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
INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

JUNE 25, 2025



(U) Evaluation of U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigade Support to Combatant Commands



~~Controlled by: Evaluations~~

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INDEPENDENCE ★ INTEGRITY ★ EXCELLENCE ★ TRANSPARENCY

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(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigade Support to Combatant Commands

June 25, 2025

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to assess the effectiveness with which the Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) supported security force assistance (SFA) in the U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern Command areas of responsibility.

(U) Background

(U) SFA is DoD activities that support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. In May 2018, the Army announced that it would establish six SFABs. The core mission of these specialized units is to conduct, assess, support, liaise, and advise military operations with allied and partner nations.

(U) Finding

(U) Officials from the 1st and 2nd SFABs supported SFA in the U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Africa Command areas of responsibility, respectively, by planning and executing missions. Geographic combatant command and Army Service Component Command officials commended the SFAB teams on the SFA activities executed in their areas of responsibility.

(U) While supporting SFA tasks in the Army Support Campaign Plan, SFAB officials conducted initial, midpoint, and final assessments of the foreign security forces in accordance with Army guidance. However, Army Service Component and SFAB officials did not measure the progress of SFA activities.

(U) Finding (cont'd)

(U) This occurred because U.S. Army Southern European Task Force–Africa (SETAF-AF), U.S. Army South, and SFAB officials did not develop indicators, such as measures of performance and measures of effectiveness, to determine whether SFAB officials effectively executed SFA activities in accordance with Army guidance. According to SETAF-AF and U.S. Army South officials, they are developing a process to assess the effectiveness of SFAB activities in support of theater campaign plans that will include indicators. However, as of April 2025, SETAF-AF and U.S. Army South officials had not implemented the process.

(U) As a result, the DoD did not have full visibility into whether the SFABs' efforts are advancing strategic priorities, such as countering violent extremist organizations and threats from competitive countries. In addition, geographic combatant command and Army Service Component officials did not have the information necessary to adjust strategic priorities, reallocate resources within statutory constraints, modify activities, and adjust timelines.

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the Commanders of the SETAF-AF and U.S. Army South establish and implement measures of performance and measures of effectiveness to assess SFA objectives in the Army Support Campaign Plan. We also recommend that the Commanders of the 1st and 2nd SFABs establish and implement measures of performance and measures of effectiveness to assess the execution of SFA tasks in the Army Support Campaign Plan.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The SETAF-AF Chief of Strategy and Plans, responding for the SETAF-AF Commander, and the U.S. Army South Deputy Commander, responding for the U.S. Army South Commander, addressed the specifics of the recommendations; therefore, the recommendations are resolved but will remain open.

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(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigade Support to Combatant Commands

(U) Comments (cont'd)

(U) The 1st SFAB Commander did not respond to the recommendation in the report, and comments from the 2nd SFAB Commander did not address the specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendations are unresolved. We request that the 1st SFAB Commander and the 2nd SFAB Commander provide comments to the final report for the unresolved recommendations.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page and the transmittal memorandum for instructions on how to provide management comments.

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(U) Recommendations Table

(U) Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Commander, U.S. Army South	None	1.a	None
Commander, U.S. Southern European Task Force–Africa	None	1.b	None
Commander, 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade	2.a	None	None
Commander, 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade	2.b	None	None (U)

(U) Please provide Management Comments by July 25, 2025.

(U) Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

June 25, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

**SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigade Support
to Combatant Commands (Report No. DODIG-2025-118)**

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) This report contains two recommendations that are considered unresolved because the 1st SFAB Commander did not provide formal management comments to the draft report and the 2nd SFAB Commander did not address the specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, those recommendations remain open. We will track these recommendations until management has agreed to take actions that we determine to be sufficient to meet the intent of the recommendations and management officials submit adequate documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions are completed.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, within 30 days please provide us your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Send your response to either [REDACTED] if unclassified or [REDACTED] if classified SECRET.

(U) Additionally, the U.S. Army South and U.S. Army Southern European Task Force-Africa agreed to address two recommendations presented in the report; therefore, we consider those recommendations resolved and open. We will close the recommendations when you provide us documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendations are completed. Therefore, within 90 days please provide us your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the recommendations. Send your response to [REDACTED] if unclassified or [REDACTED] if classified SECRET.

(U) If you have any questions or would like to meet to discuss the evaluation, please contact [REDACTED]. We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the evaluation.

Bryan Clark

Bryan T. Clark
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Programs, Combatant Commands, and Operations

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Distribution:

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COMMANDER, 2ND SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to assess the effectiveness with which the Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) supported security force assistance (SFA) in the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) areas of responsibility (AOR).

(U) Background

(U) Security cooperation (SC) is activities performed by the DoD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. SC enables and encourages allies and partners to provide U.S. forces with essential access to develop and apply their capabilities and build capacity to address shared threats or support other activities that promote U.S. security interests. According to Joint Publication 3-20, “Security Cooperation,” SFA is defined as DoD activities that support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSFs) and their supporting institutions.¹ The activities of organizing, training, equipping, building, and advising to support the development of FSFs and their institutions through institutional capacity building. Title 10 U.S.C., chapter 16, governs DoD SFA activities, such as military-to-military engagements, training with foreign forces, and support for operations and capacity building.²

(U) Security Force Assistance Brigades

(U) In May 2018, the Army announced that it would establish six SFABs, five in the Active Component and one in the Army National Guard. Each SFAB consists of multifunctional teams that include maneuver advising teams, field artillery advising teams, engineering advising teams, or logistics advising teams. The SFAB Soldiers are volunteers recruited by the Security Force Assistance Command from other Army units. Those recruited for the SFAB leadership positions are subject to a Selection and Assessment evaluation to determine if they are suitable for SFAB service.

(U) The SFABs are specialized U.S. Army units with the core mission to conduct, assess, support, liaise, and advise operations with allied and partner nations. According to the Army Chief of Staff, the SFABs’ role is to advance America’s global relationships. In addition, the SFABs are responsible for building trust,

¹ (U) Joint Publication 3-20, “Security Cooperation,” September 9, 2022 (Incorporating Change 1, July 5, 2024).

² (U) Title 10, chapter 16, U.S.C., “Security Cooperation.”

(U) interoperability, and partner capacity. More importantly, according to the Army Chief of Staff, the SFABs enable the Joint Force and interagency team to quickly respond by enhancing coordination efforts during crisis. Currently, the Army regionally aligned the SFABs to operate across all geographic combatant commands (GCCs), as follows.

- (U) 1st SFAB, U.S. Southern Command
- (U) 2nd SFAB, U.S. Africa Command
- (U) 3rd SFAB, U.S. Central Command
- (U) 4th SFAB, U.S. European Command
- (U) 5th SFAB, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
- (U) 54th SFAB (Army National Guard), globally focused

(U) We assessed the effectiveness with which the 1st and 2nd SFABs supported SFA in the USSOUTHCOM and USAFRICOM AORs, respectively. See Appendix A for a discussion of our scope and methodology.

(U) 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, U.S. Southern Command

(U) According to the Security Force Assistance Command Factbook, the 1st SFAB is the only allocated force for U.S. Army South (ARSOUTH) that builds partner capacity and maintains the United States as the partner of choice in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Additionally, the Factbook states that the 1st SFAB helps to counter the influence of other nations and build relationships that are vital to U.S. national interests.³ USSOUTHCOM is responsible for providing contingency planning, operations, and SC in its assigned AOR. The USSOUTHCOM AOR encompasses 31 countries and 16 dependencies and areas of special sovereignty. The USSOUTHCOM AOR includes the land mass of Latin America south of Mexico, the waters adjacent to Central and South America, and the Caribbean Sea. As of March 2025, the 1st SFAB maintains a persistent presence in Colombia, Honduras, and Panama, while also expanding to support temporary missions to Peru, Ecuador, and Uruguay.

(U) 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade, U.S. Africa Command

(U) According to the Security Force Assistance Command Factbook, the 2nd SFAB maintains a persistent presence in up to 12 countries and enhances partner capabilities to respond to regional security threats across USAFRICOM. USAFRICOM is responsible for U.S. military operations, including fighting regional conflicts

³ (U) Security Force Assistance Command Factbook, 2024.

(U) and maintaining military relations in 53 of the 54 African nations.⁴ USAFRICOM coordinates activities through the U.S. Army Europe and Africa to the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force–Africa (SETAF-AF). The advisor teams also work and coordinate their activities in a joint, combined and interagency environment, requiring a broad skill set and experience. According to the Security Force Assistance Command Factbook, as the brigade continues to strengthen partnerships and military cooperation across Africa, it is also ready for large-scale combat operations should crisis and conflict erupt around the world.

(U) Roles and Responsibilities

(U) Multiple DoD officials and organizations participate in the SC process, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Joint Staff, GCCs, Army Service Component commands (ASCCs), and Security Force Assistance Command.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

(U) According to DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for developing policy for SC plans; providing guidance on transfer of defense articles; recommending funding levels and allocation of resources; providing oversight of the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of SC activities; and developing a worldwide common operating picture of SC activities.⁵ Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, is responsible for advising DoD Components on SC workforce issues to ensure that the workforce is appropriately sized and possesses the requisite education, skills, and tools necessary to plan, implement, and assess SC in the DoD.

(U) Joint Staff

(U) According to Joint Publication 3-20, the Joint Staff sets doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the U.S. in joint campaigns and operations. Through joint doctrine, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also provides considerations for military interaction and the authority for combatant commanders and other joint force commanders to conduct exercises. These exercises are also conducted with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners.

⁴ (U) Although Egypt is in Africa, it is in the U.S. Central Command AOR.

⁵ (U) DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” December 29, 2016.

(U) Geographic Combatant Commands

(U) According to Joint Publication 3-20, the combatant commanders plan, execute, and assess SFA to shape the operational environment, assist FSFs in defending against internal and external threats, and to build capability or capacity in a partner nation that supports U.S. national security interests. When integrated into a Combatant Command Campaign Plan, SFA can contribute to regional stability, deter aggression, and reduce the need for U.S. forces to intervene during crisis or contingencies.

(U) According to DoD Directive 5132.03, the GCCs develop theater campaign plans using strategic DoD guidance that includes integrated DoD SC plans. The SC plans show how each GCC aligns SC activities and resources to achieve strategic campaign objectives in support of the defense strategy. According to DoD Directive 5132.03, the country-specific SC sections of each theater campaign plan serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level SC objectives. The Directive states that each country-specific SC section will identify lines of effort that represent initiatives that are specific, measurable, attainable, and relevant, and have time-bound objectives. In addition, the Directive states that the GCC will monitor and evaluate these significant SC initiatives on a regular basis to gauge effectiveness, determine whether the SC initiatives need corrections, and capture lessons learned.

(U) Army Service Component Commands

(U) The ASCCs are the Army component of combatant commands in the joint force. They are responsible for recommendations to the joint force commander on the allocation and employment of U.S. Army forces within a combatant command. ARSOUTH is the ASCC for USSOUTHCOM, and U.S. Army Europe and Africa is the ASCC for USAFRICOM.

(U) ARSOUTH's mission is to enable multidomain operations by identifying, exposing, and degrading malign influence; setting the theater; and conducting SC operations and activities in the USSOUTHCOM AOR as part of integrated deterrence toward threats to the United States.

(U) In November 2020, U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Army Africa merged into U.S. Army Europe and Africa to improve the Army's ability to meet European and African strategic and operational objectives. Due to the increased responsibilities of overseeing Army operations across two continents, SETAF-AF is the joint task force for operations on the African continent. SETAF-AF is responsible for all Army operations, including SFAB teams deployed to Africa.

(U) Security Force Assistance Command

(U) According to Joint Publication 3-20, the Security Force Assistance Command mission is to man, train, and validate the total Army SFABs for employment by combatant commands. The Security Force Assistance Command serves as the validating authority for deploying SFABs.

(U) Finding

(U) DoD Officials Planned and Executed Security Force Assistance Missions, but Did Not Measure the Progress of Security Force Assistance Activities

(U) Officials from the 1st SFAB and 2nd SFAB supported SFA in the USSOUTHCOM and USAFRICOM AORs, respectively, by planning and executing missions. Specifically, SFAB officials planned and executed the following activities in support of the theater campaign plans:

- (U) building partner nation capabilities;
- (U) building training courses, such as a military intelligence curriculum;
- (U) training with partner forces; and
- (U) supporting major exercises to strengthen interoperability and build readiness to respond to crises and contingencies.

(U) GCC and ASCC officials commended the SFAB teams on the SFA activities executed in their AORs.

(U) While supporting SFA tasks in the Army Campaign Support Plans, SFAB officials conducted initial, midpoint, and final assessments of FSFs in accordance with Army guidance.⁶ They submitted the assessment reports to their respective ASCC and GCC outlining their SFA activities that focused on authorities used, training conducted, and qualitative information on the partner nations' capabilities. However, ASCC and SFAB assessment reports did not measure the progress of SFA activities as required by Army guidance.

(U) This occurred because ARSOUTH, SETAF-AF, and SFAB officials did not develop indicators, such as measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs), to determine whether SFAB advisor teams effectively executed SFA activities in accordance with Army guidance. According to ARSOUTH and SETAF-AF officials, they are developing a process to assess the effectiveness of SFAB activities in support of theater campaign plans that will include specific indicators. However, as of April 2025, ARSOUTH and SETAF-AF officials had not implemented the process.


⁶ (U) An Army Campaign Support Plan details how the Department of the Army, Army commands, and direct reporting units support foreign forces in the achievement of geographic combatant commands' theater campaign plan objectives. (U) Army Regulation 11-31, "Army Security Cooperation Policy," March 21, 2013; Department of the Army Pamphlet 11-31, "Army Security Cooperation Handbook," February 6, 2015; and Army Techniques Publication 3-96.1, "Security Force Assistance Brigade," September 2, 2020.

(U) As a result, the DoD did not have full visibility into whether the SFABs' efforts are advancing strategic priorities, such as countering violent extremist organizations and threats from competitive countries. In addition, GCC and ASCC officials did not have the information necessary to adjust strategic priorities, reallocate resources, modify activities, and adjust timelines.

(U) The 1st SFAB and 2nd SFAB Supported Security Force Assistance in Their Respective Areas of Responsibility

(U) For FY 2022 through FY 2024, 1st SFAB and 2nd SFAB officials planned and executed their advising missions to develop the capacity and capability of FSFs in support of theater security cooperation objectives. See figure for examples of the 1st SFAB and 2nd SFAB advising missions.

(U) Figure. 1st SFAB and 2nd SFAB Activities Supporting Theater Campaign Plans



(U) Source: The DoD OIG, based on 1st SFAB and 2nd SFAB assessments for FY 2022 through FY 2024.

(U) GCC and ASCC officials commended the SFAB teams on the SFA activities executed in their AORs. For example, according to USSOUTHCOM officials, the 1st SFAB teams have been highly effective in building partner nation capacity

(U) and providing partner nations with new capabilities. Additionally, USAFRICOM officials stated that they credit the 2nd SFAB for its ability to provide security and stability within the AOR. Furthermore, officials from partner nations, such as Tunisia and Djibouti, expressed appreciation for the support the SFAB teams provided as they trained with their military personnel.

(U) According to Tunisian Military officials, without the support of the SFAB teams, they could not develop their military intelligence training. Although USSOUTHCOM officials and USAFRICOM officials stated that they believed the SFAB teams were meeting their requirements and adding value, ASCC and SFAB assessment reports did not measure the progress of SFA activities as required.

(U) Assessment Reports Did Not Measure the Progress of Security Force Assistance Activities as Required by Army Guidance

(U) For FY 2022 through FY 2024, while supporting SFA tasks in the Army Support Campaign Plans, SFAB officials conducted initial, midpoint, and final assessments of the FSFs in accordance with Army guidance. SFAB officials submitted the assessment reports to their respective ASCC and GCC outlining their SFA activities that focused on authorities used, training conducted, and qualitative information on the partner nations' capabilities. However, ASCC and SFAB officials did not measure the progress of SFA activities.

(U) According to Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-96.1, "Security Force Assistance Brigade," the SFABs are required to conduct initial, ongoing, and end-of-mission assessments of the FSFs.⁷ ATP 3-96.1 states that initial assessments elaborate on the theater planners' initial findings and continue the work of a previous partnered force. The ATP also states that initial assessments establish a baseline to measure progress and are to identify FSF capability or capacity gaps and map those to existing campaign plans and missions.

(U) For example, in February 2024, the 1st SFAB and in April 2023, the 2nd SFAB submitted initial assessments to their respective ASCCs to assess the Guyana Defense Force Battalion's and the Djibouti Rapid Intervention Battalion's capacity and capability to conduct battalion-level operations, respectively. Both initial assessments reported capability and capacity summaries and established the FSF's baseline. Additionally, the initial assessments identified advising opportunities to address the gap in support operations and improve interoperability.

⁷ (U) ATP 3-96.1, "Security Force Assistance Brigade," September 2, 2020.

(U) According to ATP 3-96.1, ongoing assessments help determine progress toward accomplishing a task or achieving an objective. SFAB officials stated that to meet the ongoing assessments requirements, the SFAB officials implemented 30-, 60-, 90-, and 180-day assessments. ATP 3-96.1 states that assessments involve deliberately comparing intended forecast outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment and help the commander determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and completing tasks.

(~~CUI~~) In 2023, the 1st SFAB and in 2024, the 2nd SFAB conducted ongoing assessments of FSFs that included the [REDACTED], respectively, to document advising opportunities to increase partner capability. Both ongoing assessments reported the FSF's mission, provided a subjective operational assessment, and qualitatively discussed the organizational effectiveness. However, the assessments did not compare the current state to the baseline and report the mission's progress toward the desired end state.

(~~CUI~~) According to ATP 3-96.1, SFAB advisor teams are required to conduct end-of-mission assessments at the conclusion of tasks and phases. The end-of-mission assessments included the authorities the SFABs used, the listed training objectives, and provided qualitative information on the partner nations' capabilities. For example, according to the 2nd SFAB's end-of-mission [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The 1st SFAB and 2nd SFAB end-of-mission assessments reported the capability and capacity of the partner nations. However, the assessments did not measure the progress of SFA efforts within the USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM AORs. For example, the 1st SFAB end-of-mission assessment for developing the Honduras Military School curriculum in support of the objective to build partner capacity did not include the progress made in developing the Honduras Military School curriculum.

(U) According to Army Regulation 11-31, "Army Security Cooperation Policy," and Department of the Army Pamphlet 11-31, "Army Security Cooperation Handbook," the ASCCs are required to conduct assessments of the SFABs' execution of SFA missions in support of the GCCs.⁹ However, ARSOUTH and SETAF-AF officials

⁸ (U) 10 U.S.C. § 333, "Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity."

⁹ (U) Army Regulation 11-31, "Army Security Cooperation Policy," March 21, 2013; Department of the Army Pamphlet 11-31, "Army Security Cooperation Handbook," February 6, 2015.

(U) did not conduct assessments to determine the progress toward theater campaign plan objectives. ARSOUTH and SETAF-AF officials relied on the SFAB teams' initial, ongoing, and end-of-mission assessments of FSFs that did not measure the progress of SFA activities. Instead, these assessments focused on qualitative measures, such as subjective opinions on the FSFs' capabilities, without corroborating quantitative measures; particularly, the percentage of institutionally trained and theater-ready FSFs in a military specialty.

(U) The Army Service Component Commands and SFABs Did Not Develop Indicators to Measure the SFABs' Effectiveness

(U) ARSOUTH, SETAF-AF, and SFAB officials did not develop indicators, such as MOPs and MOEs, to determine whether SFAB officials effectively executed SFA activities. Development of MOPs and MOEs is required by Army guidance, such as Army Regulation 11-31, Department of the Army Pamphlet 11-31, and ATP 3-96.1.

(U) According to Army Regulation 11-31 and Department of the Army Pamphlet 11-31, ARSOUTH and SETAF-AF are required to establish MOPs and MOEs to assess progress for achieving specified objectives. ATP 3-96.1 requires SFAB planners and the advisor teams conducting SFA missions to develop MOPs and MOEs to assess the execution of tasks. According to Department of the Army Pamphlet 11-31, MOPs and MOEs are two types of indicators used in assessments. MOPs evaluate whether activities are appropriately completed, while MOEs assess whether activities achieve the intended results and desired effects.

(U) ARSOUTH and SETAF-AF officials did not establish measures to assess the execution and effectiveness of the Army Campaign Support Plan objectives. For example, ARSOUTH officials did not establish measures to assess the execution and effectiveness of ARSOUTH's efforts to retain trusted partner status across the AOR. ARSOUTH officials stated that they did not develop MOEs for FY 2022 through FY 2024 because ARSOUTH leaders stopped assessments while they developed a new assessment framework. Similarly, SETAF-AF officials stated that they relied on the 2nd SFAB's tactical-level and subjective assessments rather than developing their own MOPs and MOEs to measure effectiveness. According to ARSOUTH officials, in May 2023, they initiated efforts to develop a framework for assessing the effectiveness of SFAB activities within the context of theater campaign plans, which will incorporate both MOPs and MOEs. Additionally, SETAF-AF officials stated that they are developing a new comprehensive campaign approach for the next 3 to 5 years, which will establish clear and measurable indicators to track progress and assess the effectiveness of SFA efforts. However,

(U) as of April 2025, neither ARSOUTH nor SETAF-AF had implemented these processes even though MOPs and MOEs are identified in Army guidance as primary elements in assessing the progress of SFA activities. To ensure that ASCCs and SFABs conduct comprehensive assessments, ARSOUTH and SETAF-AF officials should establish and implement MOPs and MOEs to assess SFA objectives in the Army Campaign Support Plans.

(U) SFAB officials also did not establish measures to assess the execution and effectiveness of SFA tasks in the Army Campaign Support Plans. For example, 1st SFAB officials did not establish measures to assess the execution and effectiveness of the SFA task to build partner force readiness within the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Therefore, 1st SFAB and 2nd SFAB officials should establish and implement MOPs and MOEs to assess the execution of SFA tasks in the Army Campaign Support Plans.

(U) The DoD Did Not Have Visibility into Whether the Security Force Assistance Brigade Efforts Are Effective

(U) As a result, the DoD did not have full visibility into whether the SFABs' efforts are advancing strategic priorities, such as countering violent extremist organizations and threats from competitive countries. In addition, GCC and ASCC officials did not have the information necessary to adjust strategic priorities, reallocate resources, modify activities, and adjust timelines.

(U) For example, without the ASCCs and SFABs measuring the progress of SFA activities, such as building partner forces capabilities and training programs, ASCC officials will not have the information needed to make recommendations to the GCC to modify SFA activities in their AORs. Specifically, MOPs and MOEs will provide the necessary indicators to ensure essential manning of SFABs and support the additional requests for resources to conduct SFA activities in support of campaign plans.

(U) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

(U) U.S. Southern European Task Force-Africa Comments

(U) The SETAF-AF Chief of Strategy and Plans, responding for the SETAF-AF Commander, disagreed with the finding that SETAF-AF and SFAB officials did not develop indicators to determine if SFA activities were executed in accordance with Army guidance. The Chief stated that SETAF-AF's reports include indicators and metrics for partner nation progression to assess the effectiveness of SFA activities.

(U) In addition, the Chief stated that the indicators are based on DoD guidance outlined in DoDI 5132.14. Furthermore, the Chief disagreed with the finding that SETAF-AF and SFAB officials did not measure the progress of SFA activities. The Chief stated that SETAF-AF acknowledges that a gap exists in demonstrating how progress assessment is linked to strategic objectives.

(U) The SETAF-AF Chief of Strategy and Plans recommended adding context that informs the reason why SETAF-AF has not yet implemented an updated assessments program as noted by the draft report. Specifically, the Chief stated that SETAF-AF paused revisions in anticipation of revised strategic guidance and direction from the new administration, which has emerged in recent months. The Chief also stated that this prevented SETAF-AF from revising an assessments program to more accurately measure progress against outdated strategic objectives. Finally, the Chief stated that with updated strategic guidance, SETAF-AF is now revising its assessments program in accordance with the timeline for the 1st quarter FY 2026.

(U) Our Response

(U) We appreciate the Chief's comments on the finding. However, we disagree with the Chief's comment that SETAF-AF's reports include indicators and metrics for partner nation progression to assess the effectiveness of SFA activities. As stated earlier in the finding, SETAF-AF officials stated that they relied on the 2nd SFAB's tactical-level and subjective assessments rather than developing their own MOPs and MOEs to measure effectiveness. In addition, the 2nd SFAB end-of-mission assessments reported the capability and capacity of the partner nations, but did not report the mission's progress toward the desired end state.

(U) Our report acknowledges that SETAF-AF was developing a new comprehensive campaign approach that will establish clear and measurable indicators to track progress and assess the effectiveness of SFA efforts. Therefore, we did not update the final report.

(U) 2nd SFAB Comments

(U) The 2nd SFAB Commander disagreed with the finding that assessment reports did not measure the progress of SFA activities. The Commander stated that the 2nd SFAB submitted 30-, 60-, and 90-day assessments and assessments upon completion of partner force missions using SETAF-AF-developed Security Cooperation Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Report formats. In addition, the Commander stated that SFAB advisor teams routinely submit supporting documentation such as running estimates and lines of advising that build on previous advisor teams' assessments. Furthermore, the Commander stated that

(U) the current Assessment, Monitoring, & Evaluation Report is structured to measure the performance of the foreign security force with qualitative data to support the assessed rating. The Commander acknowledged that future assessments should additionally include MOP and MOE to assess SFA objectives as an addition to the current FSF assessment.

(U) Our Response

(U) We appreciate the Commander's comments on the finding. We agree that the 2nd SFAB submitted 30-, 60-, and 90-day assessments, and assessments upon completion of partner force missions using SETAF-AF-developed Security Cooperation Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Report formats. As stated earlier in the finding, SFAB officials conducted initial, midpoint, and final assessments of the FSFs in accordance with Army guidance.

(U) We also agree that the assessments were structured to measure the performance of the FSF and included qualitative data to support the assessment ratings. As stated earlier in the finding, SFAB officials submitted the assessment reports to their respective ASCC and GCC outlining their SFA activities that focused on authorities used, training conducted, and qualitative information on the partner nations' capabilities. The end-of-mission assessments included the authorities the SFABs used, the listed training objectives, and provided qualitative information on the partner nations' capabilities. Furthermore, these assessments focused on qualitative measures, such as subjective opinions on the FSFs' capabilities, without corroborating quantitative measures; particularly, the percentage of institutionally trained and theater-ready FSFs in a military specialty. However, the assessments did not compare the current state to the baseline and report the mission's progress toward the desired end state, as required. Additionally, the assessments focused on qualitative measures, such as subjective opinions on the FSFs' capabilities, without measuring the progress of SFA activities. Therefore, we did not update the final report.

(U) In addition, we acknowledge that our analysis of some of the end-of-mission assessments included the review of running estimates and lines of advising to link the assessments to the Army Campaign Support Plans.

(U) Furthermore, we agree that the assessments should include MOPs and MOEs to assess the execution of the SFA objectives and tasks. As stated earlier in the finding, 2nd SFAB officials should establish and implement MOPs and MOEs to assess the execution of SFA tasks in the Army Campaign Support Plans.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the following officials establish and implement measures of performance and measures of effectiveness to assess security force assistance objectives in the Army Campaign Support Plan, as required by Army Regulation 11-31 and Department of the Army Pamphlet 11-31:

- a. (U) Commander, U.S. Army South, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Southern Command.

(U) U.S. Army South Comments

(U) The ARSOUTH Deputy Commander, responding for the ARSOUTH Commander, agreed and stated that ARSOUTH will coordinate with USSOUTHCOM and the 1st SFAB to develop valid MOPs and MOEs to accurately track progress and improvements needed in our partnership activities. The Deputy Commander also stated that the MOPs and MOEs will be captured and documented in the appropriate programs of record to further develop the critical outcomes of future SFAB force packages.

(U) Our Response

(U) The Deputy Commander's comments addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but open. We will close the recommendation when we verify that ARSOUTH, in coordination with USSOUTHCOM, has established and implemented MOPs and MOEs to assess SFA objectives in the Army Campaign Support Plan.

- b. (U) Commander, U.S. Southern European Task Force-Africa, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Africa Command.

(U) U.S. Southern European Task Force-Africa Comments

(U) The SETAF-AF Chief of Strategy and Plans, responding for the SETAF-AF Commander, agreed and stated that, in coordination with USAFRICOM and U.S. Army Europe and Africa, SETAF-AF plans to implement a revised SFA assessments program by 1st quarter FY 2026 with updated measures of effectiveness and performance to address new strategic objectives.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the SETAF-AF Chief of Strategy and Plans addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but open. We will close the recommendation when we verify that SETAF-AF, in coordination with USAFRICOM, has established and implemented MOPs and MOEs to assess SFA objectives in the Army Campaign Support Plan.

(U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the following officials establish and implement measures of performance and measures of effectiveness to assess the execution of security force assistance tasks in the Army Support Campaign Plans, as required by Army Techniques Publication 3-96.1:

- a. **(U) Commander, 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Army South.**

(U) 1st SFAB Comments

(U) The 1st SFAB Commander provided informal comments to the draft report stating that ARSOUTH, as the ASCC, will provide consolidated comments.

(U) Our Response

(U) We appreciate the 1st SFAB Commander's informal comments to the recommendation. Although we received comments from the ARSOUTH Deputy Commander, the management comments did not state that ARSOUTH was responding on behalf of the 1st SFAB. We notified the 1st SFAB Commander that ARSOUTH's formal comments to the recommendation did not state that ARSOUTH, as the ASCC, was responding on behalf of the 1st SFAB Commander. However, the 1st SFAB Commander did not provide formal management comments. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We request that the 1st SFAB Commander provide comments to the final report within 30 days specifying the action the command would take to establish and implement MOPs and MOEs to assess the execution of security force assistance tasks in the Army Support Campaign Plans.

- b. **(U) Commander, 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Southern European Task Force-Africa.**

(U) 2nd SFAB Comments

(U) The 2nd SFAB Commander agreed, but did not provide details on their planned actions to implement the recommendation. However, the 2nd SFAB Commander provided an additional recommendation to develop distinct criteria for each of the different authorities and frame the assessments with authority-specific measures of performance and effectiveness.

(U) Our Response

(U) Although the Commander agreed with the recommendation, they did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We acknowledge that the criteria to assess the measures of performance and effectiveness should be distinct based on the authorities used. However, we will not add or update the recommendation to specify how the Commander plans to develop the assessment to measure the execution of SFA tasks in the Army Campaign Support Plans. The Commander did not indicate the action the 2nd SFAB would take to resolve the recommendation. Therefore, we request that the Commander provide a response to the final report within 30 days specifying the action the command would take to establish and implement MOPs and MOEs to assess the execution of security force assistance tasks in the Army Support Campaign Plans.

(U) Appendix

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from June 2024 through May 2025 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in December 2020 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) We identified and reviewed military publication websites, laws, regulations, and other source documents that could be suitable criteria applicable to SFAB SFA. Specifically, we reviewed the following criteria.

- (U) DoDI 5000.68, “Security Force Assistance (SFA),” dated October 27, 2010
- (U) DoDD 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” effective December 29, 2016
- (U) Joint Publication 3-20, “Security Cooperation,” dated September 9, 2022 (Incorporating Change 1, July 5, 2024)
- (U) Army Techniques Publication No.3-96.1, “Security Force Assistance Brigade,” dated September 2, 2020
- (U) Security Force Assistance Command 350-1, “Advisor Training Guidance,” dated October 23, 2023

(U) We interviewed officials to discuss their roles and responsibilities in SFA. Specifically, we interviewed officials from the following organizations.

- (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- (U) Joint Chief of Staff, J-7 Directorate for Joint Force Development
- (U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency
- (U) Assistant Secretary of the Army
- (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation

(U) We conducted site visits to Army organizations to obtain the leadership's perspective on the 1st and 2nd SFABs' support of SFA efforts within the USSOUTHCOM and USAFRICOM AOR, respectively, and to determine the 1st and 2nd SFAB's effectiveness in supporting the GCCs. Specifically, we visited the following locations.

- (U) Security Force Assistance Command
- (U) USSOUTHCOM
- (U) ARSOUTH
- (U) 1st SFAB
- (U) USAFRICOM
- (U) SETAF-AF
- (U) 2nd SFAB

(U) We also visited the Joint Operations Command Center and the Military Intelligent and Security School House in Tunisia to assess the impact of the 2nd SFABs. Specifically, we met with the partner nations to obtain their feedback on the SFABs' effectiveness and verified their determination with the SFABs' assessment data and the SFAB officials' feedback.

(U) To assess the effectiveness of the 1st and 2nd SFABs in support of SFA activities in the USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM AOR, we obtained the 1st and 2nd SFAB initial, mid, and final assessment reports for FY 2022 through FY 2024. We reviewed 7 USAFRICOM and 50 USSOUTHCOM end-of-mission assessments to determine if the SFAB teams evaluated and measured the progress of SFA tasks toward a strategic end state; and if the assessments compared the intended forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of the SFABs.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) No prior coverage has been conducted on the SFABs during the last 5 years.

(U) Management Comments

(U) U.S. Army South



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY SOUTH (SIXTH ARMY)
4130 STANLEY ROAD
JBSA-FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEXAS 78234-2726

ARSO-DO

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Response Project No. D2024-DEV0PA-0135.000, Evaluation of U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) Support to Combatant Commands

1. U.S. Army South (ARSOUTH) reviewed the response to the Evaluation of the U.S. Army SFAB Support to Combatant Commands and concurs with the overall document. We submit the two recommendations to add in the report.

2. Recommendation 1. ARSOUTH recommends the following officials establish and implement measures of performance and measures of effectiveness to assess security force assistance objectives in the Army Campaign Support Plan, as required by Army Regulation 11-31 and Department of the Army Pamphlet 11-31.

a. Commander, ARSOUTH in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

(1) Comments: We concur with the provided recommendation. This headquarters will coordinate with USSOUTHCOM and the 1st SFAB to develop valid measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to accurately track progress and improvements needed in our partnership activities. These MOPs and MOEs will be captured and documented in the appropriate programs of record to further develop the critical outcomes of future SFAB force packages.

3. Recommendation 2: ARSOUTH recommends that the following officials establish and implement measures of performance and measures of effectiveness to assess the execution of security force assistance tasks in the Army Support Campaign Plans, as required by Army Techniques Publication 3-96.1.

a. Commander, 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, in coordination with the Commander, AROUTH.

(1) Comments: Concur with the provided recommendation. This headquarters will coordinate with USSOUTHCOM and the 1st SFAB to develop valid measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to accurately track progress and improvements needed in our partnership activities. These MOPs and MOEs will be captured and documented in the appropriate programs of record to further develop the critical outcomes of future SFAB force packages.

(U) U.S. Army South (cont'd)

ARSO-DC
SUBJECT: Response Project No. D2024-DEV0PA-0135.000, Evaluation of U.S. Army
Security Force Assistance Brigade Support to Combatant Commands

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is ARSOUTH G-3/5/7, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

MILLS.TROY.ALL
EN [REDACTED]
TROY A. MILLS
Colonel, GS
Deputy Commander

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(U) U.S. Southern European Task Force-Africa



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY SOUTHERN EUROPEAN TASK FORCE, AFRICA
UNIT 31483 BOX 18
APO AE 09605-1463


AEAF-G5

03 June 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR the Office of the DoD Inspector General, 4800 Mark Center Drive,
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: Project No. D2024-DEV0PA-0135.000, Official Army Response to the Draft DoDIG
Report (CUI) Evaluation of U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigade Support to Combatant
Commands.

1. SETAF-AF concurs with the recommendations in the draft report. In coordination with AFRICOM and USAREUR-AF, SETAF-AF plans to implement a revised SFA assessments program by 1st QTR FY26 with updated measures of effectiveness and performance to address new strategic objectives. We are submitting the below comments to address errors in the draft.
2. The draft report states on page 3 that SETAF-AF and SFAB officials (1) did not develop indicators to determine if SFA activities were executed in accordance with Army guidance, and (2) did not measure the progress of SFA activities. SETAF-AF generated reports for all its Title 10, §333 train and equip cases. Reports include indicators and metrics for partner nation progression to assess the effectiveness of SFA activities. These indicators are based on DoD guidance outlined in DoDI 5132.14, *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise*. SETAF-AF acknowledges that a gap exists in demonstrating how progress assessment is linked to strategic objectives.
3. Added context informs the reason why SETAF-AF has not yet implemented an updated assessments program, as noted by the draft report. SETAF-AF paused revision in anticipation of revised strategic guidance and direction from the new administration which has emerged in recent months. This prevented us from revising an assessments program to more accurately measure progress against outdated strategic objectives. With updated strategic guidance, we are now revising our assessments program IAW the timeline in para. 1.
4. The point of contact for this memorandum is [REDACTED].


DAVID K. SPENCER
COL, FA59
SETAF-AF G5

(U) 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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AFZA-SBH-CR

02 June 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR the Office of the DoD Inspector General, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: Project No. D2024-DEV0PA-0135.000, Official Army Response to the Draft DoDIG report evaluating U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigade support to Combatant Commands

1. References:

- a. Project No. D2024-DEV0PA-0135.000, Army Evaluation of U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigade Support to Combatant Commands
 - b. Army Regulation 11-31, Army Security Cooperation Policy
 - c. Department of Defense Instruction 7650.03, Follow-up on Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG DoD) and Internal Audit Reports
2. This response is informed by the recent announcement of 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th SFAB's inactivation. However, the response assumes that Advisor Teams from 1st and 5th SFABs, as well as other elements, can draw on the investigation and subsequent dialogue to improve assessments for future security cooperation activities.
3. 2SFAB concurs with the overall recommendations outlined in the draft DoDIG report evaluating U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) support to Combatant Commands (COCOMs). However, we offer one correction and one additional recommendation to the final report.

3. CORRECTION: The findings outline that "assessment reports did not measure the progress of SFA activities" (6). This is incorrect as 2SFAB submitted assessments using a SETAF-AF-developed Security Cooperation Assessment, Monitoring, & Evaluation (AM&E) Report formats at 30, 60, 90, and upon completion of partner force missions. Additionally, SFAB Advisor Teams (ATs) routinely submit supporting documentation such as Running Estimates and Lines of Advising that build upon previous AT assessments. The current AM&E Report is structured to measure the performance of the Foreign Security Force (FSF) with qualitative data to support the assessed rating. I acknowledge that future assessments should additionally include measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE), assessing SFA objectives as an addition to the current FSF assessment.

(U) 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade (cont'd)

AFZA-SBH-CR

SUBJECT: Project No. D2024-DEV0PA-0135.000, Official Army Response to the Draft DoDIG report evaluating U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Brigade support to Combatant Commands

4. RECOMMENDATION: The report recommends developing and employing measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE) that focus on evaluating activities "such as military-to-military engagements, training with foreign forces, and support for operations and capacity building." These efforts generally align with Title 10, § 164, 321, and 333, respectively. I recommend development of distinct criteria for each of these authorities, framing the assessments with authority-specific measures of performance/effectiveness.

5. POC for this memorandum is [REDACTED].

CLARKE.JASON.A
NDREW [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
JASON A. CLARKE
COL, SF
Commanding

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(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARSOUTH	U.S. Army South
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
ATP	Army Techniques Publication
FSF	Foreign Security Force
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
MOP	Measure of Performance
SC	Security Cooperation
SETAF-AF	U.S. Army Southern European Task Force–Africa
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SFAB	Security Force Assistance Brigade
USAFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
USSOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command

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CUI



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