(U) Evaluation of the DoD Military Information Support Operations Workforce

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March 25, 2024

(U) Objective
(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the effectiveness of the DoD’s recruitment, training, and retention of military personnel conducting Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

(U) Background
(U) MISO are intended to influence the beliefs and actions of a target population and serves as a general term for forces performing that function. This report is focused on the recruitment, training, and retention of military personnel in the Army’s Psychological Operations (PSYOP) career field, which provides the DoD’s primary MISO workforce.

(U) Findings
(U) The Army has not recruited, trained, or retained the military workforce needed to meet the DoD’s growing MISO demand, especially in the reserve component. Specifically, in FY 2023, the Army Reserve’s PSYOP groups operated with only 25 percent of the captains required to complete their missions. Army officer career management policy prevents the PSYOP branch from admitting officers directly upon commissioning, making it more difficult for the Army to attract officer candidates with the skills PSYOP commanders say they need. The inability to assign newly commissioned officers into the PSYOP branch, combined with possibly taking years to fully train reserve PSYOP officers, contributes to 10 of 32 manned reserve PSYOP detachments not having PSYOP-qualified commanders.

(U) This has occurred, in part, because the Army has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of its MISO capabilities in over 20 years. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has not monitored and reported on the growth and sustainment of the DoD’s overall Information Operations workforce as required by DoD policy.

(U) As a result, Army PSYOP, the DoD’s primary MISO workforce, has remained sized, structured, and staffed at levels that cannot meet the DoD’s growing demand for both conventional and special operations MISO at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The resulting operational tempo required of this under-resourced force risks burnout of these specialized Soldiers, which only serves to worsen the underlying conditions.

(U) Recommendations
(U) To address these conditions, we recommend that:

- (U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness monitor and conduct annual reviews of the Information Operations Career Force recruitment, training, and promotions, including MISO forces, in accordance with DoD policy and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Services.

- (U) The Commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command conduct a Capabilities-Based Assessment of the total Army MISO workforce.1

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1 (U) In Spring 2023, the PSYOP force modernization proponent proposed a Capabilities-Based Assessment to “provide a current, comprehensive, and deliberate assessment to determine how to modernize Army PSYOP forces.”
(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the DoD Military Information Support Operations Workforce

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The senior official Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness), responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, requested that Recommendation 1 be redirected to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The senior official also stated that this recommendation preempts ongoing Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy initiatives.

(U) The Commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command agreed that a capabilities-based assessment of the total Army PSYOP force can inform and validate modernization decisions across the PSYOP workforce, but disagreed with requiring the assessment to be completed before implementing ongoing Army Special Operations Forces integration initiatives or the transformation of PSYOP training.

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command did not address all elements of the DoD OIG's recommendations; therefore the recommendations are unresolved. We request that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command provide comments within 30 days of the final report to fully address the intent of their respective recommendations.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.
**Recommendations Table**

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<tr>
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<th>Recommendations Unresolved</th>
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<tr>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>None</td>
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<td>Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command</td>
<td>2.a, 2.b, 2.c</td>
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(U) Please provide Management Comments by April 25, 2024.

**U) Note:** The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.

- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.

- **(U) Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS
COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of the DoD Military Information Support Operations Workforce
(Report No. DODIG-2024-068)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General’s evaluation.
We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on
the recommendations. We considered management’s comments on the draft report when
preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) This report contains recommendations that are considered unresolved because the senior
official Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and the
Commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command either did not agree with, or did
not fully address, the recommendations presented in the report.

(U) Therefore, the recommendations remain open. We will track these recommendations until
management has agreed to take actions that we determine to be sufficient to meet the intent
of the recommendations and management officials submit adequate documentation showing
that all agreed-upon actions are completed.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore,
please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or
alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Send your response to

(U) If you have any questions, please contact

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

Bryan Clark
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Programs and Combatant Commands
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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the effectiveness of the DoD’s recruitment, training, and retention of military personnel conducting Military Information Support Operations (MISO). This report will focus on the recruitment, training, and retention of military personnel in the Army’s Psychological Operations (PSYOP) career field, which is the DoD’s primary MISO workforce.²

(U) Background

(U) The 2022 National Defense Strategy recognizes that emerging technologies and applications make it easier for competitors to engage in operations below the threshold of armed conflict, which, if left unaddressed, could endanger U.S. military effectiveness.³ It also describes how the use of traditional military tools may not be the most appropriate response to this type of operation. Instead, it suggests that activities in the information domain may prove to be more effective.

(U) Military Information Support Operations

(U) The DoD conducts MISO to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals, in a manner favorable to the originator’s objective. MISO is a strategic, operational, and tactical capability intended to help achieve the informational advantage at every level of an operation. According to Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.2, MISO contributes to the success of all types of operations and activities all along the competition continuum from shaping the operational environment to deterrence to large scale combat operations.⁴

(U) Army Psychological Operations

(U) A 2010 Secretary of Defense memorandum discontinued the use of the term “PSYOP” for the term “MISO.”⁵ However, the Army, the primary provider of MISO assets, kept the term “PSYOP” when referring to the career field, the

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² (U) THE PUBLIC RELEASE VERSION OF this report contains information that has been redacted because it was identified by the DoD as Controlled Unclassified Information and, therefore, not publicly releasable. CUI is Government-created or owned unclassified information that allows for, or requires, safeguarding and dissemination controls in accordance with laws, regulations, or Government-wide policies.
(U) military occupational specialty, and the associated Soldiers. "MISO" refers to the actual activities, and serves as a general term for forces performing that function. "PSYOP" refers to specific Army positions and units who are qualified to conduct MISO.

(U) **Policy and Doctrine**

(U) There are four primary DoD publications and three Army publications that establish policy and assign responsibilities generally for information operations (IO) and specifically for MISO.

(U) DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3607.02, “Military Information Support Operations,” assigns MISO-specific responsibilities and mandates the integration of MISO with other DoD information-related capabilities, which are described in DoD Directive (DoDD) 3600.01, “Information Operations.” DoDI 3608.11, “Information Operations Career Force,” assigns the responsibility of monitoring the creation, development, and retention of the military workforce conducting information operations.

(U) JP 3-13.2, “Military Information Support Operations,” establishes norms related to the command and control of MISO. These include theater special operations commands exercising operational control over Special Operations Forces (SOF) PSYOP forces, which come from the Army’s active component, and geographic combatant commands or Service components exercising operational control of conventional (non-SOF) PSYOP forces provided by the Army Reserve.

(U) Army Field Manual (FM) 3-53, “Military Information Support Operations,” establishes the roles of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) (USACAPOC[A]) related to providing active and Army Reserve PSYOP forces, respectively. However, Army Regulation (AR) 5-22, “The Army Force Modernization Proponent and Integration System,” states that the USASOC Commander, as the Army’s PSYOP Force Modernization Proponent, bears responsibility for developing doctrine, training, and personnel requirements for both conventional and SOF.
(U) Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, “Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management,” states that proponents are responsible for designing life-cycle development models for their branches and monitoring the professional development of their officers. The pamphlet also establishes that SOF branches, unlike all other career branches, are “non-accession branches,” which means that, rather than admitting officers into Special Forces, Civil Affairs, or PSYOP upon commissioning, these branches must recruit their officers from other career branches within the Army.

(U) Roles and Responsibilities

(U) In accordance with DoD directives and instructions, DoD MISO personnel duties and authorities differ across the DoD and the Military Services. The following individuals and entities have responsibilities related to MISO oversight, management, execution, and implementation.

(U) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict)

(U) According to DoDI 3607.02, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) (ASD[SO/LIC]) is the principal civilian MISO advisor for the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) and has several MISO workforce development and maintenance responsibilities. DoDI 3607.02 also states that the ASD(SO/LIC) oversees the DoD's MISO capability-development efforts, planning, programming, budgeting, execution, and assessments. Additionally, JP 3-13.2 and DoDI 3607.02 state that the ASD(SO/LIC) also oversees MISO capability's integration within the DoD and with other influence capabilities.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

(U) DoDD 3600.01 directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD[P&R]) to coordinate with the USD(P) and the Secretaries of the Military Departments to develop and distribute policies for the establishment and maintenance of professionally trained and educated IO forces. Additionally, DoDI 3608.11 directs USD(P&R), in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to monitor the accession, retention, and promotion rates of the Information Operations Career Force and prepare an analysis of those rates in an annual report to the Secretary of Defense.

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(U) Combatant Commanders

(U) According to DoDI 3607.02, all combatant commanders are responsible for the planning and conduct of MISO in support of their theater campaign plans. Additionally, according to JP 3-13.2, the commanders are required to identify, develop, and submit their MISO authority, forces, and resource requirements through the Joint Staff.

(U) U.S. Special Operations Command

(U) According to DoDI 3607.02, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Commander is responsible for the development and maintenance of the DoD MISO workforce and the development and implementation of DoD MISO doctrine and training. The USSOCOM Commander also synchronizes the deployment and employment of SOF PSYOP forces.

(U) U.S. Army Special Operations Command

(U) According to FM 3-53, the USASOC Commander is responsible for the organization, training, manning, equipping, education, readiness, and deployment of Special Forces, Rangers, SOF aviation forces, MISO forces, and Civil Affairs personnel. The USASOC Commander is also responsible for resolving issues affecting force modernization for those forces. USASOC resources and prepares SOF PSYOP units to conduct operations during peace or war and provides SOF PSYOP forces to execute USSOCOM-directed operations and to support conventional forces until mobilized Army Reserve PSYOP forces can arrive. USASOC also conducts recruiting for SOF PSYOP forces through the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion.

(U) U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)

(U) According to FM 3-53, the USACAPOC(A) Commander assists in the development and coordination of conventional PSYOP force requirements and personnel. The USACAPOC(A) Commander also provides subject matter expertise to the Army PSYOP branch proponent and Army Reserve as they prepare force management requirements to determine what is required to recruit, train, maintain, and retain the PSYOP workforce. All conventional force PSYOP units are assigned to the Army Reserve, under the leadership of USACAPOC(A).
(U) U.S. Army Psychological Operations Groups

(U) As noted in JP 3-04, the Army's MISO workforce consists of four PSYOP groups (POGs) shown in Figure 2. According to FM 3-53, the POGs consist of PSYOP battalions, which consist of PSYOP companies. PSYOP companies consist of PSYOP detachments. According to FM 3-53, the Army Reserve POGs are tactical in nature but provide support at the corps level.

(U) SOF PSYOP forces reside in the Army's active component. According to a USASOC press release, the Military Information Support Operations Command (Airborne), a provisional one-star command, was activated in August 2011 to rebalance the PSYOP career field within USSOCOM. Specifically, this provisional command would assist in the development of SOF PSYOP force requirements and prepare force management assessments and other requirements related to MISO force provision and budgeting for USASOC. Official USSOCOM guidance in April 2011 realigned MISO personnel and billets from the National Capital Region along with 73 billets from USSOCOM's deactivated Joint Military Information Support Command to the provisional command. The Military Information Support Operations Command (Airborne), however, no longer exists. Instead, the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), a two-star command, is responsible for all seven Special Forces Groups, the two active component POGs, and the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne).

(U) Figure 2. Psychological Operations Groups

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.
(U) The Army has not recruited, trained, and retained enough personnel to meet the DoD's growing demand for MISO, especially in the Reserve component. According to the 7th POG commander, 16 of 48 (33 percent) Reserve PSYOP detachments are completely unmanned. Specifically, in FY 2023, the Army Reserve POGs operated with only 25 percent of the captains required to complete their missions. Army officer career management policy prevents the PSYOP branch from admitting officers directly upon commissioning, making it more difficult for the Army to bring in officer candidates with the skills that current PSYOP commanders say they need. In addition, fully training Army Reserve PSYOP officers can take years, which contributes to 10 of the 32 (31 percent) manned Army Reserve PSYOP detachments not having PSYOP-qualified commanders.

(U) Also, the Army lacks an active component conventional MISO workforce, relying on the Army Reserve to fill the global, full-time requirements for MISO. Meanwhile, SOF PSYOP units in the active component are operating with less time between deployments than permitted by Army standards.

(U) These conditions occurred because of the following.

- (U) USASOC has not conducted an analysis of the Army’s total MISO workforce, including both its active and Army Reserve capabilities, since 2003. In the intervening 20 years, USASOC has altered the structure of the Army MISO workforce without a complete analysis of the potential effects of those changes on the Army’s overall MISO capability—including the transfer of USACAPOC(A) to the Army Reserve in 2006, as well as the establishment of the U.S. Army Military Information Support Operations Command in 2011 and its subsequent disestablishment in 2014. Additionally, USASOC changed the reporting structure of SOF POGs, which will further limit career progression for active component PSYOP Soldiers and increase the burden on Army Reserve MISO units.

- (U) The USD(P&R) has not complied with DoDI 3608.11, which requires the USD(P&R) to monitor the accession, promotion, and retention of the Information Operations Career Force. During interviews with representatives of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, they stated that they were unaware of the Instruction and have not prepared any reports on the IO workforce.
As a result, the DoD’s primary MISO workforce has remained sized, structured, and staffed at a level that cannot meet the current demand placed on it at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, and might be challenged to surge MISO assets in the event of emergent large-scale combat operations.

**The Army Does Not Have Enough Military MISO Personnel to Meet the DoD’s Growing Demand**

As described in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, MISO and other types of information operations are the primary means of response to competitors’ and adversaries’ activities below the threshold of armed conflict. The Army does not have sufficient MISO-qualified military personnel in its Army Reserve and active component MISO units or serving in MISO positions on joint force command staffs to meet the increasing demand. For example, in FY 2023, the four POGs (both active and reserve) operated with only 60 percent of their authorized strength. AR 220-1 categorizes a deployable strength below 69 percent as the lowest personnel readiness level. A unit at this level of readiness would require “additional resources or training to accomplish or provide the designed core functions and fundamental capability. However, the unit may be directed to undertake some portion of its core functions with resources on hand.”

**Army Officer Career Management Policy Prevents the PSYOP Branch from Admitting New Lieutenants**

According to Army Pamphlet 600-3, PSYOP, Special Forces, and Civil Affairs are non-accession branches, meaning that officers must reach the rank of captain and then seek a transfer into one of these branches. This means that new officers wishing to volunteer for PSYOP must first successfully serve in another Army branch. Representatives from the PSYOP force modernization

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11 (U) Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, “Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management,” February 1, 2010. In April 2023, a new version of this pamphlet was issued, but the evaluation team did not use it for this evaluation.
The Army cannot recruit recent college graduates with relevant degrees directly into the PSYOP branch as officers. Instead, they would have to enter the Army through an accession branch and then apply to transfer into the PSYOP branch. According to Army FM 3-53, MISO draws from multiple disciplines, such as social and behavioral sciences, advertising, cultural anthropology, humanities, language and culture, journalism, media and mass communication, political science, public relations and communications, social marketing, and statistics and trend analysis. However, recent graduates in these fields cannot begin their officer careers directly in PSYOP. Additionally, as personnel from 7th POG told us, even new officers with previous enlisted PSYOP specialist (37F) experience cannot directly re-enter the PSYOP branch as PSYOP officers (37A).

(U) Completing Required MISO Training Can Take Years for Some Army Reserve PSYOP Soldiers

(U) According to multiple USACAPOC(A) and Army Reserve POG representatives, it takes more than 2 years for some Army Reserve officers to complete the training required to become PSYOP qualified. This is partially due to limited training availability and limited flexibility of many officers at this stage of their career. Army Reserve POG personnel told us that Army Reserve captains and majors were more likely to encounter scheduling conflicts with their civilian employment, school, and family responsibilities. The 7th POG Commander told us that unlike active component MISO units in the 4th and 8th POGs, Army Reserve MISO units receive Soldiers before they are PSYOP qualified. This means that Army Reserve Soldiers must complete PSYOP qualification training after they report for duty in addition to their other military requirements, which results in officers leading MISO units before they are PSYOP qualified.

(U) The PSYOP Officer Qualification Course for Army Reserve PSYOP officers consists of a self-paced distance learning phase in which the officers learn the basic PSYOP skills and competencies needed to perform the PSYOP officer duties. Afterward, Army Reserve PSYOP officers move into a 29-day residential PSYOP Captains Career Course, a duration just below the 30-day limit for Army Reserve training established in section 10147, title 10, United States Code. The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School only offers the residential training for Army Reserve PSYOP officers.
(U) training three to four times per year. If an Army Reserve officer misses one of these training sessions, they must wait for it to be offered again later in the year and hope that seats will be available.\(^{16}\)

(U) As part of a consolidated training initiative, and to expedite officers getting PSYOP qualified, USACAPOC(A) has established a pilot program that allows Army Reserve officers to attend the 10-week active component PSYOP Officer Qualification Course. This reduces the overall time it takes to qualify for the new Army Reserve PSYOP officers admitted to the course. However, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School personnel noted that only one or two Army Reserve officers have been admitted to each session. Additionally, as 2d POG and 7th POG personnel explained, Army Reserve captains and majors tend to have less flexibility to take months away from their civilian responsibilities to attend training beyond their normal Army Reserve duty time commitment. According to the 2d POG Deputy Commander, delays in training lead to some MISO units being led by captains who are not PSYOP qualified. Additionally, some majors move to battalion or higher staff or even company command without ever having commanded a detachment, according to both 2d POG and 7th POG personnel.

(U) According to the PSYOP force modernization proponent personnel, USACAPOC(A), 2d POG, and 7th POG leaders, if new reserve officers were to commission directly into the PSYOP career field as recent college graduates, they might have more time and flexibility to spend longer lengths of time in training, compared with captains who might have more conflicting responsibilities related to civilian careers and families. The 7th POG Commander stated that if officers were commissioned directly into the PSYOP branch, they would complete their training requirements at around the time they would be promoted to captain. This would increase time available for an officer to serve in PSYOP detachments before taking company command.

\(^{16}\) According to FM 3-53, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Commander is the Army’s force modernization proponent for MISO and Army PSYOP forces in both the active and Army Reserve. The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School produces MISO doctrine and conducts assessment and selection of SOF PSYOP officers and noncommissioned officers and branch qualification training and other MISO-related training for the PSYOP workforce.

(U) According to documentation we received from the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the optimum annual throughput capacity for the residential PSYOP Captains Career Course is 48 Army Reserve officers. Additionally, we heard from 2d POG personnel that Army Reserve officers are only approved on a limited case-by-case basis to attend the active component’s training.
(U) The Army’s Full-Time Conventional MISO Requirements Are Filled by a Reserve Workforce

(U) According to FM 3-53, the Army’s conventional MISO capability resides in the Army Reserve. The reserve POGs operate in direct support of conventional forces, and Army Reserve MISO personnel fill many of the joint forces’ MISO requirements.

(U) Supporting All Combat Training Center Rotations with Reserve PSYOP Detachments Can Cause Burnout and Reduce Training Quality

(U) One requirement filled by Army Reserve PSYOP units, as the Army’s only conventional PSYOP force, is supporting units training at the Army’s Combat Training Centers (CTCs). From FY 2018 to FY 2022, 2d POG and 7th POG supported 98 CTC rotations with a PSYOP detachment. CTC rotations usually last 4 weeks. However, an Army Reserve PSYOP detachment must begin planning for a CTC rotation much earlier. Due to shortages of qualified PSYOP Soldiers, as well as competing demands from school, civilian employment, and personal life, 2d POG and 7th POG often face challenges finding enough qualified volunteers to piece together 20 detachments from across their subordinate units every year. A senior enlisted leader from 2d POG stated that Soldiers who are more flexible are leaned on more heavily. For example, a staff noncommissioned officer from that POG told us that a staff sergeant in a nearby PSYOP company had completed five CTC rotations. The operations sergeant major for 7th POG stated that they had completed 20 CTC rotations. A senior enlisted leader from 7th POG stated that sending a PSYOP Soldier to more than two CTC rotations contributes to personnel burnout.

(U) Army Reserve PSYOP detachments have limited training days available and limited training time on those days. Therefore, they do not have time to train on all their required tasks and fully integrate with the unit they will support at the CTC. CTC operations groups have complained of a lack of input from MISO units, according to an article written by a former USACAPOC(A) Commander. According to an active component PSYOP sergeant major, this lack of integration leads to scenarios exercised by PSYOP detachments being isolated from the larger exercise. Therefore, the MISO presence at CTCs does not help the commanders of supported units understand the value of MISO. Reviews of MISO units’

17 (U) The Army’s CTCs are the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Johnson (formerly Fort Polk), Louisiana.

18 (U) In a 2018 article for Army University Press, a former USACAPOC(A) Commander listed 13 key topics to be included in the training plan of a unit preparing for a CTC rotation, ranging from weapons maintenance to the use of night vision goggles. This list does not include training on MISO-specific knowledge and skills.

(U) performance may be positive, but this does not mean that supported units are getting the most out of their training. The 7th POG commander stated that commanders of supported units say that the PSYOP detachments supporting them did a great job but cannot say what job those PSYOP detachments actually did.

(U) **Combatant Commands Request More Senior Personnel Than the Reserve POGs Can Reasonably Provide**

(U) According to USACAPOC(A) officials, many force requests from the combatant commands require a larger proportion of senior personnel, especially field grade officers, than the POGs can provide. USACAPOC(A) officials told us that active component units request Army Reserve personnel through the use of position Force Tracking Numbers. DoDI 1235.12, “Accessing the Reserve Components,” states that the Service Secretaries are responsible for training and equipping Army Reserve units and individual Army Reserve members to meet the needs of the combatant commanders. However, the Secretaries are to activate reserve forces in a way that allows units to maintain their collective training and readiness. DoDD 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” goes further stating that “to the extent possible,” the Secretaries should ensure unit integrity is maintained, including unit leadership positions when reserve units are used to fulfill operational requirements.

(U) USACAPOC(A) officials stated that many of the Force Tracking Numbers the Army Reserve POGs are required to fill, however, are non-standard requests not tied to a specific capability. Instead of requesting a capability, combatant commands, in particular, have requested Soldiers of particular grades to fulfill specific roles. One example of a non-standard Force Tracking Number that has a measurable impact on the overall readiness of the reserve POGs is the ongoing requirement to support the U.S. Central Command’s MISO Web Operations Team at the Joint MISO Web Operations Center in Tampa, Florida. A representative of the U.S. Central Command’s IO directorate stated that this mission requires field grade officers who are familiar with tactical MISO and understand campaigning. According to representatives from USACAPOC(A), this Force Tracking Number requires 25 PSYOP personnel, 12 of whom are officers—6 of those being field grade officers who would otherwise be filling key command positions within the POGs. According to 7th POG leaders, filling that request alone takes two battalion commanders and five company commanders away from their units.

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(U) USACAPOC(A) officials stated that the request process would work better if requestors would state the MISO effect they need and allow the POGs to determine the forces needed to produce that effect. This would allow the force provider to appropriately pull from their structure. We learned through interviews with USACAPOC(A) and USASOC personnel that this issue affects requests across the force. Therefore, we are not making a recommendation to address procedural lapses in combatant command requests for forces; instead, we will focus on MISO-specific solutions.

(U) According to a representative of the U.S. Central Command’s IO directorate, U.S. Central Command and USACAPOC(A) leadership have discussed the POGs providing a PSYOP unit of action to fill this request in the future, minimizing the negative effect on PSYOP battalion and company commands. A U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School official stated that such a unit of action existed in the past, and that the proponent could re-create it or something like it to fill this requirement.

**U) Active Component POG Deployment-to-Dwell Time Ratios Do Not Comply with Army Standards**

(U) According to a senior enlisted leader from a theater special operations command, requests for MISO forces have outpaced the ability for the active component PSYOP battalion aligned with that region to abide by the Army’s deployment-to-dwell standard. Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 21-005 sets the goal for deployment-to-dwell ratio for active component units at 1 month deployed to 3 months at the home station and the minimum threshold at 1-to-2 in order to set a standard across the military, preventing overexposure to deployments and limiting time away from home.22 A leader from the 4th POG told us that the 4th POG requested permission to reduce its deployment-to-dwell ratio to 1-to-1.87 because it did not have the manning to accomplish the mission. The 4th POG Commander stated that this deployment-to-dwell ratio is actually closer to 1-to-1 when taking into account time spent in training and supporting exercises. DTM 21-005 states that these non-operational requirements do not count against a unit’s deployment-to-dwell ratio. However, according to the 4th POG Commander, they do represent an opportunity cost for Soldiers who have been “burned down pretty hard” on deployments. Personnel from the 4th POG described having to forego training or development opportunities except those essential to meeting the most basic requirements.

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22 (U) DTM 21-005, “Deployment-to-Dwell, Mobilization-to-Dwell Policy Revision,” August 16, 2021 (Incorporating Change 1, October 13, 2022). DTM 21-005 defines the deployment-to-dwell ratio as “the ratio of time a unit, detachment, or individual is deployed to the time the unit, detachment, or individual is in dwell.”
(U) USASOC Has Not Conducted a MISO Workforce Capabilities-Based Assessment in 20 Years

(U) According to representatives of the Army’s PSYOP Force Modernization Proponent, a comprehensive study of the entire PSYOP branch, spread across the active component and the Army Reserve, has not been completed in 20 years. In the intervening 20 years, the MISO workforce has experienced significant changes, including the creation and dissolution of an Army MISO command and the general officer billet that came with it.

(U) The reserve component’s civil affairs commands have 1,412 total civil affairs officer authorizations, 69 of which are civil affairs colonel authorizations. The active component civil affairs brigade has 337 total civil affairs officer authorizations with 4 colonel authorizations. The Army National Guard special forces groups have 203 total officer authorizations, 4 of which are colonel authorizations. The active component special forces groups have 498 total officer authorizations with 10 colonel authorizations. The POG commander positions are the only 2 PSYOP colonel billets for 334 total Army Reserve PSYOP officer authorizations and the only 2 PSYOP colonel billets for 250 PSYOP officers in the active component. This limits the possibility for PSYOP officers to promote to the rank of colonel and reduces opportunities for command at lower echelons.

Figure 3 illustrates the officer authorizations within PSYOP, civil affairs, and special forces units.

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23 (U) Civil affairs has four commands. A brigadier general commands each of the four civil affairs commands in the Army Reserve. There is no equivalent general officer authorization for the POGs. The active component’s civil affairs brigade and POGs are subordinate units of the 1st Special Forces Command, commanded by a major general who reports to the USASOC Commander. There is no equivalent authorization for the POGs, whose commanders (colonels) report directly to the USACAPOC(A) Commander.
In 2023, the 1st Special Forces Command proposed changes to the active component POG structure. Reducing the number of active component PSYOP colonel billets from two to zero and reducing the associated command positions throughout the POG would reduce opportunities to develop or even retain senior officers and noncommissioned officers, according to the 4th POG Commander. The 4th POG Commander described widespread concern that, should proposed changes to the POG structure be implemented, there would be even fewer leadership opportunities for officers and senior noncommissioned officers and no possibility for PSYOP officers to lead beyond the lieutenant colonel rank. The 4th POG Commander stated that ultimately, the entire PSYOP and Civil Affairs branches could eventually dissolve.
(U) Based on our analysis of current challenges, these changes could also result in the Army Reserve shouldering even more of the conventional MISO workload. Furthermore, reducing exposure of senior leaders in the conventional force to their peers in the MISO force could worsen the knowledge gap between what can be achieved with well-planned and well-executed MISO and what is being employed by joint force commanders.

The proposed CBA would address multiple areas of concern that we identified during our evaluation.

However, as of August 30, 2023, the proponent had not initiated the CBA due to a lack of funding commitment from the sponsor for portions of the CBA budget, according to a USASOC official familiar with the proposed CBA.

24
(U) USD(P&R) Has Not Monitored and Reported on the Information Operations Career Force as Required

(U) DoDI 3608.11 requires the DoD Component Heads to establish an IO Career Force and the USD(P&R) to monitor accession, promotion, and retention within that IO Career Force and to report their findings to the Secretary of Defense. After discussions with personnel from the Office of the USD(P&R), we concluded that the USD(P&R) is not producing these required annual IO Career Force reports. Representatives from the Office of the USD(P&R) stated that they were unaware of DoDI 3608.11 or of a specific reporting requirement related to this workforce. Furthermore, we concluded that the USD(P&R) needs to provide clearer guidance to the Services for the information Services would need to provide for USD(P&R) reporting.

(U) MISO is only one capability within the larger IO workforce and is numerically much smaller than other IO capabilities. To compare the accession, retention, and promotion rates within the IO Career Force and then to compare those rates with the rest of the military or against a DoD-wide requirement requires analysis that transcends the Services. This also requires a reporting body with access to information from across the Services.

(U) Therefore, to ensure that the capacity of the MISO workforce is monitored on its own and as part of the larger DoD IO Career Force, the USD(P&R) should develop a plan to monitor and conduct annual reviews of the recruitment, training, and promotion of the IO Career Force, including MISO forces in compliance with DoDI 3608.11.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Responses

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness monitor and conduct annual reviews of the recruitment, training, and promotion of the Information Operations Career Force, including military information support operations forces, in accordance with DoD Instruction 3608.11, and make appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Services.
(U) **USD(P&R) Comments**

(U) The senior official Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness), responding for the USD(P&R), requested that the recommendation be redirected to the USD(P). The senior official referenced DoDDs 3600.01 and 1322.18, which describe the USD(P) as the Principal Staff Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for IO oversight and direct the USD(P) to coordinate with the USD(P&R) to develop policies related to establishing and maintaining Service and joint IO forces. The senior official also stated that this recommendation preempts the Office of the USD(P)'s current implementation plan for the Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment, which reforms the management of MISO and other IO-related workforces. Additionally, the senior official stated that the outputs of the implementation plan will include updates to DoDI 3608.11.

(U) **USACAPOC(A) Comments**

(U) Although not required to comment, the 2d POG Deputy Commander and the Commander of the 7th POG, responding on behalf of the USACAPOC(A) Commander, agreed with the recommendation. The 2d POG Deputy Commander stated that the PSYOP (37 CMF) career field is too small for the increasing demand signal, and the rank structure is too limited for the level of coordination and mission and organizational requirements. The Deputy Commander also stated that the reserve component PSYOP force is the preponderance of PSYOP capability to support the Joint Force, not just the Army. The 7th POG Commander stated that the recommendation will help to significantly enhance the ability to man, train, and equip PSYOP forces for the good of all mission sets and address the ability to provide effective support to the joint force.

(U) **Our Response**

(U) Comments from the senior official Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) did not fully address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We acknowledge that DoDDs 3600.01 and 1322.18 designate the USD(P) as the Principal Staff Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for IO, which includes MISO. However, section 5.2 of DoDI 3608.11 defines the USD(P&R)'s role related to monitoring, and reporting annually on, the retention and promotion rates of the IO Career Force. Recommendation 1 aligns with the current guidance provided in DoDI 3608.11 for the role of the USD(P&R). Therefore, we request that the USD(P&R) provide comments within 30 days of the final report addressing their plans for monitoring and conducting annual reviews of the recruitment, training, and promotion of the IO Career Force, including MISO forces, until DoDI 3608.11 is updated to reassign the responsibility.
(U) **Recommendation 2**

(U) We recommend that, before implementing any currently proposed change to the structure of the military information support operations workforce, the Commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command conduct a Capabilities-Based Assessment that considers:

a. (U) Establishing a conventional military information support operations capability in the Army's active component;

b. (U) Commissioning officers directly into a conventional Psychological Operations career field; and

c. (U) Restructuring existing or creating new military information support operations units that better match current operational demand.

**USASOC Comments**

(U) The USASOC Commander agreed that a CBA of the total Army PSYOP force can inform and validate modernization decisions across the PSYOP workforce. However, the Commander disagreed with requiring that the CBA be completed before implementing ongoing Army SOF integration initiatives or the transformation of PSYOP training. The Commander also stated that initiatives related to the PSYOP training pipeline are keeping pace with the information environment’s current complexities and challenges. The Commander stated that it is essential to maintain the momentum of their critical initiatives. Additionally, the Commander stated that they are focusing on PSYOP force career progression and enhancement, which includes evaluating and assessing viable options to advance PSYOP personnel in a concerted effort to improve recruitment, re-enlistment, and retention.

**USACAPOC(A) Comments**

(U) Although not required to comment, the Commanders of the 2d POG and the 7th POG, responding on behalf of the USACAPOC Commander, agreed with the recommendation. The 2d POG Commander stated that USASOC, having a vested interest in the CBA and the Joint Force PSYOP forces, should fund the CBA. The 2d POG Commander also stated that the CBA should be followed up with a detailed manpower study to determine what staff are needed and where, and what command structure is required to best support the Joint Force. The 7th POG Commander also stated that without a CBA, the Army’s MISO capability continues to decrease without foreseeable help in addressing known gaps or posturing the capability to meet contemporary or future needs.
(U) **USSOCOM Comments**

(U) Although not required to comment, a USSOCOM representative provided a memorandum dated September 1, 2023, issued by the USASOC Commander, approving a request from the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) Commander to move forward with an Army SOF integration initiative that would reassign the 1st, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th PSYOP battalions and the 91st, 92nd, 96th, 97th, and 98th Civil Affairs Battalions to their respectively regionally aligned Special Forces Groups. The memorandum also includes a legal analysis conducted by the USASOC Staff Judge Advocate, stating that as the commander of an Army Service component command, the USASOC Commander has the authority to reassign subordinate units, like the PSYOP and civil affairs battalions. According to a representative from the USSOCOM IO directorate, MISO branch, these changes will further limit career progression for active component PSYOP Soldiers and increase the burden on Army Reserve PSYOP units.

(UC) **Our Response**

(U) Comments from the USASOC Commander did not fully address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. The ongoing Army SOF integration initiatives and efforts the Commander highlighted have not been accompanied by a CBA of the total Army PSYOP workforce. Therefore, we request that the USASOC Commander provide comments within 30 days of the final report addressing their progress toward initiating a CBA as described in Recommendation 2.
(U) Appendix

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from February 2023 through October 2023 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in December 2020 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) This report was reviewed by DoD Components associated with this oversight project to identify whether any of their reported information, including legacy FOUO information, should be safeguarded and marked in accordance with the DoD CUI Program. In preparing and marking this report, we considered any comments submitted by DoD Components about the CUI treatment of their information. If DoD Components failed to provide any or sufficient comments about the CUI treatment of their information, we marked the report based on our assessment of the available information.

(U) Our evaluation focused on the recruitment, training, and retention of military personnel in the Army's PSYOP career field, which is the DoD's primary MISO workforce. We issued requests for information, reviewed resulting documentation, and conducted site visits to answer our evaluation's objective. To determine the current state and trends related to PSYOP recruitment, training, and overall readiness, we analyzed several documents, including:

- (U) Commander's Unit Status Reports from 2d POG, 4th POG, 7th POG, and 8th POG and a strength report of reserve PSYOP personnel;
- (U) PSYOP deployment reports for personnel across the Army Reserve;
- (U) modified tables of equipment for the entire Army to determine the total number of PSYOP personnel at each grade, across the active component and Army Reserve;
- (U) content, graphics, and organization of the Army's latest online recruiting material produced by the Army Enterprise Management Office;
- (U) USASOC Accession Mission Letters from FY 2019 to FY 2025;
• (U) U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School training course schedules, attendance records, and course cancellations over the past 5 years; and

(U) We reviewed laws, policies, and guidance including:

(U) We conducted site visits and interviews with personnel from:
• (U) the Office of the USD(P&R);
• (U) the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs);
• (U) the U.S. Africa Command;
• (U) the U.S. Central Command;
• (U) the U.S. European Command;
• (U) the U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Information;
• (U) the Marine Corps Information Operations Center;
• (U) Marine Forces Reserves;
• (U) the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command;
• (U) the U.S. Army Recruiting Command;
• (U) USASOC, including Soldiers from 4th and 8th POGs; and
• (U) USACAPOC(A), including Soldiers from 2nd and 7th POGs.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, the DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued two reports discussing USSOCOM’s Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center.

(U) Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/.

(U) DoD OIG


(U) This management advisory notified the ASD(SO/LIC), the USSOCOM Commander, and the Director of the Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center of the progress and challenges in implementing actions directed by a Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum and Deputy Secretary of Defense-requested implementation plan to move Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center from initial operational capability to full operational capability. This management advisory addresses the challenges to reaching the conditions for full operational capability, particularly adequate staffing and a completed military construction project. We reviewed the recommendations but conducted no follow-up since they were not within the scope of our evaluation.

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether USSOCOM’s Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center supports the combatant commanders’ requirements to conduct MISO. We reviewed the recommendations but conducted no follow-up since they were not within the scope of our evaluation.
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL


Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report on the Department of Defense (DoD) Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Workforce. I appreciate your open and collaborative process in performing this evaluation.

The draft report recommends that “[t]he Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) monitor and conduct annual reviews of the recruitment, training, and promotion of the Information Operations Career Force, including MJSO forces, in accordance with DoD policy and make appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Services.” This recommendation is chiefly based on DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3608.11, “Information Operations Career Force,” November 4, 2005, issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, who was at that time the Office of the Secretary of Defense functional proponent for the Information Operations Career Force.

DoD Directive (DoDD) 3600.01, “Information Operations (IO),” May 2, 2013, states that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is the Principal Staff Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for oversight of IO and “coordinates with the [USD(P&R)] on policies for the establishment and maintenance of professionally trained and educated Service and joint IO forces.” Similarly, DoDD 1322.18, “Military Training,” October 3, 2019, assigns to the USD(P) the responsibility to “[d]evelop policies to establish and maintain professionally trained military service and joint information operations forces in accordance with DoDD 3600.01.”

The Office of the USD(P) (OUSD(P)) is currently developing an implementation plan for the Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment (SOIE), issued by the Secretary of Defense on July 5, 2023, which will reform the management of MISO and other IO-related workforces. OUSD(P) has established working groups, supported by USD(P&R), to develop this plan and will update DoDI 3608.11 based on its outputs.

The draft report’s recommendation assigned to the USD(P&R) risks preempting the outcomes of ongoing development of policy within OUSD(P). We recommend instead that it be assigned to the USD(P), with the USD(P&R) in a supporting role, or in the alternative be listed as a measure to be addressed by USD(P) as part of the ongoing development of policy in this area. My office will continue its support to the SOIE implementation plan working groups to ensure that the MISO workforce is sufficient to meet requirements.

Peter I. Belk
Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD


1. In keeping with the recommendations of the DODIG Report, any resulting Capability-Based Assessment (CBA) should consider both the findings in the report itself and include a comprehensive and thorough analysis of DOD Information Operations functions to include Intelligence Support to IO, and other relevant Information Related Capabilities (IRCs) across Joint and Service formations. This assessment, from the perspective of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) and any corresponding barriers will inform how to best employ our PSYOP forces in support of global DoD Information Operations requirements.

2. As the Army Proponent for the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Branch, USASOC concurs that a Capabilities-Based Assessment of the Total Army PSYOP force can inform and validate modernization decisions across the PSYOP workforce. However, I do not concur that the CBA must be complete prior to implementing changes associated with ongoing Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) integration initiatives or the transformation of PSYOP training at our schoolhouse. Ongoing PSYOP integration efforts within USASOC are based on a Commander’s risk assessment, the shift in the National Defense Strategy toward near-peer adversaries, and the operational demands of the Joint Force. ARSOF Integration bolsters unity of command; aligning ARSOF capabilities and enhancing ongoing MISO support to Combatant Commands, Theater Special Operations Commands, and DoD objectives. Ongoing initiatives in the USAJFKSWCS PSYOP training pipeline which train both active and reserve personnel are focused on ensuring MISO training is on pace with the ever-changing complexities and challenges in the information environment. It is essential that we maintain the momentum of these critical initiatives.

3. PSYOP Career Field. With our ongoing integration efforts, I am placing command emphasis and focus on career progression and enhancement of the PSYOP force. This includes evaluating and assessing all viable options to advance our PSYOP personnel and to focus on recruitment, re-enlistment, and retention. Integrating our PSYOP force within the ARSOF enterprise will be key in enhancing the PSYOP career field as well as aligning them at home station with the ARSOF forces they deploy with globally. At the USAJFKSWCS PSYOP schoolhouse, USAJFKSWCS maintains capacity to qualify 72
AOCG

3. Lastly, I would like to address the misconceptions in the report, and I am requesting the report be amended to reflect the following:

a. PSYOP O-6s. The report cites that ongoing integration efforts will reduce our PSYOP O-6s to zero. There are no current or planned cuts to the 4x USASOC PSYOP O-6 authorizations, and the recent OSD directed cuts did not include these authorizations.

b. CBAs. The report cites that the last comprehensive CBA was conducted in 2003, however, our last comprehensive PSYOP CBA was conducted in 2010. USASOC also completed a focused CBA on 14 OCT 21, as well as a CBA on Tactical Edge Innovation, both of which included PSYOP forces. Additionally, USASOC conducted a 2016 Army-directed Total Army MISO Way-ahead that helped define the role of MISO and address future requirements.

c. Dwell. Based on Geographic Combatant Command demand ISO validated operational requirements, USASOC provides MISO forces at a ratio of 1:2 Deployment-to-Dwell, meaning for every six-months a MISO unit of action is deployed, that same unit of action remains non-operationally deployed for twelve months. The comment that MISO Force deployment-to-dwell ratio, “is actually closer to 1 to 1 when taking into account time spent in training and supporting exercises” reflects an inaccurate conflation of Dwell with non-Dwell-incurring activities, such as TDYs for training, CTC events, JCS exercises, JCETs, etc. Dwell and non-Dwell-incurring activities are both captured under DoD PERSTEMPO policy. No PSYOP personnel are in violation of DoD PERSTEMPO policy, nor does USASOC anticipate any PSYOP personnel nearing DoD’s PERSTEMPO redline.

JONATHAN P. BRAGA
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army Commanding
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: 2d Psychological Operations Group Response to the DoD MISO Workforce Report

1. We agree with the DoD IG Report’s findings and recommendations.

2. The following additional comments are below:

   a. 2POG states that the 37 CMF is too small for the increasing demand signal, the rank structure is too limited for the level of coordination and mission and organizational requirements. The RC PSYOP force is the preponderance of PSYOP capability to support the Joint Force, not just the Army.

   b. A USASOC funded CBA should be conducted. USACAPOC, which has a vested interest in this CBA and a majority of PSYOP forces in the Joint Force, should contribute to funding it. 20 years without a formal evaluation of required capabilities and command structures for PSYOP forces has had a detrimental effect to the Psychological Operations CMF and the Information Operations Career Force. At a strategic level, these forces are unable to provide the required influence capability to the Joint Force to meet current and future threats.

   c. The CBA should be followed up with a detailed man-power study to determine exactly what bodies are needed and where, and what command structure is required in order to best support the Joint Force. Congress has asked the Defense Department to provide an answer on how to build more capability to conduct Operations in the Information Environment / Information Advantage/ Information Operations for years. (see attached article).

   d. Reducing the AC PSYOP command structure and removing two (of only 4) O6 command positions (and related group staff) in the U.S. Army would be a huge mistake for the entire CMF.

   e. Funding for the RC PSYOP force should include extended ADOS tours for Group and CSMs at Group and BN level in order to meet the enduring strategic integration requirements for supporting these Corps and Theater AC commands.
(U) U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (2d POG) (cont’d)

AFRC-CPC-ECO
SUBJECT: 2d Psychological Operations Group Response to the DoD MISO Workforce Report

f. We should analyze whether USASOC is the right place for the PSYOP proponent to be located based upon recent decisions about the AC force structure. (see attached article).

3. The POC is

Collins D. Cockrell
LTC, PO
Executive Officer
MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, 351 Civil Affairs Command, 230 R.T. Jones Road, Mountain View, CA 94043

FOR Commander, United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), 4037 Pratt Street, BLDG A-5585, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5200

SUBJECT: Recommended Changes to the DoD OIG Evaluation of the MISO Workforce

1. Both recommendations found on pages 16 and 17 are comprehensive solutions that will significantly enhance the ability to man, train, and equip a PO force for the good of all mission sets and address the ability to provide effective support to the joint force, particularly in support of Large-Scale Combat Operations. Without a CBA, the Army’s MISO capability continues to atrophy with no foreseeable help in addressing known gaps or posturing the capability to meet contemporary or future needs. This means that in times of war, should the joint force need this capability, the Army may not be able to provide it adequately or at all.

2. The report is well-written and reflects a thoroughly researched effort. Some of these corrections are changes that occurred after the researchers gathered data.
   a. FM 3-53, Psychological Operations Unit Operations, was updated in October 2023. Doctrine in Chapter 6, Employment Considerations, now reflects that the rules of allocation align an RC POG to a Theater Army or Corps, an RC POB to a Corps or Division, and an RC POC to a Division or Brigade. [enclosure]
   b. A deeper understanding of command relationships shows that a POG is TACON to a Theater Army and OPCON to the Joint Influence Component as part of a JTF. This, however, begs the question: from where does the Joint Influence Component get its manning? Additionally, in the ROA, there is no templating of forces that would be provided to the Geographic Combatant Command. These omissions in doctrine reinforce the need for a CBA to determine all the requirements needed to support all echelons of the joint force across all phases of the competition continuum.
   c. Data correction needed: [page 6, last line of the first paragraph]. As stated, “…leaving 10 Army Reserve PSYOP detachments without PSYOP-qualified commanders.” This number is too low. In the 7th POG alone, 16 of the 48 PO Detachments are entirely unmanned, including officers. According to the Human Resources Authorization Report generated in the Integrated Personnel and Pay
FRCN-ACA-CCO
SUBJECT: Recommended Changes to the DoD OIG Evaluation of the MISO Workforce

System-Army (IPSS-A) there are 110 unfilled captain/O3 positions in the RC. 7th POG has a required strength of 121 PSYOP Captains, it is currently filled at 37, this is a 30% required strength for the entire Group. [enclosures]

d. The delineation between RC “Conventional” PO and AC “SOF” PO is counterproductive; the activities of psychological operations is the same regardless of the supported force, component, or agency. The AC PO forces should be able to support conventional forces, and the RC PO forces should be able to support SOF forces, depending on the mission. Historically, this has been the case, and PO forces have supported conventional or SOF forces regardless of their component. Currently, the 7th POG is in pre-mission training to provide a Military Information Support Team (MIST) to a US Embassy, a mission traditionally sourced from the AC.

e. PO needs to become an accessions branch that can immediately employ and develop talent educated in our universities in academic disciplines that directly support our function. A junior officer accessed in such a manner would lead a PO Detachment, which is comparable to an infantry platoon, also led by a 2LT.

D. SCOTT 
COL, PO
Commanding

Enclosures
(U) U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (7th POG) (cont’d)

FRCN-ACA-CCO
SUBJECT: Recommended Changes to the DoD OIG Evaluation of the MISO Workforce

From FM 3-53, Psychological Operations Unit Operations, Chapter 6.

Figure 6-1. Rules of allocation
FRCN-ACA-CCO
SUBJECT: Recommended Changes to the DoD OIG Evaluation of the MISO Workforce

Screen capture from the Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army (IPSS-A), Human Resource Authorization Report. These two screens show slotted authorizations and unfilled authorizations.
(U) U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (7th POG) (cont’d)
(U) U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (7th POG) (cont’d)
(U) USASOC Commander Forces
Reassignment Memorandum

MEMORANDUM FOR Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command

SUBJECT: Legal Review- Reassignment of Psychological Operations Battalions (POBs) and Civil Affairs Battalions (CABNs) to the Special Forces Groups within USASOC

1. Executive Summary. United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) (1st SFC(A)) seek to reorganize portions of 1st SFC(A) by reassigning: 1st POB(A) to 7th SFG(A); 5th POB(A) to 1st SFG(A); 6th POB(A) to 10th SFG(A); 7th POB(A) to 3d SFG(A); 8th POB to 5th SFG(A); 91st CABN(A) to 3d SFG(A); 92 CABN(A) to 10th SFG(A); 96th CABN(A) to 5th SFG(A); 97th CABN(A) to 1st SFG(A); and 90th CABN(A) to 7th SFC(A) with each having an individual UIC. There is no manpower or equipment growth associated with the reassignment.

2. Legal Analysis:

   a. AR 220-05 governs the change in status of Army units. Specifically, Table 2-1 provides a list of potential changes and the corresponding approval authority and order type. Types of change in status include: activate, assign, disband, re-flag, reconstitute etc. Most major changes in unit status require DAMO-FM (Deputy Chief of Staff, G 3/5{7, Force Management Directorate) approval. This requirement initially appears to apply to assignments of units as well. However, footnote 5 listed next to the approval authority reads, "DAMO assigns or attaches units to ACOM, ASCC, or DRU commanders, who may further assign or attach units to a subordinate command under their jurisdiction." This is in keeping with the generally recognized traditional Commander's authority to organize his/her assigned forces in order to best meet mission requirements.

   b. AR 10-97 specifies certain authorities and responsibilities given to the Commander of USASOC to include paragraph 11-2(b) which states, "...ensures that units are organized to accomplish special operations missions and support appropriate OPLANs" and paragraph 11-3(1)(a) which states, "Is responsible to the SECARMY for execution of assigned responsibilities contained in 10 USC § 3013(b)." 10 USC § 3013(b) gives SECARMY the authorities among others to organize, train and equip forces.
AOSO-JA
SUBJECT: Legal Review- Reassignment of Psychological Operations Battalions (POBs) and Civil Affairs Battalions (CABNs) to the Special Forces Groups within USASOC

c. AR 220-05 suggests the appropriate mechanism for the sought change is to create a "provisional unit" under para 2-5. The provisional unit option is a tool for creating a new unit out of whole cloth with a new or unique capability or mission which does not already exist. It is not the appropriate mechanism for reassigning subordinate units to a new higher headquarters. This suggestion is in direct conflict with Table 2-1 as outlined above and with para 2-5 itself which specifies, "Provisional unit designations will not duplicate the designation of any historic unit, or imply a historical connection to an historic unit, regardless of whether the historic unit is active or inactive. Provisional units are not entitled to lineage or honors certificates, and will not perpetuate the lineage and honors of any active or inactive unit. Therefore, creating provisional Battalions under the POGs would constitute a legal fiction which would effectively duplicate Battalions that already exist.

3. Conclusion. Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/Sn, Force Management Directorate is the approval for most unit changes such as its initial activation or inactivation. However, ASCCs such as USASOC have the authority to assign or reassign subordinate units within their Commands once they have initially been assigned to the ASCC by DAMO. USASOC has the authority to reassign the POBs and CA Battalions to other organizations which all fall under the USASOC command structure.

CHAD HIGHILL
LTC, JA
Staff Judge Advocate
MEMORANDUM FOR G8, United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Liberty, North Carolina 28310-9110

SUBJECT: Reassignment of Psychological Operations Battalions (POBs) and Civil Affairs Battalions (CABNs) to the Special Forces Groups within USASOC

1. The 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) requests to reorganize portions of 1st SFC(A) by reassigning the POBs and CABNs to the regionally aligned Special Forces Groups. All Battalions and Groups are MTOE units assigned to USASOC and 1st SFC(A) with each having an individual UIC. The breakdown is as follows:
   a. 1st POB(A) is reassigned to 7th SFG(A)
   b. 5th POB(A) is reassigned to 1st SFG(A)
   c. 6th POB(A) is reassigned to 10th SFG(A)
   d. 7th POB(A) is reassigned to 3rd SFG(A)
   e. 8th POB(A) is reassigned to 5th SFG(A)
   f. 91st CABN(A) is reassigned to 3rd SFG(A)
   g. 92nd CABN(A) is reassigned to 10th SFG(A)
   h. 95th CABN(A) is reassigned to 5th SFG(A)
   i. 97th CABN(A) is reassigned to 1st SFG(A)
   j. 98th CABN(A) is reassigned to 7th SFG(A)

2. There is no manpower or equipment growth associated with this reassignment.

3. Point of contact for the action is [Name Redacted]

LAWRENCE G. FERGUSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
(U) USASOC Commander Forces
Reassignment Memorandum (cont’d)

AOSO-CG
SUBJECT: Reassignment of Psychological Operations Battalions (POBs) and Civil Affairs Battalions (CABNs) to the Special Forces Groups within USASOC

The above request to reassign units under 1st Special Forces Command is approved.

JONATHAN B. BRAGA
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding
## (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>ASD(SO/LIC)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBA</td>
<td>Capabilities-Based Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTM</td>
<td>Directive-Type Memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>Military Information Support Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>POG</td>
<td>Psychological Operations Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACAPOC(A)</td>
<td>U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASOC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(P&amp;R)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD(P)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
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