE/RL Georgian Service’s website posted special reports, analyses, candidate and party profiles, interviews, polls, and election results.⁵⁹² USAGM noted that RFE/RL reporters faced physical harassment, street violence, and assault while covering the elections.⁵⁹³ Similarly, VOA Georgian’s coverage featuring official and expert analysis was widely circulated in local media outlets.⁵⁹⁴ VOA also reported on Georgian voters’ perspectives, including views of the Georgian diaspora in the United States on allegations of Russian hacking into the Georgian government’s websites and, following the election, on the rhetoric surrounding Georgian President Zurabishvili’s accusations that Russia ran a “special operation” to “falsify” election results in favor of the Georgian Dream, the ruling party.⁵⁹⁵

RFE/RL Child Deportation Reporting Leads to Charges: In October, Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General charged Denys Pushlyn, the leader of the unrecognized “Donetsk People’s Republic,” and two subordinates, Eleonora Fedorenko and Svitlana Maiboroda, with violating the laws and customs of war by deporting children from eastern Ukraine to Russia.⁵⁹⁶ The allegations against the three individuals first arose in a June 2023 RFE/RL documentary film entitled “List 31,” which traced the routes and identified the organizers for children in the occupied Donetsk region of Ukraine who were deported to Russia.⁵⁹⁷ One media outlet reported that the Office of the Prosecutor General based its suspicions against the defendants on the documentary’s findings.⁵⁹⁸





The MV ARC Endurance arrives at the port of Setúbal, Portugal, on November 5, carrying more than 750 weapons, vehicles, and pieces of equipment to strengthen the U.S. military's posture in Europe. (DoD photo)

APPENDIXES

- 94 Appendix A:
Classified Appendix to this Report
- 95 Appendix B:
Methodology for Preparing this
Special IG Quarterly Report
- 96 Appendix C:
Final Reports by Lead IG Agencies
- 105 Appendix D:
Ongoing Oversight Projects
- 110 Appendix E:
Planned Oversight Projects
- 112 Appendix F:
Hotline and Investigations Activity
- 115 Appendix G:
U.S. Weapons, Equipment, and
Ammunition Committed to Ukraine
- 117 Acronyms
- 118 Map of the U.S. European Command
(USEUCOM) Area of Responsibility
- 119 Map of Ukraine
- 120 Endnotes

APPENDIX A

Classified Appendix to this Report

A classified appendix to this report provides additional information on Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) and the U.S. Government’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The appendix will be delivered to relevant agencies and congressional committees.



APPENDIX B

Methodology for Preparing this Special IG Quarterly Report

This report complies with Section 1250B of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2024 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Section 419). The Inspector General Act requires that the DoD IG—as the previously designated Lead IG for OAR and now the Special IG for OAR— provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on each overseas contingency operation.

This report covers the period from October 1 to December 31, 2024. The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs and partner oversight agencies contributed to the content of this report.

To fulfill the congressional mandate to report on OAR, the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs gather data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations referenced in this report, the OIGs have not verified or audited the information collected through open-source research or from Federal agencies, and the information provided represents the view of the source cited in each instance.

INFORMATION COLLECTION FROM AGENCIES AND OPEN SOURCES

Each quarter, the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs gather information about their programs and operations related to OAR from Federal agencies. This report also draws on current, publicly available information from reputable sources. The following sources may be included:

- U.S. Government statements, press conferences, and reports
- Reports issued by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks
- Media reports

The Lead IG agencies use open-source information to supplement information obtained through their agency information collection process and provide additional detail about the overseas contingency operation.

REPORT PRODUCTION

The DoD IG, as the Special IG (and previously designated Lead IG) for OAR, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The OIGs for the DoD, State, and USAID draft input for the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once assembled, each OIG coordinates a two-phase review of the report within its own agency. During the first review, the Special IG agencies ask relevant offices within their agencies to comment, correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation. The three OIGs incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review prior to publication. The final report reflects the editorial view of the OIGs for the DoD, State, and USAID as independent oversight agencies.

APPENDIX C

Final Reports by Lead IG Agencies

From October 1 to December 31, 2024, the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued 12 oversight reports related to OAR and the Ukraine response, as detailed in the following summaries. Reports issued by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs and other oversight agencies are available on their respective websites and ukraineoversight.gov.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Evaluation of the Accountability Controls for Seaports of Debarkation in the U.S. European Command Area of Responsibility

DODIG-2025-051; December 10, 2024

The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is effectively scaling, staffing, and preparing contingency seaports for movement of ammunition provided to foreign partners through Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA).

The DoD transports U.S. defense items by air or sea from ports of embarkation in the United States to aerial ports and seaports of debarkation in the USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) for onward movement to Ukraine.

For example, within USEUCOM, materiel is delivered via rail, truck, or air to the Logistics Enabling Node-Romania, where Logistics Enabling Node-Romania personnel receive, stage, inspect, and transfer the items for delivery to Ukraine. The 21st Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) conducts the onward movement of defense items from ports to Ukraine. The 21st TSC Theater Movement Center plans, coordinates, and executes movement control of defense items through USEUCOM AOR. Specifically, the 21st TSC uses the Movement Control Office (39th Transportation Battalion) to coordinate the onward movement of defense items through the USEUCOM AOR from seaports of debarkation.

The DoD OIG found that personnel from the 21st TSC were actively taking steps to validate additional seaports to use for delivering items in their AOR but had not yet completed all the necessary actions. In response to the DoD OIG draft report, the 21st TSC Commander agreed with the recommendation to address one area of concern and provided the DoD OIG with information that reflected how they intend to address it. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open until the DoD OIG receives documentation of corrective actions.

Follow-up Evaluation of Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine

DODIG-2025-050; December 9, 2024

The objective of this follow-up evaluation was to assess the extent to which the DoD conducts enhanced end-use monitoring (EEUM) of designated defense articles provided to Ukraine in accordance with DoD policy. The purpose of the DoD's EEUM program is to safeguard designated defense articles that require additional verification and protection.

Since the DoD OIG's previous evaluation, Office of Defense Cooperation-Kyiv (ODC-Kyiv) and the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) inventory reporting processes improved and gave the DoD visibility of thousands of additional EEUM-designated defense articles.

The DoD OIG found that the DoD improved the accuracy and completeness of its EEUM inventories but needs to improve its accountability of defense articles provided under third-party transfer (TPT). The DoD OIG found that 30 percent of defense articles provided under TPT had no inventory data on record in the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's (DSCA's) Security Cooperation Information Portal-End-Use Monitoring (SCIP-EUM) database. This occurred because the DoD and State did not have an agreement to notify divesting and receiving security cooperation organizations of all approved, government-to-government TPTs of EEUM-designated defense articles to a hostile environment.

As a result, the SCIP-EUM database does not yet accurately account for TPT EEUM designated defense articles in Ukraine, increasing the risk of misstating available and combat-capable EEUM-designated defense articles in Ukraine. Additionally, the SCIP-EUM database does not accurately account for TPT EEUM designated defense articles prevented the DoD from maintaining a common baseline of EEUM-designated defense articles as required by the Security Assistance Management Manual.

The DoD OIG made one recommendation to the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the DSCA Director, to work with State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers to develop and implement a policy stating that a single entity is responsible for notifying divesting and receiving security cooperation offices of all approved, government-to-government TPTs of EEUM-designated defense articles to a hostile environment. The DSCA Assistant Director for Internal Operations, on behalf of the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, agreed with the intent of the recommendation. The recommendation is resolved but will remain open until the DoD OIG determines that the implemented policy meets the intent of the recommendations.

Follow-up Evaluation of Management Advisory: Sufficiency of Staffing at Logistics Hubs in Poland for Conducting Inventories of Items Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring

DODIG-2025-047; December 2, 2024

The DoD OIG conducted this follow-up evaluation of the DoD OIG report "Management Advisory: Sufficiency of Staffing at Logistics Hubs in Poland for Conducting Inventories of Items Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring," to assess the actions taken by the DoD to ensure that the Office of Defense Cooperation-Kyiv (ODC-Kyiv) has sufficient capacity to effectively and efficiently conduct all required enhanced end-use monitoring (EEUM) inventories of designated defense articles before transfer into Ukraine.

The DoD OIG found that the DSCA and ODC-Kyiv took actions to provide familiarization material and training to improve U.S. military personnel's understanding and awareness of the requirements for receiving and processing EEUM defense articles at the logistics enabling nodes in Poland. Specifically, the DSCA developed a comprehensive EEUM familiarization presentation that identifies EEUM-specific laws and criteria, procedures for accurately inventorying EEUM articles, and a list of EEUM defense articles and serial number recognition photos for the most common EEUM items arriving at the logistics enabling nodes in Poland.

However, the ODC-Kyiv does not have an EEUM-specific project manager billet or a dedicated U.S. Government billet for oversight of EEUM inventories in Poland. Instead, the ODC-Kyiv assigned EEUM oversight responsibility to the ODC-Kyiv non-commissioned officer in charge and a team of ODC-Kyiv locally employed staff. Additionally, the ODC-Kyiv coordinated with USEUCOM to implement an EEUM delegation memorandum effective October 2024 appoint non-ODC-Kyiv backup personnel with the ability to conduct EEUM inventories if the primary ODC-Kyiv personnel are unavailable.

The DoD OIG made one recommendation to the Chief of Kyiv-Ukraine. The Acting Chief of ODC-Kyiv left comments, and the ODC-Kyiv EEUM subject matter expert outlined actions that ODC-Kyiv made that meet the intent of the recommendation. The DoD OIG verified the actions were completed; therefore, the recommendation is closed.

Evaluation of the Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Authority Defense Item Deliveries to Ukraine

DODIG-2025-037; November 15, 2024

The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Military Services effectively and efficiently accounted for the delivery of Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) defense items provided to Ukraine in accordance with DoD property book and DSCA security assistance policy. In addition, the DoD OIG assessed whether the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U) effectively and efficiently tracked and documented the transfer of PDA items to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The DoD OIG found that the DSCA and the Military Services did not effectively account for the PDA items they delivered to Ukrainian control. For example, the DSCA did not consistently track the status of PDA items delivered to Ukraine. The DoD OIG compared a non-statistical sample of 162 PDA line items marked as delivered to delivery records maintained by SAG-U and determined that only 65 items (40 percent) matched.

The DoD OIG determined that the DSCA and the Military Services inaccurately and inconsistently accounted for PDA deliveries for two reasons. First, DSCA policies did not provide a standard definition of when in the transportation process the PDA items are "delivered," and the DSCA did not provide oversight to ensure that delivery data was accurate. Second, the Military Services did not have adequate forward presence on the ground in Poland to confirm the transfer of PDA items to Ukrainian control.

The DoD OIG found that SAG-U and its subordinate commands effectively inventoried, tracked, and conducted customs control processes for U.S. defense items transferred to Ukrainian control. The DSCA and the Military Services stated that they could use SAG-U transfer tracking data and electronic documentation to support delivery confirmation and property book accountability. However, SAG-U does not make its data and documentation readily available to external organizations because its parent organization did not task SAG-U to document the transfer of U.S. defense articles to Ukraine or to provide this data to external organizations.

The DoD OIG made four recommendations to the DSCA Director. The Director previously took action to address one of the recommendations, and the DoD OIG verified the result; therefore, the recommendation is closed. However, the DSCA Director did not respond to the draft report; therefore, the other recommendations directed to the DSCA Director are unresolved.

Additionally, the DoD OIG made one recommendation to the U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) Commanding General. The DoD OIG made two recommendations to the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

USAREUR-AF, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Marine Corps officials agreed to address all the recommendations presented in this report; therefore, the DoD OIG considers the recommendations resolved and open until the DoD OIG verifies their implementation. The Army Chief of Staff did not respond to the draft report; therefore, the recommendations are unresolved. The Chief of Naval Operations' comments did not address the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved.

Evaluation of Security and Accountability Controls for Defense Items Transferred to Ukraine Through Romania

DODIG-2025-019: November 12, 2024

The DoD OIG conducted this evaluation to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the DoD's security and accountability controls for DoD-procured defense items transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) through the Logistics Enabling Node in Romania (LEN-R).

The DoD OIG found that the DoD did not implement effective controls to accurately account for defense items it procured for and transferred to the UAF through Romania.

For example, in 6 of 16 shipments the DoD OIG reviewed, the DoD OIG identified discrepancies between quantities of items LEN-R personnel identified as inspected and the quantity of items reported to SAG-U. The lack of effective controls and discrepancies occurred because the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) did not establish requirements in the Security Assistance Management Manual for DoD components to record inventories for foreign military financing purchases of defense items before transfer. Additionally, U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) officials did not require LEN-R personnel to perform accountability procedures for DoD-procured defense items, such as recording inventories or the proper maintenance, transmission, and protection of those records.

As a result, the DoD cannot verify the quantities of DoD-procured defense items transferred to the UAF through Romania. Additionally, since DoD officials cannot reconcile the defense items shipped against the items received at the transfer point, those officials do not have reasonable assurance that the DoD effectively and efficiently purchased and transferred non-standard ammunition for Ukraine.

The DoD OIG made one recommendation to the DSCA Director. The recommendation is unresolved pending receipt and review of management comments.

The DoD OIG made one recommendation to the USAFE Commander, in coordination with SAG-U and the U.S. Army's Joint Program Executive Office for Armaments and Ammunition. The USAFE Director of Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection agreed with the recommendation. The Director stated that USAFE will maintain and transmit accountability records in accordance with DoD policy for records management. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open until the DoD OIG receive documentation that all-agreed upon actions are complete.

Audit of the DoD's Execution of Funds to Assist Ukraine

DODIG-2025-007; October 18, 2024

The objective of this audit was to determine whether the DoD used Ukraine assistance funds in accordance with Federal laws and DoD policies.

The DoD OIG reviewed 479 disbursement transactions from January 1, 2022, to December 31, 2022, totaling \$2.1 billion. The DoD OIG reviewed the transactions to determine whether the DoD used Ukraine supplemental funds to pay for goods and services that supported the efforts in Ukraine, and whether the DoD maintained the required documentation to support the disbursement transactions.

The DoD OIG found that the DoD did not support the use of Ukraine assistance funds in accordance with the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Acts and DoD policies. Of the 479 disbursement transactions reviewed, the DoD OIG determined that the DoD used the funds correctly for 154 transactions, totaling \$1.1 billion (49.7 percent) of the \$2.1 billion, however, there was not provide sufficient documentation to support the purpose or accuracy of the remaining 323 transactions, totaling \$1.1 billion (50.3 percent) of the \$2.1 billion.

The DoD OIG found that the DoD did not sufficiently support the disbursement transactions because the DoD did not have adequate internal controls in place to ensure that supporting documentation was readily available as required by the DoD Financial Management Regulation and Federal Internal Control Standards and that documentation supporting the accuracy of the payment vouchers followed the DoD Financial Management Regulation and Joint Travel Regulations. Additionally, the DoD Financial Management Regulation did not require DoD components to document the purpose of payments that use supplemental funds that are appropriated with a specific purpose.

As a result, when the DoD maintained documentation, it generally supported the accuracy and purpose of the transactions; however, due to the lack of documentation for most of the sampled transactions, the DoD does not have assurance that it used the \$1.1 billion of Ukraine supplemental funds as directed by law.

The DoD OIG made three recommendations to the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and to Navy and Air Force managements.

The Comptroller agreed with one recommendation and described actions, that if taken, would address the underlying intent of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendations are resolved but will remain open until the DoD receives documentation that all agreed-upon actions are complete. The DoD OIG will close the recommendation once recommended DoD actions are verified.

The Comptroller disagreed with two recommendations, the Associate Director, Office of Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy responding for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy did not fully address one recommendation and the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force did not agree and address one recommendation. Accordingly, these recommendations are unresolved. The DoD OIG will track these recommendations until management has agreed to take actions that the DoD OIG determines to be sufficient to meet the intent of the recommendations and provides documentation that all agreed-upon actions are completed.

Follow-up Evaluation of Management Advisory: The Protection of Sensitive Mission Data by the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine and Its Subordinate Commands

DODIG-2025-006; October 11, 2024

This report contains classified information, and no redacted version is available. To file a Freedom of Information Act Request, please submit a request to FOIA.gov.

Audit of DoD Maintenance of Military Equipment Provided in Support of Ukraine

DODIG-2025-002; October 8, 2024

The DoD OIG conducted this audit to determine the extent to which the DoD provided maintenance support for U.S. military equipment provided to Ukraine. This audit focused on maintenance support performed at the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center-Ukraine in Jasionka, Poland.

The DoD OIG found that the DoD provided maintenance and repair on 649 military equipment items, as of August 15, 2023, ensuring the equipment was fully mission capable before providing or returning the items to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). However, several issues impacted maintenance and repair operations. For example, DoD units did not provide fully mission capable equipment in accordance with Defense Security Cooperation Agency guidance. Also, the UAF's increased use of equipment provided under the PDA resulted in a higher demand for repair parts, placing a strain on the supply chain. In addition, the DoD OIG found that the UAF did not always return reparable, which are repair parts that can be repaired or refurbished, to the DoD. Such returns could have mitigated stress to the supply chain by reducing the amount of new reparable ordered.

These issues impacted maintenance and repair operations at the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center-Ukraine, DoD readiness, and the supply chain. While DoD officials have initiated actions to address these challenges, continued actions are needed.

The DoD OIG made two recommendations to the Commander, Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U). The first recommendation is in coordination with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Military Services, to establish processes and implement controls to mitigate the challenges regarding non-mission capable military equipment arriving at the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center-Ukraine for repair and maintenance including requiring technical inspections in advance of shipping military equipment to the theater.

The DoD OIG's second recommendation to the Commander, SAG-U, is to review the possibilities of establishing a memorandum of understanding with the UAF that formalizes the April 22, 2023, and July 13, 2023, letters, and incentivizes the UAF to return reparable, instead of delaying or declining to return them, and implement the result of the review as determined appropriate.

The Chief of Staff, SAG-U, responding for the Commander, SAG-U, neither agreed nor disagreed with the first recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved.

The Chief of Staff, SAG-U, responding for the Commander, SAG-U agreed with the recommendation concerning an agreement with the UAF to return reparable; therefore, the recommendation is resolved. The DoD OIG will close the recommendation once it obtains and verifies that SAG-U's formalized agreement with the UAF fully addresses the recommendation.

Audit of Accountability Controls for Defense Items Transferred to Ukraine Through Slovakia

DODIG-2025-004; October 11, 2024

The DoD OIG conducted this audit to determine the effectiveness of the DoD's accountability controls for U.S. defense items transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) through the Logistics Enabling Node in Slovakia (LEN-S).

The DoD OIG found USEUCOM, U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF), and SAG-U officials did not have effective controls to provide visibility of all U.S. defense items transferred to the UAF through LEN-S. Specifically, USEUCOM, USAREUR-AF, and SAG-U officials could not provide a complete list of all U.S. defense items provided to the UAF through LEN-S, including quantities, types, or serial numbers. Without effective controls to provide visibility, the DoD does not have reasonable assurance that its records related to all transfers to the UAF through LEN-S are accurate.

The DoD OIG made three recommendations to the SAG-U Commander. First, to include an additional column in the Presidential Drawdown Authority Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative tracker to indicate the LEN location. Second, develop a standard operating procedure for consistent entry of data into the Presidential Drawdown Authority Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative tracker. Last, develop a standard operating procedure for consistent entry of data into KOROVAL Digital Assistance Registry. The SAG-U Chief of Staff, responding for the SAG-U Commander, agreed with the three recommendations and provided sufficient documentation to close them. Therefore, the recommendations are resolved and closed.

The DoD OIG made one recommendation to the USEUCOM Commander to develop standard operating procedures for U.S. defense items transferring to the UAF through LEN-S. The standard operating procedures should include roles and responsibilities for receiving and transferring defense items; reporting the transfer of U.S. defense items; and maintain supporting documentation for the U.S. defense items transferred. The Deputy Division Chief for USEUCOM Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities Directorate, responding for the USEUCOM Commander, partially agreed with recommendation, stating that if the United States establishes future operations at LEN-S, USEUCOM will designate a supporting unit to create standard operating procedures for receiving and transferring U.S. defense items.

The DoD OIG does not agree with waiting for the development of a standard operating procedure because it could delay the transfer of critical equipment to the UAF. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. The DoD OIG requests that the Commander reconsider his position on the recommendation and provide comments on the final report.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Democracy and Human Rights Programs in Europe and Eurasia

AUD-GEER-25-09; December 23, 2024

State OIG initially planned to conduct an audit of State programs to support democracy and human rights in selected European and Eurasian countries. However, because of similarities with a broader, congressionally mandated Government Accountability Office audit, State OIG decided to conclude its work on this topic with this information brief to avoid duplication of effort. The information brief provides an overview of State’s funding for democracy and human rights assistance in Europe and Eurasia from FY 2019 through FY 2023, describes the roles of the State bureaus involved in advancing democracy assistance programs and State’s approach to democratic backsliding, and summarizes information on the sources State uses to gauge changes in levels of democracy.

Promoting democracy and respect for human rights is a central component of U.S. foreign policy, and the revitalization of democracy is a top U.S. national security priority. According to State, since 2005, the pace of global democratic decline has accelerated, and 68 percent of the world’s population now live in autocracies. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has raised additional concerns about the stability of democratic institutions in Eastern Europe in particular. Furthermore, according to the State and USAID Joint Regional Strategy for 2022–2026, there has been an “alarming increase” in democratic backsliding among former recipients of U.S. assistance in Europe and Eurasia.

According to multiple sources, the pace of democratic decline has accelerated around the world, and Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has further highlighted the importance of democratic institutions in Eastern Europe in particular. As State’s efforts to provide democracy and human rights assistance in Europe and Eurasia continue, State bureaus will need to regularly review their approach to such programming to ensure appropriate coordination, implementation, and oversight of taxpayer funds. Although State OIG did not make recommendations in its information brief, State OIG encourages State to continue to explore ways to ensure prudent oversight of its democracy and human rights programs to ensure it is well positioned to fully evaluate the effectiveness of its programs.

Audit of the Disposition of Sensitive Security Assets at U.S. Embassies Kabul, Afghanistan and Kyiv, Ukraine

AUD-GEER-25-01; October 16, 2024

U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, suspended operations on August 31, 2021, and U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ukraine, suspended operations on February 28, 2022. In accordance with State requirements and guidance, both posts were required to remove or destroy sensitive security assets—including special protective equipment and armored vehicles—in advance of the suspensions of operations to prevent their use by hostile forces. State OIG conducted this audit to determine whether Embassies Kabul and Kyiv managed, safeguarded, and disposed of sensitive security assets in advance of evacuation at each post in accordance with State guidance.

State OIG found that Embassies Kabul and Kyiv faced different challenges that impacted their ability to manage, safeguard, and dispose of sensitive security assets in advance of their respective evacuations. For example, State OIG found that 26 percent of Embassy Kabul’s firearms and 63 percent of its armored vehicles were left in Afghanistan. Many of those

assets were abandoned intact, although some were disabled using ad hoc methods. State OIG identified several issues that contributed to assets being abandoned intact, including Embassy Kabul maintain more assets than needed for daily operations, inadequate disposition planning, inadequate guidance, and insufficient training. In contrast to Embassy Kabul, Embassy Kyiv staff were able to remove all of the embassy’s sensitive security assets prior to the suspension of operations. However, a senior Embassy Kyiv security official acknowledged that they had a smaller inventory of sensitive assets than Embassy Kabul and may have also had to abandon or destroy assets if they had faced a more exigent evacuation scenario. In addition, State OIG found that State did not fully and accurately account for sensitive assets exfiltrated from Embassy Kabul. Finally, State OIG found that State issued a waiver allowing the transfer of half of Embassy Kyiv’s armored vehicle fleet to the Ukrainian government after the suspension of operations in February 2022. As a result of the transfer, Embassy Kyiv did not have sufficient armored vehicles after resuming operations.

State OIG made 12 recommendations to address the shortcomings identified in this report. State concurred with all 12 recommendations and, at the time the report was issued, State OIG considered all 12 recommendations resolved, pending further action. The recommendations will remain open until State OIG receives documentation that all agreed upon actions have been completed.

FINAL REPORTS BY LEAD IG PARTNER AGENCIES

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Ukraine: DoD Can Take Additional Steps to Improve its Security Assistance Training

GAO-25-106773SU; November 7, 2024

The objective of this review was to examine the DoD’s approaches to training Ukraine’s armed forces, determine how the DoD assesses that training and collects lessons learned, and identify effects on U.S. military forces and training facilities in Europe.

This report contains controlled unclassified information, and no redacted version is available. Members of Congress or congressional staff who would like a copy should contact GAO’s Congressional Relations Office. Members of the press or public should file a Freedom of Information Act Request.



APPENDIX D

Ongoing Oversight Projects

Tables 21 and 22 list the titles and objectives for the Special IG and partner agencies' ongoing oversight projects related to OAR and Ukraine.

Table 21.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs as of December 31, 2024

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the U.S. European Command Force Protection Measures at Installations in Poland that Support Operation Atlantic Resolve

To determine whether the DoD implemented force protection measures at U.S. European Command installations in Poland in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve in accordance with DoD policy.

Classified Project

Classified—Please contact the DoD OIG.

Audit of the DoD's Management of European Deterrence Initiative Investments

To determine the extent to which DoD officials effectively prioritized and funded military construction in support of the European Deterrence Initiative.

Audit of Storage for U.S. Army Prepositioned Stocks in Belgium and the Netherlands

To assess the effectiveness of the Army's storage of prepositioned stocks in Belgium and the Netherlands (APS-2).

Evaluation of the Movement of Ukraine and Israel-Bound Equipment through Aerial Ports of Embarkation within the Continental United States

To assess the effectiveness with which the DoD Components are accounting for and processing defense materials from their points of origin through the Aerial Ports of Embarkation for delivery to Ukraine and Israel.

Audit of Defensive Cyberspace Operations in the U.S. European Command

To assess the effectiveness of defensive cyber operations in the U.S. European Command.

Audit of the Army's Management of Repairs to Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Meet U.S. Army Europe and Africa Mission Requirements

To assess the effectiveness of the Army's management of repairs to ensure that Bradley Fighting Vehicles transferred to U.S. Army Europe and Africa units meet mission requirements.

Evaluation of DoD's Effectiveness in Negotiating Fair and Reasonable Prices with Contractors for Ukraine Security Assistance

To assess the effectiveness with which DoD contracting officers negotiated fair and reasonable prices with contractors for Ukraine security assistance.

Audit of the Army's Management of Unfinalized Contract Actions Awarded to Provide Ukraine Assistance

To determine whether Army contracting officials properly managed unfinalized contract actions awarded to assist Ukraine by obligating funds and finalizing actions within the required limits and adjusting profit for costs incurred, or properly waiving the requirements in accordance with Federal and DoD policies.

DoD and Department of State Joint Audit of U.S. Assistance Provided in Support of Ukraine Through the Foreign Military Financing Program

To determine whether the DoD and Department of State appropriately administered and managed foreign military financing provided in response to Russia's war against Ukraine.

Evaluation of the DoD's Efforts to Protect U.S. Personnel and Operations Supporting the Ukrainian Conflict

To determine whether the DoD is effectively and efficiently protecting U.S. personnel and operations, to include executing counterintelligence activities, within the U.S. European Command in accordance with DoD policy.

Audit of the Army's Administration of Noncompetitive Contracts in Support of Ukraine

To determine whether, in support of the Ukraine response, DoD contracting officials properly administered noncompetitively awarded contracts in accordance with Federal regulations and DoD guidance.

Evaluation of DoD Efforts to Collect and Integrate Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned from the Russia/Ukraine Conflict

To determine the effectiveness of the DoD's collection and use of observations, insights, and lessons learned from Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the DoD's support to Ukraine, to inform DoD doctrine, planning, training, and equipping.

Evaluation of the DoD's Validation of Repair Parts Requested by the Ukrainian Armed Forces

To determine the effectiveness of DoD Components' processes for verifying the need for, and the accountability of, repair parts requested by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to maintain military equipment provided by the DoD.

Audit of the DoD's Processes for Providing Supplies and Equipment Funded Through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative

To assess the effectiveness of the DoD's processes for ensuring the quality and timeliness of supplies and equipment provided to the Ukrainian Armed Forces funded through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

Audit of Controls Over Funds Provided for the Replenishment of Defense Articles and the Reimbursement for Services Provided to the Government of Ukraine Through Presidential Drawdown Authority

To assess the effectiveness of the DoD's internal controls over the use of funds appropriated for the replenishment of defense articles and the reimbursement for services provided to Ukraine under Presidential Drawdown Authority.

Evaluation of DoD Processes to Provide Repair Parts to Support the Ukrainian Armed Forces

To assess the efficiency and effectiveness of DoD processes for providing repair parts for U.S. equipment to Ukraine.

Evaluation of the Demilitarization of Damaged, Destroyed, and Expended Defense Articles Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring in Ukraine (EEUM VII)

To assess the effectiveness with which DoD Components demilitarized damaged, destroyed, and expended defense articles transferred to Ukraine that require enhanced end-use monitoring (EEUM).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Inspection of Embassy Moscow, Russia

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russia.

Inspection of Embassy Ankara, Türkiye, and Constituent Posts

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Türkiye, and constituent posts.

Classified Inspection of Embassy Ankara, Türkiye, and Constituent Posts

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Türkiye, and constituent posts.

Inspection of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs

To determine whether the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs is: 1) following State leadership and management principles, 2) carrying out program and policy implementation responsibilities in line with State standards, and 3) managing its resources and information technology operations in accordance with State standards.

Review of Leahy Vetting Processes in Select Countries with Leahy Ineligible Unit Agreements

To determine whether State: 1) has developed policies and procedures for instances where recipient units cannot be identified prior to the transfer of assistance, and 2) is implementing Leahy law requirements in accordance with policies and procedures in select countries.

Audit of Department of State Anti-Corruption Programs and Activities in Eastern Europe

To determine whether the Department of State implemented and monitored anti-corruption assistance programs and activities in Eastern European countries in accordance with Federal and State requirements.

DoD and Department of State Joint Audit of U.S. Assistance Provided in Support of Ukraine Through the Foreign Military Financing Program

To determine whether the DoD and Department of State appropriately administered and managed foreign military financing provided in response to Russia's war against Ukraine.

Audit of U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ukraine, Records Retention for Electronic Messaging

To determine whether Embassy Kyiv has implemented measures to ensure Federal records created using electronic messaging applications are preserved.

Audit of Department of State Anti-Corruption Programs and Activities in Eastern Europe—Classified Annex

To determine whether the Department of State implemented and monitored anti-corruption assistance programs and activities in Eastern European countries in accordance with Federal and State requirements.

Review of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs' Property Accountability in Ukraine

To determine whether the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL): 1) followed applicable Federal, State, and INL property management processes for commodities donated to Ukrainian government entities, and 2) authorized exceptions to INL property management and donation processes.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL***Audit of USAID's Direct Budget Support to the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance Fund***

To assess: 1) USAID's oversight of its contributions to the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance fund and 2) assess the extent to which USAID's contributions to the fund supported eligible internally displaced persons.

Audit of USAID Energy Activities in Ukraine

To assess USAID/Ukraine's oversight of the implementation of the Energy Security Project procurement process and determine whether USAID/Ukraine verified that the Energy Security Project delivered selected equipment and materials to recipients as intended.

Audit of USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance Localization Approach in Ukraine

To assess USAID/Ukraine's oversight of the implementation of the Energy Security Project procurement process and determine whether USAID/Ukraine verified that the Energy Security Project delivered selected equipment and materials to recipients as intended.

Audit of the USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives Engagement of Local Partners in Ukraine to Contribute to Development Goals

To determine: 1) the extent to which the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has developed objectives and metrics for the program(s) under review; 2) OTI's progress toward achieving those objectives; and 3) how, and to what extent, OTI is monitoring implementer performance in accordance with USAID's standard policies and procedures.

Inspection of USAID Partner Controls to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Ukraine

To determine: 1) whether USAID ensured that pre-award requirements related to preventing and responding to sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) were met prior to executing assistance awards for the Ukraine response, and 2) to what extent USAID ensured that implementers that received Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance awards for the Ukraine response operationalized PSEA-related requirements.

Audit of Bureau for Resilience and Food Security Response to the Humanitarian Crisis Caused by Russia's War Against Ukraine

To determine the extent to which: 1) USAID's Bureau for Resilience, Environment, and Food Security followed a documented process to consider the risk of food insecurity and other factors when prioritizing Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 funding recommendations, and 2) USAID adapted its agricultural programming to address the impacts of Russia's war in Ukraine and measured the results.

Audit of USAID/Ukraine's HIV/AIDS Prevention Activities

To assess the extent to which selected USAID/Ukraine President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) programs are being implemented and monitored to achieve their stated goals.

Incurred Cost Audits of USAID Resources

To determine whether costs claimed by 12 recipients of Ukraine awards and sub-awards for the period January 1, 2018, to December 31, 2022, are allowable, allocable and reasonable in accordance with audit standards, award terms, and Federal regulations.

Inspection of USAID's Oversight of Starlink Satellite Terminals Provided to the Government of Ukraine

To determine the extent to which USAID mitigated the risk of misuse of the Starlink satellite terminals it provided to the Government of Ukraine.

Table 22.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by Partner Agencies, as of December 31, 2024**DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL****Audit of the Bureau of Industry and Security's Enforcement of Russia and Belarus Export Controls**

To assess the actions taken by Bureau of Industry and Security to detect and prosecute violations of Russia and Belarus export controls.

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE**DoD and NATO Logistics in Europe**

To review DoD and NATO capacity to transport personnel and materiel within Europe and consideration of related lessons learned from the effort to support Ukraine.

Management of Presidential Drawdown Authority

To assess agency implementation of the Presidential Drawdown Authority, including processes for: 1) managing drawdowns, and 2) potentially replacing defense articles provided to partners.

U.S. Direct Budget Support to Ukraine

To evaluate the transparency and accountability of the direct budget support USAID has provided to the Ukrainian government through the World Bank's Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) project, and other related matters.

U.S. Government Ukraine Recovery Planning

To assess State and USAID planning for recovery, the extent to which ongoing efforts align with U.S. priorities, and the coordination of these efforts with other donor nations and the Ukrainian government.

Readiness Implications of U.S. Military Assistance to Ukraine

To assess the impact of DoD's provision of military equipment to Ukraine on the Geographic Combatant Commands' readiness to prepare for and conduct operations, the Military Services' training and equipping capabilities, and the Army's efforts to sustain its weapons systems.

Russia/Ukraine Sanctions and Export Controls

To examine the objectives of sanctions and export controls related to the war in Ukraine and progress toward those objectives; changes in key Russian economic indicators since sanctions and export controls were imposed; and the amounts and uses of resources that agencies have received to implement and enforce those sanctions and export controls.

U.S. Support for Nuclear and Radiological Security and Safety in Ukraine

To evaluate how the Department of Energy and other agencies have used supplemental appropriations to address nuclear and radiological security and safety risks in Ukraine.

Combatting Human Trafficking during Armed Conflicts, Including Ukraine

To assess the implementation of State and USAID programs and projects to counter human trafficking in Ukraine and compare them with similar efforts in other countries experiencing armed conflict.

Ukraine Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Assistance

To examine U.S. Government assistance to Ukrainian refugees and internally displaced persons, including efforts to coordinate internally as well as with international partners on a comprehensive strategy for addressing the crises and migration challenges.

HHS Refugee Assistance for Ukrainians

To review HHS' use and oversight of Ukraine refugee assistance funding and any factors that have affected Ukrainians' temporary resettlement in the United States.

Ukraine Aid Outcome Monitoring

To examine State's Monitoring, Evaluation and Audit Services for Ukraine Reporting (MEASURE) contract, and the extent to which State is addressing any challenges to the contractor's ability to monitor, evaluate, and report on outcomes of U.S. foreign assistance to Ukraine.



APPENDIX E

Planned Oversight Projects

Table 23 lists the titles and objectives for Special IG and partner agencies' planned oversight projects related to OAR and Ukraine.

Table 23.

Planned Oversight Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs as of December 31, 2024

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the DoD's Acquisition and Distribution of Bulk Petroleum Products in U.S. Military Installations in Europe

To assess the effectiveness of the DoD's actions to reduce reliance on Russian energy sources within the U.S. European Command area of responsibility

Audit of the DoD's Facilities Sustainment in the U.S. European Command

To assess the effectiveness of the DoD's management of facilities sustainment in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility.

Evaluation of the Accountability of Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Designated Defense Communication Security Articles Provided to Ukraine

To assess the effectiveness with which the DoD is managing the accountability of enhanced end-use monitoring designated COMSEC articles provided to Ukraine.

Evaluation of the U.S. European Command's Long-Term Equipment Storage and Maintenance Complex in Powidz, Poland

To determine whether the Army is able to maintain and account for Army pre-positioned stocks of military equipment at the new Long-Term Equipment and Storage and Maintenance Complex in Powidz, Poland.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Inspection of Embassy Riga, Latvia

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Riga, Latvia.

Classified Inspection of Embassy Riga, Latvia

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Riga, Latvia.

Audit of Emergency Action Planning at Selected U.S. Embassies in the Baltic States

To determine whether selected U.S. embassies in the Baltic States are prepared to respond and recover from emergencies.

Audit of Department of State Efforts to Address Global Food Security Following Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

To determine whether State's Bureau of Global Food Security's programs and activities designed to counter the impact of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on global food security are achieving intended results.

Audit of War Crimes Accountability Capacity Building in Ukraine

To determine whether the Global Criminal Justice Grant for War Crimes Accountability Capacity-Building in Ukraine is achieving intended results.

Audit of Department of State Energy Security and Diversification Initiatives in the Black Sea Region

To determine whether State efforts to coordinate and advance energy security and diversification initiatives align with relevant strategies, have defined program objectives, and are on track to achieve those objectives.

Audit of Department of State Policies and Practices for Imposing, Enforcing, and Evaluating Economic and Financial Sanctions

To determine whether State, in coordination with the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce established and implemented policies and practices to impose, enforce, and evaluate the effect of sanctions.

Review of Remote Monitoring for Department of State Programs in Ukraine

To determine: 1) the number of State bureaus with implementing partners in Ukraine, 2) the extent to which such bureaus used remote methods or third-party contractors to monitor their programming in Ukraine, and 3) any barriers to remote monitoring in Ukraine.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of USAID's Cybersecurity Defenses

To assess the effectiveness of USAID's controls to prevent unauthorized access to its data and systems, including countering and deterring threats from foreign governments that pose a unique cyberthreat to USAID and the U.S. Government.

Audit of USAID/Ukraine's Activities to Ensure Access to Critical Health Services

To determine the: 1) extent to which USAID has developed objectives and metrics for the program(s) under review; 2) progress toward achieving those objectives; and 3) how, and to what extent, USAID is monitoring implementer performance in accordance with USAID's standard policies and procedures.

Audit of USAID's Agriculture Resilience Initiative for Ukraine

To determine how AGRI-Ukraine targets Ukraine's agricultural production and export challenges through 2023.



APPENDIX F Hotline and Investigations Activity

HOTLINE

The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs each maintain their own hotline to receive complaints specific to their agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report suspected violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority. Each OIG Hotline office evaluates complaints received through the hotlines and forwards them to the respective investigative entity for review and investigation.

During the quarter, DoD OIG Hotline investigators received 17 allegations related to OAR and referred 13 cases for further criminal or administrative investigation. State OIG received 11 allegations and referred 3, and USAID OIG received 34 allegations. In some instances, a case may contain multiple subjects and allegations. (See Figure 11.)


INVESTIGATIONS

Law enforcement personnel from the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs investigate allegations of misconduct that might compromise U.S. Government programs and operations. Additionally, investigators identify, coordinate, and de-conflict fraud and corruption investigations; share best practices and investigative techniques; and coordinate proactive measures to detect and deter the criminals who would exploit U.S. Government assistance to Ukraine.

The Special Inspector General and its oversight partners continued to use the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group framework to coordinate investigative activities,

Figure 11.

Hotline Activity Related to OAR, October 1–December 31, 2024



deconflict potential or common targets, and interact for logistical and legal support regarding the Ukraine response. The Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group framework includes representatives from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS, the DoD OIG's criminal investigative component), State OIG, USAID OIG, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Homeland Security Investigations.

The Special IG agencies have positioned criminal investigators in Germany, Poland, and Ukraine to investigate allegations of fraud, corruption and potential diversion of weapons or technology. DCIS agents in Kyiv continue working jointly with the U.S. Embassy partners and Ukrainian authorities, to assess any reported discrepancies related to accounting for weapons and military equipment requiring enhanced end use monitoring.


As of December 31, 2024, Special IG and investigative partner agencies reported 78 open investigations and 14 investigations closed and referred 3 cases to the Department of Justice.

In previous quarterly reports, the Special IG has discussed the various memoranda of understanding (MoU) that have been signed between the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs and their Ukrainian counterparts, including the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), Main Inspectorate, and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO), to formalize information sharing in support of criminal investigations and oversight work.

This quarter, DoD OIG personnel stationed in Washington and Kyiv continue to report that these MoUs have facilitated increasing cooperation between two complementary but structurally dissimilar oversight communities.

Figure 12.

Investigations Activity Related to OAR, October 1–December 31, 2024



DoD OIG investigators have reported that they routinely employ these MOUs as a mechanism for the exchange of information with their Ukrainian counterparts. DoD OIG personnel met regularly with the Ukrainian Main Inspectorate and other investigative partners, and through these relationships, facilitated by the MOUs, addressed inquiries promptly. DoD OIG personnel continue to build relationships with Ukrainian government entities to facilitate efforts to account for U.S. investments in Ukraine. (See Figure 12.)



APPENDIX G

U.S. Weapons, Equipment, and Ammunition Committed to Ukraine

Air Defense

- Two Patriot air defense batteries and munitions
- 12 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and munitions
- HAWK air defense systems and munitions
- AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M missiles for air defense
- More than 2,000 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles
- Avenger air defense systems
- VAMPIRE counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) and munitions
- c-UAS gun trucks and ammunition
- Mobile c-UAS laser-guided rocket systems
- Other c-UAS equipment
- Anti-aircraft guns and ammunition
- Air defense systems components
- Equipment to integrate Western launchers, missiles, and radars with Ukraine's systems
- Equipment to support and sustain Ukraine's existing air defense capabilities
- Equipment to protect critical national infrastructure
- 21 air surveillance radars

Ground Maneuver

- 31 M1A1 Abrams tanks
- 45 T-72B tanks
- More than 300 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles
- Four Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicles
- 189 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers
- More than 800 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers
- 250 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles
- More than 1,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs)

- More than 3,000 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs)
- More than 200 light tactical vehicles
- 300 armored medical treatment vehicles
- 80 trucks and more than 200 trailers to transport heavy equipment
- More than 1,000 tactical vehicles to tow and haul equipment
- 153 tactical vehicles to recover equipment
- 10 command post vehicles
- 30 ammunition support vehicles
- 18 armored bridging systems
- 20 logistics support vehicles and equipment
- 239 fuel tankers and 105 fuel trailers
- 58 water trailers
- Six armored utility trucks
- 125mm, 120mm, and 105mm tank ammunition
- More than 1,800,000 rounds of 25mm ammunition
- Mine clearing equipment

Fires

- More than 40 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and ammunition
- Ground-based Small Diameter Bomb launchers and guided rockets
- More than 200 155mm Howitzers and more than 3,000,000 155mm artillery rounds
- More than 7,000 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds
- More than 60,000 155mm Remote Anti-Armor Mine Systems (RAAM) artillery rounds
- 72 105mm Howitzers and more than 800,000 105mm artillery rounds
- 10,000 203mm artillery rounds

(continued on next page)

- More than 400,000 152mm artillery rounds
- Approximately 40,000 130mm artillery rounds
- 40,000 122mm artillery rounds
- 60,000 122mm GRAD rockets
- More than 200 mortar systems
- More than 600,000 mortar rounds
- More than 100 counter-artillery and counter-mortar radars
- More than 50 multi-mission radars

Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Systems

- 20 Mi-17 helicopters
- Switchblade Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
- Phoenix Ghost UAS
- CyberLux K8 UAS
- Altius-600 UAS
- Jump-20 UAS
- Hornet UAS
- Puma UAS
- ScanEagle UAS
- Penguin UAS
- Two radars for UAS
- High-speed Anti-radiation Missiles (HARMs)
- Precision aerial munitions
- More than 6,000 Zuni aircraft rockets
- More than 20,000 Hydra-70 aircraft rockets
- Munitions for UAS

Anti-armor and Small Arms

- More than 10,000 Javelin anti-armor systems
- More than 120,000 other anti-armor systems and munitions
- More than 9,000 Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles
- More than 40,000 grenade launchers and small arms
- More than 400,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades

- Laser-guided rocket systems and munitions
- Rocket launchers and ammunition
- Anti-tank mines

Maritime

- Two Harpoon coastal defense systems and anti-ship missiles
- 90 coastal and riverine patrol boats
- Unmanned coastal defense vessels
- Port and harbor security equipment

Other Capabilities

- M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions
- C-4 explosives, demolition munitions, and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing
- Obstacle emplacement equipment
- Counter air defense capability
- More than 100,000 sets of body armor and helmets
- Tactical secure communications systems and support equipment
- Four satellite communications (SATCOM) antennas
- SATCOM terminals and services
- Electronic warfare (EW) and counter-EW equipment
- Commercial satellite imagery services
- Night vision devices, surveillance and thermal imagery systems, optics, and rangefinders
- Explosive ordnance disposal equipment and protective gear
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment
- Medical supplies, including first aid kits, bandages, monitors, and other equipment
- Field equipment, cold weather gear, generators, and spare parts
- Support for training, maintenance, and sustainment activities

Source: DoD, fact sheet, "Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine," 1/9/2025.

ACRONYMS


Acronym	
ACA	Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group for Ukraine
ACC-DTA	Army Contracting Command-Detroit Arsenal
AOR	area of responsibility
ATACMS	Army Tactical Missile System
BHA	USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
DBS	direct budget support
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DoE	Department of Energy
DoJ	Department of Justice
DRL	State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EEUM	enhanced end-use monitoring
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EU	European Union
EUM	end-use monitoring
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FY	fiscal year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
G7	Group of Seven
HACC	High Anti-Corruption Court
HIMARS	High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems
IDP	internally displaced person
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INL	State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISN	State Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
LEN-S	Logistics Enabling Node in Slovakia
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NABU	National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
NNSA	National Nuclear Security Administration
NPU	National Police of Ukraine
NSATU	NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine

Acronym	
OAR	Operation Atlantic Resolve
OCR	Organizational Capacity Review
ODC-Kyiv	Office of Defense Cooperation-Kyiv
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OPG	Office of the Prosecutor General
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OUSD(P)	Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
PDA	Presidential Drawdown Authority
PEACE	World Bank Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PM/WRA	State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRM	State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
RDC-U	Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell-Ukraine
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
SAG-U	Security Assistance Group-Ukraine
SAPO	Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office
SBGS	Ukrainian State Border Guard Service
SCIP-EUM	Security Cooperation Information Portal-End-Use Monitoring
SCS	Ukrainian State Customs Service
State	Department of State
TPT	Third Party Transfer
Treasury	Department of the Treasury
TSC	Theater Sustainment Command
UAF	Ukrainian Armed Forces
UAS	unmanned aerial system (refers to one or more aircraft, plus the launch and recovery system)
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle (refers to a single aircraft)
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	UN Refugee Agency
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
USAGM	U.S. Agency for Global Media
USAI	Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAREUR-AF	U.S. Army Europe and Africa
USEUCOM	The U.S. European Command
VOA	Voice of America
WHO	World Health Organization
WFP	World Food Programme
WPS	Worldwide Protective Services

Map of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Area of Responsibility



Map of Ukraine



ENDNOTES

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An M109 Paladin fires a round of high-explosive artillery on Forward Operating Site Torun, Poland. (U.S. Army photo)



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INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINE

The United States is committed to supporting the Ukrainian people during Russia's war of aggression. We are dedicated to providing oversight of the funds and resources American taxpayers have provided in support of Ukraine.

We encourage you to confidentially report any of the following suspected activities related to the programs or operations of the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of State (including the U.S. Agency for Global Media), and the U.S. Agency for International Development to the appropriate Hotline listed below.

Corruption
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
Fraud, Waste, Abuse, Mismanagement
Trafficking In Persons



dodig.mil/hotline



stateoig.gov/hotline



oig.usaid.gov/report-fraud



+1 703-604-8799 or
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