(U) Audit of DoD Training of Ukrainian Armed Forces: Patriot Air and Missile Defense System and Collective Training

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POC: Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Readiness and Global Operations

INDEPENDENCE ★ INTEGRITY ★ EXCELLENCE ★ TRANSPARENCY
May 31, 2024

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine the extent to which the DoD trained the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to operate and maintain U.S.-provided defense articles. This report includes the results of our review of the operational and maintenance training that the Army provided to the UAF for the Patriot long-range air and missile defense system, and of collective training provided to Ukrainian infantry battalions.

(U) Background

(U) From August 2021 through July 2023, the United States provided $42 billion in defense articles and services to Ukraine through 42 presidential drawdowns. Through presidential drawdowns, the U.S. Army provided the UAF the Patriot long-range air and missile defense system (the Patriot) and related training. The Army also provided the UAF battalion-level maneuver (collective) training. From January 2023 through May 2023, the DoD provided Patriot and collective training to UAF personnel.

(U) Findings

(U) From January 15 through April 14, 2023, the Army trained UAF personnel to operate and maintain the Patriot. The 3-6 Air Defense Artillery Battalion facilitated operational and maintenance training on Patriot equipment, including the radar, launchers, and engagement control station. Also, the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command facilitated a training validation event to allow UAF personnel to demonstrate the capability of their U.S.-provided Patriot system in theater. The training that the 3-6 Air Defense Artillery Battalion and the training validation that the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command provided to UAF personnel was sufficient to ensure UAF personnel could operate and maintain the Patriot.

(U) From January 15 through May 19, 2023, the Army provided collective training to UAF battalions, totaling UAF personnel. The collective training provided to the UAF included multiple programs of instruction designed to support their progress from individual skills to battalion-level live-fire exercises. We determined that the 7th Army Training Command (ATC) did not have enough linguists to properly support training for UAF battalions that participated in collective training. This occurred because the 7th ATC did not know the number of UAF personnel it would need to train at one time or the platforms on which the UAF would require training until approximately 2 weeks before collective training. The shortage of linguists also occurred because the 7th ATC did not properly develop requirements when requesting contracted linguist support. From April through July 2023, the 7th ATC increased the number of available contracted linguists from an average of effectively resolving the linguist shortage. In addition, the 7th ATC clarified its linguist requirement; therefore, we are not issuing recommendations related to the linguist shortage and defining linguist requirements.

(U) In addition, we determined that 7th ATC personnel did not formally assess the performance of the UAF receiving collective training from January 15 through May 19, 2023. This occurred because 7th ATC personnel did not implement a formal process to assess the performance of UAF personnel receiving collective training.

(U) As of July 10, 2023, 7th ATC personnel had developed a process to assess UAF performance during collective training. However, the 7th ATC did not formalize this assessment process into a standard operating procedure.
(U) Results in Brief

(U) Audit of DoD Training of Ukrainian Armed Forces: Patriot Air and Missile Defense System and Collective Training

(U) Findings (cont’d)

(U) Not formalizing a process to assess the performance of UAF participating in collective training into a standard operating procedure may result in personnel not assessing UAF performance during training and the inability to identify needed improvements to the training. The lack of assessments may also result in the UAF’s inability to operate effectively as a unit, which could increase the risk of UAF errors and mishaps on the battlefield.

(U) Recommendation

(U) We recommend that the Commander, 7th Army Training Command, ensure that the Commander, Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine formalizes the UAF assessment process into a standard operating procedure to ensure personnel providing UAF training assess the UAF.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The Chief of Staff, responding for the Commander, 7th Army Training Command, agreed with our recommendation. The Chief of Staff's comments and the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine actions taken were sufficient to close the recommendation.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of the recommendation.
**Recommendations Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Recommendations Unresolved</th>
<th>Recommendations Resolved</th>
<th>Recommendations Closed</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Commander, 7th Army Training Command</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>8.1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(U) **Note:** The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.

- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.

- **(U) Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY EUROPE AND AFRICA
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF ARMY


(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General’s audit. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendation. Management took actions to address the recommendation in this report, and we consider the recommendation closed.

(U) We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the audit. If you have any questions, please contact me at [redacted]

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

Richard B. Vasquez
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Readiness and Global Operations
(U) Contents

(U) Introduction
(U) Objective ........................................................................................................................................................................ 1
(U) Background ......................................................................................................................................................................... 1

(U) Finding A. The Army Provided Training to the UAF on the Patriot ................................................................. 7
(U) The Army Provided Patriot Training and Performance Assessments to the UAF .......................................................... 7
(U) UAF Personnel Could Operate and Maintain the Patriot ......................................................................................... 11

(U) Finding B. The Army Provided Collective Training to the UAF, but Challenges Existed ........................................ 12
(U) The 7th ATC Provided Collective Training to the UAF ......................................................................................... 12
(U) The 7th ATC Experienced Linguist Shortages When Providing Collective Training .................................................. 14
(U) The 7th ATC Did Not Have Enough Information to Plan Linguist Support and Did Not Clearly Define Linguist Requirements .................................................................................................................. 15
(U) The 7th ATC Did Not Formally Assess UAF Performance During Collective Training ............................................ 19
(U) The 7th ATC Did Not Formalize a Process to Assess the UAF .................................................................................... 20
(U) The 7th ATC Established a Process to Assess UAF Performance but Did Not Formalize It ........................................ 21
(U) Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response ........................................................................... 21

(U) Appendix
(U) Scope and Methodology ..................................................................................................................................................... 23
(U) Internal Control Assessment and Compliance .................................................................................................................. 24
(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data ................................................................................................................................... 25
(U) Prior Coverage ..................................................................................................................................................................... 25

(U) Management Comments
(U) 7th Army Training Command ........................................................................................................................................ 27
(U) Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) ................................................................. 28

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ 29
(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine the extent to which the DoD trained the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to operate and maintain U.S.-provided defense articles.\(^1\) This report includes the results of our review of the operational and maintenance training that the Army provided to the UAF for the Patriot long-range air and missile defense system, and of collective training provided to Ukrainian infantry battalions. The first report in this series, DODIG-2023-086, included the results of our review of the Army’s training of the UAF to operate and maintain DoD equipment provided to the UAF through 2022.\(^2\)

(U) Background

(U) From August 2021 through July 2023, the United States provided the UAF $42 billion in defense articles and services through 42 presidential drawdowns. The United States Code establishes presidential drawdown authority, which allows for the delivery of defense articles from DoD stocks and services to foreign countries and international organizations in response to emergencies.\(^3\)

(\(\text{CUI}\)) Through presidential drawdowns, the DoD provided the UAF the Patriot long-range air and missile defense system (the Patriot). In addition to providing equipment, the presidential drawdowns authorize the Military Service that provides the equipment to train the UAF to operate and maintain the equipment transferred; therefore, the Army provided Patriot training to the UAF. The President also authorized the Army to provide battalion-level maneuver training to UAF infantry battalions. We will refer to the battalion-level training as “collective training” for the remainder of this report. From January through May 2023, the DoD provided Patriot and collective training to UAF personnel. Table 1 details the number of UAF personnel who were trained during Patriot and Collective training.

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\(^1\) (U) This report contains information that has been redacted because it was identified by the Department of Defense as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) that is not releasable to the public. CUI is Government-created or owned unclassified information that allows for, or requires, safeguarding and dissemination controls in accordance with laws, regulations, or Government-wide policies.


\(^3\) (U) Section 2318, title 22, United States Code.
Introduction

(U) Table 1. Number of UAF Personnel Who Received Patriot and Collective Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UAF Personnel Trained</th>
<th>Patriot Training</th>
<th>Collective Training</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) Patriot Long Range Air and Missile Defense System

Presidential Drawdown Authority 28 authorized the DoD to transfer one Patriot battery to Ukraine and provide training on the system. The Patriot is the Army’s most advanced air defense system, and it can defeat aircraft and tactical ballistic missiles. A Patriot battery includes a radar (used to detect incoming missiles and aircraft), an engagement control station (used to track and destroy incoming missiles and aircraft), power generating equipment, and up to 8 launchers, each of which can hold up to 16 interceptor missiles. From January 15 through April 14, 2023, the Army provided Patriot training to UAF personnel to teach them how to operate and maintain a Patriot. Figure 1 shows a Patriot launcher located at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

(U) Figure 1. Patriot Launcher at Fort Sill, Oklahoma

(U) Source: The U.S. Army.
(U) **UAF Collective Training**

(U) From January 15 through May 19, 2023, the Army provided collective training to [UAF infantry battalions comprising ] personnel on average per battalion (total UAF personnel). The intent of the collective training was to train UAF infantry battalions to conduct operations as a cohesive force. The collective training included small arms training, fighting vehicle training, and live-fire exercises.

(U) **Roles and Responsibilities for Training the UAF**

(U) Four Army units have had primary roles and responsibilities to provide Patriot and collective training to the UAF, including the:

- (U) 3-6 Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Battalion (3-6 ADA),
- (U) 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command (10th AAMDC),
- (U) 7th Army Training Command (7th ATC), and
- (U) Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine (JMTG-U).

(U) The roles and responsibilities include developing and executing programs of instruction and providing housing, food, and quality of life activities for UAF personnel during training, such as religious services and physical fitness facilities.

(U) **The 3-6 Air Defense Artillery Battalion and 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command Provided Patriot Training**

(U) The 3-6 ADA, a subordinate command of the 30th ADA Brigade, conducts air and missile defense training at the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The 3-6 ADA trains Soldiers and military personnel from U.S.-allied and partner nations to operate and maintain the Patriot in classroom, simulator, and field training settings. UAF personnel attending the training at Fort Sill stayed in on-base barracks, ate meals provided by the Fort Sill dining facility, and had access to all religious and recreational areas on base.

(U) The 10th AAMDC is U.S. Army Europe and Africa's (USAREUR-AF) executive agent for all theater air and missile defense operations and force management. USAREUR-AF ordered the 10th AAMDC to provide additional training to the UAF to validate that the UAF understood the best practices of using the Patriot taught by the 3-6 ADA. The 10th AAMDC provided the UAF 2 weeks of operational training (validation training) on the Patriot at the Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area in Poland following the UAF's training at Fort Sill. UAF personnel attending

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4 (U) A program of instruction is the curriculum used to train the UAF.

5 (U) U.S. Army Europe and Africa provides ready, combat-credible land forces to deter, and if necessary, defeat aggression from any potential adversary in Europe and Africa.
the validation training in Poland were housed in tents located in the training area near the dining facility where UAF personnel ate three meals a day and had access to on-site medical assistance, safety equipment, and the gym. During validation training, the 10th AAMDC observed UAF personnel performing drills and exercises on the UAF’s Patriot equipment in Poland to ensure the UAF were proficient and the equipment was functional.

(U) The 7th Army Training Command and Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine Facilitated Collective Training

(U) The 7th ATC is a subordinate command of USAREUR-AF and is responsible for delivering forces that are ready, trained, and equipped for military operations. The 7th ATC provides resources for training and readiness for USAREUR-AF assigned personnel and allocated forces throughout the U.S. European Command area of operations. The 7th ATC also oversees the JMTG-U.

(U) The DoD established the JMTG-U in 2015, with the mission of training and equipping the UAF, and tasked National Guard units with completing 9-month rotational deployments to Ukraine’s Combat Training Center to conduct this mission. However, on February 11, 2022, the U.S. European Command repositioned the assigned National Guard unit from Ukraine to Grafenwoehr, Germany, and in April 2022, the JMTG-U began training the UAF at the Grafenwoehr Training Area (Grafenwoehr).

(U) Among other responsibilities, the JMTG-U develops programs of instruction and ensures that trainers and the UAF have adequate resources during training. For example, the JMTG-U coordinates classroom and range space, housing and food, and access to clothing (cold weather uniforms, shirts, and boots) required for training exercises. The JMTG-U does not execute collective training, but it coordinates with operational units stationed in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility to come to Grafenwoehr and conduct the training.

(U) After the JMTG-U develops a program of instruction for collective training, USAREUR-AF orders an Army operational unit to provide the collective training to the UAF at Grafenwoehr. Grafenwoehr includes multiple ranges that allow for live-fire exercises of multiple platforms, including artillery and Bradley and Stryker fighting vehicles. Figure 2 depicts the command structure of the organizations providing Patriot and collective training to the UAF.
(U) Figure 2. Organizations Providing Patriot and Collective Training

(U) LEGEND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command Level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>★★★</td>
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<tr>
<td>★★</td>
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<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>🦅</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.
(U) For the remainder of this report, to reduce acronyms and abbreviations, we will use the following terms in the circumstances described:

- (U) We use “Army” when we refer to any combination of the 3-6 ADA, 10th AAMDC, and the 7th ATC.
- (U) We use “7th ATC” to refer to any combination of the 7th ATC, the JMTG-U, and the operational units that provided collective training.
- (U) We use the organizational abbreviations previously described only when describing our observations of those specific Army organizations.

(U) **Ukrainian Language Proficiency Support**

(U) The Army relies on linguists with Ukrainian language proficiency to help facilitate its training of the UAF in three ways: translation, transcription, and interpretation.

- (U) Translation requires written translations from one source of text in English to Ukrainian text.
- (U) Transcription requires written translations of oral, video, or other sources from English to Ukrainian.
- (U) Interpretation requires speaking ability in English and Ukrainian.
(U) Finding A

(U) The Army Provided Training to the UAF on the Patriot

From January 15 through April 14, 2023, the Army trained UAF personnel to operate and maintain the Patriot. The 3-6 ADA facilitated operational and maintenance training on Patriot equipment, including the radar, launchers, and the engagement control station. We did not identify any instance when the 3-6 ADA did not provide the necessary operational or maintenance training for the Patriot system. Also, the 3-6 ADA assessed UAF personnel as proficient during field training on the Patriot at Fort Sill and the 10th AAMDC facilitated a training validation event to allow UAF personnel to demonstrate their capability on the U.S.-provided Patriot system in theater. Therefore, we determined that the Patriot training the Army provided to UAF personnel equipped the UAF with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to operate and maintain the Patriot system.

(U) The Army Provided Patriot Training and Performance Assessments to the UAF

From January 15 through April 14, 2023, the Army trained UAF personnel to operate and maintain the Patriot. Specifically, the 3-6 ADA facilitated operational and maintenance training on Patriot equipment, including the radar, launchers, and the engagement control station. We observed classroom and live training on Patriot equipment and we interviewed 3-6 ADA officials and Ukrainian air defense officers during a visit to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in February 2023. Based on our analysis of the training, we did not identify any instance when the 3-6 ADA did not provide the necessary operational or maintenance training for the Patriot system. In addition, during the training at Fort Sill, 3-6 ADA officials assessed the performance of UAF personnel. Also, the 10th AAMDC facilitated a training validation event for UAF personnel to demonstrate their capability to operate and maintain their U.S.-provided Patriot system in theater.
(U) **UAF Patriot Training Included Operations and Maintenance Instruction**

For January 15 through April 14, 2023, the 3-6 ADA trained UAF personnel to maintain and operate the Patriot during a 10-week institutional training course at Fort Sill. The Patriot training provided to the UAF included adapted programs of instruction that the 3-6 ADA used to train DoD partner nations that purchased the Patriot through the foreign military sales program.\(^6\)

(U) The Patriot training that the 3-6 ADA provided to the UAF included exercises and drills on the Patriot equipment. For example, the UAF learned how to transport, aim, and fire the Patriot’s missiles and conduct tactical operations, such as knowing when to fire a missile. The 3-6 ADA also trained the UAF on how to maintain the Patriot by conducting preventive maintenance checks, performing system hardware upgrades, and identifying system faults. The following courses were adjusted specifically for the Patriot training program of instruction provided to UAF personnel.

- (U) The Patriot Operator Expeditionary Course
- (U) The Patriot Launcher Operations Expeditionary Course
- (U) The Patriot Engagement Control Station and Launching Station Maintenance Expeditionary Course
- (U) The Patriot Radar Maintenance Expeditionary Course

(U) The 3-6 ADA condensed Patriot training to provide all four courses to the UAF within a 10-week timeframe. Typically, each Patriot course takes from 8 to 24 weeks of training to complete. Officials from the 3-6 ADA made minor adjustments to the timeframes, such as dividing the instruction of the 24-week Patriot maintenance course into two groups. This allowed 3-6 ADA instructors to simultaneously train one group of UAF solely on maintenance of the radar while the other group focused on maintenance of the launcher and engagement control station. In addition, the 3-6 ADA shortened the training time after realizing that the UAF personnel were experienced air defenders. For example, the 3-6 ADA reduced Patriot equipment introductory lessons from days to hours by performing hands-on training and bypassing classroom lecture lessons. In addition, to accommodate all training lessons in the 10 weeks allotted for training, the 3-6 ADA expanded training to 10 hours per day, Monday through Saturday. This 10-week Patriot training for the UAF was considered a unique event because the UAF are in an active conflict in Ukraine and had a shorter time allotted for training on the Patriot.

\(^6\) [The foreign military sales program provides security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act. Under Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act, the United States may sell defense articles and services to foreign countries and international organizations when the President formally decides that it will strengthen U.S. security.](#)
(U) During our site visit, we observed UAF personnel using Patriot operator simulators in a classroom environment. The simulators were training stations that demonstrated different issues that may occur while operating the radar. Specifically, the 3-6 ADA conducted timed exercises to see how quickly UAF personnel could identify deficiencies and determine solutions. For example, one simulator station allowed UAF personnel to practice how to identify and shoot down non-friendly targets and show where the target may potentially land in order for UAF personnel to identify potential collateral damage. We also observed live training of UAF personnel setting up the Patriot generator, radar, and missile to prepare for a launch. In addition to observing the UAF training, we interviewed two Ukrainian air defense officers to discuss any concerns they had with the Patriot training. The Ukrainian air defense officers stated that the Army had done well with updating and adapting Patriot training based on the UAF’s needs and requests. However, the Ukrainian air defense officers stated that they would have liked more time on the actual Patriot system using live fire. Based on our analysis of the training, we did not identify any instance when the 3-6 ADA did not provide the necessary operational or maintenance training for the Patriot system. In addition to providing UAF personnel Patriot training, 3-6 ADA and 10th AAMDC officials assessed the performance of UAF personnel during and after training.

(U) The 3-6 ADA and 10th AAMDC Assessed UAF Performance During Patriot Training

(U) During the field training at Fort Sill, 3-6 ADA officials assessed the proficiency of UAF personnel on Patriot equipment. When 3-6 ADA officials identified weaknesses in the performance of UAF personnel, the officials provided feedback to the instructors to retrain or address the deficiencies. For example, while preparing the launching station, UAF personnel responsible for setting up the fiber optic cable did not handle the cable properly, sometimes pulling hard on or twisting the cable; therefore, the fiber optic cable was placed incorrectly in the launching station. Instructors from the 3-6 ADA corrected UAF personnel on the issue, which eventually fixed their fiber optic cable handling.

(U) In addition, from April 1 through April 14, 2023, after training was complete, the 10th AAMDC facilitated a training validation event in Poland, where the 10th AAMDC verified the UAF’s ability to operate the Patriot and defend critical assets based on the training the UAF received at Fort Sill. The training validation event shared lessons learned, best practices, and ensured UAF personnel were ready to execute combat operations on their Patriot equipment. For example, UAF personnel used the skills learned at Fort Sill to coordinate as a unit to set up the Patriot for operational use. UAF personnel had hands-on training with Patriot equipment to identify and report faults to the UAF maintenance team to work.
(U) through troubleshooting. In addition to the training validation event, the 10th AAMDC provided defense design training in Poland. Defense design refers to strategic placement of the Patriot to ensure the UAF is able to use the Patriot to protect its most critical assets.

(U) Officials from the 10th AAMDC assessed the performance of UAF personnel on key skills to operate and maintain the Patriot system and documented their performance over the 2-week validation event in Poland using a Patriot Validation Checklist. After UAF personnel demonstrated proficiency with a specific task, 10th AAMDC officials signed off on each Patriot training objective on the checklist. For example, by April 9, 2023, the Validation Officer in Charge signed off on the UAF’s ability to move the Electric Power Plant, which the 3-6 ADA initially taught at Fort Sill. Officials from the 10th AAMDC stated that the Patriot training at Fort Sill and in Poland was sufficient and that the 10th AAMDC believed the UAF personnel were proficient in operating the Patriot. In addition to assessing the performance of UAF personnel, the 3-6 ADA and 10th AAMDC assessed the Patriot training that was provided.

(U) **The 3-6 ADA and 10th AAMDC Assessed Patriot Training Provided to the UAF**

(U) At the completion of Patriot training, the 3-6 ADA and 10th AAMDC conducted after-action reviews to document their assessment of the Patriot training they provided to the UAF. We reviewed the 3-6 ADA’s and 10th AAMDC’s after-action reports on UAF Patriot training provided from January through April 2023. The 3-6 ADA noted in its review that the 10 weeks of Patriot training provided to the UAF had to be done in less time than the training it provided to any other foreign nations that had acquired the Patriot. According to 3-6 ADA officials, the UAF were able to learn, comprehend, and understand how to operate the Patriot system. However, in some cases, UAF personnel expressed to 3-6 ADA instructors that they wanted more one-on-one training rather than group instruction; therefore, the 3-6 ADA concluded that pre-screening UAF personnel before the course began would enable them to tailor the classes to the needs of UAF personnel.

(U) The 10th AAMDC’s after-action report noted as a strength, the use of the actual Patriot system that the UAF would take into Ukraine. According to the 10th AAMDC, training in Poland on the actual piece of equipment the DoD provided increased the knowledge and proficiency of UAF personnel, and it helped build the UAF personnel’s confidence when learning to operate and troubleshoot the system. The 10th AAMDC identified a potential improvement related to the time UAF personnel spent training on the equipment in Poland. Specifically, the 10th AAMDC stated that UAF personnel preferred more time training in Poland to become more
(U) familiar with the equipment they would operate in Ukraine. The 10th AAMDC also stated that allowing UAF personnel more time to train on the Patriot would allow UAF personnel to integrate realistic operations into training, such as using live rounds and incorporating live aircraft. However, these recommendations in the after-action report were communicated to the Security Assistance Group–Ukraine, USAREUR-AF, and Fires Center of Excellence for future consideration if necessary.

(U) UAF Personnel Could Operate and Maintain the Patriot

(CU) The Patriot training that the Army provided to UAF personnel equipped the UAF with the knowledge, skills, and ability to operate and maintain the Patriot system. We determined that the 3-6 ADA was equipped to train UAF personnel by reviewing the Patriot program of instruction and observing UAF personnel training on the Patriot equipment at Fort Sill. In addition, we determined that the 3-6 ADA and the 10th AAMDC assessed UAF personnel, which ensured that UAF personnel were proficient in operating and maintaining the Patriot system. We did not identify, and none of the personnel we interviewed (including two Ukrainian air defense officers) identified, any critical concerns with the sufficiency of the training the 3-6 ADA and 10th AAMDC provided. Therefore, we are not making any recommendations related to the 3-6 ADA and 10th AAMDC training of UAF personnel to operate and maintain the Patriot.
(U) Finding B

(U) The Army Provided Collective Training to the UAF, but Challenges Existed

(‡U‡I) From January 15 through May 19, 2023, the Army provided collective training to UAF infantry battalions, totaling . We determined that the 7th ATC did not have enough linguists to properly support training for UAF battalions that participated in collective training. We found that from March 1 through March 7, 2023, the 7th ATC had an average of linguists less, per day, versus its estimated daily requirement of . This occurred because the 7th ATC did not know the number of UAF personnel it would need to train at one time or the platforms on which the UAF would require training, until approximately 2 weeks before collective training started. The linguist shortage also occurred because the 7th ATC did not properly develop requirements when requesting contracted linguist support. From April through July 2023, the 7th ATC increased the number of available contracted linguists from an average of effectively resolving the linguist shortage. Personnel from the 7th ATC resolved the linguist shortage and clarified the linguist requirement; therefore, we are not issuing recommendations related to the linguist shortage and defining linguist requirements.

(U) In addition, we determined that 7th ATC personnel did not formally assess UAF performance during collective training from January 15 through May 19, 2023. This occurred because 7th ATC personnel did not implement a formal process to assess the performance of UAF personnel receiving collective training.

(U) As of July 10, 2023, 7th ATC personnel developed a process to assess UAF performance during collective training. However, the 7th ATC did not formalize this assessment process into a standard operating procedure. Not formalizing the process to assess the performance of the UAF participating in collective training into a standard operating procedure may result in personnel not assessing the performance of the UAF during training. The lack of assessments may also result in the UAF’s inability to operate effectively as a unit, which could increase the risk of UAF errors and mishaps on the battlefield.

(U) The 7th ATC Provided Collective Training to the UAF

(‡U‡I) The 7th ATC trained UAF battalions, a total of UAF, from January 15 through May 19, 2023. UAF personnel were housed in two camps located in Grafenwoehr. Each camp had climate-controlled sleeping quarters, dining facilities,
bathrooms, and medical facilities. In addition, the housing areas had vending machines and outdoor gyms for UAF personnel. The collective training provided to the UAF included multiple programs of instruction designed to support their progress from individual skills to battalion-level live-fire exercises. The following progression shows the typical 5-week collective training program of instruction provided to a UAF infantry battalion.

- (U) Week 1: Individual skills such as tactical vehicle driver training and marksmanship training
- (U) Week 2: Squad-level movement, attack, and live-fire exercises
- (U) Week 3: Platoon live-fire exercises
- (U) Week 4: Company situational training and live-fire exercises
- (U) Week 5: Battalion-level force-on-force exercises

(U) During our site visit in early March 2023, we observed that the collective training the 7th ATC provided to UAF personnel included training events and exercises using rifles, machine guns, and vehicles. Because the presidential drawdowns authorized the transfer of Bradley and Stryker fighting vehicles to the UAF, the 7th ATC included Bradley and Stryker training in the collective training. The 7th ATC also trained the UAF to operate the remote weapon systems in the Bradley and Stryker fighting vehicles, and a Stryker mine clearing system. In addition, the 7th ATC trained UAF personnel to approach and engage targets as a unit using the Bradley, Stryker, and mortars. Finally, the 7th ATC trained UAF personnel to perform routine maintenance and repair of battle-damaged Bradleys and Strykers. Figure 3 shows Bradley and Stryker fighting vehicles similar to those the UAF trained on during collective training.

(U) The Bradley is a full-tracked, medium armored vehicle that provides cross-country mobility, mounted firepower, communications, and protection to a mechanized infantry unit. The Stryker is a family of vehicles that includes several variants such as an infantry carrier vehicle, mobile gun system, reconnaissance vehicle, and mortar carrier.
According to 7th ATC personnel, the Army trained UAF personnel based on the time the 7th ATC had available to train them, and not the Army standard. Personnel from the 7th ATC explained that the limited time they had to train the UAF was determined by the Ukrainian government. Therefore, they structured the training based on the time they had with UAF personnel, which was 5 weeks per battalion, or 35 days. In contrast, the same collective training for another nation during peacetime would take up to 60 days.

**The 7th ATC Experienced Linguist Shortages When Providing Collective Training**

The 7th ATC did not have enough Ukrainian linguists to properly support training for UAF battalions, totaling UAF personnel, that participated in collective training. Specifically, according to the
linguist availability data. 7th ATC personnel provided, the 7th ATC had on average linguists less, per day, than its estimated daily requirement of linguists from March 1 through March 7, 2023. During our visit to Grafenwoehr in March 2023, numerous personnel told us their greatest challenge in training the UAF was a lack of linguist support. According to 7th ATC personnel, the linguist challenges began when the collective training started on January 15, 2023; however, we used the March 1 through March 7, 2023 period to quantify the linguist challenges because the data we have for this period corresponded to our personal observations during our site visit to Grafenwoehr.

(U) Because of the linguist shortage 7th ATC personnel removed or provided some training modules without linguist support. Specifically, 7th ATC personnel removed land navigation training from a combined live-fire exercise. The exercise had only the minimum number of linguists needed to safely execute the training, and driver training for the Bradley and Stryker was significantly degraded. Personnel from the 7th ATC explained that degraded training was not as detailed as it should have been and took longer than anticipated to complete as a result of the linguist shortage. In addition, according to 7th ATC personnel, because of the linguist shortage, the Army delivered the following blocks of instruction without the assistance of linguists from March 1 to March 3, 2023.

- (U) All individual medical training
- (U) Map reading

(U) Despite the challenges with linguist support, personnel providing training explained that UAF personnel were successfully performing the tasks being taught and that the 7th ATC prioritized linguists to support lethal training modules. Specifically, 7th ATC personnel explained that the blocks of instruction that were negatively affected were non-lethal training modules and that they prioritized linguist support to lethal training modules.

(U) The 7th ATC Did Not Have Enough Information to Plan Linguist Support and Did Not Clearly Define Linguist Requirements

(U) The 7th ATC did not have enough linguists to properly support training for UAF battalions that participated in collective training because the 7th ATC did not know the total number of UAF personnel it would need to
The 7th ATC did not have all information needed to forecast linguist support until 2 weeks before collective training started.

The 7th ATC did not have enough linguists available to support UAF collective training because it did not have all the information needed to forecast linguist support. Specifically, the 7th ATC did not know the total number of UAF personnel it would need to train at one time, or the platforms on which UAF personnel would require training, until approximately 2 weeks before collective training started. The initial order USAREUR-AF issued to the 7th ATC to train the UAF was for one brigade tactical group, generally comprising 4 battalions (approximately 1,600 UAF personnel). However, at the beginning of January 2023, the training mission changed to include a second brigade tactical group, resulting in a period when portions of two brigades were present at Grafenwoehr for training at the same time. This overlap resulted in the 7th ATC training 1,111 instead of approximately 1,600 UAF personnel at the same time. When we reviewed operations orders and presidential drawdowns that authorized collective training, we determined that the Bradley fighting vehicle was not authorized for transfer to the UAF until 9 days before collective training began on January 15, 2023. According to a 7th ATC staff officer, the programs of instruction for the Bradley required additional blocks of instruction requiring more linguist support, which they did not plan for, and that could take more than 90 days to obtain.

[U] According to 7th ATC personnel, the UAF brigades coming to receive collective training were composed of four battalions and one field artillery battalion.
However, according to 7th ATC personnel, obtaining linguists can take weeks or months. The contract that the 7th ATC used for sourcing most of its linguists includes a clause that the contractor has 90 days to staff linguists after requirements are approved. According to 7th ATC personnel, contracted linguists are required to have background checks, both from the DoD and the German Police, before linguists can work in Germany. Therefore, when the 7th ATC realized it needed more linguist support than the contract linguists it originally planned for the collective training, and requested additional linguists from the contractor, it took from several weeks to months for the additional linguists to arrive at Grafenwoehr.

In terms of obtaining linguist support from 7th ATC personnel explained that the Army has personnel with Ukrainian language proficiency. However, for those personnel to support the UAF collective training mission, the requiring unit (7th ATC) must route a request for forces through its higher echelon command (USAREUR-AF) and, if selected, the Soldiers would receive orders to travel, be given time to prepare, and then travel to their assignment location. Using this method of obtaining additional linguists took the 7th ATC approximately 3 months to obtain additional linguist support.

As we noted earlier in this section, the 7th ATC mission to train the UAF rapidly changed from training one UAF brigade to two UAF brigades only 9 days before collective training started. The length of time it took to source linguists, as mentioned in the example in the preceding paragraph, illustrates how the rapidly changing collective training mission negatively impacted the 7th ATC’s ability to accurately forecast its linguist requirements, as obtaining linguists is a lengthy process. Specifically, on November 23, 2022, the 7th ATC estimated that it would need contracted linguists per day to properly support collective training for one brigade. However, approximately 4 weeks after collective training started, the 7th ATC realized it needed more linguists. The 7th ATC then revised its requirement to contract linguists per day before eventually revising the requirement to contract linguists per day in April 2023 when the number of UAF battalions receiving collective training decreased.

The 7th ATC Did Not Initially Define Its Linguist Requirements Clearly

The linguist shortage also occurred because the 7th ATC did not properly define its requirements for obtaining contract linguist support. This resulted in fewer linguists to support the training mission than the 7th ATC needed. Specifically, on November 23, 2022, when the plan was to train 1 UAF brigade, the 7th ATC determined it needed contracted linguists to support both collective
Findings training and its ongoing mission of providing platform training. However, the requirement for linguists did not include factors such as contracted linguists using leave time, or not being allowed to work more than 8 hours per day and 39 hours per week per German labor law. These factors affected the number of linguists available to work, which resulted in fewer linguists available to work than the actual linguists under contract. In contrast, the 7th ATC’s collective training of the UAF ran at least 10 hours per day and 60 hours per week, and included some training during evening hours. Therefore, because of the mismatch in hours a linguist could work, the 7th ATC’s requirement did not fully capture the number of linguists it would need to support collective training as initially planned. However, on April 17, 2023, as the mission progressed and the number of UAF receiving collective training decreased, the 7th ATC refined its linguist requirement to linguists per day while also specifying that it needed linguist support 7 days a week, 12 hours per day. Because the 7th ATC started specifying the number of days and hours per day it needed linguists with Ukrainian language proficiency, it defined its operational need more clearly.

As the UAF collective training mission moved into April 2023, the 7th ATC increased its number of linguists and the number of UAF personnel in training decreased.

Table 2 shows the average linguist shortage at the beginning of March 2023, and the average linguist shortage at the end of April 2023.

(U) Table 2. Linguist Shortage Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Dates</th>
<th>Average Daily Linguist Requirement</th>
<th>Average Daily Linguists Available</th>
<th>Average Daily Linguist Shortage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 1 – March 7, 2023</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 18 – April 24, 2023</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) Source: The 7th ATC.

[U] The 7th ATC uses an application that provides text-to-speech translation using Android devices. The 7th ATC refers to this tool as “Automation.”
(U) 7th ATC Actions Reduced Linguist Shortage

As the UAF collective training mission progressed, the 7th ATC took steps to address the linguist shortages we observed. Specifically, from April through July 2023, the 7th ATC increased the number of available contracted linguists from on April 24 to by July 7, 2023. In addition, the 7th ATC increased the number of U.S. military linguists from on April 24 to by July 7, 2023. Furthermore, the number of UAF personnel participating in collective training decreased significantly as UAF battalions completed their collective training and returned to Ukraine. Table 3 shows the decrease in UAF participating in collective training.

(U) Table 3. Decrease in UAF Participating in Collective Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Period</th>
<th>Number of Battalions</th>
<th>Number of UAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 15 – March 30, 2023</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 31 – May 19, 2023</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) Source: The 7th ATC.

Based on the actions that the 7th ATC took to increase linguist support, requirement change and clarification, and the decrease in UAF personnel receiving training, we determined that the 7th ATC resolved its linguist shortage. Furthermore, 7th ATC personnel explained that they have not delivered additional modules without linguist support as of April 2023 and that they no longer had degraded training modules as of June 2023. Therefore, we are not making a recommendation related to the linguist shortage and defining linguist requirements.10

(U) The 7th ATC Did Not Formally Assess UAF Performance During Collective Training

We determined that 7th ATC personnel did not formally assess UAF performance during collective training and conducted only informal assessments of UAF personnel performance. Specifically, we requested assessments for all UAF battalions receiving collective training from January to May 2023. The 7th ATC provided assessments for UAF battalions that attended collective training from January 15 through May 19, 2023. According to 7th ATC personnel,

10 (U) In Report No. DODIG-2023-086, “Audit of DoD Training of Ukrainian Armed Forces,” June 8, 2023, we identified some challenges related to a backlog of translated training material for specialized training; however, that issue was resolved during the audit. We did not find any issues related to translated materials for collective training.
some training units assessed UAF performance, while other training units held meetings after training events to determine whether retraining was needed, and relied on feedback from UAF personnel participating in the training. However, the 7th ATC stated that these assessments were informal.

To assess the performance of UAF personnel attending the collective training, the 7th ATC conducted informal after-action reviews to assess the UAF’s ability to complete certain tasks such as targeting enemy forces. We reviewed the assessments that the 7th ATC prepared during UAF collective training. In one unclassified report, 7th ATC personnel acknowledged that UAF personnel

However, because the battalions with primarily inexperienced UAF personnel were receiving collective training and learning to maneuver and fight as a unit for the first time, this was expected. Therefore, we are not considering the issues identified in the assessment as problems or deficiencies related to the quality of training.

The 7th ATC Did Not Formalize a Process to Assess the UAF

The 7th ATC did not formally assess UAF performance during collective training from January 15 through May 19, 2023, and conducted only informal assessments of UAF personnel performance. This occurred because 7th ATC personnel did not establish a formal process to assess the performance of the UAF during collective training. Specifically, as noted in the previous section, some training units assessed UAF performance, while other training units relied on informal reviews after training events and feedback from UAF personnel on the field to assess UAF performance.

As of July 10, 2023, 7th ATC personnel developed a process to assess UAF performance titled, “Measured Assessment of Effectiveness.” The process included a self-assessment of UAF personnel before training and after training, a test related to the training UAF personnel would take before and after training, and an assessment by the officer in charge of the training. We reviewed the Measured Assessment of Effectiveness for a Company Commander Course that occurred in July 2023, and based on the assessment, the UAF personnel participating in training increased their proficiency by 63 percent. Personnel from the 7th ATC explained that this assessment process was the way forward and that it would be formalized in a standard operating procedure that will transition as the JMTG-U changes leadership.
(U) However, the 7th ATC had not formalized this assessment process into a standard operating procedure. Therefore, we recommend that the 7th ATC Commander ensure that the Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine Commander formalizes the Measured Assessment of Effectiveness process into a standard operating procedure to ensure personnel providing training to the UAF assess their performance during training events.

(U) The 7th ATC Established a Process to Assess UAF Performance but Did Not Formalize It

(U) Although the 7th ATC provided collective training to UAF personnel, 7th ATC personnel did not formally assess the performance of the UAF personnel receiving collective training from January 15 through May 19, 2023. As of July 10, 2023, 7th ATC personnel developed a process to assess UAF performance during collective training. However, the 7th ATC did not formalize this assessment process into a standard operating procedure. Not formalizing the process to assess the performance of UAF participating in collective training into a standard operating procedure may result in personnel not assessing UAF performance during training. The lack of consistent assessments may result in the UAF’s inability to operate effectively as a unit. As a result, there is an increased risk of UAF errors and mishaps on the battlefield.

(U) Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation B.1
(U) We recommend that the Commander, 7th Army Training Command, ensure that the Commander, Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine formalizes the Ukrainian Armed Forces assessment process into a standard operating procedure to ensure personnel providing training assess the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

(U) 7th Army Training Command Comments
(U) The 7th ATC Chief of Staff, responding for the 7th ATC Commander, agreed with the recommendation and provided the audit team the JMTG-U standard operating procedure.
**[U] Our Response**

Comments from the Chief of Staff and actions taken by the JMTG-U addressed all specifics of the recommendation. The standard operating procedure we received and reviewed... Therefore, based on our review of the standard operating procedure, the recommendation is closed.

**[U] Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army Acquisition, Logistics and Technology Comments**

Although not required to comment, the Director, Air Defense and Fires provided the following comments on the recommendation. The Air Defense and Fires Director stated that they reviewed the JMTG-U standard operating procedure and concurred with it, and determined it satisfied the recommendation in the report.
(U) Appendix

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from October 2022 through February 2024 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) The scope of our Patriot training observations and conclusions includes Patriot training conducted from January 15 through March 23, 2023, at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and from April 1 through April 14, 2023, at the Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area in Poland. From February 21 through February 24, 2023, we conducted a site visit to Fort Sill and interviewed 30th ADA and 3-6 ADA personnel, performed a walkthrough of the UAF living areas, and observed UAF training on the Patriot.

(U) We also conducted several meetings at the 3-6 ADA headquarters to discuss the Patriot programs of instruction, training equipment usage and availability, access to Ukrainian linguist support, and the 3-6 ADA’s lessons learned from providing the training. In addition, we interviewed two UAF commanders to understand any concerns they had with the Patriot training. We requested and reviewed the programs of instruction, assessments of the UAF personnel trained that the 3-6 ADA completed, and after-action reviews for the Patriot training.

(U) In May 2023, we held a teleconference with the 10th AAMDC to discuss the additional Patriot training the UAF attended after Fort Sill. We discussed the curriculum the 10th AAMDC taught, the proficiency of the UAF when they arrived in Poland, access to translators, and lessons learned. We requested and reviewed the daily training plan, the 10th AAMDC’s assessment of the UAF personnel it trained, and after-action reviews.

(U) The scope of our collective training observations and conclusions includes collective training conducted from January 15 through June 2023, at Grafenwoehr, Germany. From February 28 through March 2, 2023, we conducted a site visit to Grafenwoehr and observed the collective training the 7th ATC provided to the UAF. Specifically, we observed multiple training events that included:

- (U) range familiarization and qualification,
- (U) Bradley and Stryker fighting vehicle operation and maintenance,
- (U) Bradley and Stryker fighting vehicle remote weapon training, and
- (U) combined live-fire exercises.
(U) While at Grafenwoehr, we interviewed Army personnel providing the training to the UAF. During our interviews, we discussed the nature of the training and the challenges they faced in delivering their programs of instruction to the UAF. In addition, we toured Camp Kerson, a life support area built specifically for the UAF participating in collective training. We also toured Camp Algiers, a housing area for the UAF attending Stryker fighting vehicle training. Lastly, we held meetings with JMTG-U personnel in charge of facilitating training and coordinating linguist support.

(U) We requested and reviewed programs of instruction for collective training, linguist availability trackers, linguist contract documentation, and concepts of operation for collective training. We used these documents to further support our observations during our site visit and our conclusions in this report.

(U) This report was reviewed by the DoD Components associated with this oversight project to identify whether any of their reported information, including legacy FOUO information, should be safeguarded and marked in accordance with the DoD CUI Program. In preparing and marking this report, we considered any comments submitted by the DoD Components about the CUI treatment of their information. If the DoD Components failed to provide any, or sufficient comments about the CUI treatment of their information, we marked the report based on our assessment of the available information.

(U) Internal Control Assessment and Compliance

(U) We assessed internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations necessary to satisfy the audit objective. In particular, we assessed the DoD’s control activities for developing UAF training requirements on U.S.-provided advanced equipment. Internal control activities are actions management establishes through policies and procedures to achieve objectives and respond to risks in the internal control systems, which includes the entity's information system.

(U) We did not identify internal control weaknesses related to training the DoD provided to the UAF. However, we are making one recommendation related to the 7th ATC's ability to assess UAF performance by formalizing the current assessment process in a standard operating procedure. Because our review was limited to these internal control components and underlying principles, it may not have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of this audit.
(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data
(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

(U) Prior Coverage
(U) During the last 5 years the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued four reports related to the training of Ukrainian Armed Forces. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/.

(U) DoD OIG

(U) The DoD OIG determined that neither ODC-Kyiv nor SAG-U officials could verify which Leahy-vetted UAF units were authorized to send their personnel to specific training events; SAG-U officials could not verify that UAF personnel who arrived for training were assigned to a Leahy-vetted UAF unit; and the ODC-Kyiv generally submitted units and commanders for vetting at the brigade or regiment level instead of at the battalion level or lower. Collectively, these issues indicate that personnel in U.S. European Command subordinate commands are limited in their ability to ensure that the DoD is in full compliance with Leahy vetting requirements. This management advisory was the third report in a series of four reports on DoD training of the UAF.


(U) The DoD OIG identified four issues during Ukraine oversight work related to the classification review and document markings. Collectively, those issues indicate that personnel in U.S. European Command subordinate commands may not be properly marking documents with the appropriate classification. The DoD OIG determined that the increased operational tempo related to the DoD’s mission to support Ukraine security assistance significantly increased the amount of information requiring classification decisions. This management advisory was the second report in a series of four reports on DoD training of the UAF.

This report was the first report in a series of four reports on DoD training of the UAF.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: 7th Army Training Command Response to TMT HQDA-240227-K8CF.

1. 7th ATC has read the DODIG report, understands the DODIG's recommendation, and has developed the attached SOP. Please contact MAJ Thomas Howard, the 7th ATC Secretary of the General Staff, at [email protected] or [phone number] if you have any questions.

Encl

1. Training Assessment Team, SOP v1.1

John A. Mailman, Jr.
COL, FA
Chief of Staff
(U) Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: 7th Army Training Command Response to DoD IG Report D2023RH-003.001

1. I have reviewed the submitted SOP on 27 March 2024. I concur with the SOP and determine it satisfies the recommendations in report D2023RH-003.001.

2. The point of contact for this memo is MAJ Paul Kilgore at [redacted] and [redacted].

EDISON L. HAMMOND
NH-04
Director, Air Defense and Fires
(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>7th ATC</td>
<td>7th Army Training Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAMDC</td>
<td>Army Air and Missile Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>Air Defense Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMTG-U</td>
<td>Joint Military Training Group–Ukraine</td>
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<td>UAF</td>
<td>Ukrainian Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAREUR-AF</td>
<td>U.S. Army Europe and Africa</td>
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U.S. Department of Defense

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For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

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