




INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

JUNE 30, 2025



Unclassified Summary of Report No. DODIG-2025-055, “Audit of Munitions Storage in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan” and Report No. DODIG-2025-119, “Audit of Munitions Storage on Guam”



INDEPENDENCE ★ INTEGRITY ★ EXCELLENCE ★ TRANSPARENCY

On December 18, 2024 and June 30, 2025, the DoD Office of Inspector General issued audit reports DODIG-2025-055, “Audit of Munitions Storage in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan” and DODIG-2025-119, “Audit of Munitions Storage on Guam.” Due to the extent of the controlled unclassified information and classified information contained in the original audit reports, they were not released publicly. In the interest of transparency, we prepared this summary report to release some unclassified information identified during the audits.

Objective

The objective of the audits was to determine the extent to which the DoD stored and secured munitions that support U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) operations in accordance with applicable safety and security policies.¹ During the “Audit of Munitions Storage in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan,” recovery efforts for a May 2023 typhoon prevented the inclusion of DoD munitions storage areas (MSAs) on Guam in the scope. Therefore, we completed the original objective over a series of two audits: the DODIG-2025-055, “Audit of Munitions Storage in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan,” December 18, 2024, and the DODIG-2025-119, “Audit of Munitions Storage on Guam,” June 30, 2025.

Background

USINDOPACOM’s mission is to protect and defend the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests in the Indo-Pacific region by promoting security cooperation, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and when necessary, fighting to win. Due to the dispersed nature of forces across this vast region, an essential need exists for munitions storage operations across the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, installations with MSAs are located throughout the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, each installation may house multiple MSAs and each MSA may support several of the Military Services.

To execute USINDOPACOM’s mission, DoD personnel must have timely access to a diverse and adequate inventory of munitions. Proper storage of munitions ensures their availability when needed and prevents hazards to the installations and locations where they are stored and secured. In addition, due to the explosive nature of munitions, proper storage is critical to the safety of USINDOPACOM personnel and civilians.

Military units conducting munitions operations are responsible for the safety and security of their MSAs. The DoD established standards to protect and store munitions in the custody of DoD Components and standards for explosives safety and physical security. These manuals and instructions provide the minimum requirements to safeguard explosive materials from accidental detonation, damage, and tampering or theft. Specifically, DoD criteria highlight that the security of munitions is critically important to the DoD. Unauthorized access to stored munitions could jeopardize the safety and security of personnel, activities, missions, and installations worldwide.

¹ For purposes of this report, the background and scope and methodology are applicable to all four locations to include the nine munitions storage areas we audited. Therefore, we will not distinguish between Alaska, Hawaii, Japan, and Guam or either audit.

Scope and Methodology

We conducted these performance audits from May 2023 through May 2025 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

To determine whether the DoD stored and secured munitions that support USINDOPACOM operations in accordance with applicable safety and security policies, we conducted site visits to nine MSAs at five installations across the Indo-Pacific region. Specifically, we conducted site visits at:

- Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska;
- Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii;
- Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan;
- Andersen Air Force Base, Guam; and
- Naval Base Guam, Guam.

We gathered background information and conducted meetings with the DoD Explosives Safety Board and Military Service personnel to identify areas of concern. We received and reviewed the Military Services' munitions lists that support USINDOPACOM operations to determine which installations to include in our site selection based on high net explosive weight, available capacity, and number and size of munitions storage structures on DoD installations in theater.

We reviewed DoD and Military Service criteria regarding the safety and security of munitions storage, identified roles and responsibilities for munitions operations, and analyzed documentation including site plans, munitions inventories, standard operating procedures, safety deviation risk assessments, key control access logs, safety inspection results, lightning protection system inspection and testing records, and intrusion detection system testing records.

During our site visits, we interviewed staff responsible for munitions storage, safety, and security. Key personnel interviewed included the munitions accountable systems officer, quality assurance personnel, weapons safety managers, security officials, and tenant personnel. In locations where joint storage occurred, we reviewed tenant munitions storage agreements.

We conducted physical safety and security inspections of MSAs and munitions storage structures to determine whether munitions were stored in accordance with applicable safety and security policies. We inspected perimeter fencing, intrusion detection systems, lightning protection systems, interior and exterior lighting, doors, ventilation, and concrete integrity. We also inspected for evidence of flooding, and for vegetation, trash, and debris on and around the structures. In addition, we performed limited book-to-floor and floor-to-book munitions inventories.

Findings, Recommendations, Management Comments, and Management Actions Taken

Each audit report contained one finding, and we collectively made 10 recommendations across both reports. We directed recommendations to the commander of the DoD installation or unit that had oversight of operations at the MSA. Specifically, we made recommendations to the 36th Wing Commander, Andersen Air Force Base; 18th Wing Commander, Kadena Air Base; 3rd Wing Commander, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson; 673d Air Base Wing Commander, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson; and Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam Commander. Due to the extent of the controlled unclassified information and classified information contained in the findings and recommendations, we did not release them publicly. We consider two of the recommendations closed and eight resolved and open.

During the Audit of Munitions Storage on Guam, we verified the 36th Wing completed corrective actions during the audit, which resulted in the two closed recommendations. The remaining eight recommendations, from the Audit of Munitions Storage in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan are all open. The responsible commanders overseeing the MSAs agreed with the recommendations and outlined their plans to implement corrective actions to address the deficiencies we identified.

For six of the eight open recommendations, the 18th Wing Commander, 3rd Wing Commander, and 673d Air Base Wing Commander estimated the corrective actions would be completed by June 30, 2025. For the remaining two open recommendations, the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam Commander estimated the corrective actions would be completed by September 30, 2025. These eight recommendations are considered resolved and will remain open until we verify that management has fully implemented the agreed upon corrective actions. See the Table for the status of the 10 recommendations.

Table. Status of the 10 Recommendations

Installation	Management	Recommendations Made	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Kadena Air Base	Commander, 18th Wing	3	3	0
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson	Commander, 3rd Wing	2	2	0
	Commander, 673d Air Base Wing	1	1	0
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam	Commander, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam	2	2	0
Andersen Air Force Base	Commander, 36th Wing	2	0	2
Total		10	8	2

Note: No recommendations were unresolved at the time of our report's publication.

Source: The DoD OIG.

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