


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**CLASSIFIED APPENDIX**

# **OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE**

## **AND OTHER OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS**

JULY 1, 2018-SEPTEMBER 30, 2018

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Classified By: Michael S. Child, Sr., Deputy Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: X1

**SECRET//NOFORN**

Released by the DoD OIG FOIA  
Office under DODOIG-2019-000597  
on September 6, 2024.



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(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE



**CLASSIFICATION KEY (U)**

(C//NF): Confidential//Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals

(C//REL USA, FVEY): Confidential//Releasable To USA, Five Eyes

(S): Secret

(S//NF): Secret//Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

(S//OC-USGOV/NF): Secret//Originator Controlled-U.S. Government/Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

(S//NF/LES): Secret/ Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals/Law Enforcement Sensitive

(S//REL TO USA, ARE, BHR, KWT, SAU): Secret//Releasable to USA, Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia

(S//REL TO USA, ARE, AUT, CYP, FIN, IND, IRL, ISR, JOR, JPN, MLT, SAU, SWE, EU, FVEY, NATO): Secret//Releasable to USA, United Arab Emirates, Austria, Cyprus, India, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Japan, Malta, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, NATO, European Union, Five Eyes

(S//REL USA, FVEY): Secret//Releasable To USA, Five Eyes

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY, FRA): Secret//Releasable to USA, Five Eyes, France

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY, JOR): Secret//Releasable to USA, Five Eyes, Jordan

(S//REL TO USA, MESF): Secret//Releasable to USA, Middle East Security Forces

(S//RELIDO): Secret// Releasable by Information Disclosure Official Only

(U): Unclassified

(U//FOUO): Unclassified//For Official Use Only

(U//SBU): Unclassified//Sensitive But Unclassified

**On the Cover**

(U) (Top row) Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service operators demonstrate tactical repelling skills during the 2nd School graduation in Baghdad, Iraq. (U.S. Navy photo); Members of the Iraqi Federal Police practice riot control techniques during training at Camp Dublin, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo); Members of the Iraqi Border Guard Force practice assembling weapons at the Besmaya Range Complex, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo); An F-16 Fighting Falcon over Iraq prepares to maneuver away after receiving fuel from a KC-135 Stratotanker. (U.S. Air Force photo). (Bottom row) New Zealand defense force personnel provide support by fire during a combined forces live fire exercise at Camp Taji, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo); U.S. tactical vehicles drive down a village street outside Manbij, Syria. (U.S. Army photo)

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(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

# (U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

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(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE



(U) A U.S. Marine fires an FGM-148 Javelin shoulder-fired anti-tank missile, at his target during a live fire demonstration near At Tanf Garrison, Syria. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)

## (U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

### ■ (U) MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

#### (U) THE MISSION IN SYRIA EXPANDS

##### (U) U.S. Policy in Syria Evolving

(U) As reported on page 18 of this quarter's report, U.S. policy objectives in Syria appeared to expand. U.S. officials issued statements linking the continued U.S. troop deployment in Syria to the presence of Iranian troops and proxies outside Iran's borders, and to a resolution to Syria's civil war.

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(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)




(U) DoD activities in Syria have been focused on the D-ISIS campaign under legal authority provided by the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. Recently, the Administration has announced a revised Syria strategy that includes U.S. involvement in a post-ISIS Syria.<sup>2</sup>

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(a)




(S) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)




(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)



(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)



(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(b); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)



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(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

(U) Figure 1.  
(U) Map of Iraq  
UNCLASSIFIED



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(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE


## ■ (U) IRAQ

### (U) ISIS ATTACKS INCREASE IN RURAL AREAS

(U) As reported on page 22 of this quarter's report, ISIS has transitioned from a land holding caliphate to a clandestine, insurgent organization.

~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c);  
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)



(U) Iraqi Shia Militia Groups (Defense Intelligence Agency photo)

~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~


(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

(U) Figure 2.

(S) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)



(U) Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.


~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

## **(U) SOME PMF MILITIAS CONTINUE TO OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY OF THE ISF**

### **(U) Popular Mobilization Force Integration into the Iraqi Security Forces Continued to Face Obstacles**

(U) As reported on page 29 of this quarter's report, several militias belonging to Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs), an umbrella category of more than 50 armed groups, continued to act independently from government control.

(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)



(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)




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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~


(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)




(S//REL USA, FVEY)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)




S//NF

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)




(S//NF)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)



(S//REL USA, FVEY)


CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)



S//NF

(S//NF)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)




### (U) Iranian Proxies in Iraq Pose an Increased Threat to U.S. Personnel

(U) As reported on page 29 of this quarter's report, Iranian proxy forces escalated their threats against U.S. personnel in Iraq. The United States condemned Iran after attacks targeted diplomatic facilities in Baghdad and Basrah, and warned that Iran would be held responsible for attacks by proxy groups on U.S. personnel or facilities.

(S//REL USA, FVEY)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)



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(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

## (U) Iranian Backed PMF Groups

(U) As discussed in last quarter's OIR classified appendix, Kata'ib Hezbollah is among the most dangerous of the PMF groups in Iraq due to its close ties with Iran. It is also the only PMF group designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States.

The following provides profiles of the four Iraqi militia groups that DIA considers A to be both a high threat to U.S. interests and highly influenced by Iran.<sup>18</sup>

### (U) KATA'IB HEZBOLLAH



(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

### (U) KATA'IB SAYYID AL-SHUHADA



(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)


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(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)



(U) ASAIB AHL AL-HAQ



(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)


(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)



(U) HAKARAT AL-NUJABA




(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//REL FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)



S//REL TO USA, FVEY

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE



(U) The Raqqa Support Platoon clears rubble from the streets and neighborhoods in Raqqa, Syria. (U.S. Air Force photo)

### (U) IRAQ FORMS A NEW GOVERNMENT

(U) As reported on page 30 of this quarter's report, Iraq named a new president, prime minister, and speaker of parliament following months of negotiations between political blocs. The negotiations began after parliamentary elections in May that awarded a majority of seats to two predominantly Shia political blocs. Iraq's government formation is a complex, sequenced process that requires the election of the speaker and president by the newly seated parliament, comma and the designation of a prime minister by the new president. At each step of the process, the United States encouraged selection of moderate and pragmatic leaders, according to the DoS.<sup>19</sup>

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)


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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE


CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)




(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)




(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)




(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)



(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)



(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)




(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)



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(U) Figure 3.  
 (U) Map of Syria  
 UNCLASSIFIED



(U) Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET//NOFORN**  
 (U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE



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(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

## ■ (U) SYRIA


### (U) ISIS REMAINS AN ADAPTIVE ORGANIZATION

(U) As reported on page 46 of this quarter's report, the DoD, the DoS, and a United Nations committee reported increasing signs that ISIS in Syria was moving underground, regrouping, and shifting its focus to act as a clandestine insurgent organization.


(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)



(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)




(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)



S//NF

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)



S//NF

### (U) ISIS REVENUE SOURCES SUBSTANTIALLY DEGRADED, BUT REMAIN VIABLE

(U) As reported on page 46 of this quarter's report, the DoD and the United Nations reported that ISIS had retained control of some revenue streams and bureaucratic structures, which allowed it to continue to operate underground.

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)



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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

S//NF

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//NF)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//NF)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//NF)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

S//NF

### (U) FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS REMAIN A CONCERN

(U) As reported on page 46 of this quarter's report, the DoD and the United Nations both reported that ISIS fighters had gone into hiding in sympathetic communities, and that outflows of foreign fighters from Syria were lower than expected.

(S//NF)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//NF)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE



(U) A U.S. Marine observes as supplies are dropped in de-confliction zone near At Tanf garrison, Syria.  
(U.S. Marine Corps photo)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

### (U) U.S. TROOPS CONDUCT MILITARY EXERCISES AT THE AT TANF GARRISON

(U) As reported on page 48 of this report, U.S. officials continued to describe Iranian actions in Syria as provocative, and said that Iranian proxy forces were destabilizing factors. U.S. military officials singled out the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) - Quds Force as the principal group behind what it termed Iran's malign influence. In September, Iran called for the United States to withdraw troops from the At Tanf garrison, a desert encampment where approximately 200 U.S. military personnel train a local vetted Syrian opposition group. Russia warned of possible operations against "terrorists" operating in the area. Shortly afterward, U.S. Marines conducted 8 days of exercises at the garrison.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

**(U) Iranian Proxy Forces Continue Their Campaign in Syria Unabated**

(U) As reported on page 48 of this quarter's report, Iranian-backed forces continued their campaign of support for the Assad regime. The DoD reported Iranian proxy forces did not hinder Counter-ISIS operations this quarter, but their actions remain "provocative" and "destabilizing."

(S//REL USA, ARE, AUT, CYP, FIN, IND, IRL, ISR, JOR, JPN, MLT, SAU, SWE, EU, FVEY, NATO)

CENTCOM (b)  
(1) 1.4(a); DIA  
(b)(1) 1.4(a);  
OSD/JS (b)(1)  
1.4(d)

(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

S//NF

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

S//NF

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//REL IDG) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]



(U) Dangerous chemicals left behind by ISIS were found by a family returning to their home and reported to Raqqa Internal Security Forces. (U.S. Air Force photo)

(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), DIA (b)(1) 1.4(a), OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

### (U) RUSSIA CONTINUES COMMUNICATION WITH THE U.S. MILITARY

(U) As reported on page 48 of this quarter's report, Russia continued to communicate with U.S. commanders in Syria to de-conflict operations. However, outside of this limited cooperation, the DoD reported that Russia continued to act as a destabilizing force due to its support for the Syrian regime.

(S//REL USA, FRA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE



(U) U.S. Marine machine gun squad leader provides security at a position near At Tanf Garrison, Syria. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(d)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)

(S//RELIDC) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//RELIDC)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

**(S//NF/LES) MONITORING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE REMAINS CHALLENGING**

(U) As reported on page 55 of this report, delivering humanitarian aid to Syria remains a challenge. USAID has established risk mitigation and compliance programs to address the risks of operating in such an environment. This quarter, the USAID OIG issued findings on the risks of humanitarian assistance being diverted to armed groups in northwestern Syria. As reflected below, such programs are subject to significant risk.

(S//NF/LES)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(d)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

## ■ (U) OVERSIGHT

(U) As reported on page 68 of this quarter's report, from July 1 to September 30, 2018, the Lead IG agencies and partner agencies completed multiple oversight projects, including three classified oversight projects related to OIR, and continued to investigate corruption in Syria.

## (U) AUDITS, INSPECTIONS, AND EVALUATIONS


### (U) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

#### (U) Evaluation of the Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Process in Support of Operation Inherent Resolve

##### (U) DODIG-2018-162

(U) The DoD OIG conducted this assessment to determine whether the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) Commander's intelligence requirements are being satisfied by the current airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) process. PED is the transformation of raw collected data into usable information distributed for further analysis or use by commanders and staff. For OIR, the airborne ISR PED process is performed by Service and support agency personnel who distribute the analyzed intelligence data to the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-OIR.

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)



(U//FOUO) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



(U) Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service operators demonstrate tactical rappelling skills during the 2nd School graduation in Baghdad, Iraq.  
(U.S. Navy photo)

(U//FOUO) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



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(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

## **(U) DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

### **(U) Compliance Follow-up Review: The Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System Still Vulnerable to Potential Compromise**

**(U) ISP-C-18-31, AUGUST 15, 2018**

(U//~~SPH~~) The Worldwide Refugee Admission Processing System (WRAPS) is an electronic application used by the DoS to manage the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program and refugee resettlement process. ~~STATE: (b)(7)(F)~~  
[REDACTED]. In that report, the DoS OIG made four recommendations to the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), the WRAPS' system owner.

(~~C/NF~~) During this compliance follow-up review, the DoS OIG found that overall, PRM made improvements to the information security posture of WRAPS, but it still needed to address risks identified in the 2016 report. For example, PRM made significant changes to the WRAPS network architecture without submitting a notification of change to the DoS's information technology bureau as required. Additionally, based on a forensic examination and several cybersecurity assessments prepared by the National Security Agency and a DoS bureau, PRM uncovered a network compromise. Even though there was no evidence of data manipulation or modification as a result of the compromise and the incident was closed by the DoS's security bureau, the DoS OIG advised PRM to implement preventative measures, such as monthly audits, to reduce the risk of a network compromise. Finally, the DoS OIG found that PRM failed to conduct a formal risk assessment of WRAPS that complied with DoS requirements. As a result, the DoS OIG revised and reissued two of the four recommendations from the previous report and made one new recommendation. The DoS bureaus agreed with all three recommendations and the DoS OIG considers all three recommendations resolved, pending DoS OIG verification of further actions taken by the bureaus.

## **(U) GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE**

### **(U//~~FOUO~~) DoD Monitored U.S.-Provided Equipment but Should Improve Its Vetting Process for Providing Stipends**

**(U) GAO-18-458C, AUGUST 2018**

(U) The GAO reviewed the DoD support to the Iraqi Security Forces, including the Kurdistan Regional Government's military forces. Specifically, the GAO examined the extent to which the DoD monitored the end-use of equipment provided through the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF), and ensured that the Kurdistan Regional Government progressed in meeting U.S. conditions for stipend support.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The GAO determined that the DoD monitored the end-use of equipment provided to the Iraqi Security Forces through the ITEF as security conditions allowed. Additionally, the DoD conducted enhanced end-use monitoring of all sensitive ITEF-funded items provided to the Iraqi Security Forces, including inventorying and accounting for all night vision devices and thermal weapons sights.

(S//REL USA, MESP) ~~CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(d)~~  
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(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(d)

(U) In its draft report, the GAO made three recommendations to the DoD to strengthen the procedures for vetting Kurdistan Regional Government units. The DoD fully addressed the recommendations in its response to the draft report, and the GAO removed the recommendations from the final report.

## (U) PLANNED OVERSIGHT

### (U) Planned Oversight Projects by Lead IG Agencies, as of September 30, 2018

Project Title	Objective
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL	
(U//FOUO) <i>Evaluation of OIR Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Activities as OIR Transitions to Stabilization Phase</i>	(U//FOUO) To determine whether CJTF-OIR has developed necessary authorities and directives to execute the full range of HUMINT tasks as force drawdowns occur in OIR due to mission transition to stabilization phase.
(U//FOUO) <i>Evaluation of Tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) Support to OIR/OFS</i>	(U//FOUO) To determine if Theater Support Activity's tactical SIGINT PED support is sufficient to satisfy OIR/OFS requirements.

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**(U) ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS**

Acronym	Definition	Acronym	Definition
AAH	Asaib Ahl al-Haq	KH	Kata'ib Hezbollah
CJTF-OIR	Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve	KSS	Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada
D-ISIS	Defeat ISIS	MERV	Middle Euphrates River Valley
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
DoD	Department of Defense	NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
DoS	Department of State	NGIC	National Ground Intelligence Center
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation	OIR	Operation Inherent Resolve
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighters	PED	Production, Exploitation, and Dissemination
GAO	Government Accountability Office	PMC	Popular Mobilization Committee
GID	General Intelligence Directorate	PMF	Popular Mobilization Forces
HAN	Harakat al-Nujaba	PYD	Democratic Union Party (translation from Kurdish)
HTS	Ha'yat Tahir Al-Sham	SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons	UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance	USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
IRGC	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps	WRAPS	Worldwide Refugee Admission Processing System
ITEF	Iraq Train and Equip Fund	YPG	People's Protection Units (translation)
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria		



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(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

## (U) ENDNOTES

1. (U) DoD OUSD(P) D-ISIS Task Force, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/20/2018
2. (U) Lead IG Analysis.
3. (U) DoS, cable, 18 AMMAN 527, 9/18/2018.
4. (U) DoS, cable, 18 AMMAN 527, 9/18/2018.
5. (U) DoS, cable, 18 AMMAN 527, 9/18/2018.
6. (U) DoS, cable, 18 AMMAN 527, 9/18/2018.
7. (U) DoS, cable, 18 STATE 48943, 10/10/2018.
8. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/14/2018.
9. (U) Lead IG, "Operation Inherent Resolve Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2018-March 31, 2018," 4/2018; Lead IG, "Operation Inherent Resolve Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2018-May 30, 2018," 7/2018.
10. (U) DIA, "Iraq: Overview of Shia Militia Groups," DIA-22-1804-243, 04/18/2018.
11. (U) DoD OUSD(P) Iraq/Syria, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/27/2018.
12. (U) DoD OUSD(P) Iraq/Syria, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/27/2018.
13. (U) DoS, cable, 18 BAGHDAD 1531, 9/27/2018.
14. (U) DoD OUSD(P) Iraq/Syria, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/27/2018.
15. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/14/2018.
16. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
17. (S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)
18. (U) DIA, "Iraq: Overview of Shia Militia Groups," DIA-22-1804-243, 04/18/2018.
19. (U) DoS, cable, 18 BAGHDAD 1587, 10/6/2018.
20. (U), DoS, cable, 18 BAGHDAD 1573, 10/3/2018.
21. (U), DoS, cable, 18 BAGHDAD 1621, 10/15/2018.
22. (U), DoS, cable, 18 BAGHDAD 1621, 10/15/2018.
23. (U), DoS, cable, 18 BAGHDAD 1571, 10/3/2018.
24. (U), DoS, cable, 18 BAGHDAD 1571, 10/3/2018.
25. (U), DoS, cable, 18 BAGHDAD 1481, 9/17/2018.
26. (U), DoS, cable, 18 BAGHDAD 1601, 10/9/2018.
27. (U), DoS, cable, 18 BAGHDAD 1601, 10/9/2018.
28. (U), DoS, cable, 18 BAGHDAD 1601, 10/9/2018.
29. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
30. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/14/2018.
31. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/14/2018.
32. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/14/2018.
33. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/14/2018.
34. (U) DoD OUSD(P) CN&GT, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/18/2018.
35. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/14/2018.
36. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
37. (U) DoD OUSD(P) CN&GT, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/18/2018.
38. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/14/2018.
39. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/14/2018.
40. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/14/2018.
41. (U) DoD OUSD(P) D-ISIS Task Force, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/20/2018.
42. (U) Department of Justice, response to DoD OIG request for information, 10/09/2018.
43. (U) The White House, "National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America," 10/2018.
44. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
45. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
46. (U) DoS, cable, 18 AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM 255, 9/27/2018.
47. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
48. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/14/2018.
49. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/14/2018.
50. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/14/2018.
51. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
52. (U) Lead IG Analysis.
53. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
54. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
55. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/14/2018.
56. (U) DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 09/14/2018.

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(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

# (U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

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(U)CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) .....	32

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(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

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(U) Figure 9.  
CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

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(U) Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

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(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

# (U) U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

## (U) BACKGROUND AND MISSION

(S//REL USA, FVEY) This is our first Lead IG quarterly report on the Overseas Contingency Operation Yukon Journey, CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a).

(S//REL USA, ARE, BHR, KWT, SAU) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)

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(U)  
CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

(U)

(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)


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(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY


CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)



(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



U  
CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)



(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



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(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

(U) Figure 5.

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e), OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

~~S//NF~~

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)



(U) Source: Joint Staff, "Briefing to Lead IG," 8/5/2018

~~S//NF~~

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)



(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)



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(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(C//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)


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(U) OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)




(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)




(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)




(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)




(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)



(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)



(S//NF) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)



(U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



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(U) AFRICOM OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

# (U) USAFRICOM OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

(U) Introduction to the U.S. Africa Command Campaign Plan 2000-19 .....	36
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(U) AFRICOM OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

## (U) INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. AFRICA COMMAND CAMPAIGN PLAN 2000-19

(U) On February 9, 2018, the Secretary of Defense modified existing military orders and designated one counterterrorism mission in the Middle East and two in Africa as overseas contingency operations. These classified operations seek to degrade al-Qaeda and ISIS-affiliated terrorists in the Middle East and specific regions of Africa.

(U) On May 29, 2018, the DoD Inspector General was named as the Lead Inspector General for the three new overseas contingency operations -- Operation Yukon Journey, the Northwest Africa Counterterrorism overseas contingency operation, and the East Africa Counterterrorism overseas contingency operation. The Lead Inspector General named the DoS Inspector General as the Associate Lead Inspector General for the same set of operations.

(U) To report on these new contingency operations, the DoD OIG submitted a list of questions to the DoD about topics related to the operations, including the objectives of the operations, the metrics used to measure progress, the costs of the operations, the number of U.S. personnel involved, and the reason why the operations were declared contingency operations. The DoD provided classified responses to some of the questions, and those answers, along with an overview of the military activities during the quarter, are included in the classified appendix to this report.

(U) In general, the answers provided lacked detail and were provided after the requested due date. The DoD did not answer the question as to why it was necessary to designate these existing counterterrorism campaigns as overseas contingency operations or what benefits were conveyed with the overseas contingency operation designation.

(U) In addition, there are outstanding questions why the contingency operations and their specific locations are classified—particularly since U.S. forces had been carrying out counterterrorism operations in these locations with public knowledge and reporting. The DoD informed the Lead IG that the new contingency operations are classified to safeguard U.S. forces' freedom of movement, provide a layer of force protection, and protect tactics, techniques, and procedures. However, such tactical information is typically classified in any operation, even when the general location of the operation and the results of military activities are publicly disclosed. We will continue to seek answers to these questions.

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(U) AFRICOM OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS



(U) A C-130J Super Hercules in preparation for a mission at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. (U.S. Air Force photo)

## (U) USAFRICOM CAMPAIGN PLAN

(U) According to U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), the Campaign Plan articulates the Command's partner-centric approach to strengthen security forces, counter transnational threats, and conduct crisis response to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity. The Plan highlights that the United States is represented in all 53 countries of the USAFRICOM area of responsibility, and all 53 present opportunities for a wide range of engagement.

(S//REL USA, FVEY) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

## (U) USAFRICOM CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES AND LINES OF EFFORT

(U) According to USAFRICOM, the command seeks to achieve five broad objectives across the next five years (2019-2014). These five objectives and six supporting lines of effort (LOE) are summarized below:<sup>38</sup>

(U) **Objective 1.** The United States or its allies gain increased influence as preferred regional security partners, and U.S. interests in Africa are protected against destabilizing competitor state influence, activities, and aggression.

- **LOE 1 -** Strengthen partner networks, acting on shared goals with campaign and international partners.

(U) **Objective 2.** African partners secure their sovereign interests, export security, promote economic prosperity, and provide legitimate, accountable, and effective governance.

- **LOE 2 -** Enable partner nation capacity to direct and sustain professional security forces; to counter illicit activities; and to control and respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials of concern.


(U) **Objective 3.** Violent extremist organizations (VEOs) that threaten U.S. interests are degraded and contained for defeat by African partners.

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(U) AFRICOM OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

(U) Figure 6.  
(U) Lines of Effort to Campaign Objectives  
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- (U) **LOE 3** - Conduct operations and support African Union Mission in Somalia and Somali Security Forces (SSF) to degrade designated VEOs, and ensure SSF ability to establish local security in major urban centers.
- (U) **LOE 4** - Degrade designated VEOs, improve core security functions of the internationally recognized Libyan government, and strengthen national security forces aligned with a functioning and inclusive government that is broadly accepted in Libya.
- (U) **LOE 5** - Counter VEO operations and build counter-VEO capacities of campaign partners in the Western Sahel and the Lake Chad Region.

(U) **Objectives 4 and 5.** USAFRICOM maintains the ability to protect U.S. Government personnel and property; and USAFRICOM aligns the forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints, agreements necessary to accomplish its mission.

- (U) **LOE 6** - USAFRICOM can receive forces and project the power, forces, footprints, and agreements necessary for receipt of forces and power projection in order to conduct day-to-day activities, enable crisis response, and support contingencies

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(U) AFRICOM OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

(U) Africa Faces Multiple Challenges in Coming Years

(S//REL USA, FVEY, FRA)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)



(U) Competitor States and VEOs Present Security Threats to the United States and Its Allies

(S//REL USA, FVEY, FRA)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)



(S//REL USA, FVEY, FRA)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)




(S//REL USA, FVEY, FRA)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)



(S//REL USA, FVEY, FRA)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)




(S//REL USA, FVEY, FRA)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)



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(U) Figure 7.  
(U) Map of East Africa  
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(U) Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

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
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(U) AFRICOM OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

# (U) EAST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM CONTINGENCY OPERATION


## (U) BACKGROUND AND MISSION

(S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)




(U) According to USAFRICOM, various factors such as poverty, unstable governments, deep-seated tribal tensions, military conflict, and porous borders have led to instability in East Africa, and two terrorist organizations, al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Somalia, have taken advantage of these conditions to spread violent extremism.<sup>46</sup> See Figure 7 for a map of East Africa.

(S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)




(S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)



### (U) Violent Extremist Organizations in East Africa

(S//REL USA, FVEY, ACQU) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)



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(S)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(U) Figure 8.

(U)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

~~S//NF~~

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)



(U) Source: Joint Staff, "Briefing to Lead IG," 8/5/2018

~~S//NF~~

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)



(S//REL USA, FVEY)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)



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(S)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

### (U) DOD PRESENCE IN EAST AFRICA

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(U) The DoD OIG requested the DoD provide information related to the number and type of DoD personnel and the number and type of U.S. military platforms involved in the East Africa contingency operation. The DoD responded with the limited information provided above. We will seek detailed information for our future reporting.

### (U) PARTNERED OPERATIONS IN EAST AFRICA

(U) Under the East Africa contingency operation, USAFRICOM assists the Federal Government of Somalia through a train and equip mission; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support.<sup>54</sup> USAFRICOM's goal is that the Federal Government of Somalia assumes responsibility to secure its own territory; neutralizes al Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia; and interdicts the illicit flow of arms, drugs, and money.<sup>55</sup> The African Union Mission in Somalia currently supports those security functions. The African Union Mission in Somalia assists the SSF to protect Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of government, their efforts toward reconciliation and peacebuilding, and security for key infrastructure.<sup>56</sup>

(U) Apart from its actions in Somalia, the DoD builds partner capacity with other countries in the region.<sup>57</sup> For example, USAFRICOM equips Ugandan and Kenyan partners with unmanned aerial vehicles and provides corresponding training in air-ground integration and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.<sup>58</sup> In 2016 and 2017, the DoD allocated approximately \$90 million and \$140 million for Uganda and Kenya, respectively, in global train and equip funds.<sup>59</sup>

(S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(d)

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(U) Figure 9.  
 (U) Map Of Northwest Africa.  
 UNCLASSIFIED



(U) Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

UNCLASSIFIED

(S) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1-4(a) OSD/AS (b)(1) 1-4(a)

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(S)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

# (U) NORTHWEST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM CONTINGENCY OPERATION

## (U) BACKGROUND AND MISSION

(S//REL USA, FVEY)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//REL USA, FVEY)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//REL USA, FVEY)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

## (U) Violent Extremist Organizations in Northwest AFRICA

(S//REL USA, FRA)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)

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(S)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(U) Figure 10.

(U)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)



(U) ISIS in Libya

~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)



~~(S//REL USA, FRA)~~

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)



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(S) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)

#### (U) Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Libya

(S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)

#### (U) Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa

(S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

#### (U) Other Violent Extremist Organizations

(S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(U) According to USAFRICOM, other terrorist organizations operate in northern Africa outside of Libya and the Lake Chad Region. The Algerian government's counterterrorism operations have largely confined ISIS-Algeria to the northern part of the country. Similarly, Tunisian security forces have been able to limit Jund al Khalifah-Tunisia to small-scale attacks in western Tunisia.<sup>79</sup>

(S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(b)

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(S)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)


(U) Figure 11.

(U)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

~~S//NF~~

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)



(U) Source: Joint Staff, "Briefing to Lead IG," 8/5/2018

~~S//NF~~

## (U) DOD PRESENCE IN NORTHWEST AFRICA

(S//REL USA, FVEY)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)



(S//REL USA, FVEY)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)



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(S)

CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//NF)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//NF)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(U) The DoD OIG requested that the DoD provide information related to the number and type of DoD personnel and the number and type of U.S. military platforms involved in the Northwest Africa counterterrorism contingency operation. The DoD responded with the limited information provided above. We will seek detailed information for our future reporting.

#### **(U) PARTNERED OPERATIONS IN NORTHWEST AFRICA**

(S//REL USA, FVEY)

AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(U) In the Sahel region to the south of the Sahara desert, the DoD conducts non-combat missions in partnership with multiple countries. A small number of these personnel are special operations forces engaged in training and equipping partner forces, or providing advise and assist support for Nigerien forces. The majority of the DoD personnel in Niger support air operations at an airfield in Niamey or in the construction of an airbase in Agadez.<sup>89</sup>

(U) Elsewhere in the region, the DoD has entered into intelligence sharing agreements with Nigeria.<sup>90</sup> Additionally, the DoD partners with Chad, Mali, and Burkina Faso in training, logistics, equipping, and intelligence sharing.<sup>91</sup>

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(U) AFRICOM OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS



(U) U.S. Marines with Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response-Africa (SPMAGTF-CR-AF) during a joint exercise in Spain. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)

## (U) OVERSIGHT OF EAST AND NORTHWEST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS, AND OPERATION YUKON JOURNEY

(U) In October 2018, the Lead IG issued the Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations (COP-OCO) for Fiscal Year 2019. This Oversight Plan was prepared pursuant to requirements in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978. The COP-OCO describes 15 ongoing or planned oversight projects related to the three new OCOs.

(U) As of September 30, 2018, the DoD had completed one oversight project related to the East Africa and the Northwest Africa counterterrorism contingency operations and none for Operation Yukon Journey.

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(U) AFRICOM OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

**(U) U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND INTEGRATION OF OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT<sup>92</sup>**

**(U) DODIG-2018-142, AUGUST 9, 2018**

(U) The objective of this DoD OIG audit was to determine whether USAFRICOM adequately integrated operational contract support (OCS) into ongoing operations and operational planning. OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining services and supplies from commercial sources in support of operations. Combatant commands are responsible for developing an OCS annex for their theater campaign plans and other contingency plans. Additionally, combatant commands are required to establish OCS working groups and integration cells to plan and coordinate OCS.

(S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)



(U) The DoD OIG recommended that the USAFRICOM Commander incorporate an OCS annex into the June 2018 update of the theater campaign plan, and update the USAFRICOM OCS instruction to include OCS requirements related to training and common operational picture.

(U) The DoD OIG further recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop procedures to conduct periodic reviews of combatant commands' implementation of the recommendations to ensure that the combatant commands address weaknesses in OCS integration, planning, and training.

(U) USAFRICOM management agreed with the recommendations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not respond to the recommendation in the draft report. The DoD OIG requested that the Chairman provide comments on the final report.

(U) In October 2018, following the release of the DoD OIG report, USAFRICOM issued an updated Campaign Plan, which included an annex on Operational Contract support.

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**(U) ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS**

Acronym	
(U) AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
(U) AQAP	al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(U) AQIM	al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(U) CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
(U) CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
(U) COCOM	Combatant Command
(U) DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
(U) DoD	Department of Defense
(U) DoS	Department of State
(U) EXORD	Execute Order
(U) FY	Fiscal Year
(U) IG	Inspector General
(U) ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
(U) IS	Islamic State

Acronym	
(U) JAK-T	Jund al Khilafah-Tunisia
(U) JNIM	Jamaat Nusrat Al Islam Wal-Muslimin
(U) LOE	Line of Effort
(U) MNJTF	Multi National Joint Task Force
(U) OIG	Office of Inspector General
(U) SOCCENT	Special Operations Command, Central
(U) SSF	Somali Security Forces
(U) UAE	United Arab Emirates
(U) USAFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
(U) USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
(U) USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
(U) USSTRATCOM	U.S. Strategic Command
(U) USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command
(U) VEO	Violent Extremist Organization



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(U) AFRICOM OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

(U) ENDNOTES

1. (S//REL USA, ARE, BHR, KWT, SAU) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
2. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
3. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
4. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
5. CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
6. (S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
7. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
8. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
9. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
10. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
11. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
12. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
13. (S//ORCOM USGOV/NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
14. (S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
15. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
16. (S//ORCOM USGOV/NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
17. (S//ORCOM USGOV/NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
18. (S//ORCOM USGOV/NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
19. (S//ORCOM USGOV/NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
20. (S//ORCOM USGOV/NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
21. (S//ORCOM USGOV/NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
22. (S//ORCOM USGOV/NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
23. (S//ORCOM USGOV/NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
24. (S//ORCOM USGOV/NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
25. (S//ORCOM USGOV/NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
26. (S//ORCOM USGOV/NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
27. (S//ORCOM USGOV/NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
28. (S//ORCOM USGOV/NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
29. (S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
30. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
31. (U) CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
32. (S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
33. (S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
34. (S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
35. (S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
36. (S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
37. (S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
38. (S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
39. (S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
40. (S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
41. (S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
42. (S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
43. (S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
44. (S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
45. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
46. (U) USAFRICOM Commander, "U.S. AFRICOM Command 2018 Posture Statement," 3/6/2018, pp.9-11.
47. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
48. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
49. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
50. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
51. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
52. (S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
53. (S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
54. (U) USAFRICOM, "Why the U.S. Military is in Somalia," 11/29/2017; (U) USAFRICOM Commander, "U.S. Africa Command 2018 Posture Statement," 3/6/2018.

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(U) AFRICOM OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

55. (U) USAFRICOM Commander, "U.S. Africa Command 2018 Posture Statement," 3/6/2018.
56. (U) AMISOM Mandate, 2018.
57. (U) DoD, "Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Joseph F. Dunford," 8/28/2018.
58. (U) USAFRICOM Commander, "U.S. Africa Command 2018 Posture Statement," 3/6/2018.
59. (U) GAO, "Counterterrorism: DoD Should Fully Address Security Assistance Planning Elements in Global Train and Equip Project Proposals" 5/2018.
60. (U) USAFRICOM, "Why the U.S. Military is in Somalia," 11/29/2017.
61. (S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
62. (U) USAFRICOM Commander, "U.S. Africa Command 2018 Posture Statement," 3/6/2018, p. 11; (U) GAO, "Counterterrorism: DoD Should Fully Address Security Assistance Planning Elements in Global Train and Equip Project Proposals," 5/2018.
63. (S//REL USA/FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
64. (S//REL FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
65. (S//REL USA/FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
66. (U) USAFRICOM Commander, "U.S. Africa Command 2018 Posture Statement," 3/6/2018.
67. (U) USAFRICOM Commander, "U.S. Africa Command 2018 Posture Statement," 3/6/2018.
68. (U) AQIM EXORD MOD 2, 4/29/2016.
69. (U) CSR, "Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy," 5/2018.
70. (S//REL USA, FRA) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
71. (U) Thomas Joscelyn, "ISIS targets elections in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya," Long War Journal, 5/7/2018.
72. (S//REL USA, NATO) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
73. (S//REL USA, FVEY/FISA) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
74. (U) USAFRICOM Commander, "U.S. Africa Command 2018 Posture Statement," 3/6/2018.
75. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
76. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
77. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
78. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
79. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
80. (S) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
81. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
82. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
83. (S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
84. (U) USAFRICOM Commander, "U.S. Africa Command 2018 Posture Statement," 3/6/2018.
85. (S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
86. (S//NF) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
87. (S//REL USA, FVEY) AFRICOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); CENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
88. (U) USAFRICOM Commander, "U.S. Africa Command 2018 Posture Statement," 3/6/2018.
89. (U) DoD, "DoD Press Briefing on the results of the investigation into the October 4, 2017, ambush in Niger," 5/10/2018; (U) USAFRICOM Commander, "U.S. Africa Command 2018 Posture Statement," 3/6/2018.
90. (U) USAFRICOM Commander, "U.S. Africa Command 2018 Posture Statement," 3/6/2018.
91. (U) USAFRICOM Commander, "U.S. Africa Command 2018 Posture Statement," 3/6/2018.
92. (U) DODIG-2018-142, "U.S. Africa Command and U.S. European Command Integration of Operational Contract Support," 8/9/2018.

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(U) OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

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