


CUI

INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

MARCH 19, 2024



(U) Audit of Munitions Storage at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait

Controlled by: DoD-OIG

Controlled by: Audit

Category: OPSEC/DCRIT/PSI

LDC: FEDCON

POC: [REDACTED]

INDEPENDENCE ★ INTEGRITY ★ EXCELLENCE ★ TRANSPARENCY

CUI





(U) Results in Brief

(U) Audit of Munitions Storage at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait

March 19, 2024

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine whether the DoD stored munitions at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, in accordance with applicable safety and security policies.

(U) This is the second in a series of four reports reviewing munitions storage within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

(U) Background

(U) Munitions consist of ammunition and components used by the Armed Forces for national defense and security. At Camp Arifjan, U.S. Army Central manages munitions storage through its subordinate units, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command and Area Support Group-Kuwait. In April 2023, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command managed munitions storage in the Camp Arifjan ammunition supply point and theater storage area through a subordinate unit, the 592nd Ordnance Company, and a munitions supply support contractor.

(U) Findings

(U) Army officials at Camp Arifjan did not consistently store munitions in accordance with applicable safety and security policies. Specifically:

- ~~(CUI)~~ Army officials and contractor personnel stored munitions in [REDACTED] without a DoD Explosives Safety Board-approved site plan;

(U) Findings (cont'd)

- (U) Army officials did not manage munitions storage in accordance with approved net explosive weight (NEW) limits;
- (U) Army officials did not maintain continuous awareness of NEW totals stored in munition storage structures;
- (U) Army officials did not ensure compliance with semiannual emergency evacuation drills and annual inspections for munitions storage structures, which are required for waiving lightning protection systems;
- (U) Army officials did not remove vegetation around munitions storage structures in the ammunition supply point or theater storage area;
- ~~(CUI)~~ Army officials did not [REDACTED] for munitions storage structures; and
- ~~(CUI)~~ Army officials did not [REDACTED] for munitions storage structures.

(U) This occurred because Army officials did not have a process to track risk acceptance waiver expiration dates, thought annual reviews of NEW totals were sufficient, and were unaware of safety and security requirements for munitions storage.

~~(CUI)~~ When Army officials do not store munitions in accordance with safety policies, it increases the risk of serious injury, loss of life, and damage to property. For example, Army officials stored munitions in a structure that exceeded the approved NEW limits by [REDACTED]. In addition, when Army officials do not store munitions in accordance with security policies, it increases the risk of munitions being lost, stolen, or misplaced.

(U) Management Actions Taken

~~(CUI)~~ During the audit, Army officials and contractor personnel stopped storing munitions in the [REDACTED] without a DoD Explosives Safety Board-approved site plan. In addition, Army officials took corrective action to ensure munitions storage structures had [REDACTED]



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Audit of Munitions Storage at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait

(U) Management Actions Taken (cont'd)

(CUI) [REDACTED] by stationing contractor personnel at [REDACTED] and requiring contractor personnel to [REDACTED] of munitions storage structures [REDACTED]. Army officials also [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the Commander of the Area Support Group-Kuwait develop and implement procedures requiring the Area Support Group-Kuwait safety manager to verify, at least quarterly, the NEW totals in all munitions storage structures and require the Area Support Group-Kuwait safety manager to establish a vegetation control program that assigns responsibilities for removing vegetation around munitions storage structures.

(U) In addition, we recommend that the Commander of the 1st Theater Sustainment Command direct officials managing munitions in munitions storage areas to comply with semiannual emergency evacuation drills and annual inspections for munitions storage structures.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The Commander of the Area Support Group-Kuwait neither agreed nor disagreed with the two recommendations. The Commander described actions planned to address

(U) both recommendations to develop procedures for the the safety manager to verify at least quarterly the NEW totals in all munitions storage structures and to develop a vegetation control program. Therefore, the recommendations are resolved. We will close the recommendations once we verify that the Area Support Group-Kuwait has completed the agreed-upon actions.

(U) The 1st Theater Sustainment Command Operational Command Post Chief of Staff, responding for the Commander of the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation to direct officials managing munitions in munitions storage areas to comply with semiannual emergency evacuation drills and annual inspections for munitions storage structures. The Chief of Staff stated that the 1st TSC will ensure compliance by following evacuation and fire plans. However, the evacuation and fire plans do not direct officials to comply with semiannual emergency evacuation drills or annual inspections for munitions storage structures. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We request that the Commander provide comments to the unresolved recommendation within 30 days.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.

(U) Recommendations Table

(U) Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Commander, Area Support Group–Kuwait	None	1.a, 1.b	None
Commander, 1st Theater Sustainment Command	2	None	None (U)

(U) Please provide Management Comments by April 18, 2024.

(U) Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
 ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

March 19, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION
 AND SUSTAINMENT
 UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
 COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
 COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY CENTRAL
 DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
 AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: (U) Audit of Munitions Storage at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait
 (Report No. DODIG-2024-064)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's audit. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) This report contains one recommendation to the Commander of the 1st Theater Sustainment Command that is considered unresolved because management officials did not fully address the recommendation presented in the report. Therefore, the recommendation remains open. We will track this recommendation until management has agreed to take actions that we determine to be sufficient to meet the intent of the recommendation and management officials submit adequate documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions are completed.

(U) This report contains two recommendations to the Area Support Group-Kuwait Commander that are considered resolved. Therefore, we will close the recommendations when the Area Support Group-Kuwait provides us adequate documentation showing that they have completed all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendations.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Please send your response for the unresolved recommendation to audrgo@dodig.mil. For the resolved recommendations, please provide us documentation showing you have completed the agreed-upon actions within the estimated completion dates. Please send your documentation for the resolved recommendations as a PDF to followup@dodig.mil if unclassified or rfunet@dodig.smil.mil if classified SECRET.

(U) We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the audit. If you have any questions, please contact me at [REDACTED]

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:



Richard B. Vasquez
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Readiness and Global Operations

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine whether the DoD stored munitions at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, in accordance with applicable safety and security policies.

(U) This is the second in a series of four reports reviewing munitions storage within the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility. See Appendix A for the scope, methodology, and prior coverage related to the objective.

(U) Background

(U) U.S. Service members conducting operations in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility require munitions to complete missions. Munitions consist of ammunition and components used by the Armed Forces for national defense and security.¹ DoD officials store munitions in locations across USCENTCOM's area of responsibility, including Camp Arifjan.

(U) Munitions Storage Roles and Responsibilities

(U) The DoD Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) is the lead agency for explosive safety management for the DoD. At Camp Arifjan, U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) manages munitions storage through its subordinate units—the 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1st TSC) and Area Support Group–Kuwait (ASG-KU). As of April 2023, the 1st TSC managed munitions storage through a subordinate unit and a munitions supply support contractor.

(U) DoD Explosives Safety Board

(U) Under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Executive Director of the DDESB serves as the principal representative and adviser on explosives safety matters related to DoD munitions. The DDESB published Defense Explosives Safety Regulation (DESR) 6055.09, which establishes DoD explosives safety standards.²

¹ (U) Section 101(e)(4), title 10, United States Code. Munitions include devices and components of propellants, explosives, smokes, rockets, guided and ballistic missiles, bombs, artillery and small arms ammunition, grenades, mines, and more. However, military munitions do not include nuclear weapons and components.

² (U) DDESB DESR 6055.09, "Defense Explosives Safety Regulation 6055.09," Edition 1, January 13, 2019. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment develops and maintains explosives safety standards and regulations through the DDESB.

(U) U.S. Army Central

(U) USARCENT is the Army Service Component Command assigned to provide oversight and control of Army operations throughout USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. Various USARCENT subordinate units—the 1st TSC, ASG-KU, and 592nd Ordnance Company, as well as a munitions supply support contractor—execute the management, storage, and oversight of munitions on Camp Arifjan.

(U) 1st Theater Sustainment Command

(U) The 1st TSC, a subordinate unit assigned to USARCENT, is responsible for executing operational-level sustainment support to USCENTCOM and other combatant commands. At Camp Arifjan, the 1st TSC owns the munitions stored in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area.³ The 1st TSC positions munitions at Camp Arifjan to support U.S. military campaigns and can also be used to support activities such as the U.S. response to Russian operations in Ukraine. With assistance from the ASG-KU and 592nd Ordnance Company, the 1st TSC is responsible for ensuring that the munitions in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area are safely and securely stored.⁴

(U) Area Support Group–Kuwait

(U) The ASG-KU, a subordinate unit assigned to USARCENT, is responsible for managing safety and maintaining facilities at Camp Arifjan. Specifically, the ASG-KU safety manager is responsible for monitoring munitions operations and conducting annual inspections of munitions storage structures to ensure compliance with DoD and Army explosive safety standards. In addition, the ASG-KU Directorate of Public Works is responsible for repairing and maintaining facilities and other structures at Camp Arifjan, such as the fence surrounding the ammunition supply point.

(U) 592nd Ordnance Company

(U) As of April 2023, the 592nd Ordnance Company, a subordinate unit assigned to the 1st TSC, is responsible for storing and accounting for the munitions in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area at Camp Arifjan. For example, the 592nd Ordnance Company's accountability officer is responsible for maintaining accounting records that include the condition and location of all munitions stored at Camp Arifjan. In addition, the 592nd Ordnance Company's facility maintenance

³ (U) Ammunition supply points are storage areas that store, maintain, and provide operational munitions support to Army forces. Theater storage areas are storage areas that receive, store, issue, and maintain bulk and reserve munitions.

⁴ (U) The 592nd Ordnance Company is an Army reserve unit based out of Billings and Butte, Montana. In April 2023, the 592nd Ordnance Company was deployed to Camp Arifjan to manage the munitions stored in the ammunition supply point and the theater storage area for the 1st TSC.

(U) officer is responsible for reporting facility deficiencies to the ASG-KU Directorate of Public Works. Furthermore, a 592nd Ordnance Company contracting officer's representative is responsible for monitoring contractor compliance with a munitions accountability contract.

(U) Munitions Supply Support Contractor

(U) In February 2018, the Army Contracting Command–Rock Island awarded a 6-year, \$112.7 million contract for munitions supply support at Camp Arifjan.⁵ Specifically, the contractor is required to maintain accountability of munitions in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area at Camp Arifjan, in accordance with Army regulations and procedures.

(U) Army Units Storing Munitions Outside of the Ammunition Supply Point and Theater Storage Area

(U) Army officials also store munitions outside of the ammunition supply point and theater storage area at Camp Arifjan. For example, as of April 2023, the 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, stored munitions at a Patriot missile site, and the 217th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company stored munitions in a compound.⁶

(U) Munitions Storage Requirements

(U) DoD Instruction 6055.16, DESR 6055.09, DoD Manual 5100.76, and DoD Instruction 4140.01 establish safety and security guidance for munitions storage.⁷ The Army also established guidance to implement the DoD policies.

(U) Safety Requirements for Munitions Storage

(U) DoD Instruction 6055.16 requires Military Departments to establish explosives safety management programs for all DoD installations that store munitions. According to the DDESB, the lead Military Service at each installation is responsible for ensuring that munitions are stored in accordance with all applicable safety policies. In addition, Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 385–64 requires

⁵ (U) The contract includes support for both Camp Arifjan and Camp Buehring. This contract has a 1-year base, with options for five additional base periods.

⁶ (U) The 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery is assigned to the 69th Army Air Artillery Brigade headquartered at Fort Cavazos, Texas. The 217th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company is a California National Guard unit.

⁷ (U) DoD Instruction 6055.16, "Explosives Safety Management Program," July 29, 2008 (Incorporating Change 3, August 31, 2018).

(U) DoD Manual 5100.76, "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)," April 17, 2012 (Incorporating Change 2, October 5, 2020)

(U) DoD Instruction 4140.01, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Policy," March 6, 2019.

(U) installation safety managers to monitor munitions operations to ensure Army officials storing munitions understand and comply with DoD and Army explosives safety standards.⁸

(U) DESR 6055.09 establishes DoD explosives safety standards, which are intended to reduce the risk of serious injury, loss of life, or damage to property from DoD munitions operations. For example, DESR 6055.09 requires most munitions storage structures to have an approved explosives safety site plan (site plan), which establishes net explosive weight (NEW) limits and explosives safety quantity distance arcs (explosive arcs). NEW is the maximum weight of munitions in pounds of explosive material, while explosive arcs are the distance separations intended to provide defined levels of protection in the event of an explosion. For example, all munitions storage structures have an authorized NEW limit based on building design, condition, and proximity to other munitions or inhabited buildings. In addition, DA PAM 385-64 requires all munitions storage structures to have explosives licenses that establish NEW limits. Explosives licenses can be more restrictive, but not greater than, the NEW limits established in DDESB-approved site plans or risk acceptance waivers for safety deviations.

(U) DESR 6055.09 also requires most munitions storage structures to be protected with a lightning protection system (LPS). However, some munitions storage structures may not require LPSs, the DDESB may approve alternate systems that meet the intent of LPSs, or the installation commander may accept the risk for not having LPSs. In addition, DA PAM 385-64 requires installation safety officials to develop a vegetation control program that outlines requirements for maintenance of vegetation around explosive areas.

(U) DoD Instruction 6055.16 allows DoD officials to accept, assess, and document the risk for not complying with the safety standards established in DESR 6055.09. In addition, DA PAM 385-30 requires Army officials to document risk management and acceptance when deviating from explosives safety standards using a deviation and risk assessment document (risk assessment waiver).⁹ Specifically, DA PAM 385-30 requires Army officials to keep risk acceptance waivers current and to document the safety deviation, risk analysis results, and storage limits such as NEW limits.

⁸ (U) DA PAM 385-64, "Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards," May 24, 2011 (Rapid Action revision Issue date: October 10, 2013). In July 2023, the Department of the Army revised the Pamphlet. However, we conducted our review in April 2023 and the requirements in the July 2023 revision did not impact the findings identified in this report.

⁹ (U) DA PAM 385-30, "Risk Management," December 2, 2014.

(U) Security Requirements for Munitions Storage

(U) DoD Manual 5100.76 establishes requirements for protecting munitions stored at DoD installations during peacetime conditions. In addition, DoD Manual 5100.76 applies to munitions with designated security risk categories (SRC) I through IV. The SRC is the classification and sensitivity of munitions based on the relative use and availability of the munitions to criminal elements.¹⁰ Table 1 lists examples of munitions by the SRC.

(U) Table 1. Examples of Munitions by the SRC

(U) SRC	Examples of Munitions
SRC I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Missiles and rockets in a ready-to-fire configuration • Complete explosives rounds for missiles and rockets
SRC II	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Missiles and rockets that require personnel or equipment to function • Military dynamite
SRC III	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Missiles and rockets that require complex hardware or software to function • Ammunition with explosive projectiles
SRC IV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explosive components of missiles and rockets • Ammunition with non-explosive projectiles

(U)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

~~(CUI)~~ SRC I and II munitions pose a higher risk than SRC III and IV munitions and require additional security measures. DoD Manual 5100.76 and Army Regulation 190–11 require munitions storage structures containing SRC I and II munitions to be equipped with an intrusion detection system, unless the storage area is continuously staffed or under constant surveillance to detect unauthorized entry.¹¹ Munitions storage structures containing SRC III and IV require security force checks daily during non-duty hours.¹² [REDACTED]. In addition, DoD Manual 5100.76 requires munitions storage areas containing SRC I and II munitions to have perimeter fencing.

¹⁰ (U) Not all munitions have an SRC designation. For example, some munitions are categorized as non-sensitive and do not maintain an SRC designation.

¹¹ (U) Army Regulation 190–11, “Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,” January 17, 2019.


¹² (U) Daily security force checks during non-duty hours are not required if munitions storage structures containing SRC III and IV munitions are equipped with intrusion detection systems.

(U) DoD Instruction 4140.01 requires DoD officials to maintain records for all inventory in the DoD supply chain, including munitions.¹³ In accordance with DA PAM 700–16, Army officials and contractor personnel at Camp Arifjan use the Standard Army Ammunition System (SAAS) to account for munitions stored in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area.¹⁴ SAAS is an Army-wide program that provides near real-time munitions information to all ammunition support activities in the active duty and Reserve Components.

(U) Munitions Stored at Camp Arifjan


~~(CUI)~~ As of April 2023, DoD officials stored over [REDACTED] munitions in [REDACTED] munitions storage structures at Camp Arifjan. Specifically, [REDACTED] munitions storage structures are located within the ammunition supply point, [REDACTED] munitions storage structures are located within the theater storage area, and [REDACTED] munitions storage structures are located elsewhere at Camp Arifjan. We nonstatistically selected [REDACTED] munitions storage structures to review. The [REDACTED] munitions storage structures stored over [REDACTED] munitions.

~~(CUI)~~ DoD officials store munitions at Camp Arifjan in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Figures 1 and 2 show examples of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] at Camp Arifjan.



¹³ (U) DoD Instruction 4140.01, “DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Policy,” March 6, 2019.

¹⁴ (U) DA PAM 700–16, “Logistics: Ammunition Management” June 23, 2021.



(U) Finding

(U) Army Officials at Camp Arifjan Did Not Consistently Store Munitions in Accordance with Safety and Security Policies

~~(CUI)~~ Army officials at Camp Arifjan did not consistently store munitions in the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed in accordance with applicable safety and security policies.

- ~~(CUI)~~ Officials from the 592nd Ordnance Company and contractor personnel stored munitions in [REDACTED] without a DDESB-approved site plan. This occurred because 592nd Ordnance Company officials and contractor personnel thought that storing munitions in [REDACTED] near a munitions storage structure with a DDESB-approved site plan eliminated the need for a site plan.
- (U) Officials from the 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment did not manage munitions storage in accordance with approved NEW limits at the Patriot missile site. This occurred because the ASG-KU safety manager did not have a process for tracking the expiration dates of risk acceptance waivers.
- ~~(CUI)~~ The ASG-KU safety manager did not maintain continuous awareness of the NEW totals for the munitions stored in [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed. This occurred because the ASG-KU safety manager thought annual reviews of NEW totals were sufficient.
- ~~(CUI)~~ The ASG-KU safety manager did not ensure Army officials complied with all risk acceptance requirements for waiving LPSs for [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed. This occurred because the ASG-KU safety manager did not have the authority to direct 592nd Ordnance Company officials to conduct semiannual emergency evacuation drills or annual inspections on the condition of munitions storage structures.
- ~~(CUI)~~ Army officials did not remove vegetation around [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed. This occurred because the ASG-KU safety manager was not aware of the requirement to develop a vegetation control program.
- ~~(CUI)~~ Officials from the 592nd Ordnance Company and 217th Explosive Ordnance Company did not [REDACTED] [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed. This occurred because

~~(CUI)~~ 592nd Ordnance Company and 217th Explosive Ordnance Company officials were unaware that [REDACTED].

- ~~(CUI)~~ Officials from the 592nd Ordnance Company did not [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed. This occurred because 592nd Ordnance Company officials thought that [REDACTED].

~~(CUI)~~ When Army officials do not store munitions in accordance with safety policies, it increases the risk of serious injury, loss of life, and damage to property. For example, Army officials stored munitions in a structure that exceeded the approved NEW limits by [REDACTED]. In addition, when Army officials do not store munitions in accordance with security policies, it increases the risk of munitions being lost, stolen, or misplaced without detection.


(U) Army Officials at Camp Arifjan Did Not Consistently Store Munitions in Accordance with Safety and Security Policies

~~(CUI)~~ Army officials at Camp Arifjan did not consistently store munitions in the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed in accordance with applicable safety and security policies. Specifically, 592nd Ordnance Company officials and contractor personnel stored munitions in [REDACTED] without a DDESB-approved site plan. In addition, 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment officials did not manage munitions storage in accordance with approved NEW limits. Furthermore, the ASG-KU safety manager did not maintain continuous awareness of the NEW totals stored in munitions storage structures and did not ensure Army officials complied with all risk acceptance requirements for waiving LPSs. Lastly, Army officials did not remove vegetation around munitions storage structures or [REDACTED].

~~(CUI)~~ Officials from the 592nd Ordnance Company and Contractor Personnel Stored Munitions in [REDACTED] Without a DDESB-Approved Site Plan

~~(CUI)~~ Officials from the 592nd Ordnance Company and contractor personnel stored munitions in [REDACTED] without a DDESB-approved site plan. DESR 6055.09 requires munitions storage structures to have DDESB-approved site plans that include NEW limits and explosives arcs, which are intended to provide levels of protection and to prevent a chain reaction in the event of an explosion.

(~~CUI~~) However, 592nd Ordnance Company officials and contractor personnel stored [REDACTED] munitions assigned to a structure used to inspect munitions (inspection workshop) in [REDACTED] without a DDESB-approved site plan. Specifically, contractor personnel stated that when they did not complete inspections of [REDACTED] assigned to the inspection workshop during operating hours, they temporarily stored the munitions in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED].¹⁵ Although the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] complied with the [REDACTED] requirements for the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not have a DDESB-approved site plan and were located within the explosives arcs of a nearby munitions storage structure. Figure 3 shows the [REDACTED] without a DDESB-approved site plan.




(~~CUI~~) Officials from the 592nd Ordnance Company and contractor personnel stored munitions in [REDACTED] without a DDESB-approved site plan because 592nd Ordnance Company officials and contractor personnel thought that storing munitions in the [REDACTED] near a munitions storage structure with a DDESB-approved site plan eliminated the need for a site plan. Specifically, contractor personnel stated that they believed as long as the combined NEW totals of the [REDACTED] and the nearby munitions storage structure did not exceed the NEW limits established in the DDESB-approved site plan for the nearby munitions storage structure, they could store the munitions in the [REDACTED]. However, the DDESB establishes NEW limits and explosive arcs for munitions storage structures based on each specific structure's

¹⁵ (~~CUI~~) DoD Manual 5100.76 requires munitions storage structures [REDACTED] [REDACTED].

~~(U)~~ design, condition, and proximity to other munitions or inhabited buildings. The existing DDESB-approved site plan did not include the proximity of the nearby munitions storage structure to the [REDACTED], which would impact NEW limits and explosive arcs.

~~(U)~~ In April 2023, we discussed our concern with Army officials. The ASG-KU safety manager agreed that munitions temporarily stored in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] outside of a munitions storage structure with a DDESB-approved site plan were not compliant with DoD munitions safety standards. In July 2023, 592nd Ordnance Company officials and contractor personnel removed the [REDACTED] and changed their inspection procedures to eliminate the need for temporary storage. Specifically, according to contractor personnel, they began inspecting smaller volumes of munitions to ensure they could complete the inspections during normal operating hours. In July 2023, we verified the removal of the [REDACTED]. Because 592nd Ordnance Company officials and contractor personnel removed the [REDACTED] and changed their procedures for inspecting munitions, we are not making a recommendation. Figure 4 shows the same area in Figure 3 after 592nd Ordnance Company officials and contractor personnel removed [REDACTED].



(U) Officials from the 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment Did Not Manage Munitions Storage in Accordance with Approved Net Explosive Weight Limits

~~(U)~~ Officials from the 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment did not manage munitions storage in accordance with approved NEW limits at the Patriot missile site. DESR 6055.09 requires most munitions storage structures to have a DDESB-approved site plan, or an approved safety deviation, which includes established NEW limits. In addition, DA PAM 385-64 requires all munitions

~~(CUI)~~ storage structures to have explosives licenses that establish NEW limits, which can be more restrictive but not greater than the NEW limits established in DDESB-approved site plans, or risk acceptance waivers for safety deviations. However, the ASG-KU safety manager established NEW limits for [REDACTED] locations in the explosives license for the Patriot missile site that exceeded the NEW limits established in the DDESB-approved site plan. For example, the total NEW limits established in the explosives license for [REDACTED] at the Patriot missile site exceeded the total NEW limits established in the approved site plan by [REDACTED].

~~(CUI)~~ In addition, we identified [REDACTED] instances where the 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment officials exceeded the DDESB-approved NEW limit. For example, munitions stored in [REDACTED] exceeded the DDESB-approved NEW limit by [REDACTED]. Table 2 summarizes the NEW limits in the DDESB-approved site plan, NEW limits in the explosives license, and the actual NEW totals stored at the Patriot missile site.

(U) Table 2. Total NEW Limits Approved by the DDESB, NEW Limits in the Explosives License, and Actual NEW Totals at the Patriot Missile Site

(CUI)						
	Location	DDESB-Approved NEW Limits	Explosives License NEW Limits	Difference	Actual NEW Totals ¹	Difference ²
[REDACTED]						

(U) Note: The NEW limits, totals, and differences are presented in pounds.

¹ (U) Actual NEW totals are as of April 19, 2023.

² (U) Difference is between DDESB-approved NEW limits and actual NEW totals as of April 19, 2023.

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) Officials from the 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment did not manage munitions storage in accordance with approved NEW limits at the Patriot missile site because the ASG-KU safety manager did not have a process in place to track the expiration dates of risk acceptance waivers. DA PAM 385–30 requires Army officials to keep risk acceptance waivers current. In October 2016, the DDESB approved the site plan for the Patriot missile site. In May 2021, USARCENT approved a one-year risk acceptance waiver that increased DDESB-approved NEW limits at the Patriot missile site.

In addition, in June 2021, the ASG-KU safety manager established an explosives license for the Patriot missile site, which included the

(U) In June 2022, the risk acceptance waiver expired and the ASG-KU safety manager did not resubmit the waiver for renewal.

increased NEW limits. However, in June 2022, the risk acceptance waiver expired and the ASG-KU safety manager did not resubmit the waiver for renewal. In July 2023, the ASG-KU safety manager stated that when the risk acceptance waiver expired, the NEW limits for the Patriot missile site reverted to the NEW limits established in the DDESB-approved site plan. The ASG-KU safety manager also stated that they did not track the expiration date of the risk acceptance waiver; consequently, they were unaware the risk acceptance waiver expired.

(U) However, in October 2023 the ASG-KU safety manager stated that the ASG-KU has had an established process for tracking risk acceptance waivers since 2020. Specifically, the ASG-KU safety manager stated that the ASG-KU safety office tracked the status of the risk acceptance waivers on a spreadsheet and emailed the spreadsheet to USARCENT explosives safety officials on a quarterly basis. Though the ASG-KU safety manager provided us with the spreadsheet dated October 2023, the ASG-KU safety manager could not provide previous spreadsheets or provide emails documenting risk acceptance waiver spreadsheets provided to USARCENT explosives safety before October 2023. Although we confirmed the ASG-KU safety manager now has a process for tracking the status of risk acceptance waivers, the ASG-KU safety manager should have ensured the 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment officials storing munitions at the Patriot missile site complied with the NEW limits in the DDESB-approved site plan.

(U) Area Support Group–Kuwait Safety Manager Did Not Maintain Continuous Awareness of Net Explosive Weight Totals in Munitions Storage Structures

~~(U)~~ The ASG-KU safety manager did not maintain continuous awareness of the NEW totals for the munitions stored in [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed. DA PAM 385–64 requires Army safety managers to monitor munitions operations to ensure that Army officials storing munitions at an installation

~~(CUI)~~ understand and comply with explosive safety standards, which include compliance with NEW limits. In addition, a DDESB official stated that to ensure that munitions stored do not exceed DDESB-approved NEW limits, safety managers should maintain awareness of NEW totals at least quarterly, or more often depending on the movement of munitions at their installation. However, the ASG-KU safety manager only verified Army officials storing munitions at Camp Arifjan complied with NEW limits during annual safety inspections.

(U) The ASG-KU safety manager did not maintain continuous awareness of NEW totals for the munitions stored in munitions storage structures because the ASG-KU safety manager thought annual reviews of NEW totals in munitions storage structures were sufficient to ensure Army officials stored munitions within approved NEW limits. DA PAM 385-64 requires the ASG-KU safety manager to conduct annual safety inspections, which includes verifying whether NEW totals

(U) The ASG-KU safety manager only performed a review of a sample of munitions storage structures for compliance with NEW limits.

comply with DDESB-approved NEW limits. However, during an annual safety inspection for the ammunition supply point, the ASG-KU safety manager only performed a review

of a sample of munitions storage structures for compliance with NEW limits. These sampled reviews meant that the ASG-KU safety manager did not ensure compliance with NEW limits for all munitions storage structures included in the annual safety inspection. In addition, according to DDESB officials, annual reviews of NEW totals are not sufficient for determining Army officials' compliance with NEW limits because munitions stored may change throughout the year. Therefore, the ASG-KU Commander should develop and implement procedures requiring the ASG-KU safety manager to verify, at least quarterly, the NEW totals in all munitions storage structures at Camp Arifjan to ensure all organizations storing munitions comply with NEW limits.

(U) Area Support Group–Kuwait Safety Manager Did Not Ensure Compliance with Risk Acceptance Requirements for Lightning Protection Systems

~~(CUI)~~ The ASG-KU safety manager did not ensure Army officials complied with all risk acceptance requirements for waiving LPSs for [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed. DESR 6055.09 requires most munitions storage structures to be equipped with LPSs, unless DoD Components accept the risk for not having LPSs. In January 2020, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health issued a memorandum that allowed installation commanders in the USARCEN area of responsibility to waive LPSs for

~~(CUI)~~ specific types of munitions storage structures, including shipping containers and earth-covered magazines, when certain requirements are met.¹⁶ Requirements in the risk acceptance memorandum include the:

- (U) establishment of a lightning warning system,
- (U) development of a lightning evacuation plan,
- (U) execution of semiannual emergency evacuation drills, and
- (U) completion of annual inspections verifying all munitions storage structures are maintained in good condition.

(U) The ASG-KU safety manager ensured compliance with the establishment of a lightning warning system and the development of a lightning evacuation plan. However, the safety manager did not ensure Army officials storing munitions in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area executed emergency evacuation drills at least twice a year or verified all munitions storage structures were maintained in good condition. Specifically, although the ASG-KU safety manager ensured 592nd Ordnance Company officials executed an emergency evacuation drill in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area in May 2023, the ASG-KU safety manager did not ensure execution of previous emergency evacuation drills. In addition, the ASG-KU safety manager did not verify Army officials storing munitions in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area conducted annual inspections of the condition of munitions storage structures.

(U) The ASG-KU safety manager did not ensure Army officials complied with risk acceptance requirements for waiving LPSs because the safety manager did not have the authority to direct 592nd Ordnance Company officials to conduct semiannual emergency evacuation drills or annual inspections on the condition of munitions storage structures. Specifically, while the ASG-KU safety manager agreed that ASG-KU is responsible for ensuring compliance with requirements in the risk acceptance memorandum, the safety manager stated that ASG-KU does not have authority to direct 592nd Ordnance Company officials at Camp Arifjan because the 592nd Ordnance Company does not directly report to ASG-KU. Because the 1st TSC has authority over 592nd Ordnance Company officials, the 1st TSC Commander should direct 592nd Ordnance Company officials, and future units managing munitions in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area, to comply with semiannual emergency evacuation drills and annual inspections on the condition of munitions storage structures.

¹⁶ (U) Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy, and Environment), Memorandum for the Commanding General, U.S. Army Central, "Lightning Protection Systems for Contingency Locations within U.S. Army Central's Area of Responsibility—Army Acceptance of Risk," January 14, 2020.

(U) Army Officials Did Not Remove Vegetation Around Munitions Storage Structures in the Ammunition Supply Point and Theater Storage Area

~~(U)~~ Army officials did not remove vegetation around [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed. DA PAM 385-64 requires Army officials to remove vegetation around munitions storage structures to minimize fire hazards. Specifically, vegetation control limits the potential spread of an uncontrolled fire around munitions storage structures and operating locations that store munitions. According to DA PAM 385-64, controlling vegetation, such as long dry grass or brush, heavy clippings, or dead wood, is intended to slow the spread of a fire. However, we observed vegetation around all munitions storage structures in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area, which included [REDACTED] of the munitions storage structures reviewed. Figure 5 shows an example of flammable vegetation in the theater storage area.



(U) Figure 5. Flammable Vegetation in the Theater Storage Area
(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

~~(U)~~ Army officials did not remove vegetation around the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed because the ASG-KU safety manager stated that they were unaware of the requirement to establish a vegetation control program that assigned responsibilities for removing vegetation around munitions storage structures. DA PAM 385-64 requires the ASG-KU safety manager to determine required vegetation control measures and develop an installation-wide vegetation control program. Multiple organizations, including the ASG-KU, 1st TSC, and 592nd Ordnance Company, share responsibility for maintaining the ammunition

(~~CUI~~) supply point and theater storage area. However, no organization took responsibility for removing the vegetation in either area, and without a vegetation control program that assigned responsibilities for removing vegetation, the organizations did not know who was responsible for completing this task. Therefore, the ASG-KU Commander should require the ASG-KU safety manager to develop a vegetation control program that includes responsibilities for removing vegetation around munitions storage structures, and coordinate with 1st TSC Commander to ensure implementation of the vegetation control program in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area.

(~~CUI~~) Army Officials Did Not [REDACTED] for Munitions Storage Structures

(~~CUI~~) Officials from the 592nd Ordnance Company and 217th Explosive Ordnance Disposal did not [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed. DoD Manual 5100.76 requires munitions storage structures [REDACTED] [REDACTED].¹⁷ However, although 592nd Ordnance Company officials [REDACTED], they did not [REDACTED], and 217th Explosive Ordnance Disposal officials did not [REDACTED] munitions storage structure [REDACTED]. In addition, 592nd Ordnance Company officials did not [REDACTED] munitions storage structures [REDACTED] that were not included in our sample. See Appendix B for a listing of the munitions storage structures [REDACTED] [REDACTED].

(~~CUI~~) Officials from the 592nd Ordnance Company Were Not Fully Aware of [REDACTED]

(~~CUI~~) Officials from the 592nd Ordnance Company did not [REDACTED] munitions storage structures in our sample or the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures with [REDACTED] because they were not fully aware of the requirements for [REDACTED] munitions storage structures [REDACTED]. Specifically, 592nd Ordnance Company officials thought that only [REDACTED].

¹⁷ (~~CUI~~) As mentioned in the background of this report, munitions storage structures at Camp Arifjan [REDACTED].

(CUI) [REDACTED]. However, DoD Manual 5100.76 requires munitions storage structures [REDACTED].

(CUI) In October 2023, an ASG-KU Directorate of Emergency Services security official stated that as of September 2023, contractor personnel were stationed at [REDACTED]. In addition, the security official stated that contractor personnel were conducting [REDACTED] of munitions storage structures [REDACTED]. In October 2023, we verified that contractor personnel were stationed at [REDACTED], and we reviewed [REDACTED] to confirm contractor personnel [REDACTED] of munitions storage structures [REDACTED]. Because the corrective actions of the ASG-KU Directorate of Emergency Services addressed the issues we identified, we are not making a recommendation related to the [REDACTED] of munitions storage structures [REDACTED].

(CUI) Officials from the 217th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company Were Not Fully Aware of [REDACTED]

(CUI) Officials from the 217th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company did not [REDACTED] munitions storage structure with [REDACTED] because they were not fully aware of the requirements for [REDACTED] munitions storage structures [REDACTED]. Specifically, 217th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company officials thought that because the Explosive Ordnance Disposal compound was [REDACTED] and they performed [REDACTED]. However, according to Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security officials, 217th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company officials should have [REDACTED]. Therefore, only [REDACTED] did not [REDACTED] in accordance with DoD requirements.


(CUI) In October 2023, 217th Explosive Ordnance Disposal officials began conducting and documenting [REDACTED] of the munitions storage structure [REDACTED]. We reviewed [REDACTED] from October 2023 to confirm the 217th Explosive Ordnance Disposal officials documented the [REDACTED]. Because the corrective action

(~~CUI~~) of 217th Explosive Ordnance Disposal officials addressed the issue we identified, we are not making a recommendation related to the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of munitions storage structures at the EOD compound that [REDACTED].

(~~CUI~~) Officials from the 592nd Ordnance Company Did Not [REDACTED] for Munitions Storage Structures

(~~CUI~~) Officials from the 592nd Ordnance Company did not [REDACTED] [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED].


However, [REDACTED] munitions storage structures [REDACTED] [REDACTED].¹⁸ During our visit to the ammunition supply point in April 2023, we identified [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. Figure 6 shows [REDACTED]. In addition, see Appendix B for a listing of the munitions storage structures [REDACTED].



¹⁸ (~~CUI~~) In addition to the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures, [REDACTED] [REDACTED].

(~~CUI~~) Officials from the 592nd Ordnance Company did not [REDACTED] because they believed that the [REDACTED]. Specifically, 592nd Ordnance Company officials stated that [REDACTED]. However, we believe [REDACTED]. In addition, ASG-KU security officials stated that they agreed [REDACTED].

(~~CUI~~) In August 2023, ASG-KU security officials stated that they submitted a work order to the ASG-KU Directorate of Public Works to address the [REDACTED]. In August 2023, the ASG-KU Directorate of Public Works [REDACTED]. Because the ASG-KU Directorate of Public Works [REDACTED], we are not making a recommendation. Figure 7 shows [REDACTED].



(U) Inconsistent Compliance with Munitions Storage Requirements Posed Risks to Personnel and Property

(~~CUI~~) When Army officials do not store munitions in accordance with safety policies, it increases the risk of serious injury, loss of life, and damage to property. For example, when Army officials exceeded the NEW limits allowed by DDESB-approved site plans by [REDACTED] and stored munitions in [REDACTED]

(~~CUI~~) [REDACTED] without a DDESB-approved site plan, the risk of explosive arcs extending into areas where people live or work increased. This also raised the possibility of overlap with other munitions storage locations, potentially resulting in a chain reaction explosion. In addition, when Army officials did not store munitions in accordance with security policies, it increased the risk of munitions being lost, stolen, or misplaced.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Commander of Area Support Group–Kuwait:

- a. **(U) Develop and implement procedures requiring the Area Support Group–Kuwait safety manager to verify, at least quarterly, the net explosive weight totals in all munitions storage structures at Camp Arifjan to ensure all organizations storing munitions comply with net explosive weight limits.**

(U) Area Support Group–Kuwait Comments

(~~CUI~~) [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Commander addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. The Commander provided us with a sample memorandum documenting a quarterly NEW review for one munitions storage area. However, the sample memorandum did not include documented procedures requiring continued quarterly NEW verifications. We will close the recommendation when we receive procedures for quarterly NEW verifications and evidence that the ASG-KU safety manager completed at least two consecutive quarterly NEW verifications for all munitions storage structures at Camp Arifjan.

(U) Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy, and Environment) Comments

(U) Although not required to comment, the Director, Munitions and Chemical Matters, agreed with the report, stating that the Army has already taken corrective action to address the findings. The ASG-KU implemented procedures to review the NEW totals at the ammunition supply point at least quarterly to verify compliance with DDESB-approved site plans. Under these new procedures, the ASG-KU safety manager will review NEW totals on a weekly basis.

- b. (U) Require the Area Support Group–Kuwait safety manager to establish a vegetation control program that includes responsibilities to specific organizations for removing vegetation around munitions storage structures and coordinate with the Commander of the 1st Theater Sustainment Command to ensure implementation of the vegetation control program in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area.**

(U) Area Support Group–Kuwait Comments

(U) The ASG-KU Commander neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation, stating that they determined that vegetation control is part of an existing contract, and contractor personnel removed the vegetation around munitions storage structures. Furthermore, in October 2023, the Commander issued an installation policy memorandum establishing a vegetation control program for munitions storage structures at Camp Arifjan.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Commander addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. The installation policy memorandum includes safety requirements related to vegetation control and requires the Army officials managing the ammunition supply point and theater storage area to monitor and submit work orders to have vegetation removed around munitions storage structures. However, the installation policy memorandum does not support that the ASG-KU coordinated the vegetation control program with the 1st TSC. We will close the recommendation when we receive evidence that the ASG-KU Commander coordinated with the 1st TSC Commander to implement the vegetation control program.

(U) Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy, and Environment) Comments

(U) Although not required to comment, the Director, Munitions and Chemical Matters, stated that in October 2023, the ASG-KU issued an installation policy memorandum to establish a vegetation control program for removal of vegetation at munitions storage locations structures.

(U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the Commander of the 1st Theater Sustainment Command direct 592nd Ordnance Company officials, and future units managing munitions in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area, to comply with semiannual emergency evacuation drills and annual inspections of the condition of munitions storage structures.

(U) 1st Theater Sustainment Command Comments

(U) The 1st TSC Operational Command Post Chief of Staff, responding for the 1st TSC Commander, neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation, stating that the 1st TSC will ensure compliance with semiannual evacuation drills and annual inspections of the condition of munitions storage structures by adhering to established evacuation and fire plans.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Chief of Staff did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. Specifically, the Chief of Staff did not confirm whether the 1st TSC will direct 592nd Ordnance Company officials, and future units managing munitions in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area, to comply with semiannual emergency evacuation drills and annual inspections of the condition of munitions storage structures. In addition, the ASG-KU evacuation plan did not include a required frequency for conducting evacuation drills. The Chief of Staff provided us with an appendix of an ammunition supply point fire plan that included a requirement for conducting semiannual evacuation drills. However, it is unknown whether the fire plan is a 1st TSC or ASG-KU plan, and the plan does not support that the 1st TSC directed 592nd Ordnance Company officials and future units to comply with semiannual emergency evacuation drills. Furthermore, none of the documents provided by the Chief of Staff included requirements for conducting annual inspections of the condition of munition storage structures. We request that the Commander

(U) provide additional comments that clarify whether the 1st TSC intends to direct 592nd Ordnance Company officials, and future units managing munitions in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area, to comply with semiannual emergency evacuation drills and annual inspections of the condition of munitions storage structures within 30 days of the final report.

(U) Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy, and Environment) Comments

(U) Although not required to comment, the Director, Munitions and Chemical Matters, stated that the 1st TSC will ensure compliance with semiannual emergency evacuation drills and annual inspections for munitions storage locations.

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from April 2023 through December 2023 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) Safety and Security Criteria for Stored Munitions

(U) We reviewed criteria to determine whether DoD officials stored munitions at Camp Arifjan in accordance with safety and security policies. Specifically, we reviewed the following DoD and Army guidance.

- (U) DoD Instruction 4140.01, “DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Policy,” March 6, 2019
- (U) DoD Instruction 6055.16, “Explosives Safety Management Program,” July 29, 2008 (Incorporating Change 3, August 31, 2018)
- (U) DoD Manual 5100.76, “Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E),” April 17, 2012 (Incorporating Change 2, October 5, 2020)
- (U) DDESB DESR 6055.09, “Defense Explosives Safety Regulation,” Edition 1, January 13, 2019
- (U) Army Regulation 190–11, “Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,” January 17, 2019
- (U) Department of the Army Pamphlet 385–30, “Risk Management,” December 2, 2014
- (U) Department of Army Pamphlet 385–64, “Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards,” October 10, 2013

(U) Munitions Storage Structures Reviewed

(~~CUI~~) As of April 2023, DoD officials at Camp Arifjan stored approximately [REDACTED] munitions in [REDACTED] munitions storage structures. We nonstatistically selected [REDACTED] munitions storage structures to review. Specifically, we nonstatistically selected [REDACTED] structures for review based on the following factors.

- (U) SRC of munitions stored in the structures
- (U) NEW of munitions stored in the structures
- (U) Location of storage structures on the installation
- (~~CUI~~) Type of storage structure [REDACTED]

(U) Documentation Analysis and Site Visit

(U) For each munitions storage structure reviewed at Camp Arifjan, we obtained and analyzed documentation, including site plans and munitions inventories. In addition, we reviewed standard operating procedures, waivers, and key control access logs. Furthermore, we reviewed contracting officer's representative and safety official's inspection reports related to munitions storage.

(U) We conducted meetings with DDESB, Army, and contractor personnel to discuss roles and responsibilities related to munitions storage, site planning, risk management, and oversight. We also reviewed documentation from these organizations related to the safe and secure storage of munitions at Camp Arifjan.

(U) During the site visit, we interviewed staff responsible for safety, security, and storage of munitions. Key personnel interviewed included the munitions accountability officer, contracting officer's representative, safety manager, and security officials. We inspected storage conditions at the munitions storage structures to determine whether munitions were stored in accordance with applicable safety and security policies. At the tested munitions storage structures, we visually observed the following.

- (U) Lightning protection systems
- (U) Interior and exterior lighting
- (U) Doors
- (U) Ventilation
- (U) Concrete integrity and evidence of flooding
- (U) Vegetation, trash, and debris on and around the structure

~~(CUI)~~ We also tested inventory accountability at each of the [REDACTED] selected structures. Specifically, we performed book-to-floor (existence) inventories by reconciling 25 line items from the inventory provided by the command to the munitions that were present in the structure. We also performed floor-to-book (completeness) inventories by reconciling five additional line items from each structure back to the inventory provided by the command. If there were less than 25 line items in a structure, we conducted a complete book-to-floor inventory of the structure.

(U) Internal Control Assessment and Compliance

~~(CUI)~~ We assessed internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations necessary to satisfy the audit objective. In particular, we assessed control environment, control activities, risk assessment, and monitoring. We identified internal control weaknesses related to the safety and security of munitions storage at Camp Arifjan. Specifically, 592nd Ordnance Company officials and contractor personnel stored munitions in [REDACTED] without a DDESB-approved site plan. Officials from the 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment managed against NEW limits that were greater than allowed. In addition, the ASG-KU safety manager did not maintain continuous awareness of the NEW totals stored in munitions storage structures and did not ensure Army officials complied with risk acceptance requirements for waiving LPSs. Lastly, Army officials did not remove vegetation around munitions storage structures or [REDACTED].

However, because our review was limited to these internal control components and underlying principles, it may not have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of this audit.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We used computer-processed data from SAAS to identify the munitions on hand at the munitions storage structures we selected for testing. SAAS is an Army-wide program that provides near real-time munitions information to all ammunition support activities in the active duty and Reserve Components. To assess the reliability of the data from SAAS, we performed existence and completeness testing of the munitions inventories. Our testing identified discrepancies in the munitions inventories in SAAS; however, these discrepancies were not a result of system errors. Our testing did not identify any inventory discrepancies in the munitions inventory as a result of system errors.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 6 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), DoD OIG, and Army Audit Agency issued three reports discussing the DoD's storage and security of munitions.

(U) Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/>. Unrestricted Army Audit Agency reports can be accessed from .mil and gao.gov domains at <https://www.army.mil/aaa>.

(U) GAO

(U) Report No. GAO-19-118, “Actions Needed to Enhance the Security of High-Risk Ammunition at Storage Locations,” November 2018

(U) The GAO found that Military Service guidance for safeguarding SRC I munitions was not consistent with all of DoD’s minimum requirements. The report also noted that the Military Services conducted inspections of the physical security at locations with SRC I ammunition and identified security deficiencies. The GAO was unable to determine whether the Military Services resolved all security deficiencies because the Services did not consistently document resolution.

(U) DoD OIG

(U) Report No. DODIG-2021-090, “Audit of Munitions Storage in the U.S. European Command,” June 10, 2021

(U) This report is classified. To file a Freedom of Information Act Request, please submit a request to <https://www.dodig.mil/FOIA/>.

(U) Army

(U) Report No. A-2019-0003-FMP, “Ammunition Facilities Management, Lualualei Annex, Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam, Hawaii,” October 19, 2018

(U) The Army found that munitions storage facilities at the Navy’s Lualualei Annex generally were not sufficient because none of the facilities had lightning protection systems, most earth-covered magazines did not have 2-foot soil coverage, and most structures required concrete or electrical repairs. Furthermore, the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade did not have plans to assume munition operations at Lualualei when the Navy ends support, and the U.S. Army Pacific did not take sufficient steps to prioritize relocating munitions to the Naval Ammunition Depot West Loch.

(U) Appendix B

(CUI) Munitions Storage Structures at Camp Arifjan

(CUI) Structure	Structure Type	Structure Location	SRC of Munitions			Owner of Munitions Stored
[Redacted Content]						

~~(U)~~ Munitions Storage Structures at Camp Arifjan [REDACTED] (cont'd)

(U) Structure	Structure Type	Structure Location	SRC of Munitions	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Owner of Munitions Stored
[REDACTED]						

~~(CUI)~~ Munitions Storage Structures at Camp Arifjan [REDACTED] (cont'd)

(CUI) Structure	Structure Type	Structure Location	SRC of Munitions	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Owner of Munitions Stored
[REDACTED]						

(U) LEGEND

- (U) 1st TSC 1st Theater Sustainment Command
- (U) 4-5 ADA BN 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery
- ~~(CUI)~~ [REDACTED]
- ~~(CUI)~~ [REDACTED]
- (U) ASG-KU Area Support Group–Kuwait
- (U) ASP Ammunition Supply Point
- (U) BLAHA Basic Load Ammunition Holding Area
- (U) EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
- (U) MR Munitions Reserve
- (U) MWD Military Working Dog
- (U) N/A Not Applicable
- ~~(CUI)~~ [REDACTED]
- ~~(CUI)~~ [REDACTED]
- (U) SP Supply Point
- (U) SURV Surveillance Workshop
- (U) TARF Theater Ammunition Reclamation Facility
- (U) TSA Theater Storage Area

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) Management Comments

(U) Area Support Group-Kuwait



CUI
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
AREA SUPPORT GROUP-KUWAIT
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO AE 09366

9 December 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Office of Inspector General – Audit, Readiness and Global Operations Directorate, Al Udeid Air Base (AUAB), Qatar

SUBJECT: Response to DoDIG Inspection Recommendations for Munitions Storage at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait (D2023RJ-0083.002)

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the actions taken by Area Support Group – Kuwait to comply with the recommendations from the report.

2. (CUI) Recommendation 1a: [REDACTED]

Omitted because of length. Copies provided upon request.

3. (U) Recommendation 1b: Develop a vegetation control program that includes responsibilities to specific organizations for removing vegetation around munitions storage structures and coordinate with the Commander of the 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1TSC) to ensure implementation of the vegetation control program in the ASP and TSA. Corrective actions: It was determined that vegetation control is part of the horizontal contract, and they just cleared the 50-foot clear zone around the ammunition storage locations and the required distances inside and outside of the fence line, see enclosure 2 ASG-KU policy letter for vegetation control.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is [REDACTED], Safety Manager, ASG-Kuwait, at DSN: [REDACTED], email: [REDACTED].

ENSLN.DANIEL.C
ALEB. [REDACTED]

- 2 Encls
- 1. NEW Verification Memorandum
- 2. Vegetation Control Policy Letter

DANIEL C. ENSLEN
COL, AR
Commanding

CUI

(U) Area Support Group-Kuwait (cont'd)



Enclosure 2

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
AREA SUPPORT GROUP – KUWAIT
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO AE 09366

ACKU-CO

19 October 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Installation Policy Memorandum # 11 – Explosive Sites Vegetation Control Program

1. Reference:

a. DA Pam 385-64, Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards, 24 July 2023, paragraph 6-8 c and 6-9.

2. The primary purpose of vegetation control is to limit the potential spread of uncontrolled fire in ammunition and explosives storage and operating locations. Vegetation around all AE storage locations will be controlled to minimize fire hazards.

3. Controlling combustible materials, such as long dry grass or brush, heavy clippings, or dead wood, is intended to slow the spread of a fire. The responsible civil engineering, FES and safety office(s) must jointly determine the vegetation control measures required. Based on this determination they must jointly develop a vegetation control program.

4. Firebreaks will be kept clear of combustible material, such as grass, dead wood, or brush. The level of vegetation permitted within the firebreak should be minimal.

5. A minimum 50-feet of clearance is required around each aboveground magazine, operating building, or location, outdoor storage site, and ready explosives facility. This 50-foot buffer serves as a firebreak and must conform to standards listed herein.

6. A 5-foot firebreak will be maintained:

a. Around earth covered magazines (ECM) ventilators.

b. On both sides of fences (for example, magazine area fences, production line fences, and boundary fences). Where access to the outside of the fence is not available (such as garrison or installation boundaries), the firebreak will be doubled on the interior side of the fence.

7. Responsibilities:

(U) Area Support Group-Kuwait (cont'd)

Enclosure 2

ACKU-CO

SUBJECT: Installation Policy Memorandum # 11 – Explosive Sites Vegetation Control Program

a. The Commander of Ordnance Company operating the Ammunition area will monitor and submit workorders as required to have vegetation removed around the storage areas and fence line.

b. DPW will ensure a PWO is submitted to the contractor to clear the firebreaks.

c. Other organizations on Camp Arifjan and Camp Buehring i.e. EOD, K9 and Patriot sites will ensure they maintain the proper clearance around the ammunition storage areas.

d. The ASG Kuwait Safety Manger will conduct periodic inspections to ensure compliance with requirements of this command policy.

8. Point of contact for this memorandum is [REDACTED], Safety Manager, ASG-KU, [REDACTED].

ENSLN.DANIEL.C
ALEB [REDACTED]

DANIEL C. ENSLEN
COL, AR
Commanding

(U) 1st Theater Sustainment Command



~~CUI~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
1ST THEATER SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
OPERATIONAL COMMAND POST CAMP
ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO AE 09366

9 January 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Office of Inspector General – Audit, Readiness and Global Operations Directorate, Al Udeid Air Base (AUAB), Qatar

SUBJECT: Response to DoDIG Inspection Recommendations for Munitions Storage at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait (D2023RJ-0083.002)

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the actions taken by 1ST Theater Sustainment Command (1TSC) to comply with the recommendations from the report.
2. (U) Recommendation 2: Commander 1TSC direct 592ND Ordnance Company officials, and future units managing munitions in the ammunition supply point and theater storage area, to comply with semiannual emergency evacuation drills and annual inspections of the condition of munitions storage structures. Corrective actions: 1TSC Safety will ensure compliance with semi-annual emergency evacuation drills and annual inspections of the condition of munitions storage structures by adhering to ASG-Kuwait Inclement Weather Evacuation Plan and the Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) Fire Plan. See enclosures which support our intended plan of action.
3. The point of contact for this memorandum is [REDACTED], Munitions Section OIC, 1TSC, at DSN: [REDACTED], email: [REDACTED].

Omitted because of length. Copies provided upon request.

- 6 Encls
1. ASG-KU Evacuation Plan
 2. CAKU Internal Fire Plan Exercise
 3. Fire Extinguisher Training
 4. Magazine Inspection Memo
 5. Fire Extinguisher/Fire Drill Safety
 6. TSA Container Report

MASHACK.TRA [REDACTED]
HON.TASHUMB [REDACTED]
A. [REDACTED]
TRAHON T. MASHACK
COL, GS
1ST TSC OCP
Chief of Staff

~~CUI~~

(U) Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy, and Environment)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
INSTALLATIONS, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
110 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0110

SAIE-ESO

18 Dec 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Inspector General for Policy and Oversight, Department of the Defense Inspector General, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22350-1500

SUBJECT: Draft Report, Munitions Storage at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait (Project No. D2023RJ-0083.002)

1. The Army concurs with the report as written.
2. As described in the Draft Report, the Army implemented corrective actions to address many of the findings during the evaluation. In response to the outstanding recommendations, the Area Support Group – Kuwait (ASG-KU) implemented procedures to review net explosive weight (NEW) totals at its Ammunition Supply Point at least quarterly to verify compliance with its Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB)-approved Explosives Site Plan. Under these new procedures, the ASG-KU Safety Manager will review NEW totals on a weekly basis. On 19 Oct 23, the ASG-KU issued Installation Policy Memorandum #11 to establish a vegetation control program for removal of vegetation at munitions storage locations structures. Effective immediately, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command will also ensure compliance with semi-annual emergency evacuation drills and annual inspections for munitions storage locations.
3. The point of contact for this action is the undersigned, [REDACTED] or [REDACTED].

FREY.BRYAN. [REDACTED]
M. [REDACTED]
BRYAN M. FREY, P.E.
Director, Munitions and Chemical Matters

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

(U) 1st TSC	1st Theater Sustainment Command
(U) ASG-KU	Area Support Group–Kuwait
(U) DA PAM	Department of the Army Pamphlet
(U) DDESB	DoD Explosives Safety Board
(U) DESR	Defense Explosives Safety Regulation
(U) LPS	Lightning Protection System
(U) NEW	Net Explosive Weight
(U) SAAS	Standard Army Ammunition System
(U) SRC	Security Risk Category
(U) USARCEN	U.S. Army Central
(U) USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command



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