



~~TOP SECRET~~

INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

OCTOBER 14, 2022

(U) Evaluation of the DoD Processes and Procedures to Alert DoD Officials in the Event the Presidential Emergency Satchel Is Lost, Stolen, or Compromised

(U) We are issuing this final report for your information and use. The final report will not have the "Controlled Unclassified Information" markings unless required by DoD Instruction 5200.48 "Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)."

(U) Safeguard this report and do not show or release its contents for other than official review and comments. Do not disclose its contents outside your DoD Component.

"Released by the DoD OIG FOIA Office under FOIA request DODOIG-2023-000102 on May 3, 2024."

INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE

~~TOP SECRET~~





(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the DoD Processes and Procedures to Alert DoD Officials in the Event the Presidential Emergency Satchel Is Lost, Stolen, or Compromised

(U) October 14, 2022

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent that DoD processes and procedures are in place and sufficient to alert DoD officials in the event that the Presidential Emergency Satchel is lost, stolen, or compromised. Additionally, we determined the actions DoD officials may take to mitigate any lost, stolen, or compromised DoD materials contained in the Presidential Emergency Satchel.

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(U) Background

(U) Members of Congress requested that the DoD Office of Inspector General conduct a review of security procedures relating to the Presidential Emergency Satchel as part of Congress’s ongoing review of the DoD’s “roles, responsibilities, and actions to prepare for, and respond to, the planned protest and its aftermath at the U.S. Capitol campus on January 6, 2021.”

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(U) Finding

- (EU) [Redacted]
- (S) [Redacted]; however, the DoD procedures for the use of nuclear weapons provide assurance that only the U.S. President can authorize the use of U.S. nuclear weapons.
- (S) [Redacted]

(U) Recommendations

(U) We do not make any recommendations in this report.



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the DoD Processes and Procedures to Alert DoD Officials in the Event the Presidential Emergency Satchel Is Lost, Stolen, or Compromised

(U) Management Comments

(U) The Vice Director of the Joint Staff, responding on behalf of the Joint Staff and the U.S. Strategic Command, agreed with the finding. The Vice Director provided a comment matrix that included updates to the information we collected during our fieldwork, which we incorporated as appropriate.

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

(U) October 14, 2022

(S) MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

DIRECTOR, [REDACTED] ^{OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)}

(U) SUBJECT: Evaluation of the DoD Processes and Procedures to Alert DoD Officials in the Event the Presidential Emergency Satchel Is Lost, Stolen, or Compromised (Report No. DODIG-2023-004)

(S) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We are providing this report for your information and use. This report does not contain recommendations. We coordinated a draft of this report with officials from the Joint Staff and [REDACTED] ^{OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)}. The Joint Staff concurred with our report. [REDACTED] did not provide a response. Therefore, we are publishing this report in final form.

(U) We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the evaluation. If you have any questions, please contact [REDACTED] ^{DODIG (b)(6)} at [REDACTED], (DSN [REDACTED]).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. Stone", is positioned above the name of the signatory.

Randolph R. Stone
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Space, Intelligence, Engineering and Oversight

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent that DoD processes and procedures are in place and sufficient to alert DoD officials in the event the Presidential Emergency Satchel (PES) is lost, stolen, or compromised. Additionally, we determined the actions DoD officials may take to mitigate any lost, stolen, or compromised DoD materials contained in the PES.

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted].

(U) Background

(U) In a March 16, 2021 letter, the Chairman of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Oversight and Reform, and the House of Representatives Chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, requested that the DoD OIG conduct a review of security procedures relating to the PES. The request was part of Congress’s ongoing review of the DoD’s “roles, responsibilities, and actions to prepare for, and respond to, the planned protest and its aftermath at the U.S. Capitol campus on January 6, 2021.” We announced this evaluation on July 19, 2021.

(U) The Presidential Emergency Satchel

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted].

(TS) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted].¹

¹ (CU) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

- (TS) [REDACTED]

- (S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(U) Key Stakeholders for Nuclear Decision Making

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e) [REDACTED]

OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

[Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

[Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

[Redacted]

(S) Figure: OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e)

[Redacted]

(S) Source: OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(S)

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

[Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
 [Redacted]
 (S) [Redacted]
 [Redacted].

(U) The Joint Staff

(S) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The CJCS is also responsible for disseminating decisions from the President and Secretary of Defense to U.S. military forces. OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted].

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e) [Redacted]
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted].

(U) The Joint Staff National Military Command Center

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted].²

(U) DoD Policies and Procedures

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted].

² (S) [Redacted]
 [Redacted].

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e) [Redacted]

³ (U) CJCSI 3260.01F, "Joint Policy Governing Positive Control Material and Coded Control Devices," November 22, 2019.

⁴ (S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

⁵ (S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

⁶ (U) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e) [Redacted]

(U) Definition of Lost, Stolen, or Compromised

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]:

- (U) [Redacted]; or,
- (U) a violation of security, intentional or unintentional, in which the modification, destruction, or loss of NC2-ESI materials has occurred or the occurrence cannot be positively ruled out.

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted].

(S) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted].

(U) Finding

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
[Redacted]

(U) The Joint Staff Maintains Sufficient Processes and Procedures to Alert DoD Officials if NC2-ESI Materials Are Compromised

(U) The Joint Staff developed and followed CJCSIs and EAP-CJCS regarding the handling and use of NC2-ESI materials. The instructions and procedures contain information for notifying DoD officials, through conferencing and other means, as well as subsequent actions pertaining to NC2-ESI materials. Additionally, the NMCC conducts regular exercises which demonstrate that Joint Staff personnel are aware of their roles and responsibilities and are ready to alert the appropriate DoD officials in the event of compromised DoD materials.

(U) Notification When NC2-ESI Materials Are Compromised

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted].⁷

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Subsequent Actions When NC2-ESI Materials Are Compromised

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted].⁹

⁷ (S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

⁸ (U) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e) [Redacted]

⁹ (S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) [REDACTED]
(TS) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(U) Actions Involving the Compromise of the NDHB

(TS) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(U) Emergency Conferencing to Alert DoD Officials if NC2-ESI Materials Are Compromised

(S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) ^{OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)} [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED].

(U) [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED].

(U) Conference management combines the physical actions required to connect conferees as well as managing the flow of information to meet senior leader requirements. The NMCC, as the conference manager, convenes conferences once the primary briefer and desired principal conferees are added to the conference line. Conferences are not delayed for any of the other conferees.

- (U) Conference participants are broken out into two levels of participation.
- (U) Level 1 conferees are the minimum essential individuals, agencies, or organizations required to directly support the principal conferee or the conference manager.
 - (U) Level 2 conferees are individuals, agencies, or organizations required to directly support a Level 1 conferee. Level 2 conferees will usually be connected to the conference by the Level 1 conferees they support rather than the conference manager who established the conference.

(S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) ^{OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)} [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED].

(U) Conferences can involve ^{OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e)} [REDACTED] located worldwide. Therefore, recurring equipment checks are vital to ensure that all connected equipment configurations are correct. The Joint Staff performs monthly checks to confirm

(U) successful connection rates and maintains support in electronic files. The Joint Staff maintains records of monthly checks in the form of a consolidated spreadsheet to document monthly success and failure connection rates by conference type. The evaluation team received and reviewed the records from the Joint Staff NOD.

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(TS) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

- (TS) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
- (TS) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
- (TS) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
- (TS) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

¹⁰ (TS) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

- (U) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e) [Redacted]
- (U) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e) [Redacted]
- (U) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e) [Redacted]
- (U) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e) [Redacted]
- (U) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e) [Redacted]
- (U) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e) [Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(U) The DoD Has Procedures to Ensure Only the U.S. President Can Authorize the Use of Nuclear Weapons

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(S) ^{OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)} [REDACTED] as well as the deployment and basing of nuclear weapons outside the United States and the transfer for use of U.S. nuclear weapons by allies. The CJCS subsequently emphasized this fact in his phone conversation with the Speaker of the House on January 8, 2021, which the CJCS then documented in a memorandum for record as follows:

(U) The President is the sole authority for the employment of U.S. nuclear weapons. U.S. nuclear forces operate under strict civilian control. Only the President of the United States can authorize the use of U.S. nuclear weapons, and the President's ability to exercise that authority and direction is ensured by people, procedures, facilities, equipment, and communications capabilities that comprise the Nuclear Command and Control System. This system is designed to enable the authorized use of nuclear weapons while also preventing their unauthorized, accidental, or inadvertent use. Operations and activities involving U.S. nuclear weapons are surrounded by layers of safeguards.

(U) The memorandum for record also reflected that the CJCS met with the Vice CJCS, NMCC watch officer, Joint Staff Director of Intelligence, Joint Staff Director of Operations, and Director of the Joint Staff to confirm that the procedures over NC2-ESI materials are practiced daily.

(U) Compromised NC2-ESI Materials Cannot Be Used to Launch Nuclear Weapons

(S) ^{OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)} [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(TS) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(TS) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(TS) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted] :

- (TS) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted],
- (TS) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
- (TS) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
- (TS) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]

(TS) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) In his memorandum for record, the CJCS assured the Speaker of the House that a very specific and deliberate process governs a nuclear launch. The CJCS repeatedly stated that the DoD has processes, protocols, and procedures in place such that there is no chance of an illegal, unauthorized, or accidental launch.

(U) Appendix

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from July 2021 through August 2022 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we sufficiently plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the finding and conclusions.

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted].

(U) To identify DoD processes and procedures in place to alert DoD officials of a compromise of NC2-ESI materials, we interviewed the following senior officials of the Joint Staff.

- (U) Deputy Director for Homeland Defense and Nuclear Operations (J-36)
- (U) Deputy Director for Operations, Joint Staff NMCC
- (U) Chief of the Nuclear Operations Division, Joint Staff NOD
- (U) Chief of the Operational Training and Standards Division, Joint Staff NOD
- (U) Senior Nuclear Advisor, Joint Staff NOD
- (U) Program Manager Nuclear Operation Division, Joint Staff NOD

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted].

(U) We obtained and reviewed the following CJCSIs and EAP-CJCS to support actions taken by the Joint Staff NOD and NMCC in the case of NC2-ESI compromise.

- (S) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

- (U) CJCSI 3260.01F, "Joint Policy Governing Positive Control Material and Coded Control Devices," November 22, 2019
- (S) [REDACTED]
- (S) [REDACTED]
- (U) [REDACTED]

(U) We analyzed the sufficiency of the policies and procedures through the review of the documentation as well as the observation of the execution of the procedures during an NMCC exercise. We used the analysis of the documentation and exercise to support the findings and conclusions related to the evaluation objective. We used professional judgment on methods to analyze and interpret evidence to assess its sufficiency.

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) [REDACTED]

- (S) [REDACTED]
- (S) [REDACTED]
- (S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) No prior coverage has been conducted on the PES during the last 5 years.

(U) Sources

(U//~~FOUO~~) CJCSI 3231.01C, "Safeguarding Nuclear Command and Control Extremely Sensitive Information," 20 February 2019.

(U) CJCSI 3260.01F, "Joint Policy Governing Positive Control Material and Coded Control Devices," 22 November 2019.

(U) CJCSI 6810.04G, "Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Personnel Performance Objectives and Assessment Criteria, 22 October 2019.

(S) ^{OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)} [REDACTED]


(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Management Comments

(U) Vice Director, Joint Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~



THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC


DJSM 0155-22
16 September 2022

Reply Zip Code:
20318-0300

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: (U) Joint Staff Review of "Evaluation of the DoD Processes and Procedures to Alert DoD Officials in the Event the Presidential Emergency Satchel is Lost, Stolen or Compromised"

1. (U) The Joint Staff, in coordination with U.S. Strategic Command, conducted a review of the August 4, 2022 draft of the subject report. We assessed the report for technical accuracy as well as classification.
2. (U) OSD/JS (b)(5)
OSD/JS (b)(5)
3. (U) The Joint Staff point of contact is OSD/JS (b)(6)



GEORGE M. WIKOFF, RADM, USN
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Attachments:
As stated

UNCLASSIFIED When Separated From Attachments
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1	OSD/JS (b)(6)	S	i	3rd para	OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), and (b)(5)	
2		A	i	4th para	OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e), and (b)(5)	
3		A	i	6th para		
4		A	l	3rd para		
5		S	l	4th para	OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), and (b)(5)	
6		S	l	5th para		
7		S	l	Footnote 1	OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e), and (b)(5)	

					OSD/JS (b)(5)		
8	OSD/JS (b)(6)	S	1	Footnote 1, second sentence	OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), and (b)(5)		
9		S	2	1st para			
10		A	2	3rd para			
11		S	2	3rd para			

					OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), and (b)(5)		
12	OSD/JS (b)(6)	A	2	4th para	OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.7(e), and (b)(5)		
13		A	2	5th para			
14		A	3	2nd para			
15		A	3	3rd para			
16		S	3	4th para	OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), and (b)(5)		

17	OSD/JS (b)(6)	S	4	3rd para	OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), and (b)(5)	
18		S	4	4th para		
19		S	4	5th para		
20			4	Footnote 2		
21		S	5	1st para		
22		S	5	2nd para		

23	OSD/JS (b)(6)	S	5	4th para	OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), and (b)(5)	
24		S	6	1st para		
25		A	7	1st, 3rd, 4th, para		
26		A	8	2nd para		
27		A	8	3d para		
28		S	8	4th para		
29		S	9	1 st para		
30		S	9	2nd para		

	OSD/JS (b)(6)				OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), and (b)(5)	
31		S	9	3rd para		
32		S	9	3rd para title		
33		S	9	4th para		
34		S	9	Footnote 11		
35		A	10	2d para		

36	OSD/JS (b)(6)	S	10	2nd para	OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), and (b)(5)
37		S	10	7th para	
38		S	10	7th para	
39		S	11	2nd para	
40		S	11	2nd para	

					OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), and (b)(5)	
41	OSD/JS (b)(6)	S	11	3rd para		
42		S	11	3rd para, 4th bullet		
43		S	11	3rd para last bullet		
44		S	11	4th para		
45		S	12	1st para		
46		A	12	Paras 2-5		
47		S	13	1st para		
48		S	13	4th para		

					OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), and (b)(5)	
49	OSD/JS (b)(6)	C	14	1st para		
50		S	14	2nd para		

	OSD/JS (b)(6)				OSD/JS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), and (b)(5)	
51		S	14	2nd para, first bullet		
52		S	14	2nd para, second bullet		
53		S	14	2nd para, third bullet		
54		S	14	3rd para		
55		S	17	acronyms		

STANDARDIZED COMMENT MATRIX PRIMER

The matrix below is a Word document table to be used as a template for submitting comments. Except as noted below, an entry is required in each of the columns. To facilitate consolidating matrixes from various sources, do not adjust the column widths.

Column 1 – ITEM

Numeric order of comments. Accomplish when all comments from all sources are entered and sorted. To number the matrix rows, highlight this column only and then select the numbering ICON on the formatting tool bar.

Column 2 - #

Used to track comments by source. Manually enter numbers from the first comment to the last comment. These numbers will stay with the comment and will not change when consolidated with other comments.

Column 3 – SOURCE

Source of Comment. Please include office, name and number of person providing the comment so that the Report Editor can discuss comment and, where necessary, work out a resolution that accommodates both parties.

Column 4 – TYPE

C – Critical (Contentious issue requires resolution)

M – Major (Incorrect material that impacts conclusions)

S – Substantive (Factually incorrect material that does not impact a conclusion)

A – Administrative (grammar, punctuation, style, etc.)

Column 5 – PAGE

Self Explanatory. For Annexes to main report, use Annex and letter (e.g., Annex B) and Annex page number (e.g. Annex B, page B-1).

Column 6 – PARA

Paragraph number that pertains to the comment expressed. (i.e. 4a, 6g, etc.)

Column 7 – LINE

Line numbers on the designated page that pertains to the comment.

Column 8 – COMMENT

Provide comments using line-in-line-out format. To facilitate adjudication of comments, copy and insert complete sentences into the matrix. This makes it unnecessary to refer back to the publication to understand the rationale for the change. Do not use Tools, Track Changes mode to edit the comments in the matrix. Include deleted material in the comment in the strike through mode. Add material in the comment with underlining. Do not combine separate comments into one long comment in the matrix, (i.e. 5 comments rolled up into one).

Column 9 - RATIONALE

Provide concise, objective explanation of the rationale for the comment.

Column 10 - DECISION

A - Accept

R – Reject (Rationale required for rejection.)

M - Accept with modification (Rationale required for modification.)

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

- (U) CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- (U) CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
- (U) EAP Emergency Action Procedures
- (U) NC2-ESI Nuclear Command and Control–Extremely Sensitive Information
- (U) NDHB Nuclear Decision Handbook
- (U) NMCC National Military Command Center
- (U) NOD Nuclear Operations Division
- (S) [REDACTED]
- (S) [REDACTED]
- (U) PES Presidential Emergency Satchel
- (U) [REDACTED]
- (S) [REDACTED]

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