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Oral History Interview

NSA-OH-05-83

CAPT Duane L. Whitlock

11 February 1983

Danville, CA

By: Robert D. Farley

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Introduction: Today is 11 February 1983. Our interviewee,

Captain Duane L. Whitlock, United States Navy, retired.

Captain Whitlock served as an enlisted intercept operator and analyst and was later commissioned as an ensign.

Captain Whitlock served with the U.S. Navy station ~~Cast~~ <sup>Cast</sup> on Corregidor, also with the Navy unit on Guam. He

was evacuated by submarine from Corregidor to Australia

in March of 1942 where he joined the <sup>F R U</sup> fleet radio unit,

Melbourne. He spent the remainder of World War II

in Australia. Captain Whitlock in later years served as

NFOIO at NSA. The interview is taking place in Captain

Whitlock's study in Danville, California. Interviewer,

Bob Farley. Captain Whitlock desires that these four

tapes be classified Secret, Handle via COMINT Channels

Only.

Farley:

<sup>can</sup> you ~~can't~~ talk about primarily your career as it relates to intelligence and anything about the station ~~cast~~ <sup>Cast</sup>, what they did, the intelligence mission, the people. Sort of run through the people and the evacuation ~~off~~ <sup>to</sup>

Melbourne and FRUMEL and all that. But to start it off,

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service or just bring me up to date from where you lived and why you wanted to get into the service.

Just start it off like that if you would, sir.

Whitlock:

Well, I grew up during the depression and I graduated from high school just about the height<sup>P</sup> of the Depression. And I'd had two brothers ~~who~~<sup>who</sup> had been in the Navy. One of them was 14 years older than I am. One of ~~them~~<sup>them</sup> is seven years older. And on the basis though, the horror stories that they used to tell about Navy life, I had <sup>been</sup> growing up and never given any thought to joining the military at all. But when I got out of high school, there was absolutely nothing to do. One of my teachers had offered to send me down to live with her mother who lived in a little college town and go to college there, but all I had was overalls and they had holes in them, or patches in them, and I didn't see how I could swing that. So I thanked her kindly. I'd started out in high school to take a normal course aimed at teaching. The last year I was in high school, my teacher did me a great favor. She arranged for me to tour all the schools in the county with the <sup>C</sup> county <sup>S</sup> superintendent of <sup>S</sup> schools. So I went out and traveling with this gentleman, I had run into little old ladies that had been teaching school for thirty-odd years and they were coming to me asking me what I thought about some of the problems they had and it <sup>struck</sup> ~~struck~~ me a bit strange, but it didn't take long for me to figure out that the reason for it was the company that I was keeping

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at the moment. But I returned from that tour completely disillusioned because I'd decided that if I ever hoped to get married and raise a family, I certainly couldn't support them on what they were paying those teachers because the minimum wage was \$35 a month and there wasn't a single teacher in the county that was drawing any more than the minimum wage. <sup>They</sup> and ~~they~~ were farmed out to live around the community wherever anyone would take them in and I decided that I didn't want any of that nonsense. So when I got out of school I didn't quite know what to do with myself.

Farley.

Did you have a regular <sup>high</sup> school course <sup>or</sup> business course? <sup>It was it?</sup> ~~It was there any other~~ was just a general course, <sup>was it?</sup> ~~was it?~~

Whitlock:

Well, they had a general course, but they had a business course also which didn't interest me. I had thought perhaps it might and I'd signed on for a correspondence course out of the La Salle University, or at La Salle in Chicago.

Which was sort of a ~~new~~ <sup>That was a</sup> mistake. You know,

I got all the books and so forth and decided I didn't have any use for it at all. And I had a hard time getting them to take it off my hands without holding me to the <sup>contract</sup> ~~contrary~~.

But at any rate, I milled around. I worked for 5¢ <sup>an hour</sup> ~~an hour~~

in a service station, part time. Then I started driving a truck for my brother-in-law who <sup>was</sup> ~~between~~ between he and the finance company, owned three trucks. The finance company owned most of it. But at any rate, he was engaged in the hauling piling for the locks and dam on the Mississippi

River, and I was all of seventeen years old at the time I

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started driving one of these trucks. And I shared this chore with another nephew, or with a nephew of his who was a year younger than I am. But we would go out and manhandle logs that averaged a ton apiece.

Farley: My gosh.

Whitlock. And they run from 36 to 52 feet long. And we were putting 12 to 14 of them on a ton and a half truck. Of course, we had the trailer rig. I did that for three months. Darned near killed myself a time or two at it, ~~but~~ I worked at that enterprise for about three months. The pay for that little tour was <sup>a</sup> five dollar bill. I got a five dollar bill for three months of driving a truck. Of course, it was in the family. So at any rate, we <sup>got</sup> ~~by~~ into a rainy spell and we were up in Wisconsin and these logs were all oak or hardwood. And we'd go around and pick them up in different places where the farmers would cut ~~em~~ <sup>them</sup>. We had so gawdawful places to get into sometimes in those hills up there to get the logs out. And it had been raining and started raining and rained for about three or four days, I guess. The ground was so soggy that we couldn't get out, get a load on. Some old fellow that run a feed store in Prairie du Sac, Wisconsin, took pity on us and let us sleep in his hayloft, and we were getting doggone hungry. And ~~he~~ there's no chance to getting out to get a load of logs on. We didn't dare to use the gasoline to drive the trucks back to down to Iowa. So we left the truck parked there and two of us hitchhiked home. It was a hundred and fifty miles,

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something like that. And I walked all but 24 miles of it. At any rate, I got home and by the time ~~my feet had~~ the swelling in my feet had gone down to where I could get my shoes on again, I'd had some second thoughts about ever going back up there again, but I was going to go back up and get the truck. So I hitchhiked into Dubuque. I was going to try to catch one of the logging trucks out of Dubuque to go back up there. ~~And~~ I was walking down Main Street in Dubuque, here's a sign, Navy recruiter, <sup>R</sup> going to be in Dubuque the following day. So I turned right around and went home, got cleaned up, got my best clothes on, and hitchhiked back to Dubuque again. Went in to see the recruiter the next day. Well, I was fortunate because at that time everybody was ~~in~~ The Navy could really be <sup>Well,</sup> be ~~well,~~ all the military, could really be choosy at that point in time. <sup>To give</sup> Give you some idea how choosy it was. There was about 200 of us, on the order of 200 of us ~~ordered 200 of us~~ <sup>showed</sup> showed up in Des Moines. And out of the 200, there was 13 of us that went.

Farley. My gosh. They were selective then.

Whitlock: They were really selective. We were screened even before we went to Des Moines. We'd gone through the substations and most of the people were left in Des Moines. But at any rate, as I say, there were 13 of us taken. We left for <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ I went through training in San Diego. We left for San Diego on Friday the 13th. Got to San Diego and had to take street car number 13 out to the training station. And when I got to the training station, I got put in Company 3513.

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Farley: That's been your lucky number ever since.

Whitlock: Well. After I got through basic training, I applied. While I was going through basic training I applied.

Farley: Where did they send you to? Great Lakes?

Whitlock: No. To San Diego.

Farley: Oh, okay.

Whitlock: Great Lakes was not open at that time.

Farley: I see.

Now give me the year, would you?

Whitlock: This is 1935.

Farley: '36, right sir.

Whitlock: So after <sup>while</sup> ~~while~~ I was going through basic training, towards the tail end of it, I applied for one of the schools that the Navy operated. <sup>The brother</sup> ~~Brother~~ next older than I was was a radioman. My oldest brother went to ~~see him~~ <sup>see him</sup> ~~on a~~ <sup>on a</sup> ~~collier~~ <sup>collier</sup> and he used to <sup>lug coal</sup> ~~look cold~~ and complain about having to <sup>holystone</sup> ~~holystone~~ the decks to get the coal dust down. So I decided that if I had to do anything, I'd best be a radioman. If I had to get calluses anyplace, it's better not to get them on my hands. (laugh)

Farley: Cleaner job, too.

Whitlock: So applied for radio school and was sent in due course to communications clerical school which is there at San Diego; too. I resisted efforts of one of the instructors there, who was a signalman. He thought I was a damn good signalman and he did his best to get me to <sup>take</sup> ~~take~~ to be a signalman. There wasn't enough future to that as far as I could see.

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Farley: How many words did you have to send and receive?

Whitlock: I believe it was 15. And thereby hangs a tale, too. Because the first few weeks in the school ~~you were given~~ it was a communications clerical school, so the first few weeks you were given general courses. Well, a little bit of everything. And then at the end of that time, came the decision point of which you either had to branch into communications or into clerical. And then if you went into communications the openings were for radioman, for signalman and for quartermaster. Of course, if you went into clerical, it was yeoman. Well, ~~I wanted~~ <sup>wanted</sup> the one I ~~wanted~~ <sup>wanted</sup> to get into was radio and I wanted it pretty bad.

So they give us a sending and receiving test to weed out the ones who didn't seem to have an aptitude.

Well, I could receive ~~all right~~ <sup>all right</sup>. But when I sat down to take the sending test, the chief who was giving the test is sitting right across the table in front of me, see? Well, I

froze on the key. I couldn't spell my own name. ~~And he said~~ And

he said, <sup>"what's"</sup> ~~"what's"~~ "what's the matter with you?" And I said, "I don't know." I says, "I guess that you're giving me cause for a

little stage fright or something." He said, "Oh, take a blow. Have a cup of coffee." Well, he give a second chance and I was the only one that got that second chance.

And I got through it the second time. But I got doggone close to never being a radioman. So one of the other fellows that graduated at the same time as I did, a fellow by the name of Alexander, he and I wound up going

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to the good ship Richmond, a light cruiser. We'd both indicated that we wanted to go to battleships. So they sent us to the light cruiser. Most of the people put in for destroyers or light cruisers, <sup>got sent to</sup> battleships. They paid no attention at what your desires were. But at any rate, Alexander and I went to the Richmond and in due course, A.A.

Farley: Do you remember what types of equipment were aboard, what radios?

Whitlock: The receivers were R-I-B-R-I-A receivers that we had. Which were really, for that period, were modern receivers. They had gotten rid of the ~~the~~ what were they? ~~the~~ The RX, I believe was one of them that preceded these. But these receivers were big massive things, probably three by at least three, yeah. About three feet wide, two feet high, and about two feet deep. They were enormous things and they were shock-proofed to take the vibrations from gunfire.

Farley: Yes.

Whitlock: They're very rugged things. They were serviceable receivers, nothing very great about them. We used them later when I got into the cryptologic business. We used them later for the diversity receivers. The R-A-B. ~~WA~~ I don't remember whether we used R-A-As or not. That was the ~~low~~ <sup>low</sup> freq. ~~low~~ <sup>low</sup> frequency receiver. I don't believe that we had any R-A-A receivers on the diversity. We used the diversity equipment on long haul commercial RCA circuits. ~~WA~~ And I'm getting ahead of my story.

Farley: All right, go ahead. <sup>your</sup> ~~your~~ job was to handle the U.S. communications between flag ship and the vessels as well as

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port and shore, if need be?

Whitlock:

No, it was ship to ship, ship to shore. *uh*

One of the most difficult jobs for a radioman going to sea at that time was handling maneuvers. Because at that time they had no voice communications in maneuvering at all. It went through the radioman and he had to be on the bridge, so your best radioman or the radioman they put up on the bridge <sup>during</sup> ~~on~~ maneuvers. They was no radar. And we had shipboard DF of a fashion that could keep you off the rocks, but little else. I mean, it was seldom manned, except that when we were getting in close to the beach someplace and needed to know where were in fog or something like that. I had never really gotten good enough to man the bridge radio. I mean, it took a real cool character to <sup>do</sup> ~~that, because when you get~~ <sup>well</sup> ~~well~~ we were a flag ship, <sup>when</sup> ~~and when~~ you get several ships maneuvering out there on the orders of your ship, if you don't get that out right <sup>and you --</sup> ~~and if you --~~ <sup>mean</sup> the radioman <sup>himself's</sup> ~~could~~ cause these ships to stack up on them. But the radioman <sup>himself</sup>, not the officers, not the... <sup>responsibility</sup> and ~~it's a pretty darned~~ <sup>a</sup> at that time it was pretty responsible job.

Farley:

That's right. Did you send traffic in the <sup>plain</sup> ~~plane~~ or was it enciphered?

Whitlock:

There was very little enciphered traffic at that time. Most all the traffic was in the clear. They did have a service cipher. But this was used primarily for training.

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Farley:

Okay.

Whitlock:

And then occasionally, they'd send <sup>in service</sup> ~~unsurfaced~~ cipher.

It always ~~with~~ amazed me when I first encountered this.

We had a radio officer that'd pick up one of these

service ciphers, you know. And he'd read the thing off

without even bothering to <sup>check it</sup> ~~my~~ (laugh) It seemed to me it was a bit of a mystery. How in the world he could do this.

I don't know whether he'd had any crypt experience or not,

but he certainly was pretty good at it.

Farley:

I suppose when you use it long enough it becomes pretty familiar to you.

Whitlock:

Yeah, well it doesn't change, you know. That was all there

was to it. And we did have ~~it~~ <sup>but</sup> I don't remember what it is.. was, but we

~~we~~ had a machine. <sup>was. I</sup> ~~but~~ I don't remember what it ~~was~~ think

it was probably an ECM. We kept it in the message center.

It was locked in a metal container. And whenever they

got a message that had to be decrypted they just cleared

everybody out of the message <sup>center</sup> ~~center~~ and opened up the machine

and decrypted the thing. ~~Sd~~ That was about the extent

of my knowledge of the systems that were used, and it was

very seldom that we got anything that required the use of

that machine.

Farley:

Good.

Whitlock:

Well, I guess I was aboard that ship for about a year.

a little over. And Alexander and I, the fellow <sup>who I</sup> ~~that~~ went

aboard with, were always commiserating with each other.

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We weren't always happy on the ship. It was pretty rugged. We were the only division on the ship that <sup>was</sup> ~~were~~ standing eight-hour watches. And you would get up and go on the mid watch at 11:30, take your mid watch, work 'til eight o'clock in the morning, then there was no place to sleep because all they had on the ship was cots and hammocks and these all had to go up in the morning at ~~revelry~~ <sup>reveille</sup>. They were all stored away so you got up at 11:30 at night and you were up until taps the next night and that's pretty doggone rough. Of course, we would hide out wherever we could. Sooner or later some bos'n's mate would come along and give you a boot. "Come on, sailor, you can't sleep there," sort of thing. Some of us crawled in and slept in the battery locker. The batteries on ~~charge~~ and you come out of there with your head like this. There was a mast, it was one of the masts going going right up through the radio room and back and in the mast there was a little hole cut out of the bulkhead and there was this <sup>space</sup> ~~face~~ up in there that we used between the deck above and the compartment below there was a space, oh, it must have been about <sup>three to three and a half</sup> ~~30 1/2~~ feet high, and we used that area to store message blanks in. And there was usually room enough up in there for one guy to sleep ~~and~~ depending upon who could get in there first after watch. <sup>as soon as</sup>

Farley: My gosh. <sup>H</sup> Primitive life.

Whitlock: It was rough. It was rugged.

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Farley: You were happy to get off that ship then.

Whitlock: Yeah. As I say, Alexander and I were both trying to get off it. We both wanted to get into aviation. So at the time they were just building the Yorktown. The Yorktown was just being completed on the east coast. So we both applied for new construction. We flipped a coin, the idea being that if only one radioman was ordered from the ship, the winner would be the one to go. I won it. So time rocked along. We didn't hear anything more about this new aircraft carrier. And all of a sudden I come down with a terrible case of infected tonsils and they sent me to the hospital. And while I was in the hospital, orders come in to transfer one radioman to the USS Yorktown. Well, I come back to the ship pretty disgruntled because Alexander had gone. And time rocked along. I guess it was five or six months later. We were due for overhaul. And we come into Mare Island Mare Island Navy yard. And at that time we were supposed to take out all of our receivers in the radio shack and send them over to the laboratory. There was modifications that were going to be done on the receivers. So we took out all the receivers, sent them over to the lab in the ship yard. We started getting our traffic from the message center in the yard rather than the ship. We just secured everything. We started stripping out old cables. <sup>Because</sup> ~~cause~~ it was an old ship at the time. It was a good ship, but it was an old one. And for years, they

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had taken to clipping cables that were no longer needed. They just clipped them and leave them there. <sup>They were running</sup> ~~Run~~ through the ship. So part of the <sup>overhaul</sup> ~~overhaul~~ was to strip old cables out of the ship. So we had to take all the paneling off the radio room walls to get at ~~all~~ <sup>some</sup> of the cabling in there. This cabling run down through the ~~ship~~ <sup>ship. There</sup> ~~ship~~ was a tripod mass, and the cabling went out and down through the tripod mass, down through the boiler room, the engine rooms. And ~~it~~ it was hot. You get down there below decks stripping these cable wire. I forgot how much cable we took out of there.

Farley: Miles and miles. I bet.

Whitlock: It was in tons.

Farley: My gosh.

Whitlock: It was in tons. And I didn't exactly cotton to this job. Really. <sup>Around</sup> ~~And I was~~ <sup>around</sup> noon one day and I was sitting on the deck. Oh! I left out the best part of the story. Several months before this happened, the messenger come up to the radio shack and says, "Whitlock, the <sup>Exec</sup> ~~exec~~ wants to see you." Well, I thought, my God, what have I done? So I got into some clean <sup>clothes</sup> ~~clothes~~ quick. Clean whites and I went down to officers' country and usually you didn't go down there unless you were down there in the line of duty. <sup>hallowed, haloed</sup> ~~hallowed, haloed~~ This is ~~main~~ <sup>main</sup> ~~territory~~ <sup>territory</sup> So I had gone there and presented myself at the door and knocked ~~on~~ <sup>on</sup> ~~the Exec's~~ <sup>the Exec's</sup> state room door. And he says, "Enter." Well, I opened the door and stepped in and here he is in his undershirt, leaning over his washbowl, scrubbing up.

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you know. I thought, this is kind of unusual. He  
 turned and looked at me. He says, "Oh Whitlock." Says,  
 "Have a chair." This is certainly strange. And I didn't  
 know what was coming. So <sup>he</sup> He says, "Have a seat." He  
 says, "I'll be with you in just a minute." And he cleaned  
 up and put his jacket on, buttoned it up and then he  
 come around and <sup>sat</sup> ~~sat~~ down at his desk and he says, "Well,  
~~he said,~~ "Would you be interested in some, a little sort  
 of, exotic duty?" I said, "Well, that depends." He  
 said, "Well, first of all. Are you married?" I said, "No."  
 He said, "Are you planning to get married." I said, "No."  
 And he said, <sup>"All</sup> ~~Alright.~~" He says, "I can't tell you much about this."  
 He said, "But there's an opening for a few men, radiomen,  
 and involving overseas duty." He <sup>says,</sup> ~~says,~~ "It will be quite a  
 lot of overseas duty and it's sort of a thankless job."  
 He says, "You'll be using a different kind of typewriter. I can't tell  
 you much about it, except that it's an important job and  
 if you think you might be interested in it, we're thinking about  
 recommending you for it." I said, "Well, I thought it  
 over and it sounds real mysterious. <sup>Yes,</sup> ~~Yeah,~~ that's so."  
 "I'll be willing to give it a try." He said, <sup>"All</sup> ~~Alright.~~"  
 He says, "We'll ~~submit your recommendation,~~ submit a  
 recommendation on you, but one of two things ~~gonna~~ <sup>is going to</sup>  
 happen now. Either you'll get orders or you'll never hear another  
 thing about it." And he says, "You're not to discuss  
 this interview with anybody on this ship." And I thought,  
 "Holy mackerel!" ~~holy mackerel.~~ So I went back to the radio gang, went up to

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the radio shack and everybody lit on me like a duck on a June bug. "What did he want? What did he want?"

Farley: Yeah.

Whitlock: I said, "Aw some bad <sup>debts</sup> ~~debt~~ caught up with me." "Aww" They said "Aww".

Farley: Didn't believe that.

questions That.

Whitlock: That did it. I mean, they were no more <sup>what</sup> ~~what~~ took care of that. Well, this had happened several months before this period in the yard. And to make the story a little more interesting, the Executive <sup>officer</sup> ~~officer~~, my executive officer, the one who interviewed me, was none other than Commander Zacharias.

Farley: Good. Talk about him, if you would, just as sort of a digression.

Whitlock: Well. On the ship, he was well-liked by the crew. ~~He was~~ He appeared to be everything you would expect a Naval officer to be.

Farley: Was he by the book?

Whitlock: Pretty much, but, ~~not~~ not offensively so. He believed in the book. But he also believed in using a little judgement to go with it. But again, bear in mind, this is an impression from a worm's eye view. But I do know he was well-liked aboard ship. Occasionally he'd get a little snoot-full on board which he wasn't supposed to do. I've seen him come out of the ~~stateroom~~ <sup>stateroom</sup>. He'd usually do this before he was going to hit the beach.

Farley: Get up his courage.

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Whitlock: Yeah. But I saw him step out of the door of the ward room one day, and trip over the <sup>put in a cowling and</sup> ~~colleagues~~ <sup>damn</sup> near went <sup>rear end</sup> ~~on his~~ <sup>He didn't</sup> make too straight a bee line, but this didn't happen very often, <sup>But on</sup> ~~just~~ just this one occasion. I can't say much more about him than that. Of course, at that time, I had no idea what his background was at all. I just presumed he was the <sup>E</sup> <sup>O</sup> executive officer. He was an excellent commanding officer on board the ship. I didn't realize that he'd been into intelligence, knew a little bit more about what I was going to do and where I was going to go than he let on to me.

Farley: What was the date of your interview? Do <sup>you</sup> remember?  
I don't mean months, just year. <sup>The 7</sup> ~~1937~~ <sup>1937?</sup>

Whitlock: 19...It would have been early in 1937.

Farley: '37, good.

Whitlock: Yeah.

Farley: So that was your first acquaintance with Zacharias officially?

Whitlock: I run into him a little bit <sup>later. Two</sup> ~~run two~~ other times a little later on, just passing, but I'll mention that a little later.

Farley: <sup>All</sup> ~~Right~~ sir Good.

Whitlock: <sup>Well</sup> ~~Well~~ Well, following this interview, time had rocked on and I hadn't got orders. So I presumed as Zachari<sup>us</sup>~~as~~ had told me that ~~nothing~~ <sup>nothing</sup> I would never hear any more about it.

I didn't dare to go back and ask him what happened or anything. <sup>You know</sup> ~~Just~~ <sup>I was just sitting</sup> ~~tight~~ <sup>evolution</sup> So we were undergoing this ~~demo~~ <sup>evolution</sup> in the Navy yard on Mare Island and during lunch hour I was sitting on the deck in the

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radio room, a little bit perturbed at the Navy and expressing my views on the subject, swearing that, boy, you won't catch me ever shipping <sup>over</sup> out in this chicken outfit, sort of thing. About that time the phone rang and they asked for a messenger to go over to the yard to pick up a message. So the messenger had been sitting there listening <sup>to me</sup>, he ~~got~~ He got up and left, went over in the yard, and when he come back I was still carrying on. And he said, "You're not going to ship over, huh?" I said, "No way." He said, "Well, I guess you won't be interested in this message then." I said, "What do you mean?" Well, <sup>provided</sup> he agrees to extend his enlistment, transfer D.L. Whitlock, radioman third class, to duty under instructions, Washington, D.C."

Farley: Huh.

Whitlock: ~~Well~~ During this overhaul ~~he had~~ the chief radioman ~~that~~ <sup>material</sup> we had on the ship ~~spent most of his~~ was a ~~material~~ type. He spent most of his time back in the transmitter room with the transmitters. Well, he had need for replacements ~~about~~ in his gang back there, and he'd been grooming me to have me overhaul a ~~simple~~ <sup>well</sup> ~~he had me overhaul~~ a motor generator. And it worked. And then he give me a modification kit for one of the RAB receivers, which was just a minor modification involving changing a socket for different <sup>a</sup> tube type, rewiring it. But you had to <sup>realign</sup> the receiver. And he give me this job. Well, it's a job that ~~could~~ probably wouldn't take a technician more than three hours, four hours, something like that at the most. But I got no

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said, "Go to it."

help. He just give me the stuff and go to it. So I went to work on it. And it took me about three or four days. But we had a chief radio electrician by the name of Farri, who incidently had worked with Lee Deforest in with me and

Farley: My gosh.

Whitlock: then installing the towers at Arlington <sup>some</sup> years ago. But at any rate, this <sup>warrant</sup> officer, Farri, used to come by, and he wouldn't say anything, he'd just stand there and watch me. <sup>you know</sup> But I found out later that after he watched me he went back and got <sup>a hold of the Chief</sup> Chief and said that kid know what he's doing?" (laugh) And chief said, "Oh, let him go." Well, I get through it and <sup>Fruetell</sup> the chief, was obviously grooming me to take me out of the watch section and put me on <sup>a materiel</sup> materiel job. I think that would have been coming up once we left the Navy yard. But at any rate, when this message come in, everybody in the shacks <sup>so to</sup> were gathered around and looked <sup>on</sup> at it and the chief <sup>is</sup> is just standing back. <sup>He</sup> He looked over the heads of a couple others and said, "Did you know about this?" I said, "Yeah." He didn't speak to me for the rest of time I was on the ship.

Farley: Oh my gosh.

Whitlock: He just wiped me off the list, boy. So I departed for Washington to undergo this mysterious training which I was pretty sure that I knew what it was.

Farley: You weren't advised at all about what type of training it was until you got back to D.C.?

Whitlock: Yeah. I wasn't officially advised.

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All

Farley

Alright.

Whitlock.

Of course, security was pretty good back in that ~~year~~ <sup>1941</sup> era, but even so we radiomen knew that someplace in the Navy there were radiomen that were intercepting the Japanese ~~code~~ <sup>code</sup>. We knew this. And I was pretty sure that was where I was headed as a result of this interview.

Farley.

~~What did~~ <sup>Did</sup> you know that at one time, probably in this era or maybe a little earlier, that the Navy had intercept operators aboard commercial liners?

Whitlock:

Yeah.

Farley:

Plying the Pacific?

Whitlock.

Yeah. Jimmy ~~Pierceson~~ <sup>Pearson</sup> was one of them.

Farley:

So you were aware of that. ~~uh~~ <sup>?</sup>

Whitlock.

Not at that time, no. No, I wasn't aware of it at that time. ~~No~~.

Farley:

Okay.

Whitlock .

No, it was just ~~in~~ <sup>sort of</sup> a mysterious organization. We knew that there was such a thing existed. We didn't know where the people were ~~or~~ <sup>where</sup> anything else. We just knew the ~~existence~~ <sup>existence</sup> of such a thing. Well, we got to Washington and I arrived at the Navy yard with 50¢ in my pocket. Well, no. I arrived not at the Navy yard. I arrived at the Union Station with 50¢ in my pocket. So I had never been to Washington before. I had no idea what the layout was. So I got a taxi and I told him, "I don't have much money." I said, "I want to go to the Navy yard." He said, "Well, that'll be 50¢." (laugh) Fine. ~~Goes your fortune.~~

FARLEY: There goes your fortune.

~~SECRET~~ H VCCO

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Whitlock:

So we went out to the Navy yard and I checked in and the reaction was, "What in the heck are you doing here? You belong down to the Navy Department." I says, "Oh great. How do I get down there?" He said, "Don't you have any money?" I said, "No." So they give me a street car token.

Farley:

~~That way, huh?~~ They pointed -- "that way"

Whitlock:

Yeah. Down at the Navy Department. So I got down to the Navy Department and I was, of course, in uniform. I had my sea bag with me. And so ~~that~~ I get out and carry the sea bag over to into the main entrance of the Navy Department. I was the only sailor ~~in the whole place~~ <sup>the</sup> only person, in the whole place in uniform.

Farley:

This was still the '30s then.

Whitlock:

This was in '37.

Farley:

Still '37 then?

Whitlock:

'37. October I believe it was, October of '37. So I asked some questions. They had an information desk. ~~And~~ they asked, "Well, at the Navy yard they told me who to ask for. They told me to ask for a chief. I don't remember his name now, but he was the <sup>senior</sup> chief in the <sup>general</sup> service <sup>communications</sup>. He was not in our business.

Farley:

Oh.

Whitlock:

I found this out later. But at any rate, I was to report to him. So I went into the information desk and they called him and he said, <sup>he would</sup> "But you come down and get me." So here I am with this sea bag, <sup>and</sup> so I did go down and he took one look at me and says, "What are you doing here in uniform?"

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I said, "Well, I'm in the Navy " (laugh) He said, "Well, ~~He says~~ We're not permitted to wear uniforms here." He said that the Navy doesn't want it to be too obvious as to how many military people are assigned to the Washington area for political reasons. And so I chucked the sea bag off in the corner and he took me back and introduced me to a chief by the name of McGregor. Well, McGregor was the chief <sup>cryptologist</sup> ~~cryptologist~~ <sup>who</sup> ~~that~~ was teaching the class on the roof.

Farley: Okay, good.

Whitlock: ~~So~~ One of the first gentlemen I saw was one of the fellows who come into the radio school, the class. He was coming in as I graduated <sup>from</sup> ~~from~~ this radio school in San Diego, Pearly Phillips. So Pearly and I wound up going through the class at the same time. There had been eight of us that were ordered in to this class. ~~But~~ <sup>He</sup> Sam Winchester ~~was~~ <sup>he</sup> was dropped from the class. ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> was the junior member. He was dropped from the class. There was only room for eight operating positions in this little classroom. So he was dropped from the class to let a chief take the course. The chief's name was Woodward. ~~Well~~ Woodward apparently couldn't hack it. He was only there a short time and he disappeared and not too many months later, he committed suicide.

Farley: Oh boy.

Whitlock: ~~I don't know~~ I mean there was more to it. It wasn't because, I'm sure, there were other considerations than the fact that he couldn't hack the class. But at any rate, there

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were only seven of us that went through the class at the time that I was there.

Farley Did your family or your neighbors ever say anything about whether a background investigation had been conducted on you?

Whitlock. Oh yeah. Yeah.

Farley Before you were ordered to Washington?

Whitlock: Oh no. Not before I was ordered to Washington. No.

No, this come later. After I had left Washington, quite some time later, as a matter of fact, <sup>There's</sup> because <sup>there's</sup> a picture of the class I was in during the war.

Farley: Okay, excuse me. Let me switch.

TAPE 1 SIDE 2

All right sir. Oh yeah. Good looking kids. I'll be darned.

Whitlock: Out of the class of seven <sup>and</sup> there's one <sup>he's</sup> ~~missing~~ missing there, Oakins. His father had died at the time and he'd left the class early, so <sup>he's</sup> not in that picture. But out of the rest of us, there was two of us that didn't get any leave after this was over. We were sent down to Norfolk to catch the USS Cassen, which is a brand new destroyer that was going out to join the <sup>F</sup>leet in Pearl Harbor. Charlie Walters and I were tabbed with the chore of riding this destroyer out because, they said, the destroyer didn't have enough radiomen on it. Well, Walt and I rode the Ferry down to Norfolk to catch the Cassen. <sup>And then</sup> We had a little time to kill before we went aboard the Cassen, so I had a chance to get over to go aboard the Yorktown, which had just returned from her shakedown cruise to South America. I went over to look up my old pal, Alexander.

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So I found him and chatted with him for a while. And he said he was right on the verge of getting <sup>into</sup> ~~into~~ one of the squadrons, he thought, that he'd been attached to the ship's crew, but he thought he was going to make it and get into one of the squadrons.

Farley: This is a radio squadron, mobile?

Whitlock: No. No, one of the fighter squadrons as a radio officer on one of the <sup>aircraft in a</sup> ~~torpedo~~ torpedo squadron. I don't know. I don't remember what it was. But he'd be a radioman, an aviation radioman was what he was aiming at being, see? Well, I would have envied him a little bit, except I figured that my job was going to a damn sight more interesting. But I didn't, of course, didn't tell him what I was into. I told him I was heading for Pearl Harbor on this ~~charter~~ <sup>destroyer</sup> and that was it.

Farley: Do you want to talk about your training at all in Washington?

~~I think that...~~

Whitlock: Oh well, <sup>All right.</sup> ~~all right.~~

Farley: Please.

Whitlock: Sure.

Farley: How detailed was it? And did they brief you? Did you they tell you what ~~you're finally~~ <sup>your</sup> your job was finally going to be?

Whitlock: Well, the job, of course, was intercept through Japanese Naval communications. And to prepare us for this, they started teaching us the Japanese code, but we had to start copying it with a pencil. We had to learn to write Kana.

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Before we were permitted to use the typewriters. So we <sup>learned</sup> ~~learned~~ the Japanese code which involved almost as many additional characters as what is in the English alphabet. And that was a little chore in itself. And it took a few weeks to get to the point to where you could remember all the characters properly and equate them with the code groups. Of course, ~~you couldn't~~ <sup>study,</sup> there was no outside <sup>study,</sup> there was no homework on it. You couldn't practice at home or anything like this. You did all your work there.

Farley: Did they use tapes?

Whitlock: ~~They didn't~~ Yes, they used tapes and they could slow it down and as your proficiency increased they would increase it.

At the time, well this is sort of beside the point, but at the time, the place where we were undergoing training was also used for COMSEC purposes <sup>S/O</sup> ~~They~~ They had the communications security watch going on while we were undergoing training in the same room. Of course, all the COMSEC people were already cleared. But it was a monitoring ~~monitoring~~ <sup>monitoring</sup> watch. At the time it was being conducted by Jimmy ~~Pearson~~ <sup>Pearson,</sup> and I don't remember who else, ~~but~~ Red Mason, I believe. There's two or three of them there that was standing monitoring watches.

Farley: As lieutenants?

Whitlock: Huh?

Farley: As lieutenants? Or JGs?

Whitlock: Oh no. No, it was .. --

Farley: <sup>?</sup> Chiefs.

~~SECRET~~ H-UC-CC

~~SECRET~~

Whitlock: Chiefs or first class. At the time, I was radioman third class. There were three of us that were radiomen third class. There were two of us that were almost ~~that were~~ eligible to take the next exam for radioman second. One that wasn't was Red Briggs. He wasn't eligible at the time.

Farley: <sup>Is that</sup> ~~That~~ Ralph Briggs?

Whitlock: That's Ralph Briggs.

Farley: Okay. We have something to talk about on him later on.

Whitlock: Yes indeed.

Farley, <sup>All</sup> ~~Right~~.

Whitlock: ~~Shu~~ I believe that that just about summarizes the school. ~~Once we learned~~ <sup>No</sup> it doesn't either. Once we learned to copy in Kana, and then shift it over and started to learn on the typewriter, we started ~~studying~~ some in Rip-5 on procedure, Japanese procedure, operating procedure. And we were also given some training in breaking out garble tables. <sup>Call sign</sup> ~~Call sign~~ garble tables. <sup>Because</sup> ~~Cause~~ the Japanese in deriving their call sign system used the garble, the matrix, ~~you know~~.

Farley: Right

Whitlock: And we got a little training in the school as to how to reconstruct the matrix after a call change. One of the examples. ~~As~~ They give us little tests once a week. And one of the tests they give is to construct a garble table on the basis of a few call signs that they provided. Well, that was duck soup. I was the first one out of the place. This was where I began to get the idea that this is interesting stuff.

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~~SECRET~~

Farley.

Yeah.

Whitlock

~~I don't think~~ I can't recollect anything else in the way of training that's of ~~particular significance~~ <sup>particular significance</sup>.

Farley

That's fine. That's what I wanted, the details on that.

Whitlock.

Yeah. Well. I guess I can get on back to Norfolk.

Farley.

You're heading for Pearl Harbor.

Whitlock:

I did get promoted in Washington. It was kind of a ~~big~~ <sup>I've got to</sup> surprise, Oh this ~~was~~ <sup>I've got to</sup> gotta tell you. We were sitting there ~~making~~ <sup>making</sup> pecking

away at these typewriters one day when some chief over in

the ~~B~~ <sup>B</sup>ureau of ~~J~~ <sup>J</sup>ersonnel called Chief McGregor. And theywere buddies. And this chief over in ~~B~~ <sup>B</sup>ureau asked McGregor,said, "Hey, ~~Mac~~ <sup>Mac</sup> says, "You got any boys over there ready forsecond class?" ~~McGreggor's~~ <sup>McGreggor's</sup> on the phone, turned around and

he hollered "Are any of you guys eligible for second class?" <sup>Two of us</sup> raised our hand.

to us. "Raise your hand," see? And Mac said, "Yeah, I've got two

of them here." He says, "Okay. Okay. <sup>All right. Will do.</sup> ~~Alright.~~ And he hung up

and he turned around and says, <sup>All</sup> ~~Alright.~~ right, you and you come here."

The rest of you ~~Ad~~ <sup>Ad</sup> keep going." Took us over to the side andsat us down. He said, "Now look. ~~He says~~ <sup>I've got to</sup> I've got to

give you the examination...for promotion." He says, "I'll

give it to you tomorrow." He said, "Now get a paper and pencil

here. ~~We said~~ <sup>We said</sup> I'm going to tell you the things that you

ought to know something about." He said, <sup>I'll give</sup> ~~Give~~ you some idea on

what sort of exam you're going get." <sup>So</sup> ~~So~~ he sat down and he

give six ~~different~~ <sup>different</sup> items. ~~you know~~ <sup>you know</sup> So the two of us, as

soon as we broke up that afternoon, boy, we grabbed all the

manuals we could get our hands on and went home and we

just pounded the hell out of them all day long. We get down

~~SECRET~~ H VCCO

there and <sup>staggered</sup> ~~stagger~~ in the morning and barely get our eyes open and he give us the exam. It's got six questions <sup>on</sup> in it. (laughs) And so he called ~~them~~ after the exam. <sup>He</sup> He marked them, called the results over to the chief <sup>at</sup> the <sup>B</sup> Bureau and turned around and says, "Okay. You guys are both second class."

Farley: Boy. The simple way of doing it then.

Whitlock: Yeah. Well, we left Norfolk and when we finally boarded the Cassen, we discovered that they had seven radiomen on that destroyer, not counting Walters and I. They needed a radioman <sup>that</sup> like they needed a hole in the head. So all <sup>that</sup> Walt and I did was copy press. We put out the newspaper for the ship on route from Norfolk to Pearl Harbor. Stopped in Panama for a few days. First stopped in Cuba for a few days. Of course, Panama. We left Panama, I guess, we were probably four or five days out of Hawaii and I was copying the news broadcast and there's an item on <sup>a</sup> the fatal <sup>mid-air collision in Norfolk</sup> ~~two planes off~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~Yorktown~~. No survivors. One of them listed was <sup>Harold</sup> ~~Harold~~ <sup>Harold</sup> Alexander.

Farley: I'll be darned.

Whitlock: He got into the squadron, but he wasn't in there very long

Farley: Huh. That's a shame.

Whitlock: Yeah. Well, we arrived at Pearl Harbor and <sup>KEG</sup> ~~the~~ Goodwin was on hand to meet us. And we met him at this administration building that was in this picture, the Rochefort article. Well, <sup>KEG</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>out to</sup> ~~drove~~ us over the pally, <sup>at</sup> ~~the~~ station of ~~the~~ <sup>Heeia</sup> Heeia. And <sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>due</sup> course, we started standing watching at ~~Heeia~~. Having forgotten most of what we'd learned on

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the roof by this time. But it came back after a fashion.

But at <sup>Heeia</sup> ~~Hahaione~~ we were using RABs <sup>we</sup> had RAA, had at least one RAA, maybe two. No, one RAA, <sup>I think</sup> the rest of them were RABs, about four or five RABs that we were using for intercept purposes. We had an old-RX receiver there that was a pretty good receiver. But we only used it if we had to.

Farley: What do you remember about the organization when you moved in? Was it pretty well established?

Whitlock: In Washington?

Farley: In Pearl Harbor.

Whitlock: In Pearl Harbor. Oh yeah. ~~We had~~ The officer in charge was down in the Navy yard. Now, ~~none of them~~ none of the operators really got familiar with the work or the organization of the unit in Pearl Harbor. We would go down and take <sup>traffic in</sup> ~~traffic in~~ and letters and correspondence and this sort of stuff. And we knew the people, some of the people <sup>that</sup> ~~that~~ worked <sup>down</sup> ~~down~~ there. But we weren't really in on what they were doing. At that time, Lieutenant Dyer was the only officer we had there. And ~~he made his annual~~ <sup>was</sup> when he made his annual tours <sup>Heeia</sup> about the only time we saw him at ~~Hahaione~~. <sup>The</sup> ~~We would see him~~ the only time we would see him was when <sup>he</sup> ~~we~~ went down there. But once a year he would come out and make an official inspection of the station. <sup>you know.</sup>

Farley: Oh yeah. Why were you set up at <sup>Heeia?</sup> ~~Hahaione~~ Was that a space that was available to the Navy, <sup>or</sup> ~~or~~ was the intercept quality better there, <sup>or</sup> ~~or~~ what?

Whitlock: I'm not sure <sup>happened</sup> ~~what~~ how they ever ~~happened~~ to arrive there. I

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think that there were facilities at this piece of property, these buildings, I think, became available or were available to the Navy. It wasn't built for our purposes. It had four sets of quarters. <sup>There's</sup> ~~well there's~~ double quarters. There were four married quarters and a barracks on the station, plus the operation building, <sup>auxiliary</sup> ~~auxiliary~~ power ~~room and~~ and a couple other buildings, paint locker and this sort of thing. But what I don't believe that they moved there as a result of <sup>hearing</sup> ~~hearing~~ tests or anything like that. I think that this facility become available and it just represented a better set-up than what they at <sup>Wailupe</sup> ~~Wailupe~~. ~~Wailupe~~ I don't know what the installation was there. I've heard Sid Burnett and other people talk about it. But it was sort of primitive. And this move, I think, to <sup>Heeia</sup> ~~Heeia~~ presented a much better, much more secure operation. We had Marine sentries assigned for security at <sup>Heeia</sup> ~~Heeia~~. And I don't believe that they had sentries <sup>at Wailupe</sup> ~~at Wailupe~~ at that time.

Farley: Did you have badges or was it personal recognition?

Whitlock: No, just personal recognition. There wasn't that many of us.

We had a two-man, four-section watch when I first got there and we'd go to three-section if there was a call change.

Farley: Did you have to do your own recovery on the call signs?

Whitlock: Oh yes.

Farley: Good. I didn't realize that. Okay.

Whitlock: Yeah. Yeah and while a lot of this was done, at least initially, orally, that is by being able to identify the circuits that you're on and the operators on the circuits. A lot was made

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a little later about doing this with machinery. Well, that was ridiculous because you could do it better with ear than you could with any of <sup>the</sup> your machines ~~they were~~ that they <sup>could</sup> ever come <sup>up</sup> with. The <sup>Tena</sup> ~~Tena~~. Have you ever heard of the ~~Tena~~ Tena? Well, that was a big laugh to any of us who were really in the processing business way. Because the only persons that that seemed to impress were the people that were running the damn thing. We never used the output of them. We'd had it for weeks by the time they ~~get~~ <sup>they would get</sup> around to give us one of them. ~~No~~ No. The ~~admission recovery~~ <sup>cripples</sup> call sign recovery was not something that the ~~cripples~~ dirtied their hands with. We radiomen were the guys who had to handle this. And I'm not too sure that this something has ever been given proper treatment in the records.

Farley: That's why I asked because I never heard of it.

Whitlock: You never heard of it?

Farley: No sir, not that.

Whitlock: ~~All~~ <sup>All</sup> right, I've got a lot more to tell you that you've never heard of.

Farley: Please.

Whitlock: ~~We didn't~~ <sup>an</sup> We performed ~~an~~ <sup>an</sup> elementary sort of analysis ~~at Heeia~~ <sup>at Heeia</sup>. We didn't do much with these high speed automatic stations that we were taping. That traffic we never paid any attention to. This was the Japanese that we were on the lookout for any Japanese diplomatic traffic that showed up on there, or any state, whether it was Japanese or any other country. We'd stack that off and send it down. I don't

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think they did anything with it at Pearl Harbor. I think it was just sent back to Washington. But at any rate, on the Japanese Navy intercept, we did sort of an elementary analysis of it. But this was aimed more at recovering frequencies and identifying circuits, subscribers to the circuits, this type of thing. It was not really aimed at producing information or intelligence. It was aimed at the technical. <sup>It</sup> ~~was~~ was the technical analysis

Farley: To help your efforts primarily, right?

Whitlock: Right, right. And we had one day worker that'd come in and wrap the traffic and this sort of thing and did a little of this sort of analysis. We also as part of it, beside standing the watches, there was one or two days a week that we would have to come in and do other things as well. ~~So~~ I mean, once we got off the watch we didn't have necessarily free time. We'd come in and clean out clogged drains and do a little traffic sorting and this sort of thing.

Farley: Did you play as a sailor, too? Did you go through <sup>in</sup> military drills?

Whitlock: No way.

Farley: Okay.

Whitlock: This is what we did, made it so very interesting. The only time we wore a uniform was when we were on watch. And if we had to get down to the Navy yard. We made a <sup>Courier</sup> ~~courier~~ run to the Navy yard. We were our own <sup>Couriers</sup> ~~couriers~~ to take the traffic down.

Farley: You delivered ~~the~~ <sup>to</sup> Hypo?

Whitlock: Yes. We delivered <sup>into</sup> Hypo.

Farley: Morning, afternoon or...?

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~~SECRET~~

Whitlock: Once a day.

Farley: Once a day.

Whitlock: Go down in the morning. We also made the commissary<sup>run</sup> for all the married people in the station. ~~there~~  
I don't recollect anything else that transpired at <sup>s</sup>Heeia ~~Heeia~~ that was particularly significant.

Farley: Let me ask a question about the Japanese changing frequencies. How often did that happen?  
And did that create a problem?

Whitlock: Not really. Actually they didn't change it too often.  
~~They never seemed to.~~ They never wised up to the idea of changing the call signs and the frequencies at the same time. If they'd done that, they'd have given us a little <sup>problem</sup>  
~~problem~~ But for some reason or other it never occurred to them to pull that sort of ~~shenanigan~~ <sup>shenanigan</sup> on us.

Farley: Okay.

Whitlock: I'll get ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> more into the analysis part of this as I go on because I spent most of my career as an analyst, not as an intercept operator.

Farley: Early in the days when you were in ~~Hawaii~~ <sup>Heeia</sup> did the people from ~~Hawaii~~ <sup>Hypo</sup> come down anytime and say, "you <sup>you</sup> did a great job, guys."

Whitlock: Never.

Farley: This is what we developed from it. Keep it up.

Whitlock: Never. Never.

Farley: And morale was <sup>na</sup> high?

Whitlock: Excellent.

Farley: Good.

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Whitlock: We all enjoyed what we were doing. And we didn't know whether they were reading or not and in this connection, we were always watching for anything that would be helpful in the way of decryption, of something that may have happened in connection with a particular message. And as the years went by, this paid big dividends. I'll get to that a little bit later.

Farley:

All right sir.

Whitlock:

But no. We all were aware of what the other <sup>people - -</sup> what the crypto effort was up to. We knew what they were trying to do. We knew that we didn't really have any business knowing what their success was. The need to know at that time was really stringently enforced. So we didn't know.

But we knew we were doing a doggone good job and we knew that there was some darn good people doing it. That become apparent to me right quick. When I reported aboard, a gentleman by the name of Troop was on watch the afternoon <sup>that</sup> I reported aboard. And when I come in the door he took one look at me, he says, "Yep, that's him." He says, "How's Gene?" Gene's my brother.

Farley:

My gosh, they'd been waiting for you.

Whitlock:

My brother <sup>who</sup> was seven years older than I, had gone to radio school in San Diego with this gentleman on watch. And I discovered later, that at that same time there were five of the people down there at the same time my brother was, about his age, that had left there and got into this organization. Now, that's very unusual.

~~SECRET HULLCO~~

Farley: It is.

Whitlock: It is very unusual. Well, Troop, this gentleman that I say that greeted me when I come in the door, he is without a doubt one of the best intercept operators the Navy ever had. This guy could hear and copy signals that the average man didn't even know was there. He was remarkable when it come to that. He was without a doubt <sup>a good one</sup> and he would follow it. He knew what those operators <sup>what</sup> were ~~gonna~~ <sup>going to</sup> do five minutes before. ~~the~~ Japanese operators were ~~gonna~~ <sup>going to</sup> do five minutes before they themselves knew. He ~~wasn't~~ <sup>was</sup> really a good one.

Farley: <sup>What is the</sup> The date period ~~now~~ <sup>now</sup> we're up to, now?

Whitlock: Can you stop this for just a minute?

Farley: Sure thing.

(Tape starts up again)

Farley: Well, we were probably in 1939, '40? How long did you stay with ~~Hain~~ <sup>Heeia</sup> ~~Hain~~ <sup>Heeia</sup>.

Whitlock: Well, <sup>All</sup> ~~right~~ <sup>Heeia</sup> in Heeia from 1938 to March of 1940.

~~Heeia~~ <sup>We</sup> were married in February of 1940 and I left ~~Heeia~~ <sup>Hawaii</sup> in March. At the time I was a radioman second class, and in the Navy at that time, no petty officer below Petty Officer First Class had travel privileges for his dependent. He had no quarters privileges. He had nothing. He wasn't supposed to be married until he was a Petty Officer First Class. So when I got married, ~~had~~ <sup>had</sup> no transportation for my wife was not authorized. So I left her in Hawaii and I left with the understanding that I was headed for the Philippines. But they had a peculiar setup at that time. That the Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet,

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Shanghai,  
 who was aboard the cruiser in Shanghai, made all the assignments  
 of enlisted personnel coming to the Asiatic station.  
 As that as a result, when you left this country to go to Asia,  
 you didn't know where you were going and didn't find out  
 until you crossed the 180th Meridian. And when you  
 crossed the 180th Meridian, the ship you were on would  
 report the transients that he had aboard and their rates  
 to the Commander in Chief Flag Ship, and then the assignments  
 of these people were made to wherever he needed them  
 in the fleet. And this was in the Philippines, the whole  
 Far East, Guam, or wherever you might be sent. This is the way it  
 was run at that time. CINC Asiatic Fleet controlled everything  
 that went on in the Asiatic area.

Farley: That was regardless of your specialty?

Whitlock: Regardless of specialty. And the only way that this  
 could be handled was that we had there were people  
 on the staff of the fleet, CINC Asiatic Fleet, who were  
 cleared and they would endeavor to get the word to these  
 people the names of the people that were leaving, that were  
 in the organization that were aboard these transports. When  
 we were on board the transports we served as radio  
 operators. We worked right along with the general service  
 people. Nobody on there knew really that we were anything special  
 about us at all. And our names went into this report and  
 that crossed when we crossed the 180th and the cleared  
 people on the staff at CINC AF would select off the people that  
 were in our organization and then issue orders to get them to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

wherever they wanted <sup>them</sup> to go. It was <sup>in</sup>

Farley:

So the people, and I'm thinking about the Navy Department, <sup>OP-20-G</sup> and Hypo and all the others, lost control of these individuals.

Whitlock:

Well, not really, because <sup>OP-20-G</sup> ~~Op-20G~~ was in communication with <sup>CINC</sup> ~~CINC~~ Asiatic Fleet. Through our channels and they had <sup>to</sup> a slate of the tours. I know that you have records.

Farley:

Yes.

Whitlock:

And you can see from those that they kept pretty close tab of who was on the Asiatic station in our organization, when we arrived there, when we were due to leave and this sort of thing. And there was quite a lot of exchange on this. This was all encrypted now. This was back channel <sup>nav</sup> messages and so forth. But that's the way it was handled at that time, <sup>So</sup> ~~sa~~ I knew on the basis of this slate that I was supposed to be going to the Philippines. Well, when we crossed the 180th Meridian, lo and behold, I got orders to Guam. Well, I couldn't say, "This isn't right." There's nobody you can tell it to. The orders come into the ship and the ship writes <sup>your</sup> ~~you~~ orders. <sup>you</sup> ~~you~~ know <sup>and you</sup> ~~and you~~ can't say, "I know better than that." You just have to go along with it. Hell, if they sent you to Timbuktu, you'd have to go. So I got off in Guam. And it kind of surprised the people there. They weren't expecting me <sup>because</sup> ~~cause~~ that wasn't the way it was slated. I was there for a couple of months and again, at Guam, the operation was pretty much like it was at <sup>Hawaii</sup> ~~Hawaii~~. <sup>Radio</sup> ~~Radio~~ We were at <sup>Montenial</sup> ~~radio~~ Laboogan which was up on the hill, up on one of the mountains in <sup>Montenial</sup> ~~Montenial~~.

~~SECRET~~ HUCU

~~SECRET~~

We were up near the Marine prison. But it was a little concrete shack. We only used one end of it. It had been a transmitter site and it had the big ~~old~~ <sup>old</sup> antenna towers just outside the shack and they'd been sittin' <sup>sitting</sup> there for years and getting rusted out and every time we'd get an earthquake you'd hear ~~ribs~~ <sup>ribs</sup> coming down from it. You expected it to fall down there any time. But at any rate, it was a small operation. It was a one-man night watch, one man. <sup>One</sup> ~~man~~ intercept operator who was always on at night. But in Guam, the day watch was busy and reception was excellent. ~~That was probably~~ <sup>We</sup> ~~we~~ probably had the best reception in Guam of any site we had. Operating against the Japanese Navy at any time. It was excellent.

Farley: It was still targeting the Navy only.

Whitlock: Yeah.

Farley: Okay. Good. Did you have any new individuals, <sup>Did</sup> ~~did~~ you meet new people there, people who had been there before? Or were you the initial <sup>Arrival</sup> ~~arrival~~?

Whitlock: In Guam? Oh yeah. There were people there that I had met before. See, Hawaii was sort of a cross road. I'd been in Honolulu for two years. So, whenever a transport come in, we would know who was on it of our people and we would take them out to the station and wine them and dine them. So we saw people coming and going all the time. We knew where they were going, <sup>yes</sup> ~~so~~ <sup>yes</sup> I'd seen all the people before that, <sup>or</sup> ~~for~~ most all the people that were there.

Farley: Was Joslin there?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Whitlock: Uh, let me think.

Farley: Harold Joslin.

Whitlock: No. Joslin came on the transport that I left on.

Farley: Okay.

Whitlock: And the way that that came about is that ~~my wife~~ <sup>G. S.</sup> or we knew a couple of radiomen, <sup>at North Island,</sup> general service, who were in one of the flying boat squadrons, <sup>North Island,</sup> a couple radiomen, ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> I hadn't taken any civilian clothes with me when I went to Guam. All I had was uniforms. Well, they just didn't wear uniforms in Guam on liberty. Again, we wore them on watch. So I didn't have much in the way of civilian clothes and I'd mentioned this to my wife and it turns out that ~~this~~ <sup>this</sup> ~~squadron~~ <sup>squadron</sup> that ~~these~~ <sup>these</sup> two radiomen were ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> were going to the Philippines. So they called Gerty and asked her if there was anything that she'd like to send out to me, or anything that she'd like to tell me.

And she decided to send out some clothing along with them.

Sure. So I got a phone call from PD Navy yard, <sup>((Petey??))</sup> that the flying boats would come in and sit down PD <sup>((Petey??))</sup> and they got ashore and

give me a call. Well, I don't know, it was probably seven <sup>Liboogan</sup> or eight miles from <sup>where I was over to ((Petey??))</sup> Liboogan over to PD Navy yard and

I didn't have any transportation. So I called a taxi. Well, the local taxi cab company was run by a <sup>Chamoru (?)</sup> Shamory by the name of Lintiako, I think it was. Well any rate, the owner of the cab company showed up to drive me out to PD <sup>((Petey??))</sup> Well, as aside, I'd only been in Guam for two or three days, but in Guam everybody knows everybody else's business, believe

~~SECRET HULLO~~

~~SECRET~~

me. Or did at that time. And we were riding along, not much conversation. About two thirds the way to PD this driver says, "Too bad you're leaving." I says, "What do you mean I'm leaving?" I said, "I just got here." He says, "You're leaving." Nah. What's he know about it? Well, I went out to PD, <sup>((Pete's))</sup> talked to these gentlemen, picked up my clothes and returned. Then I got to thinking there was a set of quarters on the station that hadn't been used. It was for first class. There was a set of quarters there that hadn't been used for six months. It was sitting there empty. And so I went to the chief in charge, who was Jimmy <sup>Pearson</sup> ~~Piereson~~, who I'd met, who had the COMSEC duty ~~AWW~~ on the roof in Washington. And I said, "Hey Jimmy," I said, "If I could get my wife out here is there any chance that I could use that set of quarters?" I said, "I'll bring her out at my own expense, do you suppose there would be any objection to using the quarters?" He said, "I don't know." He says, "Let's go down and talk to the governor." Well the governor was a Navy captain. So we went down and talked to the governor and the governor says, "Well." He says, "I'll even do better than that." Says, "Sure, you can have them. I'll even do better than that." He says, "We'll see if we can get your wife on a ship." So we sat down and sent a message <sup>the Commandant</sup> to ~~commandant~~ of the 14th Naval District. And it was a long sob story that he knew that I was a radioman second class, I was not entitled to transportation, but in this case in the interest of morale and <sup>so forth</sup> ~~and~~ recommend consideration be given to authorize transportation for dependent wife. And dang if

~~SECRET~~ H V C C O

~~SECRET~~

commandant didn't approve it. And then he even went farther than that. It was the ~~Chaumont~~ <sup>Chaumont</sup> ~~Shamont~~ <sup>Chaumont</sup>. When the ~~Shamont~~ <sup>Chaumont</sup> came in

the ~~Chaumont~~ <sup>Chaumont</sup> the ~~Shamont~~ <sup>Chaumont</sup> was chock of block. So the commandant took some Filipina woman off the ship and put my wife on it.

Farley: Good. Very good.

Whitlock: Oh yeah. Well, at any rate, see, we'd only been married about six weeks at the time I left. And before that time we didn't associate with the ~~General~~ <sup>G</sup> ~~Service~~ <sup>S</sup> Navy. Gerty didn't have any idea what military life or Navy was all about. So she gets down and gets tossed onto this transport and someone asked her what her husband was and she told him he was a radioman second class. And the fit hit the shan, boy. That whole damn ship was up in arms. But when the ~~Chaumont~~ <sup>Chaumont</sup> ~~Shamont~~ <sup>Chaumont</sup> crossed the 180th Meridian, all of a sudden we discovered that there is a radioman first class aboard the ~~Shamont~~ <sup>Chaumont</sup> ~~Chaumont that's coming to Guam. A gentleman by the name of Markle Tobias Smith. His wife and child, wife and son.~~

Farley: Oh boy.

Whitlock: So Jimmy and I crank up and we go down and talk to the governor again. "What are we going to do about this?"

"Whitlock's wife's aboard." And he said, "Well."

He said, "What <sup>What</sup> we'll do, I'll simply ask the ~~Admiral~~ <sup>A</sup> at Shanghai ~~Shanghai~~ to leave Whitlock here and let Smith go on to the

Philippines." So we sat down and batted the message out to CINC

of Asiatic Fleet making this change. The answer ~~was~~ <sup>did not</sup> come

back, negative! "Negative!" But the ~~bullet~~ <sup>bullet</sup> there is for a radioman first

class, not a radioman second class. Have Whitlock report to the Philippines.

~~SECRET~~ H-UC-60

~~SECRET~~

Farley: Oh they did it to you then.

Whitlock: Yeah. ~~So instead of~~ <sup>My</sup> ~~...my wife...of course, my wife didn't~~  
 know it. She thought she was coming to Guam. And then  
 immediately we had to get authorization for her to stay  
 aboard ship ~~for~~ to go to the Philippines. So she come into  
 Guam thinking she's getting off the ship there and instead  
 I got on. And that's where I met Joslin. <sup>Because he'd</sup> ~~'Cause he~~ come in on  
 that ship. He and Rex <sup>Parr, Faulkner,</sup> ~~Parr, Stu Fullerton,~~ I think. ~~But~~  
~~...they arrived.~~

Farley: <sup>Did</sup> ~~Who is this~~ Smith ~~did he~~ take over then?

Whitlock: No, Markle Tobias was the radioman first class. Jimmy <sup>Pearson</sup> ~~Pierceman~~  
 was the officer in charge. Or the chief in charge.

I think that just about wraps up my experience in Guam.  
 Professionally, there wasn't much beyond what we did in  
 Hawaii, except the better intercept site. We could intercept  
 low frequency intercept traffic that you couldn't hear  
 in Hawaii at all.

Farley: You remember the month and date you left Guam.

Whitlock: Uh, I left in July of 1940. I arrived there in March of  
 '40 and left in July of '40.

Farley: You didn't have a long tour there.

Whitlock: No.

Farley: Not really huh?

Whitlock: No. So we went to the Philippines and when we arrived  
 in <sup>Manila</sup> ~~Manila~~ they dropped the cargo netting down one side of  
 the ship and brought some barges along side. And the draft  
 with their sea bags and hammocks <sup>clambered</sup> ~~clattered~~ down this  
 cargo netting to get into the barges. In the meantime,

~~SECRET~~ HVCCO

they deposited my wife on the pier and that's where the Navy's responsibility ended. They took me in a barge across to ~~Cavite~~ <sup>Manila</sup> Cavite and she's standing on the pier in ~~Manila~~ <sup>Manila</sup> and she'd been away from home before.

Farley:

Oh my <sup>gosh</sup> ~~god~~, what a ~~terrible~~ <sup>What</sup> a frightening experience.

Whitlock:

Fortunately, we ~~knew~~ <sup>we</sup> I knew a radioman first class who was another one of the fellows in the security job on the roof, Red Mason. ~~And~~ <sup>We</sup> we got in touch with Red Mason, sent a message to him from the ship. And Red Mason and his wife met my wife and took her around to ~~Cavite~~ <sup>Cavite</sup>. But I got stalled in the Navy yard and I didn't know when I was going to get out of there because until you were assigned, you just sit there in the receiving barracks and waited. I finally got ~~you~~ <sup>you</sup> out.

Farley:

Let me switch tapes, please, sir.

Whitlock:

Okay.

## TAPE 2 SIDE 1

Whitlock:

That's kind of amazing.

Farley:

~~All~~ <sup>All</sup> right sir, let's try that one, sir. I think that looks good.

Whitlock:

Okay. Well. In the Philippines, as I say, I was in a very unusual situation because as a petty officer second class, I was not entitled to commissary ~~privileges~~ <sup>privileges</sup> and to live on the civilian economy out there was something less than ~~desirable~~ <sup>desirable</sup>. There was no refrigeration. Meats, ~~vegetables~~ <sup>vegetables</sup>, all this sort of stuff, just wasn't safe for human consumption. So I managed to get special dispensation and was permitted to shop in the commissary, which was a break. But we had to find our own abode. We wound up

~~SECRET~~ ~~HVCCO~~

in Caradad. In a two story building, which is kind of unusual for the Philippines, in that area particularly. Most of them were just little Nipa huts. We were on the second floor. The place was screened, but the mode of transportation for the local population was a Colasis and there were hundreds and hundreds of them, little horse-drawn, two-wheeled buggies. There was very few vehicular traffic of any kind. The bus come into Caradad, I guess, a couple times a day and it'd come in doing about 90 miles an hour, kids, pigs and chickens scattering in all directions. But this was a good-sized little town, Caradad. It was outside the Cavite Navy yard. As I say, we were living on the second floor and it was entirely screened, but the dust, when it wasn't raining, the dust was a terrible problem because of all the horse manure that was deposited in the streets and it just got chopped to the smallest particles and it'd drift right through the screens and we managed, as poor as we were, to get a maid. My wife was pregnant. It turned out she was pregnant.

Farley:

Oh boy.

Whitlock:

So we got a maid. And the maid had to sweep the floors about every hour or two, and every time she'd sweep up a dustpan full that unadulterated horse manure would come right through the screen. Hell of a place to live. But it turns out that we were situated in the Navy yard, our operations situated in the Navy yard, in the same building with the general service communicators. And, as I say, I got there in July and I stood

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~~SECRET~~

a few watches. Quite a few, actually, for a couple of months or so in that building. But I really don't remember too much about it except it was ~~it was~~ a terrible place. It was a little cramped room and a lot of equipment, a lot of receivers in it. And the temperature, of course, in the Philippines was unbearable to begin with. It was not air conditioned. The people that were in there, <sup>the number of people that were</sup> in there and the receivers <sup>so that</sup> it was a miserable place to operate. Reception was not bad. All the welding machines and stuff like that in the Yard. It was noisy. I was really surprised that we were able to hear anything, but again, we had some darned good operators. And I'd like to mention a couple.

Farley: Please.

Whitlock: <sup>HOWARD CAIN</sup> Harold King, <sup>CAIN</sup> Shifty King, I believe he's dead now, who was darned good. And we had another by the name of <sup>NO</sup> Walvoord, <sup>TACK</sup> Jack Walvoord. He lives in Springfield, Virginia, now.

Farley: Oh.

Whitlock: But he and Shifty <sup>CAIN</sup> King were darned near as good as this guy, Troop, that I mentioned. They were good operators.

Farley: How do spell that Wal...V-A-L.

Whitlock: It's W-A-L-V-O-R-D. And I only know him as "Tac". That was the sign that he put on <sup>his intercept</sup> ~~no, it's L.L.~~ No use taking this down.

Farley: <sup>All</sup> Alright.

Whitlock: See, each one of us had a signature, a two-character group that identified the traffic that we copied. His sign was "TK" and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

that's where he got <sup>the</sup> picked up the <sup>Tack</sup> Tak. I had started off using DW and I'd been, <sup>this is</sup> retrogressing a bit, I'd been in Hawaii when I first got to <sup>Heleia Heeia,</sup> <sup>OP-20-GX</sup> I guess perhaps, two or three months and we got a letter from <sup>we get's</sup> ~~OP-20GX~~ saying that someone at <sup>S</sup> station H is using Chief Wigle's sign. DW. Here <sup>ACCORDING TO SRH355 "WIGLE" IS CORRECT.</sup> is the list of signs that were assigned at school: I run down the list and here's my sign, EW, not DW. EW. So my sign ever after that was EW.

Farley: Okay, good.

Whitlock: Well. At any rate, I begun to get more and more interested at this point in time on the analysis side of the enterprise. And I'd come back after watch sometimes to look <sup>over, look</sup> through the traffic and work on it. I was particularly interested at that time in a series of weather messages that was being originated by Japanese survey ship, the <sup>Katsurik</sup> ~~Katsurik~~. And in each of these weather messages they included their position, the position of the report. And she was conducting survey operations <sup>down</sup> ~~found~~ around the <sup>del</sup> ~~Paracel~~ <sup>Paracel</sup> Islands which is southeast of <sup>Hainan</sup> ~~Hainan~~. And I'd sit down and played with this. And I solved it with a transposition. You <sup>It</sup> ~~just~~ was a simple transposition of these positions in the weather message. I started tracking, plotting these positions where <sup>she</sup> ~~he~~ was conducting the survey, the areas <sup>she</sup> ~~he~~ was surveying. And I had this pretty well laid out. I had a track on <sup>her</sup> ~~him~~ for several <sup>weeks,</sup> ~~weeks, So one day I bundled it all up and took it over to the office which was over at the Marine prison and this is where our officer in charge held forth at that time. It was Lt <sup>for</sup> ~~Robert~~ <sup>Robert</sup> Roeder.~~

~~SECRET~~ HVCPA

~~SECRET~~

Roeder

So I took this work of mine over to ~~see~~ Lt Groder and he looked at it and found it very interesting and thanked me and that was all there was to that. I was a little disappointed you know. But I kept on following this ship and the next thing I know that ship went down and started surveying an area north of ~~A. J. on Molu~~ what's the island? Celebes, Celebes?

Farley: Cebu?

Whitlock: No, no.

Farley: Celebes alright. Celebes yeah.

Whitlock: No, no, it wasn't Celebes. What's the island. ~~uh~~ my word.

Farley: In the Philippines?

Whitlock: No, no. It's not in the Philippines. ~~uh~~ want say.. - -

Farley: In the Marshalls? ~~uh~~

Whitlock: No, it's across from Singapore.

Farley: ~~ohhh~~ ~~uh~~ ((?? Sumatra ??))

Whitlock: It's not one of the Philippines islands.

Farley: A Dutch.....?

Whitlock: Well, that's not important. I've just got a block at the moment. But at any rate, this area was roughly between Singapore and the passage...

Farley: Madagascar area, was it?

Whitlock: No no. That's farther away. That's the wrong direction.

Farley: That's farther away. My geography's gone too.

Whitlock: ~~uh~~ Well, at any rate, this area, ~~uh~~ if anyone had left Singapore and were headed for the ~~straits~~ south of ~~the~~ ~~straits~~ south of Luzon for access into the Pacific, they'd had to go through this area where the ship was surveying. It didn't occur to me at the time, this came later But I went and got a chart

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of the area and looked at it and this guy was operating in an area that <sup>had</sup> dotted lines all around it. "Not safe for navigation. Dangerous waters." This guy was in there surveying this area. And I may be ahead of myself, but when Halsey's big moment came out there, that is where the Japanese Navy came from, from Singapore right through that area. ~~that~~ <sup>they</sup> had the charts out... They had charted it out. (?) They had checked it out.

Farley:

Little did we know.

Whitlock:

We ~~didn't know~~ <sup>had</sup> no idea at the time. But this is where

I started to get interested in the analytical side of it

and, as I say, we got there in July and in September

~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> move was scheduled move was to take place to

Corregidor. Well. My wife was pregnant and I had told them that when I first reported aboard. Said that I wanted

to

leave whenever it was time for her to deliver. I expected

a little leave to take care of her and they assured me that

this would be given to me. Well, they moved her to ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>Corregidor</sup>and to accomodate my request, they left me in ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>Canacao, Sangley</sup>DF operation at ~~Canacao, Sangley~~ <sup>Canacao, Sangley</sup> Point. Not to run it,but as one of the operators. And they sent ~~old~~ <sup>poor</sup> Red Mason,who had befriended us when we got there, sent him out to ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>Corregidor</sup>.

Corregidor.

And he was mad as he could be at me until he found out that I

~~had~~ <sup>to do with it</sup> nothing really. ~~it was~~ <sup>It was</sup> not my decision. I had nothing

to do with it. Because he thought out of all the years in

the Navy, he was finally getting a break. Everybody else

had gone to ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>Corregidor</sup> and at that time you couldn't takedependents to ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>Corregidor</sup> and here he was sitting fat and~~SECRET~~ H VCCO

~~SECRET~~

Canacao  
 happy in Canacao, the DF site. He was going to be able  
 to live home with his wife, you know. He was getting a  
 break and doggone if they didn't jerk the rug out from under him,  
 transferred him to ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>at Corregidor</sup> in my place and give me the job  
 at ~~Canacao~~ <sup>Canacao</sup>.

Farley:

Why did the Navy move to ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>Corregidor</sup>?

Whitlock:

Why did they move?

Farley:

Yes sir.

Whitlock:

Well, there is a document out ~~and I don't know~~ that  
 provides the background much better than I can.

I'm sure you've seen it. I'm sure you've seen this.

Farley:

This is it. I've heard of it, yes.

Whitlock:

It sort of gives the background in there much better than I  
 can give it. That's SRH-180,  
~~that's SRA-180~~ so I know it's available.

Farley:

So this was ~~declassified~~ <sup>All</sup> by Russ Fisher. Okay. ~~Right~~ <sup>Right</sup> sir, then I'll  
 refer to that.

Whitlock:

Yeah, I think that would be better.

Farley:

I just wanted it in your words on the tape ~~right~~ if you can  
 summarize it, fine.

Whitlock:

I think that the ultimate move out there culminated  
 from a long search for a permanent site.

Farley:

Was it ~~better call it~~ <sup>because they were looking for a better intercept site?</sup>

Whitlock:

Not really. There were considerations other than that, I think, that  
 went into it. Logistics was a terrible problem. How  
 do you support a unit? They tried for a while to support  
 it over in ~~Bataan~~ <sup>Bataan</sup> They tried it up at Subic Bay. And it was  
 nothing but headaches. They couldn't get the traffic in and

~~SECRET~~ H-1000

~~SECRET~~

It was

get it out. They were just a pain in the neck.. We was also having trouble with the Army who controlled the whole area. We were having trouble getting the Army to agree to let us use anything that was in the Army sector of control.

That was another problem. All of this is covered pretty much RH 180. <sup>SRH 180.</sup> So the move, the ultimate decision to build a tunnel on <sup>the</sup> ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~and move there~~ depended upon the things more basic really than quality of intercept.

Farley: All right, fine.

Whitlock: I stayed on in <sup>Cayite</sup> ~~the ship~~ until my wife was evacuated in November. And I returned home from putting her on the ship, and it was ~~one of the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~it was~~ the Monterey. Monterey?

Farley: Yeah, that was sailing in the Pacific then.

Whitlock: I believe it was the Monterey.

Farley: Was she evacuated because she was <sup>1</sup> because she had just given ~~birth~~ <sup>birth</sup>?

Whitlock: No. No. No. <sup>What</sup> ~~What~~ had happened was that the <sup>A</sup> ~~Admiral~~ out there, Admiral ~~Hart~~ <sup>Hart</sup>. Admiral Hart had ordered the evacuation of all Navy dependents from the Asiatic station. I think it was in October of 1940. And we discovered rather accidentally that my wife was on the sailing list, <sup>It</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>she</sup> ~~was~~ on a Sunday, and we found out <sup>she</sup> ~~was~~ was scheduled to leave on a Wednesday. And that we were <sup>not</sup> ~~officially~~ notified. The ~~Navy~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~commandant~~ of the 16th Naval District had turned the job of evacuating dependents or notifying dependents over to the chaplain, of all things. And he couldn't find where we were living so we never got the word. And just one of the people we were talking to said that she saw the list and that my wife was

~~SECRET~~ Hucco

~~SECRET~~

on the list to be evacuated Wednesday and this was on a

Sunday afternoon, <sup>Since</sup> and since the ship was going to  
Australia, ~~Figi, Samoa~~ <sup>Figi, Samoa</sup> and various and  
and some of these

<sup>here</sup>  
Sundry other places, she had to have a passport. Well hell we're

sitting in <sup>Cavite</sup> ~~Cavite~~ and we had to go to the <sup>Embassy</sup> ~~Embassy~~ or the

<sup>Was</sup> ~~was~~ it the Embassy. Yeah it was the Embassy in <sup>Manila</sup> ~~Manila~~ in

order to get her passport, <sup>We</sup> ~~we~~ just barely made it by the

skin of our teeth and I got her aboard ship and under way.

And I got back to this little <sup>house</sup> ~~that~~ we were <sup>living</sup> ~~living~~ in dead

tired and here's a little note fluttering on the screen door.

"Whitlock, report to Corrigedor tomorrow morning." <sup>And there</sup> ~~And there~~

had. <sup>She</sup> ~~she~~ was limited in what she could take

aboard the ship. I had trunks of her stuff. I had all

of our stuff sitting there. What the hell am I going to do

with it? <sup>So</sup> ~~So~~ I got the maid and I said, "I don't know when

I'll be back, but you sit here in this house and don't

you let a soul in here unless it's someone that I know."

Well, the next door <sup>neighbor</sup> ~~neighbor~~ later told me that she figured that that

maid must have figured I knew every <sup>place</sup> ~~place~~ a driver in <sup>Cavite</sup> ~~Cavite~~

<sup>would be</sup> ~~would be~~ because she was running a going business over there.

Farley: Oh yeah?

Whitlock. But at any rate, I went to <sup>Corregidor</sup> ~~Corregidor~~ and when I first

got out there I was still <sup>in DC</sup> ~~in DC~~ And they had set up a DT

way out on Monkey Point where the point narrowed right down

to where you could almost fall off either side of it. And

we were operating out there. I've kind of forgotten who I

think Willis was the chief that <sup>who was</sup> ~~who was~~ Vice president in charge

of this. <sup>by</sup> ~~by~~ Sid Burnette come in later, I think, to take over

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the DF functions out there. But in addition to the DT, <sup>they</sup> they decided to install a DY. And this was installed up at the end of the <sup>Kinley</sup> Kinley Field Air Strip, which was the air strip just above the tunnel. Oh maybe, three quarters of a mile from the back tunnel entrance. Well this DY was set on a sort of a <sup>platform</sup> platform off the ground. The platform was just about level with the top of the <sup>jungle</sup> jungle, the shrubbery around. So you could climb up and crawl into this. <sup>It</sup> It was a covered thing. You crawl up there and, of course, with the signals and all the noise and stuff you couldn't hear anything going on outside. You were out there all by yourself. It was kind of an eerie feeling, believe me.

Farley:

I can.

Whitlock:

And I was out there one night standing the watch on that DY which we were checking out. It wasn't working right and we couldn't figure out why. And just getting nowhere with it. I could get the signals alright, but I couldn't get any bearings off the doggone instrument. And I suddenly heard a blood curdling scream. God, it just made the hair stand right up on the back of my neck. And I turned the receiver off to see what the heck was going on, I could just <sup>visualize</sup> visualize somebody getting a <sup>bolo</sup> bow through the neck. Sort of wound up in a gurgle, you know. And God. I stuck my head out the tent and looked around and not a soul in sight. Pretty soon the bushes started <sup>rattling</sup> rattling and out walks a deer. And I had always thought that <sup>a</sup> deer was a mute. This bugger wasn't. Boy !

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Farley: The deer <sup>making</sup> ~~making~~ the noises?

Whitlock: It was the deer making that noise. It was a blood curdling noise. (laugh)

Well, that wasn't the only hazard there. Coming back the DT site, there was a pretty steep climb up the ridge. And I was coming back up there one day and I looked up and here's a big old ~~Monitor~~ <sup>Monitor</sup> lizard, just about eye level right in front of me. I don't know who was scared the most. He went one direction and I went the other, boy. And that ~~Bugger~~ <sup>Bugger</sup> was four or five feet long. If he was an inch.

Farley: Oh good. Were you able to, based on the analysis of Japanese intercept compared with Guam and then the Philippines, were you able to estimate that things were not right and something was developing?

Whitlock: Well, I'm leading up to that.

Farley: I sorry. I'm sorry.

Whitlock: I'm leading up to that.

Farley: That's fine. That's great. I just didn't want you to overlook that part.

Whitlock: No, no indeed. No. I didn't stay out on this project too

long. Old Charlie Johns. Well, the office that I took my solution

to in ~~Cavile~~ <sup>Cavile</sup>, was the one that was being supervised by ~~Root~~ <sup>Root</sup> ~~Root~~ <sup>Root</sup> Roeder.

Farley: ~~Red~~ <sup>Red</sup> ~~Root~~ <sup>Root</sup> was it? "Red" Roeder, was it?

Whitlock: No, it wasn't red. Root. ~~Root~~

Farley: Root. ~~Root~~ <sup>Root</sup> ~~Root~~ <sup>Root</sup> Roeder.

Whitlock: ~~Root~~ <sup>Root</sup> ~~Root~~ <sup>Root</sup> In this office, he had two or three people helping him. He had a yeoman or two, crypto clerks, but he also

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had a radioman or two. And one of them was Rex <sup>JULE</sup> Jewet, who had put together a filing system on all the technical data that he could lay his hands on that only Rex <sup>JULE</sup> Jewet knew how to use. Nobody else ever could figure out his filing system and after Rex departed it was jettisoned. But at any rate, he was over there. And then there was another gentleman by the name of Charlie Jefferson Johns, who had started working in this area. And I'd become very friendly with Charlie because ~~he and I~~ <sup>we</sup> were living <sup>living</sup> he and his wife, and me and my wife were <sup>living</sup> out in this Caradad environment when we were in <sup>Cavite</sup> Cavite. We were next door neighbors and played cards and this sort of stuff you know. So, when we moved to <sup>Corregidor</sup> Corregidor, he was in the office part of the tunnel. Again, sorting traffic, wrapping it, doing the technical analysis of it. And he had as an assistant, Ted Hoover. <sup>JULE</sup> Jewet, in the meantime, had departed. But <sup>we</sup> ~~they~~ both of these men, both Johns and Hoover, were intercept operators that had been taken into the office. And there was perhaps 15, 18 full-fledged clerks in the office, yeomen, cryptanalytic clerks, as well as the officer <sup>complement</sup> ~~complement~~ which you have records of.

Farley:

Yes.

Whitlock:

But they were only two intercept operators working in there.

~~So Johns~~ <sup>JULE</sup> They had me to bring in another intercept operator to work in that area and Johns managed to get me in there. So this is where my DF experience on <sup>Corregidor</sup> ~~Corregidor~~ came to a halt. So when I first went in to work with Johns and Hoover, I was doing quite a lot of the leg work. We'd set up files on call signs

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so that we could keep messages together that referred to ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ships. It was a pretty primitive system, but it worked after a fashion and there was a lot of sorting and filing to be done. And we were producing a monthly report that was pretty technical. It was pretty much like the reports we were filing in Hawaii and in Guam. It was probably, ~~comparatively~~ <sup>comparatively</sup> speaking, ~~because~~ <sup>because</sup> it was a much bigger intercept operation than either Hawaii or Guam. The report was ~~much~~ <sup>a</sup> much bigger report. It was the same type of stuff. There was just more in it. Call sign recoveries, ~~address~~ <sup>address</sup> recoveries, frequencies, allocations and this type. It was this type of work. So I hadn't been in there too long, and I don't remember, I went in there probably in December of 1940. It was around in December. Well, about this time, we had an officer come down from the flag ship, from Admiral Hart's flag ship, who was winding up a tour as ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> CI officer. And this officer was ~~the~~ <sup>a</sup> lieutenant by the name of Jefferson Dennis. Well, the desk next to mine, was a desk next to mine in the tunnel office, Dennis come to ~~Corridor~~ <sup>Corridor</sup> and he took over this desk and he was there just waiting for transportation. He wound up his tour and been relieved and he come down there just putting in his time waiting for the next transport. Well, I sat there and watched Dennis. And Dennis would get the stack of traffic and he'd go through it, ~~he'd~~ <sup>He'd</sup> ripple through it. He'd tear off little pieces of paper and stick it here and then he'd flip it over and tear off another piece of paper and stick it here. He'd go through the whole stack of traffic like this and then pretty

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it a  
soon he may go through a couple times and look at these piece  
of paper. Of course, ~~it was all~~ it was all in chronological  
order for packaging. ~~you know~~. So he wouldn't pull it out. He  
<sup>just</sup> had ~~that~~ flipped back and forth looking at it. We hadn't got our  
copy <sup>out of</sup> it yet. I watched him doing this and then he looked  
through there and finally he pushed it aside and he'd start writing,  
see? And this was my introduction to the production of intelligence.  
He was putting out a small intelligence summary on the basis  
of his traffic analysis. Well, I'd thought he'd invented the idea <sup>and</sup>  
~~and I think he came close to being~~ if he didn't invent  
it, he came close to being one of the first ones in it.  
And this looked real interesting to me, so I understudied him for  
a while. I watched him and read the stuff that he was writing.  
And so one day I figured I'd <sup>— well,</sup> ~~well,~~ it gradually grew me on it.  
I kept trying, you know, looking and making <sup>and</sup> putting together  
two and two in my mind, but not really putting it down  
for publication or anything. And then one day I come across  
something after he'd been through the traffic. I was going  
through there and I come up with something. And I sat down and I  
studied it and finally I got these pieces of traffic together  
and I went over to Dennis. And I said, "You know what? It  
looks to me from this traffic that there's a division in  
Japanese destroyers that are going to be going from <sup>to the</sup> ~~to the~~ Ta Kao  
down to Palau. From that traffic headings, the <sup>destroyer</sup> ~~destroyer~~  
<sup>were going</sup> ~~divisions~~ and involved <sup>Ta Kao</sup> ~~(Ta Kao and~~  
<sup>involved</sup> ~~involved~~ Palau and <sup>involved</sup> ~~involved~~ Palau and  
<sup>By</sup> ~~By~~ gosh, this division of <sup>d</sup> ~~destroyers~~ were going to go down  
there. So I went over <sup>with the few</sup> ~~to show~~ the pieces of traffic I had with

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Dennis. And Dennis looked at it and looked at it and sat back and said, "Well." He said, "It's interesting. But I don't think that's what's going to happen because that's not the way that Palau is usually <sup>usually</sup> ~~usually~~ <sup>supported,</sup> ~~usually~~ they will come down through Saipan, Truk, then out to Palau. They just don't ever come down from Taiwan and go to Palau." He said, "Very interesting, but I don't think that's what it means." Well, I was crushed. Two days later the PBYS spotted the division of Japanese destroyers east of the Philippines headed for Palau. And from that day on I started writing intelligence summaries.

Farley: He drafted you then.

(gas) Alright sir, let's pick it up right there again.

Whitlock: All right. Well I think it might be well at this point to touch a little bit upon the analytical techniques that we ~~used~~ developed.

Farley: Please.

Whitlock. ~~developed~~ And what made it possible for us to do these things. The key to the whole thing, of course, was call sign recoveries and the ability to ~~identify~~ <sup>to</sup> correctly identify the call signs. We had a fairly good understanding of their fleet organization that had been built up during the years when they weren't using encoded call signs. They were actually using <sup>the</sup> names of the organizations. This is before my time. <sup>"Kuchiku Sen Tai" (?)</sup> ~~Akuchi Kusinta~~ <sup>a Japanese</sup> ~~a Japanese~~ <sup>1st</sup> ~~1st~~ <sup>destroyer</sup> ~~destroyer~~ <sup>squadron</sup> ~~squadron~~. But they had used this and we'd built up a good record of the ships, what divisions they were in, what their fleet organization was. So we had this as collateral as background

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to help us when we went about analyzing ~~for~~ our traffic. And this was a great help. We'd get so familiar with the organization that once when they changed call signs, immediately these ~~organ~~ <sup>we</sup> we could see the organization underlying these new call signs and immediately start identifying the ships and units under the new call signs. And there was also practices on the part of the Japanese that made life fairly easy for us too, at times. They had some bad habits. They would, for example, when they had a circular message going out to all the Naval districts, for example. They had a set order in which they addressed them. It always went <sup>Yokosuka</sup> ~~Yokosuka~~ <sup>Yokosuka</sup> Kure, <sup>Dairen</sup> ~~Dairen~~ Sasebo, Mizuru, Ominato, and ~~Dairen~~. So once we recovered one of these, eventually we'd find a message where <sup>with</sup> ~~where~~ this thing in and the spacing is just right so we know the other one's there. So we got a whole handful of identifications at one time. This is one of the things that they did wrong. Another thing that they did wrong was that periodically, they would put out a series of administrator <sup>or</sup> ~~in~~ personnel-type messages, and these messages would go to a division commander for action <sup>with</sup> ~~information~~ <sup>to</sup> every ship in the division. And they'd go through the whole ~~Navy~~ <sup>Navy</sup> this way. So this was another tool that we used to be sure that we had the right handles on the call signs. Once, and it didn't take us too long, once we had a pretty good collection of identifications, we were in a position to start producing intelligence. Every one of the message headings would carry an action addressee, or most of them would have an action addressee and a group of information addressees. So, just for an

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Yokosuka  
 example, if a ship was leaving Yokosuka to go to Sasebo he  
 you would originate a departure report advising Sasebo that he  
 you was getting underway, but if he include Yokosuka  
 heading Katsuriki, the place that he was leaving. So we could one  
 look at this message and we could say the Katsuriki, or whatever  
 ship it was, is leaving Yokosuka for Sasebo. And this  
 was a source of intelligence. I don't say information. I mean,  
 technically this was a source of intelligence for which very little  
 credit has ever been given in any documentation up to this point.

Farley: That's right.

Whitlock: up to this point. Now, this was anticipated, I discovered,

by Admiral Wenger, then Captain Wenger. Somewhere here  
 I have this document which is about the most precise and accurate  
 statement of the COMINT production capability during that  
 era of anything that I've seen, if you want it.

I'm going to read most of this into the record, if you don't  
 mind.

Farley: No, please do.

Whitlock: You all set?

Farley: Yes.

Whitlock: All right. All right.

Farley: Tell me where it's from and why.

Whitlock: This is extracted from the history of communications  
 intelligence in United States with emphasis on the United  
 States Navy. And I think this was edited by Graydon A. Lewis.

And it's based upon information, I think, provided to him

largely by Russ Fisher. I'm not too sure. It's SRH 149. And this

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~~is a~~ In here is a short analysis of the Orange Problem, which was the Japanese Navy, dated 30 June 1937. And I think it was probably Commander or Captain Wenger, Commander probably at that time, in reviewing the status of the Orange Problem made a couple of observations with regard to the means by which communications information could be obtained. He said that there are two methods. And it's kind of interesting to note that he said the first method involves decryption of the texts of messages; and the second is methods short of cryptanalysis, that is traffic analysis. And he summarizes the first method in one sentence. He said, "The first method has been successfully practiced for centuries, but the advent of machine ciphers and the <sup>adoption</sup> adaptation of increasingly effective security measures as a result of lessons learned in the <sup>World War</sup> world war, it is however becoming steadily more difficult, and even now only highly skilled persons aided by complicated analytical machinery are able to cope with the problem." Now that's his summarization of the cryptanalytic problem ~~involving the~~ <sup>Japanese</sup> with respect to the Japanese Navy. Now these next few statements I find very, very interesting and it's something that I know is from first-hand experience is absolutely true. He said, "The second method is a recent <sup>innovation</sup> innovation" (and I point out that this document was June 1937), "The second method is a recent innovation which is now being developed to meet the growing complications of the cryptanalytic problem. In time of war, codes and ciphers normally

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used by the enemy, will doubtlessly be changed at once.

Solutions of the new systems will probably require days, if not weeks, to accomplish. Meanwhile, unless there be some other means of obtaining it, the flow of intelligence will be stopped at the critical period when the <sup>planned</sup> ~~plan~~ campaign is being laid and information concerning the enemy is essential to success. Now, codes and ciphers may readily be superseded overnight upon the outbreak of war, but the communication system cannot be so easily changed without serious confusion resulting. Since the Navy's communications systems and methods of handling traffic are dependent upon the organization and location of its component forces, it follows that the one may be deduced from the other. This is difficult for an enemy to prevent because the absolute necessity for simplicity in a communications system precludes any but an elementary-type of cryptographic protection. To ensure the effectiveness of either method, that is either cryptanalytic or traffic analytic methods," <sup>Let</sup> ~~we'll let~~ me reread that again. "To ensure the effectiveness of either method, the enemy's communication system <sup>and</sup> ~~location~~ of forces," <sup>Now</sup> ~~now~~ someone has added that and that's not correct. That should be deleted from there. <sup>He's</sup> ~~he's~~ referring back to the two methods, Method A and Method B. These two methods are <sup>decryption</sup> ~~decryption~~ and cryptanalysis. And if you eliminate this interpretation that's been pushed in here it should read, "To ensure the effectiveness of either method of obtaining information, there are three reasons of paramount importance that the work be carried on in peace.

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First, it is then that the collateral information and background so essential to correct interpretation required ~~substantive~~ (I just touched on that).

Farley: Yes.

Whitlock: "Second, personnel must be trained <sup>about and</sup> in techniques developed. Cryptographic systems are, in general, the products of evolution. For success, solution must commence when systems are simple and follow each step in this evolution. Finally, constant and careful observation of peacetime communication can well serve as an accurate barometer of hostile intentions, because the preparation of any large force for war can hardly be ~~consummated~~ <sup>consummated</sup> without some noticeable change in the volume or nature of its communications." And it couldn't be stated any plainer than it's stated right there.

Farley: Beautiful. Let me switch tapes on that one, sir.

TAPE 2 SIDE 2

Farley: Sir, do you have any additional comments on that article?

Whitlock: I think it points up a couple of the things that I was touching on; one, that the ability to do traffic analysis was based upon getting in on the ground floor, that we knew what the fleet organization was when we went into it. And as the sledding got tougher and tougher, it paid dividends. We were able to stay abreast of them. And the thing that I want to point out here is the fact that most of the credit for the intelligence <sup>success</sup> against the Japanese Navy in World War has been given to cryptanalysis and to decryptions. I'd like to point out that there were many long dry periods during that war in which nothing was being read. And even when it was being read, just to read the message sometimes,

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there was nothing significant in the message; that unless you had the glue, unless you knew what was going on all around this message, it was meaningless and it was the job of the traffic ~~analysts~~ <sup>analysts</sup> to provide this continuity and this glue in which all of these translations fit. So an awful lot of credit ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> the continuity of intelligence ~~provided~~ <sup>provided</sup> against the Japanese Navy in World War II ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> has to go to the handful of traffic analysts that made it possible.

Farley: They have not been given <sup>proper</sup> credit.

Whitlock: Never been given proper credit.

Farley: Sir, let me talk about the intelligence, the product or whatever you prepared. <sup>who</sup> ~~who~~ was the prime recipient of your information and how was it developed so that they could have in usable form?

Whitlock: Well, initially, ~~some of the~~ <sup>some of the</sup> well, this intelligence, the intelligence content of this didn't begin to get tucked into reports until just before Pearl Harbor.

Farley: Okay.

Whitlock: Occasionally, we'd tuck <sup>in</sup> things like <sup>the</sup> to cruise the Katsuriki that I mentioned. This went into the monthly report and there was a little intelligence getting into this monthly technical report which would go back to the other station, <sup>H4P0</sup> ~~H4P0~~ and so forth. A copy would go up the <sup>CINCAF</sup> ~~CINCAF~~. They would get a chance to look at a copy of our report. But when ~~it~~ <sup>it</sup> came. <sup>when</sup> ~~when~~ we get to the point where we begin producing intelligence from traffic analysis for consumer consumption we get into the era in which we were <sup>promulgating</sup> ~~promulgating~~ this

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information electrically, that we were writing a daily intelligence report, status report. And then ~~and then~~ this report would go, if I remember ~~rightly~~ <sup>rightly</sup> and my memory's a little hazy as to the addressees. I know it went to <sup>CINC</sup> Asiatic Fleet. I believe it went to <sup>CINC</sup> Pacific Fleet, but if it didn't it went to <sup>S</sup> Station <sup>Hypo</sup> ~~Hypo~~. And it also went to Washington. Now, as I say, a lot of this information went into Rochefort's shop. And I suspect that he was not too careful when he passed <sup>this</sup> forward to indicate what the source was. I don't think this was intentional. I think ~~this was~~ that he had his report to file and he drew on whatever source material he had file it without indicating what the sources were, necessarily. So I don't mean to imply that I think he was seeking any glory by doing this. That's just the way it works. I do know this for sure, that <sup>S</sup> Station ~~Hypo~~ <sup>Hypo</sup>, Rochefort's shop was not producing anything comparable to the intelligence reports that we were producing on ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>Corregidor</sup> until ~~until~~ well after Pearl Harbor. They didn't even get headed in this direction until after Pearl Harbor, as a matter of fact. And before ~~and before~~ Pearl Harbor, there's one instance that <sup>I</sup> recall very clearly that I think should be tucked into the record somewhere. <sup>That is in October</sup> ~~Is that in October and~~ and November of 1941, we were doing traffic analysis on <sup>Corregidor and</sup> ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>and</sup> began to see the Japanese Navy inducting many, many merchant ships, and that these merchant ships begin to congregate up on the <sup>Straits</sup> ~~straits~~ of Taiwan. And we kept

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count of these ships until we begin to get a little bit disturbed. We counted two hundred such <sup>ships</sup> ships that had been incorporated into the Japanese Navy and they were all in the <sup>Hangkew, Taku, Taku</sup> Swatow, Hangchow, <sup>Taku</sup> area. So we sent a message back to Washington telling them that there were two hundred ships up in the <sup>Strait</sup> strait that hadn't been there a month or two before. So about a week went by and we got message back from <sup>Nezat</sup> Nezat back from Washington requesting a confirmation of the number two hundred. <sup>well</sup> in the meantime, we'd added 50 more. So we merely added 50 to two hundred and told them two hundred and fifty. Now this was in October and November of 1941. This was the advance expeditionary force that occupied all of southeast Asia. Now this report, I believe, and I got this <sup>in talking</sup> in talking to the NSG historian in Maine. He said that they'd run into something that had been a little bit of a mystery to them. Apparently, some such report had been given to President Roosevelt, but nobody could tell him what the source of the report was.

Farley:

Was it because it was so sensitive that people were not <sup>to</sup> privy to the source?

Whitlock:

I don't think that the people who carried the report up to him knew what the source of it was. They didn't know whether it came from cryptanalysis or traffic analysis.

They hadn't heard of traffic analysis at that time. But that's where it came from. We produced it. And this is the type of thing that we were capable of producing. In fact, one of the aircraft carriers that <sup>didn't</sup> didn't hit Hawaii, we spotted. We knew where it was. It was heading down <sup>and</sup> it was east of the Philippines and

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we reported this, too. It was with a task force heading south. And Wenger said <sup>"Cool it!"</sup> ~~Don't worry~~ Don't worry about it. We know where it's headed. They did like hell.

That's the task force that hit Singapore. Or Saigon.

Farley: Who was at fault? The intelligence officers, the Navy intelligence officers?

Whitlock: No. We're doing a lot of Monday morning quarterbacking. You've got to realize what the situation was at that time.

In the first place our whole organization was semi-illegal when we got started. Gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail. And as a result of this, we had to play it extremely close to the belt. We had to beg, borrow and steal most of the stuff that we got. <sup>Hand-me-downs</sup> ~~hand-me-downs~~ It was a <sup>to</sup> ~~hand-off~~ hand-mouth existence. And the <sup>security</sup> ~~security~~ was tighter than hell. That we who were producing it, even I, I was writing intelligence summaries. I didn't know what authority I would ever

have to provide this information to a consumer, if the time arose. And it did arise. When we were evacuated on the Permit <sup>1 Permit</sup> at a later date, I knew that there was a

division of Japanese destroyers working in the islands south of <sup>Corregidor</sup> ~~Corregidor~~ cleaning up inter-island shipping.

I knew this from analysis. So when I got aboard the sub the submarine skipper had been directed to break off patrol and return to Australia and at CINCPAC, which is now

CINCPAC Fleet, would tolerate no loss of men or equipment.

Well, this guy was a charger, <sup>"Moon?"</sup> ~~Chapel~~ <sup>((W.G. Chappel))</sup> Chapel. And he didn't feel like breaking off patrol. So he decided to head down into

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the islands, and so I sat down with a couple <sup>af</sup> ~~with~~ the other elderly CA types or <sup>crypt</sup> ~~crypt~~ types, not crypt but CI types to discuss whether I should tell the skipper of the submarine about this division of destroyers. And we decided that I didn't have the authority to. He was not cleared. We didn't know whether he was cleared or not. I had no authority to tell him this information, so I didn't tell him. The first night out we surfaced right in the middle of the destroyer division. They worked us over for 38 hours of depth charges. So you can see what the situation was. Even if the information was there, the mechanics for <sup>disseminating</sup> ~~disseminating~~ it and for using it, the machinery for <sup>disseminating</sup> ~~disseminating~~ it and using it had not been oiled and even, in many cases, wasn't in existence. So you have to look back to that era <sup>realizing</sup> ~~realizing~~ that this was new. This source of intelligence was new to the people who were exercising command decisions. That they didn't know whether to trust it or not. And this is the reason, really, is the reason that Rochefort sent his famous fresh water message to Midway.

Farley:

Right.

Whitlock:

He sent it not to impress his contemporaries, us professionals. We knew it. We knew what "AF" was. He sent it to convince the <sup>A</sup> ~~admiral~~ that he knew what he was talking about. And to convince Layton that he knew what he was talking about. See? And this is the point that is overlooked in the records, too, that we knew what that "AF" was Midway because of the position

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~~it fell~~ <sup>had</sup>  
~~it fell~~ in the list of diagrams that ~~they~~ <sup>had</sup> been assigned systematically throughout the Pacific. And then the basis of assignments elsewhere in the Pacific, AF had to be Midway. We knew this.

Farley: How early did you know it?

Whitlock: Oh heavens. Well, let me say this. I may be getting a little bit ahead of myself. I haven't gotten off ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>Corregidor</sup> yet and I'm talking about something that happened in Australia. I don't believe that it's really appreciated the role that traffic analysis had in teeing up that battle, the intelligence supporting that battle. ~~AF~~  
 We were aware that a move towards the eastern Pacific was building before they read the first thing about it.

Or decrypted the first thing. We weren't sure from the traffic analysis <sup>whether</sup> they had Hawaii in mind or whether it was Midway. Some of us <sup>we</sup> sort of suspected it was Hawaii from the size of the build-up. But you don't put this in your intelligence reports.

Farley: Yeah, that's speculation, right?

Whitlock: So, we watched this and saw this build-up. We reported the build-up. And as we saw ships ~~added~~ <sup>being added</sup>, by association, we began tabulating the ships that were being pulled together for this mission. And actually, on the basis of sightings, decrypts and battle reports that eventually emerged from the Midway encounter, it was shown that from traffic analysis alone we had named every ship in that force. We missed one minor transport. And this was done by traffic

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analysis. It was not done by cryptanalysis. <sup>And</sup> While I'm <sup>on</sup> the subject, I'd like to make something else very, very clear. That even after we began to get information out of cryptanalysis about the attack on "AF", and were reasonably sure it was Midway, nobody knew just when it was scheduled, what the date was, when are they going to hit it? And there was a lot of sweating to come up with that date. We were writing summaries. Now this was not on the basis of decrypt. This is traffic analysis summaries and Fabian came to us in Melbourne and said, <sup>you</sup> "you boys be damn sure you know what you're writing about because they're moving carriers on the basis of what you're saying." And this is before they even had the decrypt.

Farley: You mean the high Naval officials were basing their decisions on your intelligence?

Whitlock: On the reports that were coming in. And I think that the reason they were doing this is that I don't think it was clear what the source of these reports were. Whether it was traffic analysis or whether it was cryptanalysis. And I think, for that reason, that the cryptanalytic success was perhaps a bit overrated in the battle of Midway. The one cryptanalytic accomplishment that I'm aware of relates to the determination of the date of the strike. And this recovery was made in Melbourne. It was made by Rufus <sup>AAA</sup> Taylor. And it was made on two appearances of the code group involved. And that was where they got the date.

~~SECRET~~ HUGO

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I  
I believe it was 6 June, I think it was. Huh?

Farley: Yeah.

Whitlock: Okay. The problem here <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ that the code group had only been used once before in another message. And instead of being like the number "6 June", it was "6th". Sixth instead of six. ~~We had~~. They had <sup>2</sup> recovery for "six", but they didn't didn't have the recovery for "six T-H." If I remember that was the problem. But Rufe Taylor <sup>in</sup> looking at the two messages that he had, going back to the other message which I believe was out of the text of some supply message, he had managed to figure out because of the order in which it appeared, it has to be sixth. And he's the guy who come up with the date. It wasn't Rochefort.

Farley: Uh-huh. Rochefort's people claim it was because of the breaking of the date time system.

Whitlock: The date time system?

Farley: The date time system which would project the date of the attack.. No?

Whitlock: Rufe Taylor recovered the code group. I know because I was standing there when he did it. And I helped <sup>and</sup> ~~him~~ I saw him put it in a message and put it on the air.

Farley: What was the reaction from Hypo<sup>OP-20-G?</sup> or ONI or ~~DP-20G?~~ Do you remember any?

Whitlock: None. No, you gotta realize that we were too damn busy doing the job to worry about who was going to get credit for it.

Farley: Yes.

Whitlock: Huh?

~~SECRET HUGCO~~

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Farley: Correct.

Whitlock: The idea was to get the information in there from whatever source you could get it in there. And I know it wasn't until years later. <sup>Matter</sup> ~~matter~~ of fact <sup>I</sup> ~~A~~ come back to Washington and I began to get a little bit irritated because nobody either in Washington, <sup>and we</sup> ~~and~~ began to get people back from Hawaii <sup>Station</sup> ~~any~~. God you wouldn't think that Melbourne <sup>or</sup> ~~or~~ station Charlie would have a cast that had anything to do with the war. And we carried it for a long time by ourselves.

Farley: That's right.

Whitlock: This is not in the records and it annoys me somewhat.

Farley: This is why this interview is so interesting. Because as you just said there is not <sup>enough</sup> information on what you people did, so I hope this will add to our file.

Whitlock: Well, I hope so. I wish that there was some other way to add to them besides just me. Bear in mind now, I started out as an enlisted analyst. I was fortunate on <sup>Corregidor</sup> ~~Corregidor~~ because the officer in charge desk was right behind me and I could <sup>hear</sup> ~~everything~~ that transpired. Everything that was going on. And <sup>to</sup> ~~I~~ had <sup>to</sup> ~~not~~ been given access <sup>to</sup> ~~to~~ before the war <sup>of</sup> ~~any~~ decrypts out of the <sup>P</sup> ~~purple~~ machine. Matter of fact, I didn't even know that we had a machine on <sup>Corregidor</sup> ~~Corregidor~~. I found that out after we left it. I mean, it was definitely need-to-know.

Farley: What was the feeling that <sup>Corregidor</sup> ~~Corregidor~~ had a <sup>Purple</sup> ~~purple~~ machine and <sup>Hypo</sup> ~~Hypo~~ had no <sup>Purple</sup> ~~purple~~ machine?

Whitlock: Well, because we were producing intelligence and <sup>Hypo</sup> ~~Hypo~~ wasn't.

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Farley: That confirms it there, doesn't it?

Whitlock: They sent the ~~purple~~ <sup>purple machine first</sup> ~~first~~ to the Philippines before they sent it to Hawaii. And I'd like to point out another thing. There was a good reason for that. That in the Philippines, we were hearing Japanese Navy communications that you couldn't hear in Hawaii.

Farley: Good.

Whitlock: And ~~this~~ <sup>in</sup> we could ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> Hawaii a ~~major~~ <sup>major</sup> ~~lot~~ <sup>lot</sup> practically all the intercept you got in Hawaii was on point-to-point circuits. It was major shore station circuits in Japan. You seldom, seldom ever got any intercept from inter-ship or ship-to-ship traffic. And this is where you get information ~~on ships~~ <sup>on ship</sup> on ship moves. We were able to do that. That's why we were producing intelligence reports before Hawaii ever got in the business.

Farley: Huh. Good. I'm glad that's on the record. Sir, let's go back to November, December of '41. Do you recall the build-up or the increase in tension or was there anything that you people were aware of that would say, ~~something~~ <sup>something</sup> was imminent?

Whitlock: Yeah. Yeah. I think it was in early November that we produced <sup>what</sup> ~~at~~ we called ~~it~~ <sup>you</sup> a fleet organization, ~~you~~ call it an order of battle.

Farley: Right.

Whitlock: We produced a fleet organization on the Japanese <sup>navy</sup> ~~which~~ incorporated these two hundred and fifty ships which had just shown up up north of us. We had laid out the whole Japanese Navy organization from the basis of traffic

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analysis. We sent this report to Washington and we sent it via Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and at that time Lieutenant Commander Mason was the fleet intelligence officer. In his endorsement, of which we received a copy back, he stated that ~~didn't~~ <sup>in perusing</sup> the

organization that was presented herein, you can ~~draw~~ <sup>draw</sup> but one conclusion. That the Japanese Navy is deployed on a wartime basis and it can be construed in no other light. This is ~~the~~

~~the~~ endorsement that went on the report that went back to Washington. That report never surfaced anywhere. It was never mentioned in the Pearl Harbor investigation.

Farley: So that was at least a month?

Whitlock: At least a month?

Farley: At least a month before, huh?

Whitlock: I said November; it could have been October that we did this.

I think it was around the first of November. So. Again, I reiterate, we were producing intelligence on ~~that~~ <sup>Corregidor</sup> before.

~~before, it was even in~~ I think, before it was produced anywhere else.

I don't think it was even being produced in Washington on the basis of what they were getting. They were too far behind the time.

Farley: That's right.

Whitlock: Hawaii wasn't hearing enough of it. I think we carried a major portion of the intelligence ~~burge~~ <sup>burden</sup> through, at least through the early stages of the war, and I think pretty well through the war.

Farley: Good. Should we move on to the ~~Winds message~~ <sup>Winds message</sup> or is there something up to that point that you'd like to talk about.

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Corregidor

Whitlock: Well, we're still on ~~Corregidor~~. Oh, oh. I got ahead and now we're going to have to drop back.

Farley: All  
All right.

Whitlock: All  
All right.

Farley: Fair enough. Corregidor

Whitlock: On ~~Corregidor~~. There's something else I'd like to point out.

Farley: Please, please.

Whitlock: Okay. As I indicated a little earlier, I've always been interested in the cryptanalytic end of things. So on ~~Corregidor~~, whenever I could get all my work out of the way, my report written, I'd go down and get ahold of a worksheet and I would start pulling additives on ~~the~~ the JN-25 system. And on the worksheets on which they ~~put~~ the messages, they invariably left off the messages headings. They would put only the originator of the message and then they'd write all the code groups across. Starting point and starting point and starting point. ~~So~~ so that you could line them up. And then you take your known code groups and start playing with the things until you could get one that would drop the whole line. Huh?

Farley: Yes. I've done that, too.

Whitlock: So what I discovered is my knowledge of traffic analysis. I could look at the heading and just about tell them what the message was going to say. I could tell them the code groups to look for. Place names, ship names. The average crypt clerk was flying blind. I mean, ~~hell~~, it was a hit-or-miss basis. Without any clues to go on.

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So I sort of teamed up with one of the enlisted ~~cripples~~ <sup>Cripples</sup>.  
Guy by the name of Anderson. And he and I, I think, began  
to pull more additives than about any four or five of  
the rest of them put together. And they began to keep  
a score of who was pulling the most additives. Well, <sup>Anderson</sup>  
~~Anderson~~ was well up there all the time. He was pulling  
about three to one for anybody else in there. And he damn  
near went blind doing it. But at any rate, all of a  
sudden Anderson's score begin dropping down. It got to where  
even ~~though~~ <sup>even</sup> the dumbest clerk we had in there was  
pulling more additives than Anderson was. Anderson ~~wasn't~~  
<sup>He</sup> was a non-communicating sort of a cuss. He was working like hell,  
but there was no additives coming out. Nobody could figure  
out what he was doing. Well, Andy finally confided in me.  
He says, "I think I'm on to something." He says, ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> I found  
out if you take the difference between the code groups  
it's the same difference as there is between the encoded  
version of those groups. The differences are the same,  
they're relative. So what that rascal was doing was he  
had sat down and started taking the difference of all the  
high frequency code groups, and this was just a clerical job.  
He was ~~brutting~~ <sup>brutting</sup> it out. He made a little book of all the  
differences of the high frequency code groups. And then he'd  
run down one of these lists taking differences and check them  
in the code group. He hit one <sup>and laid</sup> ~~right~~ in there and, boy, ~~and~~ <sup>it'd</sup>  
go off. He got this book pretty well stacked up and ~~all~~  
~~of a sudden~~ <sup>and</sup> Fabian was just ribbing the hell out  
of Andy about <sup>it</sup> "What's the matter Anderson? Your score's

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said under his breath,

falling off. *WAW* Andy, "You son of a bitch." (laugh)

Anderson hated Fabian with a purple passion, but for no good reason because Andy was one of Fabian's fair-haired boys,

but Andy didn't know it. But any rate, it got to the point that Anderson was pulling something <sup>on</sup> the order of

six or seven hundred additives a day when the best below

him <sup>was</sup> pulling something around two hundred and fifty or three

hundred. And he wasn't saying anything to anybody. And *finally*

*finally* Fabian had to get at him. "What the hell are you

doing, Andy?" And he found out about the handy Andy.

Well, Fabian liked to beat him about the head and ears.

But they put this thing together and everybody started using it and

brother! that more than quadrupled the output of additives

from that place.

Farley: So it was worth the while he spent preparing that.

Whitlock: Yeah. Yeah. And *I'm* this is something *I'm* pretty sure that didn't go on in Hawaii.

Farley: No. No, I've never heard of this one either. Anderson is a familiar name, but I just can't place him in the hierarchy.

Whitlock: Well, I don't know what happened to Andy. They put him up for commission the same time that I was put up for it. And Andy was sent down with me to take our physical at Melbourne, physical promotion. Andy said, "I don't want the goddamn commission." Fabian says, "You're going to take it." Andy was grumbling all the way down there. So we got down to the doctor. He was going to give us the physical and

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Andy says, "Doc, do I have to take this damn physical?"

And the <sup>Doc</sup> ~~doc~~ says, "If you want to get promoted, you ~~gotta~~ got to take it." He says, "Well, I don't want to get promoted."

He says, "Hell." He says, "I can't hear very well." He says, "I can't hardly see a damn thing." And the doctor says, "Well, Andy, how did you get in the Navy?" He says, "I wasn't this way when I got in the Navy." (laugh)

Farley: The Navy did it to me, huh?

Whitlock: So he said, "Okay. Put your clothes on." So Andy never <sup>did</sup> ~~didn't~~ take his commission. Later on he did. He relented and accepted. I don't know what happened to him since then. But I'm mentioning just a few of the people, the nameless individuals who was responsible for the cryptanalytic success ~~the~~ Navy scored in World War II. The more I think back to these individuals and what they did, the more upset I get about the move to single out Rochefort for his accomplishments.

Farley: Why is that? <sup>Because</sup> ~~Because~~ you people didn't have good PR men?

Whitlock: Well, as I say, you have to remember the conditions that existed at that time. Rochefort is one of the few people that we <sup>had</sup> had that high visibility. Now we had people <sup>had</sup> ~~that~~ out in the Far East that high visibility, but with respect to a local Admiral, ~~not~~ <sup>who</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~regard~~ <sup>who</sup> not with respect to a fleet commander <sup>who</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>who</sup> was making the major decisions, see? So I look at Rochefort. ~~He may~~ <sup>He may</sup> I don't know anything about the man. I have no reason to believe that he isn't one of the better types that we had. But I can't believe that he single-handly with his little pill-pushing crew at <sup>S</sup> station H

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Coral

were the ones that pulled the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway and the rest of World War II chestnuts out of the fire. That isn't the way it works. I know because I told you before. I've held a comparable job, the comparable job, as a matter of fact, and I know how it works there.

So. Well, let me see. What else do I need to tell you about ~~Coral Sea~~ <sup>Corridor</sup>?

Farley: Was the tunnel a pretty decent place in which to work and live?

Whitlock: Yeah. Yeah. Well, the first perhaps, not the latter.

(both talking at the same time)  
billet's

Farley: Were your ~~billet's~~ inside also?

Whitlock: No.

Farley: You were out on the ~~grounds~~?

Whitlock: They had a quarters area. I think there was seven or eight sets of quarters. There was one set of quarters that was built for chief petty officers, unmarried. Then there was a set of barracks for all enlisted men, unmarried. And then I guess there was perhaps, ~~let's~~ <sup>let's</sup> see, one, two, three, four, ~~perhaps~~ <sup>perhaps</sup> five other sets of quarters for married people and thank God they never took any wives or dependents out to that place to have to live in those quarters. The quarters themselves were nice. Well, nice as you could expect.

It was Philippine ~~mahogany~~ <sup>mahogany</sup>. It was set on beams, 14x14 ~~mahogany~~ <sup>mahogany</sup> beams is what they were set on. And after the first attack we had an unexploded bomb come down through the house, go through the whole house, go through one of these beams and

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disappeared into the earth and never went up.

Farley: My gosh.

Whitlock: The difficulty with the quarters was that they had oil-burning cook stoves. And the way that it worked is that you regulated the flow of oil out into the chamber where it was burning with a valve and you had to stand right over it and adjust that valve to <sup>keep</sup> ~~keep~~ that thing from filling up and burning oil going on the deck. Which happen on one occasion. Before they caught it, the whole floor was afire around the stove and the stove was about ready to drop through the floor. It wasn't the best arrangement.

Farley: Boy, I'll say.

Whitlock: But after December 7th, we hastily got out of those buildings, those quarters.

Farley: Let me ask about the relationship with the Army troops on <sup>Corregidor</sup> ~~Corregidor~~. Did you associate at all, either socially or ~~AW~~ officially?

Whitlock: A little bit. A little bit. We weren't too welcome really. We could feel it, sense it more than anything else. And we didn't make many <sup>forays</sup> ~~forays~~. I went, I think, once or twice to the <sup>Rocker Three</sup> ~~rocker three~~ club or whatever it was. Rocker four, I forgot what it was.

Farley: Yeah.

Whitlock: You didn't feel welcome. You didn't feel quite like you belonged there. And we did make some friends. We ~~not~~ made some <sup>acquaintance</sup> ~~acquaintance~~. I met a couple of sergeants <sup>and</sup> they used to come down and drink our beer and play poker with us.

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~~SECRET~~

Come to think about it, we never went up to their place (laugh), but no, we didn't mix too much.

Farley: Who was the <sup>senior</sup> officer on ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>Corregidor?</sup>

Whitlock: Well, MacArthur.

Farley: Okay.

Whitlock: Well, this is something I can perhaps relate.

Farley: All right.

Whitlock: In some of the records, I think, in going through this document on ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>Corregidor</sup>, the history, the COMINT effort in the Philippines, some mention was made about the Army filing a complaint on non-cooperation on the part of the Navy unit on ~~at~~ Monkey Point. And this, of course, was totally unjustified because most of the intelligence that we were producing was the type that the Army on ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>Corregidor</sup> could do nothing about. MacArthur ~~could have not~~ <sup>could not</sup> have reacted to it. There was nothing that he could have done. And, as is pointed out in that report, I didn't know about it at the time, but it seems the one instance in which information was passed to him, that one of our officers was playing <sup>golf</sup> ~~up~~ this was before the war ~~and~~ <sup>P</sup> apparently on the basis of a purple decrypt ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> ~~one~~ <sup>of</sup> our officers ~~out~~ <sup>playing</sup> ~~golf~~ <sup>and</sup> heard a couple of types <sup>5</sup> that weren't even cleared, Army types, discussing information that he'd turned over to them. So, I know ~~that~~ <sup>that we</sup> ~~gave~~ <sup>gave</sup> them nothing except what they could use, what we were sure they could use. And it never ~~never~~ <sup>to</sup> seemed to us that the powers ~~of~~ <sup>to</sup> be had too much confidence in what we told them anyway.

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~~SECRET~~

And furthermore, amazingly enough, they didn't seem to know how use what we give them when it could be used. And to demonstrate this, ~~After~~ just shortly after ~~Manila~~ <sup>Manila</sup> was occupied, and the Japanese Navy had moved into the Navy yard in ~~Cavite~~ <sup>Cavite</sup>, the Japanese Navy brought in some float ~~float~~ planes. These are Bettys. I think it was the Japanese Zero, zero equipped with floats. Well, MacArthur's air force, as I recall, had ~~diminished to where~~ <sup>diminished to where</sup> a little ~~aware that~~ <sup>aware that</sup> we had about, I think, there were four serviceable P-40s left, if I remember rightly and they had moved them into ~~cabin~~ <sup>Cab cavern (?)</sup>, which was over on ~~Bataan~~ <sup>Bataan</sup>. And they had one Piper Cub at ~~Kindley Field~~ <sup>Kindley</sup> on ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>Corregidor</sup>. Well, the Piper Cub was a civilian plane that was unarmed. And the Japanese had moved their batteries around into ~~Batangas~~ <sup>Batangas</sup> and started shelling us from the ~~Batangas~~ <sup>Batangas</sup> shore, and we had nothing we could train on that area until they cranked around one of the twelve inch mortars, topside. And they ~~set~~ <sup>sent</sup> this Piper Cub up to do some reconnaissance work over ~~Batangas~~ <sup>Batangas</sup> to see if he could locate the batteries over there and the guy that was flying it, I don't know this, but someone said that he was flying it with a shotgun across his lap. (Laugh) But at any rate, it was pretty pitiful. Well, he was over there tooling around over ~~Batangas~~ <sup>Batangas</sup> when we copied a message out of ~~Cavite~~ <sup>Cavite</sup>, ordering five Bettys into the air to destroy the enemy plane over ~~Batangas~~ <sup>Batangas</sup>. Well, Rufe Taylor got on our field phone and called ~~MacArthur's~~ <sup>MacArthur's</sup> CP and got MacArthur's G2, some colonel,

~~SECRET~~ ~~NUCCO~~

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I forgot his name.

Farley:

~~Whitlock~~ <sup>Willoughby</sup> ~~Whitlock~~, was it?

Whitlock:

I don't remember what his name. He went on to become a general.

Farley:

~~Whitlock~~ <sup>Willoughby</sup> ~~Whitlock~~.

Whitlock:

Well, he got him on the phone, and Rufe told him what we had. When Rufe got through telling him, he says, "Do about it?"

"Do about it. Well, man, if you've got any P-40s left you get in the air, you better get them in the air or you're going to lose a Piper Cub." Apparently this knucklehead says, "Well, I

don't know what I can do about it." And Rufe Taylor just

blew a fuse. After he slammed the damned receiver back down,

he stood there for a while. He says, "Come on, let's see

what happens." And go out of the tunnel and watch the

developments. So we got outside <sup>the tunnel</sup> and this little

ole Piper Cub come tearin' back in like a startled honey

bee and landed at McKinley and the P40s got up there and managed

to engage the Bettys and we had ring seats to the only dog fight, I think,

that ever occurred in the Philippines at the early stages of the

war. No losses, no hits, no <sup>runs no</sup> ~~runs no~~ errors on either side.

Farley:

MacArthur didn't come out to <sup>Corregidor</sup> ~~Corregidor~~ until after

December 7th, right?

Whitlock:

Oh no. <sup>He</sup> ~~he~~ was on <sup>Corregidor</sup> ~~Corregidor~~ before then.

Farley:

How <sup>how</sup> ~~how~~? How much before?

Whitlock:

~~Oh he was on there for~~ <sup>there,</sup> He was living, he had quarters there

for ~~about~~ practically all the time that I was there. He

was ~~there~~ there in '40.

Farley:

<sup>was he?</sup> ~~So was he~~ Okay. Good. <sup>All</sup> ~~Right~~. Yes, I know that, too.

I know that.

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~~SECRET~~

Whitlock: I don't know when he went out there, but he was there when I got there. I know that. Because we used to go past his quarters and he had his little boy out there with the <sup>Yamah</sup> ~~Yamah~~ taking care of him. Little kid running around kicking soldiers in the shins and they didn't dare to do anything about it.

Farley: Yeah. Who was the senior Navy officer?

Whitlock: Senior Navy officer. <sup>When?</sup> Uh, well, <sup>When?</sup> Before or after?

Farley: 1940s.

Whitlock: Well.....

Farley: I'm sorry. Before Pearl Harbor.

Whitlock: Before Pearl Harbor it probably was the commander <sup>that</sup> we had at Monkey Point, Commander Carlson. And that was kind of a funny arrangement. Commander Carlson was senior to Fabian or Lietwiler or any of the rest of them, but Fabian and Lietwiler were the guys <sup>with</sup> ~~that~~ and Rufe Taylor <sup>He</sup> ~~was~~ the ones <sup>that</sup> run the show. Swede Carlson, Commander Carlson was a language <sup>guy</sup> and I think he was so highly specialized that they didn't trust him to be in command, except in name only.

Farley: Right. Let me switch, please sir.

TAPE 3 SIDE 1

Farley: All right sir.

Whitlock: Well, <sup>late</sup> ~~late~~ after the war got under way, and I guess it was <sup>late</sup> ~~late~~ January or early February, I've kind of forgotten when it was, a decision was apparently made, and this is one of the few decisions that I didn't overhear, to send some of our people out of Corregidor. And they decided to send Charles Johns and

~~SECRET~~ H. V. C.

~~SECRET~~

Ted Hoover, who were the other two traffic analysts there <sup>out</sup> with the group headed by Fabian, Lt Fabian. And of course, Charlie Johns, being a good friend of mine, told me what was up and told me to keep my mouth shut, which I did. But it bothered me a little bit because it was all hush-hush. It was kept very closely under wraps, the planning for this. And so far as I could see, there was no real need for it because all of us in that tunnel were cleared for Top Secret. I took the same oath of secrecy that the people that were planning this <sup>did</sup> ~~was~~ and it was going to have some upon my performance on my work. And so I knew ~~that~~ this is the reason Charlie Johns told me, so that it wouldn't come as too great a shock to me, to find out that I was going to be left carrying the ball after those guys left. So. I don't know whether Johns ever <sup>said</sup> ~~sent~~ anything to Fabian or not. One night fairly late when the report had been out and so forth, <sup>Fabian</sup> ~~Fabian~~ come by and said, "Come on outside and you and Johns and Hoover come outside. I want to talk to you." So he took us out of the tunnel and he fished out a half a bottle of bourbon he stashed somewhere and decided to clue me in. And I don't know whether he decided to do this because ~~because~~ of Johns. I don't think so because I don't think Johns would have dared to tell him that he brought me into it. I think it was probably Fabian's decision. But at any rate, when he got through telling me, I told him roughly what I told you. ~~I said~~ <sup>I said</sup> I told him, ~~I said~~ "Well look. If you <sup>I don't</sup> ~~don't~~ want everybody that's left behind here

~~SECRET~~~~HUCCO~~

~~SECRET~~

thinking that you were taking a powder, you better let the rest of those boys inside know where you're going and why you're going."

And the next morning he put out a memorandum for "all hands" that was left there, outlining the plan.

Farley: Now <sup>you're</sup> ~~this morning~~ talking about the evacuation?

Whitlock: I'm talking about the evacuation. Yeah.

Farley: Could I cut this off and go back and talk about the winds message? Let's pick up first of December and give me a little <sup>chronology</sup> ~~chronology~~ of day by day and <sup>then</sup> work into the winds message.

Whitlock: <sup>All right</sup> ~~all right~~. Oh my gosh.. Well, that happened, of course, before December.

Farley: Yes. Right, right.

Whitlock: The setup for it. Well, ~~because~~ because I was an analyst, I was one of the first that was brought in to the fact that we should be on the lookout for the winds message. None of the operators were told what the meaning was. They were told what to look for, but not what the meaning would be.

I was told what the meaning was, what the meaning would be.

Farley. How were you aware that there was <sup>it was</sup> a "winds message"?

Whitlock: A winds message? Well, this was from decrypts, from <sup>P</sup> purple, from <sup>P</sup> purple decrypts. And of course, I don't know, and I can't say at this time, where that decrypt came from. I don't know whether that was one of the decrypts we got or <sup>it was</sup> something they got in Washington. I know they didn't get it in Pearl because Pearl didn't have a <sup>P</sup> purple machine. So it either would have had to <sup>have</sup> ~~of~~ been ours on <sup>Corridor</sup> ~~Washington~~ Washington and I suspect it was ours. I don't know for sure.

~~SECRET~~ HUSCO

~~SECRET~~

But at any rate, we were clued in as to what to look for, and what to expect as a result of it. So what we did is we <sup>got</sup> brought on every man off watch that we could bring. We went to a <sup>watch on</sup> watchman, watch off. Manned every position we could man. We put every language officer we had on watch and started tuning for Japanese broadcasts for them to monitor. We covered every weather broadcast that we knew of out of Tokyo. We covered everything we could think of.

Farley: You were monitoring all type circuits?

Whitlock: Yes. Everything that we could. Every place that we could possibly conceive of that message appearing. Weather circuits, the first place that we would look. The weather broadcasts. We were even watching the high-speed automatic circuits, the international circuits, because we figured if this decision was made it was going to go worldwide. It's not <sup>going to</sup> gonna go just to Washington. It's going to come down here to <sup>Manila</sup> Manila. It's going to go <sup>every</sup> every place in the world where there's a Japanese <sup>Consulate</sup> embassy or consulate that needs to be alerted. So we figured the chances of getting this was pretty damn good.

And we also, I also know that for some reason or other, I don't why, I don't think Guam was ever alerted. I don't remember <sup>for</sup> for sure. I'm not sure. I don't remember whether Guam was. <sup>M</sup> It may be because they didn't have <sup>any</sup> any linguists or anybody to translate it or something like this.

This could have been the reason. But I don't believe Guam was included. <sup>by</sup> I know Hawaii was, and I presume, and I've

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seen since then, that there was a lot of other people looking for it. <sup>I personally</sup> ~~personally~~ can't believe that that message could ever have been sent without someone other than a remote operator way back in Cheltenham picking it up. I just can't believe that someone back there would pick up a message that hadn't been heard by the people that were all covering everything coming out of Japan that we could think of. That this one operator should hear something that none of the rest of us could find. I just ~~flat~~ <sup>flat</sup> can't believe it.

Farley:

So you didn't hear either one, the winds or the winds execute message.

Whitlock:

Neither.

Farley:

Neither one.

Whitlock:

Nothing. There was one other incident that arose that I think that is probably worth mentioning. ~~It was long~~ <sup>in the</sup> Again, I think it was in perhaps in October, early November that one of these <sup>incidents</sup> ~~incidents~~ that I told you about, that you're aware of <sup>an anomaly</sup> ~~an anomaly~~, something that goes wrong on the part of the Japanese operators. <sup>Well,</sup> ~~And~~ something happened and I think it was around the first week of November, that we got a message, intercepted a message that had two aircraft carriers appeared in the heading of the message. ~~I believe~~ <sup>it was the</sup> I think it was the <sup>Zuikaku</sup> ~~Zuikaku~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~Shokaku~~ <sup>the Shokaku</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>I came</sup> ~~across~~ the same message that had been sent with what we call tactical call signs substituted for the ones that we had already identified. Now, the regular call signs

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at that time, were two characters and a number, like *haifu six*.  
~~haifu~~ Well, these tactical call signs, the number went first.  
<sup>six haifu.</sup>  
 I mean they wouldn't just put ~~6 haifu~~ I mean it was an  
 entirely different combination. That's just the type of  
 call sign. We called the ~~haifu~~ <sup>haifu six</sup> series as their service call  
 signs and then there was separate set of call signs, ~~add an~~  
 entirely different system, in which it would be a number,  
 character, character and we called that their tactical  
 call sign. Well, it was hard for us to ever recover  
 many of these because they would only use them for short  
 periods of time ~~and brief~~ <sup>in brief</sup> tactics or something like that.  
 They didn't use them long enough for us to really be sure of  
 what we were ~~getting~~ <sup>getting</sup>. So this to me represented a real coup.  
 By god, I had the tactical call signs for two of the carriers  
 as a result of them sending the same message with a different  
 heading. They sent it with a tactical heading and with a  
 service heading. So I kept watching traffic. We didn't  
 see anything more of the carrier call signs in the service  
 traffic. They disappeared. And we began to get concerned  
 about this. That there was this one carrier that we still  
 hadn't even spotted, but ~~all~~ <sup>not</sup> the rest of the carriers. <sup>The</sup> ~~the~~ one  
 that was coming down east ~~very~~ <sup>or</sup> down west of us. And we had him spotted  
 but all the rest of ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> the main carrier fleet, we couldn't  
 account for, but every day or two these damn tactical  
 call signs would show up on the circuits up around southern  
 Japan, up where they should be. Up around ~~Sikere station~~ <sup>? Seiki Air Station (?)</sup>,  
 up in that area. So this is all we had to go on. We

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kept figuring that these two carriers were still in that ~~LU~~ area.  
 and this is the only <sup>In</sup> ~~only~~ in retrospect, this is the only  
 instance where I suspect communication deception. That's  
 the only example of it in the whole war that I can point to  
 and say, "I think that that might have been deception."  
 But again, because there were these tactical call signs  
 we were just a little bit concerned about saying, yeah, the carriers  
 are still there.

Farley: Were we caught short? Suggesting that most of the fleet  
 was still in home waters based on incomplete intelligence?

Whitlock: Well, ~~well~~, I think obviously we were. "Nobody said  
 that, <sup>certainly</sup> ~~certainly~~ if anyone had said, "Hey, we think  
 there's some carriers coming over to strike you." No, we  
 didn't say that. We had no basis to say it. We were concerned  
 with the fact that we weren't seeing them all. I'll tell  
 you that, ~~and~~ I'll tell you ~~about~~ to emphasize that <sup>I'd</sup> ~~I'd~~ like to point  
 out <sup>perhaps</sup> ~~perhaps~~ my modesty shouldn't allow me to point it out.

But I offered a case of scotch to the first intercept operator  
 that found the frequencies that those carriers were using.

On Corregidor. Rufe Taylor found out about <sup>it</sup> ~~and~~ said,  
 "Hey, Whit. I hear you offered to buy the boys a case  
 of scotch if they found the carrier." I thought he was  
 going to chew me out. I said, "Yes sir, I did." He  
 says, "Let me pay for half of it." (laugh).

Farley: Good. He wanted to find out where they were, too.

Whitlock: Yeah.

Farley: Is there anything else immediately subsequent to Pearl Harbor

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that you'd like to recall? Let me ask a question again.

How did you find out about Pearl Harbor?

Whitlock:

Oh, I was waking from a deep sleep ~~and~~ on a nice beautiful moonlit night, somebody says, "You better get up and get your clothes on and get down to the tunnel. They hit Pearl Harbor." The reaction is ~~the~~ "No!" Beautiful moonlight night.

Oh, there is one other thing. And this concerns the support we gave to the Army. As these new organizations cropped up in the Japanese Navy where we ~~have~~ <sup>had</sup> no collateral, no background on them, they made it a little difficult

to figure out what they were. And we saw the Japanese Navy

Air Force being reorganized. And this again was late

1941. Not as late as the rest, I mean, ~~fully~~ well, not late. It was probably mid-1941. We saw this reorganization

taking place and we didn't know quite what to make of it.

~~We~~ <sup>We</sup> saw these new entities <sup>t</sup>forming up, new relationships

in these messages <sup>that</sup> I was telling you about. We would see

a command address that we didn't know who he was and then

we'd see a whole string of these different types of air units,

~~you know~~, And included is an information address. Well,

we knew who the air ~~units~~ <sup>units were</sup> from, but we didn't know who this

bugger was that the message was going to. ~~See~~ <sup>See</sup> so we had to...

We figured this must be a command which incorporates this particular group of aircraft, these different aircrafts.

And ~~we would~~ <sup>we would</sup> this is a traffic analyst job. So we'd go to the officers there and ask him to tell us something about

Naval air organization, because we didn't know. We didn't

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them.

so we'd have ~~em~~. We'd be intercepting them all the way. They were on CW. But they were using one-time pads. We couldn't read it. And we would follow these guys. We'd also got the DF on them. Taking DF on the planes. And the minute the bearing started shifting fast, we notified the Army. "You better stand by." And they learned from us and when we told them that they're coming in, they'd hit the air raid siren. That was the alert for Corregidor. We were providing that. And again, this is to counter the claim that we were not giving support to the Army. We'd give it to them when it was something they could use.

Farley: Did they shoot down any of the aircraft based on that early warning?

Whitlock: Not while I was there. No. While I was there the planes were coming over, oh I think around 15,000, 10 or 15,000 feet. And the only three-inch <sup>50</sup> caliber we had on <sup>Corregidor</sup> Corregidor was fused, I think, around <sup>seven or eight</sup> 8,170 <sup>on 8,170</sup> thousand or so. We were way below and couldn't begin to reach <sup>them</sup> ~~em~~. And they were pattern <sup>all</sup> bombers.

Farley: You mentioned John <sup>ie</sup> ~~Leitwiler~~, you want to talk about him at all? Anything that should be on the record?

Whitlock: Well, I think <sup>yes</sup> ~~yeah~~. I doubt if I can say anything about him that most other people haven't said. <sup>He was</sup> ~~He's~~ one hell of a fine Naval officer. "Honest <sup>to</sup> John, <sup>He</sup> he didn't come by that name by accident.

Farley: Was that because he was by the book?

Whitlock: He was by the book. <sup>you</sup> ~~He always~~ <sup>you</sup> could always predict him.

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You knew what he was going to do. You knew just exactly what to expect, if you knew the book. But he was a darned good officer. There's no question about that.

Farley.

What was his position in the structure there?

Whitlock.

<sup>As I said,</sup>  
~~Um--as I say,~~ Fabian was really running the show <sup>ie</sup> when <sup>ie</sup> Lettwiler arrived. Well, <sup>ie</sup> Lettwiler was supposed to be Fabian's relief, but Fabian refused to be relieved. So it was kind of a peculiar setup. I think we sort of looked at <sup>ie</sup> Lettwiler as being the assistant in charge until Fabian took his little band and headed for the East Indies <sup>or</sup> the West Indies <sup>or</sup> East Indies, which is it?

Yeah, East Indies. But from that point on, the burden, of course, <sup>ie</sup> fell on Lettwiler and the guys that worked with him admired him. He would really stand up for his men.

I suspect if he hadn't asserted himself, some of us wouldn't have gotten off Corregidor. I don't know whether this is documented anywhere. <sup>but I believe</sup> I'm not sure whether it was he or whether it was Taylor found out somehow or other that we were at the bottom of the evacuation list. And I know that <sup>ie</sup> Lettwiler had something to do with turning that list upside down. I don't know what it was, but I know that he was instrumental in getting it changed.

<sup>Things</sup> ~~Things~~ were getting pretty hectic <sup>by</sup> ~~but~~ the time I left and it got much more so after I left. I left in March <sup>well,</sup> you've got the record. I left on March the 15th, <sup>or</sup> March 16th, what was it?

Farley:

~~16th~~ Sixteenth.

Whitlock

<sup>Sixteenth.</sup>  
~~16th~~ Left there the 16th and we celebrated St. Patrick's Day

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under depth charge attack.

Farley: I have another date, too. 8 April. Was that the date of arrival down there?

Whitlock: 8 April?

Farley: What could that have been?

Whitlock: Well, let's see. 16th to the 8th, 16th from 30th is 14. That's close to being right.

Farley: Okay.

Whitlock: We landed in <sup>Freemantle.</sup> ~~Port Moresby~~ (2).

Farley: Tell me about <sup>it.</sup> ~~it.~~

Whitlock: Let me tell you just one thing more about <sup>Corregidor</sup> ~~Corregidor~~ before we <sup>move on</sup> ~~move on~~.

Farley: Well. <sup>Yeah</sup> ~~Yeah~~ okay. You talk, then I'll ask another question.

Whitlock: Well, you asked me about <sup>ie</sup> ~~Leftwiler~~ and I wanted to tell you something on that.

Farley: Yes please.

Whitlock: It got to the point that we sat up and worked as long as we could. We stayed at the desk and kept at it and we were probably putting in something on the order of 16, 18 hours a day, at least. All of us. And we were pulling additives. I mean your desk was always cluttered with papers and traffic and this sort of thing. And ~~several~~ <sup>at Cavite</sup> ~~when our Navy pulled out of Cavite~~ they cut loose a bunch of barges that they had down there and some of these barges drifted out and a couple of them <sup>wound</sup> ~~wound~~ up on Monkey Point out on the rocks. One of them had a bunch of old <sup>En field</sup> ~~En field~~ rifles in it and that's how we got our arms. Another one had big cases of chocolate which had all <sup>got</sup> ~~got~~ watered down with sea water and we'd sit out there and scrape it down you had a wafer about a quarter of an inch thick

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and starting with something about an inch and a half like this, what have you got? You got a little wafer like that. But at any rate, There was also a couple cases of coconut, ~~and we~~ shredded coconut. And we drug one of them up by the tunnel entrance and opened it up and everybody was quite welcome to help themselves to the coconut. So we had a ~~habit of~~ <sup>habit of</sup> taking a break around about 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning or midnight or so and go out and get a breath of fresh air and a handful of coconut that sort of hold us on. ~~There was a~~ <sup>John and I</sup> In the meantime, we had taken in another ~~with the~~ <sup>fellow, a</sup> chief that was helping me. I was writing the summaries and he was doing a lot to sort and tee up this stuff. <sup>Ei</sup> ~~Gieken~~ was his name. So Gike and I used to <sup>go</sup> ~~go~~ out and sit down and had a ritual of hitting this coconut case <sup>very often</sup> ~~very often~~. Well, we'd gone out this one night and had our coconut and come back in and gosh, here's <sup>ie</sup> ~~Leitwiler~~ sitting at his desk. Everything's cleared off it. There isn't a paper on his desk. And Taylor was sitting <sup>to</sup> ~~on~~ my left. His desk was completely cleaned. And they were sitting there field stripping their .45s. And so I jokingly said to Taylor, I said, "You expecting them aboard tonight?" Taylor looked up at me and said, "No, this is for you boys." He says that, "John and I have discussed it and we decided not to let a damn one of you fellows fall into their hands. We're going to shoot everyone of you and kill ourselves."

Farley.

~~a~~ Jeepers ~~-----~~

You didn't sleep well that night.

Whitlock.

I sat down rather abruptly. And they meant it, I mean, if you

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knew either one of them, you better believe that that's exactly what they intended to do. And I told them, <sup>I</sup> said, "I only <sup>got</sup> one request from you." I said, "When you shoot me, get me going away. I don't want to see it." (laugh)

Farley: The intelligence information you were collecting, the intercept, up to the bitter end were you still sending it to ~~Hypo~~ Hypo and back to D.C.?

Whitlock: Not up to the bitter end. It got to where there was nothing going out. ~~It was~~ <sup>We</sup> we used what we could get out of it locally and burned it. We would <sup>go</sup> go through it, report whatever we could report or whatever we could see, whatever we could break out of it, ~~and I imagine that while we~~ <sup>We</sup> had started burning almost immediately after December 7th. And we had been burning for days. We only had that one little incinerator there. And we were burning back stuff continuously to get it down to manageable proportions. So at the time I left, it was pretty well <sup>gone.</sup> ~~we~~ <sup>We</sup> were all right down to ~~right down to~~ almost to the bone. And they didn't have too much to get rid of. We were getting rid of it day by day and we only kept ~~the~~ the most basic reference documents that we needed.

Farley: What group were you in? Were you in the first, second or third group to be evacuated?

Whitlock: Well, actually it was the third group, but there was a mistake. The third group was sent out accidentally. Would you like to hear how it came out?

Farley: Please, please.

Whitlock: <sup>All</sup> ~~Right~~ <sup>A</sup>right. Well, we got word that there was a submarine coming

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in. She was bringing in some 3-inch .50 caliber  
ammunition that was <sup>fused</sup> fuse to reach those bombers that  
were coming over. So she come in and unloaded her  
ammunition and ~~then~~ this being the second group, we knew  
what was coming, so they put together a second group to  
be evacuated. Of course, after any one of these groups  
leave your morale sort of hits rock bottom. So this second  
group got underway late in the afternoon, in the evening,  
as a matter of fact. And <sup>I shoved</sup> I moved off and ~~then~~ I took one look  
at the traffic that day and decided there <sup>wasn't</sup> was a hell of  
a lot to write about, so I <sup>shoved</sup> shoved it aside and went and turned in ~~and~~  
figured I'll get a good night's sleep. I figured, hell,  
if I can't leave here, at least I can get a little rest.  
Well, I had a bunk just outside the tunnel entrance. I never had  
a bunk inside. I slept outside. Well, they had bunks  
inside, but not enough to take care of everyone. And  
they always kept <sup>at least</sup> one watch in those bunks. And everybody  
else, the dayworkers and everybody else, they slept  
outside. I never had a bunk in the tunnel. But at any  
rate, I turned in and got to sleep and all of a sudden all  
hell broke loose. I woke up and, <sup>God</sup> ~~god~~, there was ~~people~~ people  
running every which way. And Novak was the senior chief on  
<sup>Corridor</sup> ~~Corridor~~. I saw Novak running into the tunnel pulling  
his pants up and buckling his ammunition belt at the same time.  
~~And~~ I thought, <sup>Oh</sup> ~~oh~~ <sup>God</sup> ~~god~~, they're coming aboard tonight."  
Well, I was one the internal destruction party. So I  
dashed into the tunnel where I figured I was supposed to  
be if the Nips were landing. And, <sup>God</sup> ~~god~~, I come in and I ~~turned~~ turned

~~SECRET~~

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around the office and when I come in the office here was a group of people, sort of kneeling around the floor. And just as I come into the office Taylor was facing me. And I kind of come up behind this group and <sup>the</sup> heard <sup>the</sup> first thing I heard Taylor say to <sup>him</sup> ~~himself~~, "Well John, I, for one, <sup>will volunteer</sup> ~~volunteer~~ to stay here." Well this hit me pretty heavy. I thought, <sup>"My God, My God,"</sup> it doesn't take much guts to volunteer to stay in the tunnel."

I thought that's what he meant. And I didn't know what they were talking about for a second or two. And finally, ~~and Taylor~~ Taylor looked up and saw me standing there and he says, "How about you, ~~whit~~, <sup>whit</sup> can you go?" I said, "Go where?" He says, "To Australia." I said, "You're damn right, I ~~am~~ <sup>can</sup>." He says, "Can Geiken take over?"

I says, "I think so." He says, "Okay. Go. Get your stuff." So they named off, <sup>and all rounded up</sup> ~~round~~ a few people and we all got out, <sup>We</sup> ~~and we~~ got in this damn truck and headed down around <sup>Malinta</sup> ~~Milinda~~ Hill at night, with no lights on the damn truck. We lost one guy over the cliff down there in broad daylight. Went over the cliff with a tractor and a water tank. Crushed him. He was hauling water back and forth. ~~At~~ At any rate, we get around down there

and I don't remember which dock we went to. I don't know <sup>whether</sup> ~~whether~~ it was the north dock or the south dock. But I think

it might have been the south dock. It was the one that was closest to <sup>Bataan</sup> ~~Bataan~~, anyway. Well, we went down and they had a launch waiting for us. They loaded us in there with some lieutenant in this group. And the lieutenant told the coxswain that to take us over to <sup>Mariveles</sup> ~~Marvay~~. It was a submarine tender, an old <sup>(?) Autiss ??</sup> ~~Autiss~~ I think it was sitting over there.

And Presumably the submarine was over there. So this was,

~~Oh~~ I don't know, ~~and~~

~~SECRET~~ HVC

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one or two o'clock in the morning, <sup>Something</sup> something like that.

And we get over to the <sup>7 0015 (P)</sup> odds, and no submarine. And they asked where the sub is. <sup>They said "He's"</sup> ~~well, he's~~ headed out."

Well, he had to stay on the surface until he cleared the mine fields. So we headed out on the launch and chasing after him

and, <sup>God,</sup> ~~god,~~ we finally <sup>caught</sup> ~~found~~ him out there. We come up alongside and the first thing we heard is, "Goddamn it, I can't ~~and~~ take those men on here. I <sup>can't</sup> ~~can't~~ take those men aboard."

And nevertheless we come along side and this lieutenant <sup>who</sup> was with us ~~we~~ hopped over on the sub and went up in the <sup>conning</sup> tower. And there was a heated argument. The skipper was saying, "My <sup>God, I've</sup> ~~god, I've~~ only got room for fighting men on this boat." He says, "These guys have done their fighting. I'm taking them out of here." And they was pow-wow-ing up there something <sup>terrific</sup> ~~terrific~~. So finally, this lieutenant come back and told us to come aboard, remain top side. In the meantime, we're still heading for the mine fields. So we come aboard and most of us didn't have anything. There was a few that brought their stuff along dropped it on the submarine. I had an old pair of dungarees and nothing else that I was wearing. <sup>I had</sup> the clothes I was wearing. So all of a sudden we <sup>find</sup> this lieutenant that was with us taking men off the submarine, putting <sup>them</sup> back in this boat. We didn't know what the heck was going on. And finally the skipper up on the bridge says, <sup>All</sup> "All right, we can't take all night with this. I <sup>got to</sup> ~~gotta~~ get out of here. Get those men below." So we go below and this lieutenant <sup>who came with</sup> ~~come with~~ us, stayed. And were we surprised <sup>we</sup> ~~we~~ go below and here's the whole batch we sent out earlier in the day. And what had happened, is that on the

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Permit.

way up to Corregidor the <sup>ei</sup> ~~Archibald~~ this submarine, spotted  
 all ~~one~~ of the PT boats that had left ~~Corregidor~~ in Corregidor in  
 McArthur's party. And this PT boat had broken down and  
 they'd beached it. And apparently they were running  
 "chuck-o'-block" so that ~~McArthur~~ and the rest of them. ~~McArthur~~  
~~McArthur~~ and this group ~~of~~ <sup>they</sup> didn't have room to take this  
 crew aboard. They had too much aboard so they relieved  
 this boat of ~~its~~ <sup>its</sup> fuel supply and told the crew to carry  
 on and fight the war as best they could and shoved off  
 and left them sitting there on this sand spit. Well,  
 when the Permit come up there they spotted this crew  
 or this boat. They went over and took the crew off and  
 destroyed the boat and brought the crew back up to ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>Corregidor</sup>  
 Well, this Lieutenant JG was the skipper of the PT boat.  
 And what he'd done is when they got into ~~Corregidor~~ <sup>Corregidor</sup>, he'd  
 gone over and reported to the senior naval officer  
 who was the <sup>C</sup>captain, who was acting in place of the <sup>A</sup>admiral,  
 who had gone batty on us, as the <sup>C</sup>commandant. He reported to  
 the <sup>C</sup>commandant and requested that his crew be assigned to  
 the naval battalion that was fighting in ~~Bataan~~ <sup>Bataan</sup>. And the  
 allowed as to how that was proper and so ordered. And  
 then the guy requested permission to return to his command.  
 And the commandant said, "All right," but this <sup>Lieutenant JG</sup> ~~Lieutenant JG~~  
 neglected to tell him that his command was in Australia.

Farley:

Great.

Whitlock:

So he went back to the boat and told the submarine skipper  
 what the <sup>C</sup>commandant had said, to disembark his men, that they

~~SECRET~~ HVC

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were to be transferred to the Navy battalion on ~~the~~ <sup>Balaan</sup> and submarine skipper said, "Well, I will like hell. <sup>Ad. I'm taking</sup> ~~take~~ <sup>them</sup> ~~em~~ out of here." So this lieutenant <sup>L</sup> ~~turned~~ <sup>to</sup> around and hightailed it back up to see the <sup>C</sup> captain, the <sup>C</sup> commandant, and while he was gone the submarine skipper got underway. And one of the PT boat skippers ~~said that~~ <sup>C</sup> told the commandant that "Moon" <sup>Chappel</sup> ~~Chappel~~ had refused to offload the PT boat crew. The <sup>C</sup> commandant ordered the submarine back in again. So when she come back in the coast watchers sighted her <sup>coming</sup> ~~going~~ in and reported a submarine standing, so they activated another <sup>group</sup>.

Farley: Oh no.

Whitlock: They activated another evacuation group. And we went out in that unit and that was the group I was in.

Farley: Oh, I see. I see. So you were pretty well loaded down then.

Whitlock: Well, as I recall, it was the P boat. She was designed, I think, for a crew of about 60. We had a hundred and twenty aboard. And it got a bit tight after we <sup>were</sup> ~~down~~ 38 hours <sup>under</sup> ~~on~~ the depth charge attack. The water temperature at the time of the attack, the induction temperature was 83 degrees. And we had all cooling systems turned off. And there was so many people aboard that everybody who wasn't on watch had to be in a bunk. There just wasn't enough room. Half the people were in the bunks and the other half was on watch. And the bunks were

three deep and they were covered with canvas, zippered canvas <sup>mattresses.</sup> over the ~~mattresses~~. And the <sup>transients</sup> ~~transients~~ slept on top of <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ canvas and the crew who normally used the bunks, would sleep on the <sup>mattress</sup> ~~mattress~~.

But that was no particular advantage because it got so damn hot that the people laying on these bunks sweat through the

canvas, ~~the~~ <sup>through the mattress</sup> sweat ~~on the mattress~~. And <sup>perspiration</sup> ~~perspiration~~ is the <sup>per</sup> ~~per~~spiration

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

collecting on the deck plate ~~and it~~ stood in a puddle about this deep against the ~~with the~~ bulkhead. It was hot in there, believe me.

Farley: I can believe it. For 38 hours?

Whitlock: Yeah. And it got to where the oxygen was almost gone on us. ~~We got through the~~ Oh what's this chemical they spray? I forgot. There's a chemical they sprayed ~~that~~ takes the carbon monoxide out of the air. They sprayed that and you could get over and get down and get a ~~whiff~~ <sup>whiff</sup> and get a little oxygen. But it got to where if you strike a match, the match wouldn't light. ~~It was just like~~ <sup>you</sup> you wouldn't even see any flame at all.

Farley: Boy, that's really <sup>an</sup> absence of oxygen.

Whitlock: And we were down ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> he was conning ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ship manually ~~and~~ <sup>because</sup> they were lining up to take turns ~~on~~ <sup>on</sup> the wheel ~~since~~ <sup>since</sup> you could get about one pull on it. ~~And then~~

Farley: Exhausting?

Whitlock: Exhausting, and then you just sit down and pant for a few minutes and crawl ~~in with all~~ <sup>around</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>and</sup> during all of this, of course we were all just in ~~skivvies~~ <sup>skivvies</sup> skivvy pants. Skipper sitting in the middle of the conning ~~car~~ <sup>tower</sup> in skivvy pants ~~that~~ <sup>buggers</sup> outguessing the little ~~buggers~~ <sup>buggers</sup> up above. But he'd sit there and, of course, ~~the sound man~~ <sup>the sound man</sup> it was piped ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> and you could hear whatever ~~he was hearing~~ <sup>he was hearing</sup> through the whole sub And you could hear ~~them~~ <sup>them</sup> ping, ping, ping on ~~them~~ <sup>us</sup>. And when they finally got us up, it was just like somebody hitting the hull with a sledge hammer. I mean, ping, boy! ~~Really~~ <sup>It would really</sup> ring, you know. And then what would happen is ~~this guy~~ <sup>one of the DDs</sup> would lay

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off and ping on us and the other two would make a run  
 and drop the depth charges. So sound man screw bearing so-and-so  
<sup>Speeding</sup>  
~~screw's~~ bearing so-and-so. <sup>Speeding</sup> Feeding up and coming closer,  
<sup>Speeding</sup> feeding up and coming closer. And all of a sudden you hear ~~in~~ them  
 go over the top (sound effects) Right over the top of you and  
 then you just sit there like this.

Farley. And wait.

Whitlock: And wait. Pretty soon you hear a click." and right after that  
 a "wham" and the whole sub just goes like this and this steam <sup>Pipes were</sup>  
~~At the~~ shattered <sup>and</sup> go flying all over the place. It was quite  
 an experience.

Farley: I can believe it was.

Whitlock: I wouldn't take a million <sup>dollars</sup> for it, but I think <sup>I'd</sup> put up  
 a million to avoid it.

Farley: Wouldn't do it again, huh?

Whitlock: How long did it take you to get to Freemantle?

Whitlock: About 20 days.

Farley: You were aboard that thing for twenty days?

Whitlock: Yeah. uh...

Farley: Anybody ~~At the~~ crack up?

Whitlock: Are you interested in more of the story?

Farley: Yes please. I'm sorry.

Whitlock: Well, after we got away from ~~At the~~ these destroyers, we  
 went on south and turned east, south of Mindanao. We were  
 going over north <sup>of the Celebes</sup> ~~east, south of~~ <sup>of the Celebes</sup>. And we come to periscope depth  
 one night and looked around and the skipper spotted a bunch of lights  
 in the horizon. He battle surfaced. Went tearing in there

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~~SECRET~~

and it turned out to be a bunch of fishing boats. It could have been the whole Japanese. <sup>Navy.</sup> Oh we knew that, <sup>yeah,</sup> this was something else. We knew that the whole Japanese <sup>S</sup> second <sup>F</sup> fleet was down in this area. This is from our analysis. I knew this. I knew the whole Japanese <sup>S</sup> second <sup>F</sup> fleet was down there. They had a base that they'd taken over in <sup>Kendari</sup> ~~on the Celebes~~ <sup>on the Celebes</sup>. And they had a base at Ambouina, Ambon Island. And <sup>spread</sup> ~~Surabaya~~ <sup>Surabaya</sup>. And the whole Japanese <sup>S</sup> second <sup>F</sup> fleet was <sup>spread</sup> out between these three bases. Well, we were going down right down between two of them. We were going down between <sup>Kendari and Ambon</sup> ~~Kendari and Ambon~~. And about three o'clock in the afternoon we come up to periscope depth to look around and spotted <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ Japanese merchant ship at extreme range heading south. So <sup>he</sup> ~~we~~ battle surfaced in <sup>broad</sup> daylight and <sup>started</sup> ~~started~~ chasing that doggone Japanese ship. Well, the Japanese ship could make just about the same speed that we could and we <sup>couldn't</sup> ~~couldn't~~ close with him. We <sup>chased him</sup> ~~chased him~~ all afternoon, damn near getting dark, so Moon finally says, "Prepare to fire two, two and four." He's going to take a crack at him at something like seven thousand yards. So they readied two torpedoes. <sup>Old Moon</sup> ~~Old Moon~~ touched them off and almost immediately ordered "crash dive," "crash dive." One of those damn fish went out and circled around and come right back at us. We were down to about 155 feet and right over the top of us you could hear the screws on the thing.

Farley: Did he hit the Japanese <sup>U.S. ship?</sup> ~~U.S. ship?~~

Whitlock: Nooo. He ~~had~~ <sup>well</sup> when we spotted <sup>The</sup> ~~the~~ torpedo situation was terrible early in the war

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Farley. I heard that. *Let me switch tapes.*

~~Whitlock~~ *Excuse me let me 111.*

Tape 3 Side 2

Farley. *All* ~~right~~ *right* sir.

Whitlock. On the subject of torpedoes. When we run into the *Des Div Three,* ~~Des Div Three,~~ south of Corrigedor, when we first surfaced and run into

*them* ~~him~~ *He* and was taken under attack. ~~he~~ *he* had fired two torpedoes

at that time. And if he'd hit any of those destroyers, it probably wouldn't have been quite so bad for us. But he missed and one of the fish went up on the beach and exploded.

But then we took a *beating* ~~beating~~ for a while. But at any rate, on this merchant ship, we fired at and missed and we had to dive to get away from our own fish. We proceeded on down and we were

going to go through a passage. *like the way my mind is getting*

*I* knew at one time what the name of the passage was. But it was into the east of ~~Timor~~ *Timor.* There's a passage into the Indian Ocean.

Then we were going to go through this passage. Well,

we were going to hit it during the daylight hours so we had to go through it submerged. Well, *at the* ~~first~~ *we* ~~passing~~ ~~missed~~ it

and we wound up in an inlet looking at native villiage right

in the eye. And then when we finally hit the passage, the

tide was running through it. It caught us and we went through

that passage sideways making about 15 knots.

Farley. Sideways yet?

Whitlock. Yeah. So we got through that passage. We're *+* ~~southeast~~ *of* southeast of *Timor* ~~in the~~ *We're* ~~wide open ocean.~~ *we're* ~~free.~~ *!* Every time we went through

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one of these areas we expected to find it mined or something like that, you know. Wide open ocean. The nearest land is five miles away straight down. So the submarine skipper had been up all hours up to that point, so he decided to turn in and get some sleep. I was sitting in the little dinette area that they have and then they have racks <sup>that has</sup> ~~that's got~~ slots in them for the dishes. You slide the dishes down the slot so that ~~well~~ when you're submerged in a submarine, you're never on even keel. You're stern down or bow down. You're going along like this, or at least you were in those days. So you had to have this <sup>protection</sup> ~~protection~~ to keep the dishes from flying out. Well; we're cruising along and you get used to this, you don't think <sup>nothing</sup> ~~nothing~~ of it, but all of <sup>of a</sup> sudden it seems like we were getting a pretty steep angle. The bow ~~and~~ or the stern was dropping. I sort of looked around <sup>and</sup> ~~nobody~~ seemed anxious <sup>about it</sup> and all of a sudden these damn dishes started flippin' out of these racks. I ~~heard~~ <sup>heard</sup> the skipper yell, "What the hell's going on back there?" He got out of his bunk. And somebody said, "Nothing sir. Everything's fine." And it was quiet for a second or two. Skipper says, "Like ~~like~~ hell it is." And he stepped out ~~of his bunk~~ <sup>of his bunk</sup> he stepped out into the passageway, missed his footing and fell right through the area that we were sitting, <sup>"Boom!"</sup> ~~"boom"~~ this way. I mean, it was just like he was dropping down. We were about like this. Well, what had happened ~~was~~ <sup>is</sup> some doggone knucklehead crew member had pumped the four trim tanks with the valves inboard and he pumped these trim tanks right into the ~~the~~ after control room. And by the time the skipper caught

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~~SECRET~~

it, the shafts were turning in water and the water was <sup>within</sup> ~~at~~ about six inches of our motors, electric motors.

Farley: That's all you need.

Whitlock: And ~~the way~~ he was lucky. He was lucky he ever got us out of that. We were just damn lucky. That was the closest squeak I think we had on the whole trip. He managed to get it evened out. Got us out of there.

Farley: You were lucky to end up in Australia.

Whitlock: Yeah, you better believe it.

Farley: Can we move to Melbourne or is there something in ~~between~~?

Whitlock: No, I believe I just about...covered everything

Farley: You landed at Fremantle, then?

Whitlock: Fremantle and took a train down. ~~ml~~

Farley: Took a train down to ? ~~ml~~

Whitlock: Five days and we stopped at every state border and changed trains because of the different ~~languages~~.

Farley: Wide gauge and narrow gauge.

Whitlock: Yeah. Well, when we got ~~when we got~~ there, of course, the first group had already arrived and they had started to set up shop. The intercept site at ~~Morabin~~ <sup>Morabin</sup> had not been completed. So we toolled around there for a week or two before we really started producing ~~the thing~~ <sup>again</sup>. We, of course, were in at the Monterey flats as an apartment house that we had taken over. Or that apparently the Australian Navy, in conjunction with Fabian had worked out a deal to take this place. It was a brand new building. They went through and knocked out holes through the wall so they had passageways

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all through the building. <sup>They wrecked</sup> They wrecked the poor guy's apartment building, but I doubt <sup>if</sup> he ever got paid for it either.

Farley: Probably not.

Whitlock: But at any rate, when we finally did get into operation, they had this group of <sup>WIRANS</sup> who they had trained. And they had trained them to copy with pencil. And it took a little retraining to get them around to using our <sup>RIP-5s</sup> ~~ripes~~.

Farley: Who was in charge of that first element that set up in Melbourne?

Whitlock: Fabian was.

Farley: Where was Mason then?

Whitlock: Mason. Well, Mason was there, but Mason was not really in the cryptologic business. He was there as an intelligence officer. But he did set up shop with us. He was the senior officer at Monterey Flat. But this was only temporary. The Australian contingent was headed by a Commander Newman, who was Royal Navy. He wasn't Australian. He was Royal Navy. <sup>COMINT</sup> And the Australian <sup>COMINT</sup> effort was under his wing. He, incidentally, had been lashed <sup>with</sup> to the cat of nine tails when he was an <sup>E</sup>nsign. He was a staid individual if you've ever seen one. Carried his kerchief in his cuff. It was <sup>WIRAN</sup> really amazing; amusing really, because you could set your watch by that man and he demanded absolute quiet while he was working. He had two <sup>WIRAN</sup> officers working in his office with him and they'd tiptoe around the office. No typewriters in there. And he would sit ~~there~~ at his desk.

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~~SECRET~~~~JUST~~

Farley: At attention.

Whitlock: At attention. Everything neat, in its place. Anytime between 8:30 and 10 o'clock the door would fly open, in come Rosie Mason. He'd mostly plop <sup>his</sup> backside down in a chair and put his feet up on Newman's desk, toss his <sup>hat</sup> ~~head~~ over and said, "Good morning, Jack. What's cooking?" (laugh) It finally wore the old bugger down. He finally got to be a human being.

Farley: Turned in his suit.

Whitlock: Okay.

Farley: <sup>the</sup> 12th of March <sup>12 1942</sup> ~~13~~ they said FRUMEL was set up at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne. <sup>was that when</sup>

Whitlock: <sup>the</sup> 12 March of <sup>12 1942</sup> ~~13~~ that was Fabian's group.

Farley: Okay.

Whitlock: That was before I got there.

Farley: <sup>All</sup> ~~right~~ right. You were at Monterey.

Whitlock: Yeah.

Farley: Okay.

Whitlock: They had just move into Monterey. As I say, they just got through knocking the walls out of it and getting <sup>desks</sup> ~~desks~~ some stuff for us.

Farley: Were you aware of the U.S. Army contingent in Melbourne, called Central Bureau?

Whitlock: Not really.

Farley: ~~Okay~~ Okay

Whitlock: No.

Farley: They were down there at that time, just about that same time.

~~SECRET~~ ~~AVECO~~

~~SECRET~~

Whitlock About the same time? No, I wasn't aware.

Farley. Okay.

Whitlock I didn't know too much about what the Army was doing except that I heard reports. Oh, Taylor would mention things or <sup>ie</sup> Letwiler or Fabian mention something. Rufe Taylor used to come back and say he tried the best he could while he was briefing <sup>Mac Arthur</sup> ~~McArthur~~ to count the ribbons on his chest and he said he never did get them all counted (laugh).

Farley: A little diversion <sup>there?</sup> ~~method~~ Did you immediately plunge in to the operation again. That is <sup>receiving</sup> ~~receiving~~ traffic?

Whitlock. Just as soon as we had anything we had to get our hands in to. And <sup>Morabin</sup> ~~A. Morabin~~ turned out to be a pretty good intercept <sup>site.</sup> ~~site.~~ It was quite a ways removed from <sup>us and</sup> ~~where~~ they had an Australian <sup>Courier</sup> ~~The~~ Australian Army courier run a motor bike in early in the morning to bring the traffic into us. But it turned out to be an amazingly good <sup>site,</sup> ~~site,~~ surprisingly good site. And the quality of those women operators was excellent. They had operators there that some of our people wished they were as good as. They were good. And this message that I spoke of and Rufe Taylor recovered the code group, was intercepted at <sup>Morabin</sup> ~~Morabin~~ Morabin.

Farley: Very good. Who did your intercept then? Just one site out there or were there more?

Whitlock No there was ~~just one~~ <sup>well there was</sup> a site. ~~at the~~ The Australians had a site up at ~~on~~ <sup>on</sup> what's the capital city?

Farley: Uh, starts with C. ((Canberra))

Whitlock. They had <sup>The</sup> ~~peculiar~~ The Australians had a peculiar system.

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~~SECRET~~

They wouldn't ~~refer to their base~~ refer to their base according to the name of the town it was in. They had different names for each one of their stations and I never can remember the name of the station.

Farley. Canberra?

Whitlock. Canberra. Well, it was near Canberra.

Farley: ~~Belconon?~~ Belconnen?

Whitlock: Belconnen, Belconnen. Belconnen. Belconnen, yeah, it was near Belconnen. Okay. I never can remember the name of the doggone place.

Farley: Okay.

Whitlock: But at any rate, we finally got to where we getting traffic down from that place, too, but it was sort of delayed. <sup>It was</sup> a little below behind the late force.

Farley. Who provided all your analytical aids to replace those that were burned?

Whitlock: We brought, ~~for~~ the first group brought out a complete set of documents with them, so that they planned to go into business in Indonesia. In the East Indies. But they didn't make it.

Farley: What American units were you supporting in Melbourne?

Whitlock: Commander <sup>S</sup> ~~Seventh~~ <sup>F</sup> fleet.

Farley: Okay. I see. Any Army elements at all? If you had <sup>useful</sup> information ~~you slipped~~ to them?

Whitlock: Well, ~~that~~ <sup>any</sup> anything of that nature was handled on a ~~personal~~ <sup>personal</sup> basis and in briefings. We participated. I know. ~~And~~ I know that we participated. I don't know to what degree. But I do know that officers in our unit <sup>there</sup> did participate in the

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~~SECRET~~

Army briefings there. I don't know to what extent or what they provided to them or anything. We didn't formally address the Army in communications. We addressed nothing to them in the way of reports <sup>of</sup> that nature.

Farley: Okay. I have a note here saying April '42 FRUPAC moved to the Monterey building.

Whitlock: April '42, that's about right. That's just about the time we got there. You had 8 April?

Farley: 8 April earlier.

Whitlock: Yeah, okay. Well, that's pretty ~~well~~ close

Farley: That's good. That's good sequence. When did you get a direct commission?

Whitlock: Well, ~~in~~ in '43. In '43, I had just made chief radioman. I had been chief radioman for a year. I'd made chief radioman <sup>I</sup> and ~~just got~~ used to be that your acting appointment as a chief petty officer, your acting appointment then become permanent. Well, I'd just become permanent appointment when I come into work one day and the first thing they said was, "Fabian wants to see you." So I went out looking for him and run into him in the hallway. And he "Good morning, Whit" or something or other. And he <sup>yak yaked</sup> ~~yak~~ about something else. And he started to turn around and go away. I said, "They told me down there that you wanted to see me for something." "Oh yeah! Come on." And he rammed his finger into my solar plexis and says, "I'm going to make an officer out of you." I said, "Well, thanks a lot." At that time, you know, ~~it was~~ <sup>it was</sup> to make chief in the few years it took me to make it was quite an accomplishment so I didn't figure he was doing me any

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~~SECRET~~

particular favor. But ~~when~~ <sup>he</sup> recommended that I be commissioned <sup>L</sup> Lieutenant <sup>J.G.</sup> ~~in~~ And when the commission come through it was <sup>E</sup> ensign, date of rank, August 14th, 1943. <sup>12</sup> I was a little perturbed, in retrospect, I wasn't at the time. Because at the time, I didn't really realize what I was doing or the importance of what I was doing. It was a job. And I looked to the officers on the scene as the people who were overseeing the job and they knew what was being done and approving of what was being done. And it wasn't a matter of who was getting credit for it or anything. It never occurred to me ~~why~~ that I was doing anything exceptional. I was doing what I thought was expected of me. And ~~that~~ it wasn't until quite some time later, considerably later, I'd gone back and put a tour in Washington and come back out to Pearl Harbor at the end of the war. And I was at Pearl Harbor at the end of the war when I was told to get into a good uniform and come down. The <sup>A</sup> Admiral had wanted to see me. Well, I presented myself to the <sup>C</sup> Commandant of the 14th Naval District and he cited me, gave me a bronze star.

Farley: Great.

Whitlock: With the citation was <sup>so</sup> ~~sanitized~~ that it was absolutely meaningless. But I earned that as an enlisted analyst. That's what I got it for. One of the officers we had on Corrigedor, Gil Richardson, apparently saw notice of my award someplace in some <sup>N</sup> Navy magazine. He <sup>sat</sup> ~~wrote down~~ <sup>it</sup> down and wrote a letter to the Bureau of <sup>P</sup> Personnel, and on the basis of his letter they awarded me a "combat V" to go on the ~~44~~ ribbon.

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~~SECRET~~

Farley. Excellent.

Whitlock: But something rather distasteful had happened in the interim, that I went back to Washington with this Bronze Star and I found out that a WAVE officer back there who was the granddaughter of the baseball commissioner, Landis, had been awarded a Bronze Star. And what it was awarded for is she had been playing ~~and she was~~ hostess for the Captain's social events, who was a single man. And I took that Bronze Star <sup>off</sup> and wouldn't wear it until I got this notation of the Combat V and ~~it~~ then I figured it was <sup>all right</sup> ~~all right~~ to wear it.

Farley. That really would degrade a <sup>medal,</sup> ~~medal~~, wouldn't it?

Whitlock. Yeah.

Farley: That's too bad. Whit, what should we talk about now when you're in operation in Melbourne as relates to the progress of the war? Any significant or outstanding contributions other than those that you've already talked about?

Whitlock: Well, I mentioned <sup>off</sup> ~~the~~ course, there was the battle of <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ Coral Sea, which we provided information on prior to, during and after. There was the Midway deal. But I just cite these as examples of ongoing reports that were coming out of there pretty continuously. I haven't really dwelt too much on the technical aspects of this and I think it might be well to say a couple things about that.

Farley. Please.

Whitlock: A lot is made <sup>about</sup> ~~about~~ the difficulty, about the achievements really, in breaking the Japanese operations code, JN-25.

~~SECRET~~ HUGCO

~~SECRET~~

about the Navy. It was a reasonably complex code at the time and it was cited as quite an achievement of being to get into it and stay with it through these changes. Of course, there were breaks in our favor. But little has ever been said about the difficulty of staying with the callsign system changes, which, as I pointed out earlier, were essential to being able to provide the glue or the continuity of the whole reporting system. This was no small responsibility. It was no small problem to satisfactorily deal with. Because the Japanese Navy got pretty sophisticated in their callsign systems during the course of the war. Now one of the things that I think that helped us in Melbourne was that we managed for the first time to get our hands on a captured navy callsign book and we were able to, on the basis of that, to validate what we had been doing that showed us that we are right. We knew what we were talking about. This book was particularly helpful to us, although it was helpful to us in helping us to recover new changes because they had the listing within the callsign book. Any new book come out, it had the same order. You understand what I mean?

Farley: Yes.

Whitlock: The ships and all of the organizations were still in the same order. So this was a big help to us in getting into the systems when they change. Now to give you some idea of the complexity of these callsign systems, we had a system that came in while I was in Melbourne.

~~SECRET~~ H VCC



~~SECRET~~

of this. It was business as usual for us, you know. We were sitting there. So we come back after lunch and one of the guys brought a bottle along and he pulled open one of these drawers and stuck the bottle in there. And about midafternoon, well, we'd taken a little swig on it once in a while, and about midafternoon Fabian walked in. And everytime he come down there he's always making some comment about that 32 drawer monstrosity. "When you going to start using it" sort of thing. Well, he walked in about three o'clock this afternoon, "When you going to start using this file cabinet?" He reached over and out of 32 drawers he pulled out the one with the <sup>liquor</sup> ~~liquor~~ bottle in it.

Farley: You were using it.

Whitlock: He said, "You better get rid of that." We did.

Well, I get off in nonsense like this.

Farley: No, no, no. This is worthwhile. As I say, <sup>it</sup> detract<sup>s</sup> from <sup>the</sup> routine, or it's a digression from the routine, which has been covered in some detail in the reports and the records. But not like you have today, which is extremely worthwhile. Do you think of anything else ~~that~~ <sup>that is</sup> in the way of support to the <sup>F</sup>leets or support to <sup>Mac</sup>Arthur, or successes in helping to shorten the war in the Pacific?

Whitlock: ~~Well~~ There are several other things I can talk about. Yeah. To give you some examples, some of the other things that was done, at one period we got to where we got into the position where we were reading JN-25 pretty good. They intercepted a message that was originated by a Japanese <sup>A</sup>dmiral, who incidentally happened to be the commander of one these

~~SECRET~~

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<sup>Air Flot</sup>  
 air flotillas, ~~air~~ Flot 22. And this fellow was in Truk  
 and he sent a message to Tokyo, <sup>N</sup> ~~naval~~ <sup>H</sup> Headquarters, and he was  
 complaining about problems with communications security.  
 And he said that they were giving the enemy valuable  
 information in their communications. And then he cited  
 several messages that had been originated by a small tanker,  
 which had departed Truk for ~~Guadalcanal~~ <sup>Kwajalein</sup>. And he cited  
 what information the enemy could have got out of it, ~~just~~ <sup>out of</sup>  
 the headings of the messages. And it turns out that this  
 little old tanker was sunk entering ~~Guadalcanal~~ <sup>Kwajalein</sup>. So I went back and  
 pulled out our reports covering this period. And by ~~god~~ <sup>God</sup>, that's  
 just the way we called it. This <sup>A</sup> admiral knew what he was  
 talking about. Fortunately about two days later, Halsey hit  
 Truk in their first attack and that <sup>A</sup> admiral was killed. That  
 was where it ended right there. So we got some breaks  
 through the war.

Farley. Yeah, yeah. That's right.

Whitlock: Another thing that I might mention about on the technical  
 side, and again, I wish my memory was a little sharper so  
 far as the place, the specific places are concerned, ~~but~~  
~~there was~~ <sup>Again</sup> this bears upon ~~callsign~~ <sup>callsign</sup> and code recoveries.  
 The technical problems that we were up against. There  
 was a Japanese naval detachment up in northern Borneo.  
 It wasn't either ~~Lae or Salamaua~~ <sup>Lae or Salamaua</sup>, but there was some little  
 place. ~~Whit~~ I can't remember the name of it, but it's almost  
 due west of Rabaul, but it's on New Guinea. Well, this little  
 unit over there got themselves cut off. They were

~~SECRET~~ HVCUO

~~SECRET~~

isolated. It was a <sup>N</sup>avy landing party. So we got a code change and wouldn't you know it, this poor little outfit over there didn't have the new code. So we would see a brand new JN-25 message coming out of Tokyo going down to this little unit here and then it'd go into Rabaul. Rabaul would have to reencode it in the old system.

~~Farley:~~~~Beautiful.~~~~Whitlock:~~

<sup>Send</sup> and sent it over there. Not only codes, but they give away much of their call sign system the same way.

Farley:

What a break. Beautiful.

Whitlock:

It's things like this that helped us along. It wasn't the whole answer. One other thing that happened on <sup>Corregidor</sup> ~~Corregidor~~ that I think I should mention, and this is mentioned also in this document here that I showed you.

Farley:

Yes.

Whitlock:

Right after the first of December, of course, the Japanese Navy changed their JN-25, their major code on the first of December, 1941. And actually, we were not deriving too much intelligence from that code even before that. I mean, it hadn't got to the point that it was really readable. And again, intelligence up to that point was largely, on the basis of traffic analysis with what other sketchy stuff we could get out of the JN-25 decrypts, which didn't amount to a hill of beans, really. But at any rate, after this major code change, I think it was probably right after Pearl Harbor, it might have been before <sup>or</sup> somewhere between the 6th and the 10th, I think it was after Pearl Harbor really. <sup>through</sup> ~~through~~ analyzing the We ~~got~~ <sup>got</sup> come across and going through and analyzing the

~~SECRET~~ HUCU

~~SECRET~~

traffic, we come across the same message. Two entirely different texts. Checking it out, <sup>they</sup> ~~we~~ had sent one text in the plain code, they'd forgot to encrypt it. And then they encrypted it.

Farley: What more do you need? *Flynn.*

Whitlock: And we were in like *flint* Well, we're the ones and again this is in this little document here. It was Corregidor that told Hawaii and told Washington that the code was still good. That we were into it, that we knew what had happened to it. We were the ones that did that. Pearl Harbor never did anything like that.

Farley: No, well, it's wonderful to have all this on the record.

Whitlock: Well I say Pearl Harbor never did anything like that. They didn't, up to that point in the war. Later on, they had some good people. Don't misunderstand me. They had some sharp people in Hawaii. If I remember right, one of them is now one of the supreme court justices.

Farley: *Whizzer White? "Whizzer" White?*

Whitlock: Huh? *"Whizzer"*

Farley: Not ~~Whizzer~~ White.

Whitlock: No no.

Farley: No, okay. He was Admiral Burke's buddy. I know who you mean, but I can't place <sup>him</sup> ~~me~~ I can't remember <sup>his</sup> ~~his~~ name.

Whitlock: Stevens? <sup>uh</sup> Is it Stevens? *uh*

Farley: Stevens, Stevens. Stevens is right.

Whitlock: Yeah.

Farley: He's newly appointed. Right

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~~SECRET~~

Whitlock: Yeah. ~~Farley~~.

Farley: Stevens is the name.

Whitlock: Well, he was at FRUPAC. And I think he was one <sup>of</sup> the guys who was responsible for breaking one of the last call sign ~~sign~~ systems that the Japs used on us, which turned out to be the simplest one the ever used, really. It was a ~~strip~~ <sup>strip</sup> cipher that was used. ~~that was nothing~~ <sup>Nothing</sup> to it.

Farley: How come FRUMEL didn't move north when ~~Mac Arthur~~ <sup>Mac Arthur</sup> and his headquarters moved to Brisbane and then up toward the Philippines?

Whitlock: ~~Well, I think~~ <sup>Well, I think</sup> that this would have presented some problems ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> continuity, for one thing. I don't think we could have afforded to split up the effort to make the move. You had to carry on here while you were ~~pulling~~ <sup>pulling</sup> up there and it wasn't worth the gamble. I don't know this to be the fact. No one ever brought this up, but if I were asked to give a reason for it, I suspect that would be it. There's a matter of sitting, a matter of carrying it out and maintaining the continuity. And I think that that ~~indicates~~ <sup>indicates</sup> fairly well the quality of intercept that we were getting at ~~Morabina~~ <sup>Morabina</sup>. ~~I don't think~~ <sup>I don't think</sup> I'm not too sure that we would have gained much of a technical advantage by moving. And we had electrical communications to support the people up that way as we needed.

Farley: Makes sense. Did you leave before E.S.L. Goodwin came?

Whitlock: Yes. Yes, I left just before he got there. I was one of

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to leave.

the first <sup>if</sup> I was the second man to leave. The first man to leave was a man, Geik <sup>F</sup>in, that I spoke of. ~~He had~~ <sup>S</sup> something happened to him. He had a stroke of something. Excuse me. <sup>u</sup> And he was sent out on a medical. But after he left I was the next one to leave. I left there in October 1943.

Farley:

<sup>1943</sup>  
~~43~~ Oh. Then you came back to D.C.?

Whitlock:

I went back to D.C.

Farley:

Is there anything else about FRUMEL we should talk about?

Whitlock:

I'm trying to think. ~~I believe I've~~ <sup>I believe I've</sup> told you most of everything that I can think of with regard to FRUMEL.

~~u~~ No, I can't think of anything.

Farley:

<sup>All</sup> Right. Then you came back to what position in Washington?

Whitlock:

Well, when I got my orders in FRUMEL, ~~of course~~ <sup>of course</sup> that was 1943 and I'd been out of the country since 1938. And I had a daughter who was three years old and I thought it was time to go home. I saw that the place wouldn't fall apart if I left. And so when my orders came in, Fabian got ahold of them. He says, "Whit, let me see if I can get these orders cancelled?" I said, "No. I've been here long enough." I said, "I want to go home." He says, "Well, ~~look~~ <sup>look</sup> <sup>it's</sup> <sup>He says</sup> <sup>it's</sup> better to be a big frog in a little puddle, than a little frog in a big puddle." And that's the way he put it to me. "Hell," I said, "I'll take my chances." Well, he was so right. I got back to Washington and who's Whitlock, you know? I was a little frog in a big puddle. I went back as a commissioned officer, but I was an <sup>F</sup> ensign.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

pull? None.

How much water does an ensign. ~~124...None of them~~

I didn't bother to tell them, nobody ever asked, and nobody ever looked into it, as to what I had been doing or what responsibilities I had been carrying. So I get back there in this organization, this big ~~mouth~~ <sup>no mouth</sup> thing, and it's all compartmented. I'm doing analysis. I don't have access to the operations reports like I had out there. I didn't know what was <sup>what</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>It</sup> ~~close to me~~ <sup>A</sup> well, it was the army concept, really, that the traffic <sup>analysts</sup> ~~analysts~~ you pass all this into the intelligence officer. He's the guy that makes the decisions. ~~Baloney!~~ <sup>Baloney!</sup> ~~It doesn't~~ <sup>It doesn't</sup> work that way very good.

And they're afraid that what's going to happen is that they make all these other goodies <sup>available</sup> ~~available~~, all this collateral information to you, you're going to fudge. That isn't the way it works. In other words, what they're really telling you is that they don't trust you. And ~~Baloney!~~ <sup>Baloney!</sup> Well, this is the situation I got into back there. We couldn't see any collateral reports on what our ships <sup>page were</sup> ~~page were~~ doing. We'd see something going on in traffic and we knew damn well that ~~it was some of it~~ <sup>was some</sup> there ~~was some~~ operation that we were doing. But the only guy in there that knew was a little guy that we called <sup>"The Duck"</sup> ~~the duck~~ P.P. Lee. Quack, quack, quack, quack, quack. Nice guy.

Farley: I heard that name.

Whitlock. Well, he had access to the inner sanctum. So that little monkey would go in there and read the files, come back to

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...that's  
 look at what we were doing, "that's not the way it is."  
 He wouldn't tell you what was in there, but <sup>it</sup> ~~it~~ irritated  
 me for a long time. But we sat there and ground it out,  
 nevertheless, as best we could.

Farley: You came...excuse me, I'm sorry.

Whitlock: Yeah.

Farley: You came back as an analyst or you took over a section, <sup>?</sup> ~~also~~

Whitlock: No, no. I was just another one of the working men in there.

Farley: What a shame. What a shame. All your talent and your know-how  
 and your experience gone for naught.

Whitlock: Well, not really. I used it.

Farley: Yeah, you were working on a problem, but you couldn't pass  
 it on to some of the youngsters or the people who had never  
 been out of the D.C. area.

Whitlock: Well, I managed to pass <sup>it</sup> ~~it~~ somehow. Some of them that were doing  
 the job managed to listen to me. I was quite a celebrity  
 when I first got back here because I was the first one  
 back out of the war area. I mean, celebrity as far as the  
 people I was working with. Hell, the WAVEs would all  
 gather around and hear sea stories about Corregidor.

Farley. How it really was, yeah.

Whitlock ~~But I think~~ No, it was just a different philosophy.

And I don't think it was one that worked particularly well.

I think <sup>the one</sup> ~~that~~ we had ~~in~~ <sup>worked.</sup> the Philippines <sup>I</sup> ~~don't~~ know

how Hawaii worked, and I kind of suspect that maybe Hawaii

was working like Washington was. I don't know how they

were working. I don't know what access the analysts themselves

had to the operational or collateral information. It could be

that they were passing everything they had through

~~SECRET~~ ~~HAVE~~

~~SECRET~~

Rocheport. I don't know. He might have been the point of contact. But all <sup>the while</sup> ~~in~~ I was an analyst overseas, there was nothing bearing upon intelligence on the Japanese Navy, on their operations at any rate, that I wasn't privy to.

Farley: And that was missing back in D.C.

Whitlock: That was missing in D.C. It was compartmented.

Farley: Let me switch tapes please.

TAPE 4 SIDE 1

Farley: ~~All~~ <sup>57.11</sup> Right let's try that. I think that's going to do it, sir.

We're <sup>57.11</sup> back in D.C. ~~and~~ 6.2.

Whitlock: ~~All~~ <sup>6.2</sup> Right. Well, when I got ~~back~~ <sup>back</sup> to Washington, I was assigned to GT. And at that time, the officer who was heading up GT was Lieutenant Commander Dennis. And the difficulties that I just mentioned about the compartmentation, I'm sure, was not <sup>of</sup> Dennis's doing. He knew better than that. This is the way that the command was set up there and Dennis run the TA section. He, of course, had access to all this background material, but he couldn't give access to individual analysts. And as far as he went in this direction was to give access to P.P. Lee who was also a lieutenant commander. But the rest of us, no. It wasn't because, I'm sure, that Dennis didn't understand the advantages of complete immersion. I think it was simply <sup>an</sup> administrative matter that he had to abide by. But there was GT which was the traffic ~~analysis~~ <sup>analysis</sup> section. And I kind of forgot, it was GZ and GY, but I sometimes get the two mixed up. I think GZ was the decryption element and I think GY was the intelligence production

~~SECRET~~ H. V. S.

~~SECRET~~

element. The idea there being that you got TA fed in from one direction and you got the decrypts fed in from another and GY was the one that produced the reports. ~~So~~ Whereas I was writing intelligence reports, that were put on the wire when I was in station <sup>sitting</sup> city in FRUMEL. When I got to Washington I was writing TA reports which went to Pearl Harbor and Melbourne and also up to GY. So again, you have to appreciate that I was ~~a~~ young <sup>E</sup> ensign, that I didn't know my way around as an officer, and I was not privy to the decision-making process. For years after that, as a matter of fact. So while I developed a philosophy with regard to how the communication intelligence business should function, it was years before I had a chance to really do anything about it. And that chance didn't come until much later in Japan when I put together the Navy's first advance exploitation unit, on a different problem naturally. Do you want to close this door?

Farley

Would let me take a quick <sup>check of the recorder.</sup> ~~r... (tape cuts off)~~.

There we go. Let's try that again. That tape has been acting up, but it's working now.

Whitlock.

Okay.

Farley:

You were talking about the exploitation unit you set up.

Whitlock.

Well, this was in Japan. And was not against the Japanese, naturally.

Farley

~~Whitlock.~~

Were intercepting against those other people at that time.

~~Farley:~~

Whitlock

I'm afraid so. No, not at that time. no. This comes at a little later date.

Farley:

Okay. Let me, just <sup>as an aside</sup> ~~on the side~~, during World War II was there

~~SECRET~~

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ever an effort in the Navy, and I'm <sup>thinking</sup> ~~thing~~ of field units,  
against Uncle Joe and his people?

Whitlock: No.

Farley: No? okay. Okay

Whitlock: No, ~~we had~~ <sup>we didn't</sup> We didn't have that many facilities.  
You realize that worldwide we had less than 200 intercept  
operators.

Farley: Is that all? My gosh.

Whitlock: There was 170, I think, 179 or something like that.

Farley: I did not realize that. ~~Well, let's just~~

Whitlock: Well. This is at the time World War II broke out, and  
naturally after the war broke out, if there was any effort  
against anyone else but the Japanese, it would have been in  
Washington. And it certainly wasn't <sup>at</sup> ~~on~~ any of the sites that  
I was located.

Farley: That was just an aside. It just came to me because they  
usually ask that question and some people just sit silently and  
don't even <sup>acknowledge</sup> ~~make knowledge of~~ the question. Anything to talk  
about about that Japanese unit, or would you rather go on  
to something else?

Whitlock: No, I think that would be jumping ahead quite a ways. I don't  
know, I think I told you most of <sup>what</sup> ~~what~~ I can recall about  
the techniques, about the value of what was done <sup>and</sup> ~~how~~ it was  
done. And these techniques we carried on through the whole  
war. I mean it just wasn't something that happened in  
Australia or <sup>idk</sup> ~~Corregidor~~ and that was it. The same things  
went on in Washington and in Pearl Harbor, or in Station

~~SECRET~~ Hucce

~~SECRET~~

Hypo.

Hypo. So I think that I've covered everything that I can think that's unique in that field.

Farley: Where were you when the war ended? Were you back in D.C.?

Or were you on a special assignment?

Whitlock: I was heading for an assignment with a joint intelligence production center in Guam when the war ended. ~~I was actually~~ Where I was actually, was in San Francisco with my wife and in the Oak Knoll Hospital. All the hotel rooms jammed full of a hang-over of the United Nations sessions. There was no place to get a room. I wound up at two o'clock in the morning after having gone from hotel to hotel trying to find a place to put up my wife and baby, winding up on the door-step of a house out in south San Francisco of people I didn't know, had never met. My wife had never seen them, but we knew of them because her mother knew them. Knocking on the door at two o'clock in the morning asking to please take us in off the street because I had a baby and my wife was sick. And the people said, "Well, come in." Their whole family load had just arrived from Hawaii. They were sleeping all over the place in the house. And this couple got out of their bed and give us their bed.

Farley: That's something.

Whitlock: Yeah.

Farley: Really something.

Whitlock: And I had to buy a car to get across country. Shall I tell you the whole story?

Farley: Please.

~~SECRET~~ H/CO

~~SECRET~~

Whitlock:

Okay. I was under orders to go to this unit and we were in Washington at the time. We had an apartment, which was scarce as hen's teeth. ~~I was~~ <sup>we</sup> ~~lucky~~ <sup>we</sup> were really lucky to get one when we went there during the war and we had held out there for the couple years that I was there. And when it came time to go, the way they had worked ~~things there~~ <sup>things there was</sup> you couldn't get transportation for your household effects. <sup>So</sup> ~~so~~ the way that things had worked out there is that you would turn your apartment <sup>over</sup> to someone provided they bought your furniture. ~~you know~~. So I had made this arrangement to sell the furniture and turn the apartment over with the idea of taking my wife home. Her home was Hawaii and I established the fact that, ~~yes~~ <sup>yes</sup>, there'd be no problem of taking her back to Hawaii now. And wouldn't you know it, that after I'd entered into this contract, the Navy, ~~well~~, the military threw a freeze on transportation because they were shipping troops and equipment across country from the European Theater, taking them into the Pacific. So they could get me on a train, but they couldn't get my dependents on a train. And here I'm sitting with a contract to turn over my apartment and no place for my wife and my baby daughter to hole up. So I had to get out and scurry around and buy a car. Now, can you imagine ~~all~~ <sup>how many</sup>

Farley:

~~At that time, that's...~~

Whitlock:

~~how many~~ <sup>how many</sup> cars were available in about this period of time, in 1946?  
~~46?~~

Farley:

And about three times the price they were worth.

Whitlock:

Yeah. And ~~at~~ <sup>finally</sup> I finally managed to get one.~~SECRET~~ HCCO

~~SECRET~~

It

It was a Lincoln Zephyr, 12 cylinder, monster. And I was <sup>lucky</sup> lucky I got it for, I think it was twelve hundred dollars, <sup>something</sup> something like that.

Farley"

It was a bargain.

Whitlock:

It was <sup>a 30 something</sup> ~~at 30 something~~, It was ancient, I forgot what year. But at any rate, they <sup>doled</sup> ~~doled~~ me out whole bunch of gas

ration stamps and the tires on the damn thing were no good, or they didn't look too good to me. They were about the best you could get so I took them in to have them recapped and somebody stole them. So <sup>The</sup> ~~the~~ guys that recapped them, ~~and~~

It

was a rip-off. They were fairly good sidings, so he replaced them. And I put those things on and I'd driven that car exactly 19 miles when I headed west across country. I had no idea whether I was ever going to get there or not. The Pennsylvania turn-pike wasn't in, so the first good sized hill, I guess the people up there call them mounds, the first one I hit, this car didn't have enough guts to get up and go in frontwards. I had to turn around and back up to it. (laugh)

Farley:

And you got cross-country?

Whitlock.

And I <sup>got</sup> ~~got~~ cross-country in the damn thing. And we got into San Francisco about eleven o'clock at night and the wife was

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

[REDACTED]

about the time we were crossing

the bridge, <sup>you know</sup> ~~you know~~ the Oakland Bay Bridge. So we got into San Francisco and I started going from hotel to hotel and they just laughed at me. I got on the phone and I called every motel in the <sup>area</sup> ~~area~~ and they laughed at me. They had permanent residents

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~~SECRET~~

in the motels in this area for years. Well, I don't know, I went to 11 or 12 different hotels, anyplace that would take in anyone, ~~you know~~ ~~~~~~~~~  
 The area or the hotel didn't matter. I would have taken anything. Well, do you know that after these people took us in and I went down to report in the next day at the <sup>F</sup>federal <sup>B</sup>Building, and I told them what had happened, they were incensed. They said that everyone of those major hotels that you went to have rooms blocked for the Navy, for Navy transits. They should have told you to come up here and we would ~~assign you~~ <sup>assign you</sup> a room. Not a damn one of those hotels, not a clerk in those ~~hotels~~ <sup>hotels were helpful. Some</sup> ~~some~~ of them wouldn't even talk to me. They'd stand there with their back to me.

Farley:

~~You~~ <sup>You</sup> were in uniform?

Whitlock:

I was in uniform.

Farley:

Boy.

Whitlock.

So I knew that ~~I had~~ <sup>I had</sup> I didn't have much time. I was scheduled to leave on a jeep carrier, the <sup>(?) Copadie (?)</sup> ~~Copadie~~.

So without ~~having~~ <sup>making</sup> arrangements, ~~any~~ <sup>any</sup> making any arrangements to get my wife back to Hawaii, I had to leave that up to her. I drove this doggone ~~little~~ <sup>car and</sup> ~~car~~ and started from one dealer to another because I had to sell it. Of course, I was in uniform. I had to be in uniform. And they knew damn well what the situation was. Well, I wound up practically giving the damn thing away.

Farley:

Damn gangsters.

Whitlock:

Damn gangsters. And the day after I gave it away, I had to put her in the hospital, in Oak Knoll. And the only way

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by car. They

that you could get to Oak Knoll <sup>by car</sup> ~~but they~~ did get an ambulance over and took her, but the only way at that time that I could get over there is I had to ride the street car into San Francisco, take the train over to <sup>Leandro,</sup> Oakland, get on a streetcar and ride out to San ~~Leandro(?)~~, get on another bus, ~~and~~ I would leave south San Francisco at eight o'clock in the morning in order to get to Oak Knoll at one o'clock in the afternoon for visiting hours. And I had to leave this little girl with these strangers all day long. Well, the day after they put her into the hospital, I got a call from the <sup>F</sup>ederal <sup>B</sup>uilding said that I had been assigned duty as boat officer, to report that evening as boat officer. I reported that evening and that was the day the war ended. And maybe you think <sup>I</sup> didn't have some fun getting those drunken <sup>sailors</sup> ~~sailors~~ back to their ship that night.

Farley: I can believe it. And you really didn't care, did you?

Whitlock: Not really. So <sup>here</sup> ~~here~~ I am, our furniture was gone. There was no way I could go back to Washington. I didn't have any place to live. So I was debating, since the war's ended, should I ask Washington. <sup>7</sup> ~~uh~~, figured I better keep my mouth shut. So eventually they put me on the <sup>what</sup> ~~the~~ Copadie(?) and I showed up in Hawaii and the reaction was "what in the hell are you doing here?" And ~~in the~~ <sup>what</sup> ~~uh~~ I sat there. They wanted to see us once a week, just to be sure we're still alive. There was nothing <sup>It</sup> ~~doing~~, absolutely nothing. And this went on for several weeks and finally they figured they had to do something with us, and they <sup>It</sup> ~~will~~ was make-work

~~SECRET~~ H-VECC

~~SECRET~~

sort of jobs, but finally, it got around to where demobilization had set in and we were shucking people like crazy. We had 700 people, ~~the day~~ around 700 people when I arrived. A month later, ~~for~~ two months later, ~~the~~ month and a half later ~~I~~ think it was, we were down to 17.

Farley: Huh. Really cleaned house.

Whitlock: Oh boy, had it <sup>was</sup> cleaned up. We had millions of dollars worth of equipment sitting up at Wahiwa and we didn't even have the people to go out and trim the weeds around the buildings. I mean, ~~it was~~ it really folded fast.

Farley: I guess so. Is there anything else that we should wrap up about the war before ~~we~~ we shut down?

Whitlock: I don't really think so. Later on, I don't know, I imagine it's a matter of record, later on when I came to work for NSA, I think that I got involved in at least one or two history-making events with the agency. But I presume these are documented. For example, I went over with the group of people under Captain Dennis, who was in charge. We went over to implement the UKUS Agreement.

Farley: Good.

Whitlock: And we hammered out <sup>the</sup> technical agreements ~~with this group~~... or this group hammered it out with them <sup>while</sup> and ~~while~~ I was over there I was instrumental in setting up the combined Naval Party as a result of this get-together. And I thought that I was putting <sup>together</sup> a nice juicy job for me and I came back and who did they send over there but Captain Zallow(?). I didn't get the job. But ~~in~~ in that group there was Madison ~~Mitchell~~,  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Benjamin, Guy Stevens, Dennis and I. And it was kind of amusing  
~~amusing~~ <sup>there</sup> at that time, ~~there~~ was a gentleman by the name  
 of Joe Hooper.

Farley: ~~I know him~~ I know the name, right.

Whitlock: Well, Joe was fairly well up in the hierarchy. I guess he  
 would be the <sup>equivalent</sup> ~~equivalent~~ of DD Prod or something like that.

Farley: Yes.

Whitlock: Well, I was sort of amused. ~~They had a~~ We had some social ~~occasion~~  
~~occasion~~, ~~occasion~~, a cocktail party or something. I happened to  
 be standing right <sup>back</sup> ~~back~~ of Joe and Joe was talking to one of  
 his people. Joe says, "I'm amazed. ~~He says~~ They really  
 sent some people over this time that know what they're  
 talking about." Then he turned around and happened to see me  
 and says, "You weren't supposed to hear that."

Farley: Great.

Whitlock: Joe went on to become the Director, eventually. I guess it  
 was "Sir" Hooper finally, wasn't it?

Farley: Yes, yes. Yeah. He was knighted. He was a character.

Whitlock: Well, I think that about wraps it up, Bob.

Farley: <sup>All</sup> ~~A~~right. But Whit as long as you're sitting there,  
 why don't I just shoot you and we can pose you the way you like,  
 if you want to ~~pose~~ I think this is a good background there.  
 Let me try another one <sup>to</sup> ~~for~~ you. make sure it's good. Get  
 you in focus here. I'll put this in the archives. Thank you, Sir.

Whitlock: Well, you're quite welcome.

Farley: Anything <sup>else</sup> ~~that~~ we should put on tape before I ask you the  
 classification. What classification would you like on this?

~~SECRET~~ HUCCO

~~SECRET~~

Whitlock: I don't think there's anything in here ~~that is~~ What is techniques, secret?

Farley: Yes.

Whitlock: Secret Codeword?

Farley: Yes.

Whitlock: I don't think we had anything above Secret Codeword.

Farley: I don't. I don't. But I'm glad you're classifying it that high because so many other people want it Official Use Only or Confidential, ~~and that's~~.

Whitlock: Well, the reason I've done that is because I have talked about techniques that I am sure are still valid in use against some of the <sup>T</sup>Third <sup>W</sup>World, ~~in we have~~

Farley: That is true. That is true.

Whit, could I ask another question before, ~~I~~ I want to hear your paper, but I'll ask you quickly, What are your thoughts on the rash of books, <sup>exposes,</sup> ~~expose's,~~ Puzzle Palace ~~and~~?

Whitlock: Sickening.

Farley: <sup>in</sup> Lewin's American Magic, which he didn't even know <sup>in</sup> much about intelligence.

Whitlock: I was just reading something, <sup>and it's</sup> ~~that~~ It's not only the books.

It's beginning to show up in periodicals, journals and things like this. I was just reading one of <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ science

magazines that's put out weekly by this American Association <sup>of</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~Prevention of~~ Science. It's scientific reports and all this.

And now they're dealing with the commercial code.

Farley: I read that.

Whitlock: Did you read that?

Farley: Right.

Whitlock: This makes me shudder a little bit because I think we're

~~SECRET~~ H-UCO

~~SECRET~~

right on the verge. ~~W~~ NSA's in a hard position to say no to the banking community and so forth on some of these codes. But it's a damn shame, ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> ~~mean,~~ <sup>forcing NSA into</sup> they're sort of ~~forcing in and saying~~ <sup>forcing NSA into</sup> a position of having to either authenticate or at least indicate what their knowledge is of these codes and I think this is bad.

Farley: Yes, I do too.

So we wonder what the future will be. And on that note, let me thank you <sup>gratefully.</sup> ~~graciously.~~ I enjoyed it. It's been very pleasant. It's been very fruitful. Some ~~parts~~ <sup>of</sup> this information we've never hear before and will, as I said earlier, fill in some of the gaps.

Whitlock: Well, I hope it does. I'm particularly concerned of the that some of the nameless people are being left out of the histories of this era.

Farley: Right. Right.

Whitlock: There were other analysts, traffic analysts, that certainly was as good I was. I know I was good. I make no bones about that. But there were others that were certainly as good as I was. And I think it's a damn shame that some acknowledgement of that fact hasn't found it's way into the historical records. There was a handful of us, really not many ~~any~~ of us compared to the number of people that were in the cryptanalytic effort.

Whitlock: That's more romantic I guess.

Whitlock: I'm sure it is. More glamorous.

Farley: So thank you again sir. I appreciate your time.

~~SECRET~~ HVECC