

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS



OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE

INCLUDING U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO

UKRAINE



JULY 1, 2024–SEPTEMBER 30, 2024



On the cover: U.S. Army National Guard M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System crewmembers simulate firing rockets during rapid insertion training at Chievres Air Base, Belgium. (U.S. Air Force photo)



We are pleased to present this Special Inspector General report to Congress on Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR). This report discharges our quarterly reporting responsibilities pursuant to Section 1250B of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2024 and Lead IG reporting responsibilities under 5 U.S.C. 419.

Section 1250B states that no later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal year, the Special Inspector General for OAR shall submit to Congress a report summarizing U.S. funding, programs, and operations for Ukraine with respect to that quarter.

This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the DoD, State, and USAID Offices of Inspector General, as well as the other U.S. oversight agencies that coordinate their activities through the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group.

This report addresses the following topics specified in Section 1250B:


- USEUCOM operations and related support for the U.S. military: pages 22, 33-34
- Security assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war: pages 36-57
- Economic assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war: pages 64-65, 71-76
- Humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war: pages 76-83
- Operations of other relevant U.S. Government agencies involved in the Ukraine response: pages 50-52, 75-76, 92-94, 104
- Description of any waste, fraud, or abuse identified by the OIGs: pages 114-127
- Status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits: pages 114-127, 135-137
- Status and results of referrals to the Department of Justice: pages 135-137
- A description of the overall plans for review by the OIGs of such support of Ukraine, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits: pages 128-134

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A special warfare combat crewman fires a minigun during riverine training with Romanian Naval Forces. (U.S. Navy photo)

CONTENTS

JULY 1, 2024–SEPTEMBER 30, 2024

2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

9 STATUS OF FUNDS

- 10 U.S. Government Overview
- 14 U.S. Military Funding
- 14 Foreign Military Financing
- 17 Direct Budget Support

21 SECURITY ASSISTANCE

- 22 Status of the War
- 33 Regional Deterrence
- 36 Support to Ukrainian Forces
- 50 Other Security Support to Ukraine

59 DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

- 60 Embassy Operations
- 64 Recovery Planning
- 66 Governance and Countering Corruption
- 71 Economic Growth
- 76 Health
- 78 Humanitarian Assistance

85 HUMAN RIGHTS AND SANCTIONS

- 86 War Crimes and Human Rights
- 92 Sanctions and Use of Russia's Sovereign Assets

97 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION

- 98 Public Diplomacy
- 100 Educational and Cultural Affairs
- 101 Countering Disinformation

111 APPENDIXES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available at least \$182.99 billion for OAR and the broader Ukraine response. Of this funding, \$131.36 billion is for security-related activities and assistance, which includes \$46.51 billion for increased U.S. military activity in Europe and \$45.78 billion for the DoD to replace weapons and materiel donated to the UAF. Congress has also made available \$43.84 billion for governance and development programs, more than half of which is for funds to pay salaries for Ukrainian public servants. Additionally, \$4.08 billion has been made available for humanitarian assistance.¹

The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) launched a ground incursion into Russia's Kursk region, seizing approximately 1,000 square kilometers of Russian territory at the peak of the incursion. This was the first time Ukraine sent ground troops into Russia since the war began. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Ukraine sought to relieve pressure on Ukrainian forces on the front line in the eastern and southern parts of the country by drawing Russian forces away from these areas.² While the Kursk incursion achieved tactical success, it did not cause Russia to divert a significant number of forces from eastern Ukraine.³ Instead, Russian forces accelerated their territorial gains in the Donetsk region.⁴ As of the end of the quarter, the UAF's occupation of part of Kursk remained ongoing, though Russian counteroffensives had begun to reclaim territory.⁵

The UAF deployed F-16 fighter jets in combat for the first time.⁶ Introduction of the aircraft came after months of Ukrainian government requests for advanced western fighter planes, followed by additional months of training of Ukrainian pilots and maintainers.⁷ Ukraine plans to employ the F-16s in an air defense role, protecting Ukrainian cities from Russian bombardments.⁸ On August 26, a Ukrainian pilot was killed when his F-16 crashed during an operation to shoot down incoming Russian missiles.⁹ The DoD said it was following the investigation of the crash and would incorporate any significant findings into its F-16 training for UAF pilots.¹⁰

The UAF carried out strikes against Russian naval forces and Russian energy infrastructure, though neither has significantly affected Russia's ability to prosecute the war. In response to continued Ukrainian strikes, Russia's Black Sea Fleet relocated from Crimea to ports inside Russia.¹¹ However, the Fleet's surface ships and submarines still remain within their guided missiles' range of Ukrainian targets.¹² Additionally, the UAF used one-way attack UAVs to conduct nine strikes on Russian oil and gas infrastructure, including a refinery in Moscow.¹³ These attacks caused short-term, localized power outages, though Russia's highly redundant grid has negated any broader effects from these strikes.¹⁴

NATO announced the formation of NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), a new command to coordinate security assistance to Ukraine. NSATU will oversee training of the UAF at facilities in allied countries; provide support to the long-term development of the UAF; and support Ukraine through planning, coordination of donations with allies and partners, transfer of security assistance material, and repair of equipment.¹⁵ Hundreds of international personnel will be deployed to the NSATU headquarters in

A U.S. Army Soldier participates in a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protective exercise in Camp Karliki, Poland. (U.S. Army photo)



Wiesbaden, Germany and to logistical hubs in the eastern part of the alliance to provide support to Ukraine.¹⁶

The United States delivered vehicles, ammunition, weapons, artillery and mortar rounds, and mines and demolition equipment to Ukraine.¹⁷ The assistance includes Bradley fighting vehicles, which the UAF prefers over M1A1 Abrams tanks delivered in previous quarters due to the Bradley's speed and maneuverability.¹⁸ U.S. maintenance experts continued to provide remote maintenance support for this equipment via secure voice, video, and chat channels.¹⁹ Ukraine is almost certainly relying on its domestic UAS capabilities when responding to Russian strikes and seeks to further enhance its own defense production capability.²⁰

USAID provided \$3.9 billion in additional direct budget support (DBS) to Ukraine.²¹

This funding is part of the \$7.84 billion in the April 2024 supplemental appropriation for DBS.²² DBS has enabled Ukraine to continue government operations and delivery of essential services.²³ This funding from USAID was allocated for first responders, salaries for school employees and civil servants, assistance for internally displaced persons (IDP), assistance for low income families, disability assistance, and subsidies for housing and utilities.²⁴

Most USAID Ukraine awards were not covered by third-party monitoring. USAID site visits in Ukraine continued to be restricted by the number of high-level visitors and the ongoing security environment, which affect the capacity of U.S. and Ukrainian staff to safely monitor activities. USAID uses third-party monitoring to provide oversight for locations that, not which are unavailable or impractical for direct site visits by USAID staff.²⁵ While USAID Ukraine continued to expand its third-party monitoring mechanism, only 3 of its 51 active awards were covered during the quarter. Of the active awards not covered by its third-party monitoring mechanism, USAID Ukraine identified 19 awards that were eligible for third party monitoring.²⁶

The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv maintained an active schedule of staff movements during the quarter, despite having to operate under restrictive conditions.²⁷ However, embassy movements to Chernihiv, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Sumy were constrained by a headquarters approval process. These movement limitations present challenges to programming, monitoring, evaluating, and support to Ukraine. The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv has formally requested authority for the Chief of Mission to approve movements for Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Dnipro.²⁸

Concerns regarding Ukraine's corruption and rule-of-law may be a major impediment to post-war economic recovery and attracting foreign investment. State noted Ukraine's commitment to tackling corruption, evidenced through the country's efforts to strengthen independent anti-corruption institutions and implement reforms aligned with EU and international norms.²⁹ However, corruption continues to complicate Ukraine's efforts to achieve stronger integration with European institutions, media said.³⁰

The Ukrainian government put political pressure on the supervisory board of Ukrenergo, a state-owned energy company.³¹ The European Union, international financial institutions, and energy experts expressed concern about the move.³² Western officials formally urged the Ukrainian government to reverse course, saying that such a move could jeopardize their collective ability to support Ukrenergo and other energy security priorities in Ukraine.³³ International observers expect that Ukraine will endure a difficult winter 2024-2025, given Russia's extensive and continuing destruction of Ukrainian energy infrastructure, as well as a lack of qualified personnel in the energy sector.³⁴

The U.S. Government significantly expanded sanctions against Russian and other actors involved in Russia's war against Ukraine during the quarter.³⁵ On August 23, State and Treasury announced the designation of more than 400 individuals and entities known to be supporting Russia.³⁶ As of late September, almost 5,200 individuals and entities were subject to U.S. sanctions.³⁷

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Ukrainian recruits haul a simulated casualty during training. (NATO photo)

About OAR, the Ukraine Response, and Special IG Oversight

MISSION BACKGROUND

Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) is the U.S. Government’s operation in and around the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility to deter Russia’s aggression against NATO and to reassure and bolster the alliance in the wake of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Under OAR, the United States provides security assistance to Ukraine and conducts other military activity to strengthen the collective security of European partners.

OAR began as a USEUCOM effort to provide rotational deployments of combat-credible forces to Europe in the wake of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the OAR mission has evolved in line with U.S. policy objectives. The most recent mission statement is outlined in a classified Execute Order dated August 31, 2023.

In addition to security assistance, the U.S. Government provides financial, material, and technical assistance to Ukrainian institutions and civil society. According to the U.S. Government’s Integrated Country Strategy for Ukraine, “a future grounded in Europe, built on democracy, rule of law, and economic prosperity is within Ukraine’s grasp and is in the United States’ best interests for Ukraine to achieve.” (See Table 1.)

ABOUT THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR OAR

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Section 419) established the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies are the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

(continued on next page)

About OAR, the Ukraine Response, and Special IG Oversight

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Table 1.

U.S. Government's Mission Goals in Ukraine

Win the War: Ukraine effectively uses security, economic, and diplomatic tools to prevail on the battlefield and set conditions for a just and lasting peace.

Win the Future: Ukraine strengthens its civil society and democratic and economic institutions and implements anti-corruption, justice sector, and corporate governance reforms to achieve sustainable momentum toward Euro-Atlantic integration to win a secure and just future that delivers prosperity for all its citizens.

Hold Russia Accountable: Ukraine and its allies hold Russia and its enablers accountable for war crimes and damage to Ukraine.

Account to U.S. Taxpayers: Humanitarian, economic, and security assistance delivers effective relief and sustainable results for Ukrainians.

Rebuild the U.S. Mission in Ukraine: Bring back staff to ensure proper execution of administrative objectives and rebuild the parts of the embassy destroyed at its closure in February 2022.

Source: State, website, "Integrated Country Strategy: Ukraine," 8/29/2023; State, vetting comment, 4/29/2024

On August 18, 2023, the Secretary of Defense designated OAR as an overseas contingency operation, triggering Section 419, and the Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency selected the DoD IG to be the Lead IG for OAR, effective October 18, 2023. In turn, the DoD IG appointed the State IG as the Associate IG for OAR.

In December 2023, Section 1250B of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2024 re-designated the Lead IG for OAR as the Special Inspector General for OAR. The Lead IG agencies conduct oversight of the Ukraine response individually under their own authorities and collaboratively, to carry out the following whole-of-government responsibilities:

- Submitting to Congress, on a quarterly basis, a report on the contingency operation and making that report available to the public no later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal year quarter.
- Developing a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensuring independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations.

COMPREHENSIVE OVERSIGHT

Since June 2022, oversight organizations from across the U.S. Government have coordinated their activities through the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group. The Working Group ensures open lines of communication and situational awareness across department and agency boundaries to ensure that all areas of the broader effort receive appropriate oversight coverage, and to avoid duplication of effort.

The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs have long-established field offices and personnel in Europe to support audits, evaluations, and investigations of activities related to OAR and the U.S. response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This pre-existing footprint in Europe means that the OIGs have deep familiarity with U.S. Government programs and activities in Europe, including past oversight work on assistance to Ukraine, and established connections with program personnel.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH NON-U.S. OVERSIGHT AGENCIES

The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs have signed memorandums of understanding (MoU) with their Ukrainian counterparts—such as the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), Main Inspectorate, and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)—and other bilateral and multilateral organizations implementing programming in Ukraine. (See Table 2.) The MoUs formalize information sharing in support of criminal investigations and oversight work.

For DoD OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG personnel stationed in Washington, D.C, Kyiv, and elsewhere in Europe, these MoUs have facilitated the nascent but increasing cooperation between two complementary but structurally dissimilar oversight communities. OIG personnel routinely employ these MoUs as a mechanism for the exchange of information with their Ukrainian counterparts, including the Ministry of Defense Main Inspectorate and Ukrainian law enforcement agencies. The MoUs have facilitated regular meetings between OIG personnel and their Ukrainian partners, including law enforcement, to build relationships, quickly address inquiries, and work collaboratively to identify potential fraud, waste, and abuse.

The OIGs have also worked to leverage MoUs with international organizations and initiate regular information sharing processes that could be models for other international law enforcement relationships. This information sharing will provide a more comprehensive understanding of fraud risks with international organization oversight partners.

DETAILS ON OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY

Further details about completed, ongoing, and planned work by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs and partner agencies can be found in the following Appendixes.

- **Appendix C:** Final Reports by Lead IG Agencies
- **Appendix D:** Ongoing Oversight Projects
- **Appendix E:** Planned Oversight Projects
- **Appendix F:** Investigations

Table 2.

Memorandums of Understanding Used for Oversight of OAR and the Ukraine Response

Agency	Ukrainian, European, or Other Institution	
DoD OIG	National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU)	State Bureau of Investigations
	Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)	Ukrainian National Police
	Ministry of Defense Main Inspectorate	European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
State OIG	National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU)	UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)
	Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)	International Organization for Migration (IOM)
USAID OIG	National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU)	World Bank Group Internal Audit
	Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)	World Bank Integrity
	European Anti-Fraud Office	Ukrainian National Police
	UN World Health Organization	Japanese International Cooperation Agency





Sergeant Stout air defense armored vehicles parked in Ansbach, Germany. (DoD photo)

STATUS OF FUNDS

- 10 U.S. Government Overview
- 14 U.S. Military Funding
- 14 Foreign Military Financing
- 17 Direct Budget Support

STATUS OF FUNDS

In accordance with the Special Inspector General (IG) for Operation Atlantic Resolve's (OAR) legislative mandate, this section provides a comprehensive accounting of the amounts appropriated by the United States for Ukraine.³⁸

The Special IG for OAR has collected funding data from all 14 Federal agencies that were authorized to receive funds through the Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts, including the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). (For sources, see page 156.)

U.S. GOVERNMENT OVERVIEW

Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available at least \$182.99 billion for OAR and the broader Ukraine response, of which \$130.08 billion has been obligated and \$86.67 billion disbursed as of the end of this quarter. (See Table 3.)

Congress appropriated \$174.19 billion through the five Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts enacted FY 2022 through FY 2024, of which \$163.64 billion was allocated for OAR and the Ukraine response, and \$10.55 billion was allocated for other primarily humanitarian purposes. Additional funds of \$18.21 billion were allocated from annual agency appropriations and \$1.08 billion was allocated from other supplemental appropriation acts.³⁹

Security: Nearly three-quarters of the funds appropriated for the Ukraine response are for security programs administered by the DoD and State. (See Table 4.) Security-related appropriations have increased each year since the full-scale invasion began and currently total \$131.36 billion. The largest share of this is \$46.51 billion for increased U.S. military activity in Europe and the European Deterrence Initiative, which supports the forward deployment of U.S. military forces and prepositioned stocks in Eastern Europe to deter aggression against NATO allies.

Additionally, \$45.78 billion in security funding has been appropriated to the DoD to replace weapons and materiel donated to Ukraine under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). PDA is not a funding source but rather an authority that allows the President to provide military assistance from existing defense articles in the DoD's stocks, subject to a statutory cap.⁴⁰ The statutory limit for PDA is \$100 million of weapons and equipment transferred worldwide per year.⁴¹ However, Congress increased the caps on PDA to \$11 billion for FY 2022, \$14.5 billion for FY 2023, and \$7.8 billion for FY 2024, providing \$33.3 billion in cumulative PDA.⁴² Supplemental appropriations provided funds for DoD Components to replenish items transferred to Ukraine.⁴³

Security funds also provide for the procurement of weapons and materiel for Ukraine and other partners and allies through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Congress created USAI as a means to help Ukraine provide for its self-defense following Russia's 2014 invasion of Crimea. FMF is the U.S. Government's standing program through which State procures and the DoD delivers

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Table 3.

Status of U.S. Appropriations for Operation Atlantic Resolve and Other U.S. Government Activities Relating to Ukraine, Grouped by Implementing Agency, FY 2022 to FY 2024, in \$ Millions

Funds Appropriated by Agency and Account	Appropriated	Obligated	Disbursed
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE			
U.S. Military Support, Including for U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)	\$46,505.82	\$33,324.81	\$21,171.38
Replenishment of DoD Stocks	45,780.00	22,690.35	5,760.17
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)	32,672.46	22,909.32	22,729.24
DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG)	16.00	7.97	7.60
Department of Defense, Total	124,974.28	78,932.45	49,668.38
DEPARTMENT OF STATE			
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF)	6,392.77	6,392.77	1,062.64
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	1,343.34	1,317.99	496.76
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	1,197.73	1,197.73	959.83
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	534.70	495.96	365.89
Diplomatic Programs (DP)	496.15	436.72	315.03
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR)	407.57	259.57	174.58
Assistance to Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA)	345.96	293.51	105.17
Global Health Programs (GHP-State)	146.68	36.23	20.15
Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance (ESCM)	110.00	55.46	29.60
Capital Investment Fund (CIF)	44.17	44.04	32.24
State Office of Inspector General (State OIG)	21.50	12.68	11.09
Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE)	12.74	11.63	1.11
International Military Education and Training (IMET)	7.79	3.79	3.79
Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service (EDCS)	5.00	—	—
Department of State, Total	11,066.10	10,558.10	3,577.88
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT			
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	34,187.63	29,413.86	27,398.61
Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)	2,728.62	1,479.55	850.71
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	2,536.21	2,536.14	1,782.78
Transition Initiatives (TI)	195.00	186.27	138.38
Operating Expenses (OE)	86.00	45.02	33.83
Global Health Programs (GHP-USAID)	78.29	67.51	27.80
USAID Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG)	23.00	8.58	7.88
USAID, Total	39,834.75	33,736.93	30,240.00
ALL OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES			
U.S. International Development Finance Corp. (DFC)	2,805.17	2,805.17	792.41
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)	1,844.65	1,833.29	629.98
Department of the Treasury (TREAS)	1,031.93	1,025.73	1,017.15
Department of Energy (DOE)	766.91	579.31	361.40
Export-Import Bank of the U.S. (EXIM)	184.46	184.46	—
U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM)	167.11	167.11	161.47
Department of Agriculture (USDA)	150.00	137.89	122.37
Department of Justice (DOJ)	126.40	90.58	79.01
Department of Commerce (DOC)	22.10	22.02	15.60
Government Accountability Office (GAO)	7.50	4.20	4.20
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)	2.50	2.30	2.30
National Security Council (NSC) and Other*	3.58	—	—
Other U.S. Government Agencies, Total	7,112.30	6,852.06	3,185.86
TOTAL FUNDING	\$182,987.44	\$130,079.53	\$86,672.12

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Agency funds appropriated or otherwise obligated after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, through various dates ranging between August 30, 2024, and September 30, 2024. *DoD OIG did not request information on appropriations to the NSC and Homeland Security Council nor the Intelligence Community Management Account in the Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts. ^USAI funds transferred to the Foreign Military Sales Trust Fund for execution are recorded as expenditure transfers, as described in GAO-24-107232 Ukraine: Status and Use of Supplemental U.S. Funds, and the amounts presented above as USAI "obligations" and "disbursements" may not conform to GAO definitions of these terms.

Sources: See Sources for Status of Funds in endnotes on page 156.

Table 4.

U.S. Appropriations for Operation Atlantic Resolve and Other U.S. Government Activities Relating to Ukraine, Grouped by Funding Category, FY 2022 to FY 2024, in \$ Millions

Funds Appropriated by Agency and Account	Agency	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024	Total
SECURITY					
U.S. Military Support, Including for U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)					
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)	DoD	\$12,131.55	\$14,909.49	\$19,464.78	\$46,505.82
Replenishment of DoD Stocks	DoD	6,300.00	12,300.00	14,072.46	32,672.46
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	DoD	12,550.00	13,380.00	19,850.00	45,780.00
International Military Education and Training (IMET)	State	4,655.00	77.77	1,660.00	6,392.77
	State	1.79	2.00	4.00	7.79
Security, Total		35,638.34	40,669.26	55,051.24	131,358.84
GOVERNANCE & DEVELOPMENT					
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	Joint^	9,406.83	17,466.50	7,849.00	34,722.33
Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)	Joint^	1,149.57	350.00	1,575.00	3,074.57
U.S. International Development Finance Corp.	DFC	717.82	1,581.34	506.01	2,805.17
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	State	637.55	385.79	320.00	1,343.34
Multilateral Assistance, International Financial Institutions (IFI)	TREAS	650.00	—	250.00	900.00
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR)	State	159.15	116.92	131.50	407.57
U.S. Agency for Global Media	USAGM	72.96	47.99	46.17	167.11
Global Health Programs (GHP-State)	State	37.83	53.82	55.03	146.68
Export-Import Bank of the U.S.	EXIM	—	184.46	—	184.46
Global Health Programs (GHP-USAID)	USAID	27.71	35.01	15.57	78.29
Educational & Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE)	State	12.74	—	—	12.74
Governance & Development, Total		12,872.17	20,221.83	10,748.27	43,842.27
HUMANITARIAN					
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	USAID	1,652.78	342.88	540.55	2,536.21
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	State	601.67	273.37	322.70	1,197.73
Transition Initiatives (TI)	USAID	120.00	50.00	25.00	195.00
Department of Agriculture	USDA	100.00	50.00	—	150.00
Humanitarian, Total		2,474.45	716.25	888.25	4,078.95
AGENCY OPERATIONS					
Department of Health and Human Services	HHS	954.00	409.65	481.00	1,844.65
Department of Energy	DOE	58.15	461.30	247.46	766.91
Diplomatic Programs (DP)	State	299.09	137.05	60.00	496.15
Department of Justice	DOJ	126.40	—	—	126.40
Department of the Treasury	TREAS	113.00	—	18.93	131.93
Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance (ESCM)	State	110.00	—	—	110.00
Operating Expenses (OE)	USAID	42.00	5.00	39.00	86.00
Capital Investment Fund (CIF)	State	34.17	10.00	—	44.17
USAID Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG)	USAID	5.00	8.00	10.00	23.00
Department of Commerce	DOC	22.10	—	—	22.10
State Office of Inspector General (State OIG)	State	8.00	5.50	8.00	21.50
DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG)	DoD	—	8.00	8.00	16.00
Government Accountability Office	GAO	—	7.50	—	7.50
Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service (EDCS)	State	5.00	—	—	5.00
National Security Council and Other*	NSC	—	1.58	2.00	3.58
Nuclear Regulatory Commission	NRC	2.50	—	—	2.50
Agency Operations, Total		1,779.41	1,053.58	874.38	3,707.38
TOTAL FUNDING		\$52,764.37	\$62,660.93	\$67,562.14	\$182,987.44

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Agency cumulative appropriation data is provided for funds appropriated or otherwise obligated after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, through various dates ranging between August 30, 2024, and September 30, 2024. *DoD OIG did not request information on appropriations to the NSC and Homeland Security Council nor the Intelligence Community Management Account in the Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts. ^State and USAID jointly administer ESF and AEECA appropriations.

Sources: See Sources for Status of Funds in endnotes on page 156.

weapons and materiel requested by partners and allies. (See pages 14-16.) A relatively small portion of total security funding for the Ukraine response—\$6.39 billion—in FMF enables the U.S. Government to backfill partner nations that have depleted their military stocks through donations to Ukraine.

Governance and Development: Of the total appropriations for the Ukraine response, \$43.84 billion is for governance and development programs administered by State, USAID, Treasury, U.S. International Development Finance Corp., U.S. Agency for Global Media, and Export-Import Bank of the U.S. More than one-half of this funding has been disbursed for direct budget support (DBS), which provides funding—through international intermediaries—to the Ukrainian government for salaries and expenses to continue operations and provision of public services. USAID, which administers DBS programming and funding through the Economic Support Fund, announced in August that the U.S. had disbursed \$26.8 billion in DBS to Ukraine since 2022.⁴⁴

Humanitarian Assistance: Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$4.08 billion for humanitarian assistance through State, USAID, and USDA programs. More than half of this funding was appropriated in FY 2022 when the Ukrainian refugee situation and disruptions to Ukrainian food production and distribution peaked following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia

Agency Operations: Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$3.71 billion for agency operations across multiple Federal agencies. This includes \$68.00 million for oversight provided by DoD OIG, State OIG, USAID OIG, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

Key Budget Terms

Appropriation Legal authority for Federal agencies to incur obligations and to make payments out of the Department of the Treasury for specified purposes. Appropriations represent amounts that agencies may obligate during the period of time specified in the respective appropriation acts but do not represent the cash amounts set aside in Treasury for purposes specified in those acts.

Apportionment The action by which the Office of Management and Budget distributes amounts available for obligation, including budgetary reserves established pursuant to law, in an appropriation or fund account. An apportionment divides amounts available for obligation by specific time periods (usually quarters), activities, projects, objects, or a combination thereof.

Obligation A commitment that incurs a legal liability of the Government for the payment of goods and services ordered or received.

Disbursement Amounts paid by Federal agencies during the fiscal year to liquidate Government obligations.

Reprogramming Shifting funds within an appropriation or fund account for purposes other than those contemplated at the time of appropriation.

Transfer The shifting of funds from one appropriation or fund account to another.

Source: GAO, "Ukraine Funding: DoD Needs to Improve its Reporting, Guidance, and Evaluation Efforts," GAO-24-106763SU, 9/30/2024.

Table 5.

DoD Funds Apportioned from Ukraine Supplemental Appropriation Acts and Annual DoD Appropriation Acts for Operation Atlantic Resolve, FY 2022 to FY 2024, in \$ Millions

U.S. Appropriations, Apportioned by Account	Army	Navy	Air Force	Defense-wide	Total
U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT, INCLUDING FOR USEUCOM AND EDI					
Military Personnel	\$1,456.98	\$34.77	\$252.38	\$—	\$1,744.13
Operation & Maintenance	16,794.41	4,237.76	3,053.78	2,830.23	26,916.17
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation	159.68	155.53	859.00	488.72	1,662.93
Procurement	7,911.27	423.57	5,298.58	109.14	13,742.56
Military Construction	347.22	320.63	632.97	—	1,300.82
Defense Production Act Purchases	—	—	—	600.00	600.00
Cooperative Threat Reduction Account	—	—	—	93.40	93.40
Defense Health Program	—	—	—	28.78	28.78
Office of the Inspector General	—	—	—	16.00	16.00
Army & Defense Working Capital Funds	7.07	—	—	409.97	417.04
U.S. Military Support, Total	26,676.63	5,172.26	10,096.70	4,576.23	46,521.82
DOD STOCKS REPLENISHMENT					
Operation & Maintenance	955.67	472.89	668.52	7,458.35	9,555.44
Defense Production Act Purchases	—	—	—	146.00	146.00
Procurement	24,369.06	4,028.51	1,163.08	82.34	29,642.99
Procurement Replacement of DoD Stocks	5,308.12	761.45	366.00	—	6,435.57
DoD Stocks Replenishment, Total	30,632.85	5,262.85	2,197.61	7,686.69	45,780.00
UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE INITIATIVE					
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, Total	—	—	—	32,672.46	32,672.46
TOTAL FUNDING	\$57,309.48	\$10,435.11	\$12,294.31	\$44,935.38	\$124,974.28

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Reflects apportionment of appropriated balances for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) as of August 31, 2024, and for appropriated balances from the Ukraine supplemental appropriation acts and other annual Department of Defense appropriations as of September 20, 2024. Procurement Replacement of DoD Stocks consists of the apportionment of procurement appropriations to the military services in PL 118-50 Div. B for DoD Stocks Replenishment.

Sources: OUSD(C), responses to DoD OIG request for information, 24.4 OAR 001, 10/17/2024 and 10/29/2024.

U.S. MILITARY FUNDING

Since February 2022, Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available \$124.97 billion to the DoD, of which the Army has received the largest share at \$57.31 billion and \$44.94 billion is for Defense-wide accounts. (See Table 5.) These appropriations include funding to support the full range of costs associated with the increased U.S. military presence in Europe, both to support Ukraine and to provide enhanced deterrence in Eastern Europe. The DoD uses these funds to replenish its stocks around the world that have been drawn down to deliver weapons and materiel to Ukraine under PDA and as USAI funding to provide direct support to Ukraine.⁴⁵

FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING

Through the FMF program, the Secretary of State may supervise and direct financing for military assistance for a specific purpose, usually in response to a request from the recipient country. FMF funds do not belong to the recipient nation but rather are executed by the DoD, and the funded items are transferred to the recipient country.⁴⁶

Table 6.

Countries, Value, Disbursements, and Purposes for Foreign Military Financing Programs Using Supplemental Funds as of September 2024, in \$ Thousands

Country	Total Program Value	Total Disbursed	Funding Purpose
Ukraine	\$2,277,354	\$334,429	Artillery and rocket systems and munitions; Armed UAS/counter-UAS, EDA overhead costs, armored vehicles, air defense systems (Soviet and NATO); Rocket-propelled grenade launchers, sniper and counter-sniper equipment; Small arms; Night vision devices (NVD), C2 and cyber capability equipment; Combat care training and equipment; Airfield equipment; Maritime domain awareness and coastal defense capabilities; River patrol boats; Support for fixed-wing capabilities; Professional military training; Combat training equipment, including improvised explosive devices (IED), Laser engagement, Targeting and Urban Operations simulators, and small-scale construction supporting these systems.
Other Countries			
Albania	32,000	15,759	UH-60 helicopter; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) protection equipment
Bulgaria	114,500	41,346	AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder missiles
Croatia	140,000	140,000	UH-60 helicopter; APX-123A Transponders and supplies
Czechia	325,520	305,520	Advanced Targeting Capability; UH-1Y helicopters; AH-1Z helicopters; spare engines
Ecuador	100,000	—	
Estonia	164,350	129,500	Hi Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)
Greece	60,000	12,675	Practice ammunition; Weapon System Program; M1117 and Aerosonde; CH-47 sustainment; F-35 support
Latvia	162,700	70,200	Naval air strike missiles; HIMARS
Lithuania	162,737	45,144	Blanket order training; AN/PRC-163; AN/PRC-167; Joint Threat Emitters; JCATS; Simple Key Loaders; NVGs and aiming lasers
Moldova	41,713	19,872	NVDs; body armor; small arms and ammunition; AN/PAS-13 MTWS and accessories; HMMWV; UAS-ISR; Radars AN; MC6 parachutes
Montenegro	123,000	24,276	Cybersecurity services, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) support; NVDs
North Macedonia	123,000	64,535	JLTVs; Strykers; Javelin missiles
Poland	395,000	275,000	F-16 engines, M1A1 tanks and support
Romania	281,000	22,561	Cybersecurity services, FOTS and SCOMAR equipment; BAK-12; PUMA AE and UAVs, Virtual battlespace software and support
Slovakia	234,000	207,328	JLTVs, M4 Rifles/Optics
Slovenia	57,500	39,144	JLTVs, Common Remote Weapons Systems (CROWS)
Taiwan	80,000	33,639	MQ-9 Modification
Zambia	80,000	—	Bell 412 Helicopters
Other Countries, Total	2,589,920	1,446,499	
GRAND TOTAL	\$4,767,274	\$ 1,780,928	

Notes: Ukraine total includes funds obligated directly to Ukraine and to the Ukraine Defense Enterprise Program for Ukraine. Ecuador funding to be reprogrammed for Nepal pending Congressional approval. Excludes \$120 million in loan subsidies from \$4 billion in direct loans authorized for Poland, and \$60 million in loan subsidies from \$920 million in direct loans authorized for Romania.

Source: State, responses to State OIG request for information, 10/17/2024, 10/23/2024, and 10/28/2024; State, vetting comment, 10/28/2024.

Four of the five Ukraine supplementals appropriated a total of \$6.3 billion in FMF for Ukraine and other countries.⁴⁷ These funds allow recipients to seek the purchase of U.S.-made defense materiel and U.S.-provided training through the FMF process. As of September 2024, State had obligated approximately \$4.4 billion of the FMF funds appropriated in the Ukraine supplementals, including more than \$1.7 billion directly to Ukraine to address urgent battlefield needs and ensure the operational readiness of equipment supplied by the United States.⁴⁸ FMF support to Ukraine has included air defense, armored vehicles, anti-armor capabilities, munitions, and donation agreements with partner countries.⁴⁹ (See Table 6.)

During the quarter, State said that it reprogrammed \$50 million of \$150 million initially obligated for Ecuador to Ukraine (\$27 million) and regionally in Europe (\$23 million). In addition, State said it applied \$123 million in FMF from its FY 2024 annual appropriation, including \$60 million for Ukraine and \$63 million, combined, for partners and allies in Eastern Europe.⁵⁰

State used FMF supplemental funds to provide other partners with incentives to divest from Russian defense articles through donations of defense articles to Ukraine or to backfill such donations made by countries actively supporting Ukraine's defense requirements.⁵¹ In the past 12 to 18 months, State has expanded its efforts to support partner nations and allies, supplanting their previous ties to Russia's defense industry.⁵²

State said its Transition of Russian Equipment program aims to deprive Russia's defense industry of revenues that support Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine by identifying candidate partners with Russian defense articles in stock that might be willing to divest and utilize FMF to purchase U.S.-made defense articles instead.⁵³ State cited Zambia as a non-European country that has been willing to divest Russian-made equipment it has in stock and replace it with U.S.-made items.⁵⁴

State also noted three obstacles to implementing the FMF program. First, U.S. industrial base capabilities and production times for weapon systems replenishment often have lengthy production timelines.⁵⁵ Second, uncertainty regarding future funding for Ukraine complicates decisions on how to address both its short- and long-term needs.⁵⁶ Finally, some partners have bilateral relations with Russia and are avoiding divestment and donation decisions. State said that Ukraine needs to strengthen its defense industrial base. Absent timely donations from partners, State may need to reprogram supplemental FMF funds for Ukraine.⁵⁷

During the quarter, State said that it reprogrammed \$50 million of \$150 million initially obligated for Ecuador to Ukraine (\$27 million) and regionally in Europe (\$23 million), pending congressional approval.

In August, USAID announced the obligation of nearly \$3.9 billion in DBS to Ukraine, bringing the total amount provided since 2022 to \$26.8 billion.

DIRECT BUDGET SUPPORT

According to State, direct budget support (DBS) has provided support to the Ukrainian government to ensure the continuity of operations and delivery of essential services, including delivery of health services, support for internally displaced persons (IDP), and other forms of urgent assistance, the embassy reported.⁵⁸ For example, according to a State cable, U.S. direct budget support has sustained the salaries of more than 653,000 educators and 574,000 health and emergency workers.⁵⁹

In August, USAID announced the obligation of nearly \$3.9 billion in DBS to Ukraine, bringing the total amount provided since 2022 to \$26.8 billion.⁶⁰ USAID obligated the funds to the World Bank's Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) in Ukraine Project.⁶¹ (See Table 7.)

The fifth Ukraine supplemental appropriation act contained a provision specifically stating that funds made available for DBS may be made available for the reimbursement of pensions.⁶² USAID reported that DBS would not be used to reimburse pensions, in accordance with this statutory prohibition, and that the funds would be monitored to ensure that they are not used for restricted purposes such as pensions.⁶³ The U.S. Government is working to determine how to allocate the remaining \$3.95 billion in DBS funds.⁶⁴

As of the end of the quarter, the United States provided approximately \$3.9 billion of the \$34.6 billion in Ukraine's general fund, according to Ukraine's Ministry of Finance.⁶⁵ (See Figure 1.) Since February 2022, the United States has provided approximately \$26.8 billion out of \$98 billion total.⁶⁶ The European Union has provided \$40.5 billion, the International Monetary Fund \$10.2 billion, Japan \$6.3 billion, and Canada \$5.1 billion.⁶⁷

Table 7.


USAID Allocation of DBS from the 5th Supplemental

Assistance for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)	\$1,484,130,224
School Employee Salaries	855,980,000
First Responders	692,198,920
Assistance for People with Disabilities	340,981,648
Civil Servant Salaries	290,562,419
Guaranteed Minimum Income for Low-Income Families	158,846,373
Housing and Utility Subsidies	76,300,416
TOTAL	\$3,822,699,584

Source: USAID Ukraine, response to USAID OIG request for information, 9/27/2024.

Figure 1.

Contributions to the Ukraine General Fund, January–September 2024, in \$ Billions



Accountability in DBS is the “number-one consideration,” the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv said, with spot checks conducted on an independent and continuous basis.⁶⁸ USAID continued to employ a private accounting firm to provide oversight of DBS, using technical support to the Ministry of Finance designed to strengthen controls and processes in its financial systems, in addition to spot checks down to the beneficiary level, and continuous monitoring and review.⁶⁹ (See Table 8.)

Table 8.

DBS Spot Checks, July 16 to August 15

<p>Tier 1 macro level Review fund flows from the World Bank to designated Ukrainian banks (the National Bank of Ukraine or Ukreximbank), and from there, to the State Treasury Account of the State Budget of Ukraine.</p>	<p>7 spot checks</p>
<p>Tier 2 institutional level Review fund flows, focusing on payroll and other eligible expenditures, from the State Treasury Account to agencies and public institutions (clinics within the Program of Medical Guarantees, schools, and other relevant institutional recipients across all tranches), which Direct Budget Support reimbursed.</p>	<p>160 spot checks 29 discrepancies identified</p>
<p>Tier 3 individual level Review fund flows focusing on salary payments to individual health care employees, teachers and school employees, and government employees, as well as other payments to individual recipients of funds that the U.S. Government reimbursed.</p>	<p>77 spot checks 3 discrepancies identified</p>

Since program startup, a USAID-funded accounting contractor identified several issues that required remediation. Discrepancies included:

Improper reimbursement requests: One Ukrainian government agency over-reported its Unified Social Contribution (a salary-related social security tax) payments that were to be reimbursed by DBS. Some salary expenditures were financed from Non-Program of Medical Guarantees (the national health care benefit package) sources but were not excluded from salary expenditures claimed for reimbursement from the World Bank.⁷⁰

Payments to ineligible personnel: In some cases, people serving in the military or the salary expenditures of people serving in the military were included as eligible. In other cases, submissions incorrectly included ineligible employees, such as those on unpaid leave, or excluded eligible employees, such as external part-time employees financed by the Non-Program of Medical Guarantees. Clinics incorrectly reported the number of people by using a straight headcount calculation instead of a wage basis calculation.⁷¹

USAID helps Ukrainian small- and medium-sized businesses continue to operate and create much-needed jobs. (USAID photo)

USAID reported that it helped the Ukrainian government identify and address these issues. The Ukrainian government worked proactively with USAID to make improvements. For example, the Ministry of Finance introduced new controls to improve the quality of reports from spending units and establish a discrepancies rectification mechanism, as recommended by USAID.⁷² USAID OIG and the GAO are conducting audits of USAID's contributions to Ukraine. (See pages 131-132.)







An F-16 Fighting Falcon on the flight line during a welcoming ceremony on Malacky Air Base, Slovakia. (U.S. Air National Guard photo)

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

- 22 Status of the War
- 33 Regional Deterrence
- 36 Support to Ukrainian Forces
- 50 Other Security Support to Ukraine

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

The United States provides security assistance to Ukraine and other European nations under OAR and, in some cases, programs funded and managed by State.⁷³ The current OAR strategic objectives emphasize NATO-wide collective security and deterrence capability, according to the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM).⁷⁴ The Integrated Country Strategy for Ukraine outlines further objectives for that country to strengthen its military and non-military security capability.⁷⁵ (See Table 9.)

USEUCOM reported that approximately 7,300 U.S. Service members directly supported the OAR mission during the quarter. USEUCOM said that this was not a decrease from the 8,100 personnel reported last quarter but rather the result of a correction made to the reporting of personnel by the Service components.⁷⁶ In addition, approximately 85,000 U.S. personnel served within the USEUCOM theater.⁷⁷ A small number of U.S. military personnel served in Ukraine under Chief of Mission authority.⁷⁸ (See page 39.)

STATUS OF THE WAR

UAF Launches Incursion in Russian Territory

During the quarter, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) continued to defend against Russian military advances in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported that the UAF continued to suffer heavy attrition and lacks sufficient manpower, capabilities, and munitions—particularly artillery, air defense, and long-range strike capabilities—to overcome Russia’s air and ground advantages.⁷⁹

In early August, Ukrainian forces launched a ground incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, gaining approximately 1,000 square kilometers at its peak. Through the Kursk incursion, Ukraine sought to relieve pressure on Ukrainian forces in the eastern and southern parts of the country, and to draw Russian forces away from at-risk areas, according to the DIA.⁸⁰ At a joint public event, Britain’s MI6 Chief Richard Moore and U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns noted that the surprise operation by the UAF was a “significant tactical achievement” but did not achieve one of its objectives—forcing Russia to divert forces from Ukraine’s eastern region.⁸¹ Russia initially responded to the incursion with accelerated attacks on other fronts in Ukraine and later with counterattacks in Kursk.⁸²

Meanwhile, Russia’s military capability has proven sufficient to sustain its slow, grinding offensives, characterized by a mix of small dismounted infantry attacks, mechanized assaults, and active defense along the expanded front line, the DIA said. These advances are aided by Russia’s manpower, equipment, and overall capability advantages.⁸³

Zelenskyy Visits the United States to Address the United Nations and Promote His Victory Plan

In September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy traveled to the United States to give an address to the United Nations and to appeal to U.S. leaders to support his proposed “victory plan.” In the address, Zelenskyy highlighted Russia’s deliberate strikes against Ukraine’s civil infrastructure, especially its nuclear power facilities. He raised concerns about the regional implications of a potential nuclear accident in Ukraine and called on the United Nations to intervene and bring a just and lasting end to the war. Additionally, Zelenskyy appealed to the nations of Africa and the Middle East, casting Russia’s invasion as a “colonial war.”⁸⁴

While in the United States, Zelenskyy met with President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. as well as presidential candidates Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump to introduce his plan for victory in Ukraine privately before releasing details to the public.⁸⁵ In October, after the quarter ended, Zelenskyy made most details of the plan public, though it also includes several classified points. The victory plan calls for Ukraine to join NATO and argues that Ukraine’s battle-tested veterans will prove a valuable asset in deterring and defending against aggression against other members of the alliance. It also calls for a significant infusion of military assistance, including enhanced air defenses, real-time satellite data and other intelligence products, the lifting of partner-imposed restrictions on the use of

Table 9.

U.S. Goals Related to Security

OAR Strategic Objectives

Support NATO and assure NATO allies in Eastern Europe of U.S. commitment to collective security.

- U.S. efforts to support NATO-led activities in Eastern Europe.
- NATO allies in Eastern Europe are assured of U.S. commitments to collective defense.

Develop combined defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. and Eastern European NATO allies.

- U.S. and Eastern allies demonstrate interoperable military capabilities.

Russia is deterred from aggression against Eastern European NATO members.

- Russia perceives NATO as a credible alliance committed to the security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of its members.
- Russia perceives U.S. commitment to the NATO alliance and its mission to defend the security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of its members.
- Russia is dissuaded from taking offensive (overt or covert) actions against NATO member states.

Integrated Country Strategy

Ukraine leverages existing partnerships and establishes new ones to ensure continued supplies of military and security assistance and provision of training for new military capabilities.

Ukraine has the tools to protect civilians and critical infrastructure, including the energy grid, heating, cyber networks, media environment and information space.

Source: USEUCOM, response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.2 OAR 007, 4/3/2024; State, “Integrated Country Strategy-Ukraine,” 8/29/2023.

long-range weapons to strike Russia, and the deployment of a strategic non-nuclear deterrent package to Ukraine.⁸⁶

Zelenskyy's plan also calls for significant foreign investment in Ukraine's economy to help the nation rebuild. The plan notably does not include any concessions of occupied territory to Russia. It also suggests that if Ukraine does not have the protection of an alliance, such as NATO, it might seek to obtain nuclear weapons as a protective deterrent.⁸⁷

Russia Advances Along the Front Lines

Russian forces accelerated their territorial gains in the Donetsk region, especially in the vicinity of the city of Pokrovsk, despite Ukraine's incursion into Kursk and mounting losses of Russian personnel and equipment.⁸⁸ The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Rafael Grossi, traveled to Kursk on August 27 to inspect a nuclear power plant located about 25 miles from the center of the fighting, according to media reporting. Grossi told reporters that while the plant was still operating under "close to normal" conditions, there was "danger or possibility of a nuclear accident" at the facility, which lacks any kind of protection against missile strikes.⁸⁹

Grossi also warned about the deteriorating security situation around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine, according to media reporting. Russian forces seized the plant early in the war, and it has come under repeated attacks over the past 2 years. On August 17, Russia accused Ukraine of dropping an explosive charge from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) on a road near the Zaporizhzhia plant. The International Atomic Energy Agency reported that there had been intense military activity very close to the plant and that their inspection team heard frequent explosions, machine gun and rifle fire, and artillery at various distances from the plant.⁹⁰

In mid-August, Ukrainian authorities ordered the evacuation of Pokrovsk, a key city in the Donbas region, as Russian forces continued to gain territory in eastern Ukraine, according to media reporting. The head of Pokrovsk's military government said that residents had at most 2 weeks to flee ahead of Russian advances. Authorities made the decision to evacuate though more than 53,000 people, including almost 4,000 children, remained in the city, according to media reports. Pokrovsk is one of Ukraine's main defensive strongholds and a logistical hub for Ukrainian troops on the eastern front.⁹¹

In the Kharkiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions, Russia has made small-scale probing attacks to facilitate small territorial gains and to disrupt Ukrainian counterattacks. Overall, Russian operations continue to suffer from disjointed planning and coordination between ground force commanders, and poor tactical execution, which results in incremental gains at a high cost in personnel and equipment, according to the DIA.⁹²


Russia's threat to NATO's eastern flank remains largely limited to cyberattacks and indirect actions, as Moscow almost certainly seeks to impose costs on allied countries for supporting Ukraine without risking a direct armed conflict with the alliance, according to the DIA. Russia's ability to pose a conventional military threat to NATO, such as by seizing member state territory, has been severely degraded by losses in Ukraine, continued resource and force commitment to the war, and obstacles to conducting joint offensive operations.⁹³

Russian forces accelerated their territorial gains in the Donetsk region, especially toward the city of Pokrovsk, despite Ukraine's incursion into Kursk and mounting losses of Russian personnel and equipment.


UKRAINE CONFLICT TRENDS

During the quarter, the front lines of the conflict remained mostly unchanged though attacks inside Ukraine increased. According to data compiled by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, this increase was driven by greater numbers of air and drone strikes, and smaller increases in armed clashes and shelling/missile strikes.

Attacks by Quarter and Type, February 24, 2022–September 30, 2024



Locations of Attacks during the Quarter, July 1–September 30, 2024



In September, Ukraine’s Deputy Interior Minister told reporters that Ukraine counted approximately 55,000 citizens as “missing.” The list of those missing is mostly military personnel, but many civilians have also disappeared due to illegal deportations, kidnappings, and Russian missile attacks. The 55,000 figure is an increase from the 42,000 missing persons that Ukraine’s Interior Ministry reported in July. According to media reporting, these numbers do not include the estimated 19,500 Ukrainian children forcibly deported to Belarus, Russia, or occupied territories within Ukraine.⁹⁴

In September, Ukraine’s Deputy Interior Minister told reporters that Ukraine counted approximately 55,000 citizens as “missing.”

UAF Strikes Damage Russian Oil and Gas Facilities

The DIA reported that the UAF continued to strike Russian oil and gas infrastructure, in some cases hundreds of miles inside Russian territory. The UAF conducted 9 strikes on these facilities during the quarter, a decrease from the 12 reported during the previous quarter.⁹⁵ (See Table 10.)

As of mid-September, Russia resumed operations at refineries damaged in the previous two quarters, according to the DIA. However, Russia extended its gasoline export ban until the end of 2024 to combat high domestic prices resulting from those facilities being offline. Strikes on Russian electric power infrastructure caused short-term, localized power outages, though Russia’s highly redundant grid has negated any broader effects from these strikes.⁹⁶

The Russian military has responded to Ukrainian UAV strikes—including ones against energy infrastructure—by using air defense systems across regions that are frequently targeted by the UAF. The DIA said that it has not observed the Russian military specifically allocating systems to defend energy infrastructure. However, Russian forces have continuously conducted strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure.⁹⁷

Table 10.

UAF Strikes on Russian Oil and Gas Infrastructure

Name	Date	Outcome
Voloshino Transformer Station–500kV	7/9/2024	Damaged transformers and associated infrastructure.
Tuapse Refinery	7/22/2024	Damaged auxiliary components.
Rostov Fuel Reserve (Kamensky)	8/3/2024	Damaged fuel storage tanks.
Kursk Transformer Station–330kV	8/8/2024	Damaged a transformer and associated infrastructure.
Rostov Fuel Reserve (Proletarsk)	8/17/2024	Damaged fuel storage tanks.
Rostov Fuel Reserve (Kamensky)	8/28/2024	Damaged fuel storage tanks.
Kirov Fuel Reserve (Kotelnich)	8/28/2024	Damaged fuel storage tanks.
Moscow Refinery	9/1/2024	Damaged primary processing unit.
Konakovo Power Plant	9/1/2024	Damaged natural gas supply facility.

Source: DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.4 OAR 053, 9/25/2024.

U.S. Policy Supports Limited Strikes into Russia

At an August 8 news conference, 2 days after the UAF invaded Kursk, a DoD spokesperson told reporters that this incursion was consistent with U.S. policy, which supports Ukraine's right to defend itself from attacks emanating from over the border inside Russia. When asked whether the DoD would support Ukrainian strikes in Moscow against Russian troops preparing to fight, the spokesperson said that the DoD does not support long-range attacks into Russia but declined to elaborate on what, if any, specific geographic limitations the U.S. Government has placed on the use of U.S.-provided weapons inside Russia.⁹⁸

Similarly, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) said that U.S. policy supports defensive Ukrainian strikes "just over the border" in Russia and specifically said that the UAF has done so to defend Kharkiv and may soon do so if Russia moves forcefully against Sumy, both of which are consistent with U.S. policy. The OUSD(P) said that the United States has consistently prohibited the use of U.S.-provided ATACMS or long-range strikes inside Russia but did not provide the DoD OIG with geographic limitations on where this authority ends.⁹⁹

According to the OUSD(P), the U.S. Government requires that all UAF operations, including those enabled by U.S. security assistance equipment or advisory assistance, be consistent with the international Law of Armed Conflict. The OUSD(P) stated that this means limiting operations and strikes to valid military targets and taking precautions to mitigate harm to civilian populations.¹⁰⁰ This quarter, the OUSD(P) reported that all indications suggest that the UAF is conducting itself in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict throughout all theaters of operations, and there was no evidence that the UAF had intentionally struck prohibited targets inside of Russia with U.S.-provided weapons.¹⁰¹

Additionally, the DoD has placed restrictions on the Ukrainian use of certain U.S.-provided long-range weapons and cluster munitions inside Russia.¹⁰² According to media reporting, Ukraine has abided by these limitations on the use of these weapons and made effective use of them inside occupied Ukrainian territory, including a successful strike on a Russian air defense system in Crimea this quarter.¹⁰³

The UAF has employed smaller, non-U.S. munitions, such as one-way attack UAV for strikes deep into Russian territory including a refinery this quarter, but the resulting damage has generally been limited in scope.¹⁰⁴ (See Table 10.) However, in September, the UAF employed small UAVs to strike a Russian missile depot in Toropets, Russia, triggering the detonation of more than 200 tons of high explosives, which completely destroyed the facility and registered as the equivalent of a 3.2-magnitude earthquake, according to media reporting.¹⁰⁵

Russian officials have repeatedly denounced Western support for Ukrainian strikes inside Russian territory as escalatory. However, the OUSD(P) said there was little evidence that Ukrainian strikes or operations inside Russia either shaped or precipitated a change in Russia's behavior on the battlefield in other areas of operation.¹⁰⁶

UAF Pushes Russia’s Black Sea Fleet out of Crimea

Ukraine has damaged or sunk at least 25 Russian ships and submarines since the start of the full-scale invasion. These attacks have forced Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to move operations out of the northwestern Black Sea, resulting in greater freedom of movement for Ukrainian food exports and other trade. Additionally, in response to Ukrainian strikes, the Black Sea Fleet continued to shift warships out of the Crimean naval bases in Sevastopol and Feodosiia this quarter, moving them further east to Novorossiysk and other smaller ports in Russia.¹⁰⁷ This move has not had a material effect on Russia’s prosecution of the war, according to the DIA. From their new operating areas, the Fleet’s surface ships and submarines still remain within their guided missiles’ range of Ukrainian targets¹⁰⁸

This quarter, the UAF conducted four successful strikes against Russian Navy and other maritime-related assets, resulting in the loss of one inoperable Kalibr-capable submarine and multiple damaged ferries, according to the DIA. (See Table 11.) This is a slight decrease from the five successful maritime strikes conducted the previous quarter.¹⁰⁹

According to the DIA, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet remains unable to conduct amphibious assaults and close-range strikes due to successful Ukrainian attacks. The Russian Navy’s primary role in the conflict with Ukraine has been launching Kalibr cruise missiles against Ukrainian targets.¹¹⁰

In August, the UAF struck an S-400 anti-aircraft missile complex in Crimea, according to media reporting. Russia established this air defense system to protect the Kerch Strait Bridge, an important logistics and transport link for supplying Russian forces. Additionally,

U.S. Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, and Ukrainian Navy explosive ordnance disposal technicians conduct simulated underwater demolition operations off the coast of Varna, Bulgaria. (U.S. Navy photo)



Table 11.

UAF Strikes on Russian Maritime Targets During the Quarter

July 23: A Ukrainian attack damaged and caused a fire aboard a ferry at the Russian port of Kavkaz, which is located across the Kerch Strait from the Crimean Peninsula.

August 2: The UAF struck the Rostov-na-Donu, a Kilo-class attack submarine assigned to Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. The ATACMS missile strike further damaged the submarine, which probably was already functionally destroyed and had been undergoing repairs from a previous Ukrainian attack in September 2023.

August 16: A Ukrainian ATACMS strike targeting the Kerch Strait area resulted in damage to a ferry crossing and an associated vessel.

August 22: A Ukrainian attack that may have employed a Neptune coastal defense cruise missile severely damaged a Russian ferry transporting fuel across the Kerch Strait.

Source: DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.4 OAR 047 and 24.4 OAR 052, 9/25/2024.

Ukrainian forces struck the Morozovsk airfield in Russia's Rostov-on-Don region, which borders the occupied Ukrainian Donbas. A barrage of UAVs struck warehouses containing ammunition, including guided aerial bombs.¹¹¹

The Russian military has used Russian-occupied Crimea as a base for prosecuting the war since February 2022. The peninsula hosts Russia's Black Sea Fleet, six air bases, command and control centers, arms depots, drydocks, army bases, and air defense radars and anti-missile systems. Russia regularly launches missiles, including hypersonic ones, and UAVs from Crimea and the coastal Black Sea into southern Ukraine against military and civilian targets, according to the DIA. Crimea also serves as a key logistics hub. Russia delivers substantial supplies to Crimea across the Kerch Strait Bridge as well as by ship to support troops in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian strikes into Crimea over the past quarter, including those involving Western-provided precision missiles, have disrupted Russian supply lines and destroyed offensive sites, such as air defense and missile sites, command posts, and airfields.¹¹²

Russia Strikes Ukrainian Energy Infrastructure, Hospitals

Since March, Russia has changed tack in its bombardment of Ukraine's energy infrastructure. Recent strikes have focused on power generation sites, which take longer to repair than the previously targeted transmission and distribution sites. Russian forces have also struck the key stations feeding operational power to Ukraine's still-functioning nuclear plants, according to media.¹¹³

This quarter, Russia used a combination of missile and UAV volleys when conducting its near-daily mass strikes into Ukraine, according to the DIA.¹¹⁴ (See Table 12.) On July 8, a Russian attack struck a children's hospital in Kyiv and targets in other cities across Ukraine, killing at least 41 civilians in what media reports described as the deadliest wave of air strikes in months.¹¹⁵ Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said through social media that more than 100 buildings were damaged.¹¹⁶ The Ukrainian government stated that the attacks demonstrated that Ukraine urgently needs to upgrade its air defenses with help

Table 12.

Major Strikes on Ukrainian Infrastructure During the Quarter

Month	Attack Characteristics
July	Two attacks using approximately 600 glide bombs, 60 drones, and 40 missiles with targets ranging from energy infrastructure, ammunition production plants, and a Kyiv children's hospital.
August	Four major attacks using at least 230 missiles and UAVs.
September	Six major attacks using approximately 300 UAVs and at least 60 missiles, striking the Poltava Military Communications Institute and a nearby civilian hospital.

Source: DIA, responses to DoD OIG request for information, 24.4 OAR 044 and 24.4 OAR 066, 9/25/2024.

from its Western allies. Air defenses shot down 30 of 38 missiles, media reported, citing the UAF.¹¹⁷ A UAF leader noted that it has become more difficult to repel Russian attacks as more Russian missiles are equipped with radar and thermal traps.¹¹⁸

On August 26, Russian forces launched an attack with more than 200 missiles and UAVs, killing seven people and striking energy facilities across Ukraine. According to media reporting, a Russian UAV briefly entered Polish airspace. The UAF's then-Air Force Commander told reporters that their forces downed 102 out of 127 incoming missiles and 99 out of 109 UAVs, describing the attack from the air, ground, and sea as "the most massive" of the war. According to Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, 15 regions across Ukraine sustained damage in this attack.¹¹⁹ The attack resulted in power and water outages across Ukraine and forced Ukrainian authorities to disconnect several nuclear power units from the grid, according to media reporting.¹²⁰

According to the DIA, these strikes are unlikely to seriously degrade the UAF's ability to carry out core warfighting functions, since the military relies on localized grids and individual unit generation utilizing gasoline and diesel-powered generators. However, the UAF may face an increased shortage of available generators and associated parts as more of the civilian population becomes reliant on external sources for electricity, especially heading into winter.¹²¹

Russia's expansive air campaign against Ukrainian critical national infrastructure and economic areas of interest continues to strain the UAF's limited air defense capabilities, the DIA said. Ukraine lacks the means to sufficiently detect, interdict, and deter all Russian air threats.¹²² The UAF has developed sufficient tactics, techniques, and procedures to intercept Russian strikes into Ukraine, but these are impeded by munition shortages for their Western-supplied integrated air and missile defense systems. The UAF has employed alternative methods, such as utilizing mobile fire teams and using tactical air assets to interdict Russian precision guided munitions.¹²³

Ukraine almost certainly prioritizes the protection of critical national infrastructure, leaving large urban areas near the front line more vulnerable to Russian strikes, according to the DIA. This quarter, cities near the Russian border and out of the range of Ukraine's air defenses, such as Kharkiv, have been the most vulnerable.¹²⁴

On August 26, Russian forces launched an attack with more than 200 missiles and UAVs, killing seven people and striking energy facilities across Ukraine.

Russian Military Capabilities

This quarter, the DIA provided the following analysis on several aspects of Russian forces' capabilities in Ukraine:

Battlefield Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Employment: Russia has maintained its airborne battlefield surveillance advantage relative to Ukraine, enabling Russian troops to identify and strike Ukrainian troops and equipment along the frontline with a broad array of UAS. Russia also continues to use military and commercial UAS to deliver lethal effects when used in a one-way attack role or to drop munitions. Finally, Russian forces continue to use UAS to spot and adjust artillery and assess the effectiveness of glide bomb and missile strikes. Russian UAS have proven susceptible to electronic warfare, traditional air defense, and airborne interdiction by Ukrainian UAS and tactical aviation.¹²⁵

Joint Fires: Since July, Russian forces have continued to employ joint fires—strikes that use a combination of UAS, artillery, aviation, or missile strikes—to suppress and destroy Ukrainian defensive positions along the front line. Following Ukraine's Kursk incursion, Russia conducted tactical joint fires on Ukrainian troop concentrations and equipment, such as HIMARS launchers and early warning radars. Russian forces have not, however, exhibited significant improvements in integrating ground force maneuver elements into their joint fires.¹²⁶

Counter-Battery Capability: Russian counter-battery radars are generally less capable than Ukraine's Western-provided systems. However, Russia continues to field more counter-battery radar systems than Ukraine and has a greater availability of ISR and munitions. This dynamic has enabled Russia to sustain a counter-battery advantage on most sections of the front line by using UAS to identify Ukrainian counter-battery radars and striking them prior to artillery engagements or by expending more munitions than Ukraine.¹²⁷

Force Protection: Russian force protection remains a point of vulnerability as Ukrainian strikes using first-person view, one-way attack UAVs and precision guided munitions continue to inflict significant Russian casualties along the front line and in better protected rear areas. Russian electronic warfare and air defenses have struggled to prevent Ukrainian strike salvos from damaging and destroying Russian air defense assets, ammunition depots, and command posts, including in Crimea and inside Russian territory.¹²⁸

Electronic Warfare: Russian electronic warfare measures, such as GPS-jamming, antenna hardening, and counter-UAS have marginally improved Russian troop and equipment survivability during assaults, helping to enable continued Russian offensives across the front line.¹²⁹

Tactical Aviation and Close Air Support: Since July, Russia has primarily used its fixed wing tactical aviation to employ glide bombs, which have continued to enable Russian offensives by suppressing Ukrainian defenders and destroying fortified positions and urban structures. Russia continues to employ rotary wing aircraft as fire support assets, delivering small diameter unguided rocket salvos or using guided air-to-ground missiles to strike Ukrainian armored vehicles. Russia has not exhibited an ability to provide dynamic close air support in the traditional Western sense but does use tactical aviation to support ground maneuver by attacking Ukrainian positions prior to Russian ground assaults.¹³⁰

(continued on next page)

Russian Military Capabilities *(continued from previous page)*

Command and Control: Russian forces continue to show deficiencies in their ability to coordinate combined arms units at the operational level and rely on smaller elements to seize terrain along the front at a slow pace. Russia's delayed response to the Kursk incursion further highlights the Russian leadership's lack of preparedness to adapt to a changing environment. In mid-August, Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov held the first meeting of a coordination council to facilitate support to combat units in the Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk regions but failed to suppress Ukraine's initial large-scale gains in Kursk.¹³¹

SUPPORT FROM PARTNERS

This quarter, Russia continued to receive varying degrees of support for its war in Ukraine from several countries, including Belarus, Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC).¹³²

Belarus: Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka continues to make public pronouncements in support of Russia and its position in the conflict.¹³³ In August, Lukashenka ordered the Belarusian military to transfer ammunition and unspecified equipment to the Russian military to make up for materiel losses resulting from Ukraine's Kursk incursion.¹³⁴

PRC: As of September, the PRC continued to provide materiel assistance to Russia's war effort, according to the DIA. Beijing supports Moscow's defense industrial base by providing needed commodities and components for arms manufacturing, helping Russia continue its operations in Ukraine.¹³⁵ NATO has described the PRC as "a decisive enabler" of Russia's war against Ukraine through its so-called "no limits" partnership and as a large-scale support for Russia's defense industrial base.¹³⁶

North Korea and Iran: This quarter, Russia received artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles from North Korea and ballistic missiles from Iran.¹³⁷ In October, North Korean soldiers arrived in Russia for military training and equipping to support Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine, according to media reporting.¹³⁸

Russia Increases Troop Presence in Ukraine as UAF Seeks to Address Readiness

The DIA estimated that during the quarter, Ukraine had approximately 900,000 troops deployed in support of the war effort.¹³⁹ Russia had 600,000 to 700,000 troops deployed to Ukraine, out of a total force of more than 1.3 million.¹⁴⁰ (See Table 13.)

According to the DIA, the number of Russian troops deployed to Ukraine has likely increased despite rising casualties and falling recruitment. Russian casualties have almost certainly increased throughout the summer relative to earlier in the year as Moscow intensified costly offensive operations in Kharkiv and Donetsk. Meanwhile, Russian recruitment rates have almost certainly fallen in 2024 compared to 2023, challenging Moscow's ability to sustain those high-casualty offensives.¹⁴¹

In January, President Putin claimed that the Russian military was recruiting 1,500 new soldiers per day. However, by early July, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev—whom the DIA said was prone to embellishment—claimed that Russia was recruiting only 1,000 personnel per day, a marked decrease over the last 8 months even as the Russian military has increased recruitment incentives. Both public

Table 13.

Estimates of Total Russian Military End Strength

Ground forces	650,000–680,000, including at least 100,000 conscripts.
Airborne	35,000-70,000
Navy (including Navy Infantry)	150,000
Aerospace	165,000
Strategic Rocket Force	50,000
Special Operations	1,000
Railway troops	29,000
Command and Support	180,000
TOTAL	1,320,000

Source: DIA, response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.4 OAR 043, 9/25/2024.

claims and internal Russian reports probably exaggerate Moscow's true force generation capacity, according to the DIA.¹⁴²

Similarly, media reporting suggests that Ukraine is struggling to recruit new soldiers. Approximately 800,000 Ukrainian men have gone into hiding, changing their addresses and working unofficially to avoid conscription, according to media reporting.¹⁴³

The DIA reported that the Ukrainian government began implementing policy changes this quarter to address readiness issues stemming from the UAF's expedited basic training timelines. Previously, the UAF used a 30-day basic training timeline before deploying its personnel to the front line and combat operations. On September 15, the UAF Commander-in-Chief, General Oleksandr Syrskyy, announced that the military planned to double its training pipeline to 60 days by the end of November due to reports of new recruits being under-trained once arriving in the field.¹⁴⁴

REGIONAL DETERRENCE

United States Deploys Long-Range Missiles to Germany

On July 10, the U.S. and German governments issued a joint statement that the United States will begin episodic deployments of long-range missiles to Germany in 2026 as part of planning for the enduring stationing of these capabilities in the future. When fully developed, these assets will include SM-6, Tomahawk, and developmental hypersonic missiles, which have significantly longer range than current land-based weapons in Europe. Exercising these advanced capabilities will demonstrate the United States' commitment to NATO and its contributions to European integrated deterrence.¹⁴⁵



The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate long-range conventional weapons systems under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed in 1987. This treaty remained in force between the United States and Russia following the fall of the Soviet Union. However, the United States withdrew from the treaty in 2019, citing Russian violations. The U.S. Government plans to deploy these systems to Europe as part of a larger strategy to deter and potentially defend against further Russian aggression. These weapons will have the range to reach targets inside Russian territory.¹⁴⁶

Both NATO and German government officials have praised the deployment as a necessary credible deterrent, and other European countries, including France, Italy, and Poland, have indicated that they plan to develop similar capabilities.¹⁴⁷

U.S. Army National Guard M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System crewmembers simulate firing rockets during rapid insertion training at Chievres Air Base, Belgium.

NATO Considers Increasing Minimum Defense Capability Requirements

In 2024, 23 of the 32 NATO member states met the alliance's commitment to spend at least 2 percent of their respective gross domestic product on defense. This represents a significant increase in defense spending among NATO member states since 2014, when only three countries met that target.¹⁴⁸ The DoD said that the other member states have plans to meet that commitment.¹⁴⁹

Yet while defense spending within the alliance has increased, defense capabilities are lacking in key areas. This quarter, NATO worked on developing minimum defense capability requirements for member states, according to media reporting. NATO seeks to convert the minimum requirements into binding targets for individual governments to provide for the defense of Europe before the planned meeting of defense ministers in Fall 2025.¹⁵⁰

As of this quarter, NATO reported that it had 500,000 troops at high readiness working across all domains—land, sea, air, cyber, and space—to deter aggression in Eastern Europe.

The NATO Defense Planning Process is an ongoing framework through which NATO identifies the capabilities that it requires and promotes their development and acquisition by allied countries. It also provides a forum for member states to harmonize their national defense plans within the context of the alliance. This process apportions requirements to each ally as capability targets, which they are then committed to implementing. According to NATO, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has caused allied nations to accelerate their investment in long-term European defense and deterrence.¹⁵¹

NATO identified six areas that are the most pressing to address, according to media reporting. These include shortages in air defense and long-range missiles, troop numbers, ammunition, logistical issues, and lack of secure digital communications. NATO planners believe NATO will need dozens of additional brigades to withstand a Russian attack.¹⁵² As of this quarter, NATO reported that it had 500,000 troops at high readiness working across all domains—land, sea, air, cyber, and space—to deter aggression in Eastern Europe.¹⁵³

In July, NATO members pledged to expand their defense industrial capacities and to further enhance NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense with new ballistic missile defense assets, and to improve NATO’s cyber capabilities with a new NATO Integrated Cyber Defense Center. According to NATO, allies are also enhancing their preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats, strengthening their energy security, and enhancing their resilience to hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns.¹⁵⁴

While NATO has not provided an estimate of the cost to remedy its capability gaps, its leaders have said that in many cases, nations will need to exceed the 2 percent target of their gross domestic product for spending on defense, according to media reporting. NATO’s findings highlight the difficulties ahead to achieve its goals at a time when the alliance’s unity may be tested by budget constraints among European members and differences over what NATO’s stance on Russia should be.¹⁵⁵

Russia Announces Revised Nuclear Doctrine, Lowering Requirements for Nuclear Weapons Use

On September 25, President Putin announced a revision to Russia’s nuclear doctrine, effectively lowering the threshold for a nuclear strike. Under the revised policy, Russia will consider a conventional attack by any nation with the “support or participation of a nuclear power” as a joint attack against Russia.¹⁵⁶ While Putin did not specifically state whether this new doctrine would call for a nuclear response to such an attack, he stated that Russia could use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack that the Russian government viewed as an existential threat. According to media reporting, the vague formulation of this wording leaves room for wide interpretation.¹⁵⁷

The OUSD(P) said that the DoD will not change its support to Ukraine in response to Russia’s announcement and accused the Russian government of fabricating external threats to justify its aggression. The OUSD(P) said that neither the United States nor NATO pose a threat to Russia, and it characterized Russia’s nuclear rhetoric as “reckless and irresponsible” throughout its war against Ukraine.¹⁵⁸ The DoD continues to monitor nuclear threats, including those from Russia, but has seen no reason to adjust its nuclear posture nor any indications that Russia is preparing to use a nuclear weapon, according to the OUSD(P).¹⁵⁹

Live chemical agents are used in a NATO course to test the skills of a group of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense specialists. (NATO photo)



A Russian government spokesperson told reporters that the revisions in Russia’s nuclear policy are a “warning signal to those countries about the consequences in case of their involvement in an attack on our country with various assets, not necessarily nuclear ones.” Ukraine has already struck targets inside Russia, including a ground incursion into Kursk, but these have largely been limited in scope. Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine is a threat aimed at discouraging the West from allowing Ukraine to use longer range weapons to strike critical targets deep inside Russia, according to media reporting.¹⁶⁰

SUPPORT TO UKRAINIAN FORCES

The United States and its partners and allies coordinate international security assistance to Ukraine through a variety of international mechanisms ranging from high-level Ukraine Defense Contact Group meetings to informal discussions between the U.S.-led Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U), the International Donor Coordination Center (IDCC), and representatives from donor nations. (See Table 14.) At SAG-U and the IDCC—which are co-located in Wiesbaden, Germany—staff evaluate Ukrainian requests for training and equipment, identify which partner nation can provide the assistance, and ensure that the assistance is delivered in a timely manner.¹⁶¹

The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv’s Office of Defense Cooperation-Kyiv (ODC-Kyiv) evaluates and executes security assistance in support of Ukrainian defense and security forces. The ODC-Kyiv said that it cooperates daily with USEUCOM, the Military Service components, and SAG-U. SAG-U has a larger staff and thus greater capacity, and its work involves multilateral coordination with partners and allies. With its smaller long-term staff, the ODC-Kyiv engages in bilateral cooperation with the Ukrainian government. The ODC-Kyiv has a staff of American and locally employed Ukrainian personnel with security assistance expertise and cultural insight, whereas SAG-U is largely staffed with military personnel on

shorter-term deployments. Because the ODC-Kyiv operates under State authorities, it cannot train and advise the UAF, whereas SAG-U, as a Title 10 military command, can and does train and advise the UAF.¹⁶²

SAG-U said that it works with the ODC-Kyiv daily in its mission to plan, coordinate, and synchronize U.S. training with the UAF. This includes the formal invitation of Ukrainian military leaders to send units to participate in training, facilitation of vetting requirements, and cross-border transportation. SAG-U described this relationship as mature and helpful in facilitating the conduct of training opportunities.¹⁶³

In addition to SAG-U and the IDCC, which focus on near-term requirements for the UAF, donor nations have established eight “capability coalitions,” which seek to meet Ukraine's capability needs into the future.¹⁶⁴ The capability coalitions operate under the Ukraine Defense Contact Group.¹⁶⁵

Table 14.

Coordination of International Assistance to Ukraine

<p>Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. mechanism to coordinate and oversee the full spectrum of U.S. security assistance to the UAF. • Established in November 2022. • Combined, joint service headquarters, consisting of approximately 400 multinational Service members. • Located in Wiesbaden, Germany, under the operational control of USEUCOM. • Includes SAG-U Operations Kyiv, a small contingent of advisors located in Ukraine, operating under chief of mission authority.
<p>International Donor Coordination Center (IDCC)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The primary body for coordinating and executing international military assistance to Ukraine at the tactical level. • Established in March 2022. • More than 50 countries represented. • Voluntary entity to share information and synchronize efforts, led by a UK brigadier general. • Collocated with SAG-U in Wiesbaden but no command-and-control relationship exists between them.
<p>Ukraine Defense Contact Group</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Platform to convene defense ministers from approximately 50 nations, meeting monthly to discuss Ukraine’s security needs. • First meeting in April 2022. • Provides high-level venue for countries to announce and deconflict donations. • Operates eight capability coalitions to sustain support into the future.
<p>NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New NATO headquarters formally established in July and currently working toward full operational capacity. • Will assume the responsibilities of the IDCC, including facilitating the donation, transfer, and repair of equipment, as well as training and long-term development of the UAF. • Collocated with SAG-U in Wiesbaden with SAG-U and the IDCC.

Sources: : SAG-U, responses to DoD OIG request for information, 24.1 OAR 026, 12/27/2023; 24.1 OAR 027, 12/27/2023; and 24.3 OAR 025, 7/2/2024; NATO, press release, “NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine,” 7/11/2024; NATO, press release, “New NATO Secretary General Visits Shape and NSATU,” 10/14/2024; SAG-U, vetting comment, 10/29/2024; OUSD(P), vetting comment, 11/3/2024.

Figure 2.

Capability Coalitions and Lead Member Countries

The capability coalitions are collaborative civilian-military bodies established to enable a multinational, capability-centric approach to security assistance for Ukraine, SAG-U said. This includes coordinating and deconflicting security assistance, particularly procurements, for Ukraine across donor countries to help ensure Ukraine's priority needs are met into the future. These coalitions are tasked with addressing long-term issues related to equipping, sustainment, developing the defense industrial base, and production issues. Nations with relevant expertise in a given area lead the coalition on that capability along with Ukrainian partners.¹⁶⁶ (See Figure 2.)

NATO Announces New Command to Coordinate Ukraine Assistance

On July 11, NATO announced the formation of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), a new headquarters to plan, coordinate, and arrange delivery of security assistance to Ukraine. Once at full operational capability, NSATU will:

- coordinate the training of Ukrainian forces at facilities in allied countries;
- coordinate military donations;
- manage the transfer and repair of equipment; and
- support the long-term development of Ukraine's armed forces, enabling Ukraine to become more interoperable with NATO.¹⁶⁷

NSATU will comprise approximately 700 personnel from NATO allied nations and partners. The effort will be headquartered in Wiesbaden, Germany, but the total number above also includes personnel assigned to various logistical hubs in NATO's eastern flank.¹⁶⁸ According to SAG-U, the Capability Coalitions will continue their work under NSATU developing Ukraine's long-term military needs, projected out to 2 years in the future.¹⁶⁹

SAG-U reported that SOK had a daily average of 37 personnel in Ukraine this quarter, an increase from the 30 reported last quarter, but still below the DoD-approved 60-person capacity.

SAG-U Operations-Kyiv Supports the UAF Under Limited Authorities

Last quarter, SAG-U established SAG-U Operations-Kyiv (SOK), a small group of rotational U.S. military personnel in Kyiv. SAG-U personnel do not serve in a combat role. Instead, they work directly with UAF leadership to facilitate effective employment of U.S. military assistance under Chief of Mission authority rather than Title 10 military authority.¹⁷⁰

U.S. military personnel in country, including those in support of SOK, generally operate under diplomatic Chief of Mission authority rather than military combatant command authority. As such, their activity, operations, and personnel fall under the direction, coordination and supervision of the chief of mission, and must be conducted pursuant to State policy standards, lines of funding, and logistics limitations.¹⁷¹ USEUCOM explained that this requirement restricts SOK's ability to support the UAF at a scale commensurate with their requirements. USEUCOM said that while it has the capability to provide this support, it is not permitted to do so under Chief of Mission authority and has not received any policy exceptions to mitigate these restrictions.¹⁷²

SAG-U reported that SOK had a daily average of 37 personnel in Ukraine this quarter, an increase from the 30 reported last quarter, but still below the DoD-approved 60-person capacity.¹⁷³ SOK personnel worked toward increasing the availability of secure communication systems, improving force protection, and building advisor capabilities this quarter.¹⁷⁴

SAG-U said that it provides security cooperation and security force assistance training for SOK personnel prior to their deployment to Ukraine. This training is conducted with resources and experience already present within SAG-U as well as the Defense Security Cooperation University. SAG-U said it was working with the university to provide professional lessons and training for the SAG-U team, which will include a 3-day Ukrainian language familiarization training event provided through the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center currently under development.¹⁷⁵

The United States Delivers Ammunition, Vehicles, and Other Critical Assistance to Ukraine

This quarter, the UAF lacked a sufficient number of infantry fighting vehicles. Historically the UAF has also struggled with insufficient quantities of man-portable air-defense systems and various 40mm ammunition. According to SAG-U, these deficits prevent the UAF from countering or deterring Russian ground forces. When materiel shortfalls are identified, UAF partners are quick to bring them to the attention of the United States and partner nations, after which they perform research to obtain information on whether new shipments are inbound. If not, SAG-U engages with coalition partners to deliver NATO standard munitions or uses the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) process to deliver U.S.-specific munitions from stocks.¹⁷⁶ According to SAG-U, the UAF's most consistent requests for equipment fall into three categories: long-range strike munitions, conventional artillery munitions, and delivery platforms for both.¹⁷⁷

During the quarter, the United States delivered vehicles, ammunition, weapons, artillery and mortar rounds, and mines and demolition equipment to Ukraine. The announced assistance included Bradley fighting vehicles. According to SAG-U, the UAF has expressed a preference for lighter infantry fighting vehicles over heavier main battle tanks, such as the M1A1 Abrams tanks delivered in previous quarters.¹⁷⁸


During the quarter, the DoD announced nine packages of munitions and equipment to be sent to Ukraine, including approximately \$1.35 billion through PDA and \$1.9 billion through the USAI. Some of this may have been delivered during the quarter, while some will have future delivery dates. For a full list of defense items that the U.S. Government has provided to Ukraine, see Appendix G.¹⁷⁹

END-USE MONITORING

Federal law requires end-use monitoring (EUM) of certain transfers of defense equipment and services to foreign entities to ensure that the items are being used in accordance with the terms and conditions of the transfer agreement and applicable Federal law.¹⁸⁰ The DoD, through the Golden Sentry program, conducts EUM of items that were transferred via Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or other U.S. Government security cooperation programs on a government-to-government basis. State, through the Blue Lantern program, conducts pre- and post-license checks of some articles and services exported through direct commercial sales that may be funded by means including FMF.¹⁸¹ State’s Bureau of International

Figure 3.

Disposition of EEUM Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine, as of September 2024



The UAF prefers to train its personnel in Ukraine whenever possible, which limits the support that the international community can provide due to national policy restrictions.

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) tracks all of the equipment it donates to Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies, which does not fall under the Blue Lantern program, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the transfer agreement and applicable Federal law.¹⁸²

Certain defense items are subject to enhanced EUM (EEUM) since they incorporate sensitive technology; are particularly vulnerable to diversion or other misuse; or the diversion or other misuse of which could have significant consequences for U.S. national security. Of the 19 types of designated defense articles that required EEUM, 8 had been provided to Ukraine as of the end of the quarter. (See Figure 3).¹⁸³

On September 27, the DoD OIG issued a management advisory related to its ongoing evaluation of EEUM in Ukraine. (See page 114.) While conducting this evaluation, the ODC-Kyiv and security cooperation personnel identified ongoing challenges using barcode scanners for EEUM of defense article inventories. Some scans were inaccurate, some barcodes were illegible or missing, the scanners did not function well in adverse weather, or scanners were prohibited in some secure storage sites.¹⁸⁴ The ODC-Kyiv said that the barcode scanners provided by the DSCA are not used as a primary method for conducting inventories, and the scanner limitations identified have not had an adverse impact on the DoD’s ability to execute end-use monitoring.¹⁸⁵ The OUSD(P) said that the DoD is currently working toward the recommended solutions, including improving bar code label durability and improving cyber-security for data scans.¹⁸⁶ The DoD OIG had completed five oversight projects related to EEUM and had three ongoing as of the end of this quarter.¹⁸⁷ (See pages 129 and 133.)

Donations Strengthen UAF Armor Capability

UAF defensive and offensive capability across the different armored platforms has remained relatively stable, according to SAG-U. The UAF has a high demand for these assets for both the newly generated brigades and to replenish units in the defense along the front line. The UAF must make difficult decisions about where to allocate these limited resources as priorities remain fluid with the constantly evolving battlespace.¹⁸⁸

The sustained increase in donations of armored platforms has largely been used to support the building of new brigades, but only a few of these have completed or will complete collective training directly enabled by the international community in the near-term. SAG-U said it was undertaking significant train-the-trainer efforts to make the UAF more self-sufficient in conducting platform training. The UAF prefers to train its personnel in Ukraine whenever possible, which limits the support that the international community can provide due to national policy restrictions.¹⁸⁹

Some donations of armored vehicles have included items that were non-mission capable—that is, in such a condition that they are unable to perform their designated function. This drives additional maintenance work for the UAF to assess and repair these platforms prior to their employment. The provision of the required spare parts to complete this work continues to be a challenge at the scale and pace required, according to SAG-U. SAG-U reported no significant changes in the equipment, training, or maintenance support it provided UAF armor units this quarter.¹⁹⁰

Policy Mistakes Contribute to the Munitions Shortage in Ukraine

According to a media report, miscalculations by policymakers in the United States and Europe may have led to an inability to produce a sufficient supply of the munitions being used by the UAF. From 2014 to 2015, U.S. manufacturers decreased production of 155mm artillery rounds—now a staple of the UAF’s defense—due to manufacturing defects and safety violations, which resulted in no new rounds being added to the DoD’s stockpiles. Additionally, a DoD decision to change the type of explosive used in those rounds resulted in the Army spending \$147 million on a facility it ultimately did not use, according to media reporting.¹⁹¹

A plan to replace an antiquated plant in Virginia that produced propellant for shells has fallen a decade behind its scheduled completion and has almost doubled in cost, according to media reporting. That delay has created a greater U.S. reliance on raw materials from overseas, including from countries with close trade ties to Russia. Additionally, the United States had a plan before the full-scale invasion to source explosive materials from a factory in eastern Ukraine, which was seized by Russia shortly after the full-scale invasion, according to media reporting.¹⁹²

In the years between Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea and its full-scale invasion in February 2022, senior NATO commanders and officials who operated or supervised U.S. munitions plants repeatedly raised concerns to their respective governments about inadequate munitions production capabilities, but those warnings went largely unheeded, according to the media report. Although total U.S. monthly shell production will likely increase by the end of 2024, it is not expected to reach its target for another 18 months, according to the media report.¹⁹³

Despite such challenges, the DoD OIG found that Army and Marine Corps officials implemented an effective strategy for managing Army and Marine Corps on-hand inventory to support war reserve, training, and testing requirements for 155mm ammunition. On July 24, the DoD OIG published an evaluation of this strategy and found that Army, Marine Corps, and Joint Staff officials compared worldwide inventories against global requirements on a weekly basis. (See page 115.) Additionally, Army officials invested in the industrial base to increase production of 155mm ammunition. As a result, Army and Marine Corps officials maintained sufficient 155mm ammunition to meet threats to U.S. national security interests.¹⁹⁴

UAF Adapts U.S.-Provided UAS to the Ukrainian Battlefield Environment

The UAF generally employs U.S.-provided weapons and equipment consistent with the technical aspects of those weapons and equipment, according to SAG-U. However, the battlefield situation sometimes calls for employment that differs from traditional U.S. doctrine at the tactical and operational levels. The UAF has been using weapons and equipment effectively to achieve tactical objectives in line with UAF priorities by adapting U.S. tactics, training, and procedures to address their current environment, according to SAG-U.¹⁹⁵

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On August 27, President Zelenskyy told reporters that Ukraine had carried out the first successful test of a domestically produced ballistic missile.

SAG-U said that its advisors are helping the UAF improve its use of weapons consistent with joint operations doctrine. SAG-U continues to observe and record employment tactics and identify trends in the modern, technology-reliant battlefield. At this time, SAG-U has not implemented any modifications based on observations of UAF weapons and equipment use. However, both the DoD and U.S. allies often send representatives to SAG-U to observe and learn how the UAF is operating across the multi-domain battlefield.¹⁹⁶

The Ukraine Army's Unmanned Systems Force Command has undertaken efforts to adapt UAS provided to the UAF to the current battlefield conditions, including defense against electronic warfare, according to SAG-U. The command has created a logistics hub to receive, conduct quality control and functionality checks, and make necessary modifications or repairs to U.S.-provided platforms. Typically, this involves removal and replacement of critical components to ensure survivability in an electro-magnetic congested environment. Another common modification is to the components that initiate detonation of the warhead when the target is impacted, according to SAG-U.¹⁹⁷

According to SAG-U, platforms that have been found not to function adequately in the battlefield environment of Ukraine after having been fielded and some have been repurposed and cannibalized for components. SAG-U said that partner nations have provided the UAF with fixed-wing, multi-sensor UAS with ISR capability, but this platform was left unused for more than 7 months because of its inability to perform flight operations in the Russian jamming environment. SAG-U said that co-production efforts have allowed U.S. manufacturing to mimic designs of Ukrainian operationally tested and vetted systems, which reduces the future risk of delivery of incapable and obsolete platforms.¹⁹⁸

SAG-U said that partner nations have developed improved employment methods, threat detection, and counter-UAS technology to better protect Ukrainians employing U.S.-provided equipment from Russian attacks. This includes developing protective armor screens to cover infantry fighting vehicles to avoid and mitigate attacks from Russian UAS.¹⁹⁹

Ukraine Aims to Increase Domestic Arms Production

Ukraine is almost certainly relying on its domestic UAS capabilities when responding to Russian strikes, according to the DIA. On September 1, Ukraine launched more than 150 one-way attack UAVs to saturate Russian defenses and degrade petroleum, oil, and lubricant infrastructure in the vicinity of Moscow. Additionally, on September 10, Ukraine re-engaged civilian infrastructure targets near Moscow using a similar tactic. Ukraine lacks the domestic capability to produce precision-guided munitions on parity with Russian stockpiles and will probably continue to rely on domestically produced UAS as a response to Russian strikes, according to the DIA.²⁰⁰

On August 27, President Zelenskyy told reporters that Ukraine had carried out the first successful test of a domestically produced ballistic missile. Ukraine continues to develop its own ability to produce war materiel as part of a broad effort to lessen its dependence on Western military aid. Zelenskyy also said that the UAF had recently deployed a long-range, Ukrainian-made "rocket drone," called Palianytsia, for the first time.²⁰¹

About 250 defense startups across Ukraine are building unmanned weapon systems in facilities camouflaged as rural car repair shops, according to a media report.²⁰² For example, the Ukrainians have produced a car-sized vehicle that looks like a small, turretless tank with its wheels on tracks. Named the Odyssey, the vehicle can travel up to 18.5 miles on one battery charge and can act as a rescue-and-supply platform.²⁰³ The vehicle can also be modified to carry a remotely operated heavy machine gun or sling mine-clearing charges. Ukrainian engineers are focused on developing low-cost platforms to which weapons or smart components can be added later.²⁰⁴ The United Nations, human rights groups, and others have expressed concern about some of Ukraine's self-produced UAS because they use artificial intelligence.²⁰⁵

MAINTENANCE

The UAF often evacuates Western-donated equipment that suffers damage on the battlefield to other countries, most often to the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell-Ukraine (RDC-U) in southern Poland.²⁰⁶ There, the United States and partner forces conduct major repairs and train UAF maintenance technicians.²⁰⁷ In addition, SAG-U provides maintenance mentorship to the UAF at Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany.²⁰⁸

U.S. maintenance experts also conduct remote maintenance sessions leveraging Ukrainian translators and secure voice, video, and chat channels to guide UAF personnel in Ukraine through the maintenance process of weapon systems they may find unfamiliar.²⁰⁹ The RDC-U has 39 channels operating continuously. These channels process from 2,000 to 2,500 calls or texts per month, according to SAG-U.²¹⁰

This quarter, the RDC-U performed maintenance on 39 types of platforms, including infantry fighting vehicles, air defense artillery, cargo trucks, and other weapon systems.²¹¹ SAG-U reported no significant changes to maintenance support this quarter but indicated that the UAF's most frequent request is the ability to conduct more and higher-level maintenance tasks.²¹²

The UAF has four levels of maintenance capabilities: user maintenance (such as track maintenance and changing, oil servicing, and filter replacements); trained maintainer (just behind the front line, more in-depth repairs, such as replacement of assemblies); away from front lines (such as barrel changes and light damage repair); and civilian repair depots (for in-depth structural repair and remanufacture of components).²¹³

The DoD has provided seven 3D printers to the UAF to enable them to produce certain parts locally, reducing the timeline and lessening dependence on the DoD supply chain. This includes setup, training, and technical support. The UAF prints parts based on technical data provided for specific weapon systems. The DoD is negotiating a memorandum of understanding with Ukraine on safe storage, use, and intellectual property protection to facilitate additional technical data provisions, according to SAG-U. Currently, Ukraine is only producing parts for its own use. Manufacturing via 3D printing is not an approved source of supply for U.S. parts or weapon systems.²¹⁴

This quarter, the RDC-U performed maintenance on 39 types of platforms, including infantry fighting vehicles, air defense artillery, cargo trucks, and other weapon systems.

SAG-U estimates that most UAF basic training—90 percent—is conducted by Ukrainians in Ukraine.

TRAINING

The United States and its international partners provide a variety of training to the UAF, including basic, collective, leadership, and platform-specific training.²¹⁵ U.S. military trainers located at Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany, as well as other locations in Europe and the United States, provide primarily collective, leadership, and equipment training to the UAF.²¹⁶ (See page 46.)

This quarter, 19 nations provided training to the UAF within their respective borders. SAG-U stated that its numbers on international training are provided with the caveat that they are only as accurate as the information that partner nations have voluntarily shared, as SAG-U does not have a command relationship with any of these other countries and cannot enforce reporting requirements.²¹⁷

SAG-U estimates that most UAF basic training—90 percent—is conducted by Ukrainians in Ukraine. The number of UAF troops trained internally has likely increased with the implementation of the new mobilization law. SAG-U predicts that between October 2024 and July 2025, the UAF plans to train 127,000 troops across all levels of training, of which approximately 20,000 will be trained internationally, resulting in approximately 84 percent of all UAF training taking place domestically.²¹⁸

This quarter, the United States trained 298 UAF personnel on the F-16, the M2A2 Bradley, the HIMARS, brigade headquarters procedures, company command, and targeting. The U.S. military conducted this training in the United States, Germany, and Poland.²¹⁹

According to SAG-U, the UAF's training requests have trended toward higher-level collective training for key assets, such as the HIMARS, and continued crew-level training for artillery platforms. The UAF has also expressed interest in developing a U.S.-style master gunner program, which demands a high level of tactical and technical proficiency, for some of its systems. This quarter, UAF training programs increasingly focused on platoon- and battery-level training for the HIMARS, including non-launcher crew elements such as maintainers, platoon and battery commanders, and ammunition supply teams.²²⁰


The UAF is actively growing its force generation capacity through the development of domestic training pipelines led by Ukrainians, according to SAG-U. This quarter, the UAF requested train-the-trainer support for frequently donated platforms, including the M2A2 Bradley armored infantry fighting vehicle and M1117 armored security vehicle, to help them develop that capability in country. In addition to these ongoing courses, SAG-U is coordinating U.S. support for a HIMARS train-the-trainer course. The UAF is also attempting to mature its maintenance capability by increasing its ability to conduct advanced maintenance functions within Ukraine.²²¹

INTERNATIONAL TRAINING OF THE UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES

Countries Training the UAF by Type

Basic Training		Platform/Specialist Training	
Canada	Poland	Canada	Poland
Denmark	Sweden	Czechia	Slovakia
Lithuania	Romania	Finland	Spain
Netherlands	United Kingdom	Germany	Romania
Norway		Italy	United Kingdom
		Netherlands	United States
Collective Training		Leadership Training	
Belgium	Lithuania	Australia	Lithuania
Czechia	Poland	Canada	Netherlands
France	Slovakia	Denmark	Norway
Germany	Spain	Finland	Romania
		France	Sweden
		Germany	United States
		Kosovo	

Approximate Number of UAF Trained



Note: SAG-U reported that it was unable to provide detailed information on international support for UAF training, as the DoD does not exercise command over the IDCC nor any other donor nation. All information on allied and partner nation contributions is reported voluntarily to SAG-U. Many donor nations do not share information on the totality of their contributions, which makes it difficult or impossible to calculate total numbers for international training support.

Sources: SAG-U, response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.4 OAR 084, 10/1/2024.

156,000

Approximate number of UAF personnel trained by the international community since February 2022.

17 percent

Approximate percentage of international training conducted by the United States.

90 percent

Approximate percentage of UAF soldiers who receive basic training from the UAF in Ukraine rather than from the international community.

This quarter, the first group of fully trained pilots began operating F-16s in Ukraine.

The UAF Deploys F-16 Fighters for the First Time, Soviet-era Protocols Hinder Air Force Development

The Air Force Capability Coalition continued to support the development of Ukraine's capability to operate the F-16 this quarter, including the training of Ukrainian pilots and support personnel in the United States and Europe.²²²

This quarter, the first group of fully trained pilots began operating F-16s in Ukraine.²²³ The OUSD(P) reported that while Ukrainian pilots are training on an accelerated timeline, this timeline can fluctuate based on student experience, English language skills, and progression through the training program.²²⁴

Introduction of the F-16 came after a year of Ukrainian requests for advanced western fighter planes, followed by additional months of training of Ukrainian pilots and maintainers.²²⁵ Ukraine plans to employ the F-16s in an air defense role, protecting Ukrainian cities from Russian bombardments. According to media reporting, Ukrainian officials have expressed concerns that the delivery of these assets has been too slow, and the UAF is still several months away from fielding a full squadron of F-16s, which would typically consist of 15 to 24 aircraft.²²⁶

SAG-U reported that the UAF's ability to operate the F-16 is limited by the lack of an aviation general officer on the UAF General Staff, which is composed of land component officers unfamiliar with modern Western combat aircraft capabilities, limitations, and support requirements. According to SAG-U, legacy Soviet-era practices also limit progress in this area. For example, if an aviation accident is determined to be a non-combat event, the Ukrainian criminal prosecution service leads the accident investigation. This has a detrimental effect on safety culture, discouraging transparency and safety improvements.²²⁷

On August 26, a Ukrainian F-16 crashed, and its pilot was killed. This was the first reported loss of a Ukrainian F-16 since the initial delivery of those aircraft less than one month before. At the time of the incident, the pilot was engaged in an operation to shoot down a barrage of more than 200 incoming Russian missiles and UAVs.²²⁸ Four days after the crash, President Zelenskyy fired the head of the Ukrainian air force.²²⁹

As of the end of the quarter, Ukraine was investigating the cause of the crash and had not announced findings from its investigation. On September 17, General James Hecker, Commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe and Africa, told reporters that the DoD was following the investigation and would incorporate any significant findings into its F-16 training for UAF pilots. General Hecker said that the DoD was working to balance its commitment to training Ukrainian pilots with other partner nations to which the U.S. Government has agreed to provide F-16 training.²³⁰

Ukrainian UAS Capability Is Growing in an Evolving Environment

The UAF attributed its initial success in Kursk to a new tactic of using radar-guided, first-person view UAS to intercept and destroy Russian ISR UAVs mid-air, effectively blinding Russian commanders and leaving them unable to monitor the battlefield. Ukrainian forces

also relied on updated jammers, pre-programmed with active Russian frequencies, which disrupted Russian communication networks and UAS control frequencies.²³¹

Since June, Ukrainian combat first-person-view UAS usage has increased by 25 percent, and in July, Ukraine surpassed Russia in long-range UAS employment, according to the DIA. Ukraine is now employing incendiary devices on its UAVs to clear Russian trenches and positions located in tree lines.²³²

Equipping and Training: U.S. support for the UAF’s UAS capability this quarter involved advise, assist, and equip elements focusing mainly on offensive efforts. SAG-U said the most noteworthy contribution this quarter was the provision of explosives to Ukraine to continue production of warheads for one-way attack aircraft.²³³

Ukrainian trainers and original equipment manufacturers provided the bulk of UAS training to Ukrainian forces during the quarter. The UAF continued to train one UAS battalion—approximately 250 personnel—per month. According to SAG-U, the UAF has also begun training its mechanized brigades to implement UAS training.²³⁴ U.S. partners that provide assistance for uncrewed systems have also developed a better understanding of the UAF’s operations, vision for the future, and capability gaps, according to SAG-U.²³⁵

Evolving Needs: SAG-U said that the greatest challenge to meeting the UAF’s UAS requirements was the evolving nature of the Ukrainian military and its tactics, which creates ambiguity about capability needs. Likewise, a lack of operational analytics on some of the UAF’s capabilities hinders SAG-U’s ability to make informed decisions on support.²³⁶

Ukrainian trainers and original equipment manufacturers provided the bulk of UAS training to Ukrainian forces during the quarter.

Table 15.

U.S. and International UAS Assistance to Ukraine

Top UAF Requests

- Munitions to weaponize one-way attack UAVs
- Specific components to bolster and scale up Ukrainian domestic manufacturing of preferred platforms
- Direct funding of Ukrainian-manufactured UAS platforms
- Funding and procurement of certain U.S.-made UAS

U.S. Assistance Provided During the Quarter

- Explosives to enable the Ukrainians to produce warheads for one-way attack aircraft
- Fixed-wing UAS for ISR
- Loitering munitions
- Long-range, one-way attack aircraft
- Operator and staff training to assist in force generation efforts to form new UAS battalions within the UAF

Nations that Have Provided UAS Training Since 2022

Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Türkiye, United Kingdom, United States

Sources: SAG-U, response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.4 OAR 070 and 24.4 OAR 086, 10/1/2024.

A noticeable trend for the UAF is to protect its troops from combat threats by replacing them with uncrewed systems whenever possible.

In addition, UAS technology and employment are constantly evolving alongside the domestic industrial base that supports operations, SAG-U said. A noticeable trend for the UAF is to protect its troops from combat threats by replacing them with uncrewed systems whenever possible. Uncrewed systems permeate all services and operations in some form or fashion as part of the effort to preserve the lives of the UAF's fighting force. Uncrewed aircraft and ground, maritime surface, and subsurface vehicles now dominate the battlespace, and the UAF is focused on continuing to trend in this direction.²³⁷

SAG-U said that the UAF has shifted focus from U.S.-provided UAS to support for Ukrainian manufactured systems. Increased reliance on locally produced systems has helped reduce costs, eliminate foreign field service representatives, and improve the ability of end-users to provide direct feedback to the manufacturer to hasten improvements and modifications.²³⁸

Many UAF units have become proficient at maintaining, repairing, and modifying their UAS as needed to improve performance and efficacy, according to SAG-U. Some units have developed their own research and development components to correct known deficiencies of donated platforms and perform basic aircraft checkouts prior to distribution to the operational elements.²³⁹ The UAF has employed both commercial and custom-built UAS and counter-UAS technology in its Kursk incursion.²⁴⁰

UAF Electronic Warfare Struggles to Keep Pace with Russia

SAG-U said that the UAF continues to increase its proficiency in electronic warfare: manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum to deny the enemy or to ensure friendly use of wireless communications, including control of uncrewed systems.²⁴¹ This quarter, the UAF increased its electronic warfare capabilities with an increase in donated equipment, but the pace of equipment donation has not kept up with the rapid reprogramming and hardware upgrades that Russian forces are performing on their systems and devices, according to SAG-U.²⁴²

The UAF receives training on systems it currently has, ranging from maintenance training on electromagnetic support platforms to training on newer systems, if they are approved to be donated or purchased. The UAF has received several parts, such as amplifiers, to improve its own systems to meet electronic warfare gaps. According to SAG-U, these new and improved systems will provide greater fidelity for specialized electronic warfare units.²⁴³

The UAF Adapts Medical Capabilities to Battlefield Realities

SAG-U assessed that the UAF's medical capabilities were generally improving, but still have gaps in workforce, equipment, training, and some specific skill sets. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Healthcare Department, established in early 2024, has developed policies aimed at addressing challenges and better aligning coalition support to meet priority requirements, according to SAG-U. For example, the Department published a policy in July that established standards of medical skills that may be performed by combat medics in the pre-hospital environment.²⁴⁴

Ukrainian recruits wrap a simulated casualty in a heat blanket during training. (NATO photo)



SAG-U said that the United States and coalition partners have trained 430 UAF personnel in combat life saver training and 1,020 personnel in platoon combat medic training in 2024. In addition, the UAF has made more than 400 specific requests for medical items through the IDCC and consistently communicates its need for armored ambulances as a top priority. Additional UAF medical needs include tourniquets, hypothermia prevention kits, and infusion equipment.²⁴⁵ According to SAG-U, UAF medical capabilities have been challenged by competing priorities with other categories of equipment and armored ambulances approved in past PDA drawdowns have not been delivered quickly.²⁴⁶

SAG-U said that it has recommended that the UAF adopt tactical combat casualty care training, based on Ukraine's experiences on the battlefield, where timelines to definitive medical care may be unknown. For example, SAG-U has recommended expanding field medical training, such as tourniquet use, as a part of basic training for all recruits, though this will ultimately be weighed against how much time is available.²⁴⁷

OTHER SECURITY SUPPORT TO UKRAINE

ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE

Agencies across the U.S. Government—including the DoD, State, USAID, and the Department of Energy (DoE)—work together on the defense and reconstitution of Ukraine's critical national infrastructure.

The OUSD(P) said that priorities for protection are energy generation and transmission, following Russia's deliberate targeting of this critical infrastructure. Failure to provide adequate heating and power during the winter could result in humanitarian catastrophe and destabilizing migration.²⁴⁸ During the quarter, U.S. Government agencies worked to develop a comprehensive U.S. Government policy on further assistance for passive protection for energy infrastructure in Ukraine.²⁴⁹

Defenses at priority energy sites have proven largely effective against Russian attacks. According to the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, the DoE, USAID, and State continue to engage with the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy and the Ministry for Reconstruction on additional requests for material support for critical infrastructure protection.²⁵⁰

DoD: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in consultation with other U.S. Government agencies, continued developing protection measures for critical energy infrastructure, according to USEUCOM. This included identifying critical energy sites in preparation for protection implementation in future assistance.²⁵¹

DoD support includes air defense systems designed to lower the cost per intercept following the increased use of low-cost one-way attack UAVs against critical infrastructure.²⁵² The DoD has also provided passive protection materials through PDA, such as rapidly deployable barriers to increase the survivability of key energy components. This material is unlikely to withstand direct impact but improves the survivability of critical equipment against indirect damage, according to the OUSD(P).²⁵³

Table 16.

DoE Activities During the Quarter to Protect Critical National Infrastructure

Activity Type	Activity During the Quarter
Passive Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provided technical recommendations to the Ukrainian government on measures it can take to improve the effectiveness of its passive protection. Provided UAS valued at \$169,000 to the National Guard of Ukraine to support protection and response at the three nuclear power plants remaining under Ukrainian control.
Risk Assessment and Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continued support for remote sensing, crisis management planning, and nuclear power plant risk analysis to prepare for and respond to nuclear or radiological incidents and emergencies in Ukraine. Conducted courses and coordination meetings on risk assessment securing and transporting radioactive materials for the UAF and several Ukrainian government agencies and organizations. Provided a high-volume air sampler and gamma spectrometer to better identify radiological releases and attribute their cause.
Capacity Building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supported workshops and training on countering nuclear smuggling, insider threat mitigation, cyber security training for nuclear power plant operators, basic radiation protection for public health and safety, and nuclear forensics for Ukrainian forces. Supported joint exercises among Armed Forces, State Security Service, National Guard, State Border Guard Service, National Police, and State Emergency Service to identify, respond to, and mitigate the threat of radiological and nuclear material.
Technical Exchange	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organized a nuclear security technical exchange for Ukraine's State Security Service and the National Guard of Ukraine. This included a tour of the second-largest nuclear reactor site in the United States, engagements with cybersecurity experts from the commercial nuclear industry, and meetings with FBI teams tasked with mitigating internal threats.
Radiological and Nuclear Response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supported a State-funded workshop that focused on strategic communication, international coordination, and logistics during nuclear or chemical response, among other topics. Hosted Ukrainian officials for a nuclear forensics train-the-trainer event in the United States to support in-country delivery of training objectives by UAF to essential operators. Provided initial regional-level rapid response training for CBRN responders focused on public health and safety response. Provided radioactive source removal equipment to support source recovery operations near front lines or crisis regions. Delivered aerial and vehicle-based radiation detection, handheld detection equipment, supporting ancillary equipment, and associated training materials.

Source: DoE OIG, response to DoD OIG request for information, 24.4 WOG DOE 02, 24.4 WOG DOE 04, and 24.4 WOG DOE 05, 10/3/2024.

USAID: USAID focused on mobilizing resources to help counterparts restore generation capacity; repair transmission damage; support new small-scale power generation potential; achieve resilience by redundancy, including by storing excess critical assets; and providing passive protection assistance.²⁵⁴ USAID procured critical repair equipment and materials for Ukraine, such as autotransformers, transformers, and thousands of meters of wire and cable.²⁵⁵ USAID also procured rebar, steel wire mesh, and gabion barriers to help the Ukrainian government provide Level 1 and Level 2 passive protection at critical energy, rail, and port sites.²⁵⁶ These measures have been particularly effective in protecting energy assets, including by deterring attacks.²⁵⁷ USAID is working with the UN humanitarian groups to provide backup generation at key utilities sites.²⁵⁸ USAID is providing all the materials for passive protection that the Ukrainian government has requested of it thus far.²⁵⁹

DoE: The National Nuclear Security Agency provided technical recommendations to the Ukrainian government on measures it can take to improve the effectiveness of its passive protection.²⁶⁰

The DoE reported that it faces several challenges in coordinating energy assistance to Ukraine. The wartime environment limits in-country activities and travel, while strict bureaucracy, frequent Ukrainian staff turnover, and corruption limit consistent implementation. The high operational tempo has contributed to staff burnout. Similarly, high staff turnover, particularly at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, has impeded the DoE's ability to fully integrate efforts and contributed to delays in interagency policy and program decisions.²⁶¹

CYBERSECURITY

The United States Sanctions Russian Hackers Targeting U.S., European Infrastructure

In July, the United States sanctioned two leaders of an organization of Russia-based malicious hackers, the Cyber Army of Russia Reborn. While these hackers initially focused their attacks on infrastructure assets in Ukraine, the group has since targeted countries that have supported Ukraine in its resistance to Russia's aggression, State said.²⁶²

For example, the Cyber Army of Russia Reborn was responsible for cyber attacks against water supply, hydroelectric, wastewater, and energy facilities in the United States and Europe.²⁶³ State noted that the Russian government continues to provide a safe haven to cybercriminals and enables their malicious cyber activities against the United States and its allies and partners.²⁶⁴

State Supports Cybersecurity, Countering Russian Influence in the Western Balkans

Russia's efforts to hack and disrupt online activities drew condemnation from U.S. and international authorities, according to diplomatic statements.²⁶⁵ In late July, 15 member states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including the United States, denounced Russia's continued cyber attacks across the OSCE region.²⁶⁶

During the quarter, State's Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy obligated \$9.1 million in supplemental funding to strengthen cybersecurity in the Western Balkans and Albania, with the purpose of countering Russian influence in the Balkan region, State said.

This quarter, State reported that Russia's malign efforts included cyber attacks against the International Olympic and Paralympic committees to tarnish the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic games held in Paris.²⁶⁷

USAID's \$128 million Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure program seeks to strengthen the resilience of Ukraine's critical infrastructure against cyberattacks by fostering collaboration between government, the private sector, academia, and civil society. USAID supported a Cybersecurity Innovation Hackathon in August and will provide mentoring to the winners to help them apply for grants to develop their ideas. In addition, USAID contributed to the launch of Ukraine's first educational Cybersecurity Industrial Control System Laboratory in August. This lab will train cyber specialists to help reduce and eliminate vulnerabilities in industrial control systems.²⁶⁸

During the quarter, State's Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy obligated \$9.1 million in supplemental funding to strengthen cybersecurity in the Western Balkans and Albania, with the purpose of countering Russian influence in the Balkan region, State said.²⁶⁹

Related programs will support key government institutions in the region, as well as defend against key national or sector-specific vulnerabilities, State reported.²⁷⁰ The support will also extend to the Western Balkans group within the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, a Netherlands-based international cooperation body, State said.²⁷¹ In Albania, the supplemental funds will purchase software and hardware for the country's National Security Operations Center, State reported.²⁷²

CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Community policing: State INL assistance seeks to help Ukrainian law enforcement transition from a post-Soviet concept of district police officers to a community policing model, focusing on service to the community and crime prevention. During the quarter, State INL support enabled the National Police of Ukraine (NPU) to add 82 new officers in Rivne Region and create a new unit of 199 police officers in Khmelnytsky region. State said the new unit will patrol and respond to calls in 15 communities and 374 other small towns and villages. State also said this launch concludes a pilot expansion of the Patrol Police from major region cities to the districts, which the NPU and State INL began in 2015.²⁷³

In September, State began a 1-year program with the Department of Justice (DoJ) to help the NPU recruit new cadets for the Patrol Police and increase quality control oversight within the Patrol Police. The program seeks to permanently transition recruitment and training away from DoJ support to the Patrol Police, provide leadership and management training for front-line supervisors, increase the NPU's criminal analysis investigation capacity, and support end-use monitoring of State INL-donated equipment.²⁷⁴

Equipment Delivery: This quarter, State INL delivered \$43 million of emergency equipment including drones, armored vehicles, medical kits, generators, weapons, IT equipment, and other supplies to Ukrainian partners.²⁷⁵ State noted that a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) and a Toyota Land Cruiser donated to the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS) were destroyed by a mine and Russian artillery fire, respectively. None of the 11 vehicle occupants were harmed, leading State to conclude that these incidents "demonstrate the life-saving impact of INL's law enforcement assistance to Ukraine."²⁷⁶

Leadership exchanges: State INL coordinated high-level visits for U.S. Government officials and Ukrainian government personnel and funded training for Ukrainian law enforcement during the quarter. In August, leadership from the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection met with the SBGS to explore joint solutions to border security challenges.²⁷⁷

In July, State INL supported a delegation of Ukrainian Members of Parliament, their staff, and police officers attended the National Association of School Resource Officers conference in Phoenix, Arizona, where delegation participants expressed a desire to create a School Security Service Officer program in Ukraine.²⁷⁸ According to State, the School Security Service Officers are focused on immediate issues of protecting children from airborne attacks and providing evacuation training to students and school staff.²⁷⁹ In August, State INL led an NPU delegation to study crisis negotiation teams in the United States, including those at the FBI, the Orange County Sheriff’s Office in California, and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department in Nevada.²⁸⁰ In September, a delegation of Ukrainian law enforcement personnel attended the International Association of Women Police Annual Conference in Chicago, Illinois.²⁸¹

Moldova: In July and August, State INL provided training for Moldovan officials on emerging threats related to trafficking in persons. Led by a Ukrainian expert in open-source intelligence, 30 Moldovan law enforcement representatives focused on fighting child exploitation and finding missing persons. The course aimed to strengthen the capacity of investigators and prosecutors to use open-source intelligence for anti-human trafficking.²⁸² State INL also provided training on asset forfeiture and money laundering to representatives from the Moldova’s General Prosecutor’s Office, the Service for Preventing and Combating Money Laundering, and the National Anticorruption Center.²⁸³

In September, State INL provided the final tranche of equipment for a project with Moldova’s General Police Inspectorate Forensics Lab Digital Evidence Unit. The donation included three computers valued at \$107,000. Previously, State INL helped upgrade the unit’s server room and local area network to improve the unit’s ability to process large amounts of data from digital sources.²⁸⁴

DEMINING

Since 2022, landmines and other unexploded ordnance in Ukraine have caused more than 1,000 civilian injuries and fatalities.²⁸⁵ One-third of Ukraine’s territory is contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance, and up to 15 percent of Ukraine’s farmland remains unusable due to their presence.²⁸⁶ A report issued in September estimated that since February 2022, landmines and unexploded ordnance suppressed Ukraine’s gross domestic product by \$11.2 billion (nearly 6 percent of Ukraine’s gross domestic product in 2021), and the value of Ukraine’s exports declined by \$9 billion while regional tax revenues declined by more than \$1 billion.²⁸⁷

State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) leads the U.S. Government’s demining efforts in Ukraine, with contributions from State INL and SAG-U. As of mid-September 2024, State PM/WRA had obligated more than \$184 million, and disbursed approximately \$130 million, primarily in Nonproliferation,

Since 2022, landmines and other unexploded ordnance in Ukraine have caused more than 1,000 civilian injuries and fatalities.

Since February 2022, State INL has provided \$13 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds for demining and disposal operations for other types of unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices.

Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related funds for humanitarian demining programs in Ukraine.²⁸⁸ In addition, on September 11, State announced it had allocated an additional \$103 million for demining programs, with more than \$86 million deriving from Ukraine supplemental Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related and Diplomatic Programs appropriations and the remainder deriving from State's base appropriations for FY 2023 and FY 2024.²⁸⁹ Since February 2022, State INL has provided \$13 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds for demining and disposal operations for other types of unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices.²⁹⁰

U.S. demining assistance follows two general approaches: deploying contractor and NGO teams to conduct demining activities and providing the Ukrainian government the capacity to identify and safely dispose of mines and unexploded ordnance itself. State said U.S. assistance has supported the deployment of more than 90 contractor and NGO demining teams across nine Ukrainian regions.²⁹¹ These teams supplement approximately 180 Ukrainian government teams, State said.²⁹² As of September, State PM/WRA demining teams had surveyed more than 1,100 square kilometers (425 square miles) of land to identify high-priority minefields for Ukraine to allocate its demining resources.²⁹³ In addition, the teams found and removed more than 4,500 explosive hazards, improving safety for 90,000 Ukrainian civilians living near hazardous areas and returning approximately 2,224 acres of land to productive use.²⁹⁴ Overall, more than more than 494,000 acres of fertile land have been turned over for farming, according to State.²⁹⁵

During the quarter, State PM/WRA funded the operations of a training facility in western Ukraine; conducted manual and mechanical clearance operations; executed non-technical surveys to identify hazardous areas; and provided in-person and digital explosive ordnance risk education.²⁹⁶ In addition, State PM/WRA continued to implement capacity-building activities for Ukrainian humanitarian demining agencies through a train-and-equip project, and a strategic-level capacity-building project that included the following elements.²⁹⁷

Training for the State Special Transport Service: The training addressed explosive hazard awareness, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), battle area clearance, detector training, and heavy demining machinery operation.²⁹⁸ As of September, State had supported training for 1,234 individuals who earned a total of 1,980 completion certificates in explosive ordnance disposal, manual mine clearance and battle area clearance, non-technical survey, hook-and-line, and mechanical training.²⁹⁹

Equipment: State PM/WRA donated demining equipment, valued at approximately \$5.8 million, to the State Special Transport Service. The equipment included four remote-controlled demining machines with attachments to address varied explosive hazards and environments; spare parts; mobile maintenance workshops; and trucks, trailers, and cranes to transport the machines to the field. The donation also included four armored excavators, vehicles, and personal protective equipment.³⁰⁰

Post-removal Safety: State PM/WRA awarded a \$4 million grant to an international NGO to continue efforts to improve the physical safety of conflict-affected communities that have been severely impacted by explosive ordnance, with a focus on operations in the Chernihiv, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr regions.³⁰¹

According to State, since February 2022, it has provided \$13 million of EOD support to include training to the NPU EOD and SBGS tactical units with embedded EOD components. During that time, State INL has trained 96 NPU EOD technicians, other police, and border guards on basic demining and EOD awareness and provided NPU EOD units with bomb suits, x-ray equipment, vehicles, and other equipment to assist officers to safely and effectively expand their work.³⁰² The NPU's demining and other EOD efforts generally operate near the front lines and in city centers that present dangers to Ukraine's armed forces, law enforcement, and civilians.³⁰³ For that reason, State said, NPU clears the way for crime scene investigators and emergency personnel to conduct rescue and recovery operations.³⁰⁴ During the quarter, State INL supported multiple training sessions, including an FBI-led course focused on advanced EOD techniques, and courses on using robots to inspect and detect crimes scenes and conduct seizures and other dismantling operations. For the latter course, State INL also delivered six robots, which State said provide rapid deployment and flexible disarmament capabilities, and 13 Ford vans to transport equipment and personnel.³⁰⁵

State PM/WRA continued to closely monitor demining programs. During the quarter, these monitoring practices included weekly reports and regular phone calls with its contractor, a visit to a training center in Western Ukraine, and meetings with implementors in Kyiv.³⁰⁶ State PM/WRA also maintains a cooperative agreement with an NGO to deploy a third-party monitoring team. The demining program also is monitored under the MEASURE contract, designed to assess whether assistance achieves its intended outcomes.³⁰⁷ State INL said that the dynamic security conditions where the NPU EOD operates preclude State INL from directly monitoring EOD field efforts; however, State INL received regular updates from NPU field offices.³⁰⁸

State cited several demining activity successes in Ukraine this quarter. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin, Germany, held in June, the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy of Ukraine reported that approximately 7.4 million acres of land had been returned to productive use since February 2022.³⁰⁹ In addition, in September, Ukrainian Prime Minister Shmyhal stated that since January, deminers had surveyed, cleared mines from, and returned to farmers approximately 500,000 acres of fertile land in the Kharkiv, Kherson, and Mykolaiv regions.³¹⁰

State also said that as of August, State INL-supported NPU EOD units have responded to 76,596 calls for assistance; demined over 150 square miles of land, mostly in city centers; seized over 326,885 pieces of ordnance; and disposed of 132,966 pieces, including hand- and rocket-propelled grenades, artillery munitions, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, multiple-launch rocket systems, free-flight rockets, and aerial bombs.³¹¹

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NONPROLIFERATION AND BORDER SECURITY

State Continued Efforts to Secure CBRN Materials and Prevent Arms Diversions in Ukraine

This quarter, State's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) continued to provide nonproliferation assistance in two areas. First, State worked to counter Russian weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)

threats.³¹² State ISN’s efforts under this strategic pillar included providing equipment, supplies, expertise, and training to the Ukrainian government and regional stakeholders to prevent, detect, disrupt, mitigate, and respond to Russian weapons of mass destruction and CBRN attacks.³¹³ State ISN also provided equipment and resources to Ukrainian scientists so that they could continue their research.³¹⁴ Second, State ISN coordinated with Ukraine and other nations in the region to increase their capacities to prevent arms diversions and to enhance the capabilities of border security agencies and respond to threats from Russia, arms traffickers, and other malign actors in the region.³¹⁵ Overall, State ISN has obligated approximately \$175 million from both base and Ukraine supplemental appropriations to implement responses in these areas.³¹⁶ (See Table 17.)

State said that during the quarter, State ISN personnel completed the first EUM annual cycle of inspections and secondary checks using a new standard procedure for non-permissive environments, which included checks for relevant equipment provided to Ukraine under the Export Control and Border Security program from July 2016 to December 2023.³¹⁷ State said that program staff conducted in-person inspections in 11 regions, to include 68 locations, inspecting 2,555 items through standard and alternative EUM inspections and reporting, and 5,520 items through delayed EUM reporting in coordination with Ukrainian partners. The equipment, valued at \$9.2 million, was provided to Ukraine’s SBGS, State Service for Export Control of Ukraine, and State Customs Service of Ukraine.³¹⁸

Table 17.

State ISN Nonproliferation and Border Security Programs Related to Ukraine During the Quarter

Pillar	Activity
<p>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Scientific Response</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obligated \$8.3 million to purchase and provide detection, sampling, analysis, protective, and operational equipment to ensure CBRN elements of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and UAF had standardized, complementary, and interoperable equipment for chemical forensics missions. • Awarded a \$2 million grant to secure radiological and nuclear facilities; purchase specialized vehicles for the State Specialize Enterprise Radon Association to recover and transport radioactive material; and provide specialized radiological and chemical detecting equipment to the State Emergency Service. • Brought 20 individuals from the SBU and UAF to the United States for advanced, specialized training in nuclear forensics. State ISN plans to hold a multi-day conference in 2025 on CBRN critical infrastructure protection. • Completed the final delivery of CBRN equipment to the NPU unit in Kyiv that protects diplomatic missions. The equipment included CBRN and ballistic personal protective equipment, radiation pagers, medical supplies, and other operational equipment.
<p>Preventing Arms Diversion and Border Security</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provided training on mobile surveillance equipment, mission planning, and technical skills on camera systems to 15 SBGS officers deployed along approximately 200 kilometers of Ukraine’s frontier region. The training was delivered at the Border Police Center of Excellence for Border Security in Ungheni, Moldova. • Provided training in Ungheni, Moldova, on intermediate medical capabilities, tools and interventions, operations planning, and small unit protocols for casualty prevention to 10 medics from SBGS’s Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Odesa detachments. The trainees also received aquatics training.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 9/23/2024.






USAID's HOVERLA activity equips emergency services across Ukraine with protective uniforms and rescue equipment to enable them to respond to attacks from Russia's forces. (USAID photo)

DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

- 60 Embassy Operations
- 64 Recovery Planning
- 66 Governance and Countering Corruption
- 71 Economic Growth
- 76 Health
- 78 Humanitarian Assistance

Figure 4.

State and USAID Obligated Humanitarian Assistance and Development Funding, by Sector, FY 2024



DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

In addition to security assistance, the U.S. Government provides direct budget support, development, and humanitarian assistance to support Ukraine and its people. State’s Integrated Country Strategy for Ukraine outlines mission objectives related to a variety of U.S.-funded activities in Ukraine.³¹⁹ USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy for Ukraine further identifies objectives and intermediate results related to U.S.-funded development activities in Ukraine.³²⁰

EMBASSY OPERATIONS

MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS

In late May, State implemented a new movement policy and associated procedures to allow the Chief of Mission in Kyiv to approve movements in 14 of 20 regions in Ukraine, including in and around Kyiv and in central and western Ukraine without review from State headquarters in Washington, D.C.³²¹ Movements to other locations controlled by Ukraine but nearer to combat areas, such as in Chernihiv, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and


Sumy may occur, but still require approval from Washington, D.C.³²² State does not authorize movement to locations in Ukraine that Russia controls.³²³ State said it made no additional changes to the policy during the quarter.³²⁴

The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv said the new movement policy had an immediate, positive impact on its ability to execute the President’s policy through increased outreach, oversight, and monitoring of U.S. programs.³²⁵ During the quarter, embassy staff made 95 movements that required Worldwide Protective Services personnel facilitation: 39 movements in and around Kyiv, 29 in central and western Ukraine, and 27 in more distant locations including Dnipro, Kharkiv, and Lviv.³²⁶ Both the number and percentage of overall movements in support of diplomatic and programmatic engagement increased this quarter, indicating that movement policy and procedures approved in May allowed embassy personnel to interact with Ukrainian counterparts and program implementers more often. (See Figure 5.) State said the embassy’s Regional Security Office hired additional Foreign Service National protective security personnel, to build capacity and flexibility for supporting high-level visitors and monitoring visits.³²⁷ The Regional Security Office is examining options for increasing the number of monitoring visits.³²⁸

Nonetheless, the embassy indicated that the uncertain security situation in Ukraine and staffing limitations presented significant challenges to implementing assistance and conducting in-person monitoring.³²⁹ State said that during the quarter, several travel requests to Ukraine were delayed or canceled due to threats and the travel clearance process at State headquarters in Washington, D.C. State noted that the ongoing conflict has challenged the ability of embassy personnell’ to schedule meetings in advance, and that requests for high-value movements often are submitted with only a few days’ notice for Washington’s clearance.³³⁰ According to the embassy, the ability for the Chief of Mission to approve movements to currently restricted regions would improve the ability to meet mission objectives within a risk-based approach on the movement approval process. The embassy said it has formally requested such authority for Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Dnipro.³³¹

Figure 5.

Worldwide Protective Services-facilitated Personnel Movements in Ukraine, January to August 2024



CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTATION

Conscription: USAID reported that its humanitarian assistance partners have raised concerns about the impact of unclear conscription exemptions on locally-hired staff recruitment and retention.³³² Increased checkpoints and police and military stops targeting male staff further complicate the situation. Efforts are underway to monitor these issues and explore potential solutions to mitigate these challenges.³³³

Conscription continues to affect USAID health activities in two primary ways: it disrupts access to services, impacting programmatic targets such as the number of people tested for HIV and treated for tuberculosis; and it inhibits staffing and the procurement of services.³³⁴ USAID is implementing adaptive programmatic approaches to minimize the impact on the number of individuals reached with critical essential services; however, mitigating the effects on staffing and services remains more challenging.³³⁵

Mobilization and civil society groups: Civil society groups faced substantial administrative challenges during the quarter, especially as a result of Ukraine’s mobilization law passed in April.³³⁶ An August report from a civil society monitor described difficulties for such organizations in sustaining their activities and staff, though the law provides exceptions for civil society workers who want to defer military service.³³⁷

The monitor noted a dual strain on Ukrainian civil society organizations during wartime, as the conflict demands robust humanitarian support—even as humanitarian personnel may be mobilized for military service, the report said.³³⁸ Despite the mobilization law’s effective date in May, bureaucratic delays are still posing a hindrance to Ukrainian civil society workers trying to defer their military service, the advocacy group reported.³³⁹ Some applicants have had to submit documentation multiple times, interpret unclear instructions, and navigate a lack of information on the exemptions process for appeals, according to the group’s report.³⁴⁰

Equipment and spare parts: Finding parts and equipment to repair damage from Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is difficult, according to public policy researchers.³⁴¹ Many of these items are Soviet-era designs which Western donor nations cannot easily provide, research indicated.³⁴² There is not enough time to import parts to repair Ukraine’s damaged energy autotransformers before the onset of winter, research showed.³⁴³ Russia has broadened its energy targets in Ukraine to include substations as well as transmission and distribution systems, the same research found.³⁴⁴

MONITORING

USAID site visits in Ukraine continued to be restricted by the number of high-level visitors and the ongoing security environment, which affects the capacity of U.S. and Ukrainian staff to safely monitor activities.³⁴⁵ While USAID reported that it had streamlined the approval process for site visit requests, demands for motor pool, armored vehicle, and security services have increased as staff levels and visits have grown.³⁴⁶ Request for monitoring visits require extensive planning and are often denied by the embassy’s Regional Security Office due to a lack of vehicles or security personnel. According to the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, several requests for monitoring visits were rescheduled due to security threats or high-level visits that were prioritized for Regional Security Office resources.³⁴⁷ USAID Ukraine reported making a

USAID reported that its humanitarian assistance partners have raised concerns about the impact of unclear conscription exemptions on locally-hired staff recruitment and retention.

During the quarter, the Disaster Assistance Response Team, based in Kyiv, conducted monitoring trips for nine activities across six implementers, three regions, and six sectors.

dedicated effort to request a higher volume of oversight trips during the quarter.³⁴⁸ During the quarter, 14 trips for USAID Ukraine programs were delayed or rescheduled by the Regional Security Office due to high-level visits or security threats.³⁴⁹ USAID Ukraine conducted 31 site visits (an increase from 19 site visits in the previous quarter) and 161 third-party monitoring visits (56 in-person visits and 105 virtual site visits) during the quarter.³⁵⁰

Although third-party monitors faced access challenges due to shifting ground conditions and donor demands, all monitoring visits were rescheduled or adjusted to ensure safety and visit integrity, according to USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA).³⁵¹ During the quarter, the Disaster Assistance Response Team, based in Kyiv, conducted monitoring trips for nine activities across six implementers, three regions, and six sectors.³⁵² These included economic recovery, cash, and shelter activities in the Poltava and Kyiv regions in July; protection activities in the Kyiv region in August; and shelter, protection, and health activities in the Kyiv and Ivano-Frankivsk regions in September.³⁵³

USAID uses third-party monitoring contractor to provide oversight for locations which are unavailable or impractical for direct site visits by USAID staff.³⁵⁴ While USAID's Mission in Ukraine continued to expand its third-party monitoring mechanism, most USAID awards were not covered during the quarter. USAID reported that only 3 of its 51 active awards, the Energy Security Program (\$920 million award), Agriculture Growing Rural Opportunities (\$205 million award), and the Competitive Economy Project (\$170 million award), were supported by third-party monitoring.³⁵⁵

Coverage of the Agriculture Growing Rural Opportunities and the Competitive Economy Project ended this quarter.³⁵⁶ Of the remaining 48 active awards, 6 are ending this quarter, 13 are unsuitable for third-party monitoring (as support activities, architecture services, and audit support), and 4 are in the final stages of procurement or startup, leaving 19 awards which could be eligible for third-party monitoring but are not currently covered, according to USAID.³⁵⁷ USAID plans to extend its third-party monitoring mechanism next quarter to its Decentralization Offering Better Results and Efficiency (\$107 million), Governance and Local Accountability (\$150 million), Democratic Governance East Activity (\$157 million), Ukraine Confidence Building Initiative 4 (a \$252 million USAID Office of Transition Initiatives award), Health Reform Support (\$137 million), and Support TB Control Efforts in Ukraine (\$55.5 million) awards.³⁵⁸ Third-party monitoring of the Energy Security Program will continue.³⁵⁹

State has limited access to monitoring programs and operations in some locations. State's Bureau for Political-Military Affairs Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages this challenge through cooperative agreement with an NGO. The NGO completes site visits to verify the accuracy of demining implementers reports and their compliance with award terms and conditions.³⁶⁰ Other embassy sections, such as those representing State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations, and Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) Export Control and Border Security Program, and USAID rely on third-party monitors; while several others rely on the embassy-wide Monitoring, Evaluation and Audit Services for Ukraine (MEASURE) contract.³⁶¹ Embassy sections conduct virtual monitoring and telephone interviews with implementers.³⁶² One section also noted that, when possible, it conducts some programs outside the country, and two sections noted they have hired or intend to hire Ukrainian locals, who are not subject to travel restrictions, to conduct program monitoring.³⁶³

Administration of Foreign Affairs

The Diplomatic Programs account is used to support the people, infrastructure, security, and programs that facilitate implementation of U.S. foreign policy.³⁶⁴ State received a total of \$522 million for the Diplomatic Programs account from the five Ukraine supplemental appropriations acts.³⁶⁵ As of September 30, State had obligated or transferred a total of \$487 million and disbursed \$315 million in Diplomatic Programs funds, as well as approximately \$8 million from FY 2024 base appropriations for its Ukraine response.³⁶⁶ During the quarter, State said that it obligated \$72.4 million and expended \$80.5 million in Diplomatic Programs funds appropriated in the Ukraine supplementals.³⁶⁷ State said it used these funds to sustain U.S. and locally employed staff supporting State's Ukraine responses, continue protecting American personnel and facilities in Ukraine and Russia, bolster sanctions targeting Russian entities, counter Russian disinformation, and conduct diplomatic engagement to promote partners' support for Ukraine and hold Russia accountable.³⁶⁸

RECOVERY PLANNING

In a July speech just before the end of her tenure, Penny Pritzker, the U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine's Economic Recovery, recommended Ukraine commit to implementing five elements of Ukraine's Path to Prosperity.³⁶⁹ (See Table 18.)

According to the White House, Pritzker's work creating a new model for war risk insurance has lent confidence to companies doing business in Ukraine.³⁷⁰ During the quarter, Ukrainian officials called for continued war risk insurance from multilateral and private donors.³⁷¹ During and prior to the quarter, Pritzker led multiple delegations of U.S. business leaders throughout Europe with the objective of preparing for Ukraine's economic recovery and EU accession, according to State.³⁷²

Table 18.

Ukraine's Path to Prosperity

- Ukraine must develop a whole-of-government planning capacity.
- Ukraine needs to establish "shovel-ready" construction projects to attract foreign investment in the near term.
- Ukraine should advance its reform and anti-corruption efforts, which would also encourage large-scale economic investment.
- Public and private foreign investors must marshal investment capital, in combination with authorized seizure of Russian sovereign assets and war risk insurance.
- Ukraine will "need all its people back" for a workforce to drive a national economic resurgence.

Source: State, press release, "Ukraine's Path to Prosperity: Remarks by Penny Pritzker, Special Representative for Ukraine's Economic Recovery, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs," 7/31/2024.

During a July visit to Kyiv, Marisa Lago, the Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, reaffirmed U.S. support for Ukraine’s war effort, while sounding a note of caution about Ukraine’s ongoing labor shortages, taxation policies, and overall business climate, according to diplomatic reporting.³⁷³

The Under Secretary also emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s continued economic reforms as a key part of winning the war and laying the groundwork for a prosperous post-conflict future.³⁷⁴ Continued engagement—both from the U.S. Government, and private-sector U.S. businesses active in Ukraine—will be needed to drive Ukrainian business reforms and generate revenue, which the country can apply to its war effort, Lago said, according to a transcript from the event. A robust economy is “as critical to Ukraine’s success in the war and in future peace as the direct military campaign to defend the country,” the transcript said.³⁷⁵

Developments in 2022 Pipeline Explosion Case Spark Diplomatic Dispute

In August, Germany announced the results of its investigation into the September 2022 Nord Stream gas pipeline explosion, sparking a diplomatic dispute between Germany and Poland. The offshore pipeline system, the world’s largest, transmits Russia’s natural gas to Germany’s Baltic coast.³⁷⁶ The investigation found that a small group of Ukrainians used Poland as a base from which to sabotage the pipeline, according to media reporting.³⁷⁷

Germany’s investigation found that Polish law enforcement did not act on an arrest warrant for one of the suspects, which German authorities had issued in June. The suspect, a Ukrainian citizen, has since left Germany and is now believed to be in Ukraine, media reported.³⁷⁸ Russia also expressed dissatisfaction with the current situation, arguing that Germany’s purported slow progress in the Nord Stream investigation meant the country was failing to do its part in the global fight against terrorism, according to media.³⁷⁹

Polish authorities assessed that all suspects are now in Ukraine, press reports said.³⁸⁰ Ukrainian law forbids the extradition of Ukrainian citizens, media reported.³⁸¹ President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Valeriy Zaluzhnyy, former commander of the UAF, had approved of the operation, press reports said. However, spokespersons for both Zelenskyy and Zaluzhnyy denied knowledge of and involvement in the operation, according to media.³⁸²

The dispute has also threatened to damage relations between Germany and Ukraine, even as authorities in Berlin continue to lend military and diplomatic support to Kyiv, according to media reporting.³⁸³ As of October, the Nord Stream controversy continued, according to media and U.S. diplomatic reports.³⁸⁴



GOVERNANCE AND COUNTERING CORRUPTION

According to State, Ukraine’s corruption and rule-of-law concerns will be the country’s primary impediment to post-war economic recovery and attracting foreign investment.³⁸⁵ Ukraine has spent the last decade fighting corruption through anti-corruption organizations, substantial reforms, and frequent media investigations. State reported Ukraine’s “deep commitment” to tackling corruption, evidenced through the country’s efforts to strengthen independent anti-corruption institutions and implement reforms aligned with EU and international norms.³⁸⁶

However, corruption continues to complicate Ukraine’s efforts to achieve its EU and NATO aspirations. Judges, politicians, and officials have been charged with corruption and the Ministry of Defense has been a key player in many corruption scandals, according to State and the media.³⁸⁷ State reported that a recent attempt to combine the two procurement agencies during the war was viewed negatively by NATO and Group of 7 (G7) officials.³⁸⁸ In September, Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) dismissed its first deputy over suspected whistleblower reprisal against a NABU employee who reported a possible information leak of sensitive case material to the Office of the President.³⁸⁹

Nonetheless, State and the DoD cited progress countering corruption in Ukraine during the quarter, including:

U.S. Assistance: State in late August said that there remains no credible evidence of illicit diversion of U.S.-provided defense equipment, direct budget support, or humanitarian assistance from Ukraine—even as Russia spreads disinformation to the contrary, according

USAID’s anticorruption activity supported UNDP’s effort to organize a Youth Innovation Camp to help equip participants with basic knowledge about integrity and inclusiveness in the democratic process. (USAID photo)

to a diplomatic cable.³⁹⁰ Ukrainians are effectively using U.S. security assistance on the battlefield every day to defend their country, the cable said.³⁹¹

Energy: In August, a Ukrainian deputy energy manager was detained by the country’s security service and subsequently dismissed after being caught receiving a \$500,000 bribe to smuggle state-owned mining equipment.³⁹²

In September, the Ukrainian government pressured Ukrenergo, Ukraine’s national electricity network operator, to remove its president, allegedly for his failure to ensure the security of the network.³⁹³ However, observers asserted that the dismissal was part of an effort to undermine the independence of Ukraine’s energy sector and bring it under direct government control.³⁹⁴ Two members of Ukrenergo’s supervisory board resigned in protest of the dismissal, calling the ouster politically motivated, media said.³⁹⁵

The European Union and international financial institutions publicly expressed concern that the Ukrainian government exercising political pressure on the ostensibly independent organization could lead to political interference and corruption in awarding energy contracts, according to State and the media.³⁹⁶ G7 officials urged the Ukrainian government to reverse course, with G7 ambassadors publicly concurring that the move “could jeopardize our collective ability to support Ukrenergo and other priority measures of Ukraine’s vital energy security.”³⁹⁷

Defense: In the defense sector, senior DoD leaders have engaged with Ukrainian counterparts to advocate for reforms to enhance transparency and accountability, such as defense procurement, corporate governance, human resource management, professional military education, logistics, and democratic civilian control of the military. According to the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)), the Ukrainian government has made progress in these areas but will need to continue making improvements for Ukraine to achieve its Euro-Atlantic integration goals.³⁹⁸

Table 19.

U.S. Goals Related to Counter-Corruption

Integrated Country Strategy

Ukraine implements sustainable reforms of its institutions, with a focus on anti-corruption laws, regulations, and enforcement; transparent financial and fiscal systems; and the justice sector.

Ukraine builds its capacity for regulatory oversight and holds accountable those responsible for committing malfeasance or misfeasance.

Country Development Cooperation Strategy

Increased health system transparency.

Economic impact of corruption reduced in likely sectors.

Strengthened anti-corruption systems and practices

Source: State, “Integrated Country Strategy-Ukraine,” 8/29/2023; USAID Ukraine, “Ukraine Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2019-2024, Extended Through Jan 9, 2026,” 1/4/2024.

Advocacy and media: Several civic activists and investigative journalists working on anti-corruption have faced pressure or harassment, including two key civil society organization leaders (subgrantees) working with USAID’s Pro-Integrity activity.³⁹⁹ In response to increasing pressures on the media, USAID’s media program has pivoted resources to support physical and digital security resources for outlets under threat.⁴⁰⁰

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

USAID continued to support Ukrainian government entities to enhance anti-corruption, transparency, and integrity measures to be more accountable to their citizens.⁴⁰¹ (See Table 20.)

USAID has provided over \$8.5 million to develop and implement Prozorro, a fully electronic public procurement platform to ensure open access to public contract opportunities in Ukraine.⁴⁰² USAID has supported Prozorro, launched as a pilot in February 2015, since 2016.⁴⁰³ In August 2016, the use of the Prozorro system became mandatory for all public procurements.⁴⁰⁴ According to USAID, Ukraine’s public procurement reform, centered around the Prozorro eProcurement system, has significantly curbed corruption and saved over \$9.1 billion from 2016 to 2024 by promoting competition and lower contract prices by 7-10 percent.⁴⁰⁵ Civic oversight through the DOZORRO network, which uses open data from Prozorro, identified over 42,000 high-risk tenders and filed over 35,400 appeals, leading to the cancellation or amendment of contracts worth \$1.1 billion.⁴⁰⁶ Despite the ongoing war, 80 percent of public procurement is conducted through Prozorro, with competitive bidding still strong in frontline regions.⁴⁰⁷

In particular, USAID aided in the technical development of a new module in Prozorro, enabling international donors, including the World Bank, to conduct procurement for Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts.⁴⁰⁸ The module allows donors to either act as contracting authorities or collaborate with Ukrainian authorities for rebuilding war-damaged infrastructure.⁴⁰⁹ In September, Ukraine’s First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy, Yulia Svyrydenko, announced the first procurement under the World Bank through Prozorro, opening up new opportunities for domestic producers to participate in procurement for donor-funded projects.⁴¹⁰ The contract opportunity is part of an experimental project in partnership with the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine to upgrade equipment and software in 25 regional branches of the Ukrainian Pension Fund.⁴¹¹

Table 20.

USAID-supported Anti-Corruption Activities During the Quarter

Program	Activity During the Quarter
Pro-Integrity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Embedded experts, technology improvements to enhance transparency and monitor corruption, and supported transparent recruitment and hiring practices. This included implementing changes to ensure that groups such as returning veterans have the ability to enter and contribute to the civil service at both national and local levels. Supported local civil society organizations to strengthen anti-corruption watchdogs, as well as provide diverse expertise leading to transparency improvements in the government.
Accounting Chamber of Ukraine Capacity Strengthening	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conducted training for state auditors to build their capacity to improve audit efficiency and alignment with international standards.
Justice for All	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supported a people-centered justice sector through modernizing local courts, expanding local access through community justice centers, supporting modernization of the legal education system, and providing expertise for access to judicial services during wartime.

Source: USAID Ukraine, response to USAID OIG request for information, 9/27/2024.

In August, State INL and the International Development Law Organization signed a letter of agreement to conduct a 2-year, \$2.9 million program to support the selection of candidates for the High Anti-Corruption Court, Supreme Court, and State Judicial Administration.

USAID said that the World Bank's use of Prozorro will increase transparency and accountability in selecting companies for reconstruction projects, ensuring effective use of global taxpayer funds.⁴¹² Prozorro facilitates procurement in the global marketplace, ensures compliance with global procurement standards that make reconstruction efforts more efficient, and aligns with the World Bank's and other international institutions' goals of managing funds responsibly during Ukraine's recovery.⁴¹³

Anti-corruption and transparent revenue generation activities face uncertainty around outstanding reforms to key stakeholders, including the State Customs Service and Accounting Chamber of Ukraine, according to USAID.⁴¹⁴ The long absence of leaders of partner institutions such as the Ministry of Restoration and the State Agency for Restoration and Development of Infrastructure of Ukraine has caused minor delays in advancing some USAID activities, although the recent appointment of new leadership is expected to resolve this challenge.⁴¹⁵

ANTI-CORRUPTION ADVISING AND TRAINING

State said INL, in coordination with the Department of Justice (DoJ) and other partners, has operated a decades-long anti-corruption program aimed at improving Ukrainian institutions' capacities to investigate, prosecute, convict, and seize assets of government officials at all levels who are engaged in public corruption.⁴¹⁶ State INL provides capacity building, equipment, and technical support to advance legislation to strengthen their independence and ability to effectively counter corruption in Ukraine.⁴¹⁷

During the quarter, State INL continued its efforts to support reforms and improve capacities to further Ukraine's integration with Europe:

Combatting bribery: In May, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) signed a 2-year letter of agreement with State INL to provide technical assistance to Ukraine as it works toward accession to the OECD's Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.⁴¹⁸ During the quarter, State said INL assisted Ukraine with efforts to combat foreign bribery and to accelerate Ukraine's progress toward membership in the OECD's Working Group on Bribery.⁴¹⁹

Selection and training of judges: In August, State INL and the International Development Law Organization (IDLO) signed a letter of agreement to conduct a 2-year, \$2.9 million program to support the selection of candidates for the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC), Supreme Court, and State Judicial Administration.⁴²⁰ According to State, the project supports merit-based hiring to fill more than 2,500 vacancies across the judiciary, and will address years-long case backlogs and rebuild public trust.⁴²¹ IDLO continued to implement a State INL-supported effort to vet prosecutors for the Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG), conducting 264 background checks and 47 integrity questionnaires.⁴²² IDLO also assisted the High Court of Justice Ethics Council in conducting integrity checks and producing integrity questions for 13 candidates for the HACC.⁴²³ In late August, INL and USAID co-hosted an orientation session for the Public Council of International Experts' support for the selection process for 25 HACC candidates.⁴²⁴

State said INL held legal writing workshops in Lviv and Kyiv for NABU detectives and prosecutors from OPG and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) that

addressed the fundamentals for preparing legal documents.⁴²⁵ In addition, the Department of Justice Resident Legal Advisor, embedded with State INL at the Embassy in Kyiv, led a comprehensive 3-day program on open-source intelligence and malware challenges and investigations for OPG, NABU, National Police of Ukraine, and SAPO investigators and prosecutors.⁴²⁶ State said the DOJ Resident Legal Advisor provided technical guidance in partnership with INL on draft legislation to improve plea bargaining options for SAPO prosecutors to secure cooperation against other corrupt actors and the recovery of ill-gotten proceeds of corruption.⁴²⁷

State noted that Ukraine has achieved some successes related to anti-corruption, prosecution, and judicial institutions.⁴²⁸ For example, Ukraine has passed seven laws since December 2023 to strengthen anti-corruption institutions, increase transparency of SAPO and HACC hiring and vetting practices, secure SAPO’s separate legal entity status for furthering their independence, and require asset disclosure for government officials.⁴²⁹ State also noted that half of the 1,300 OPG prosecutors who have undergone re-attestation either resigned prior to the start of, or did not pass, the process.⁴³⁰

Additionally, a joint assessment by State INL, the EU, and the Japanese government found NABU to be an independent institution capable of combating high-level corruption. The assessment offered 150 recommendations that State INL and other global partners will help NABU implement.⁴³¹

Lastly, in August, the directors for NABU and SAPO announced their combined results for anti-corruption activities for January to June 2024, which included 323 new investigations, 166 suspects, 131 indictments, and 36 convictions. In addition, they reported the Ukrainian government recouped approximately \$89 million, most of which was provided to the military to purchase UAVs. The directors provided updates on the corruption and bribery cases for several high-level government officials and justices.⁴³² (See Table 21.)

Table 21.

Corruption and Bribery Investigations, Indictments, and Prosecutions of High-Level Ukrainian Officials

Agency	Activity
<p>NABU and SAPO</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After a 5-month investigation, charged the Chair of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine for accepting a \$1.36 million bribe and falsifying asset declarations. • With the SBU, arrested the Deputy Minister of Energy for receiving a \$500,000 bribe from the representative of a state-owned coal company; the Deputy Minister was subsequently dismissed from his position. • Uncovered a \$170,000 bribe involving OPG prosecutors who accepted the money to close a criminal case. • Launched criminal proceedings against the First Deputy Director for the State Bureau of Investigation Office for Undeclared Property after media reports that he resides in an elite Kyiv apartment not disclosed in his official declaration of assets. The National Agency on Corruption Prevention is also monitoring the situation.
<p>HACC</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiated hearings against the former Chairman of the Supreme Court, who is accused of receiving a \$3 million bribe. • Set bail for “Servant of the People” MP Mykola Zadorozhny, who is charged with seeking kickbacks from repair funds in Sumy.

Source: State, responses to State OIG request for information, 9/23/2024.

In late July, Ukraine secured a preliminary deal with creditors for restructuring \$20 billion in public debt, according to media.

USAID stated that its implementers play a key role in re-establishing judicial institutions and enabling them to perform their core functions to become more effective and independent. USAID implementers provided expert and technical support to selection commissions and advisory groups of experts to develop methodologies, rules of procedure, regulations, and procedures for governing the assessment and selection of judicial members. These institutions now have new member compositions and have resumed selections of candidates for disciplinary functions and judicial roles.⁴³³

ANTI-CORRUPTION SUPPORT IN MOLDOVA

State INL also continued to support programs to develop the capacity of anti-corruption and integrity agencies in Moldova, including the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office and the National Anti-Corruption Center, while funding civil society efforts to monitor these same agencies. State said INL funded travel to Moldova for the FBI to provide assistance on a variety of investigative techniques, including coordinating digital forensic expertise, advising leadership on investigative strategy and multilateral operations coordination, and helping obtain international corporate records to establish probable cause for warrants in support of ongoing investigations.⁴³⁴

In addition, State INL, with IDLO as its implementing partner, provided logistical and administrative support to Moldova's Prosecutor Vetting Commission. The Commission is responsible for assessing over 250 prosecutors for potential financial anomalies or other corruption-related activity.⁴³⁵ State INL also managed a contract to support the Commission's Secretariat, and it funds an anti-corruption and judicial reform expert to assist with pre-vetting and vetting activities.⁴³⁶ Lastly, with IDLO, State INL supported Moldova's Anti-Corruption Advisory Committee, providing policy recommendations for anti-corruption legislation and regulatory advocacy, as well as supporting the Committee's ongoing operations and activities.⁴³⁷

ECONOMIC GROWTH

In late July, Ukraine secured a preliminary deal with creditors for restructuring \$20 billion in public debt, according to media.⁴³⁸ A group of private international creditors agreed to write off more than a third of the value of the Ukrainian government bonds they held.⁴³⁹ A previous arrangement to allow Ukraine to suspend debt payments was set to expire on August 1, media said.⁴⁴⁰ State said the plan was formally approved by international bondholders in late August.⁴⁴¹

The deal will save \$11.4 billion in payments over 3 years from Ukraine to its creditors, media reported, citing a Ukrainian government statement.⁴⁴² The International Monetary Fund, which has in the past made its assistance to Ukraine conditional on the country reducing its debt, also approved the new arrangement, according to media reports.⁴⁴³

On August 1, after a wait of more than 2 years, Ukraine and Türkiye announced their ratification of a free trade agreement, according to diplomatic reporting.⁴⁴⁴ The deal, initially signed in February 2022, just weeks before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, will deepen trade between the Black Sea countries, according to a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Ankara.⁴⁴⁵ The bilateral relationship reached \$7.3 billion in trade volume in 2023; that figure should exceed \$10 billion as a result of the new agreement, the U.S. Embassy in Ankara said.⁴⁴⁶

The Ukrainian government recently made several high-profile changes in the senior ranks of government.⁴⁴⁷ Oleksiy Kuleba, the former Deputy Head of the Office of President of Ukraine, was appointed as a Vice-Prime Minister of Restoration - Minister for Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine (Minister of Infrastructure), and Vitaliy Koval, the former Head of the State Property Fund, was appointed as the Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food.⁴⁴⁸ The Deputy Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food, Markiyany Dmytrasevych, who was responsible for international donor coordination, was dismissed on September 12.⁴⁴⁹ USAID Ukraine's Office of Economic Growth counterparts in the Ministry of Economy remain unchanged and the changes have not impacted USAID Ukraine's Office of Critical Infrastructure.⁴⁵⁰

STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

While there is no accurate public inventory of Ukrainian state-owned enterprises, USAID's implementer analyzed three State Property Fund of Ukraine registers, the Ministry of Economy's Unified Monitoring of State-Owned Enterprise Management Efficiency Register, and the Ministry of Justice's Unified State Register of Enterprises and Organizations, and identified 3,592 state-owned enterprises as of April 1, 2024.⁴⁵¹ Ukraine held 23 privatization auctions for state-owned enterprises with an estimated value of \$89 million in the third quarter of FY 2024.⁴⁵² Among them, 7 auctions for state-owned enterprises took place in September.⁴⁵³ USAID provided direct privatization support to 12 of these enterprises, including identifying legal problems, suggesting solutions, verifying privatization documents, registering property, advising on bringing financial statements in conformance with Ukrainian regulations, and preparing promotional materials.⁴⁵⁴

REBUILDING ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE

Russia began targeting Ukraine's electrical transmission system in the first winter of the full-scale invasion and has continued to do so throughout its conduct of the war. (See pages 29-30.) By targeting both transmission and generation, Russia's attacks over the last two-plus years have made Ukraine's energy grid especially fragile, resulting in an unstable energy and water supply across the country.⁴⁵⁵ Ukraine has lost 51 percent of its total pre-war generation capacity, resulting in rolling blackouts as the grid cannot meet demand.⁴⁵⁶ Thermal and combined heat and power units have endured the most severe damage, with approximately 82 percent of pre-war capacity lost, while other power generation modalities in Ukraine's grid have seen a range of damages.⁴⁵⁷

Table 22.

U.S. Goals Related to Economic Growth

Integrated Country Strategy

Ukraine rebuilds a transparent and competitive post-war economy through corporate governance, legislation to achieve de-oligarchization, especially in the energy and metals sectors, attract foreign investment, and generate sustainable government revenue.

Ukraine implements international best practices and continues decentralization while rebuilding social, physical, and critical infrastructure.

Country Development Cooperation Strategy

Strengthened subject matter expert competitiveness.

Increased productivity of agricultural SMEs through market systems.

Inclusive, innovative finance expanded.

Source: State, "Integrated Country Strategy-Ukraine," 8/29/2023; USAID Ukraine, "Ukraine Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2019-2024, Extended Through Jan 9, 2026," 1/4/2024.

In September, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken announced more than \$700 million in new assistance to support Ukraine.

The Ukrainian government is financially limited in its ability to rebuild damaged energy infrastructure to bring back power and heating before the winter. The DoE said that the Ukrainian government is working with international partners to procure materials for infrastructure repair, but even with these efforts, it is unclear how much generation capacity Ukraine can restore before the heating season begins. If attacks on the grid continue, even with significant additional repairs or procurements, Ukraine's electrical generation gap is predicted to be large enough that the system will not meet peak winter electricity and heating demand.⁴⁵⁸

Secretary Blinken Announces Additional Energy Assistance for Ukraine

In September, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken announced more than \$700 million in new assistance to support Ukraine, including \$325 million to support Ukraine's energy infrastructure efforts in the midst of ongoing Russian attacks, in addition to the announcements last quarter of \$500 million by the U.S. Government at the Ukraine Peace Summit and the \$1 billion by international partners.⁴⁵⁹ The assistance is intended to repair and restore Ukraine's power generation facilities damaged by Russian attacks, deploy new distributed power technologies, provide emergency backup power for critical services such as water and heat, and strengthen the physical security of critical energy infrastructure.⁴⁶⁰

USAID: USAID provided equipment, materials and technical assistance to address the continued provision of basic needs to Ukrainian citizens, including electricity, heat, and water, as well as to strengthen the resilience of the grid.⁴⁶¹ USAID Ukraine and the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv have regular discussions with the Ukrainian government as it administers energy sector assistance among various energy organizations such as district heating utilities, generation and distribution companies, and gas and electricity transmission operators.⁴⁶² USAID stated that it validates needs and specifications, and contracted for equipment during the quarter to focus on the repair of critical assets for the coming months.⁴⁶³

State: State's Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR) said it continued to support Ukraine's natural gas sector, specifically for UkrGasVdybovannya, a part of state energy company Naftogaz.⁴⁶⁴ State-provided funding will advance development of new and existing gas assets, while enhancing sustainable operations, State ENR reported.⁴⁶⁵ A separate program will support a clean hydrogen project, helping shift Ukraine's energy sector toward decarbonization and cleaner energy forms.⁴⁶⁶

At the time of reporting, State ENR said it had obligated less than \$200,000 of \$12 million in total supplemental funding.⁴⁶⁷ The bureau reported that no new programs were launched during the quarter; instead, obligations went toward programs already in operation.⁴⁶⁸ The bureau has allocated, but not yet disbursed, \$7 million for its work with UkrGasVdybovannya, and \$2 million for the decarbonization project, it said.⁴⁶⁹

State ENR reported that its work will be monitored under the MEASURE mechanism for all Ukraine supplemental assistance.⁴⁷⁰ State ENR-managed assistance will include standard as well as customized performance indicators relevant to supplemental funds, whether for funds previously obligated or funds due for obligation in FY 2025, the bureau said.⁴⁷¹


TRADE: BOTTLENECKS, BORDER CONTROLS LIMIT COMMERCE

Imports and exports face challenges at border crossing points between Ukraine and Poland due to limited space, which results in slow traffic flow.⁴⁷² In addition, crossing points lack sanitary facilities and services, as well as equipment, such as scanners.⁴⁷³ On August 5, Poland closed the Dorohusk checkpoint, located near the Ukrainian Yahodyn border crossing point, for essential repairs.⁴⁷⁴ On the eve of the closure, approximately 300 trucks were in line to leave Poland for Ukraine through this border crossing point, with an estimated waiting time of 10-12 hours to cross to the border.⁴⁷⁵ According to Polish officials, repair work at the Dorohusk checkpoint will last until November 14.⁴⁷⁶ Based on previous trends, the border control point closure will lead traffic to be redirected to other nearby control points, such as Porubne, according to USAID.⁴⁷⁷

As of the end of the quarter, 35 border control points had received USAID assistance with rapid upgrades and direct equipment procurement, including delivering prefabricated buildings for customs processing, restrooms and administrative offices, pavement repairs, surface drainage, traffic organization tools, traffic signs, LED lighting, and recycling bins.⁴⁷⁸ USAID said that it delivered dynamic scales, scanners, generators, railway wagon lifts, information and communication technology equipment, and crane motor engines.⁴⁷⁹ According to USAID, these upgrades at road border control points improved safety, efficiency, and accessibility.⁴⁸⁰ Equipment provided to railway border control point transshipment facilities increased productivity in transloading and the number of wagons per train.⁴⁸¹ Export volumes vary based on factors including Ukraine's overall economy and the security situation.⁴⁸²

Figure 6.

Total Monthly Exports through 35 Ukrainian Border Crossings, in \$ Millions



Illicit Drug Traffickers Adapt to Ukraine's Wartime Conditions

Prior to February 2022, Ukraine was largely considered a transit country for foreign-produced drugs, such as cocaine and heroin, which were most frequently bound for consumer markets in Europe or Russia, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). While identifiable overland corridors for the movement of these drugs existed, Ukraine's southern ports on the Black Sea, such as Odesa and Pivdenny, served as the primary inject points for the transit of illicit drugs. The DEA said that Russia's full-scale invasion has disrupted this traditional trafficking model and seriously diminished the amount of drugs transiting Ukraine's Black Sea ports.⁴⁸³

According to the DEA, transnational criminal organizations have largely shifted illicit trafficking activities from Ukraine to nearby countries, since the war has increased the risks for international illicit trafficking activities due to denied transit through northern, eastern, and southeastern Ukraine. Additionally, while Ukraine is under martial law, many security checkpoints throughout the country apply greater scrutiny to the movement of overland cargo.⁴⁸⁴

Domestically produced amphetamine, methamphetamine, methadone, alpha-PVP, and new psychoactive substances have long been assessed by Ukrainian officials as presenting the greatest threats to Ukrainian society, due to much of the production of these drugs being consumed by Ukrainians. Production and consumption of cannabis also remains a strong drug of choice in Ukraine but is considered much less caustic to communities, according to DEA.⁴⁸⁵

The war in Ukraine caused the displacement of large segments of Ukraine's populace. This societal disruption temporarily curtailed production and distribution for domestically produced illicit drugs, according to the DEA. However, to meet the strong demand for synthetic drugs, clandestine laboratory activity quickly resumed with a trend toward the establishment of more numerous, although smaller in scale, operations with distribution activities supported by internet-based sales and delivery through the Ukrainian postal system, taxi services, or dead drops, according to the DEA. Additionally, a network of call centers throughout Ukraine and Eastern Europe supports internet-based illicit drug trafficking activities.⁴⁸⁶

The DEA reported that it engages in bilateral cooperation with Ukraine's State Border Guard Service and the National Police of Ukraine's Counternarcotics Department. However, widespread corruption throughout Ukraine's justice system continues to impede investigations into the most prolific drug trafficking organizations operating in the country. The DEA also works in partnership with State INL to improve counterdrug investigative capacity within these organizations. The DEA said it is planning a 2-week advanced narcotics investigator course in December 2024 and a clandestine lab course in early 2025.⁴⁸⁷

GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY

State continued to respond to food security shocks resulting from Russia's war in Ukraine, notably the disruptions to international trade of grain and other Ukrainian food export commodities, State said.⁴⁸⁸ Food supply shocks that stem from Ukraine have an outsized impact on the rest of the world: some 400 million people rely on Ukraine for their food supply, State said, citing data from the UN World Food Programme.⁴⁸⁹ State's Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) maintained monitoring and oversight activities by reviewing program updates and financial reporting from implementers, according to the bureau.⁴⁹⁰

Ukraine supplemental funding supported OES programs worldwide, the bureau's reporting showed, reflecting the global impact of Russia's war against Ukraine.⁴⁹¹ The purpose of these programs is to help countries throughout the world improve farming practices so they can better withstand future food shocks. Funds went toward alleviating weather-driven disaster risk in Africa, State OES said, specifically through the Africa Disaster Risk Financing Programme, a part of the African Development Bank.⁴⁹² During the quarter, State OES also supported its Global Fertilizer Challenge program, which targets developing countries in Asia and South America for optimizing fertilizer use and related agricultural practices, the Bureau said.⁴⁹³ In a similar effort, Ukraine supplemental funding supported the Foundation for Food and Agriculture Research, again to develop fertilizer optimization practices, State OES said.⁴⁹⁴

Ukraine's HIV epidemic was already one of the most severe in Europe prior to the conflict.

HEALTH

HEALTH CONCERNS

HIV: The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv warned during the quarter of a rising risk of HIV in Ukraine, especially among users of injectable drugs, according to a cable.⁴⁹⁵ The onset of Russia's full-scale war in Ukraine has sparked an increase in rates of HIV in Ukraine, according to the embassy.⁴⁹⁶ HIV is in active transmission within UAF populations, the cable reported.⁴⁹⁷

An estimated 270,000 Ukrainians (1 percent of the population) are living with HIV, many of whom are internally displaced due to the war.⁴⁹⁸ Ukraine's HIV epidemic was already one of the most severe in Europe prior to the conflict.⁴⁹⁹ Despite efforts to ensure continued access to treatment, health care services, especially in conflict zones, have been disrupted by the ongoing conflict.⁵⁰⁰

Based on past conflict research, stress stemming from combat leads to higher-risk behavior, including intravenous drug use, as well as commercial or transactional sex without protection, the embassy said.⁵⁰¹ During a meeting on conflict-related sexual violence organized by State INL in Krakow, Poland from July 15 to 18, representatives from the CDC based at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv and health and legal professionals from Poland and Ukraine discussed HIV-related issues and the importance of HIV prophylaxis for victims of sexual violence.⁵⁰²

Drug-resistant infections: According to media reporting and State, antimicrobial resistance is a growing problem in Ukraine since the full-scale invasion, affecting civilian and military patients alike. Ukrainian doctors are increasingly struggling to treat the wounds of civilian and military patients due to rising resistance to antibiotic and antiviral drugs.⁵⁰³ This has led to rising morbidity and mortality rates among patients who are unresponsive to the limited range of treatments available, longer hospital stays, and a need for multiple surgical revisions of amputations.⁵⁰⁴

State noted that a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)-supported survey in 2022 revealed that all tested cases of *Klebsiella pneumoniae* in Ukraine were resistant to critical antibiotics, including the last-line treatment, meropenem. Similar patterns of resistance were seen in other bacteria from wound infections. This shows how difficult it has become to treat these infections, with resistance spreading and complicating care, even in patients transferred to European hospitals.⁵⁰⁵ The CDC supported Ukraine in establishing sequencing capacity; quality controls and national surveillance protocols are now being implemented.⁵⁰⁶

State also said that DoD and Ukraine collaboration on sequencing has shown that many infections are carrying potent combinations of resistance genes.⁵⁰⁷ During the quarter, DoD-funded researchers collected data from three frontline hospitals and two referral centers in western Ukraine to study the phenomenon of drug-resistant infections. According to researchers, the study aims to serve as a foundation for future research into other clinical and logistical challenges associated with the war in Ukraine as well as other conflicts around the world.⁵⁰⁸

SUPPORT FOR THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR

The Ukrainian Ministry of Health (MoH) reported that during the quarter, 7 health facilities were destroyed and 14 damaged, bringing the total to 221 destroyed and 1,656 damaged since February 2022.⁵⁰⁹ As of September, donors had facilitated the restoration of 923 facilities: 533 fully restored, 353 partially restored, and 37 fully restored but subsequently destroyed again.⁵¹⁰

Table 23.

USAID Support to the Ukrainian Health Sector During the Quarter

Activity	Activity Highlights
Rebuild health care facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provided technical support to the MoH Health Recovery Project Office, coordinating restoration efforts for 2,795 health care facilities (HCF) and initiating 1,877 restoration and 450 renovation projects. • USAID grants—including 6 issued this quarter—to support the restoration of health services. Another USAID grant program aimed to restore and expand services at 93 HCF in war-affected areas by the end of FY 2024. • Provided the office with estimates of the financial resources needed for the recovery of 14 selected facilities in the Chernihiv region, based on assessments conducted during the war. • Supported the Dream platform, a new tool for monitoring and ensuring transparency in HCF restoration and investment fund usage. • Developed two electronic tools for the MoH: one for monitoring damaged HCFs and coordinating health sector restoration efforts, and another for tracking critical equipment needs and distribution.
Expand health care access	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expedited the procurement of essential medicines and collaborated with in-country partners to ensure the rapid delivery of health commodities. • Piloted and expanded self-testing programs for HIV in areas with limited health care access, as well as deploying mobile units to serve displaced and remote populations. • Facilitated remote medical consultations and hotline services.
Enhance transparency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supported the National Health Service of Ukraine’s establishment of a Public Accountability Board and provided expertise to local authorities for creating supervisory boards in hospitals. • Supported the development of a new electronic continuing professional development registration system to close corruption loopholes in professional development services for health care workers. • Supported the launch of the Information Platform of Public Health, which aims to enhance transparency in the MoH’s decision-making processes. • Educated patients about health care reform, particularly their rights to receive free services. • Made recommendations to the National Health Service of Ukraine on how to optimize the network of HCFs contracted for health benefit packages related to stroke, childbirth, and neonatal care. The recommendations included improvements to contracting criteria.

Source: USAID OFM, response to USAID OIG request for information, 6/25/2024.

During the quarter, shelling in the Dnipro region forced MoH staff to relocate training activities to safer areas. Power shortages and increased reliance on generators have led health facility staff in affected regions to consume more gasoline for these generators.⁵¹¹ USAID supplied power stations to the National Health Service of Ukraine to minimize work disruptions and is procuring subcontractors to install permanent generators at the facility.⁵¹²

USAID also supported the MoH Health Recovery Project Office, which aids in monitoring, decision-making, and distributing critical equipment, such as power generators and solar panels, to health care facilities to mitigate energy supply disruptions.⁵¹³ In addition, USAID has supported expansion of health care services, including through expedited procurement of essential medicines and collaboration with in-country partners to ensure the rapid delivery of health commodities.⁵¹⁴ (See Table 24.)

Despite the ongoing conflict, USAID-supported HIV activities are currently meeting 100 percent of their targets by adapting to the changing conditions.⁵¹⁵

USAID reported that it works closely with Ukrainian government counterparts to provide legal and technical support, including drafting and advocating for necessary legal amendments.⁵¹⁶ The absence of updated regulations, including in the tax code and within the MoH, has posed a challenge to USAID's pharmaceutical systems strengthening efforts, USAID said.⁵¹⁷ However, these changes require significant political will, which can fluctuate with shifting war-related priorities.⁵¹⁸

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

As of August 2024, approximately 3.67 million Ukrainians were internally displaced, an increase of more than 120,000 since April, according to the UN's International Organization for Migration (IOM).⁵¹⁹ As of July, more than 6 million refugees from Ukraine were registered as refugees across Europe.⁵²⁰ From July to August, the number of Ukrainians who returned declined from about 4.7 million to nearly 4.4 million, indicating fewer people returning to their habitual residences.⁵²¹

There are two general types of displaced persons: IDPs, or people forced to flee their homes who remain in their country of origin, and refugees, including those forced to flee their homes who have departed their country of origin.⁵²² USAID BHA leads the U.S. Government's response for IDPs, including in Ukraine. State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) leads and is the primary implementer for the U.S. Government's refugee assistance, including for Ukrainian refugees. State PRM also provides support to IDPs in Ukraine.⁵²³

USAID and State PRM partner with international organizations, including UN organizations, and multiple NGOs to support protection efforts for conflict-

Table 24.

UN Goals Related to Humanitarian Assistance


Humanitarian Response Plan

Provide principles and timely multisectoral lifesaving assistance to internally displaced people, non-displaced war affected people and returnees, ensuring their safety and dignity.

Enable access to basic services for internally displaced people, non-displaced war-affected people and returnees.

Source: UN OCHA, "Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan Ukraine," 1/3/2024.

Figure 7.

USAID Humanitarian Assistance Funding for Ukraine Response, All Obligations

affected populations in Ukraine.⁵²⁴ These efforts include case management, mental health and psychosocial support; gender-based violence prevention, legal assistance, and mobile protection teams serving remote communities.⁵²⁵

State has obligated more than \$866 million and USAID has obligated more than \$592 million in Ukraine supplemental funds to provide emergency assistance and support to internally displaced persons (IDP) and other people within Ukraine and refugees across the region.⁵²⁶ In addition to the Ukraine supplemental funds, State has obligated approximately \$139 million in funds appropriated in other appropriations acts for its response to Ukrainian IDPs and refugees.⁵²⁷ (See Figure 7.)

In September, Secretary Blinken announced \$237 million in new humanitarian assistance for Ukraine with FY 2024 funds.⁵²⁸ Newly announced assistance will focus on displaced Ukrainians and other vulnerable groups access essential resources like food and shelter.⁵²⁹ This funding also includes winter preparedness efforts and supports community health services, including disease prevention, psychosocial assistance, and support for survivors of gender-based violence.⁵³⁰ Additionally, it will include a contribution to the UN Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund, which provides vital protection assistance to women, girls, and women-led civil society organizations.⁵³¹ September's announcement brings the total U.S. humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since February 2022 to nearly \$3.8 billion, including more than \$906 million since the beginning of FY 2024.

CHALLENGES TO PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Humanitarian partners continued to face challenges in providing assistance to conflict-affected populations in Ukraine. Armed conflict frequently intensifies protection risks, leaving civilians vulnerable to dangers like domestic violence, exclusion from critical humanitarian aid, forced labor, family separation, and sexual violence.⁵³² Intensified fighting since May, especially in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Kherson, has severely restricted humanitarian access to frontline areas.⁵³³ Escalations along the Ukraine-Russia border in the Sumy region in mid-August further hindered access and caused displacement.⁵³⁴

Attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure have severely disrupted partner operations and hindered services that rely on online registration, such as legal aid and mental health consultations.⁵³⁵ The attacks have caused lengthy power outages affecting essential infrastructure like water utilities, heating systems, and educational institutions, most of which lack generators.⁵³⁶ This reliance on electricity leaves millions of people at risk of being trapped in cold high-rise buildings during the winter, with limited access to heating and communication.⁵³⁷

Attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure have severely disrupted partner operations and hindered services that rely on online registration, such as legal aid and mental health consultations.

HEALTH

To address the health needs of conflict-affected populations, U.S. humanitarian partners are providing medical supplies, medicines, and other health assistance in Ukraine and neighboring countries.⁵³⁸ USAID BHA collaborated with UN organizations and five international NGO partners to meet emergency health needs in Ukraine.⁵³⁹

Disaster-affected populations are highly vulnerable to waterborne diseases due to limited access to hygiene items, safe drinking water, and sanitation services.⁵⁴⁰ In response, U.S. partners provided water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance to conflict-affected populations by distributing hygiene kits, repairing damaged infrastructure, and delivering safe drinking water to affected areas.⁵⁴¹ USAID BHA supports IOM, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, UNICEF, nine international NGO partners, and one Ukrainian NGO in addressing these needs in Ukraine.⁵⁴²

WINTERIZATION

Winter conditions in Ukraine may cause widespread population displacement, including movement from Ukraine to other countries.⁵⁴³ As the weather grows colder and damage caused by Russia's extensive bombardment of Ukraine's energy infrastructure diminishes the country's ability to generate power, Ukrainians may decide to seek refuge outside their home country to ensure more reliable supplies of heat and electricity, according to the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv.⁵⁴⁴

Wartime conditions strain Ukrainians' ability to find reliable shelter, the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv said, even when electricity remains available.⁵⁴⁵ Households struggle to pay expenses amid depleted savings, rising electricity and living costs, and income loss, according to the embassy.⁵⁴⁶ The Ukrainian government increased electricity tariffs by an average of

USAID BHA allocated more than \$168 million to support winterization needs during the 2024/2025 winter season, collaborating with 5 international organizations and 12 NGOs.

60 percent from May to June 2024, the embassy reported.⁵⁴⁷ Relief organizations began during the quarter to pre-position essential winter commodities, including warm clothing, heaters, and blankets, according to the cable.⁵⁴⁸

In July, the United Nations released its 2024/2025 Winter Response Plan in preparation for Ukraine's winter, requesting more than \$492 million in funding to support an estimated 1.8 million people.⁵⁴⁹ The plan prioritizes support for water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance, as well as shelter, food, and health measures—often for frontline and other endangered communities.⁵⁵⁰ Frontline communities are often required to inhabit housing that has been damaged by war, such as leaking roofs, damaged walls, and broken windows, all of which hinder readiness for winter weather, according to embassy reporting.⁵⁵¹

USAID BHA allocated more than \$168 million to support winterization needs during the 2024/2025 winter season, collaborating with 5 international organizations and 12 NGOs.⁵⁵² This assistance includes multipurpose cash support and the distribution of generators to health care facilities and collective centers to ensure critical power supply during outages.⁵⁵³ Additionally, the funding covers shelter assistance for collective centers, including safety repairs, functional heating and water systems, and essential supplies like bedding and emergency relief commodities.⁵⁵⁴

FOOD ASSISTANCE

To address the food needs of vulnerable populations impacted by Russia's full-scale invasion, the USAID BHA supports the World Food Program (WFP) and two international NGOs in providing food assistance through in-kind food baskets and cash assistance for food purchases in Ukraine.⁵⁵⁵ WFP focuses on food distribution in eastern and southern Ukraine, where conflict and supply chain issues limit access.⁵⁵⁶

In July, USAID BHA allocated an additional \$70 million to WFP, increasing the total award to \$130 million for the period from November 1, 2023, to March 31, 2025.⁵⁵⁷ This funding will enable WFP to assist an additional 435,471 individuals with emergency food and cash during the upcoming winter.⁵⁵⁸ It also supports logistics coordination and training initiatives for food security and livelihoods clusters.⁵⁵⁹ Overall, USAID BHA funding allows WFP to support more than one million individuals.⁵⁶⁰

Through an international NGO consortium, USAID BHA distributes food kits to beneficiaries in various regions, including Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kherson, Kyiv, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Zaporizhzhia.⁵⁶¹ USAID BHA also provides limited food assistance in both government-controlled and Russia-occupied areas of Donetsk through a local NGO partner.⁵⁶²

REFUGEES

A key element of U.S. support for displaced persons is cash assistance, either unrestricted or targeted for specific purposes, such as shelter repair, rent, and utilities. State said that from July to August, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), with U.S. support, provided nearly \$12.9 million in cash assistance in Ukraine. State said that by the end of the quarter, UNHCR projected it would deliver a total of \$18 million to 109,000 individuals in Ukraine.⁵⁶³ In Moldova and Slovakia, UNHCR provided approximately \$4 million in cash assistance. State said UNHCR expected total expenditure for the quarter to be approximately \$6.9 million to approximately 22,500 individuals.⁵⁶⁴

State also said that from January to June, its partners had collectively provided basic-needs assistance to 205,000 individuals and livelihood and economic assistance to 76,000 people.⁵⁶⁵ During the same period, State partners provided protection services to 521,000 people, including 124,000 children; and mental health and psychological support to 74,000 people, individual counseling and health education to 77,000 people, and specialized gender-based violence programs to 66,000 people.⁵⁶⁶

State implementing partners have provided life-saving humanitarian assistance to “hundreds of thousands from Ukraine” who are living in countries in the region or displaced within Ukraine.”⁵⁶⁷ For example, State said that from January to June, its partners had collectively provided basic-needs assistance to 205,000 individuals and livelihood and economic assistance to 76,000 people.⁵⁶⁸ During the same period, State partners have provided protection services to 521,000 people, including 124,000 children; and mental health and psychological support to 74,000 people, individual counseling and health education to 77,000 people, and specialized gender-based violence programs to 66,000 people.⁵⁶⁹ State PRM will fund two new programs to be implemented by UNICEF.⁵⁷⁰ (See Table 25.)

State said that from July to August, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), with U.S. support, provided nearly \$12.9 million in cash assistance in Ukraine.

Table 25.

New UNICEF Programs Supported by State

Program	Activity
<p>Cesty Initiative in Poland and Czechia (commenced September 1, 2024)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seeks to provide 36,000 Ukrainian refugee adolescents and youth in Poland and Czechia with multiple pathways to access education, gain relevant skills, and transition to stable employment. The program will include: technical and vocational education and training; first job opportunities, including internships and apprenticeships aligned with participants’ professional aspirations; and continuing education and training with a focus on youth who are currently working.
<p>Creating Safe Pathways for Family Reunification and Reintegration of Children Evacuated Abroad in Ukraine (Ukraine Children Pathways) (commenced August 18, 2024)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seeks to address a capacity gap in the Ukrainian child protection system. Will build the Ukrainian government’s capacity to focus on Ukrainian children institutionalized abroad, including an estimated 350 Ukrainian children evacuated overseas or forcibly deported to Russia and Belarus. Will support children returning to Ukraine, including for family reunification and family-based care, education, and best-interest determinations.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 9/23/2024; State, vetting comment, 10/28/2024.







Reporter Evan Gershkovich arrives at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland on August 1, 2024, following his release from Russian custody. (U.S. Air Force photo)

HUMAN RIGHTS AND SANCTIONS

- 86 War Crimes and Human Rights
- 92 Sanctions and Use of Russia's Sovereign Assets



Former U.S. Marine Paul Whelan speaks with reporters at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland on August 1, after being released from Russian custody. (U.S. Air Force photo)

HUMAN RIGHTS AND SANCTIONS

WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

POLITICAL DETAINEES, PRISONERS OF WAR RELEASED IN COMPLEX OPERATIONS

On August 1, the United States and Russia conducted a prisoner swap of two dozen people, including journalist Evan Gershkovich and former U.S. Marine Paul Whelan, according to diplomatic and media reporting.⁵⁷¹ Russia released 16 journalists, dissidents, and other prisoners in return for 8 Russians imprisoned throughout Europe, including Vadim Krasikov, who was serving a life sentence for murder. The complex swap involved diplomatic coordination with Germany, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, and Türkiye.⁵⁷²

On September 21, Ukraine and Russia engaged in a prisoner exchange involving more than 100 captives on each side. This was the largest prisoner exchange between the two sides since January 2024. According to media and UN reporting, most Ukrainian prisoners of war suffer from malnourishment, sustained medical neglect, severe and systematic mistreatment, and torture while in detention. There have also been isolated reports of Ukrainian soldiers abusing Russian ones, mostly during capture or transit to internment sites, according to media reporting.⁵⁷³

INVESTIGATION OF WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine reported that between June 1 and August 31, 589 civilians in Ukraine were killed and 2,685 were injured, a 45 percent increase in casualties compared to the previous 3-month period.⁵⁷⁴ The UN coordinates with Ukrainian NGOs, many of which are funded by USAID's human rights program, to generate this data. In the first half of 2024, USAID supported 66 monitoring trips to war-affected areas to document alleged war crimes and human rights violations against thousands of Ukrainians. On September 23, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine announced that it found evidence of widespread, systematic torture of Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war, both in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory and in Russia. The commission indicated that these practices followed common patterns at all prisons investigated, and that Russian officials either ordered or tolerated the use of torture. Methods of torture included the recurrent use of sexual violence, mainly against male victims, in almost all these facilities. Prisoners who have been released reported grave or irreparable physical harm and psychological trauma, with many experiencing serious challenges reintegrating into society, according to the UN commission.⁵⁷⁵

As part of ongoing efforts to pursue justice for crimes committed during Russia's war against Ukraine, State initiated or continued efforts with interagency and multilateral partners.⁵⁷⁶ State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), among other bureaus and teams, provided equipment and programming to Ukrainian counterparts through the quarter.⁵⁷⁷ State's Office of Global Criminal Justice directed additional resources to several initiatives to further efforts to support the Ukrainian government, civil society, and international institutions in advancing justice for international crimes committed in the context of Russia's war against Ukraine, including establishing effective reparations mechanisms, supporting access to justice for victims and survivors, and strategic litigation and case building in addition to continuing funding to support the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group for Ukraine (ACA).⁵⁷⁸ State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) focused its efforts on civil society efforts for justice on cases including instances of illegal deportation of Ukrainian children, conflict-related sexual violence, and other war crimes.⁵⁷⁹ (See Table 27.)

In June 2022, the DoJ established the War Crimes Accountability Team with the goal of centralizing and strengthening efforts to hold accountable those who have committed war crimes and other atrocities in Ukraine. During the quarter, members of the War Crimes Accountability Team traveled to Kyiv to meet with Ukrainian partners and represent the DoJ at an international conference on the investigation and prosecution of Russia's alleged attacks on civilian targets, including attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure.⁵⁸⁰

Table 26.

U.S. Goals Related to War Crimes and Human Rights

Integrated Country Strategy

Ukraine builds its capacity to document, investigate, and prosecute war crimes and enlists support from international partners to ensure perpetrators of war crimes are held to account.

Source: State, "Integrated Country Strategy-Ukraine," 8/29/2023.

The Ukrainian government made slow but steady progress in prosecuting war criminals and other human rights violators, State said, citing Ukrainian official data.⁵⁸¹ As of September, Ukrainian authorities have identified almost 700 perpetrators, issued nearly 500 indictments, and convicted almost 130 individuals of war crimes, State reported.⁵⁸² State said the Ukrainian

Table 27.

State INL, GCJ, and DRL Activity Related to War Crimes and Human Rights**Activity During the Quarter**

- Convened representatives of 6 U.S. Government donor agencies and more than 20 international and national NGOs to share information on war crimes and **discuss lessons learned, best practices, and continuing challenges**. The participants decided to enhance coordination with Ukraine's Office of the Prosecutor General, including through meetings that will occur every 3 to 4 months, State said.
- Held a case-building workshop, co-hosted with USAID, for Ukrainian regional prosecutors, specifically for prosecution of higher-ranking Russian officials under charges of war crimes.
- Trained the National Police of Ukraine on **digital forensics, investigations, and justice work** specific to Russian forces active in Ukraine.
- Supported the for the Hague-based International Commission on Missing Persons.
- Supported the State Scientific Research Forensic Center, part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
- Conducted a **do-no-harm witness and survivor communication sessions** for 10 lawyers and psychologists from a Ukrainian nongovernmental organization that conducts pre-screenings of Ukrainian refugees.
- Released a report on the illegal deportation of 300 of Ukrainian children to Russia from Kharkiv Oblast providing information to the International Criminal Court.
- Filed a **landmark complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee** on behalf of 18 Ukrainian victims of a Russian missile attack which killed 29 people and injured over 200. The complaint argues that Russia violated the right to life of all those killed during an attack on the city of Vinnytsia on July 14, 2022, conducted as part of Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 9/22/2024; State, vetting comments, 10/28/2024.

government has collaborated with the International Criminal Court based in The Hague, Netherlands; the Court has so far issued six arrest warrants for Russian officials charged with war crimes in Ukraine, State said.⁵⁸³

State and the DoJ reported a diverse set of current and near-future challenges related to domestic Ukrainian efforts to advance victim-centered justice for atrocities in Ukraine.⁵⁸⁴ The sheer number of alleged Russian atrocities—more than 133,000 incidents have been reported according to Ukrainian authorities and this number increases daily and presents one of the greatest challenges to successfully tracking and prosecuting atrocity crimes and support victims, State said.⁵⁸⁵

A limited capacity for investigation and prosecution, especially among Ukrainian law enforcement bodies, added to the general challenge of rendering justice in Ukraine during the quarter, State said.⁵⁸⁶ State also said it remains difficult to take individuals accused of international crimes into custody.⁵⁸⁷ Other issues, including gaps in Ukraine's legislative framework and lack of access to frontline crime scenes, is also hindering justice work, which may continue to affect future efforts that realistically will be underway in Ukraine for many years.⁵⁸⁸ State said that in September and October 2024, Ukraine took steps to address some of the gaps in its legislative framework that relate to the prosecution of international crimes.⁵⁸⁹

The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv reported a “profound transformation” in Ukraine’s war crime investigation activities, which State INL is facilitating, the cable said.

ATROCITY CRIMES ADVISORY GROUP

The ACA, which coordinates justice efforts supported by the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, provided advice and support to Ukraine’s domestic authorities to pursue justice for perpetrators of atrocities, State reported.⁵⁹⁰ State’s Office of Global Criminal Justice acts as the lead officer for U.S. engagement in the ACA, in close partnership with State INL, which also supports two of the group’s implementing entities, State said.⁵⁹¹

During the quarter, the ACA deployed 15 highly experienced legal experts to Ukraine to provide assistance, direct advice, and capacity-building in coordination with Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General, according to State.⁵⁹² Implementers delivered 10 training sessions to more than 100 investigative professionals, State said.⁵⁹³

Training curriculum focused on a variety of high-priority areas, including cases against leadership-level suspects; a methodology for “case-mapping,” to manage a caseload for some 200,000 atrocity-related incidents; cases related to the destruction of cultural heritage; gender-based and sexual violence; and collaboration between justice and military officials, among other efforts, according to State.⁵⁹⁴ In September, the ACA supported Ukrainian military and justice advisors travel to Washington, D.C., where they met with officials from State, the DoJ, and the FBI to discuss technical solutions and share information, State said.⁵⁹⁵

WAR CRIME INVESTIGATIONS

State worked to broaden and deepen justice efforts alongside Ukrainian partners, according to a diplomatic cable from the quarter.⁵⁹⁶ The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv reported a “profound transformation” in Ukraine’s war crime investigation activities, which State INL is facilitating, the cable said.⁵⁹⁷

Since 2022, State INL has allocated approximately \$25 million in assistance to the National Police of Ukraine, the cable reported.⁵⁹⁸ The funds have supported a variety of efforts, including training, mentorship, equipment and new technologies, and armored vehicles. The Ukrainian police force estimated that State INL-supported changes resulted in a 70-percent gain in investigative efficiency, according to the cable.⁵⁹⁹ The advancements in productivity enabled the police force to expand the number and complexity of its cases under investigation while reducing the time requirements for those cases, the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv reported.⁶⁰⁰

State INL’s assistance enhanced key justice priorities, namely the investigation of Russia’s massacre of Ukrainians at Bucha, a northwest suburb of Kyiv, which unfolded in the first weeks of Russia’s invasion, the cable said.⁶⁰¹ The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv noted that many investigative challenges persisted during the quarter, including a significant backlog of autopsy and DNA requests.⁶⁰² The backlog threatens to slow down the judicial system to the point of potentially stalling investigations, thereby threatening the integrity of Ukraine’s war-related judicial processes as a whole, according to the cable.⁶⁰³

The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv reported that addressing the investigative backlog will require a continuation of timely and effective U.S. assistance, identifying a particular need for equipment to facilitate forensics, autopsies, and fingerprint identification.⁶⁰⁴

State said that since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, State Office of Global Criminal Justice has awarded more than \$30 million in funding to provide capacity building and advice to Ukraine’s domestic authorities, financial support to relevant international institutions, and funding to civil society organizations to advance accountability and victim-centered justice for atrocity crimes committed in Ukraine.⁶⁰⁵ According to State, these efforts have significantly contributed to increased capacity and international cooperation focused on ensuring robust, victim-centered justice international crimes.⁶⁰⁶ Nonetheless, State said, Ukraine and the international community will be confronting justice efforts for decades to come given the complexity and scale of atrocities and abuses.⁶⁰⁷ As a result, sustained, coordinated support that helps Ukraine carry out justice efforts in line with international best practices will remain critical for many years going forward, State said.⁶⁰⁸

In a related step toward assuring war-related justice for Ukraine, State in July reported its approval of approximately \$440,000 allocation of State funds to the Support Programme for Ukraine, an Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) project.⁶⁰⁹ The funds will aim to support capacity building across Ukrainian law enforcement and criminal justice authorities, specifically to investigate crimes related to missing children, according to a diplomatic cable.⁶¹⁰

With USAID support, the International Organization for Migration launched the “They Used You” campaign with ads in public places like the train car shown here to raise awareness about the signs of human trafficking, how to prevent and detect it, and how to ask for help. (USAID photo)



U.S. Response Combines Further Sanctions, Diplomatic Pressure

In August, the Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on 19 individuals and 14 entities and State imposed sanctions on 19 Belarusian regime officials.⁶¹¹ The announcement coincided with the fourth anniversary of Belarus's fraudulent presidential election, held on August 9, 2020, which delivered the pretext for an extension of tenure to longtime Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka.⁶¹²

The parties sanctioned by Treasury are known to support Russia's war in Ukraine through the production of defense materiel, the transshipment of goods to Russia, the facilitation of sanctions evasion, and revenue generation for the oligarchs in Lukashenka's inner circle.⁶¹³

The United States coordinates its sanctions with other countries, an approach that directly counters claims by the Belarusian regime that the United States has implemented the measures by unilateral decision, State said.⁶¹⁴ The multilateral sanctions strategy maximizes effectiveness and mitigates the Belarusian regime's ability to exploit any gaps in Western sanctions policies, according to State.⁶¹⁵

In July, the United States joined more than three dozen countries from the OSCE to express their concern for the treatment of Belarus' political prisoners.⁶¹⁶ Detainees have been held on grounds including opposition activism and demonstration against Russia's war in Ukraine, a joint statement said.⁶¹⁷

The statement noted the deaths of six political prisoners in Belarus, and the critical condition of several other individuals detained on political grounds.⁶¹⁸ The statement cited Belarus's inhumane prison conditions and degrading treatment, including torture, acts of physical and sexual violence, absence of fair legal representation and trials, and a lack of basic health care and privacy, according to the statement.⁶¹⁹ State noted it would consider further measures, like additional sanctions, to hold Belarusian authorities to account for their suppression of the country's pro-democracy advocates.⁶²⁰

In August, a Belarusian court sentenced two journalists to prison, extending a long-running crackdown on press freedom in the country, according to media reporting.⁶²¹ The court found the journalists guilty of "extremism" and sentenced them to incarceration.⁶²² The number of journalists imprisoned in Belarus now totals 30, making the country the third-worst jailer of journalists in the world, after the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Myanmar, according to a media report.⁶²³ In late August, another journalist, Andrey Kuznechyk, passed the 1,000-day mark in a Belarusian prison on charges many have called politically motivated, according to media.⁶²⁴

In August, the Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on 19 individuals and 14 entities and State imposed sanctions on 19 Belarusian regime officials.

SANCTIONS AND USE OF RUSSIA'S SOVEREIGN ASSETS

RUSSIAN SOVEREIGN ASSETS

In October, G7 leaders announced they had finalized a plan to extend \$50 billion in loans to Ukraine, to be repaid using funds derived from immobilized Russian sovereign assets (RSA), according to media and government reports.⁶²⁵ The G7 previously moved to immobilize Russian sovereign assets held in banks in their respective jurisdictions and will use interest accrued from these assets to repay loans that G7 countries will offer Ukraine now, media said.⁶²⁶ The deal's announcement marks a breakthrough in negotiations that persisted for months, according to press reports.⁶²⁷

On October 23, the United States announced it would loan Ukraine \$20 billion, according to reports from the press and the White House.⁶²⁸ Half of the U.S. funds will be for economic assistance, while the remaining half will be in military support, which will require approval from Congress, media said.⁶²⁹ Ukraine will receive at least half of the total loans by the end of 2024, according to a press report. The G7 countries hold an estimated \$280 billion in total Russian sovereign assets, mostly in the European Union, media said.

On October 29, the U.S. Government requested a premium on its share of the RSA-backed loans, according to a media report.⁶³⁰ The premium would compensate for the loan agreement's sanctions-related risks.⁶³¹ If EU nations do not renew the sanctions that keep RSA immobilized, the basis of the RSA-backed loans would come under doubt, whether for EU nations or other loan providers, including the United States.⁶³² Under current policy, EU sanctions require unanimous approval, and renewal every 6 months; the refusal of a single EU nation could mobilize RSA again, jeopardizing the availability of RSA and associated loans to Ukraine, a press report said.⁶³³

Table 28.

U.S. Goals Related to Sanctions

Integrated Country Strategy

Ukraine and its allies leverage appropriate laws to use seized Russian assets to finance Ukraine's reconstruction and recovery.

Source: State, "Integrated Country Strategy-Ukraine," 8/29/2023.

Treasury reported that, as of the end of the quarter, it had imposed sanctions on more than 80 percent of Russia's banking system, preventing access to the global system.

SANCTIONS UPDATE

U.S. Government sanctions expanded significantly during the quarter, extending a pattern of using sanctions as an economic weapon against Russia's aggression against Ukraine, according to diplomatic communications.⁶³⁴ On August 23, State and Treasury announced the designation of approximately 400 entities and individuals known to be supporting Russia.⁶³⁵ As of September 20, the total of war-related, U.S.-sanctioned targets stood at 5,195, State reported.⁶³⁶

Treasury reported that, as of the end of the quarter, it had imposed sanctions on more than 80 percent of Russia's banking system, preventing access to the global system. Treasury has issued hundreds of designations and taken actions to hinder Russia's efforts to evade sanctions in third countries, including Armenia, Cyprus, and Saudi Arabia, which—while not under sanctions themselves—have played a significant role in helping Russia evade sanctions. Treasury said it has established a new secondary sanctions regime, which aims to hinder Russia's ability to use third country banks to support its military-industrial base.⁶³⁷

State said that U.S. and other sanctions against Russia were impacting the Russian government-backed war as intended.⁶³⁸ "Sanctions imposed on Russia by the international coalition supporting Ukraine are working," a September cable from the U.S. Mission to the OSCE said.⁶³⁹ According to the cable, sanctions imposed since February 2022 have deprived Russia of more than \$400 billion in revenues and assets.⁶⁴⁰ The liquid assets in Russia's National Wealth Fund have shrunk by half since the start of the war, the cable said, without quantifying the fund's past and current values.⁶⁴¹

As part of sanctions efforts during the quarter, State said it designated two additional entities and two vessels associated with Russia's Arctic LNG-2 site—a site already under U.S. sanctions—as well as multiple other companies related to the Arctic LNG-2 project.⁶⁴² Arctic LNG-2, located on Russia's Arctic northern coast, is operating but unfinished, and would significantly increase Russia's ability to produce and export liquefied natural gas, allowing Russia to monetize its energy resources while evading sanctions, according to media reporting.⁶⁴³

The most recent sanctions designations followed deceptive activity on the part of two LNG tanker ships, which deliberately obscured their location. The method, known as "spoofing," manipulates or shuts off a ship's transponder equipment to evade detection and global maritime law enforcement.⁶⁴⁴ The ships attempted to load LNG sourced from Arctic LNG-2, a contravention of U.S. and international sanctions.⁶⁴⁵

Dual-use Technologies Deployed Against Ukrainian Soldiers, Civilians

Diplomatic reporting during the quarter noted a continued pattern of dual-use technologies, which can serve both civilian and military purposes, flowing into Russia.⁶⁴⁶ In July, for example, the U.S. Mission to the OSCE spoke out against the significant amount of dual-use technologies, as well as other intermediate parts and weapons precursors, that have gone into Russian UAVs, rockets, and missiles.⁶⁴⁷

The PRC is Russia's greatest supplier of dual-use technologies, delivering 73 percent of Russia's total imports—worth \$16 billion—of that type since February 2022, according to diplomatic reporting.⁶⁴⁸ Russia's partnerships with countries like the PRC are enhancing Russia's overall weapons production capacity—a longer-term threat to Ukraine and European security more broadly, according to the cable.⁶⁴⁹

State said that, since the start of the war in Ukraine, 97 percent of direct imports from Western countries to Russia have ceased.⁶⁵⁰ Numerous U.S. Government agencies—in particular, the Departments of Commerce, State, and the Treasury—apply sanctions and export controls to restrain the flow of dual-use goods into Russia.⁶⁵¹ Commerce maintains a Common High Priority List of such goods; the list now includes 50 categories of goods to help limit Russia's access to technologies needed for its defense industrial base.⁶⁵²

During the quarter, persistent use of restricted technologies in Russian weapons, including some components from U.S. technology firms, continued to occur.⁶⁵³ According to a July investigation, the missile that struck the Okhmatdyt children's hospital in Kyiv contained electronics from U.S. chipmakers—components that trade controls were designed to prevent from use in Russian weapons.⁶⁵⁴ Despite U.S. and other sanctions, since 2022 Russia has imported almost \$4 billion in restricted microchips, a component in Russia's weapons, via trade patterns leading through Hong Kong, mainland PRC, and elsewhere, according to a media report.⁶⁵⁵







Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy speaks during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, on September 6, 2024. (U.S. Air Force photo)

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION

98 Public Diplomacy

100 Educational and Cultural Affairs

101 Countering Disinformation



PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION

U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and Ambassador Bridget A. Brink speak with Ukrainian civil society groups in Kyiv, Ukraine, on September 11, 2024. (State photo)

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv executed a wide variety of public diplomacy efforts during the quarter, specifically through grants and social network messaging, State reported.⁶⁵⁶ The lessons learned are informing greater collaboration among the embassy and public diplomacy implementers, State said.⁶⁵⁷

Presence on social media: The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv said it operates across most major social media platforms.⁶⁵⁸ Embassy staff tracked “engagements,” or interactions with social media content, across all active platforms.⁶⁵⁹ Content on war-specific events during the quarter—for example, messaging on Russia’s attacks—attracted as many as 700,000 engagements, State reported.⁶⁶⁰ Other public diplomacy messaging, including a video honoring Ukraine’s Independence Day on August 24, also received large-scale engagement, according to State.⁶⁶¹

During the quarter, the Public Diplomacy Section awarded 25 new grants, obligating about \$1.86 million, of which it had disbursed about \$199,000 as of September, State reported.

Promotion of fact-based media: In addition, State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) launched one new program on media coverage in Europe and Eurasia that seeks to provide objective, accurate, and verified reporting to counter Russia's disinformation and propaganda.⁶⁶² The program aims to support the creation of diverse media products, including reports, longer investigations, and video content, State DRL said.⁶⁶³ The program received \$1.75 million in obligations, from the FY 2022 supplemental appropriation; disbursements totaled \$432,000 as of the end of August.⁶⁶⁴ The program is scheduled to end on June 21, 2025, State said.⁶⁶⁵

America House: State operates three "America House" locations in Lviv, Kyiv, and Odesa.⁶⁶⁶ The centers provide English language programs, cultural events, and skills training, according to State.⁶⁶⁷

During the quarter, America House Kyiv welcomed approximately 9,400 attendees, State reported.⁶⁶⁸ The Lviv and Odesa locations reported more modest attendance numbers, in the low thousands, according to State, with most attendees participating in-person rather than online.⁶⁶⁹

As of September, the embassy's Public Diplomacy Section had obligated \$3.6 million to support this programming.⁶⁷⁰ About \$827,000 of those funds had been disbursed by the same time.⁶⁷¹

During the quarter, the Public Diplomacy Section awarded 25 new grants, obligating about \$1.86 million, of which it had disbursed about \$199,000 as of September, State reported.⁶⁷² The grants aligned with three primary goals: 1) strengthening democratic governance and economic growth; 2) helping Ukraine resist and counter Russian aggression and influence; and 3) promoting Western-oriented reform that integrates Ukraine into European structures.⁶⁷³ The performance period for the new grants began in July 2024 and will run until September 2025, State said.⁶⁷⁴

The outcomes of programs supported by this quarter's awards are shaping plans for FY 2025, State reported.⁶⁷⁵ During the quarter, the embassy's Public Diplomacy Section began collaborating with the Monitoring, Evaluation and Audit Services for Ukraine (MEASURE) contractor to define performance indicators and realize outcomes across the section's three stated primary goals, according to State.⁶⁷⁶

Countering disinformation with partners: During the quarter, State's Global Engagement Center worked with partner governments to counter the Russian government's disinformation and boost Ukraine's image and reputation around the world, according to State.⁶⁷⁷ In partnership with the Ukraine Communications Group, a joint effort with Poland that the two countries launched in June 2024, the Global Engagement Center helped lead an influencer campaign during the 2024 Olympics in Paris, France, State said.⁶⁷⁸ Also during the quarter, the Global Engagement Center debunked Russian disinformation narratives on military recruitment, the Russification of Ukrainian children, and purported "color revolutions," according to State reporting, a reference to movements for democratic reforms in ex-Soviet and other regions in recent years.⁶⁷⁹

EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

Table 29.

State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Programs and Grants Funded Using Ukraine Supplemental and Base Funds, July to September 2024

Program/Recipient	Activity
International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP): Impact Awards \$5,000 (Base Funding)	This alumni grant will support horse-assisted therapy techniques to bring holistic healing experiences to approximately 24 war-affected children from Ukraine.
IVLP: Cultural Management for Arts Entrepreneurship \$243,000 (Base Funding)	Nine leaders from the Ukrainian arts community engaged with American cultural institutions, theaters, museums, galleries, and public and private entities to foster dialogue, exchange knowledge, learn the latest trends and practices in cultural management, and develop strategies for developing a new art ecosystem.
IVLP: National Security and Defense Policy in the United States \$6,047 (Base Funding)	Two representatives from the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine explored national security and defense policy in the United States.
Academy for Women Entrepreneurs (AWE) \$54,000 (Ukraine Supplemental)	Seeks to include and empower Ukrainian women entrepreneurs living in Bulgaria, Portugal, and Slovenia, as part of rebuilding Ukraine's entrepreneurial ecosystem.
Digital Connections Program \$57,000 (Ukraine Supplemental)	Supported "Digital Ukraine: Influence Redefined" conference in Romania in August 2024. Twenty young Ukrainians based in 14 European countries convened to explore best practices in creating impactful campaigns to raise awareness about Ukraine within their host communities.
Professional Fellows Program (PFP) Ukraine Supplemental Alumni Fund \$54,963 (Ukraine Supplemental)	Distribution of the first installment of alumni grants to 10 finalists for implementing follow-on projects addressing programs for youth in conflict zones, humanitarian relief efforts, and post-war recovery, among others.
EducationUSA \$64,750 (Base Funding)	Education-focused operations are providing on-the-ground and virtual advising within Ukraine and in neighboring countries to support prospective Ukrainian students in pursuing higher education in the United States.
Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) \$1,465,000 (Base Funding)	Funded 1 year of study in the United States for 50 Ukrainian high school students. Program supports key foreign policy priorities such as promoting U.S.-Ukrainian ties at the grassroots level, enhancing media literacy, raising global awareness in American communities, and fostering exceptionally high levels of English fluency among participants. There are 7,800 FLEX alumni from Ukraine.
BridgeUSA Ukraine Journalism Scholarship Program \$100,000 (Educational and Cultural Affairs Recovery Funds)	Provides a 3-month immersive fellowship experience in the United States to 10 top international journalists. Held annually, organized by the World Press Institute. The selected journalists will have the opportunity to learn about U.S. founding principles of a free press and journalistic best practices that promote transparency and accountability, and travel nationwide. One Ukrainian journalist will participate in Fall 2024.

Program/Recipient	Activity
BridgeUSA Ukrainian Academic Fellows Program \$500,000 (Ukraine Supplemental)	Funding will establish enduring university exchanges between U.S. and Ukrainian institutions, fostering continuous collaboration and knowledge sharing. Program also seeks to advance U.S.-Ukraine cooperation in key areas vital for Ukraine’s rebuilding efforts.
Alumni Engagement Innovation Fund \$34,000 (Base Funding)	Funding for “Youth Empowerment for Sustainable Development” project. Supports U.S. Mission Ukraine’s U.S. foreign policy priority of promoting Ukraine’s economic recovery and sustainable economic growth. Project will provide educational courses and host a large-scale youth forum.
Ukraine Cultural Heritage Response Initiative (UCHRI) \$10,500,000 (Ukraine Supplementals)	Funding will support the assessment, safeguarding, and repair of damaged cultural heritage in Ukraine, in addition to protecting and building capacity for Ukraine’s cultural heritage sector. Projects have been funded to counter false cultural heritage narratives

Source: State, response to State OIG request for information, 9/22/2024.

COUNTERING DISINFORMATION

INFORMATION LANDSCAPE

During the quarter, independent media in Ukraine continued to report that they faced a range of pressures in the form of harassment, doxing (publishing of private documents or personal information), and what journalists say is the threat of selective mobilization, or draft, of journalists who report on high-level corruption. In August, one of Ukraine’s leading investigative daily newspapers published a letter reporting “systematic pressure from the Office of the President of Ukraine” against some of its journalists and editorial team. The newspaper said that the government blocked access to Ukrainian officials and pressured businesses to drop advertising in the paper. Representatives of other leading independent media organizations publicly expressed support for the newspaper.⁶⁸⁰

A continuing trend this quarter was the use of anonymous social media channels, many of which promote a pro-presidency narrative line, using similar tactics—physical threats, doxing, and false allegations of illegal activity, to put pressure on investigative journalists when they are breaking corruption stories, as well as on anti-corruption activists and democratically-minded reformers. In addition to the anonymous Telegram channels, an informal group of “people for hire” sustained attack narratives against government critics including anti-corruption, pro-reform activists, as well as members of the diplomatic corps, including, at times, the U.S. Ambassador, State said.⁶⁸¹

During the quarter, Russia employed disinformation campaigns to undermine global support for Ukraine and create division among allies using cyber bots and other means, according to the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). Russia has disseminated false content targeting a wide range of audiences, including Ukrainians, residents of Russia, and international communities in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. This disinformation aims to weaken the cohesion of the global coalition supporting Ukraine by sowing discord and distrust within these countries. USEUCOM said this approach illustrates a broader pattern of Russia using disinformation to erode unity and influence public opinion on a global scale.⁶⁸²

Media Freedom: During the quarter, Russia restricted several media entities domestically and in the United States.⁶⁸³ Likewise, the United States designated sanctions against leading Russian media figures over their malign influence and messaging on Ukraine.⁶⁸⁴

On August 28, Russia issued a permanent ban of entry into Russian territory for more than 90 individuals, many of whom are U.S. journalists, including personnel from major American newspapers.⁶⁸⁵ Other banned individuals include lawyers, national security officials, academics, U.S. elected officials, and business executives, media reported.⁶⁸⁶

Russia said it decided to issue the bans in response to Western sanctions against Russia, as well as an alleged “Russophobic course” on the part of the Biden administration, media said, citing an official statement from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁸⁷ The total number of U.S. citizens under Russian sanctions now stands at almost 2,100, media said.⁶⁸⁸

Internet freedom: During the quarter, Russia significantly reduced the video speed and quality of YouTube, the U.S.-based Internet video platform, according to a media report.⁶⁸⁹ The practice, known as ‘throttling,’ was a deliberate push to move Russian Internet users from foreign platforms to domestic alternatives, such as Russia’s ‘RuNet,’ a state-supported and state-controlled internet platform, according to media.⁶⁹⁰

Russian officials have acknowledged publicly the state’s degradation of YouTube, calling their campaign a “forced step” in reaction to Western companies’ alleged violations of Russian laws related to the Internet, media reported.⁶⁹¹

Another press report from August warned that blocking YouTube may reduce Internet speeds for Internet users across Russia, while also working against RuNet.⁶⁹² The same source said the YouTube daily audience in Russia is about 83 million, approaching parity with the 89 million Russians who watch television daily.⁶⁹³ Four out of five Russians above the age of 12 use YouTube every day, the report said.⁶⁹⁴

U.S.-based Google, which owns YouTube, has also sustained a contentious relationship with the Russian government, including the media regulator Roskomnadzor, according to a press report.⁶⁹⁵ Google has blocked dozens of accounts belonging to pro-Russian government, Russian media channels and performing artists, while refusing to suspend accounts that Roskomnadzor demanded be removed, media said.⁶⁹⁶

In August, Reporters Without Borders, an international NGO supporting press freedom, publicly denounced Russia’s throttling practices.⁶⁹⁷ The organization said it “condemns the Kremlin’s use of this latest censorship method, which jeopardizes the right to information.”⁶⁹⁸ The same group reported degradation of YouTube’s performance in Ukraine’s Russia-occupied regions of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk, during the same period.⁶⁹⁹

Similarly, Meta, the parent company of social media platforms Facebook and Instagram, announced on September 17 that it had decided to ban Russia Today (RT) and other Russian state media for spreading manipulative information on their platforms, which are among the world’s largest.⁷⁰⁰ “RT and other related entities are now banned from our apps globally for foreign interference activity,” a Meta representative said, according to media.⁷⁰¹ Meta took similar actions against Russian state media in 2020 and 2022, press reported.⁷⁰²

On August 28, Russia issued a permanent ban of entry into Russian territory for more than 90 individuals, many of whom are U.S. journalists, including personnel from major American newspapers.

Beyond censorship concerns, blocking or degrading YouTube performance could cost Russia as much as \$23 million per day, the Current Time report stated.

Current Time, the 24/7 Russian-language digital and TV network led by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) in cooperation with Voice of America (VOA), interviewed Internet freedom experts during the quarter on how the Russian government's throttling of YouTube would impact Russia socially as well as economically.⁷⁰³ Beyond censorship concerns, blocking or degrading YouTube performance could cost Russia as much as \$23 million per day, the Current Time report stated.⁷⁰⁴

That and other Current Time, RFE/RL, and VOA reports during the quarter included instructions on how to circumvent Russian government censorship, according to the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM)—an effort that the networks began even before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.⁷⁰⁵ A separate report from Current Time said that, if Russia wanted to completely block access to sites like YouTube then it would have to block all circumvention tools, such as virtual private networks (VPNs), effectively disconnecting Russia from the global Internet and exacting a massive cost on the national economy.⁷⁰⁶

APPLE COMPLIES WITH RUSSIAN MEDIA REGULATOR, REMOVES APPS FROM ONLINE MARKETPLACE

On October 18, the U.S. tech company Apple confirmed it had removed the application, or app, for RFE/RL's Current Time, according to RFE/RL reporting.⁷⁰⁷ The app had been available in the Russian version of Apple's App Store, the company's online marketplace.⁷⁰⁸ Apple said it removed the Current Time app at the request of Roskomnadzor, Russia's media regulator, RFE/RL reported.⁷⁰⁹

Apple's decision extends the company's pattern of agreeing to what many consider repressive Russian regulatory stipulations, RFE/RL said.⁷¹⁰ During the summer and fall of 2024, Apple removed more than 120 VPN apps from the company's App Store in Russia, according to the broadcaster.⁷¹¹ VPNs allow internet users to circumvent restrictions in Russia and other countries where government restrictions limit open access to the Internet.⁷¹²

RFE/RL noted that its Russian-language projects have come under increasing pressure from the Russian government, especially since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.⁷¹³ Civil society groups have accused Apple of helping the Russian government suppress free speech in the country, RFE/RL reported.⁷¹⁴

Russia Attempts Election-Year Manipulation

Transatlantic diplomacy during the quarter highlighted the risks of Russian government-backed disinformation, especially in its relevance ahead of the 2024 U.S. presidential election.⁷¹⁵ The reporting said the disinformation campaigns were expected to intensify until November.⁷¹⁶ Specifically, the disinformation campaigns will likely leverage key issues in U.S. politics, including immigration and continued U.S. support for Ukraine.⁷¹⁷

Similar disinformation campaigns are seeking to divide Western democracies over support to Ukraine, according to diplomatic reporting.⁷¹⁸ In the European Union and elsewhere, Poland called for a coordinated campaign of strategic communications to counteract and debunk Russian disinformation efforts across Europe and the United States, the cable reported.⁷¹⁹

TREASURY SANCTIONS RELATED TO MEDIA FREEDOM

On September 4, The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) applied a dozen sanctions against Russian individuals and entities for their malign influence efforts targeting the U.S. presidential election, according to an agency press release.⁷²⁰ The Russian malign actors employed a variety of tools, Treasury said, including artificial intelligence deepfakes and disinformation, in a move to erode U.S. public confidence in election processes and institutions.⁷²¹

The same day as Treasury's sanctions, the Department of Justice (DoJ) announced it had issued indictments of two employees of RT, the state-owned Russian broadcast platform formerly known as Russia Today.⁷²² The RT employees used a front company, thereby obscuring their Russian identity, to target and contact unwitting U.S. influencers, mostly among conservative alternative media, according to Justice and media reports.⁷²³ One U.S. company disseminated almost 2,000 videos, earning tens of millions of views, using RT-curated content, the DoJ said.⁷²⁴ Russian government-linked individuals and content have also appeared among U.S.-based liberal alternative news outlets, according to a press report.⁷²⁵

The head of RT, Margarita Simonyan, acknowledged her platform's collaboration with Russian government officials in September.⁷²⁶ "All the employees of RT and the editor-in-chief only obey the orders of the Kremlin," Simonyan said, according to a U.S. press report.⁷²⁷

In September, State noted RT's attempts to manipulate, via covert influence activities, the outcome of the October 2024 presidential election in Moldova.⁷²⁸ RT's activities include cyber capabilities with ties to Russian intelligence, State reported.⁷²⁹ Some of RT's covert activities provided support to individuals under U.S. sanctions, State said.⁷³⁰ RT's activities in Moldova seek to foment political unrest, according to State, likely with the specific goal of causing protests to turn violent.⁷³¹

DOD MESSAGING IN EASTERN EUROPE


USEUCOM reported that it is working to identify, publicly expose, and disrupt Russian disinformation attacks while also planning for election-related threats and mitigating vulnerabilities. USEUCOM said that it has worked with partners to target and dismantle the

infrastructure used to spread disinformation, including taking offensive actions against key platforms and networks. Additionally, the USEUCOM Cyber Space Operations Division is enhancing awareness of cyber security threats through proactive engagements with partners and allies, further strengthening efforts to combat disinformation and protect against cyber threats.⁷³²

USEUCOM reported that it uses a combination of non-attributed Internet-based messaging and U.S. Government-attributed media to disseminate messages in support of OAR. In addition, since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, USEUCOM psychological operations forces have provided assistance to Ukraine. USEUCOM said it continues to conduct activities in the information environment to promote both deterrence and assurance, contest Russian malign narratives, and build resilience among foreign audiences to counter disinformation.⁷³³

Figure 8.

Attributed USEUCOM-supported Information Operation Campaigns in Europe During the Quarter



USEUCOM said that assessing the effectiveness of these efforts to counter Russian disinformation campaigns is challenging due to the complex and evolving nature of the mission. The outcomes of these efforts often take time to become apparent, as shifting public perceptions and undermining false narratives is a gradual process, according to USEUCOM.⁷³⁴

USEUCOM's attributed campaigns focus on audiences in eastern Europe in ways that directly and indirectly impact OAR objectives. These include efforts to disrupt Russia's disinformation activities in the region, increasing confidence in the NATO alliance, and degrade adversaries' attempts to legitimize their operations.⁷³⁵

During the quarter, USEUCOM had active U.S.-attributed information operation campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Poland, and Romania. (See Figure 8.) Campaigns in Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina aimed to increase recruitment for those nations' militaries. Messaging highlighted the benefits of military service and contained links to the Bosnian Ministry of Defense recruitment website.⁷³⁶

According to USEUCOM, the Bosnian Troop Unity campaign made more than 22 million impressions across multiple platforms, including television, print, radio, internet, social media, and outdoor placements, such as billboards. The target audience viewed series videos nearly 1 million times, most frequently on social media. Of the 5,640 social media reactions, 99 percent were positive, and 91 percent of the 395 comments on series products were positive, according to USEUCOM. After the National Unity series ended, 56 percent of survey respondents from the target audience expressed support for the Bosnian armed forces, an increase of 7 percent following series dissemination, according to USEUCOM. The National Unity series will conduct a second dissemination during the first quarter of FY 2025, followed by the required post dissemination assessments.⁷³⁷

The Georgia Bright Future series reached 54 percent of the target audience at least once with more than 3,300 television spots, and series products made more than 30 million impressions online, according to USEUCOM. Polling data show that the Georgian people have low levels of trust in their national government and their country's electoral process. Target audience comments were 59 percent negative, expressing skepticism about EU integration, citing a lack of understanding of its benefits, fear of losing national identity, and comparisons to the Soviet Union. Some feared closer relations with the West would lead to further conflict with Russia, citing Ukraine as an example, according to USEUCOM. In contrast, 95 percent of social media reactions were positive.⁷³⁸

The Stronger Together campaigns in Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania focused on highlighting the benefits of the NATO alliance. In Poland, digital products reached the entire target audience, generating nearly 380 million digital impressions, 55 million views of video products, and more than 400,000 engagements with digital content. According to USEUCOM, surveys of the target audience revealed that 42 percent (approximately 4.5 million Poles) recalled seeing series products. While support for NATO in Poland has been on a gradual decline, those who recalled series messages were 8 percent more likely to support NATO and 11 percent more likely to support Poland's involvement in global defense activities.⁷³⁹

During the quarter, USEUCOM had active U.S.-attributed information operation campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Poland, and Romania.

U.S. AGENCY FOR GLOBAL MEDIA

USAGM has adapted its activities as Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to evolve.⁷⁴⁰ The agency reported that, of its \$25 million in total supplemental funding, it has expended \$20.66 million as of September 30.⁷⁴¹ All of the \$25 million has now been obligated, or committed to specific uses, USAGM said.⁷⁴² (See Table 30.)

Table 30.

Application of USAGM Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations for the International Broadcasting Account, by Program and Activity, as of September 2024, in \$ Thousands

Program/Activity	Cumulative Funding, as of September 2024			FY 2024 Fourth Quarter	
	Allocations	Obligations	Expenditures	Obligations	Expenditures
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty	\$9,013	\$9,013	\$9,013	\$0	\$1,081
Mobile Equipment	909	909	909	0	40
Travel, Emergency Relocation, and Realignment of Operations	401	401	401	0	0
New Capabilities and Programs	5,266	5,266	5,266	0	879
Marketing and Program Support	243	243	243	0	0
Kyiv and Regional Bureau Initiative	2,064	2,064	2,064	0	146
Baltic Waves Radio	130	130	130	0	17
Technology, Services, and Innovation	2,660	2,660	2,183	0	270
Astra 4A Satellite	849	849	685	0	82
Astra 19.2 Satellite	1,500	1,500	1,188	0	188
MW Transmissions–Armenia and Estonia	311	311	311	0	0
Voice of America	9,202	9,202	7,174	1,068	1,571
Ukraine Regional Reporting	4,753	4,753	2,849	459	879
Content for New Ukrainian TV Channel	2,170	2,170	2,088	255	287
Expanded VOA Washington Coverage	1,326	1,326	1,318	194	216
Office of Policy and Research	2,429	2,429	609	837	387
Open Technology Fund/Rapid Response Fund	1,320	1,320	1,320	0	0
Expanded Polygraph: Fighting Misinformation	954	954	918	159	190
Providing Ukraine/Russia Coverage in Regional Markets to Counter Disinformation	375	375	356	\$0	\$16
Middle East Broadcasting Networks	125	125	125	\$0	\$0
Radio Free Asia	125	125	125	\$0	\$0
Office of Cuba Broadcasting	125	125	106	\$0	\$16
GRAND TOTAL	\$25,000	\$25,000	\$20,656	\$1,905	\$3,325

Note: Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.

Source: USAGM, response to State OIG request for information, 9/19/2024.

Voice of America (VOA): USAGM’s flagship news platform added three new documentaries and associated materials to enhance coverage of the war and its impact on human lives, the agency said. VOA did not launch any new radio or television channels or digital platforms; instead, VOA focused on maintaining what it called “programming surge,” as well as enhancing digital content and production, made possible by supplemental funding, USAGM said.⁷⁴³

VOA’s Eurasia division maintained comprehensive coverage of Russia’s war in Ukraine during the quarter, according to USAGM.⁷⁴⁴ The division’s work involved on-the-ground reporting from Ukraine, debunking Russian propaganda on Ukraine’s invasion of Russia’s Kursk region, and coverage of Russia’s lethal attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, among other topics, USAGM said.⁷⁴⁵ Freelancers hired in Ukraine and working for VOA filmed original footage from Kursk, the agency said.⁷⁴⁶

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL): Journalists from RFE/RL’s Ukrainian-language service reported from Sudzha, a town in the Kursk region that Ukrainian forces captured in August.⁷⁴⁷ A separate RFE/RL report, this time from Kursk city, interviewed Russians fleeing the fighting in the broader region.⁷⁴⁸ The RFE/RL Russian Service spoke with mothers of Russian conscripts, who claimed the Russian government had lied to them, USAGM said; the mothers said they rely on Ukrainian news and social media for accurate information.⁷⁴⁹

During the quarter, USAGM spent \$879,000 on New Capabilities and Programs.⁷⁵⁰ Part of this funding supported RFE/RL radio broadcasting from Lithuania to disseminate Russian-language reporting in the Baltics and Russia, including the Moscow and St. Petersburg metro regions, USAGM said.⁷⁵¹

Because YouTube is one of RFE/RL’s main platforms for reaching consumers of Russian language news, the degradation of YouTube could directly limit RFE/RL’s work and effectiveness, USAGM reported.⁷⁵² Therefore, alternative approaches like radio remain “essentially important” for USAGM’s activities in Russia and eastern Europe, the agency said, whether in Russian or other languages.⁷⁵³ USAGM noted that, while supplemental funding has covered costs for regional broadcasting like the Russian-language radio transmissions from Lithuania for the past 2 years, supplemental funding was ending; as a result, RFE/RL was seeking “internal resources” to be able to renew the broadcasting agreement.⁷⁵⁴

USAGM underscored the effectiveness of VOA and other reporting, during the quarter and previously.⁷⁵⁵ A joint FBI/DoJ affidavit referenced an investigation by the VOA Russian Service, while another report on a project investigating Russian propagandists sparked an official reaction from Moscow as well as coverage from more than 50 Russian media outlets, USAGM said.⁷⁵⁶

VOA focused on maintaining what it called “programming surge,” as well as enhancing digital content and production, made possible by supplemental funding, USAGM said.

Foreign Press Centers, which are State-funded locations supporting foreign journalists working in the United States, maintained an active schedule of outreach and programs during the quarter.

FOREIGN PRESS CENTERS

Foreign Press Centers (FPC), which are State-funded locations supporting foreign journalists working in the United States, maintained an active schedule of outreach and programs during the quarter.⁷⁵⁷ State operates FPCs in New York City and in Washington, D.C., according to State.⁷⁵⁸ The mission of the FPCs is to provide direct access to authoritative American sources of information.⁷⁵⁹ FPCs hosted 48 media events for foreign journalists, including press briefings, roundtables, reporting tours, and interviews during the quarter.⁷⁶⁰

Part of the FPCs' work over the quarter focused on supporting understanding of the U.S. electoral process, State reported.⁷⁶¹ The FPCs hosted two briefings during the quarter that explained the upcoming election along two main themes: election security and redistricting.⁷⁶² During the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, the FPCs organized 33 topical briefings for foreign journalists, including journalists from Ukraine and Russia, State said.⁷⁶³

The FPCs measured their progress this quarter through a variety of metrics, State said.⁷⁶⁴ These included pre- and post-participation surveys, an annual survey, website page views, as well as the collection of anecdotal feedback through frequent meetings with journalists, according to State.⁷⁶⁵ Further, the FPCs produce impact reports for each of their programs, employ a media monitoring platform, and gather input from journalists and posts, State reported.⁷⁶⁶ The FPCs face the permanent challenge of tracking media products that are determined to be the direct result of FPC engagements; likewise, the FPCs can encourage, but never require, U.S. policymakers to engage with FPC-supported journalists, State said.⁷⁶⁷







A U.S. Army M3 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicle during exercise Paladin Strike at Camp Adazi Training Area, Latvia. (U.S. Army photo)

APPENDICES

- 112 Appendix A:
Classified Appendix to this Report
- 113 Appendix B:
Methodology for Preparing this
Special IG Quarterly Report
- 114 Appendix C:
Final Reports by Lead IG Agencies
- 128 Appendix D:
Ongoing Oversight Projects
- 133 Appendix E:
Planned Oversight Projects
- 135 Appendix F:
Hotline and Investigations Activity
- 138 APPENDIX G:
U.S. Weapons, Equipment, and
Ammunition Committed to Ukraine
- 140 Acronyms
- 141 Map of USEUCOM Area of Responsibility
- 142 Map of Ukraine
- 143 Endnotes

APPENDIX A

Classified Appendix to this Report

A classified appendix to this report provides additional information on Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) and the U.S. Government’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The appendix will be delivered to relevant agencies and congressional committees.



APPENDIX B

Methodology for Preparing this Special IG Quarterly Report

This report complies with Section 1250B of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2024 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Section 419). The Inspector General Act requires that the DoD IG—as the previously designated Lead IG for OAR and now the Special IG for OAR— provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on each overseas contingency operation. This requirement is consistent with the requirement that the Lead IG publish a biannual report on the activities of the Inspectors General with respect to that overseas contingency operation (5 U.S.C. Section 419(d)(2)(F)).

This report covers the period from July 1, 2024, to September 30, 2024. The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs and partner oversight agencies contributed to the content of this report.

To fulfill the congressional mandate to report on OAR, the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs gather data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations referenced in this report, the OIGs have not verified or audited the information collected through open-source research or from Federal agencies, and the information provided represents the view of the source cited in each instance.

INFORMATION COLLECTION FROM AGENCIES AND OPEN SOURCES

Each quarter, the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs gather information about their programs and operations related to OAR from Federal agencies. This report also draws on current, publicly available information from reputable sources. The following sources may be included:

- U.S. Government statements, press conferences, and reports
- Reports issued by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks
- Media reports

The Lead IG agencies use open-source information to supplement information obtained through their agency information collection process and provide additional detail about the overseas contingency operation.

REPORT PRODUCTION

The DoD IG, as the Special IG (and previously designated Lead IG) for OAR, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The OIGs for the DoD, State, and USAID draft input for the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once assembled, each OIG coordinates a two-phase review of the report within its own agency. During the first review, the Special IG agencies ask relevant offices within their agencies to comment, correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation. The three OIGs incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review prior to publication. The final report reflects the editorial view of the OIGs for the DoD, State, and USAID as independent oversight agencies.

APPENDIX C

Final Reports by Lead IG Agencies

From July 1 to September 30, 2024, the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued 4 management advisories and 22 oversight reports related to OAR and the Ukraine response, as detailed in the following summaries. Complete reports by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs and other oversight agencies are available on their respective websites and ukraineoversight.gov.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Management Advisory: The DoD Should Analyze the Use of Barcode Scanners for Conducting Inventories of Defense Articles Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring

DODIG-2024-140; September 27, 2024

The DoD OIG issued this management advisory during the conduct of its evaluation to determine the extent to which the DoD conducts enhanced end-use monitoring (EEUM) of defense articles provided to Ukraine in accordance with DoD policy.

Traditionally, EEUM serial number inventories are conducted by security cooperation personnel by writing down by hand the serial numbers the defense articles. In a hostile environment where the volume and pace of defense articles moving into the country is very high compared to a peacetime environment, traditional EEUM serial number inventories become impractical. To address the impracticality, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) authorized the use of hand-held barcode scanners in Ukraine, for use by both the Office of Defense Cooperation-Ukraine (ODC-Ukraine) and the Ukrainian Armed Forces, with the goal of improving the speed and efficiency of EEUM inventories. However, during the evaluation, ODC-Ukraine personnel identified ongoing challenges using the barcode scanners for EEUM of defense article inventories. These challenges could limit the potential benefits of expanding the use of barcode scanners in the future. The DoD OIG provided this management advisory to enable the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the DSCA Director to take immediate actions on the DoD OIG recommendation.

The evaluation found that some scans were inaccurate, some barcodes were illegible or missing, and scanners did not function well in adverse weather and were prohibited in some secure storage sites. These identified challenges resulted in ODC-Ukraine and security cooperation personnel having to go through the time-consuming process of writing the serial numbers of large quantities of EEUM-designated defense articles by hand, which increases the potential for errors in transcribing numbers. According to 11 of 13 security cooperation organization personnel interviewed by the DoD OIG, the effective use of hand-held barcode scanners could save time and increase the speed of inventories.

As a result, the DoD OIG recommended that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the DSCA conduct a review of challenges using barcode scanners and develop and implement a plan of action and milestones to correct identified problems prior to making any decisions on whether to use barcode scanners to conduct EEUM inventories on a broader scale.

The Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) partially agreed but did not fully address the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and will remain open. The DoD OIG will consider this recommendation resolved when the OUSD(P) agrees to provide the DoD OIG with a plan of action and milestones that states when and how stakeholders intend to address the challenges identified in the management advisory.

Summary of Oversight Reports on Security Assistance to Ukraine Issued from January 2020 Through February 2024, to Inform DoD Efforts to Support Israel and Other Future Security Assistance Efforts

DODIG-2024-131; September 16, 2024

The DoD OIG reviewed 31 DoD OIG oversight reports issued between January 2020 and February 2024, found that the DoD has continued to face systemic challenges across a variety of areas related to security cooperation for Ukraine. The DoD OIG identified and summarized these challenges and respective recommendations that, if implemented, may improve the efficiency and effectiveness of DoD efforts to support Israel and other future security assistance efforts.

Based on the review of the 31 oversight reports for Ukraine, the DoD OIG identified systemic challenges related to the:

- enhanced end-use monitoring (EEUM) of sensitive equipment provided to Ukraine;
- accountability and control of U.S.-provided equipment, including inventory and property book concerns;
- financial management of Ukraine supplemental funding, including inaccurate reporting of the DoD's use of funds; intelligence sharing;
- information and physical security; and
- information operations.

The DoD OIG summarized key recommendations that should be considered for implementation, as applicable, when conducting security cooperation activities and identified potential best practices for criminal investigations during security assistance operations.

Evaluation of the DoD's Replenishment and Management of 155mm High Explosive Ammunition

DODIG-2024-113; July 24, 2024

The DoD OIG conducted this evaluation to determine whether the DoD developed an effective strategy to meet 155mm High Explosive (HE) ammunition Total Munitions Requirements, balancing war reserve, training, and testing requirements for 155mm HE ammunition.

The DoD authorized the transfer of three types of 155mm HE ammunition to the Ukrainian government from U.S. Army and Marine Corps stockpiles. As of March 12, 2024, the President had authorized the transfer of 155mm HE ammunitions to the Ukrainian government using Presidential Drawdowns.

DoD Instruction 3000.04 requires the Armed Forces to establish a total munitions requirement in accordance with the Munitions Requirements process. The total munitions requirement consists of all munition requirements for war reserve, training, and testing. The training and testing

requirements include the munitions required to train the force and support Military Department programs, ensuring that weapons and platforms deliver the intended effectiveness.

The DoD OIG found that Army and Marine Corps officials implemented an effective strategy for managing Army and Marine Corps on-hand inventory to support war reserve, training, and testing requirements for 155mm HE ammunition. Army, Marine Corps, and Joint Staff officials compared worldwide inventories against global floor requirements on a weekly basis. Furthermore, Army officials invested in the industrial base to increase production of 155mm HE ammunition.

As a result, Army and Marine Corps officials maintained sufficient 155mm HE ammunition to meet threats to vital U.S. national security interests. As of September 2023, the Army and Marine Corps' on-hand inventory of 155mm HE ammunition exceeded the global floor requirements. Of the 1,272 Army unit status reports the DoD OIG reviewed for FY 2022 and FY 2023, the DoD OIG found no instances in which a unit reported a lack of 155mm HE ammunition available for training. Of the 404 Marine Corps unit status reports reviewed for FY 2022 and FY 2023, only 7 reports indicated that the reporting unit lacked sufficient 155mm HE ammunition for training. The DoD OIG reviewed testing requirements, authorizations, and expenditures from FY 2020 to FY 2023 and determined the Army officials had sufficient on-hand inventory of 155mm HE ammunition for testing, such as capability, stockpile reliability, and armament rebuilding.

The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this report.

Management Advisory: Audit of Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell-Ukraine Restructuring Contract Invoice Oversight

DODIG-2024-108; July 15, 2024

The DoD OIG issued this management advisory during the conduct of its audit to determine whether Army contracting personnel acted in accordance with Federal and DoD policies to properly award the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) Task Order W56HZV-23-F-0077, under the task order, for the maintenance of equipment at the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell-Ukraine (RDC-U); appropriately planned for and established controls to conduct surveillance of contractor performance; and effectively monitored contractor performance.

This management advisory addresses a deficiency related to Army contracting personnel not properly reviewing, contractor-submitted invoices for the task order for the maintenance of equipment at the RDC-U before payment. The contractor submitted 64 invoices, totaling \$21.2 million, from the inception of the task order award in December 2022 until July 2023. The DoD OIG focused this review on the 53 labor, equipment, and travel invoices, totaling \$20 million, submitted by the contractor and paid for under the task order for the maintenance of equipment at the RDC-U.

The DoD OIG found that Army contracting personnel did not properly review 53 contractor invoices as of July 26, 2023, to ensure compliance with the contract, despite established requirements and best practices to review invoices. This occurred because the contracting officer inappropriately waived the contracting officer's representative review and approval of invoices. In addition, the contracting officer relied on Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) closeout audits, which primarily focus on indirect cost rates and not on whether invoiced amounts were allowable, allocable, or reasonable.

Specifically, the contracting officer stated that the invoice reviews were not necessary because DCAA auditors would ultimately identify and reconcile any issues on invoices when they perform a complete audit at the end of the contract. As a result, Army contracting personnel made improper payments on labor invoices totaling \$29,772 and did not identify non-compliant contractor-submitted invoices. In addition, Army contracting personnel did not actively safeguard the Government's interests on a high-risk cost-reimbursement contract. Finally, the Army does not have assurance that the \$20 million paid to the RDC-U contractor, as of July 2023, resulted in contractually compliant maintenance and labor services, equipment purchases, or travel.

The DoD OIG made five recommendations to the Executive Director of the Army Contracting Command-Detroit Arsenal (ACC-DTA). The Acting Executive Director of the ACC-DTA disagreed with the recommendations and suggested that they should be directed to the DCAA. We shared the Acting Executive Director's comments concerning redirecting the recommendations with the Deputy Assistant Director of Policy for the DCAA. The Deputy Assistant Director agreed with the DoD OIG that ACC had the overall responsibility for administration and oversight of the contract, specifically highlighting the Army's role to settle any DCAA audit findings. The recommendations are unresolved and will remain open. We requested that the Acting Executive Director, ACC-DTA reconsider the recommendations and provide comments on the final management advisory.

Management Advisory: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Handling of Sensitive Information at Logistics Enabling Node-Romania

DODIG-2024-109; July 15, 2024

The DoD OIG issued this management advisory during its evaluation to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the DoD's security and accountability controls for U.S. defense items transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the Logistics Enabling Node in Romania. This report is classified. Details can be found in this quarterly report's classified appendix.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Management Assistance Report: The Department Would Benefit from a Formal, Systematic Methodology to Capture and Utilize Lessons Learned Following Post Evacuations

AUD-GEER-24-32; September 30, 2024

To ensure the safety of mission personnel during political instability or other security threats, State may evacuate personnel and suspend operations at an embassy or consulate. Since 2014, State has evacuated and suspended operations at seven overseas posts because of deteriorating security environments in the host countries, including Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, in August 2021 and Embassy Kyiv, Ukraine, in February 2022. During an audit of the disposition of sensitive security assets in the lead-up to the evacuations of Embassy Kabul and Embassy Kyiv, State OIG identified challenges related to State's approach to documenting and applying lessons learned from previous post evacuations. This report addresses those challenges.

State OIG found that State had not established a consistent, comprehensive method to capture lessons learned following post drawdowns, evacuations, and suspensions of operations. State OIG identified two types of reports intended to document lessons learned. Both types of reports are intended to document significant lessons learned following post evacuations and may include recommendations to aid other posts facing emergency evacuation scenarios. However, State OIG found that State had not established clear requirements as to when these reports must be produced. State OIG also found that, even when lessons learned reports were produced following a post's evacuation, State had not established a process to systematically review documented lessons learned or determine when lessons learned should necessitate changes to State policies, procedures, or guidance. As a result, State OIG found that many of the same difficulties experienced by posts that underwent evacuations prior to 2021 were repeated during the evacuation of Embassy Kabul.

State OIG made three recommendations to address the deficiencies identified in this report. The relevant State entities concurred with two recommendations and neither agreed nor disagreed with one recommendation. At the time the report was issued, State OIG considered all three recommendations resolved, pending further action. The recommendations will remain open until State OIG receives documentation that all agreed upon actions have been completed.

Inspection of Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

ISP-I-24-16; September 23, 2024

State OIG inspected the executive direction, foreign policy priorities, staffing, policy and program implementation, resource management operations, and information management operations of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM).

State OIG found that 1) PM's Assistant Secretary and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary demonstrated State leadership principles to communicate and foster resilience, 2) PM managed increased activity in several high-profile areas of concern to State, the Administration, and Congress: Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific strategy, and support to Israel following the October 2023 Hamas attack, 3) PM's staffing did not keep pace with workload growth that resulted from the war in Ukraine, new Indo-Pacific Strategy responsibilities, and the Israel-Hamas conflict, 4) PM did not have a centralized system for tracking contracts, and 5) PM had deficiencies in grants management, including the lack of full and open competition for assistance awards

State OIG made 21 recommendations, all to PM. PM concurred with 20 recommendations and disagreed with 1 recommendation. At the time the report was issued, State OIG considered 20 recommendations resolved, pending further action, and 1 recommendation unresolved. The recommendations will remain open until State OIG receives documentation that all agreed upon actions have been completed.

Classified Annex to the Inspection of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

ISP-S-24-16A; September 23, 2024

State OIG conducted this inspection to evaluate the programs and operations of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. This report, one of two for the inspection, is classified. Details can be found in this quarterly report's classified appendix.

Supplemental Classified Report on the Audit of the Disposition of Sensitive Security Assets at U.S. Embassies Kabul, Afghanistan and Kyiv, Ukraine

AUD-GEER-24-31: September 19, 2024

State OIG is conducted this audit to determine whether U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, and U.S. Embassy Kyiv managed, safeguarded, and disposed of sensitive security assets in advance of the evacuation of each post in accordance with State guidance. This report is classified. Details can be found in this quarterly report's classified appendix. State OIG issued a related unclassified report in October.

Letter to Congressional Committees on Direct Financial Support to Ukraine

August 29, 2024

The Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act (Division B of P.L. 118-50, April 24, 2024) required State OIG to report to Congress on the mechanisms for monitoring and safeguards in place for oversight and accountability for direct financial support to the Ukrainian government. This letter responded to that requirement. State OIG reported in the letter that State was following the procedures required for certification and reporting to Congress regarding direct financial support, as it had been at the time of previous reporting to Congress by State OIG and USAID OIG in response to earlier mandatory reporting requirements in appropriations laws in 2022 and 2023.

Audit of Worldwide Protective Services III Initial Training Consolidation Initiative

AUD-SI-24-23; July 26, 2024

State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security's (DS) Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) program provides contracted guard, personal protection, and support services at diplomatic locations. The WPS II contract required that security vendors train their personnel before assignment to State duties. However, DS found issues with the quality, oversight, and cost of training provided by the security vendors. Once trained, security vendors provide security services in a variety of countries, including Iraq and Ukraine. To address these issues under the subsequent WPS III contract, State awarded a contract in 2021 to provide initial training to WPS III security vendor personnel. State OIG conducted this audit to determine whether DS's efforts to consolidate initial WPS III training enhanced oversight, improved training quality, and achieved envisioned cost savings.

State OIG found that DS enhanced oversight of initial WPS III training by consolidating the training. However, State OIG was unable to determine whether DS improved training quality or achieved envisioned cost savings because DS had not collected data, established baseline data or performance indicators, or developed a methodology to monitor, evaluate, and measure training quality improvements or cost savings.

State OIG made four recommendations to address the deficiencies identified in this report. The relevant State entities concurred with all four recommendations and, at the time the report was issued, State OIG considered all four recommendations resolved, pending further action. The recommendations will remain open until State OIG receives documentation that all agreed upon actions have been completed.

Review of the Department of State's Development and Implementation of the U.S. Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Conventional Weapons in Eastern Europe

ISP-S-24-11; July 16, 2024

State OIG conducted this review to evaluate State's development and implementation of the U.S. Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Conventional Weapons in Eastern Europe. This report is classified. Details can be found in this quarterly report's classified appendix.

Inspection of Embassy Bucharest, Romania

ISP-I-24-24; July 10, 2024

State OIG inspected the operating environment, executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management operations of Embassy Bucharest.

State OIG found that 1) the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission led Embassy Bucharest in a professional and collaborative manner; 2) Embassy Bucharest advanced important U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives, including those related to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine; 3) the Consular Section and Defense Attache' Office collaborated to provide American Citizen Services to U.S. service members in Romania; 4) the embassy suffered from attrition and difficulty in hiring new local employees due to non-competitive salaries; and 5) Embassy Bucharest did not have a process for coordinating foreign assistance programs managed by multiple State bureaus and U.S. Government agencies.

State OIG made 20 recommendations, 19 to Embassy Bucharest and 1 to the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. The embassy and the relevant State bureaus concurred with 17 recommendations and neither agreed nor disagreed with 3 recommendations. At the time the report was issued, State OIG considered all 20 recommendations resolved, pending further action. The recommendations will remain open until State OIG receives documentation that all agreed upon actions have been completed.

Classified Inspection of Embassy Bucharest, Romania

ISP-S-24-24; July 1, 2024

State OIG conducted this inspection to evaluate the programs and operations of Embassy Bucharest. This report, one of two for the inspection, is classified. Details can be found in this quarterly report's classified appendix.

**U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
OF INSPECTOR GENERAL*****Ukraine Response; Assessment of USAID's Response to Staffing Challenges and Increased Programming Following Russia's Full-Scale Invasion***

E-121-24-003-M; September 19, 2024

After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, USAID's assistance programming in the country increased by more than 224 percent by April 2023. In contrast, USAID's staffing in Ukraine shrank to 58 percent of pre-invasion levels. USAID OIG initiated this evaluation due to the increase in funding to the mission's award portfolio, potential risk of remote-managed

assistance, and congressional interest in oversight of Ukraine programming. The objective was to determine how USAID responded to challenges associated with its staffing footprint while implementing expanded programming.

USAID OIG determined that USAID addressed challenges in staffing and programming in Ukraine through multiple actions that can inform the Agency's ongoing and future work in complex crisis environments:

- Implementation of workplace flexibilities, such as staff rotations and extended temporary duty status
- Pursuit of alternative workspace
- Expansion of third-party monitoring of USAID programming
- Rapid deployment of the Disaster Assistance Response Team
- Surge and contractor staff support
- Priority bidding to fill Foreign Service Officer positions
- Strategic workforce planning that resulted in 50 new mission positions
- Transition seminar

USAID OIG found that USAID took responsible actions to address staffing challenges and meet increased programming needs in Ukraine. For about 3 months after Russia's full-scale invasion, USAID did not have a staff presence in Kyiv. Even with the phased reopening of the embassy beginning in May 2022, the State Department significantly restricted the number of U.S. government personnel in-country and their travel within Ukraine.

USAID recognized the need to add resources to meet increased humanitarian and development programming and pursued a multitiered approach to reconstitute USAID/Ukraine operations and supplement assigned Mission personnel. Unable to control staff allocations and travel within Ukraine during the first year after the full-scale invasion, USAID implemented workplace flexibilities such as staff rotations and extended temporary duty status, sought office space in Poland, and leveraged its existing contract for third-party monitors of USAID projects and activities. In addition, USAID/Ukraine successfully added and retained staff by bringing employees from other USAID offices to add capacity in Ukraine, offering counseling and support services to staff serving in Ukraine, holding an in-person transition seminar for incoming and outgoing staff, and developing a workforce plan to gradually increase staffing levels.

Direct Budget Support: Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, Mandated Assessment

9-199-24-001-M; September 5, 2024

Russia's February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing war has caused catastrophic loss of life and livelihood. Prior to 2024, the United States, through USAID, provided \$22.9 billion in direct budget support to the Ukrainian government to ensure the continuity of operations and delivery of essential services. USAID provides this support to the Ukrainian government through World Bank trust funds.

On July 12, 2024, USAID obligated an additional \$3.9 billion to the Ukrainian government through the World Bank's Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) multi-donor trust fund. This additional funding is from the Ukraine Security Supplemental

Appropriations Act of 2024 (the Act), enacted on April 24, 2024. The Act appropriated \$7.8 billion in funding to provide direct budget support to the Ukrainian government. The Act also required USAID OIG to submit a report to Congress detailing and assessing the monitoring mechanisms and safeguards in place to prevent corruption and ensure accountability over USAID's direct budget support to the Ukrainian government. Accordingly, the objective of this evaluation was to assess the design of these monitoring mechanisms and safeguards per the statutory directive. USAID OIG submitted prior reports to Congress assessing monitoring mechanisms and safeguards over USAID's direct budget support to the Ukrainian government in January 2023 and March 2023.

USAID OIG found that the mechanisms and safeguards over U.S. direct budget support contributions to the Ukrainian government aligned with Federal and Agency standards. Specifically, the World Bank and USAID had implemented multiple monitoring mechanisms and safeguards over the Agency's direct budget support to the Ukrainian government. These 12 mechanisms and safeguards include reviews, reports, and other methods that aligned with Federal internal control standards. Specifically, the World Bank had six existing procedures to manage direct budget support contributions. These procedures were 1) recipient financial statement audits, 2) World Bank financial reports, 3) annual and final progress reports, 4) anticorruption and fraud protocols, 5) implementation status and results reports, and 6) expenditure verification reports. The World Bank also had internal control principles that aligned with each mechanism. In addition, the World Bank provided enhanced support to the PEACE project through three other mechanisms: 1) agreed-upon procedure reviews, 2) consultants embedded within the Ukrainian government's Ministry of Finance, and 3) beneficiary phone surveys. Moreover, USAID implemented three due diligence safeguards over direct budget support contributions by using contractors to conduct spot checks, financial statement audits, and capacity building. These safeguards were 1) technical assistance to the Ukrainian government's Ministry of Finance, 2) financial and internal control audits of the Ukrainian government's ministries, and 3) capacity building of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine.

Public International Organizations: USAID Did Not Consistently Perform Expected Due Diligence

E-000-24-002-M: August 22, 2024

USAID regularly partners with multilateral organizations, including United Nations agencies such as the World Food Programme and UNICEF, and the World Bank. These organizations, also known as public international organizations (PIOs), deliver development and humanitarian assistance in complex, emergency situations. In the past year, USAID has relied heavily on PIOs to implement its humanitarian assistance programming for its pressing responses in Gaza and Ukraine. While USAID's obligations, disbursements, and in-kind contributions to PIOs increased 282 percent from \$5.6 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2019 to \$21.4 billion in FY 2022, PIOs are not subject to the same rigorous oversight regulations as contractors, grantees, and other nongovernmental organizations. This limits USAID's insight into how PIOs manage U.S.-provided foreign assistance funds. Nevertheless, USAID's policies on managing PIO agreements include a variety of due diligence mechanisms to help ensure proper oversight of U.S. funds.

USAID OIG's evaluation objective was to determine the extent USAID performed expected due diligence over funding to selected PIOs. We focused on the 67 PIOs that received \$45.9 billion total in USAID funding between FYs 2019 and 2022.

USAID OIG found that USAID did not consistently use pre-and post-award due diligence mechanisms to ensure effective oversight of PIOs. Before making an award, USAID must perform an organizational capacity review (OCR) of the PIO to ensure it is capable of adequately safeguarding Agency resources. OCRs should be updated at least every 5 years. However, USAID did not conduct OCRs in line with Agency guidelines for more than 70 percent of PIOs. Rather than using OCRs to understand that challenges that PIOs faced when administering USAID funds, Agency staff relied more on Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network assessments or other types of risk assessments and management plans.

Additionally, when an OCR included recommendations for corrective action, USAID did not have a formal follow-up mechanism to ensure that the Agency addressed the recommendations.

After making an award to a PIO, USAID can apply due diligence oversight mechanisms that vary by agreement type. A USAID official said most PIO agreements are made through cost-type awards, and the Agency's policy for these awards allows for spot checks related to USAID-funded activities. However, for the cost-type awards we reviewed, USAID officials generally did not perform spot checks. Moreover, USAID had limited guidance for conducting spot checks and did not track their occurrence or results.

USAID OIG determined that USAID has limited insight into how PIOs manage billions of dollars in U.S. funding, so the use of pre-and post- award due diligence mechanisms can help USAID officials ensure that a PIO is capable of safeguarding Federal funding. When USAID does not use these mechanisms, Agency officials lack access to information on potential vulnerabilities in a PIO's policy and organizational framework and project operations and management that might lead to waste or misuse of critical U.S. aid funds.

USAID OIG made three recommendations to USAID's Bureau for Planning, Learning, and Resource Management/Office of Development Cooperation to strengthen the Agency's oversight of PIOs. The Agency agreed with the first two recommendations and partially agreed with the third. One recommendation is resolved but open pending completion of planned activities, and two recommendations are open and unresolved pending more information and revised management decisions, if applicable.

FINAL REPORTS BY LEAD IG PARTNER AGENCIES

ARMY AUDIT AGENCY

Managing Shop Stock for Armored Brigade Combat Teams Deployed to Europe

A-2024-0068-FIZ

The Army Audit Agency conducted this audit to determine if armored brigade combat teams deployed to Europe managed shop stock lists per Army policy. This report is classified. Details can be found in this quarterly report's classified appendix.

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE***Ukraine Funding: DoD Needs to Improve its Reporting, Guidance, and Evaluation Efforts***

GAO-24-106763SU; September 30, 2024

The GAO conducted this audit to determine how the DoD has used and tracked funding in support of Ukraine, including Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds. This report contains controlled unclassified information so it is not publicly available. Details can be found in this quarterly report's classified appendix.

Ukraine: DoD Could Strengthen International Military Training Coordination by Improving Data Quality

GAO-24-107776; September 26, 2024

The GAO conducted this review to examine U.S. coordination with other countries on military training provided to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) outside Ukraine.

The GAO found that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), through the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U), coordinated international military training for UAF with the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, multinational groups, and individual countries. According to SAG-U information, during the first 2 years of the war following Russia's full-scale invasion, more than 30 countries helped train about 116,000 Ukrainians outside Ukraine as of February 2024. The U.S. trained about 16 percent of these forces. As of May 2024, the total number of Ukrainians trained outside Ukraine had grown to an estimated 127,000.

SAG-U collects training data from the U.S. military, multinational groups, and allied or partner nations on a training tracker spreadsheet and uses the data to show a comprehensive picture of U.S., allied, and partner nation military training contributions outside Ukraine. Although the GAO found SAG-U's training data sufficiently reliable to report broad trends in the number of Ukrainians that completed military training outside of Ukraine, the GAO found that the data had some limitations, including blank or inconsistently labeled data fields, that make more specific types of analyses difficult. Without collecting quality data organized in a systematic way, SAG-U cannot ensure consistent and complete tracking of the training that the U.S., allies, and partner nations provided to inform decisions about Ukraine's future training needs.

The GAO also identified key challenges to providing international military training outside of Ukraine. Some key challenges related to training design, such as insufficient time for training and lack of standardized content and support. Additional key challenges involved administrative problems with personnel, scheduling, equipment, and logistics. SAG-U has taken steps to address these challenges, such as establishing training directives to help standardize delivery of training and collecting end-of-training reports to share lessons learned.

The GAO recommended that the DoD establish clear written guidance defining the terms and variable for all data entered into the SAG-U training system of record for tracking the provision of international military training to Ukraine. The DoD concurred with the recommendation. Once the GAO confirms that the DoD has taken action in response to the recommendation, the recommendation will be closed.

Ukraine: U.S. Agencies Should Improve Tracking of Authorized U.S.-Origin Defense Article Transfers Requested by Foreign Donors

GAO-24-106745; August 20, 2024

The GAO examined information on U.S. and foreign security assistance donations to Ukraine since January 1, 2022, how U.S. agencies coordinate with foreign donors to provide defense articles to Ukraine and the key factors that are considered, and how State authorizes third-party transfers (TPT) to Ukraine and the extent U.S. agencies can track these transfers for end-use monitoring.

At least 30 countries have pledged over \$148 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since Russia's invasion in 2022. This includes \$2 billion of defense items of U.S. origin—such as missiles and ammunition—that foreign donors requested to transfer to Ukraine. State approves these transfers and the DoD is required to monitor the items.

The GAO found that State had authorized 217 TPT of U.S.-origin defense articles by 26 foreign donors to Ukraine as of April 2024. The DoD is required to conduct end-use monitoring on these defense articles; however, the GAO found that the DoD is limited in its ability to do so. The GAO found that State and the DoD's inconsistent communication of authorized TPT details makes it difficult for the DoD to track them.

The GAO found that DoD officials are often unaware of TPTs authorized by State until they are identified upon entry to Ukraine, if at all. State has taken some steps to enhance its document management system for TPTs to improve external information sharing. However, neither State nor the DoD verify the delivery of authorized TPTs transferred to Ukraine, including those subject to enhanced end-use monitoring. State does not consistently request TPT delivery notification from donors, and its policy does not require it. DoD officials acknowledged that records of authorized TPTs transferred to Ukraine. Timely and complete information about the transfer of authorized TPTs to Ukraine would help ensure that the DoD can properly account for sensitive defense articles and better prevent their misuse and diversion.

The GAO made six recommendations to State and the DoD. Four recommendations identify steps that State and the DoD should take to collect delivery information from foreign donors for TPTs and incentivized donations, and two are related to steps State should take to improve information sharing about TPTs subject to U.S. end-use monitoring. State concurred with five recommendations and the DoD partially concurred with one. Once the GAO confirms that State and the DoD have taken actions in response to the recommendations, the recommendations will be closed.

Ukraine: Oversight of U.S. Direct Budget Support

GAO-24-107520; July 31, 2024

The GAO conducted this review as requested by Congress, to provide information about the direct budget support (DBS) to the Ukrainian government and the existing oversight of this funding. This report is part of a series of evaluations the GAO is conducting on U.S. oversight of direct budget support to Ukraine.

As of July 2024, USAID had obligated \$26.8 billion for DBS to the Ukrainian government and planned to obligate an additional \$3.95 billion. This funding is intended to ensure Ukraine can continue critical operations and deliver essential services. USAID provided this funding to the Ukrainian government through World Bank trust funds. Most of this funding was used to reimburse Ukraine for eligible expenses such as salaries for teachers, civil servants, and healthcare workers.

USAID monitors the use of U.S. DBS funding, and the World Bank supervises World Bank trust funds and operations used to provide DBS to Ukraine. Both USAID and the World Bank hired contractors to support their oversight efforts. The contractors' reviews offer different levels of accountability based on their oversight approaches. For example, contractors monitor Ukraine's management of U.S. DBS funding to provide visibility and identify gaps in processes, and they also are conducting financial statement audits that can promote transparency, and bolster stakeholder confidence in financial reporting.

Ukraine: State and USAID Should Improve Processes for Ensuring Partners Can Perform Required Work

GAO-24-106751; July 31, 2024

The GAO conducted this study to review State and USAID's use of implementing partners since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. State and USAID have obligated at least \$5.2 billion to support selected non-security humanitarian, stabilization, and development assistance in Ukraine and neighboring countries.

Implementing partners play a key role in executing this assistance. State and USAID aim to select high-performing partners who can accomplish the work required.

The GAO found that for 26 of the 28 awards it reviewed, State and USAID reviewed potential partners' past performance. For the two awards the GAO reviewed that were a certain type of agreement international organizations, State did not screen the past performance of the organizations. State policy does not require this screening. As a result, State has a higher risk of selecting partners for this type of agreement that may be excluded by the U.S. Government from receiving an award or may not perform well in carrying out the needed assistance.

For USAID's awards in the sample, USAID officials documented detailed information about applicants' past performance. In contrast, State did not record this level of detail because State does not require such detail to be documented. Detailed documentation could help other State officials understand the risks of using these partners to implement non-security assistance now and in the future.

The GAO issued five recommendations, including for State to screen all international organization partners for past performance, for State to improve its documentation of past performance reviews, and for State and USAID to monitor partners' screening of sub-partners for past performance. The GAO issued four recommendations for State and one recommendation to USAID. State and USAID concurred, and the GAO will close the recommendations once it confirms that these actions have been taken by State and USAID.

Cyberspace Operations: DoD Should Take Steps to Improve Coordination with Foreign Partners

GAO-24-103716C; July 25, 2024

The GAO conducted this audit to identify DoD cyber operations and activities in Europe since January 2022 and the mitigation of challenges in undertaking those actions. This report is classified.

Ukraine Assistance: Actions Needed to Properly Value Defense Articles Provided Under Presidential Drawdown Authority

GAO-24-106934; July 22, 2024

In 2023, the DoD notified Congress that it had misvalued certain defense articles provided under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) to Ukraine by about \$6.2 billion. As a result, this amount was still available for use as PDA assistance. The GAO was asked to review the DoD's accounting of all defense articles provided to Ukraine under PDA. This report examines the extent to which the methods the DoD used to value defense articles provided to Ukraine under PDA have been consistent with DoD guidance.

The GAO found that the DoD's efforts to properly value defense articles for drawdown are hampered because the Foreign Assistance Act does not clearly define certain terms and the DoD lacked PDA-specific valuation guidance. First, the Foreign Assistance Act is not clear on the definition of "value" or the purpose of the maximum aggregate value as these terms relate to articles provided under PDA. This affects the DoD's ability to establish clear guidance for valuing defense articles under PDA.

Second, though the DoD has accounting policy for valuing defense articles, it is not specific to valuation for PDA purposes. Not having specific guidance on methods for valuing articles provided under PDA affects the values given to those articles. As a result, the DoD cannot have assurance that the articles will be valued accurately, which may result in a miscalculation of the remaining Presidential determination authorization amount.

At the DoD Component level, the GAO found that some Components did not consistently follow the DoD's accounting policy as instructed when valuing defense articles for PDA. The GAO estimates that about 12 percent of all defense articles provided to Ukraine under PDA were valued using methods that did not comply with DoD guidance and may need to be revalued. Moreover, the GAO estimates that 61 percent of the reported values do not have appropriate supporting documentation, which leads to the inability to verify the valuation. Without Component-specific procedures to ensure that the methods used comply with DoD guidance and are appropriately documented, the DoD cannot ensure that the values are accurately calculated across the Components for PDA purposes.

The GAO recommended that Congress consider clarifying the definition of "value" as it relates to defense articles provided under PDA. The GAO also made seven recommendations to the DoD, including that it updates guidance to include a PDA-specific valuation section and develop Component-specific valuation procedures for PDA. The DoD concurred with all seven recommendations and cited actions it will take to address them. Once the GAO receives and assesses documentation demonstrating that the recommendations have been addressed, the recommendations will be closed.

APPENDIX D

Ongoing Oversight Projects

Tables 31 and 32 list the titles and objectives for the Special IG and partner agencies' ongoing oversight projects related to OAR and Ukraine.

Table 31.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs as of September 30, 2024

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the Army's Management of Undefined Contract Actions Awarded to Provide Ukraine Assistance

To determine whether Army contracting officials properly managed undefinitized contract actions awarded to assist Ukraine by obligating funds and definitizing actions within the required limits, and adjusting profit for costs incurred, or properly waiving the requirements in accordance with Federal and DoD policies.

Audit of the U.S. European Command Force Protection Measures at Installations in Poland that Support Operation Atlantic Resolve

To determine whether the DoD implemented force protection measures at U.S. European Command installations in Poland in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve in accordance with DoD policy.

Classified Project—SOCEUR IO

Classified—Please contact the DoD OIG.

Evaluation of Accountability Controls for Sea Ports of Debarkation in the U.S. European Command

To determine whether the U.S. European Command is effectively scaling, stocking, staffing, and preparing select sea ports for movement of equipment provided to foreign partners.

Audit of the DoD's Management of European Deterrence Initiative Investments

To determine the extent to which DoD officials effectively prioritized and funded military construction in support of the European Deterrence Initiative.

Audit of Storage for U.S. Army Prepositioned Stocks in Belgium and the Netherlands

To assess the effectiveness of the Army's storage of prepositioned stocks in Belgium and the Netherlands (APS-2).

Evaluation of the Movement of Ukraine and Israel-Bound Equipment through Aerial Ports of Embarkation within the Continental United States

To assess the effectiveness with which the DoD Components are accounting for and processing defense materials from their points of origin through the Aerial Ports of Embarkation for delivery to Ukraine and Israel.

Audit of the DoD's Execution of Funds Provided for Assistance to Ukraine

To determine whether the DoD used the Ukraine assistance funds in accordance with Federal laws and DoD policies. The President signed the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Acts with the purpose of responding to the situation in Ukraine. This audit will determine whether the appropriated funds meet that purpose.

Evaluation of the DoD's Effectiveness in Negotiating Fair and Reasonable Prices with Contractors for Ukraine Security Assistance

To assess the effectiveness with which DoD contracting officers negotiated fair and reasonable prices with contractors for Ukraine security assistance.

Audit of DoD Maintenance Operations for Military Equipment Provided to Ukraine

To determine the extent to which the DoD provided maintenance support for U.S. military equipment provided to Ukraine.

DoD and Department of State Joint Audit of U.S. Assistance Provided in Support of Ukraine Through the Foreign Military Financing Program

To determine whether the DoD and Department of State appropriately administered and managed foreign military financing provided in response to Russia's war against Ukraine.

Evaluation of the DoD's Efforts to Protect U.S. Personnel and Operations Supporting the Ukrainian Conflict

To determine whether the DoD is effectively and efficiently protecting U.S. personnel and operations, to include executing counterintelligence activities, within the U.S. European Command in accordance with DoD policy.

Evaluation of Security and Accountability Controls for Defense Items Transferred to Ukraine through Romania

To determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the DoD's security and accountability controls for U.S. defense items transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the Logistics Enabling Node in Romania.

Audit of Security and Accountability Controls for Defense Items Transferred to Ukraine through Slovakia

To determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the DoD's security and accountability controls for U.S. defense items transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the Logistics Enabling Node in Slovakia.

Follow-Up Evaluation of Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine

To determine the extent to which the DoD conducted EEUM of designated defense articles provided to Ukraine in accordance with DoD policy during the period after June 2, 2023. This evaluation is a follow-up to DODIG-2024-043, "Evaluation of the DoD's Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine," released on January 10, 2024.

Evaluation of the Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Authority Defense Equipment Deliveries to Ukraine (Property Book II)

To determine whether the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Military Services are effectively and efficiently accounting for the delivery of Presidential Drawdown Authority defense equipment to Ukraine in accordance with DoD property book and DSCA security assistance policy.

Follow-up Evaluation of Management Advisory: The Protection of Sensitive Mission Data by the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine and Its Subordinate Commands

To assess the extent to which the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine and its subordinate commands, in coordination with the U.S. Army Europe and Africa, have fully implemented plans and issued guidance to improve compliance with DoD information security policies.

Follow-up Evaluation of Management Advisory: Sufficiency of Staffing at Logistics Hubs in Poland for Conducting Inventories of Items Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring

To assess the actions taken by the DoD to ensure that the Office of Defense Cooperation-Ukraine has sufficient capacity to effectively and efficiently conduct all required enhanced end-use monitoring inventories of designated defense articles prior to transfers into Ukraine.

Audit of the Army's Administration of Noncompetitive Contracts in Support of Ukraine

To determine whether, in support of the Ukraine response, DoD contracting officials properly administered noncompetitively awarded contracts in accordance with Federal regulations and DoD guidance.

Evaluation of DoD Efforts to Collect and Integrate Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned from the Russia/Ukraine Conflict

To determine the effectiveness of the DoD's collection and use of observations, insights, and lessons learned from Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the DoD's support to Ukraine, to inform DoD doctrine, planning, training, and equipping.

Evaluation of the DoD's Validation of Repair Parts Requested by the Ukrainian Armed Forces

To determine the effectiveness of DoD Components' processes for verifying the need for, and the accountability of, repair parts requested by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to maintain military equipment provided by the DoD.

Audit of the DoD's Processes for Providing Supplies and Equipment Funded Through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative

To assess the effectiveness of the DoD's processes for ensuring the quality and timeliness of supplies and equipment provided to the Ukrainian Armed Forces funded through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

Audit of Controls Over Funds Provided for the Replenishment of Defense Articles and the Reimbursement for Services Provided to the Government of Ukraine Through Presidential Drawdown Authority

To assess the effectiveness of the DoD's internal controls over the use of funds appropriated for the replenishment of defense articles and the reimbursement for services provided to Ukraine under Presidential Drawdown Authority.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Review of Leahy Vetting Processes in Select Countries with Leahy Ineligible Unit Agreements

To determine whether State: 1) has developed policies and procedures for instances where recipient units cannot be identified prior to the transfer of assistance, and 2) is implementing Leahy law requirements in accordance with policies and procedures in select countries.

Inspection of Embassy Moscow, Russia

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russia.

Inspection of Embassy Ankara, Türkiye, and Constituent Posts

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Türkiye, and constituent posts.

Classified Inspection of Embassy Ankara, Türkiye, and Constituent Posts

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Türkiye, and constituent posts.

Inspection of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs

To determine whether the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs is: 1) following State leadership and management principles, 2) carrying out program and policy implementation responsibilities in line with State standards, and 3) managing its resources and information technology operations in accordance with State standards.

Information Brief on Democracy and Human Rights Programs in Europe and Eurasia

To provide an overview of State's funding for democracy and human rights assistance in Europe and Eurasia, describe State's approach to democratic backsliding, summarize the sources State uses to gauge changes in democracy, and present an analysis of the democracy and human rights funds State provided to the region from FY 2019 through FY 2023.

Audit of the Disposition of Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicles in Advance of Evacuations at U.S. Embassies Kabul and Kyiv

To determine whether the U.S. Embassies in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Kyiv, Ukraine, managed, safeguarded, and disposed of sensitive security assets in advance of the evacuation and suspension of operations at each post in accordance with State guidance, and what challenges were encountered upon reopening U.S. Embassy in Kyiv.

Audit of U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ukraine, Records Retention for Electronic Messaging

To determine whether Embassy Kyiv has implemented measures to ensure Federal records created using electronic messaging applications are preserved.

Audit of Department of State Anti-Corruption Programs and Activities in Eastern Europe

To determine whether State implemented and monitored anti-corruption assistance programs and activities in Eastern European countries in accordance with Federal and State requirements.

Audit of Department of State Anti-Corruption Programs and Activities in Eastern Europe - Classified Annex

To determine whether the Department of State implemented and monitored anti-corruption assistance programs and activities in Eastern European countries in accordance with Federal and State requirements.

Joint Audit of the DoD and Department of State Oversight of the U.S. Assistance to Ukraine Through the Foreign Military Financing Program

To determine whether the DoD and State implemented effective oversight over foreign military financing provided to Ukraine for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of USAID's Direct Budget Support to the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance Fund

To determine how USAID oversees its contributions to the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance Fund and assess the extent to which USAID's contributions to the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance Fund supported eligible internally displaced persons.

Audit of USAID Energy Activities in Ukraine

To assess USAID/Ukraine's oversight of the implementation of the Energy Security Project procurement process and determine whether USAID/Ukraine verified that the Energy Security Project delivered selected equipment and materials to recipients as intended.

Audit of USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance Localization Approach in Ukraine

To determine: 1) the extent to which USAID has developed objectives and metrics for the program(s) under review; 2) progress toward achieving those objectives; and 3) how, and to what extent, USAID is monitoring implementer performance in accordance with USAID's standard policies and procedures.

Audit of the USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives Engagement of Local Partners in Ukraine to Contribute to Development Goals

To determine: 1) the extent to which USAID has developed objectives and metrics for the program(s) under review; 2) progress toward achieving those objectives; and 3) how, and to what extent, USAID is monitoring implementer performance in accordance with USAID's standard policies and procedures.

Inspection of USAID Partner Controls to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Ukraine

To verify whether USAID held partners responding to the Ukrainian crisis to required sexual exploitation and abuse measures prior to executing awards and will review the internal controls reported by partners.

Audit of Bureau for Resilience and Food Security Response to the Humanitarian Crisis Caused by Russia's War Against Ukraine

To examine steps taken by USAID's Bureau for Resilience and Food Security to respond to world-wide food security concerns resulting from the Ukrainian crises.

Audit of USAID/Ukraine's HIV/AIDS Prevention Activities

To determine the mission's role in ensuring that internally displaced persons living with HIV/AIDS have access to medical and social services, and medications during the war.

Incurring Cost Audits of USAID Resources

To determine whether costs claimed by 12 recipients of Ukraine awards and sub-awards for the period January 1, 2018, to December 31, 2022, are allowable, allocable and reasonable in accordance with audit standards, award terms, and Federal regulations.

Inspection of USAID's Oversight of Starlink Satellite Terminals Provided to the Government of Ukraine

To determine how: 1) the Government of Ukraine used the USAID-provided Starlink terminals, and 2) USAID monitored the Government of Ukraine's use of USAID-provided Starlink terminals.

Table 32.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by Partner Agencies, as of September 30, 2024

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the Bureau of Industry and Security's Enforcement of Russia and Belarus Export Controls

To assess the actions taken by the Bureau of Industry and Security to detect and prosecute violations of Russia and Belarus export controls.

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

DoD and NATO Logistics in Europe

To review DoD and NATO capacity to transport personnel and materiel within Europe and consideration of related lessons learned from the effort to support Ukraine.

DoD Efforts to Train Ukraine Forces

To examine the DoD's approaches to training the Ukrainian Armed Forces, determine how DoD assesses that training and collects lessons learned, and identify effects on U.S. Military forces and training facilities in Europe.

Management of Presidential Drawdown Authority

To assess agency implementation of Presidential Drawdown Authority, including processes for: 1) managing drawdowns and 2) potentially replacing defense articles provided to partners.

U.S. Direct Budget Support to Ukraine

To evaluate the transparency and accountability of the direct budget support USAID has provided to the Ukrainian government through the World Bank's Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) project, and other related matters.

U.S. Government Ukraine Recovery Planning

To assess State and USAID planning for recovery, the extent to which ongoing efforts align with U.S. priorities, and the coordination of these efforts with other donor nations and the Ukrainian government.

U.S. Government Ukraine Recovery Planning

To assess State's and USAID's planning for recovery, the extent to which ongoing efforts align with U.S. priorities, and the coordination of these efforts with other donor nations and the Ukrainian government.

Readiness Implications of U.S. Military Assistance to Ukraine

To assess the impact of the DoD's provision of military equipment to Ukraine on the Geographic Combatant Commands' readiness to prepare for and conduct operations, the Military Services' training and equipping capabilities, and the Army's efforts to sustain its weapon systems.

Russia/Ukraine Sanctions and Export Controls

To examine the objectives of sanctions and export controls related to the war in Ukraine and progress toward those objectives; changes in key Russian economic indicators since sanctions and export controls were imposed; and the amounts and uses of resources that agencies have received to implement and enforce those sanctions and export controls.

U.S. Support for Nuclear Radiological Security and Safety in Ukraine

To evaluate how the Department of Energy and other agencies have used supplemental appropriations to address nuclear and radiological security and safety risks in Ukraine.

Combating Human Trafficking during Armed Conflicts, Including Ukraine

To assess the implementation of State and USAID programs and projects to counter human trafficking in Ukraine and compare them with similar efforts in other countries experiencing armed conflict.

Ukraine Refugee and Internally Displaced Person Assistance

To examine U.S. Government assistance to Ukrainian refugees and internally displaced persons, including efforts to coordinate internally as well as with international partners on a comprehensive strategy for addressing the crises and migration challenges.

HHS Refugee Assistance for Ukrainians

To review HHS' use and oversight of Ukraine refugee assistance funding and any factors that have affected Ukrainians' temporary resettlement in the United States.

APPENDIX E

Planned Oversight Projects

Table 33 lists the titles and objectives for Special IG and partner agencies' planned oversight projects related to OAR and Ukraine.

Table 33.

Planned Oversight Projects Related to OAR and Ukraine by the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs as of September 30, 2024

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the DoD's Acquisition and Distribution of Bulk Petroleum Products in U.S. Military Installations in Europe

To assess the effectiveness of DoD actions to reduce reliance on Russian energy sources within the U.S. European Command area of responsibility.

Audit of the DoD's Facilities Sustainment in the U.S. European Command

To assess the effectiveness of the DoD's management of facilities sustainment in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility.

Audit of Defensive Cyberspace Operations in the U.S. European Command

To assess the effectiveness of defensive cyber operations in the U.S. European Command.

Evaluation of the Accountability of Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Designated Defense Communication Security Articles Provided to Ukraine

To assess the effectiveness with which the DoD is managing the accountability of enhanced end-use monitoring designated COMSEC articles provided to Ukraine.

Evaluation of the Demilitarization of Damaged, Destroyed, and Expended Defense Articles Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring in Ukraine

To assess the effectiveness with which the DoD uses established demilitarization processes for damaged, destroyed, and expended defense articles requiring enhanced end-use monitoring.

Evaluation of the U.S. European Command's Long-Term Equipment Storage and Maintenance Complex in Powidz, Poland

To determine whether the Army is able to maintain and account for Army pre-positioned stocks of military equipment at the new Long-Term Equipment and Storage and Maintenance Complex in Powidz, Poland.

Evaluation of DoD Stockage of Spare and Repair Parts to Support the Ukrainian Armed Forces

To assess the efficiency and effectiveness with which DoD organizations are storing spare and repair parts in Poland and Ukraine to meet the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Inspection of Embassy Riga, Latvia

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Riga, Latvia

Classified Inspection of Embassy Riga, Latvia

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Riga, Latvia.

Inspection of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs

To evaluate the programs and operations of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

Audit of Emergency Action Planning at Selected U.S. Embassies in the Baltic States

To determine whether selected U.S. embassies in the Baltic States are prepared to respond and recover from emergencies.

Audit of Department of State Efforts to Address Global Food Security Following Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

To determine whether State's Bureau of Global Food Security's programs and activities designed to counter the impact of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on global food security are achieving intended results.

Audit of War Crimes Accountability Capacity Building in Ukraine

To determine whether the Global Criminal Justice Grant for War Crimes Accountability Capacity-Building in Ukraine is achieving intended results.

Audit of Department of State Policies and Practices for Imposing, Enforcing, and Evaluating Economic and Financial Sanctions

To determine whether State, in coordination with the Departments of Commerce and Treasury established and implemented policies and practices to impose, enforce, and evaluate the effect of sanctions.

Review of Remote Monitoring for Department of State Programs in Ukraine

To determine: 1) the number of State bureaus with implementing partners in Ukraine, 2) the extent to which such bureaus used remote methods or third-party contractors to monitor their programming in Ukraine, and 3) any barriers to remote monitoring in Ukraine.

Review of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs' End Use Monitoring Property Management in Ukraine

To determine whether the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL): 1) followed applicable Federal, State, and INL property management processes for commodities donated to Ukrainian government entities, and 2) whether INL authorized exceptions to bureau property management and donation processes.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of USAID's Cybersecurity Defenses

To assess the effectiveness of USAID's controls to prevent unauthorized access to its data and systems, including countering and deterring threats from foreign governments that pose a unique cyberthreat to USAID and the U.S. Government.

Audit of USAID/Ukraine's Activities to Ensure Access to Critical Health Services

To determine: 1) the extent to which USAID has developed objectives and metrics for the programs under review, 2) determine progress toward achieving those objectives, and 3) determine how, and to what extent, USAID is monitoring implementer performance in accordance with USAID's standard policies and procedures.

Audit of USAID's Agriculture Resilience Initiative for Ukraine

To determine how AGRI-Ukraine targeted Ukraine's agricultural production and export challenges through 2023.

APPENDIX F Hotline and Investigations Activity

HOTLINE ACTIVITY

The DoD, State, and USAID OIGs each maintain their own hotline to receive complaints specific to their agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report suspected violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority. Each OIG Hotline office evaluates complaints received through the hotlines and forwards them to the respective investigative entity for review and investigation.

During the quarter, DoD OIG Hotline investigators received 12 allegations related to OAR and referred 10 cases for further criminal or administrative investigation. The State OIG received 14 allegations and referred none, and the USAID OIG received 34 allegations. In some instances, a case may contain multiple subjects and allegations. (See Figure 9.)

INVESTIGATIONS

Law enforcement personnel from the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs investigate allegations of misconduct that might compromise U.S. Government programs and operations. Additionally, investigators identify, coordinate, and de-conflict fraud and corruption investigations; share best practices and investigative techniques; and coordinate proactive measures to detect and deter the criminals who would exploit U.S. Government assistance to Ukraine.

The Special Inspector General and its oversight partners continued to use the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group (FCIWG) framework to coordinate investigative activities, deconflict potential or common targets, and interact for logistical and legal support

Figure 9.
Hotline Activity Related to OAR, July 1–September 30, 2024





Figure 10.

Investigations Activity Related to OAR, July 1–September 30, 2024

regarding the Ukraine response. The FCIWG framework includes representatives from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS, the DoD OIG's criminal investigative component), State OIG, USAID OIG, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Homeland Security Investigations.

The Special IG agencies have positioned criminal investigators in Germany, Poland, and Ukraine to investigate allegations of fraud, corruption and potential diversion of weapons or technology. DCIS agents in Kyiv continue working jointly with the U.S. Embassy partners and Ukrainian authorities, to assess any reported discrepancies related to accounting for weapons and military equipment requiring enhanced end use monitoring.

Special IG criminal investigators also engage international counterparts on a regular basis and in multilateral forums such as the European Fraud Working Group and the Complex Emergencies Working Group. During these forums, U.S., bilateral, and multilateral law enforcement and oversight bodies share best practices and lessons learned from previous operations that are applicable to Ukraine-related investigations and investigations in other complex emergency environments. On September 17-18, 2024, USAID OIG hosted the Complex Emergencies Working Group in Washington DC. The forum featured panels on investigative information sharing, covering privileges and immunities, partnering in Ukraine to combat fraud, and criminal prosecution for fraud. USAID's Bureau for Planning, Learning, and Resource Management emphasized reporting requirements to USAID and the OIG, and six case studies addressed topics including sexual exploitation investigations and identifying double billing.

As of September 30, 2024, Special IG and investigative partner agencies reported 61 open investigations and 30 investigations closed.

In previous quarterly reports, the Special IG has discussed the various memoranda of understanding (MOU) that have been signed between the DoD, State, and USAID OIGs and their Ukrainian counterparts, including the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), Main Inspectorate, and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO), to formalize information sharing in support of criminal investigations and oversight work.

This quarter, DoD OIG personnel stationed in Washington and Kyiv reported that these MOUs have facilitated the nascent but increasing cooperation between two complementary but structurally dissimilar oversight communities.

DoD OIG investigators have reported that they routinely employ these MOUs as a mechanism for the exchange of information with their Ukrainian counterparts. DoD OIG personnel met regularly with the Ukrainian Main Inspectorate and other investigative partners, and through these relationships, facilitated by the MOUs, addressed inquiries promptly. DoD OIG personnel continue to build relationships with Ukrainian government entities to facilitate efforts to account for U.S. investments in Ukraine.



APPENDIX G

U.S. Weapons, Equipment, and Ammunition Committed to Ukraine

Air Defense

- Two Patriot air defense batteries and munitions
- 12 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and munitions
- HAWK air defense systems and munitions
- AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M missiles for air defense
- More than 2,000 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles
- Avenger air defense systems
- VAMPIRE counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) and munitions
- c-UAS gun trucks and ammunition
- Mobile c-UAS laser-guided rocket systems
- Other c-UAS equipment
- Anti-aircraft guns and ammunition
- Air defense systems components
- Equipment to integrate Western launchers, missiles, and radars with Ukraine's systems
- Equipment to support and sustain Ukraine's existing air defense capabilities
- Equipment to protect critical national infrastructure
- 21 air surveillance radars

Ground Maneuver

- 31 M1A1 Abrams tanks
- 45 T-72B tanks
- More than 300 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles
- Four Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicles
- 189 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers
- More than 800 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers
- 250 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles
- More than 1,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs)

- More than 3,000 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs)
- More than 200 light tactical vehicles
- 300 armored medical treatment vehicles
- 80 trucks and more than 200 trailers to transport heavy equipment
- More than 1,000 tactical vehicles to tow and haul equipment
- 153 tactical vehicles to recover equipment
- 10 command post vehicles
- 30 ammunition support vehicles
- 18 armored bridging systems
- 20 logistics support vehicles and equipment
- 239 fuel tankers and 105 fuel trailers
- 58 water trailers
- Six armored utility trucks
- 125mm, 120mm, and 105mm tank ammunition
- More than 1,800,000 rounds of 25mm ammunition
- Mine clearing equipment

Fires

- More than 40 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and ammunition
- Ground-based Small Diameter Bomb launchers and guided rockets
- More than 200 155mm Howitzers and more than 3,000,000 155mm artillery rounds
- More than 7,000 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds
- More than 60,000 155mm Remote Anti-Armor Mine Systems (RAAM) artillery rounds
- 72 105mm Howitzers and more than 800,000 105mm artillery rounds
- 10,000 203mm artillery rounds

- More than 400,000 152mm artillery rounds
- Approximately 40,000 130mm artillery rounds
- 40,000 122mm artillery rounds
- 60,000 122mm GRAD rockets
- More than 200 mortar systems
- More than 600,000 mortar rounds
- More than 100 counter-artillery and counter-mortar radars
- More than 50 multi-mission radars

Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Systems

- 20 Mi-17 helicopters
- Switchblade Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
- Phoenix Ghost UAS
- CyberLux K8 UAS
- Altius-600 UAS
- Jump-20 UAS
- Hornet UAS
- Puma UAS
- ScanEagle UAS
- Penguin UAS
- Two radars for UAS
- High-speed Anti-radiation Missiles (HARMs)
- Precision aerial munitions
- More than 6,000 Zuni aircraft rockets
- More than 20,000 Hydra-70 aircraft rockets
- Munitions for UAS

Anti-armor and Small Arms

- More than 10,000 Javelin anti-armor systems
- More than 120,000 other anti-armor systems and munitions
- More than 9,000 Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles
- More than 40,000 grenade launchers and small arms
- More than 400,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades

- Laser-guided rocket systems and munitions
- Rocket launchers and ammunition
- Anti-tank mines

Maritime

- Two Harpoon coastal defense systems and anti-ship missiles
- 90 coastal and riverine patrol boats
- Unmanned coastal defense vessels
- Port and harbor security equipment

Other Capabilities

- M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions
- C-4 explosives, demolition munitions, and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing
- Obstacle emplacement equipment
- Counter air defense capability
- More than 100,000 sets of body armor and helmets
- Tactical secure communications systems and support equipment
- Four satellite communications (SATCOM) antennas
- SATCOM terminals and services
- Electronic warfare (EW) and counter-EW equipment
- Commercial satellite imagery services
- Night vision devices, surveillance and thermal imagery systems, optics, and rangefinders
- Explosive ordnance disposal equipment and protective gear
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment
- Medical supplies, including first aid kits, bandages, monitors, and other equipment
- Field equipment, cold weather gear, generators, and spare parts
- Support for training, maintenance, and sustainment activities

Source: DoD, fact sheet, "Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine," 9/6/2024.

ACRONYMS

Acronym	
ACA	Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group for Ukraine
ACC-DTA	Army Contracting Command-Detroit Arsenal
BHA	USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
DBS	direct budget support
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DoE	Department of Energy
DoJ	Department of Justice
DS	State Bureau of Diplomatic Security
DRL	State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EEUM	enhanced end-use monitoring
ENR	State Bureau of Energy Resources
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EUM	end-use monitoring
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FPC	foreign press center
FY	fiscal year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GoU	Government of Ukraine
G7	Group of Seven
HACC	High Anti-Corruption Court
HCF	health care facilities
HIMARS	High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems
IDCC	International Donor Coordination Center
IDLO	International Development Law Organization
IDP	internally displaced person
INL	State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISN	State Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
MEASURE	Monitoring, Evaluation and Audit Services for Ukraine
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRA	Migration and Refugee Assistance
MRAP	Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle
NABU	National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization

Acronym	
NPU	National Police of Ukraine
NSATU	NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine
OAR	Operation Atlantic Resolve
OCR	Organizational Capacity Review
ODC-Kyiv	Office of Defense Cooperation-Kyiv
ODC-Ukraine	Office of Defense Cooperation-Ukraine
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OES	State Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OPG	Office of the Prosecutor General
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OUSD(P)	Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
PDA	Presidential Drawdown Authority
PEACE	World Bank Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance
PIO	public international organization
PM/WRA	State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRM	State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
RDC-U	Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell-Ukraine
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RSA	Russian sovereign assets
RT	Russia Today
SAG-U	Security Assistance Group-Ukraine
SAPO	Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office
SBGS	Ukrainian State Border Guard Service
SOK	SAG-U Operations-Kyiv
State	Department of State
TACOM	U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command
TPT	Third Party Transfer
Treasury	Department of the Treasury
UAF	Ukrainian Armed Forces
UAS	unmanned aerial system
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UNHCR	UN Refugee Agency
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
USAGM	U.S. Agency for Global Media
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USEUCOM	The U.S. European Command
VOA	Voice of America
WFP	World Food Programme
WPS	Worldwide Protective Services

Map of U.S. European Command Area of Responsibility



Map of Ukraine



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Ukrainian Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov is greeted by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III at the 24th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, on September 9, 2024. (DoD photo)



INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINE

The United States is committed to supporting the Ukrainian people during Russia's war of aggression. We are dedicated to providing oversight of the funds and resources American taxpayers have provided in support of Ukraine.

We encourage you to confidentially report any of the following suspected activities related to the programs or operations of the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of State (including the U.S. Agency for Global Media), and the U.S. Agency for International Development to the appropriate Hotline listed below.

Corruption
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
Fraud, Waste, Abuse, Mismanagement
Trafficking In Persons



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