




INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

JUNE 12, 2025



Evaluation of the Movement of Ukraine- and Israel-Bound Equipment Through Aerial Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States

INDEPENDENCE ★ INTEGRITY ★ EXCELLENCE ★ TRANSPARENCY





Results in Brief

Evaluation of the Movement of Ukraine- and Israel-Bound Equipment Through Aerial Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States

June 12, 2025

Objective

The objective of this evaluation was to assess how effectively DoD Components accounted for and processed defense materials from their points of origin through aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) for delivery to Ukraine and Israel. From June 2023 through September 2024, the U.S. Army's Joint Munitions Command tracked that 12 APOEs shipped 14 million defense articles to Ukraine in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve.

Finding

We determined that the DoD Components were mostly effective in following processes for providing defense articles to Ukraine and Israel from points of origin through APOEs in the continental United States. For example, we determined that Blue Grass Army Depot, Dover Air Force Base, and Military Service officials communicated effectively to coordinate, transport, and load onto aircraft a shipment of arms, ammunition, and explosives from its point of origin through the Dover APOE.

However, we determined that U.S. military personnel at the Logistics Enabling Node-Poland's Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group (airfield personnel) were unaware of and unprepared to receive opportune cargo (cargo not previously scheduled for the shipment but that can fit in the available cargo space) that was added to approximately 10 to 20 percent of arriving flights. This occurred because

Finding (cont'd)

airfield personnel did not have access to either a Global Air Transportation Execution System terminal or the Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence system at their office. As a result, airfield personnel may spend more time verifying the accuracy of cargo load manifests before the cargo can be released to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

We also determined that Security Assistance Group-Ukraine contracting personnel did not ensure that contractors consistently returned transportation materials, including pallets, cargo nets, and ratchet straps, from the Logistics Enabling Node-Poland to the nearest Air Mobility Command Air hub within three days, as required by the Defense Transportation Regulation. This occurred because the U.S. European Command did not promulgate clear and effective procedures for returning the transportation materials to an Air Mobility Command hub in theater. As a result, APOEs had to replace the ratchet straps, and the Air Mobility Command was unable to recirculate the transportation materials into the Defense Transportation System in a timely manner.

Recommendations

We originally directed Recommendation 1 to the Commander of the Air Mobility Command. As a result of management comments, we redirected that recommendation to the Commander of the U.S. European Command. We recommend that the Commander require Logistics Enabling Node-Poland airfield personnel to maintain consistent access to the Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence system for visibility of in-transit air cargo.

We also recommend that the Commander of the U.S. European Command establish and implement procedures for returning transportation materials from the airfield personnel to an Air Mobility Command hub within three days, in accordance with the Defense Transportation Regulation.



Results in Brief

Evaluation of the Movement of Ukraine- and Israel-Bound Equipment Through Aerial Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States

Management Comments and Our Response

Although we redirected Recommendation 1, the 21st Theater Sustainment Command implemented actions to gain in-transit visibility of air cargo manifests, which meet the intent of the recommendation.

The Division Chief for Logistics Operations (J43), responding for the Commander of the U.S. European Command, did not agree with Recommendation 2 but stated that the U.S. European Command will implement actions that are sufficient to meet the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open.

We will close these recommendations when we verify that management officials took the actions required to fully address the recommendations. Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.

Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Commander, U.S. European Command	None	1, 2	None

Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.





OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

June 12, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the Movement of Ukraine- and Israel-Bound Equipment Through Aerial Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States (Report No. DODIG-2025-113)

This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

This report contains two recommendations that are considered resolved and open. The Division Chief for Logistics Operations (J43), responding for the Commander of the U.S. European Command, disagreed with Recommendation 2 but provided planned actions that address the intent of the recommendation. As a result of management comments from the Director of Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, responding for the Commander of the Air Mobility Command, we redirected Recommendation 1 to the Commander of the U.S. European Command. Based on the management comments, we readdressed Recommendation 1 to the Commander of U.S. European Command even though we believe actions taken met the intent of the recommendation. We will close the recommendations when we receive documentation showing that the agreed-on actions are complete.

Please provide us your response within 90 days addressing specific actions in process or completed on the resolved recommendations. Send your response to [REDACTED] if unclassified or [REDACTED] if classified SECRET.

If you have any questions, please contact [REDACTED].
We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the evaluation.

Bryan Clark

Bryan T. Clark
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Programs, Combatant Commands, and Operations

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Introduction

Objective

The objective of this evaluation was to assess how effectively DoD Components accounted for and processed defense materials from their points of origin through aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) for delivery to Ukraine and Israel.

We focused this evaluation on the Dover Air Force Base (AFB) APOE; however, we reviewed and analyzed the DoD's entire process for transporting defense articles from depot through APOEs, including reviewing how these defense articles are received in Poland at the Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group (A/DACG).

Background

From June 2023 through September 2024, the U.S. Army's Joint Munitions Command (JMC) tracked that the DoD shipped over 14 million defense articles through 12 APOEs to Ukraine in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve.¹ Additionally, from October 2023 to October 2024, the APOE at Dover AFB delivered 5,124 tons of cargo to Israel on 71 missions. During this time, the Dover AFB APOE served as the primary APOE for missions transporting defense articles to both Ukraine and Israel.

Of the defense articles transported to Ukraine, over 99 percent was arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E). Specifically, of the over 14 million defense articles transported to Ukraine through APOEs, Dover AFB personnel facilitated the transportation of 13,385,876 (94.8 percent) defense articles. According to the JMC's records, other notable APOEs facilitating AA&E movement to Ukraine were Travis AFB in California, shipping 353,880 (2.5 percent) defense articles, and Hill AFB in Utah, shipping 216,508 (1.5 percent) defense articles.

The JMC's records showed that 99.3 percent of all defense articles shipped to Ukraine from June 2023 through September 2024 originated from seven depot locations, as described in the following table.

¹ Operation Atlantic Resolve is the DoD operation in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility to deter Russia's aggression against member states of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and reassure and bolster the alliance in the wake of Russia's February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Under Operation Atlantic Resolve, the United States provided security assistance to Ukraine and conducted other military activities to strengthen the collective security of European partners.

The JMC provided us with Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) information for defense articles provided to Ukraine for June 2023 through September 2024.

Table. Defense Articles Shipped to Ukraine (by Depot Point of Origin)

Location	Number of Defense Articles Transported to APOE	Percent of Total
Crane Army Ammunition Authority	6,732,779	47.7
Tooele Army Depot	2,439,713	17.3
McAlester Army Ammunition Plant	1,878,356	13.3
Naval Weapons Station Earle	1,261,634	8.9
Letterkenny Army Depot	891,919	6.3
Anniston Army Depot	520,237	3.7
Blue Grass Army Depot	301,774	2.1
Total from These Seven Depots	14,026,412	99.3
Overall Total to Ukraine	14,116,910	100.0*

*The remaining 0.7 percent of defense articles comes from other depots or individual military units.
Source: The DoD OIG, derived from JMC data.

The DoD’s Process for Transporting Defense Articles Through APOEs to Ukraine and Israel

For Ukraine, according to a JMC transportation official, as each new Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) was announced, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency issued execute orders to the Military Services and Defense agencies to execute the movement of defense articles. According to JMC officials, on receipt of a new execute order, the JMC coordinated with the Military Services, depots, and APOEs to schedule AA&E transport from depots to the designated APOE for delivery to Ukraine and Israel. The U.S. Army’s depots and stored munitions facilities typically fulfilled the execute orders from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which included AA&E. Dover AFB APOE personnel stated that shipments of AA&E have restrictions because of net explosive weight. As a result, JMC officials stated that AA&E is typically transported by truck from depots to APOEs for delivery to Ukraine and Israel.²

As of October 8, 2024, the JMC requested more than 7,000 U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) trucks to deliver munitions from eight depots to six APOEs and one seaport for AA&E shipment in support of Ukraine. Once AA&E defense articles arrived at APOEs, Dover and Travis AFB APOE personnel stated that APOE personnel offloaded and inventoried defense articles at the In-Transit Munitions Facility and then moved the articles to temporary storage facilities.

² According to the Defense Transportation Regulation, net explosive weight is the actual weight (in pounds) of explosive mixtures or compounds that is used to determine explosive limits and quantity data arcs.

The DoD transfers defense articles to Ukraine and Israel differently. According to USTRANSCOM officials, although some transport flights bound for Ukraine employed U.S. military aircraft, personnel from USTRANSCOM's Air Mobility Command (AMC) primarily contracted Special Airlift Assignment Missions (SAAMs) to transport the defense articles.³ According to A/DACG personnel, U.S. contractors at the Logistics Enabling Node–Poland (LEN-P) are primarily responsible for physically unloading defense articles from arriving aircrafts at the A/DACG for transfer to Ukraine. An AMC official stated that the contractors have access to the Global Air Transportation Execution System (GATES), which provides them with visibility of incoming aircraft manifests.⁴ A/DACG officials told us that the contractors, who are contracted through the Security Assistance Group–Ukraine (SAG-U), are also responsible for recovering System 463L assets, including the AMC's System 463L pallets and cargo nets and APOE ratchet straps.⁵ Dover AFB APOE and A/DACG personnel stated that the official property transfer from the U.S. Government to the Ukrainian Armed Forces takes place at the LEN-P.

In contrast, Dover AFB officials told us that the Israeli government typically picks up defense articles at the continental U.S. (CONUS) APOEs. The Dover AFB APOE officials stated that the official property transfer from the U.S. Government to the Israeli government occurs when Israeli pilots, flying Israeli planes, transport defense articles for Israel directly from the APOE to Israel, primarily from the Dover AFB APOE. According to Chapter 608 of the Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR), combatant commanders are responsible for recirculating the System 463L assets back into the Defense Transportation System by returning the property to the nearest AMC hub within 3 days.⁶ AMC personnel told us that the AMC has a contracted air terminal manager on the ground in Israel who collects System 463L assets when they arrive, and the AMC reliably receives System 463L assets back to their air hubs from Israeli pilot pickup missions.

³ A SAAM is a mission that performs and provides an exclusive service for a specific user at a desired movement time. SAAMs are funded airlift missions that cannot be supported by U.S. military aircraft because of the unusual nature of the flight, the flight's sensitivity, the urgency of the cargo, or because the flight's operational delivery is to locations outside the established channel structure.

⁴ GATES automates support for the receipt, movement, and billing of cargo and passengers. GATES provides the DoD, AMC, 618th Air Operations Center, and approved air transportation functions with an automated management system to process and track cargo and passenger information needed to plan and execute airlift operations, manage resources, provide logistical support information, and provide message routing and delivery service for aircraft movement data.

⁵ System 463L assets are composed of the 463L pallets, nets, tie-down chains and devices, straps, pallet couplers, and radio frequency identification tags.

⁶ USTRANSCOM 4500.9-R, "Defense Transportation Regulation" (Incorporating Changes, April 3, 2025). This report references the 2023 and 2024 versions of the applicable DTR sections that were in effect during this evaluation.

DoD Policies for Transporting and Safeguarding Goods

The DTR requires that all defense article shipments move through the Defense Transportation System.⁷ USTRANSCOM is responsible for developing, publishing, and maintaining the DTR, which prescribes documents, methods, and procedures for DoD Components to conduct traffic management functions initiated or sponsored by the DoD, including the transportation and movement of defense materiel. Specifically, the DTR requires the use of the Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence (IGC) system or GATES to track and monitor cargo. The IGC is the U.S. military's system of record for in-transit visibility. GATES aids in scheduling, processing, and tracking cargo and passenger movements. GATES data, including cargo manifests, are available to DoD users through the IGC.

USTRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command

USTRANSCOM is a unified, functional, combatant command. USTRANSCOM's mission is to conduct global mobility operations that enable joint force projection and sustainment. A USTRANSCOM official stated that USTRANSCOM develops and maintains contractual relationships with commercial carriers to meet defense transportation requirements. USTRANSCOM, in conjunction with the Services and combatant commanders, provides guidance through the DTR for the movement of all traffic management functions related to cargo, System 463L pallets, and net assets.

According to Joint Publication 4-01, "The Defense Transportation System," the AMC, which is a subordinate functional command of USTRANSCOM, is responsible for aviation mobility for the DoD.⁸ Specifically, the AMC is responsible for operating or arranging for the operation of air terminals at all APOEs in CONUS and in overseas theaters. Moreover, the DTR states that the AMC serves as the DoD's single operational manager for System 463L assets worldwide. The AMC also manages and controls all System 463L assets from origin to destination, including the return or allocation of assets in a theater of operations. The AMC is responsible for managing a global System 463L asset database to provide inventory, accountability, tracking, visibility services, and support.

⁷ USTRANSCOM DTR 4500.9R Part II, "Cargo Movement," Chapters 201–208, May 2014 (Incorporating Changes, August 14, 2024).

⁸ Joint Publication 4-01, "The Defense Transportation System," June 6, 2014.

U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command (JMC)

The JMC is responsible for producing, storing, and distributing conventional munitions for the DoD. JMC personnel delivered munitions from seven primary installations for shipment in support of Ukraine, including the Blue Grass Army Depot. During this evaluation, the JMC directed the transfer of 105mm artillery rounds from the Blue Grass Army Depot to the Dover AFB APOE as part of PDA for Ukraine. We focused on this transfer of defense articles because it aligned with the timing of our fieldwork and site visits to the depots and Dover AFB APOE.

Dover AFB's Role as an APOE

According to Dover AFB and JMC personnel, the Dover AFB serves as the primary APOE for defense articles transferred to Ukraine and Israel. An APOE is an airfield that a geographic combatant command designated for sustained air movement of personnel and materiel, as well as an authorized port for entrance into or departure from the country in which it is located.⁹

When preparing air cargo loads, Dover AFB officials told us that they consider the type and quantity of AA&E in the shipment because of net explosive weight limitations. An A/DACG transportation official told us that APOE load planners typically use the Airlift Integrated Interface system to create load plans 72 hours in advance of the anticipated flight departure.¹⁰ The transportation officials also stated that personnel in CONUS finalize air cargo manifests in GATES before the aircraft depart from the APOE, and GATES and the IGC release the manifests 30 minutes after the flights depart APOEs. The Airlift Integrated Interface system is a stand-alone system that does not feed either GATES or the IGC. However, the IGC pulls data directly from GATES. Dover AFB personnel stated that they also send a hard copy of the manifest with the aircraft whenever feasible.

The A/DACG at the Logistics Enabling Node—Poland

According to 21st Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) personnel, the A/DACG in Poland supports the movement of personnel and cargo on aircraft and deployments. In support of Operation Atlantic Resolve, the A/DACG consists of 21st TSC personnel and contractors who load and unload the aircraft. A/DACG officials told us that, among other requirements, their responsibilities include pallet breakdown, material inventory, data entry, and onward movement with Ukrainian or Polish trucks depending on final approved location.

⁹ In this evaluation, the applicable geographic combatant commands are the U.S. European Command for the Ukraine defense articles and the U.S. Central Command for the Israel defense articles.

¹⁰ USTRANSCOM DTR 4500.9R Part III, Appendix I, "Mobility," March 3, 2023, states that the Airlift Integrated Interface supports the push-pull on the shipping interface, allowing for streamlined submission of SAAM options, aircraft load plans, and hazardous diplomatic clearance documentation. The Airlift Integrated Interface system provides timely feedback, removes execution roadblocks, improves tracking, and reduces effort by enabling a real-time, coordinated workflow and discussion tool for the DoD. This report references the 2023 and 2024 versions of the applicable DTR sections that were in effect during this evaluation.

Finding

DoD Components Were Mostly Effective in Following Processes for Providing Defense Articles to Ukraine and Israel Through APOEs, but the DoD Can Improve Its Receiving Processes

We determined that the DoD's processes for providing defense articles to Ukraine and Israel from points of origin through APOEs in CONUS were mostly effective. For example, we determined that Blue Grass Army Depot, Dover AFB, and Military Service officials communicated effectively to coordinate, transport, and load onto aircraft an AA&E shipment from its point of origin through the Dover APOE in support of the Ukraine and Israel missions. However, the DoD can improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its shipping and receiving processes for defense articles provided to Ukraine for the following reasons.

- A/DACG personnel at the LEN-P did not have visibility of air cargo manifests through GATES for inbound flights and were unaware of and unprepared to receive opportune airlift, or opportune cargo, that APOE personnel added to approximately 10 to 20 percent of arriving flights.¹¹ This occurred because A/DACG personnel did not have access to either a GATES terminal or the IGC at their office on the airfield.¹² Access to this system would provide A/DACG personnel with visibility into any opportune cargo that is added to flight manifests less than 12 hours before aircraft depart the CONUS APOEs.
- SAG-U contracting personnel did not ensure that contractors consistently returned the System 463L assets, including 463L pallets, cargo nets, and ratchet straps, at the LEN-P to the nearest AMC air hub within 3 days, as required by the DTR. We determined that this occurred because the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) did not promulgate clear and effective procedures for returning the System 463L assets to an AMC hub in theater, as required by the DTR.

As a result, without providing A/DACG personnel with visibility of in-transit air cargo and passenger movement, the DoD may continue to require additional time to receive and transfer defense articles to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In addition,

¹¹ The DTR defines opportune airlift as "that portion of lift capability available for use after planned requirements have been met." Opportune cargo is that which can move because of space availability on a scheduled SAAM flight but that was not scheduled.

¹² The DTR authorizes one GATES system per airfield. The contractor who offloads aircraft at the LEN-P has access to GATES at this airfield.

without procedures for returning System 463L assets, the AMC and APOEs may incur additional costs to purchase additional shipping materials to support the DoD's logistics demands globally. For example, Dover and Travis AFB officials told us that they had to purchase an unprogrammed \$2.8 million of assets, which included ratchet straps, to support Ukraine SAAMs since 2022.¹³

The DoD Met Quality Assurance, Shipping and Receiving, and Physical Security Requirements in Accordance with DoD Regulations

Based on our observations and the testimony of officials at Dover AFB and the Blue Grass Army Depot, DoD officials met requirements related to quality assurance, physical security, and shipping and receiving for the transportation of defense articles to Ukraine and Israel in accordance with DTR 4500.9-R, DoD Manual 5100.76, DoD Manual 5200.08, Defense Explosives Safety Regulation 6055.09, Department of the Army Pamphlet 742-1, and Army Regulation 702-12.¹⁴

Blue Grass Army Depot and Dover AFB officials met the following requirements.

- Blue Grass Army Depot officials effectively and efficiently implemented quality assurance procedures to verify defense article conditions and accurately account for defense articles before shipment to APOEs, such as at Dover AFB, in accordance with Department of the Army Pamphlet 742-1 and Army Regulation 702-12.
- Blue Grass Army Depot, Dover AFB APOE, and Military Service officials coordinated efficiently and effectively to meet shipping and storage requirements and accurately account for AA&E defense articles when receiving defense article shipments in support of Ukraine and Israel.

Blue Grass Army Depot, USTRANSCOM, and Dover AFB officials met DoD physical security requirements for storing and transporting AA&E.

¹³ Travis and Dover AFB officials told us that they do not have specific numbers for just the increase in ratchet straps, but the same officials stated that the large increase in asset costs were primarily for ratchet straps for air cargo missions to Ukraine.

¹⁴ DoD Manual 5100.76, "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)," April 17, 2012 (Incorporating Change 2, October 5, 2020).

DoD Manual 5200.08, Volume 3, "Physical Security Program: Access to DoD Installations," January 2, 2019 (Incorporating Change 1, September 18, 2020).

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Defense Explosives Safety Regulation 6055.09, "DoD Explosives Safety Standards," January 13, 2019 (Incorporating Change 1, February 23, 2024).

Department of the Army Pamphlet 742-1, "Ammunition Surveillance Procedures," November 22, 2016.

Army Regulation 702-12, "Quality Assurance Specialist (Ammunition Surveillance) Program," August 2, 2021.

The DoD Can Improve the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Its Processes for Incoming Air Shipments of Defense Articles Being Provided to Ukraine

The DoD should improve the effectiveness of in-transit visibility for U.S. personnel on the receiving end of air cargo flights. The DoD should also improve the efficiency of the Defense Transportation System by returning System 463L assets within 3 days, in accordance with the DTR.

A/DACG Personnel Receiving Air Shipments Did Not Have Consistent Access to the USTRANSCOM Standard System to Track Air Cargo Manifests

A/DACG personnel at the LEN-P told us that they did not have access to GATES or the IGC for visibility of incoming air cargo manifests. Instead, A/DACG personnel stated that they relied primarily on load plans they retrieved from the Airlift Integrated Interface, the load planning system that load planners at APOEs use to forecast incoming flight cargo. As of May 7, 2025, 21st TSC personnel stated that A/DACG personnel mitigate the lack of access to GATES by having access to other systems that include manifests that are not as detailed as the manifests in GATES but provide enough information to ensure that A/DACG personnel can coordinate onward movement. In addition, 21st TSC personnel stated that A/DACG officials can coordinate with personnel at Ramstein Air Base to obtain GATES updates if needed. However, without access to the actual manifests located in GATES or the IGC, A/DACG personnel told us that they were unprepared for last-minute opportune cargo, which they estimated as arriving on approximately 10 to 20 percent of incoming SAAM flights, especially from the Dover AFB APOE.

During our APOE site visit to Dover AFB in November 2024, we observed that opportune cargo was added to the flight manifest. When we arrived at the In-Transit Munitions Facility to observe the AA&E move from the facility to the SAAM flight, we observed a pallet of opportune cargo already on the loader. We learned that load planners at the Dover AFB APOE added a pallet of robotics parts to the scheduled AA&E SAAM flight as opportune cargo before the flight departed.




Figure. AA&E and Opportune Cargo That Dover AFB Officials Loaded onto a SAAM Flight
Source: The DoD OIG.

We interviewed A/DACG personnel in December 2024 to determine whether they were aware of the opportune cargo that the load planners added to the flight manifest before the flight arrived at the LEN-P. The A/DACG personnel told us that they did not know that the pallet of robotics parts was added to the flight as opportune cargo. They also told us that, in the case of the robotics parts, the air cargo manifest validation process delayed the release of the defense articles to the Ukrainians for approximately 12 hours.

Contractor Personnel Operated the GATES Terminal at the LEN-P

During an interview in September 2024, A/DACG officials stated that although GATES contains the official flight manifests, the officials did not have access to GATES because the contractor personnel who physically unload the aircraft operated the only GATES terminal at the LEN-P. However, the DTR does not allow adding a second GATES terminal on an active airfield where GATES is already in use.¹⁵ According to

¹⁵ USTRANSCOM DTR 4500.9R, Part III, Appendix I, "Automated Mobility Systems," paragraph G states, "GATES is not structured to support enterprise-level in-transit visibility tracking, ad-hoc reporting, or timed data mining requirements. GATES access for the purpose of tracking movement of air modal passengers and cargo will not be granted."

A/DACG officials, without access to GATES, they retrieve a list of equipment planned for delivery approximately 48 to 72 hours before the flight's scheduled arrival through the Airlift Integrated Interface.

AMC personnel told us that A/DACG personnel can, however, have IGC accounts, which are simple to create and would provide A/DACG personnel with the same level of visibility for air cargo manifests that GATES provides.¹⁶ IGC access includes visibility into any opportune cargo added to flight manifests less than 12 hours before aircraft depart the CONUS APOEs.¹⁷

As of April 2025, the U.S. Army was working to optimize U.S. military operations and their impact at the LEN-P. Also in April 2025, the DoD announced that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine will take over the LEN-P operations at the airport, with a small U.S. Government presence remaining at the LEN-P for defense article accountability purposes. However, LEN-P personnel having consistent access to the IGC will remain important to ensuring full accountability of air cargo arriving at the LEN-P in the future.

SAG-U Contracting Officials Did Not Ensure That Contractors Returned Shipping Assets for PDA Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine in a Timely Manner

AMC officials told us that SAG-U contracting officials did not ensure that contractors arranged for the return of System 463L pallets, cargo nets, and other air cargo transport equipment to the Defense Transportation System within 3 days, as required by the DTR. Specifically, the DTR states that System 463L assets supporting sustainment operations will be returned to the nearest air hub within 3 days of delivery at the forward operating base. Dover and Travis AFB officials told us that because SAG-U personnel did not ensure the timely return of the equipment, in November 2024, their stores of System 463L pallets, cargo nets, and other air cargo transport equipment in their DoD Pallet and Net Distribution Centers decreased by an estimated 50 percent since February 2022.

Additionally, Dover and Travis AFB officials told us that they only received the ratchet straps back from the LEN-P for reuse in support of Ukraine SAAMs 10 to 15 percent of the time since 2022. Furthermore, as of January 23, 2025, 21st TSC personnel told us that approximately 500 System 463L pallets, worth approximately \$979,500, were stacked at the LEN-P, awaiting return to the Defense Transportation System.

¹⁶ The website for the IGC is: <https://www.igc.ustranscom.mil/igc/>. Users need only click on "need an account" and enter the requested information.

¹⁷ USTRANSCOM DTR 4500.9R, Part III, Appendix I, paragraph G states, "IGC is a DoD automated program providing supply chain, distribution, and logistics information fusion through common integrated data application services."

21st TSC personnel at the A/DACG stated that they did not return the System 463L pallets to the nearest AMC air hub, Ramstein Air Base, within 3 days as the DTR requires because the return of pallets was SAG-U's responsibility and fell within their contractor's scope of work. In addition, we determined that the 2023 USEUCOM Theater Distribution Plan did not provide clear guidance on how personnel at the LEN-P should return System 463L assets to the Defense Transportation System.

When we visited the A/DACG on February 3, 2025, A/DACG and SAG-U officials told us that, because of our meetings on this evaluation, their personnel are now coordinating with U.S. Air Force units and Army 16th Sustainment Brigade officials to improve the timeliness of returning System 463L pallets, cargo netting, and straps back to Ramstein Air Base by truck for reuse. However, USEUCOM officials have not said that they established formal procedures to codify this process for personnel between rotations. We determined that ensuring the return of air assets to the nearest AMC air hub within three days of delivery to the A/DACG, in accordance with the DTR, is critical to ensure the efficient reuse of AMC air assets in the Defense Transportation System.

The A/DACG Delayed Delivery of Defense Articles to Ukraine Because of Opportune Cargo, and the AMC Was Unable to Recirculate System 463L Assets into the Defense Transportation System in a Timely Manner

Without providing A/DACG personnel with visibility of in-transit air cargo and passenger movement, the DoD may require additional time to receive and transfer defense articles to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Specifically, A/DACG personnel at the LEN-P could be more efficient and effective when offloading inventory and transferring defense articles to Ukraine. For example, A/DACG personnel told us that when air cargo flights arrive with opportune cargo, A/DACG personnel must spend extra time verifying the accuracy of cargo load manifests before they can release the cargo to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As of May 7, 2025, 21st TSC personnel stated that A/DACG personnel obtained visibility of in-transit air cargo through access to systems that include manifests that are not as detailed as the manifests in GATES but provide enough information to ensure that A/DACG personnel can coordinate onward movement. In addition, 21st TSC personnel stated that A/DACG personnel can coordinate with personnel at Ramstein Air Base to obtain updated information through GATES if needed. Although 21st TSC personnel stated that A/DACG personnel can obtain updates through GATES, the DTR designated the IGC, not GATES, as the system of record for in-transit visibility.

In addition, without procedures for returning System 463L assets, the DoD may incur additional costs for the AMC and APOEs to purchase additional shipping materials to support the DoD's logistics demands globally. For example, Dover and Travis AFB officials told us that they had to purchase an unprogrammed \$2.8 million of assets, which included ratchet straps, to support Ukraine SAAMs since 2022. As of May 7, 2025, 21st TSC personnel stated that they were waiting for USEUCOM and U.S. Army Europe and Africa officials to review 21st TSC-provided standard operating procedures on the return of System 463L assets to the Defense Transportation System.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Revised Recommendation

As a result of management comments, we redirected Recommendation 1 to the Commander of USEUCOM. This revision did not change the overall intent of the recommendation.

Recommendation 1

We recommend that the Commander of the U.S. European Command require the Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group personnel at the Logistics Enabling Node–Poland to maintain consistent access to the Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence system for visibility of in-transit air cargo.

Air Mobility Command Comments

The Director of Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, responding for the AMC Commander, agreed and stated that U.S. military personnel at the LEN-P's A/DACG should have access to the IGC at their office. However, the Director stated that this recommendation should be assigned to the USEUCOM Commander instead of the AMC. Specifically, the Director stated that the IGC provides in-transit visibility of DoD personnel and cargo to combatant commands, Components, Services, the Joint Staff, agencies, and other Federal organizations. The IGC is the DoD's automated program for supply chain, distribution, and logistics information fusion through common integrated data application services. The Director added that the AMC does not own or control system access to the IGC. Instead, the Director stated that the USEUCOM Commander must ensure that all assigned forces use the IGC for advance shipment data for inbound shipments and routine cargo movement tracking and tracing, in accordance with the DTR.

Our Response

Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation. However, the Director stated that they are not the correct stakeholder to act on this recommendation and suggested that we reassign it to USEUCOM. Despite the Director's comments to reassign the recommendation, the 21st TSC implemented actions to gain in-transit visibility of air cargo manifests, which meet the intent of the recommendation. Therefore, although we are redirecting the recommendation to the USEUCOM Commander, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we receive documentation verifying that A/DACG personnel at the LEN-P have consistent visibility of in-transit air cargo.

Recommendation 2

We recommend that the Commander of the U.S. European Command establish and implement procedures for returning System 463L assets from the Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group to an Air Mobility Command hub within 3 days, in accordance with the Defense Transportation Regulation.

USEUCOM Comments

The Division Chief for Logistics Operations (J43), responding for the USEUCOM Commander, did not agree with the recommendation, stating that guidance for the implementation and execution of requirements in the DTR already exist in the USEUCOM area of responsibility. Specifically, the Division Chief stated that the 2023 USEUCOM Theater Distribution Plan assigns responsibility to the U.S. Army Europe and Africa through the 21st TSC. The Division Chief stated that the Distribution Plan requires the U.S. Army Europe and Africa to provide oversight of the return of System 463L assets and their timely return to the Defense Transportation System. However, the Division Chief told us that the guidance is outdated and stated that USEUCOM will update its existing guidance by December 31, 2025.

Our Response

Although the Division Chief disagreed with our recommendation, their comments addressed the specifics of the recommendation. Their proposed plan of action to revise the guidance in the USEUCOM Theater Distribution Plan to more clearly identify the requirements for returning System 463L assets to the Defense Transportation System in accordance with the DTR meets the intent of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we receive documentation showing that USEUCOM updated its Distribution Plan to include procedures for returning System 463L assets from the A/DACG to an AMC hub within 3 days, in accordance with the DTR.

Appendix

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this evaluation from August 2024 through May 2025 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in December 2020 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

We identified and reviewed laws, policies, directives, and DoD guidance for moving sensitive and non-sensitive military equipment through APOEs in CONUS. Specifically, we reviewed the following criteria.

- USTRANSCOM DTR 4500.9R, “Defense Transportation Regulation,” Part II, “Cargo Movement,” Chapters 201–208, May 2014 (Incorporating Changes, August 14, 2024)
- DoD Manual 5100.76, “Physical Security of Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,” April 17, 2012 (Incorporating Change 2, October 5, 2020)
- DoD Manual 5200.08, Volume 3, “Physical Security Program: Access to DoD Installations,” January 2, 2019 (Incorporating Change 1, September 18, 2020)
- Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Defense Explosives Safety Regulation 6055.09, Edition 1, “DoD Explosives Safety Standards” (Incorporating Change 1, February 23, 2024)

At Blue Grass Army Depot, we observed and reviewed documentation for preparing the ground shipment of AA&E by truck from Blue Grass Army Depot to Dover AFB. At Dover AFB, we observed and reviewed receipt documentation of the AA&E shipped from Blue Grass Army Depot to Ukraine. In addition, we observed load planning and collected the load planning documents for moving the AA&E by air from Dover AFB to outside CONUS. We also physically observed and collected documents for handling and storing AA&E at Blue Grass Army Depot and physically observed procedures and collected documentation for receipt and verification of AA&E for air movement at Dover AFB. We obtained and reviewed security procedures from the Ammunition Shipping Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) at the Blue Grass Army Depot, and we collected and reviewed results from the physical security inspections of the

Director of Emergency Services at the Blue Grass Army Depot. Additionally, we observed physical security verification of transportation protective services for the cargo at Blue Grass Army Depot enroute from Blue Grass Army Depot to Dover AFB and at Dover AFB.

We analyzed 26 flight plan spreadsheets for Ukraine PDA that JMC personnel compiled, which allowed us to determine the AA&E throughput at the various military depot and APOE locations between June 2023 and September 2024. Our analysis included determining the quantity of AA&E and non-AA&E items from seven depots responsible for over 99 percent of the shipments between June 2023 and September 2024. We also determined the overall number of AA&E items that each of the 12 APOEs supporting the 26 PDA flight plans shipped. In addition, we determined the AA&E and non-AA&E that depots shipped to the APOEs, as well as the AA&E items by type and quantity that each APOE shipped to Ukraine between June 2023 and September 2024.

We conducted 17 virtual interviews and 11 in-person interviews during our fieldwork. Virtual interviews included personnel from the following organizations.

- USTRANSCOM Operations, Plans, and Training (J3); Joint Logistics (J4); and Strategy, Policy, Programs, and Resources (J5/8) Directorates
- AMC Air Transportation Division
- Air Force Medical Readiness Agency
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency International Operations and Strategy, Policy, and Planning
- JMC
- Dover, Travis, and Hill AFBs/APOEs
- AA&E supply depots Anniston, McAlester, Letterkenny, Tooele, Crane, and Hawthorne and Blue Grass Army Depot
- A/DACG in Poland

Our in-person interviews and direct observation of operations included Blue Grass Army Depot leadership, staff personnel from the Consolidated Shipping Center, the quality assurance specialist ammunition surveillance manager, and the Directorate of Emergency Services. In-person interviews also included leaders and staff personnel from Dover AFB/APOE, including: (1) the commander and staff of the 436 Aerial Port Squadron; (2) air terminal management; (3) non-AA&E cargo processing operations; (4) AA&E cargo processing and special handling; (5) capability forecasting; (6) load planning; and (7) In-Transit Munitions Facility operations. Through our interviews, we obtained information to determine the DoD's processes and procedures for transporting defense materials from their points of origin through APOEs for delivery to Ukraine and Israel.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

In September 2024, the evaluation team received computer-processed data in the form of 26 spreadsheets compiled by JMC officials. These spreadsheets detailed 26 flight plans detailing the planned movement of various PDA defense articles to Ukraine from June 2023 to September 2024. The 26 spreadsheets detailed the movement of 14,116,910 defense articles to Ukraine, of which over 99 percent were AA&E. We compiled comprehensive information from these JMC spreadsheets regarding each item being transported to Ukraine, including logistics information such the military depot used to source the equipment, the APOE employed to facilitate the onward movement, and the estimated arrival and departure dates from the APOE. We reviewed and analyzed the data in these 26 spreadsheets to determine the extent to which the DoD facilitated the transfer of these items to Ukraine through the APOEs in a comprehensive and timely manner.

Prior Coverage

During the last five years, the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued seven reports discussing DoD transportation operations.

Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/>.

DoD OIG

Report No. DODIG 2025-047, “Follow-up Evaluation of Management Advisory: Sufficiency of Staffing at Logistics Hubs in Poland for Conducting Inventories of Items Requiring Enhanced End Use Monitoring,” December 2, 2024

The DoD OIG found that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency developed a detailed and comprehensive enhanced end use monitoring (EEUM) familiarization presentation for personnel supporting the EEUM inventory process for defense articles arriving at the LEN-P. The DoD OIG also found that the 39th Transportation Battalion developed and implemented standard policies and procedures for military logistics personnel stationed at the LEN-P for properly managing in-transit defense articles requiring EEUM. However, the DoD OIG also found that Office of Defense Cooperation–Ukraine relies on a rotating and temporary cadre of individuals to conduct EEUM inventories at the LEN-P because Office of Defense Cooperation–Ukraine does not have specific billets for conducting these inventories at the LEN-P.

The DoD OIG recommended that the Office of Defense Cooperation–Ukraine Chief, in coordination with the USEUCOM Commander, develop a plan to rapidly designate non–Office of Defense Cooperation–Ukraine personnel with the ability to conduct EEUM inventories if the primary Office of Defense Cooperation–Ukraine personnel are unavailable.

Report No. DODIG-2024-093, "Evaluation of the Accountability of Ukraine-Bound Equipment to Sea Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States," June 10, 2024

The DoD OIG found that the DoD accounted for and rapidly transported defense materials for Ukraine from the points of origin to seaports of embarkation in CONUS, as directed in the execute orders. However, more efficient processes for transporting and accounting for equipment would address the following and other issues identified during the evaluation.

- DoD Components often sent defense materials with inaccurate or inadequate documentation.
- DoD personnel could not easily identify defense materials being provided to Ukraine using military shipping labels or by querying transportation systems.
- Personnel at a seaport of embarkation did not always acknowledge auto-generated reports of shipment for ammunition as the DTR requires.

The DoD OIG recommended that the USTRANSCOM Commander review USTRANSCOM shipping operations, document lessons learned from rapidly shipping defense materials to Ukraine, develop and implement procedures that simplify shipping acknowledgement processes, and make tracking and identifying PDA materiel easier. The DoD OIG also recommended that the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency update execute orders to direct shippers to use foreign military sales and documentation procedures for PDA shipments, such as identifying the PDA order number on the generic military shipping label and including DoD Form 1348-1A with each shipment unit.

Report No. DODIG 2024-053, "Evaluation of the U.S. European Command's Planning and Execution of Ground Transportation of Equipment to Support Ukraine from Port to Transfer Locations," February 8, 2024

The DoD OIG found that although USEUCOM and the U.S. Army Europe and Africa implemented security controls for equipment transferred from seaport to ground transportation, their in-transit visibility of this equipment could improve. According to 21st TSC personnel, no end-user was identified for the equipment being provided to Ukraine and, at the final transfer location, the 21st TSC did not have a dedicated unit to report receipt of equipment.

The DoD OIG recommended that the Commander of the U.S. Army Europe and Africa develop and implement a plan to ensure that PDA equipment traveling through the USEUCOM area of responsibility is equipped with in-transit visibility devices or other means and methods to ensure near-real-time visibility of PDA equipment in accordance with USEUCOM guidance.

Report No. DODIG-2023-084, “Evaluation of Accountability Controls for Defense Items Transferred Via Air to Ukraine within the U.S. European Command Area of Responsibility,” June 8, 2023

The DoD OIG found that DoD personnel effectively and quickly received, inspected, staged, and transferred defense items to Government of Ukraine representatives at the A/DACG. However, DoD personnel did not have the required accountability of the thousands of defense items that they received and transferred there. DoD personnel did not fully implement their SOPs to account for defense items and could not confirm the quantities of defense items received against the quantity of items shipped for three of five shipments the DoD OIG observed, as the DTR requires. These conditions occurred because:

- the Military Services and Defense agencies did not provide the required information on shipping manifests or coordinate shipments with USTRANSCOM,
- SOPs at the A/DACG did not specify DTR-required accountability procedures, and
- DoD personnel did not receive training or guidance on DoD policy requirements.

The DoD OIG recommended that DoD officials instruct the Military Services and the Defense agencies to: (1) comply with existing directives to verify and manifest defense items being transferred in accordance with the DTR and execute orders and (2) develop and issue procedures consistent with DTR requirements to increase accountability for defense items being transferred to the Government of Ukraine.

Report No. DODIG 2021-093, “Audit of the Department of Defense’s Sea Transportation and Storage of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,” June 11, 2021

The DoD OIG found that DoD officials followed requirements in the DTR for preplanning, loading, inspecting, and unloading AA&E shipments by sea, including maintaining 101 (96 percent) of 105 required documents for the 30 AA&E shipments in the DoD OIG’s sample. DoD officials could not provide one of the four remaining documents, and the other three were provided but did not contain the correct control number. When asked, Surface Deployment

and Distribution Command (SDDC) officials did not provide an explanation for the one missing document. The three documents contained incorrect control numbers because the shipper, the JMC, included the control number for one of the individual pieces of cargo in the container when the officials were supposed to use the control number for the overall shipping container.

The DoD OIG recommended that the USTRANSCOM Commander update the DTR to specify which transportation control number should be used on DD Form 1907, "Signature and Tally Record," for containerized shipments. The DoD OIG also recommended that the JMC Commander implement a control for depots to follow the DTR requirement to place copies of required forms in waterproof envelopes and attach envelopes outside and inside the transportation container doors.

Report No. DODIG 2021-099, "Audit of Physical Security Conditions at the U.S. Transportation Command Military Ocean Terminals," July 8, 2021

The DoD OIG found that physical security programs at the military ocean terminals did not comply with DoD, Army, and installation guidance for protecting AA&E shipments. Specifically, at the military ocean terminals, the physical security plans were not reviewed annually, and the physical security plans did not comply with DoD and Army guidance related to physical security. In addition, physical security personnel at a military ocean terminal did not consistently perform physical security procedures, including procedures related to vehicle inspections and access controls.

The DoD OIG recommended that the SDDC Commanding General: (1) review the updates to the military ocean terminals' physical security plans to ensure that the remaining instances of noncompliance identified in the report were addressed, (2) complete and issue all military ocean terminals' draft SOPs for physical security personnel, and (3) develop and implement SOPs that require a review of the military ocean terminals' physical security plans at least annually or on change of installation commander or appointment of a new director of emergency services, anti-terrorism officer, physical security officer, or chief of police.

Report No. DODIG 2020-071, "Audit of the Department of Defense's Ground Transportation and Secure Hold of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives in the United States," March 23, 2020

The DoD OIG found that the DoD and its commercial carriers transported 107,625 AA&E ground shipments (103,853 by truck and 3,772 by rail) from October 2016 through March 2019 and determined that the DoD and the

commercial carriers did not always transport AA&E by ground in accordance with the DTR. Specifically, the DoD did not: (1) properly pack at least two AA&E ground shipments as the DTR and DoD Component criteria for AA&E shipments required; (2) verify that information about the contents of the AA&E shipment was in the tracking system for 20,426 of 103,853 ground shipments made by truck, as the DTR requires; (3) provide commercial carriers with access to installations so the carriers could deliver nine AA&E truck shipments to the installation, as DoD guidance requires; and (3) follow up on 12 of the 33 SDDC safety investigation recommendations made in 13 transit accident reports.

The DoD OIG recommended that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Sustainment), in coordination with USTRANSCOM and the Military Services:

- give the SDDC the authority to enforce the Military Services' compliance with the DTR and hold Military Service officials accountable for not complying with the regulations and for not transmitting bills of lading to the Defense Transportation Tracking System,
- develop and implement a methodology or controls to prevent the Military Services from allowing AA&E shipments to leave a military installation until officials confirm that the bill of lading is transmitted to the Defense Transportation Tracking System for tracking, and
- evaluate creating a centralized tracking system to track rail shipments of AA&E and implement that tracking system, if appropriate.

The DoD OIG also recommended that the Military Departments, in coordination with the SDDC Commander, develop and implement training for secure hold requirements at military installations and direct the base commanders with secure hold areas to implement the training with appropriate staff. In addition, the DoD OIG recommended that the USTRANSCOM Commander, in coordination with the Military Services, update the DTR to require that installations receiving AA&E send a receipt confirmation of the report of shipment and notify those who work at the installation delivery access points of any incoming shipment of AA&E to reduce the risk of a secure hold denial.

Management Comments

Air Mobility Command



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS AIR MOBILITY COMMAND

13 May 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: AMC/A4
Building P-40
510 POW/MIA Drive
Scott AFB, IL 62225-5011

SUBJECT: Recommendation Closure Request - Project No. D2024-DEV0PC-0166.000,
Evaluation of the Movement of Ukraine- and Israel- Bound Equipment Through
Aerial Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States, Report Date April 29,
2025.

1. AMC/A4 requests closure of open recommendation one identified in DoDIG Project No. D2024-DEV0PC-0166.000.
2. Please reference Tab 1 for the follow-up status and rationale for closure request for the recommendation. Please reference Tab 2 and Tab 3 for supporting documentation referenced in Tab 1.
3. The AMC/A4 point of contact is [REDACTED], AMC/A4T, Commercial Phone Number [REDACTED], DSN [REDACTED], email [REDACTED].

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NY.D. [REDACTED]
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Date: 2025.05.16 12:37:08 -05'00'
ANTHONY D. BABCOCK, Brig Gen, USAF
Director of Logistics, Engineering
& Force Protection

Attachments:

1. Closure Rationale
2. Defense Transportation Regulation Reference 1
3. Defense Transportation Regulation Reference 2
4. Evaluation of the Movement of Ukraine- and Israel- Bound Equipment Through Aerial Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States Report

AIRMEN — MISSION — COMMITMENT

Air Mobility Command (cont'd)

TAB 1
DODIG PROJECT NO. D2024-DEV0PC-0166.000, 29 APRIL 2025

Evaluation of the Movement of Ukraine- and Israel- Bound Equipment Through Aerial
Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States

AMC/A4
FOLLOW-UP STATUS FOR RECOMMENDATION CLOSURE

REFERENCES: Reference Tab 2- Global Air Transportation Execution System vs. Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence for intransit visibility purposes, Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR), Part III, Appendix I, Paragraph G.
Reference Tab 3- Tracking and Tracing, Defense Transportation Regulation, Part II, Chapter 202, Paragraph L 2-3.

RECOMMENDATION 1: The DoD OIG recommends that the Commander of the Air Mobility Command provide the Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group personnel at the Logistics Enabling Node–Poland with consistent access to the Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence system for visibility of in-transit air cargo.

AMC/A4 RESPONSE: Air Mobility Command Directorate of Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection concurs with the DoD IG assessment that U.S. military personnel at the Logistics Enabling Node–Poland’s Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group should have access to Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence system at their office, but believe that this is a United States European Command Commander responsibility, not Air Mobility Command.

Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence provides in-transit visibility of DoD personnel and cargo to Combatant Commands, Components, Services, Joint Staff, Agencies, and other Federal organizations. Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence is the DoD’s automated program for supply chain, distribution, and logistics information fusion through common integrated data application services. Air Mobility Command does not own or control system access to Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence. United States European Command Commander must ensure all assigned forces are utilizing Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence for advance shipment data for inbound shipments and routine cargo movement tracking and tracing, as mandated by Defense Transportation Regulation Part II, Chapter 202, Paragraph L2-3 and Defense Transportation Regulation Part III, App I, Para G.

Actual Completion Date: 13 May 2025.

Total Actual/Estimated Monetary Benefits Realized: \$0.

U.S. European Command



UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
UNIT 30400
APO AE 09154

ECJ43-EDDOC

13 May 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: (U) Management Comments in reply to the Evaluation of the Movement of Ukraine- and Israel-Bound Equipment Through Aerial Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States (Project No. D2024-DEV0PC-0166.000)

References: (a) (U) DOD IG Draft Report APOE D2024-DEV0PC-0166.000

(b) (U) USTRANSCOM DTR 4500.9R, "Defense Transportation Regulations," Part II, "Cargo Movement," Chapters 201–208, May 2014 (Incorporating Changes, August 14, 2024)

(c) (U) USTRANSCOM DTR 4500.9R, "Defense Transportation Regulations," Part VI, "System 463L Pallets and Nets," Chapter 608, June 18, 2018 (Incorporating Changes December 10, 2024)

(d) (U) USEUCOM Theater Distribution Plan 2023, 30 September 2023

1. (U) In reply to ref (a), USEUCOM J4 non-concurs with the recommendation "...that the Commander of the U.S. European Command establish and implement procedures for returning System 463L assets from the Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group to an Air Mobility Command hub within 3 days, in accordance with the Defense Transportation Regulations."

2. (U) Guidance for the implementation and execution of regulations in refs (b) and (c) already exist within the USEUCOM AOR.

a. (U) Reference (d) assigns responsibility to United States Army Europe through the 21st Theater Sustainment Command to provide "...oversight over the efficient, cost effective and proactive management of containers and inter-modal distribution platforms from the point the asset is identified and enters the USEUCOM AOR and/or DTS to the point when the asset is returned to its owner for subsequent re-use, has left the DTS (i.e. reached home station), or leaves the AOR, whichever event occurs first."

b. (U) USEUCOM will reaffirm the guidance within ref (d) during this year's publication update.

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U.S. European Command (cont'd)

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ECJ43-EDDOC
SUBJECT: (U) Management Comments in reply to the Evaluation of the Movement of Ukraine-
and Israel-Bound Equipment Through Aerial Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United
States (Project No. D2024-DEV0PC-0166.000)

3. (U) The USEUCOM point of contact is [REDACTED], USA, Deputy Division Chief, DSN:
[REDACTED], or email: [REDACTED].

TAYLOR.SCOTT.ALA
N. [REDACTED]
SCOTT A. TAYLOR, Colonel, USAF
Division Chief, Logistics Operations (J43)

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

A/DACG	Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group
AA&E	Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives
AFB	Air Force Base
AMC	Air Mobility Command
APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation
CONUS	Continental United States
DTR	Defense Transportation Regulation
GATES	Global Air Transportation Execution System
IGC	Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence
JMC	Joint Munitions Command
LEN-P	Logistics Enabling Node–Poland
PDA	Presidential Drawdown Authority
SAAM	Special Airlift Assignment Mission
SAG-U	Security Assistance Group–Ukraine
SDDC	Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TSC	Theater Sustainment Command
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command



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