(U) Evaluation of the Accountability of Ukraine-Bound Equipment to Sea Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States
(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the Accountability of Ukraine-Bound Equipment to Sea Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States

June 10, 2024

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation is to determine whether DoD Components are effectively accounting for defense materials being provided to Ukraine from their points of origin to seaports of embarkation within the continental United States.

(U) Background

(U) When exercising Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), the President issues a presidential determination order directing the DoD to provide defense materials to Ukraine. Then, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) issues an execute order to the Military Services and Defense agencies to send the equipment and provides information and instructions. The Military Services may also issue additional orders and disposition instructions to specific units with instructions on what defense materials to provide and how to transport and account for defense materials being provided to Ukraine.

(U) DoD Components transport equipment designated for Ukraine from the point of origin to the seaport of embarkation using the Defense Transportation System and follow the policies and procedures in the Defense Transportation Regulation.

(U) Findings

(U) The DoD has accounted for, and rapidly transported, defense materials for Ukraine from the points of origin to seaports of embarkation within the continental United States, as directed in the execute orders. However, more efficient processes for transporting and accounting for equipment would address a number of issues identified during our evaluation, such as:

- (U) DoD Components often sent defense materials with inaccurate or inadequate documentation,
- (U) DoD personnel could not easily identify defense materials being provided to Ukraine using military shipping labels or by querying transportation systems, and
- (U) personnel at a seaport of embarkation did not always acknowledge auto generated reports of shipment for ammunition as required by the Defense Transportation Regulation.

This occurred because the instructions the DSCA provided in PDA execute orders did not provide specific guidance on how to account for and transport PDA material. Additionally, PDA material did not have any unique identifier assigned to identify the Presidential Determination order on military shipping labels or in transportation data systems. Finally, personnel at a seaport of embarkation did not use and respond to reports of shipment because using other transportation systems was more effective for tracking shipments and those systems had more accurate information. As a result, DoD processes were less efficient and effective than they could be, and personnel are not complying with all Defense Transportation Regulation requirements.

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that:

- (U) The U.S. Transportation Command Commander review U.S. Transportation Command shipping operations, document lessons learned from rapidly shipping defense materials to Ukraine, and develop and implement procedures that simplify shipping acknowledgement processes and make it easier to track and identify PDA material.
(U) Recommendations (cont’d)

- (U) The DSCA Director update execution orders to direct shippers to use Foreign Military Sales transportation and documentation procedures for PDA shipments, such as identifying the Presidential Determination order number on the generic military shipping label and including DoD Form 1348-1As with each shipment unit.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The USTRANSCOM Deputy Commander, responding on behalf of the USTRANSCOM Commander, agreed with the recommendation to document lessons learned and identify best practices from providing support to Ukraine for use in future operations, and partially agreed with the recommendation to simplify shipment acknowledgement processes and develop and implement procedures to make it easier to track and identify PDA shipments. The Deputy Commander stated that the Defense Transportation Regulation provides guidance and has different requirements based on different factors. Although they only partially agreed with the recommendation, the Deputy Commander stated that USTRANSCOM will work in coordination with the appropriate Service representatives to review opportunities to simplify shipment acknowledgement and receipt processes. Finally, the Deputy Commander did not agree with the recommendation to use the Transportation Control Number construct to identify PDA shipments on military shipping labels and in electronic transportation systems, but proposed an alternative method for tracking that we found meets the intent of our recommendation.

(U) The DSCA Assistant Director (International Operations), responding for the DSCA Director, agreed with the recommendation, and stated that the DSCA will request the Services to include the PD order number on their military shipping label in each presidential determination order. Based on the comments from the DSCA, we clarified the language in Recommendation 2 to be clear what documentation is required.

(U) The comments and actions described in both USTRANSCOM and the DSCA’s official comments addressed the intent of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendations are resolved and will remain open until USTRANSCOM and the DSCA provide documentation demonstrating recommendation implementation.
(U) **Recommendations Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Recommendations Unresolved</th>
<th>Recommendations Resolved</th>
<th>Recommendations Closed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Transportation Command</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1.a.1., 1.a.2., and 1.b.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency Director</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) **Note:** The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.

- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.

- **(U) Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of the Accountability of Ukraine-Bound Equipment to Sea Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States (Report No. DODIG-2024-093)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) The Deputy Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency Assistant Director (International Operations) agreed to address all the recommendations presented in the report; therefore, we consider the recommendations resolved and open. Additionally, based on the Assistant Director's official comments, we did revise Recommendation 2 to clarify the recommendation's intent. We will close the recommendations when you provide us documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendations are completed. Therefore, please provide us within 90 days your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the recommendations. Send your response to either [redacted] if unclassified or [redacted] if classified SECRET.

(U) If you have any questions, please contact [redacted]

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

Bryan Clark
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Programs, Combatant Commands, and Operations
(U) Contents

(U) Introduction
(U) Objective ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 1
(U) Background ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 1

(U) DoD Components Effectively Accounted for and Transported Defense Materials Being Provided to Ukraine from Their Points of Origin to Seaports of Embarkation Within the Continental United States ............................................................................. 6
(U) DoD Processes to Transport and Account for Defense Materials Being Provided to Ukraine from Their Points of Origin to Seaports of Embarkation Within the Continental United States Can Be More Efficient .............................................................. 11
(U) Shipping Inefficiencies Could Slow the Delivery of Equipment to Ukraine ............................................................. 13
(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response............................................................................... 14

(U) Appendix
(U) Scope and Methodology ........................................................................................................................................................................... 17
(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data .......................................................................................................................................................... 18
(U) Prior Coverage .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 18

(U) Management Comments
(U) U.S. Transportation Command ................................................................................................................................................................. 20
(U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency .................................................................................................................................................... 23

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................................... 24
(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether DoD Components effectively accounted for defense materials being provided to Ukraine from their points of origin to seaports of embarkation within the continental United States.¹

(U) Background

(U) On February 24, 2022, Russia began a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since that time, the United States and its allies and partners have rapidly transferred defense articles to the Government of Ukraine to support the defense of Ukraine. The United States provides defense items through multiple programs and authorities, including Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

(U) The DoD has Provided Defense Items to Ukraine Through Presidential Drawdown Authority

(U) The DoD has provided defense items to Ukraine via PDA. PDA is an authority by which the President can authorize the immediate transfer of articles and services from U.S. stocks.² After the President issues a Presidential Determination (PD) order under PDA, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) issues an execute order (EXORD) directing the Military Services and Defense agencies to fulfill the order and providing planning information and instructions.³ The purpose of the EXORD is to facilitate the immediate movement of defense items from military units and existing DoD resources to assist and support the Ukraine’s ongoing war efforts. As Ukraine’s need for assistance continues, PDA EXORDs require DoD Components at all levels to rapidly move defense items. Once the DSCA issues an EXORD, the Military Services and Defense agencies source the items from military units and existing DoD inventory. The Military Services and Defense agencies then transport them to a port of embarkation to move onward to Ukraine.

¹ (U) This report contains information that has been redacted because it was identified by the Department of Defense as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) that is not releasable to the public. CUI is Government-created or owned unclassified information that allows for, or requires, safeguarding and dissemination controls in accordance with laws, regulations, or Government-wide policies.
² (U) A PD is required to initiate and define the scope and maximum dollar value authorized for the approved drawdown. The use of the PDA to direct a drawdown to provide military assistance under section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) is a valuable tool of U.S. foreign policy in crisis situations. It allows for the speedy delivery of defense articles and services from DoD stocks to foreign countries and international organizations to respond to unforeseen emergencies.
³ (U) The DSCA directs, administers, and provides guidance to the DoD Components and DoD representatives to U.S. missions, for the execution of DoD security cooperation programs.
**The Defense Transportation System Moves Defense Materials**

(U) The EXORD instructs the Military Services and Defense agencies to coordinate the movement of defense items with the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) before any movement and to follow all requirements for cargo movement in the Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR). The DoD uses the Defense Transportation System to move defense materials from their point of origin (known as the shipper) to the seaports of embarkation (SPOEs) (known as the transhipper) and onward to Ukraine. USTRANSCOM is the lead agency for DoD transportation and conducts global mobility operations that enable joint force projection and sustainment. USTRANSCOM uses a mix of military, commercial, and foreign military partners to move DoD personnel and materiel across the globe. USTRANSCOM develops and maintains a wide variety of contractual relationships with commercial carriers to meet defense transportation requirements.

(U) USTRANSCOM consists of a headquarters element; Army, Navy, and Air Force, Service Component Commands; and two joint subordinate commands. The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), USTRANSCOM’s Army component, is responsible for surface transportation. The SDDC uses DoD capabilities and commercial partnerships to move equipment and personnel by rail, road, and waterway. The SDDC also provides ocean terminal services, traffic management, and transportation engineering globally.

**The Defense Transportation Regulation Is the DoD’s Policy for Cargo Movement**

(U) DTR 4500.9-R, prescribes documents, methods, and procedures for DoD Components to transport and move defense items to, within, and outside of the Defense Transportation System, including items transferred to the Government of Ukraine under PDAs. Under the overall policy direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, USTRANSCOM develops, publishes, and maintains the DTR. Specifically:

- (U) DTR Part II, Chapter 203, outlines policies and procedures to route shipments to, from, and between locations both in, and outside of, the Continental United States. It requires shippers to:
  - (U) identify the shipment receiver and consolidate shipping units in pallets or intermodal shipping containers for handling and movement;
  - (U) assign a Transportation Control Number (TCN), a 17-position alphanumeric character set, to each shipping unit to control a shipment throughout the transportation cycle of the DTS; and

---

4 (U) DTR 4500.9-R, Defense Transportation Regulation.
• (U) prepare the Transportation Control and Movement Document, which serves as a form of shipping manifest, identifying the cargo contents and other relevant information.\(^6\)

• (U) DTR Part II, Chapter 204 addresses hazardous materials.\(^7\) It requires shippers to ensure that:
  ○ (U) the driver has the proper credentials and a written route plan;
  ○ (U) transportation control and movement documents are completed and that the shipping papers include the bill of lading and declaration for dangerous goods to include the hazardous materials data;
  ○ (U) materials are properly marked, packaged, labeled, loaded, blocked, and braced; and
  ○ (U) motor vehicles are inspected, and drivers receive emergency response instructions.

• (U) DTR Part II, Chapter 205 describes the requirements for transportation protective services. Protected cargo are items designated as having characteristics requiring them to be identified, accounted for, secured, segregated, or handled in a special manner to ensure their safety or integrity. The DoD divides protected cargo into sensitive, pilferable, and controlled cargo. Sensitive cargo are arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E) that are a definite threat to public safety and can be used by militant, revolutionary, criminal, or other elements for civil disturbances, domestic unrest, or criminal actions. Controlled cargo are items that require additional control and security as prescribed in various regulations and statutes. Chapter 205 also provides the minimum requirements for the movement of sensitive and classified material, including AA&E.\(^8\) It requires:
  ○ (U) the receivers of such items to perform accountability measures, as well as a requirement to check containers for signs of theft, damage, or tampering and perform an inventory quantity verification either immediately or within 24 to 48 hours of receipt, depending on the condition and classification of the item received;\(^9\) and

\(^6\) (U) The Transportation Control and Movement Document (also known as a DD Form 1384) is a basic shipping document that lists all data concerning a shipment, including the type and quantity of defense items. The document also provides data used to generate manifests and logistics management reports during the shipment process.


\(^9\) (U) AA&E shipments fall into four Security Risk Classifications, I through IV, or uncharacterized, depending on the type of AA&E. The DTR requires inventory quantity verification of Security Risk Classification I and II items within 24 hours of receipt and Security Risk Classification III and IV items within 48 hours of receipt.

(U) According to USTRANSCOM subject matter experts, the inventory quantity verification requirement does not require the receivers of items to open boxes or other containers during transportation and movement, assuming inspectors find no evidence of damage or tampering.
• (U) shippers to send a Report of Shipment (REPSHIP) and for receivers to acknowledge they received the REPSHIP.

• (U) DTR Part II, Chapter 208 provides general guidance on packaging and handling items. The section on marking and labeling requires that:
  ○ (U) DoD shipping activities use a bar coded Military Shipping Label (MSL) for shipments in the Defense Transportation System and prescribes the information required for the bar code; and
  ○ (U) Shipment unit documentation includes a packing list, kit list, and line item documents (DD Form 1348-1A, Issue Release/Receipt Document, DD Form 1149, Requisition and Invoice/Shipping Document, and DD Form 1150, Requests for Issue/Transfer/Turn-In) and will be attached to or packaged with the shipment in accordance with Department of Defense Standard Practice Military Marking for Shipment and Storage (MIL-STD-129R).

---

(U) Finding

DoD Components for Transportation and Accountability of Defense Materials Being Provided to Ukraine from Their Points of Origin to Seaports of Embarkation Within the Continental United States Can Be More Efficient

DoD components accounted for and rapidly transported defense materials the United States provided to Ukraine from their points of origin to SPOEs within the continental United States. However, DoD Components did not move and track equipment as efficiently as possible, and did not follow some DoD policies.

- (U) DoD Components often sent defense materials being provided to Ukraine to the SPOE with inaccurate or inadequate documentation. For example, some shippers sent equipment with incorrect delivery location codes, TCNs, or missing documentation, such as MSLs. This occurred because the DSCA EXORD provides instructions to prioritize speed but did not provide Transportation Officers (TOs) at the point of origin with specific instructions on how to account for and transport PDA equipment.

- (U) DoD personnel could not easily identify defense materials being provided to Ukraine using military shipping labels or by querying transportation systems. This occurred because DoD transportation systems, such as the Global Air Transportation Execution System (GATES) do not include unique identification information for PDA material and USTRANSCOM and the DSCA do not provide specific guidance for marking MSLs, documents, or TCNs as PDA materials.

- (U) Military Ocean Terminal–Sunny Point (MOTSU) personnel did not always acknowledge REPSHIPs for AA&E shipments as required by the DTR, which is used to ensure that receivers are ready to receive the cargo when it arrives. MOTSU personnel did not always use and respond to REPSHIPs as required because that process was not as effective as using other transportation systems that more accurately tracked PDA shipments. We observed personnel at MOTSU using the Global Freight Management system’s inbound shipments report function and the Carrier Appointment System to track incoming ammunition and explosives shipments instead of responding to dozens of REPSHIPs daily.

11 (U) A TCN is a 17-character data element assigned to control and manage every shipment unit throughout the transportation pipeline and for payment processing. The TCN for each shipment unit is unique and shippers should not duplicate TCNs within the Defense Transportation System. Appendix L of the DTR Part II has different types of TCN construction formats outlined, including a format for Foreign Military Sales/Building Partner Capacity program shipments. Such a system is not in place for PDA material.
(U) According to MOTSU personnel, these other transportation systems more accurately reflect shipping information than the data in the REPSHIP reports and was more useful to ensure that those receiving the cargo were ready for its arrival.

(U) As a result, DoD Components at the SPOE were not as efficient and effective as they could be when tracking and accounting for equipment being sent to Ukraine. When shippers do not send equipment with the correct information and documentation, SPOE personnel must work harder than necessary to correct documentation errors and prepare shipments. In addition, headquarters, point of origin, SPOE, and other DoD personnel cannot quickly query transportation systems, such as GATES, to provide shipping documentation and data about PDA shipments for Ukraine.

(U) DoD Components Effectively Accounted for and Transported Defense Materials Being Provided to Ukraine from Their Points of Origin to Seaports of Embarkation Within the Continental United States

(U) DoD Components accounted for and transported the defense materials the United States provided to Ukraine from their points of origin to SPOEs in the continental United States. Specifically, according to personnel supporting operations, the Defense Transportation System, shippers, and SPOE personnel ensured equipment moved from the point of origin, to the SPOE, and then onto the appropriate vessel faster than routine shipments.

(U) We conducted site visits to two points of origin and two SPOEs to observe and “follow” equipment and determine whether DoD Components were effectively accounting for different types of defense materials the United States was providing to Ukraine from their points of origin to SPOEs within the continental United States. We visited Sierra Army Depot and the dock at Joint Base Charleston to observe how DoD personnel process and account for general end items. Similarly, we visited Crane Army Ammunition Activity (CAAA) and MOTSU to observe how DoD personnel process and account for ammunition and explosives.
(U) Sierra Army Depot Personnel Rapidly Processed, Accounted for, and Transported Ukraine-Bound Defense Materials to the Sea Port of Embarkation

(U) Sierra Army Depot personnel rapidly prepared and transported vehicles and mine roller equipment to be shipped to Ukraine through the SPOE at Joint Base Charleston. We observed equipment preparation and shipment processes from start to finish. We observed that Sierra personnel employed quality assurance (QA) processes to ensure that personnel properly shipped and accounted for the equipment. QA personnel checked if the equipment met the standards in the disposition instructions and checked it again after Sierra personnel packed and prepared it to ship. We observed that at the time of shipment, Sierra QA personnel checked the vehicles and shipping documents to ensure that the serial numbers matched and that the other Sierra personnel had followed the disposition instructions. Sierra personnel also gave the delivery driver a packet of documentation including the bill of lading, MSLs, DD Form 1348-1A, and a waterproof packing list envelope before loading (see Figure 1). However, the waterproof packing envelope with documentation was not directly attached to each item, as required by the DTR and Department of Defense Standard Practice Military Marking for Shipment and Storage (MIL-STD-129R).

(U) We also heard about how personnel expedited processes to meet the deadlines for Ukraine-bound equipment. During our visit, Sierra personnel quickly created the preparation documentation packet and shipping documents and ordered the trucks to transport the vehicles and mine rollers to Charleston using the Integrated Booking System. Although Sierra personnel had anticipated sending the mine rollers a week after our visit,

---

12 (U) Sierra Army Depot in Herlong, California, is the Army’s largest facility dedicated to equipment retrograde, regeneration, reutilization, and redistribution. With 36,000 acres, it provides ample space, low humidity, and low precipitation; excellent for the long-term storage of mechanized vehicles. Sierra Army Depot relies upon machinists, craftsmen, equipment operators, and support personnel to receive, store, maintain, and ship Army material anywhere in the world, at any time.
(U) they were able to complete the preparation and ship them the next day to meet the deadline for equipment to arrive in Charleston. Sierra personnel stated that these processes have eight unique steps that usually take several days, but they completed them overnight to meet the expedited requirement.

(U) **Personnel at the Joint Base Charleston Sea Port of Embarkation Effectively Received, Accounted for, and Shipped Ukraine-Bound Defense Materials**

(U) Personnel at the Joint Base Charleston SPOE effectively received, accounted for, and shipped Ukraine-bound defense materials. We conducted a site visit to Joint Base Charleston to observe how SDDC’s 841st transportation battalion personnel processed the vehicles arriving from Sierra Army Depot. We observed 841st personnel review the shipping documentation for each load to ensure that it had the correct MSL, correct TCN, and bill of lading. For one vehicle we followed from Sierra Army Depot, 841st personnel found that one digit in the TCN was incorrect, but the 841st personal already had a corrected MSL for that vehicle. We observed the driver provide the plastic packing list envelope, the commercial bill of lading, and the DD Form 1348-1A the Sierra TOs had prepared and given him. Although we observed 841st personnel apply the correct MSL to the vehicle, we did not see them apply the plastic packing list envelope and DD Form 1348-1A to the vehicle, as required by the DTR.

(U) Once 841st personnel determined that the cargo was at the correct place, was the correct equipment, and had the correct labeling, they directed the driver to the dock storage yards where contracted professionals offloaded the equipment and pre-staged it for loading on the assigned vessel. 841st personnel told us that once the vessel arrives, contracted professionals load the cargo according to the vessel stow plan. 841st personnel said they also account for cargo as it is loaded onto the vessel and prepare the ocean manifest and other required shipping documentation. We reviewed the ocean manifest and found that the vehicles and mine rollers expected on the vessel had arrived at the SPOE, were processed, and ultimately loaded onto the vessel bound for Ukraine.

---

13 (U) Joint Base Charleston includes a military port used to transport DoD materiel. The 841st Transportation Battalion is the single port manager for all DoD cargo moving through seaports on the Eastern Seaboard and through the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility, including the port at Charleston. The 841st is part of the 597th Transportation Brigade and SDDC.

14 (U) An ocean manifest is a detailed listing of all Shipment Units picked up by a ship and identified by a TCN.
(U) Personnel at Crane Army Ammunition Activity Properly Accounted for, Processed, and Shipped Ammunition to the Sea Port of Embarkation

(U) Personnel at CAAA properly accounted for, processed, and shipped ammunition to the ammunition SPOE, MOTSU. We conducted a site visit to CAAA and observed personnel preparing ammunition for shipment to MOTSU.\(^{15}\) We observed that CAAA QA personnel check to make sure CAAA personnel had properly inspected the ammunition in storage and identified anything that could impact shipment before ammunition was moved from storage and pre-staged to load into containers. We observed Crane personnel using scanners to record each pallet of ammunition as other personnel loaded it into the container (see Figure 2).

(U) Once loading personnel had prepared and loaded the container, QA personnel checked to see if loading personnel had properly blocked and braced the load before QA personnel attached the shipping documents. QA personnel included one set of shipping documents and an extra copy of the DD Form 1348-1A Issue Receipt/Release Document on the inside of the container and then locked and sealed the container in accordance with the DTR. QA personnel zip tied a second set of shipping documents enclosed in a waterproof bag to the outside of the container and applied the MSL. QA personnel also applied the bolt seals to the containers and recorded the seal numbers.

---

\(^{15}\) CAAA is located in Crane, Indiana. CAAA’s mission is to safely receive, inspect, store, ship, renovate, demilitarize, and manufacture conventional ammunition, missiles, and related components to support Army and Joint Force readiness. CAAA is responsible for approximately 25 percent of DoD’s munitions stockpile with over 1,800 munitions storage bunkers across more than 51,000 acres.

(U) During our evaluation, we found security vulnerabilities at CAAA. We addressed our findings and recommendations in Management Advisory: Security Concerns at Crane Army Ammunition Activity.
(U) The CAAA Properly Used the Defense Transportation Tracking System To Provide Additional Protections for Controlled Equipment

(U) We concluded that CAAA TOs and the drivers complied with DTR Chapter 205 and that the Defense Transportation Tracking System (DTTS) provided the location and status of shipments. DTR Chapter 205 includes regulations for the Transportation Protective Services for controlled equipment, such as AA&E or classified equipment. To protect this controlled equipment, these shipments must be transported by dual-driver teams, the drivers must have security clearances, and the shipments within the continental United States are tracked and monitored by the DTTS.

(U) DTTS watch officers were able to provide approximate locations and the status of shipments we were tracking from CAAA to MOTSU. A pair of drivers showed us the system set up in their truck, how it worked, the panic button on their dash, and their two separate remote panic buttons, as required by the DTR. Although they did not use their panic buttons for the shipment from CAAA to MOTSU, the drivers shared how they had used the panic button and DTTS provided support in the past.

(U) Personnel at Military Ocean Terminal–Sunny Point Properly Received, Accounted for, and Shipped Ammunition from Crane Army Ammunition Activity

(U) MOTSU personnel properly received, accounted for, and shipped AA&E shipments. During our site visit to MOTSU, we observed the 596th Transportation Brigade accept the shipments arriving from CAAA.\(^{16}\) According to MOTSU personnel, before arriving at MOTSU, drivers or their trucking companies make an appointment to unload their shipments in the Carrier Appointment System. Gate guards and 596th personnel check the bolt seals for any signs of compromise. We observed that 596th personnel checked the drivers’ paperwork and conducted truck inspections before directing drivers to the staging pad where MOTSU personnel unloaded their shipment and staged their container based on the assigned vessel’s stow plan.

(U) According to MOTSU personnel, SPOE personnel conducted their inventory by container and did not open the containers or disturb the seals. We reviewed the vessel’s ocean manifest and determined that it had all the containers of ammunition expected and that the transportation and accountability process for controlled defense materials was generally effective.

\(^{16}\) MOTSU, North Carolina, serves as a transfer point between rail, trucks, and ships for the export of ammunition, explosives, and military equipment for the DoD. It is the largest military munitions terminal in the world. The Army’s 596th Transportation Brigade of SDDC runs MOTSU and manages cargo movements on Military Sealift Command (MSC) employed vessels.
(U) DoD Processes to Transport and Account for Defense Materials Being Provided to Ukraine from Their Points of Origin to Seaports of Embarkation Within the Continental United States Can Be More Efficient

(U) DoD processes for moving and tracking PDA equipment to and through SPOEs within the continental United States can be more efficient. Although point of origin and SPOE personnel moved equipment from the point of origin to the SPOE and onto the vessel, some DoD personnel did not comply with all DTR requirements. The PDA EXORDs included language requiring compliance with the DTR, but did not provide any specific requirements. DTR Part II on cargo movement includes 13 chapters (totaling 449 pages), 52 appendices (Appendix A-Appendix ZZ), a separate table of contents, and separate lists of acronyms/abbreviations, change requests, definitions, references and missions, roles, and responsibilities. It includes requirements to comply with standards in other DoD policies and various shipping industry standards. Clearer instructions for moving and tracking PDA equipment could help to improve DTR compliance even as personnel move quickly to meet the PD EXORD directions.

(U) Point of Origin Transportation Officers Often Sent Shipments of Ukraine-Bound Defense Materials to Seaports with Inaccurate or Inadequate Documentation

(U) SPOE personnel stated that they often received shipments at the SPOE with inaccurate or inadequate documentation. SPOE personnel stated that some shipments had incorrect delivery location codes, TCNs, or missing shipping labels. We observed shipments at Charleston and MOTSU that had Charleston or MOTSU as the delivery location code when the code should have indicated the final destination in Europe. SPOE personnel at Charleston stated that they had to re-print so many labels that they had exhausted their supply of over 1,400 labels.

(U) When shipments arrive with incorrect or inadequate documentation, SPOE personnel spend time tracking down information and using unit personnel to correct documentation errors to limit the amount of “frustrated cargo” that could increase delivery time and costs to the Government.17 According to SPOE personnel, because SDDC personnel cannot correct documentation errors, they must contact personnel at the point of origin or a third party to correct documents. 841st personnel stated that when equipment arrives with no documentation at all, they must spend significant time tracking down a point of contact.

17 (U) Frustrated cargo is any shipment of supplies or equipment which, while en-route to destination, is stopped before receipt and when further disposition instructions must be obtained. Improper marking, packaging, and funding requirements will result in frustrated cargo.
(U) SPOE personnel reported that using a consolidated entity as a third party to organize incoming equipment was helpful. For Army cargo, SPOE personnel at Charleston stated that having 404th Army Field Support Battalion personnel to help ready Army equipment and documentation for shipment gave them a consolidated point of contact to address errors for Army-provided equipment. SDDC personnel at Charleston stated that they encountered more problems with equipment from other Military Services that did not go through the 404th. For ammunition and explosives, SDDC personnel at MOTSU stated that when they had problems with a shipment’s documentation, they worked with a consolidated point of contact at Joint Munitions Command to correct documentation. Preserving these potential best practices and lessons learned could benefit future operations or other PDA missions.

(U) DoD Personnel Could Not Use Transportation Systems to Easily Identify a Shipment as Ukraine-Bound or Provide an EXORD Number

(U) DoD personnel could not use transportation systems to easily identify PDA shipments of defense materials bound for Ukraine or provide the PD number associated with the material. Transportation personnel could not query transportation systems of record to provide shipping documentation and data about shipments of PDA defense materials for Ukraine. This is important because DoD personnel cannot easily analyze data about shipments bound for Ukraine stored in transportation systems. Instead, DoD personnel are maintaining separate lists of shipments and equipment that include the PD number for PDA cargo because the transportation systems cannot quickly or easily provide this information.

(U) Additionally, we observed personnel using free text fields to identify a shipment as bound for Ukraine or provide a PD number. However, this information does not appear on the MSL or carry over to more widely used transportation tracking systems, such as GATES. Being able to identify shipment units by PD number in transportation systems or from the MSL could assist in transportation and accountability processes. For example, TOs in Europe must track and account for the status of PDA equipment movement and delivery to Ukraine. Easy identification of PDA equipment in transportation systems could help answer questions and provide data faster when needed operationally or for oversight.

(U) The DTR provides specific instructions for how to manage Security Cooperation Program shipments, including Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Building Partner Capacity (BPC). PDA shipments could benefit from aspects of the FMS/BPC structure for more efficient identification and tracking. For example, the generic MSL provides a field for an FMS code to identify a particular FMS case. A comparable code could be used to identify and track equipment by PD number. Additionally, DTR Appendix L
(U) includes an FMS/BPC-specific TCN construction format. A PDA-specific TCN construction may make it easier to identify PDA equipment in transportation systems because they all have a TCN data field. Although all FMS or BPC procedures may not be appropriate for PDA equipment, FMS/BPC does provide a widely understood model that could provide some additional structure to the PDA processes.

(U) MOTSU Personnel Did Not Always Acknowledge REPSHIPs as Required by the DTR

(U) MOTSU personnel did not always acknowledge REPSHIPs as required by the DTR. DTR Chapter 205 requires the shipping TOs to send a REPSHIP and for the receiving TOs to acknowledge receipt of the REPSHIP for all categories of AA&E to ensure that receivers can receive the cargo when it arrives. We observed that MOTSU transportation personnel had received dozens of REPSHIPs the day before our visit. According to MOTSU personnel, if they had acknowledged each one, it would have taken time that they could have spent on other tasks.

(U) Instead of relying on information in REPSHIPs, we observed MOTSU personnel using the Global Freight Management system’s inbound shipments report function and the Carrier Appointment System to track incoming shipments instead of responding to dozens of REPSHIPs every day. MOTSU personnel showed us how they can produce a report made with real-time data showing the inbound shipments based on data in the Global Freight Management system or showing the arrival appointments scheduled in the Carrier Appointment System. We reviewed REPSHIPs sent to MOTSU and found that the estimated time of arrival listed on the REPSHIP was not always accurate. We found one with an arrival date that was one week later than the actual arrival. If MOTSU personnel had relied on the REPSHIP estimated arrival information instead of the other systems, they would have planned inaccurately.

(U) Shipping Inefficiencies Could Slow the Delivery of Equipment to Ukraine

(U) As a result, DoD Components at the SPOE are not as efficient and effective as they could be when tracking and accounting for equipment being sent to Ukraine. When shippers do not send equipment with the correct information and documentation, SPOE personnel must spend additional and unnecessary time and effort to correct documentation errors and prepare shipments. In addition, headquarters, point of origin, SPOE and other DoD personnel cannot quickly query transportation systems, such as GATES, to provide shipping documentation and data about PDA shipments to Ukraine.
(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Revised Recommendation
(U) As a result of management comments, we revised Recommendation 2 by adding the phrase “or other property transfer or property release form” so that the recommendation includes the different material release or transfer forms the DTR allows shippers to attach to materials during shipment.

(U) Recommendation 1
(U) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command,
   a. (U) Conduct a review of shipping operations to:

(U) USTRANSCOM Management Comments
(U) The USTRANSCOM Deputy Commander, responding on behalf of the USTRANSCOM Commander, agreed with the recommendation and stated that USTRANSCOM will conduct a review of its PDA shipping operations to document lessons learned and best practices.

(U) Our Response
(U) The Deputy Commander's response addressed the specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, we consider the recommendation resolved and open. We will close the recommendation when USTRANSCOM provides documentation of the completed review.

   2. (U) Simplify shipment acknowledgement processes within the Defense Transportation Regulation requirements.

(U) USTRANSCOM Management Comments
(U) The Deputy Commander, responding on behalf of the USTRANSCOM Commander, partially agreed with the recommendation and stated that the DTR provides a significant amount of guidance and varying requirements based on different factors. The Deputy Commander also stated that USTRANSCOM will review opportunities to simplify shipment acknowledgment and receipt processes, in coordination with appropriate Service representatives.
(U) Our Response

(U) The Deputy Commander's comment and plan to review opportunities to simplify shipment acknowledgement and receipt processes with the appropriate Service representatives meets the intent of the recommendation. Therefore, we consider the recommendation resolved and open. We will close the recommendation when USTRANSCOM provides documentation of the review or revised sections of the DTR implementing a simplified process.

b. (U) Develop and implement procedures to make it easier to track and identify Presidential Drawdown Authority equipment from point of origin to the point of delivery. Specifically, procedures should include requirements to identify shipments as Presidential Drawdown Authority shipments in electronic transportation systems and incorporate the Presidential Determination order number in shipment documentation, and on the generic military shipping label or within the Transportation Control Number generation construct.

(U) USTRANSCOM Management Comments

(U) The Deputy Commander, responding on behalf of the USTRANSCOM Commander, partially agreed with the recommendation. Specifically, the Deputy Commander did not agree with the suggestion in the recommendation to modify the TCN construct as the mechanism to identify shipments as PDA shipments on MSLs and in electronic transportation systems. Instead, the Deputy Commander suggested generating a unique Category D Project Code for each Presidential Drawdown Authority package and including the Project Code in DSCA EXORDs.

(U) Our Response

(U) After reviewing the Deputy Commander's alternate suggestion, we agree that using Project Codes to identify and track different PDA shipments as PDA and including the PD number on MSLs and in electronic transportation systems meets the intent of the recommendation. We confirmed that data fields for the project code are in electronic transportation management systems and on the generic MSL. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved and open. We will close the recommendation when USTRANSCOM provides documentation that it has developed and implemented procedures to identify and track PDA equipment.
**Finding**

**Recommendation 2**

(U) We recommend that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency Director update execution orders to direct shippers to use certain Foreign Military Sales transportation and documentation procedures for Presidential Drawdown Authority shipments. Specifically, shippers should use a generic military shipping label that identifies the Presidential Determination order number for the Presidential Drawdown Authority shipment and transports at least one DoD Form 1348-1A or other property transfer or property release form with each shipment unit.

**DSCA Management Comments**

(U) The DSCA Assistant Director (International Operations), responding for the DSCA Director, agreed with the recommendation stating that the DSCA will request the Services include the PD order number on their MSL in each PD EXORD. The Assistant Director also stated that the DSCA would not direct the use of any specific document because that would not be in line with the DTR.

**Our Response**

(U) The Assistant Director's comments about directing the Services to include the PD order number on MSLs addressed the intent of the recommendation. Based on the Assistant Director’s comments, we revised the recommendation to clarify what documentation or form should be required. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved and open. We will close the recommendation when the DSCA issues and provides us a copy of an EXORD that includes instructions to include the PD number on MSLs and include at least one copy of DD Form 1348-1A or other property transfer or release form with each shipment unit.
(U) Appendix

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from September 2023 through April 2024 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in December 2020 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) We focused this evaluation on the processes for equipment movement and accountability for Ukraine-bound equipment from the point of origin to the SPOE within the continental United States, to include a review of laws, DoD directives, orders, procedures, and instructions. Our areas of focus included:

- (U) Transfer documentation and accuracy;
- (U) Compliance with laws, policies, directives and regulations;
- (U) Accountability records and accuracy;
- (U) Safety and security controls; and
- (U) Process efficiencies and effectiveness.

(U) We identified laws and DoD directives, orders, and instructions governing the movement of military items from point of origin to SPOEs. We gathered information from stakeholders and personnel involved in identifying, assigning, sending, and processing equipment bound for Ukraine from the point of origin to a SPOE within the continental United States.

(U) We conducted a site visit to the USTRANSCOM and SDDC headquarters to meet with officials and subject matter experts to learn more about their operations, as well as roles and responsibilities. Additionally, we conducted site visits to “follow” sensitive equipment and non-sensitive equipment from their points of origin to two different SPOEs, the port of Charleston and MOTSU. We gathered testimonial, observational, and documentary evidence during the site visits and used this evidence to draw our conclusions.
(U) **Use of Computer-Processed Data**

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(\(U\) **Prior Coverage**

(U) During the last 5 years, the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued four reports discussing equipment accountability and transportation. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at [http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/](http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/).

(\(U\) **DoD OIG**

(U) DODIG-2023-092, “Management Advisory: DoD’s Transportation of Ammunition in Support of Ukraine,” July 5, 2023

(U) DODIG-2023-084, “Evaluation of Accountability Controls for Defense Items Transferred Via Air to Ukraine within the USEUCOM AOR,” June 8, 2023

(U) The objective of the evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD implemented accountability controls for defense items transferred via air to Ukraine within the U.S. European Command area of responsibility, in accordance with the DTR and DoD instructions. The report concluded that DoD personnel swiftly received, inspected, staged, and transferred defense items to Government of Ukraine representatives in Jasionka. However, DoD personnel did not have the required accountability of the thousands of defense items that they received and transferred.
(U) The evaluation found that DoD personnel: 1) did not consistently complete all required forms and record item quantities; 2) could not confirm that the quantities of defense items received matched the quantity shipped as DTR requires.

(U) DODIG-2021-093, “Audit of the DoD's Sea Transportation and Storage of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,” June 11, 2021

(U) The objective of the audit was to determine whether the DoD transported AA&E by sea in accordance with the DoD regulations. The report concluded that DoD officials followed the requirements in the DTR for preplanning, loading, inspecting, and unloading AA&E shipments in the sample selected for audit.

(U) The audit found that: 1) DoD could not provide documents for all AA&E shipments requested; 2) some documents provided included incorrect control numbers.


(U) The objective of the audit was to determine whether the DoD protected AA&E transported in the United States by commercial ground carriers in accordance with the DTR. The report concluded that the DoD did not properly verify that information about the contents of the AA&E shipment was in the tracking system for 20,426 of 103,853 ground shipments made by truck, as required by the DTR. The report also states that SDDC systems did not track 3,772 AA&E rail shipments and all small package shipments of arms and ammunition.

(U) The audit found that DoD did not properly: 1) pack at least two AA&E ground shipments as required by the DTR and DoD component criteria for blocking and bracing AA&E shipments; 2) verify that information about the contents of the AA&E shipment was in the tracking system as required by DTR; 3) provide commercial carriers with access to installation so that the carrier could deliver AA&E ground shipments to the installation as required by DoD; and 4) follow up on SDDC safety investigation recommendations made in transit accident reports.
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: TCDC


1. The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provides management responses to recommendations 1.a.1., 1.a.2., and 1.b. found in the subject report.

2. The point of contact in this matter is [Redacted]

JOHN P. SULLIVAN
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Commander

Attachment
USTRANSCOM Response

cc:
TCJ3
TCJA
(U) U.S. Transportation Command (cont’d)

DoDIG Draft Report (Project No. D2023-DEV0PD-0166.00)

“Evaluation of the Accountability of Ukraine-Bound Equipment to Sea Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States”

Dated April 2024

Recommendation 1.a.1: The Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, conduct a review of shipping operations to document lessons learned and identify best practices for future movements. USTRANSCOM will continue to synchronize the transportation efforts of the Combatant Commands, Services, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to improve end-to-end movement of security assistance material.

**USTRANSCOM Response:** Concur. USTRANSCOM concurs with this recommendation and will conduct a review of its Presidential Drawdown Authority operations to document lessons learned and best practices for future movements. USTRANSCOM will continue to synchronize the transportation efforts of the Combatant Commands, Services, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to improve end-to-end movement of security assistance material.

Recommendation 1.a.2: The Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, simplify shipment acknowledgement processes within the Defense Transportation Regulation requirements.

**USTRANSCOM Response:** Partially concur. The DTR currently provides a significant amount of guidance regarding Proof of Shipment, Proof of Delivery, In Transit Visibility (ITV) and shipment Tracing and Tracking. The specific requirements can vary based on shipment commodity, mode of shipment, and service specific policies, processes, or systems used in shipment execution processes. USTRANSCOM will review opportunities to simplify ship acknowledgement/receipt processes in coordination with appropriate Service representatives.

Recommendation 1.b: The Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, develop and implement procedures to make it easier to track and identify Presidential Drawdown Authority equipment from point of origin to the point of delivery. Specifically, procedures should include requirements to identify shipments as Presidential Drawdown Authority shipments in electronic transportation systems and incorporate the Presidential Determination order number in shipment documentation, such as the generic military shipping label or within the Transportation Control Number generation construct.

**USTRANSCOM Response:** Partially concur. CICS Instruction 4110.01F provides comprehensive guidance regarding the appropriate development and use of Project Codes. Project Codes may be used as a mechanism to identify shipments requiring special recognition or aligned to distinct efforts. The Defense Logistics Manual (DLM) 4000.25, Volume 2, Appendix 7.13 describes the process for establishing Category D Project Codes that align to those projects of direct interest to the Secretary of Defense. Similar Project Codes currently exist within the Defense Automatic Addressing System Logistics Data Gateway for Presidential Drawdown Authority efforts unrelated to Ukraine.

USTRANSCOM recommends the DOD, via OSD (A&ES), generate a unique Category D Project Code for each Presidential Drawdown Authority package. USTRANSCOM further recommends that execution orders published by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency direct the Services
and Defense Agencies to use the approved Project Code when coordinating and documenting transportation of drawdown material in all electronic transportation systems of record. The cargo transportation movement record generated at the origin would include the Project Code and subsequently be shared throughout the movement to the ports of embarkation and strategically moved to the theater. Theater processes and the systems of record supporting those processes warrant an additional review for means to receive, account for, and close out PDA movements.

USTRANSCOM does not concur with modifying the Transportation Control Number generation construct. The Generic Military Shipping Label currently includes a data field for documenting an approved Project Code for that shipment and would be applied at the originating station.

USTRANSCOM will continue to ensure the regulatory guidance contained within the DTR is reviewed regularly for accuracy, relevance, and clarity.
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (DODIG)

SUBJECT: Response to the draft DODIG Report “Evaluation of the Accountability of Ukraine Bound Equipment to Sea Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States” (Project No. D2023-DEV0PD-0166.000)

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the subject DODIG’s draft evaluation report titled Evaluation of the Accountability of Ukraine-Bound Equipment to Sea Ports of Embarkation in the Continental United States” (Project No. D2023-DEV0PD-0166.000). I appreciate DODIG’s open and collaborative process in performing this evaluation.

DODIG’s draft recommends that the “The Director, DSCA, update execution orders to direct shippers to use certain Foreign Military Sales transportation and documentation procedures for Presidential Drawdown Authority shipments such as identifying the Presidential Determination order number on the generic military shipping label and including DoD Form 1348-1As with each shipment unit.” DSCA concurs with critical comment regarding DODIG’s draft recommendation.

Moving forward, DSCA will include updated verbiage in each Presidential Determination Execution Order (PD EXORD) to request the Services include the Presidential Determination order number on their Military Shipping Label (MSL). However, DSCA is not the appropriate authority to direct the use of any specific document as this is not in line with the Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR), which allows for the use of a range of documents, depending on the type and origin of shipment. The DTR already directs the use of an MSL for every shipment which enters the Defense Transportation Service (DTS), and it is not in line with TRANSCOM regulations to require something different.

Please direct any further questions to DSCA’s main point of contact for this matter, ROBERT P. HELFANT
Assistant Director
International Operations
## (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA&amp;E</td>
<td>Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>Building Partner Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAA</td>
<td>Crane Army Ammunition Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD Form</td>
<td>Department of Defense Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD OIG</td>
<td>Department of Defense Office of Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTR</td>
<td>Defense Transportation Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTTS</td>
<td>Defense Transportation Tracking System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXORD</td>
<td>Execute Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATES</td>
<td>Global Air Transportation Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Presidential Determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>Presidential Drawdown Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOTSU</td>
<td>Military Ocean Terminal at Sunny Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSL</td>
<td>Military Shipping Label</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPSHIP</td>
<td>Report of Shipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDDC</td>
<td>Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOE</td>
<td>Seaport of Embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>Transportation Control Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>Transportation Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Whistleblower Protection
U.S. Department of Defense

Whistleblower Protection safeguards DoD employees against retaliation for protected disclosures that expose possible fraud, waste, and abuse in Government programs. For more information, please visit the Whistleblower webpage at http://www.dodig.mil/Components/Administrative-Investigations/Whistleblower-Reprisal-Investigations/Whistleblower-Reprisal/ or contact the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator at Whistleblowerprotectioncoordinator@dodig.mil

For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

Congressional Liaison
703.604.8324

Media Contact
public.affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

DoD OIG Mailing Lists
www.dodig.mil/Mailing-Lists/

www.twitter.com/DoD_IG

LinkedIn
https://www.linkedin.com/company/dod-inspector-general/

DoD Hotline
www.dodig.mil/hotline

Whistleblower Protection safeguards DoD employees against retaliation for protected disclosures that expose possible fraud, waste, and abuse in Government programs. For more information, please visit the Whistleblower webpage at http://www.dodig.mil/Components/Administrative-Investigations/Whistleblower-Reprisal-Investigations/Whistleblower-Reprisal/ or contact the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator at Whistleblowerprotectioncoordinator@dodig.mil

For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

Congressional Liaison
703.604.8324

Media Contact
public.affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

DoD OIG Mailing Lists
www.dodig.mil/Mailing-Lists/

www.twitter.com/DoD_IG

LinkedIn
https://www.linkedin.com/company/dod-inspector-general/

DoD Hotline
www.dodig.mil/hotline