

JANUARY 2024 | VOLUME 36 ISSUE 2

SPECIAL WARFARE

**USAJFKSWCS
CONTINUOUS
TRANSFORMATION AND
MODERNIZATION:
VISUALIZING SWCS 2030**

**IRREGULAR
WARFARE
ACADEMY:
ORIGINS**

**RUSIC:
EMPOWERING THE
ARMY'S SPECIAL
OPERATIONS SOLDIER
WITH UNMANNED SYSTEMS**




**TRANSFORMING & MODERNIZING
FOR THE FUTURE ARSOF**

THE OFFICIAL PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

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ON THE COVER

Illustration of the future ARSOF operator in a multi-domain battle. (Adobe Stock artwork)



SUBMISSIONS

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS

Special Warfare aims to inform, educate, and bring awareness to the talented, highly effective, and instrumental skill sets of Special Operations Forces.

We welcome submissions of academic work from students, professors, and cadre of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the U.S. and abroad.

Manuscripts should be 500 to 1,500 words in length. Include a cover letter. Submit a complete biography with author contact information (i.e. complete mailing address, telephone, e-mail address).

Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double-spaced and in a digital file. Endnotes should accompany works in lieu of embedded footnotes. Please consult The Associated Press Stylebook.

Articles that require security clearance should be cleared by the author’s security manager and public affairs office prior to submission. A memo of the security clearance should be forwarded with the article. If the article talks about a specific theater special operations command, the article will be forwarded to the TSOC for clearance.

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Photos, graphics, tables and charts that accompany articles should be submitted in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics).

SUBMISSION REVIEW AND PUBLICATION

All submissions will be reviewed in a timely manner. Due to the volume of submissions we receive, we cannot reply to every submission. However, we do review and appreciate every submission. If your content meets the goals and requirements, we will be in touch. There is only one editor on staff and while in-edit or layout phase of the upcoming magazine, new submissions will not be reviewed until complete.

Please note that submitted content is not guaranteed to be published in Special Warfare. There are several factors that determine what content is ultimately published including time and space availability, the approved editorial outline and theme, as well as relevance to the Special Warfare target audience and mission.

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SPECIAL WARFARE

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U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY
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The Special Operations Center of Excellence

MISSION To produce world - class quality ARSOF Soldiers, is our non-negotiable contract with the U.S. Army, the Nation, and the American people. There is no second place in the Profession of Arms, and anything less than exceptional is unacceptable

GUIDING PRINCIPLES Always strive for Excellence in all we do! Our Profession and our Nation demands it. Everything we do should be planned, organized and executed effectively and efficiently. Every success and every mistake is an opportunity to learn and improve. Serving our country carries the responsibility for unwavering Courage. Courage to do what is right and put the mission before self. This requires Trust...the Trust I have in you and your Trust in me. Trust and integrity is foundational to personal accountability and critical self-assessment. As Leaders, I expect you to empower subordinates, build Trust, build Teams, and Do What’s Right – Always!

EDITOR NOTE Acronyms USAJFKSWCS and SWCS are used interchangeably.

From the
COMMANDING
GENERAL



Special Warfare exists to strengthen the Army special operations profession. My intent for this publication is to offer a forum for special operations forces warfighting ideas and concepts. It provides a canvas for serious discourse about the challenges of the contemporary operational environment and how Special Operations Forces should transform to meet future requirements. I encourage all of you reading this today to contribute to the professional dialogue and inform warfighting concepts, doctrine and training for the future of ARSOF.

The Chief of Staff of the Army will tell you that we are now in a period of continuous transformation, adapting to the realities of the modern battlefield while having to maintain readiness to respond to crisis and, if called upon, fight and win our nation’s war. That call could come at any time.

Over the past couple of months, we initiated movement on our SWCS 2030 Strategy to drive continuous institutional transformation. This transformation at the Special Warfare Center and School is strategically driven, threat informed, and operationally focused. It is necessary to maintain relevance in an ever-changing world, but we also will not fail in our priority mission to deliver world-class Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations professionals to the Army and the joint force. Through a series of jury-reviewed articles, this issue of *Special Warfare* informs our community of interest on our transformation and modernization efforts. We encourage you to discuss these changes within your organizations and to give us candid and constructive feedback through this professional forum.

– Veritas et Libertas –

GUILLAUME “WILL” BEAURPERE

BRIGADIER GENERAL, U.S. ARMY
COMMANDING GENERAL

“Under my direction, we have initiated movement forward with implementation of our SWCS 2030 transformation. Through a series of jury-reviewed articles, this issue of Special Warfare will inform our community of interest on the modernization efforts across the ARSOF Generating Force towards SWCS 2030.”

— Brig. Gen. Guillaume “Will” Beaurpere

Letter from the EDITOR

Thank you all for being part of our journey as we re-established the *Special Warfare Magazine* back in August 2023. We took this as an opportunity to advance the vision of the magazine as we move forward.

Working alongside the command team at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, we shifted the content to align the *Special Warfare Magazine* as a professional branch journal focusing on academic, institutional, and theme-based writing pieces.

What does this mean? Each edition of the magazine is assigned a theme based on Army Special Operations Forces command initiatives. Article submissions will be selected as it correlates with the theme and will go through a jury-review process to preserve the integrity of the articles and the magazine. We welcome articles from students, cadre, military, academic and institutional professionals, instructors, and international partners and allies.

Who did we partner with? We partnered with our colleagues from the Directorate of Training, Doctrine and Proponency to oversee the review process. The jury consists of approximately two-to-three subject matter experts knowledgeable on the topics and overall theme. The jury pool will change during each edition. It's our goal to maintain transparency through this process and keep the authors abreast of their article's status. Please know that if an article isn't published in an edition of the magazine, we'll save it for a future publication. Additionally, we partnered with the Army University Press, and we continue to make touch points for future partnerships.

What are the themes? The themes for 2024 and deadlines to submit articles are as follow:

Spring 2024:
How ARSOF Fights (Irregular Warfare and Large-Scale Combat Operations)
Submission deadline: *Accepting submissions now.*

Summer 2024:
SOF-Space-Cyber Triad
Submission deadline: *Feb. 15, 2024*

Fall 2024:
SOF Medicine (Medical, Veterinary, and Dental)
Submission deadline: *May 15, 2024*

Winter 2024:
Innovation, Modernization, and Partnerships
Submission deadline: *Aug. 15, 2024*

If you have an article you wish to submit for any of the four editions, send them to specialwarfare@socom.mil. The earlier the submission the better. In the subject line, add the month and edition your article is intended for.

For the present edition, the theme focuses on the SWCS 2030 Strategy and transformation. The topic captures the various perspectives of the Strategy from the new PSYWAR school to details about the Irregular Warfare Academy.

Happy reading!


ELVIA KELLY
EDITOR, SPECIAL WARFARE MAGAZINE
U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL



Elvia Kelly, Special Warfare Magazine editor and SWCS Public Affairs officer, participated in a tandem jump with the Golden Knights at 12,500 feet in Laurinburg, North Carolina, August 2016.

—(鳥水溝)—

OPERATION BLACK DITCH

Introduction of the PROBLEM

In the business world, firms will often do a 'pre-mortem,' where they imagine all the various ways a new project could fail then examine each in turn. Another approach is require a team to write the press release for their new project just to get approval to spin off a new team. In the national security circles, *fictional intelligence*, or *FICINT*, attempts to envision the future by examining the latest technologies and trends. All three of these require leaps of imagination, educated guesses, not necessarily on what will happen, but what may happen.

Perhaps the most famous FICINT is Ghost Fleet, the book was so good it became a verb. As the U.S. Army Special Operations Command looks at the next decade, the commanding general asked every Soldier in each town hall how they envision the future fight. 'Ghost Fleet 2.0' is out there, in the minds of the ARSOF Soldiers. A story that helps the Soldiers of every regiment visualize the various ways ARSOF is going to prevent and, if necessary, fight, World War Three — a story which sparks the imagination of ARSOF's innovative operators and enablers.

The following narrative, *Operation Black Ditch*, is just one vision of how a future conflict with the Chinese Community Party, or CCP, could play out. What role do you see playing in the coming conflicts? What tools do you see yourself using? What training will you need to focus on? What tools do we need to drop? What will be no longer be able to rely on? What about the future conflict with Russia? Iran? Somewhere else the National Defense Strategy isn't looking? Submit your ideas to DL-USASOC_CAG@socom.mil.

Editor's note: The following article is fiction. The blue text is a link, and the blacked-out text is for aesthetic purposes.



LAST FALL (██████████ PHILIPPINES)

Master Sergeant Rusty Parkhill felt the wooden chair groan as he settled into it. Or was that my knees? He took a long pull of his San Miguel beer, savoring a welcome reward at the end of a long day of training out on the zodiacs. Colonel Danilo Abundo pulled up a chair at the small table across from him, grinning at the old sergeant.

“We are not the young men we were in Mindanao,” he offered, tapping his beer to Ryan’s.

“Speak for yourself,” Rusty growled back. “I still beat most of them out of the water today.”

“Most,” Abundo offered with a nod and a tilt of his beer bottle. “A younger Russel would have been able to say, ‘all’, no?”

Rusty locked eyes with the Philippine colonel and glared, before relenting and settling back into his chair. “The new kid, Delen, is something else. Graduated Ranger school just last month, and he’s still fast as hell.”

“Your new captain bested you to, did he not?”

Parkhill rolled his eyes and cast a glance at the bar, where the young captain was still ordering. “That kid’s fresh out of finishing school. He doesn’t have any miles on his legs yet.” The colonel smirked and enjoyed his own long pull of beer.

Spotting the new captain leaving the bar, Col. Abundo extended his hand to the empty seat across from him, gesturing for him to join them. The Philippine colonel looked over his other shoulder, locking eyes with one of his own Soldiers, who got up from a nearby table and dutifully filled the fourth seat.

Rusty took the opportunity to introduce them. “Capt. George Raleigh, this is Col. Danilo Abundo, commanding.”

The new clean cut captain shook the colonel’s hand firmly, “Pleasure to meet you, sir.” Turning to his team sergeant, he asked, “How do you two know each other?”

“*Basilan*,” both responded in unison before taking another long drink.

“And this is Maj. Jose Pamonag, my ops officer,” the colonel said. The two junior officers shook hands in greeting and sat down, as well.

Further conversation was interrupted by the waitress’ arrival, covering their table with a mix of seafood and chicken inasal. The men, famished from the day’s training, quickly tucked into their meals. A whole day in the shoot house could wear you out, but training on the water was a whole other level. In and out of their zodiacs and climbing ship ladders took a toll, compounded by churn of the sea state.

The training was a welcome shift from the years of flat range, close-quarters battle training and was driven by renewed Philippine concerns for their sovereignty. Those concerns weren’t new but stemmed from back before 1999 when the Philippine Navy ran the BRP Sierra Madre aground in the Second Thomas Shoal. Since then, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began its ‘island’ building, encroaching ever further into the Philippine EEZ. When they flagrantly ignored the South China Sea Arbitration in 2016, it was clear the Philippine SOCOM forces needed to start shifting their focus from the terrorists down south to the belligerent neighbor to their west. ‘Wolf Warrior Diplomats’ across South East Asia were talking down to the regional states while the PRC’s ‘maritime militia’ anchored together hundreds of illegal fishing boats, stealing from Philippine waters.

The Soldiers sat back in their chairs and finished their beers, empty plates before them. Tomorrow was scheduled for more visit, board, search, and seizure training and additional work on the zodiacs. The training plan had been up in the air as Typhoon Danas barreled toward Luzon, but this morning the storm broke abruptly north, ensuring another hard day on the water. With just over another 12 hours till

they’d be back in the zodiacs, Rusty ordered another round of San Miguels with a wave of his hand. The waitress quickly returned with the beers and the group took them over to the beach side of the bar, where Staff Sgt. Trent Sindal sat talking to an impromptu gathering of local fisherman.

The young psychological operations noncommissioned officer held up a smart phone in one hand and a QR code sticker in the other, having just gotten the assembled gathering to download the West Philippine Sees app. “So anytime you see those Chinese fishing boats encroaching on your best spots, you just tap here and here. That’ll send the boats location up to the computer in Manila, where it’ll get passed along to the authorities.”

Trent waited for Abel, his interpreter, to finish translating before cracking a wry smile. “Now that’ll get everyone the Chicom boat’s position, but if you really want to help the cause, snap a picture with the phone’s camera. This way, we can track the boat and get the message out.” The fishermen gathered around nodded back and forth. These locals had seen some of the greatest impacts of PRC encroachment in Philippine waters. The same media and data were also automatically cataloged and copied back to the US-based Trans-Regional Irregular Warfare Task Force, or TRIWTF, to be used in future operations planning and immediate I/O messaging.

In the past, the central government hadn’t done much more than lodge verbal protests, wary of being hit by economic retaliation. The CCP saw any push back as their smaller neighbors not knowing their place. But, when COVID hit, and the CCP began retaliating against any perceived slight, no matter how small, the countries of the region began to push back. On their own, the PRC could easily isolate them, but operating in an integrated partnership raised the costs.

The assembled fishermen looked out to the ocean with distraction. They’d all kept their boats in port to see which way the storm would turn. Now that Typhoon Danas was heading across the northern tip of Luzon, they were all eager to get back to sea and their catch. Seeing eagerness, Sgt. Sindal wrapped up his class, passing out more QR code stickers for them to share with friends not present.

Their work done, the team looked out over the calm waters of the West Philippine Sea, enjoying the sunset. Master Sergeant Parkhill found himself looking forward to another day of hard training with their Philippine SOCOM partners, even if his knees had been rooting for the storm to stay on its southerly track.

██████████ PHILIPPINES)

The remnants of the storm blew overhead as Chief Warrant Officer-Three Ash Griffin navigated the Toyota Landcruiser down the muddy road. Seated behind him, Tech Sgt. John Krivokrasov watched the map on his phone, announcing, “Another two kilometers” without looking up. The four Soldiers rode in silence for another five minutes, with Krivokrasov staring at the screen in his lap. “Ok, here.” Chief eased the SUV off onto the side of the dirt track road and put it in park. The rain was letting up, but the wind still howled outside the cab.

Two days earlier his team had been working down south when Typhoon Danas had knocked out power to the islands north of Luzon. Chief woke up abruptly to a call from the local Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) team Chief, Sgt. 1st Class Matt Swann, letting him know he had a flight of humanitarian assistance about to load onto a C-130 flight the following morning, Chief called in five favors to get his team to Clark Air Force Base in time to catch it. This was a new opportunity. Swann’s CMSE team had gotten the first C-130 to the ██████████ only a few weeks earlier.

Chief Griffin’s three-man team had been down in ██████████ ill for a few weeks now, visiting Philippine outposts under the auspices of their

advise and assist mission. However, in between stops, his team would drive out to local ██████████ and... Well honestly, Chief did know the finer details of what they were doing.

Broadly, they were mapping the invisible networks around ██████████, which he understood. How, Chief wasn’t about to try and understand. The former weapons sergeant couldn’t make heads or tails of what Staff Sgt. Craig Parkins was doing with that tangle of wires and his small laptop, but none of it was team equipment. Craig had gone to a local shop the day they arrived and come back with a sack of wires and boards, and he’d been toying with it every chance he got since. “What are you gonna do with all that crap?” Ash asked him one night over dinner. “You look like you robbed a RadioShack.”

“What’s a Radio Shack, Chief?” the NCO responded, looking up from his work with a confused look. Chief was as stumped by what the young commo sergeant was doing as he was by who was doing it. Standing six feet-two and built like a running back, Staff Sgt. Craig Parkins looked like he belonged in a CRF, not playing with electronics. But everywhere they went, Craig would only need a couple minutes to set his cables, type a few strokes on his laptop, and MacGyver the odd improvised tool before he’d map the local network around each site. He’d log all the devices, networks, and take a few minutes to quickly probe a vulnerability or two before closing his laptop and telling them to drive on.

While Ash didn’t understand the how, he did get the why. Their team’s job was to map the digital terrain in the First Island Chain. Their work would help cyber operators back in the U.S. as they sought ██████████. That work was very technical and slogging slow, and nothing Ash wanted any part of. But his team gave all the nerds back on the east coast of the U.S. something they couldn’t replicate: access. Chief Griffin’s team could drive around almost all of the Philippines, and were safe enough to secure themselves while they did it. Parkins did the digital work, Ash drove, though he’d take the opportunity to snap a few pictures along the way. Several of the sites they visited while down south were ██████████ ██████████ and they were notorious for ██████████ the area. So, while Craig did his work, Ash would step out of the SUV, snag a couple pics, and upload them back to the PSYWAR team in I ██████████ who could both push them out through local stringers, but also send them back to the TRIWTF, where PSYOP Soldiers could knit them into global narrative and messaging campaigns.

Accepting the weather wasn’t going to improve, nor worsen much, Chief turned off the engine and got out of the cab. The four Soldiers looked at the weighty black tough boxes in the bed of the truck and then at each other. “Matt and I will take one.” Craig quickly blurted, causing Chief to roll his eyes.

While Ash could drive all over the southern archipelago without raising much of an eye-brow, getting up here to ██████████ fell outside his pattern of life. Hence, when he heard the CMSE team headed up by Swann had managed to get flights going north, Ash quickly shot a report to his higher HQ telling them he was going to jump on the next available one. He was worried he’d get some push back from his commander, so he was surprised to read the prompt response, “Approved, stand by for support.” His excitement took a hit when that support arrived in the form of the diminutive Tech Sgt. John Krivokrasov, a Guardian from Space Force, and his two lumbering tough boxes of electronics.

Ash waited impatiently while the sizeable CMSE chief and Craig lifted the first box off the bed of the truck and moved it to a clearing fifty meters off the road. The tech sergeant jumped into the bed of the truck and struggled to get the second tough box sliding toward the tailgate. As Ash took hold of it and prepared to take the weight of it, he had a flashback to team week at Special Forces Assessment and

Selection, when he always seemed to be stuck carrying more than his share of the weight. Between the two, they managed to get the box down off the truck with a minimal of amount of swearing, though they had to take two stops to get it over to its twin in the clearing.

“Kid, you gotta get this kit smaller,” Ash gasped as he dropped his end of the box. The Guardian was as focused on his current task as he’d been on his phone’s map screen few minutes before, not looking up while he responded to the chief.


“This is the smaller kit, Chief,” Krivokrasov said, pulling out a satellite dish and connecting up more wires Chief Griffin didn’t understand. “The original one was the size of a connex.” Swann and Craig had returned to the truck, opening the hood, and giving the appearance they were trying to diagnose a problem.

Craig watched the Guardian work and had to hand it to him, the kid was professional, moving quickly to get everything setup. “What’re we doing up here again?” he asked.

“Getting inside a hard to reach ellipse,” Krivokrasov responded turning the system on.

“You mean that three dot thingy?” Ash followed up.

This one actually stumped the guardian enough to break his concentration and make eye contact with the chief, both exchanging a look of confusion. Suddenly, Sgt. Krivokrasov eyes lit up in recognition, “No. That’s an ellipsis,” stressing the ending like a snake. He paused a moment, eager to explain, but catching the dread in Ash’s eyes, the



Guardian returned his attention to the task at hand. “Satellite and space stuff, Chief.”

Griffin actually sighed in relief at being spared the science-grammar lesson, though again, his respect for the Guardian grew a little. He stopped disrupting the tech sergeant and 20 minutes later Krivokrasov began repacking his gear. No other traffic had passed on the road, so Swann and Parkins jogged back over to help move the tough boxes.

“Not so fast Craig. Swann and I will get this box, you and Starlord can get the other.” The Chief and the Civil Affairs NCO picked up the first box and began carrying it back to the truck before anyone could object.

“Starlord?” Tech Sgt. Krivokrasov asked Craig, confusion on his face.

Craig shrugged, hosting up his side of the box, “Beats being called Tazer Face.” The oddly matched pair wrestled the box back onto the bed of the truck, only stopping once this time. Everything loaded, the team quickly returned to the airfield to help with the distribution of supplies to the locals.

TAIWAN

Captains Chloe MacLeod and Kaitlin Daishi stood at the front of the community center as about 50 Taiwanese local citizens mulled around the room, sipping green tea from disposable cups.

“If you could all please take your seats, we’ll get started,” Kaitlin announced in Mandarin to the room. They assembled quickly, found seats among the rows of folding chairs and quieted down. Kaitlin turned to her fellow captain, “This is Capt. Chloe MacLeod, a Civil Affair officer.”

“We’d like to thank you all for coming tonight. The goal of this conference is to help each of you learn what it takes to run your own disaster response seminar within your own communities.” She paused there while Kaitlin, an intelligence officer, translated for the room.

The conference was being supported by the Taiwanese National Fire Agency and sought to expand and professionalize similar conferences being run all over the country. While the country had conducted its annual Han Kuang exercise for decades, recent PRC escalations had brought the need for more repeatable and smaller but regular training if the country was going to be ready. Private citizens and even the Taiwanese billionaire Robert Tsao had been setting up their own programs to improve Taiwan’s territorial-defense, and they were reaching out to these, as well. The goal of the series was to tie all these nascent efforts into an organized web and then into the national response agencies.

Introductions complete, the conference broke out into separate smaller rooms to discuss specific issues. While Capt. MacLeod left with the local NPA Chief to discuss disaster response logistics, Capt. Daishi went upstairs to a smaller room with a couple dozen young Taiwanese already seated. Not wanting to lose the momentum, she started into her pitch immediately, “OSINT stands for open source intelligence and, in today’s connected world, it’s invaluable.” She clicked the presentation onto the next slide and began showing a series of examples from the last 10 months in Ukraine.

“Years ago, you needed people like me to figure out where the enemy was, and where they were headed. Today, everyone you know, everyone on LineChat is a collector.” In front of her, the attendees, several still in secondary school, nodded along as they took notes on their laptops, or in some cases, their phones. Kaitlin’s block of instruction had two goals. Today, she would teach the assembled attendees how to train their fellow Taiwanese citizens not just what to look for, but how to post and share it. Tomorrow’s instruction would take it another level, and teach the assembled how to do their own analysis of the information they pull in from those they teach. Only two years out of the Intelligence Captains Course herself, she didn’t

expect to be teaching so much of the same to others yet, but these were interesting times.

Downstairs, Master Sgt. Simon Lee watched from the back of the room as Spec. Robert Agneau gave his own block of instruction to a room of assembled graphic designers and media students. Simon had to admit he was impressed. Despite his very junior rank, Robert was in his mid-twenties. A college communications graduate, he’d been trying to break out as an influencer on YouTube when he saw the news of the Chinese crackdown in Hong Kong. After, scrolling through Instagram, he found himself frustrated with his own feed of highly polished photos and clips focused solely on selling an airbrushed life. Something just wasn’t satisfying enough anymore for him. As he read more on the censorship the CCP was enacting in Hong Kong, he felt a call to action. He was looking at ways to make a bigger impact when he learned of the 37IET program, allowing him to come straight in to become a PSYOP Soldier. He’d struggled some adapting to the Army, in particular the rigid and often inane rules, but he found once his leadership saw what he could do with video, they seemed to care less about his haircut.

Specialist Agneau had been surprised he was entrusted on such a small-unit mission so early but, once he got up in front of the assembled Taiwanese students, all his nerves vanished. He was lost in the fun of working with ligamenta creators, teaching them the ins and outs of offense and defense in the world of influencing. Less lecture and more collaboration, he was excited to find so many of the assembled students already lampooning the disinformation the CCP tried to inject into Taiwanese society.

Seeing the class was well in hand, Master Sgt. Lee slipped out and headed back to the logistics seminar being cohosted by Capt. MacLeod and her NFA counterpart. Here was where his real work was going to be done. Chloe was busy talking about all the challenges of logistics in the best of conditions then highlighting how hard it would be in the event of a conflict with the mainland. As she discussed the need for prepositioned stocks of supplies, the pervasive theme was reinforced: Once things go down, it’s either on the island or it’s several weeks away. When Capt. MacLeod’s introduction wrapped up, Simon circulated the small groups, listening in. Local Taiwanese discussed what they had available, and what they needed to start stocking now. He would chime in and ask, where they could store such and such, and whenever a group suggested a local vendor with some room, he’d write down their contact info. A person with storage space for disaster supplies might have room for a few other crates as well. Simon found homes for devious things. Circulating the room, he slowly added to his rolodex. Time was short. They had seven years to prepare for Putin to follow up his invasion of Crimea, and they hadn’t done enough. The urgency had been there but planning for the future kept being relegated to a tomorrow problem. He reflected on the sage advice his Korean mother oft repeated as he grew up in Southern California. The best day to plant a tree is 20 years ago. The second best is today. Tomorrow was too late. Today was the day.

The seminar wrapped up for the day, but as they discussed the following day’s itinerary, one of the attendees highlighted a weather report. Typhoon Danas pushed past Luzon and was heading generally north. It wasn’t clear if they’d have to delay the second day of the seminar until after it passed. Captain Daishi confirmed with the room they would plan to start on time in the morning, but adjust as needed depending on the storm’s track. Meanwhile, Master Sgt. Lee scowled, nervous at the prospect of losing another day.

TO BE CONTINUED IN THE NEXT ISSUE



U.S. ARMY
JFKSWCS

**PINELAND
UNDERGROUND**
PODCAST



SWCS 2030 TRANSFORMATION

U.S. ARMY JFK SWCS COMMAND TEAM SPEAK
ON FUTURE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS



**TUNE IN
TODAY!**

THE OFFICIAL PODCAST FROM THE U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL

U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY
SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL

CONTINUOUS TRANSFORMATION AND MODERNIZATION

VISUALIZING SWCS 2030

By Brig. Gen. Guillaume "Will" Beaupere, Chief Warrant Officer 5 Gary Ostrander,
and Command Sgt. Maj. Lionel "Lee" Strong, USAJFKSWCS Command Group

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School delivers world-class Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations (PO) Soldiers and doctrine for the full range of military operations across all domains and dimensions.

With a multi-component (COMPO) (Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve) responsibility, the SWCS' role as an Army Center of Excellence includes supporting the doctrinal, training, leadership and education, and personnel proponenty needs of the total Army for CA, PO and SF. In addition to its assumption of branch proponent responsibilities, SWCS assumed the specified proponent responsibility for irregular warfare for the Army as delegated by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.⁰¹ This responsibility affords SWCS an opportunity to lead the Army's effort to think deeply about the role of irregular warfare and special operations activities in support of the full range of military operations.

WHY SWCS MUST CHANGE

Our institution must transform to address the modern multidomain and multidimensional battlefield, and we must do so with urgency knowing that Army special operations formations are already asked to take a leading role in solving the challenges instigated by peer and near-peer competitors worldwide.

Change does not come without risk. For over 70 years, we have operated under a Center and a singular school model. The SWCS 2030 Strategy transforms the CoE into a Center with three unique and largely autonomous schools—a move that will require vigilance on the part of the staff to address various challenges. As our institution evolves and modernizes, we are prepared to identify and mitigate risk wherever possible.


⁰¹ Refer to IW Academy: The Origin in this edition of Special Warfare Magazine.

Photo provided by U.S. Army

Center of Excellence

Designated by HQDA, a Center of Excellence [COE] is an organization that creates the highest standards of achievement in an assigned sphere of expertise.

Army Regulation 5-22,
The Army Force Modernization Proponent
and Integration System



THREE BRANCH SCHOOLS AND THE IW ACADEMY

BRANCH SCHOOLS – WHAT REMAINS UNCHANGED

As SWCS executes its 2030 Strategy and accompanying lines of effort, we will not change the standards or quality of instruction at our selection and assessment, qualification training or advanced skills courses. Our high standards are nonnegotiable. Current and future assessment and selection candidates and qualification course students will not be affected by the reorganization. While SWCS will continue to modernize courses to remain the world’s premier training

institution, these efforts will neither distract from nor be distracted by this deliberate reorganization of our headquarters and establishment of branch schools.

The structure and missions of the Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute, the Master Sgt. David K. Thuma Noncommissioned Officer Academy and Special Warfare Medical Group remain unchanged. The SWCS will continue to own professional military education for its noncommissioned officers and warrant officers. Each of these elements will continue to provide world-class training and professional development to our ARSOF, Army, and joint formations.

Given current recruiting and accession challenges, a focus on schools, the leadership, and production numbers for each of the three branches will remain SWCS’ priority.

USAJFKSWCS will execute a 2030 strategy that incrementally establishes three branch schools for PO, CA, and SF with O-6 (Colonel/O-5 promotable) commandants to properly align roles, optimize functions, and formalize responsibilities inherent in ours and other Army Centers of Excellence.



U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER & SCHOOL
2030 STRATEGY
SPECIAL OPERATION CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

Driven by...



USASOC goals to posture, generate, and transform ARSOF



TRADOC goals to acquire, train, develop, guide, and shape




CAC goals to drive change, develop leaders, and steward the profession

Our Priorities...

People



Excellence



Innovation



Teamwork

Lines of Effort

SE1

TRANSFORM AND MODERNIZE

Mutually support the Army and joint force’s objectives

MAIN

GENERATE AND ENHANCE THE FORCE

Develop people as our platform

SE2


EXPAND AND ENHANCE PARTNERSHIPS

Enable ARSOF posturing activities


SWCS 2030 GOALS

- All domain doctrine, training, leadership, and personnel
- PSYWAR School and Information advantage
- Civil Affairs School
- Irregular Warfare Academy
- COMPO 3 Training alignment
- Joint and multinational institution

2023 CURRENT



2025 PROPOSED BRANCH SCHOOLS



BRANCH SCHOOLS – WHAT CHANGES

The SWCS 2030 Line of Effort 2, Transformation and Modernization, directs the formation of three branch schools. Each of the branch schools/training battalions (qualification courses) will be overseen by a commandant who is similarly responsible for branch-specific proponent roles and DTLP functions. The intent is for each school commandant (preferably an O-6 Centralized Selection List select) to be paired with a command sergeant major senior enlisted advisor to form the command team of each branch school. This is critical to the credibility and success of the schools, the institution, and the branches. The commandant will enforce unity of command and unity of effort by combining command and branch proponent leadership with branch qualification standards in curriculum developed and implemented within a subordinate training unit.

Our investment in a senior officer and enlisted branch representatives provides each of our three career fields the expertise needed to effectively integrate DTLP across the Center and adjacent branch schools. This command team provides more precise management and representation of branch equities and greater integration of the capabilities they provide the Army and joint force to preserve combat power and increase the likelihood of operational success. Meanwhile, the Center remains relatively unchanged in its administration, management, and resourcing functions to ensure the successful development and publishing of doctrine, training management and resourcing, leadership and education, and proponent programs and products.

IRREGULAR WARFARE

On Feb. 28, 2022, Headquarters Department of the Army G3/5/7 designated the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and, in turn, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School as the Army Proponent for Irregular Warfare (IW). As the IW Proponent, SWCS is responsible for doctrine, training, leader development and education, and personnel proponent functions as outlined in AR 5-22, Army’s Force Modernization Proponent and Integration System. In keeping with our school’s concept and recognizing our IW responsibilities to the Army and the joint force, we intend to establish an IW Academy. The initial estimate calls for the realignment of our ARSOF Captains Career Course, our Language, Regional Education, and Culture program, and a few of our specialized courses that address innovation and experimentation initiatives (i.e. advanced planning, cyber, unmanned systems, robotics). As resources allow, we anticipate a need to deliver revised IW curriculum to Army professional military education (PME) from the basic NCO and officer leader courses to intermediate level education and beyond. In keeping with the direction of Army doctrine in the multidomain for greater joint and allied partnerships, we envision our IW training and education to look a lot like our Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center and PSYOP Qualification Courses, each of which possess joint accreditation. Our IW Academy is an Army academy offering intellectual capacity and leading-edge human and informational advantage indispensable to success in irregular warfare operations and activities.



USACAPOC(A)’s mission is to provide strategic, operational, and tactical CA, PO, and IO capabilities to the force, so they can fight and win in a modern multi-domain and multi-dimensional battlefield. Innovations stated within SWCS’s 2030 Transformation and Modernization strategy will support our mission by bringing proponency training together and aligning multi-compo branches. SWCS’s innovative approaches to establish a Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) School and return to uniformed training standards and curriculum will go a long way to foster aligning cross-compo unity of effort with unity of function.

Our formations are filled with talented Soldiers who deserve the best training. We must collectively seek innovative means and ways to ensure the Army and the joint force can overcome challenges and face crises of future operational environments. As SWCS maintains its role to deliver quality instruction and training, a proactive strategy to transform and modernize capabilities is crucial. USACAPOC(A)’s sense of urgency matches that of SWCS and the command supports the 2030 strategy to unify training and proponent responsibilities across CA, PO, and SF.”

Maj. Gen. Isaac Johnson, Commanding General
U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)





"WHAT DOES THE ARSOF SOLDIER OF 2030 LOOK LIKE TO YOU?"

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School fosters an environment of education, information, and awareness about the overall SWCS mission in generating the ARSOF Soldier. As we dive into the SWCS 2030 Strategy and transformation in this edition of Special Warfare Magazine, we asked members from the ARSOF community about what the future ARSOF Soldier looks like.

"I see the ARSOF Soldier of tomorrow possessing cross-cultural fluency while being an adaptive problem solver, project manager, and inspirational leader. Just like today, ARSOF Soldiers need to continue to be mentally tough, physically fit, detail focused, interpersonal, introspective, disciplined, and partnership focused. For 2030, they will be required to know how to operate producing zero-signature, understanding how to use emerging technologies and systems to operate for prolonged periods of time."

Master Sgt. Brian Relation,
Former SWCS G-3 Operations Sergeant

"One, an all-volunteer force; Two, educated and innovative to meet the technical challenges of tomorrow; and Three, fit."

Retired Command Sgt. Maj. Joe Fancher,
Former USAJFKSWCS, Command Sergeant Major

"On a future battlefield, ARSOF will be in denied territory and hunted by a technologically sophisticated and MDO-capable adversary. Without our traditional advantages, ARSOF of 2030 need to be savvy in rudimentary survival and sabotage without advanced gear. Operators need to be semi-independent thinkers and actors; battlefield nomads who are astronomically difficult to find and if found, nearly impossible to kill. They are strategic scoundrels that operate with resistance elements to hound the enemy's rear area. They are "Black Devils" that instill fear in the enemy."

Lt. Col. Michael Prather,
Field Experimentation Division USASOC

"The answer to this question really starts with the hiring process. What our nation requires of our ARSOF warrior today is no different than when our organization was founded. That warrior is and must continue to be of high character, intellect, and physical fitness. We cannot afford for that recipe to change as we near 2030. Instead of focusing on what to think, like through the use of robotics and unmanned systems, we should continue to hire the right people that know how to think. Individuals who possess the attributes of high character, intellect, and physical fitness come equipped with the tools to adapt to an ever-changing environment and to fight and win our nation's wars."

Command Sgt. Maj. Chuy Almonte,
ARSOF Assessment and Selection Sergeant Major

"The 2030 ARSOF Soldier needs to become the Nation's SOF tool of choice for Political Warfare. Moving forward, ARSOF Soldiers must adopt a mind-set that views relationship building—and its associated access, placement, and influence—as a means for Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) efforts. Now more than ever, the ARSOF Soldier needs to bring in different perspectives and experiences to the table as we solve our Nation's hardest problems."

Maj. Brandon C. Schwartz,
Special Forces Underwater Operations, Commander

"The future ARSOF Soldier looks hyper-enabled; they will be better connected to critical information via their end user devices and sophisticated next-generation radios. They will have enhanced CBRNE detection capabilities thus increasing their survivability. They will be better equipped for arctic temperatures in order to support operations at negative 65 degrees. Their Clandestine Body Armor will be over 65 percent lighter while maintaining the same survivability as the previous version. In addition, they will have the ability to operate in a rapidly-changing, GPS denied, unmanned vehicle saturated, electromagnetic warfare environment."

Lt. Col. Kenneth B. Fowler,
USASOC Deputy, Combat Development Division

"As the ARSOF Soldier evolves to meet the nation's needs, our uniquely developed access around the world remains invaluable. We must endeavor to become tactical integrators of exquisite capability to leverage our access toward enabling an innovative joint force across domains."

CW3 David J. Jones,
Instructor, Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute (Airbone)



"We remain threat informed. We take a look at our curriculum and make sure it's relevant in today's threats. We draw on lessons and our doctrine. That's why Irregular Warfare Academy is a great opportunity to create advantage."

-Brig. Gen. "Will" Beaurpere

Brig. Gen. "Will" Beaurpere (center), USAJFKSWCS commander, Maj. Gen. Christopher Eubank (right), commander of the U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command, and Patrick Tucker (left), Defense One reporter, discuss a variety of topics, including data literacy, importance of nation partners, lessons learned in Ukraine tied at the institutional level, robotics, and the SWCS 2030 Strategy during AUSA in Washington, D.C. in October 2023. (Photo by Elvia Kelly, USAJFKSWCS Public Affairs Office)

INVESTING IN THE TOTAL ARMY

ALIGNING MULTI COMPO BRANCHES

The SWCS is responsible for the training, education, professional development, and personnel management of the three branches SF, PO, and CA. These branches and responsibilities span beyond active duty (COMPO 1) formations and extend across the Army National Guard (COMPO 2), and Army Reserve (COMPO 3). The preponderance of the Army's Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations capabilities exist outside of ARSOF formations within the Army Reserve. As the Army undergoes rapid changes to modernize the force, SWCS is prioritizing resources and aligning training standards and curriculum to continue to provide the Army PO and CA capabilities that can achieve decisive effects in the human, physical, and information dimensions. SWCS 2030 will better align CA and PO training across the Total Army to deliver forces that can execute multidomain operations across the competition continuum.

RESTATIONING OF THE 6TH TASS BDE HQ

The Special Operations Center of Excellence is the only Center of Excellence where the Total Army School System training brigade within COMPO 3 is not aligned geographically with its CoE. The 6th Training Brigade Headquarters is responsible for the training and education of Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations noncommissioned officers. The headquarters is located at Fort Totten, New York. The SWCS has petitioned the U.S. Army Reserve Command to consider a restationing action to move the brigade headquarters to Fort Liberty, North Carolina.

CONCLUSION

The SWCS 2030 leads to a future Special Operations Center of Excellence composed of three branch schools and an IW Academy. Each responsible for executing a line of effort destined to produce expertly trained and educated IW practitioners and compo-agnostic CA, PO, and SF officers and enlisted Soldiers ready for their first assignment on a team or detachment.

As we roll out doctrinal and curriculum updates, we will ensure that we don't jeopardize the capacity or quality of our professional military education or our branch qualification and advanced skills courses. Our branch schools and IW academy will keep us synchronized with the needs of the Army and the joint force. We will continue to adapt our training and education to develop leaders, who can solve our nation's most challenging problems.

Between now and 2030, the SOCoE and O-6 school commandants will transform doctrine, modernize compo-agnostic training, develop threat-informed and IW-relevant PME, and effectively assess and select Total Army CA, PO, and SF officers and enlisted Soldiers. These transformational and modernizing effects will provide a return on investment from our schools, Academy, curriculum standardization and redesign, compo alignment, and TASS restationing that will deliver Total Army CA, PO, and SF branches capable of meeting the demands of irregular or conventional warfare operations and activities worldwide.



Want to learn more about the USAJFKSWCS 2030 Strategy, check out Pineland Underground's podcast *Transformation Ain't Easy*.

US S R

Empowering the Army's Special Operations Soldier with Unmanned Systems

By Lt. Col. Rory Hanlin, 6th Battalion, 2nd Special Warfare Training Group

Unmanned systems are the weapon of choice in the modern operating environment. Commonly referred to as drones, unmanned systems have occupied the battlefield for over two decades. From the early advent of the now-famous Predator and Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles to the past few years of high-intensity conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine, we are entering a new, more lethal, and more ubiquitous era of drone warfare. More challenging still, the use of unmanned systems is no longer restricted to state-sponsored, expensive “big wing,” military-grade aircraft focused on striking terrorist leaders in ungoverned spaces during the Global War on Terror. Instead, the surge of small, inexpensive, unsophisticated, and expendable unmanned systems on battlefields in Eastern Europe and the Middle East presents new and heretofore unaddressed capabilities that threaten the underlying assumptions of U.S. military primacy. However—along with this threat—these systems also present Army special operations forces with new opportunities to leverage their unique skills and enhance a complementary capability for the joint force.

UNMANNED SYSTEMS IN ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS

The ARSOF must holistically and systematically address the recent and unprecedented technological developments in unmanned systems if we can expect to deliver real competitive advantage to the joint force across the range of military operations. To this aim, the USASOC Army Special Operations Robotics Division, Force Modernization Center, provided ARSOF with the vision and resources to modernize and integrate unmanned systems into special operations missions worldwide. Simultaneously, numerous entrepreneurial efforts of disparate tactical formations across the command developed new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to capture the most optimal use of unmanned systems on the battlefield. These TTPs are, in many cases, gleaned from hard-won lessons learned on the battlefields of Iraq, Syria, and Eastern Europe. Because many of the TTPs associated with

U.S. Army Sgt. Nicholas Sutton, an infantryman assigned to 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 11th Airborne Division, releases a Black Hornet 3 drone at a remote fighting position during Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center-Alaska 23-02 at Yukon Training Area, April 3, 2023. Division Soldiers are using JPMRC-AK 23-02 to innovate, experiment with, and test new equipment to give our Soldiers a tactical edge against any adversary. Photo by Senior Airman Patrick Sullivan, U.S. Air Force

unmanned systems are either domain, region, or adversary specific, they must be efficiently collated and distributed to forces facing challenges unique to a particular area of operations or mission type.

At the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the 6th Battalion, 2nd Special Warfare Training Group, developed an enduring mechanism that—

- Collects unmanned systems lessons learned and TTPs from the operational force.
- Incorporates input from Department of Defense agencies and outside subject-matter experts.
- Organizes and systematizes data for ease of use.
- Identifies the foundational principles of employment.
- Builds a teachable curriculum that then propagates these foundational principles.
- Institutionalizes these principles so that they become endemic to the way ARSOF fights in the future.

That mechanism, called the Robotics and Unmanned Systems Integration Course coined as RUSIC, has been in development for two years and has now reached its initial operational capability. The first-ever RUSIC class came online in October 2023.

ROBOTICS AND UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATION COURSE (RUSIC)

The RUSIC teaches ARSOF Soldiers the foundational elements of integrating and optimizing the full range of unmanned aircraft system and counter-unmanned aircraft systems capabilities into their formation. The RUSIC graduates return to their units as U.S. Army-certified master trainers qualified as UAS pilots with the ability to train and qualify their own teammates to independently operate and employ UASs. They acquire the capability to not only effectively employ C-UAS but also to construct their own organic unmanned systems from locally-procured components. At course end, each graduate is ready to teach, train, and enable partner forces with the ability to employ these UAS/cUAS capabilities on the battlefield.

The RUSIC does offer instruction on specific models and systems (such as Sky Raider, Skydio, and Black Hornet 3); however, the course also teaches the underlying principles, authorities, policies, and strategies of employment for numerous commercial off-the-shelf and experimental systems currently on the market. Moreover, RUSIC focuses the student on employing operationally relevant unmanned systems to reinforce interoperability with host-nation partners. As evident in Ukraine, ARSOF knowledge, equipment, and experience must be employable by our host-nation partners to achieve optimal results on the battlefield.

RUSIC'S THEORY OF SUCCESS

The RUSIC's application of the theories of robotics and unmanned systems empowers special operators with the critical skills, knowledge, and capabilities to fight and win on the multidomain battlefield. The innovative and transformative potential of RUSIC does represent a reinvention of ARSOF. Instead, it further capitalizes on what we already bring to the fight—an all-weather, all domain, transregional irregular



U.S. cavalry scouts, with Mustang Troop, 1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment launch the Puma unmanned aircraft system, March 17, 2023, at the Grafenwoehr Training Area. 2CR provides V Corps with a lethal and agile force capable of rapid deployment throughout the European theater in order to assure allies, deter adversaries, and when ordered, defend the NATO alliance. Photos by Spc. Orion Magnuson, U.S. Army



warfare fighting formation that provides relative advantage to the Army and the joint force throughout the competition continuum. In this vein, the course focuses on the transformation of graduates into unmanned systems integrators.

The ARSOF Soldier is the vital node of the hardware-software Soldier system. The physical and digital systems—and how we train with and employ them—must keep pace with the rapid technological developments of our time. What remains constant, however, is that the ARSOF Soldier behind the remote is more

critical than any piece of hardware. It is only by optimizing and hyper-enabling the Soldier operator that we see the true potential of innovation and applicable technologies. Absent vendor, brand loyalty, or technological bias, RUSIC seeks to prepare our Soldiers to operate and integrate myriad robotic and unmanned tools into team room toolboxes. In sum, the goal for RUSIC is a graduate who understands and implements the fundamental principles common to all unmanned systems and effectively integrates them into the full range of special operations forces activities, in any domain, any dimension, and with any partner.

RUSIC WAY FORWARD

The RUSIC began in 2021 as a pilot program following a directive from the commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and has since matured into a course available through Army Training Requirements and Resources System. However, there is still much work to be done to solidify the resourcing required through the completion of a program of instruction. The 6th Battalion sees the future of RUSIC in two lines of effort: strengthening partnerships and adding capability.

Without the continued interdependence of partnerships across the Army, the joint force, the interagency, and our allies, RUSIC would prove impractical if not impossible to sustain. Throughout the course's short history, 6th Battalion has cultivated ties with key partners from across the unmanned systems community of interest, including the USASOC Robotics Division, the Maneuver Center of Excellence (the Army's robotics proponent), the 82nd Airborne Division Innovation Cell, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S. Army Futures Command, and Marine Forces Special Operations Command. Constant collaboration with these agencies, government labs, organizations, and industries is essential to test, evaluate, and integrate leading-edge capabilities into our courses and to maintain overmatch and outpace our peer and near-peer threats. For our RUSIC program to remain viable to the operational force, staying abreast of the latest in robotics and unmanned systems hardware and software is essential to course relevance. Remaining operationally aware of the evolution and employment of these systems in operations in Eastern Europe offers considerable lessons for both advanced technologies and TTPs.

One such capability that has proven operationally significant optimizes the sensor-to-munition decision-making cycle. In Eastern Europe, most unmanned system utilization centered on reconnaissance in support of terminal guidance. This lesson did not go unnoticed by our RUSIC curriculum developers. They captured these lessons, associated technologies, and TTP. They now teach how to use unmanned systems to “see and sense” into adversary deep areas to deliver terminal guidance for long-range precision fires and to provide target detection, identification, engagement, and defeat. Future RUSIC will work to implement practical exercises to bring this from concept to reality.

Conflicts such as those in Ukraine and Azerbaijan demonstrate the undeniable role and effectiveness of low-cost, compact, and expendable unmanned systems on the modern battlefield. This capability demonstrates not only potential dangers and risks for our force but, more importantly, it reinforces the unique opportunity these capabilities provide ARSOF. Addressing both the risk and the opportunity, RUSIC trains and educates ARSOF Soldiers and their partner forces on the functionality and operational utility of unmanned and robotic systems to enhance survivability, lethality, and sustainability. As this technology continues to evolve, 6th Battalion will ensure RUSIC remains adaptive, innovative, and focused on equipping and empowering ARSOF Soldiers with the most current equipment, capabilities, and effects required to integrate into the full range of military operations in support of the Army and joint force.



Want to learn more about the USAJFKSWCS RUSIC program, check out Pineland Underground's podcast that will release January 23.

PSYWAR for the Range of Military Operations School



By Brig. Gen. Guillaume "Will" Beaurpere, Col. Jeremy Mushtare, and Dr. Bradley Bloom

The United States is engaged in a global strategic competition for influence. Our adversaries regularly coerce decision-makers and attempt to mobilize relevant populations with anti-U.S. narratives interwoven with mis- and dis-information. They are mastering deception and waging protracted information warfare to undermine our credibility abroad and amongst our allies and partners. The Department of Defense recognizes this challenge and is aligning its strategy to compete and respond by creating focused joint force information advantage to achieve objectives in the physical, information, and human dimensions. While refining strategy and doctrine, the Army is simultaneously experimenting with IA concepts and capabilities to enhance its service contribution to information as a joint function. Under the Army's construct of five Information Advantage (IA) key tasks, the Special Operations Center of Excellence (SOCoE) is the designated Army lead for the Influence Key Task. As the DoD's core capability for influencing relevant foreign audience behavior, Psychological Operations (PO) forces are central to this overall strategy and are the capability of choice to gain and maintain relative influence advantage over our adversaries in the human dimension.

Modern U.S. Army PO forces convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in support of military objectives.⁰¹ It is critical that this branch of the joint force adapt and modernize to meet all domain requirements of the 21st-century environment. However, as we layout below, the current Army PO branch proponent model is not optimally structured to effectively drive the change necessary to modernize and professionalize. Formally established as a branch in 2006, PO still lacks a senior PO officer designated as the branch commandant to synchronize doctrine, training, leader development, education and personnel management. There is no unified PO school teaching to a single basic performance standard for all Army components regardless of curriculum delivery methods. These functions are critical for a branch that spans not only the Army's active and reserve components but also provides increasing education and training to the joint force as other services expand their information warfare capabilities and create influence practitioners.

To efficiently unify the management of the PO career field, the Special Operations Center of Excellence is taking a cue from historical Army successes and its own origin as the Psychological Warfare Center, or PSYWAR. We propose to re-establish the office of the PO

commandant with centralized selection command authority over a redesignated multi-Compo (Total Army) Psychological Warfare School and related branch management functions. This action will unify training and traditional proponent responsibilities for the entirety of the PO branch. A PO commandant, serving concurrently as the designated PO branch chief, will create a single point of command responsibility and align PO branch management with a successful education and training structure employed by other Army CoEs and branches. This commandant will also be charged with driving influence concepts and training to support the key human dimension aspects of Army IA and the information joint function.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ORIGINS

Today's PO branch traces its conceptual roots to colonial "rebels," who disseminated handbills at the Battle of Bunker Hill in 1775 encouraging British Soldiers to desert. The 20th century industrial-age warfare spawned more organized influence efforts in World War I, evolving to formal PSYWAR programs with specialized development and dissemination units in both the European and Pacific theaters during the Second World War. In 1950, spurred by the surprise invasion of South Korea and complex post-WWII security threats, the Army appointed then-Brig Gen. Robert A. McClure as the first Chief of Psychological Warfare under the Army G-3. Because of its strategic importance, McClure's Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare became the first Special Staff Division with direct access to the Army Chief of Staff. By 1952, OCPWs role included unconventional warfare doctrine, training, and requirements development. McClure moved the existing U.S. Army PSYWAR Center and School from Fort Riley, Kansas, to what is now Fort Liberty, North Carolina, to train PSYWAR and unconventional warfare practitioners. The 10th Special Forces Group, the Army's first SF formation, activated within the PSYWAR Center in June of that year. The rapid elevation of PSYWAR and the formal establishment of Army Special Forces was the direct result of centralized authority, high-level access to leadership, and the unity of purpose as a result of McClure's vision and direction.⁰²

In December 1956, reflective of its expanding role in Irregular Warfare, the Army changed the name of the PSYWAR Center and School to the Special Warfare Center and School. In 1964,



Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure (third from left) meets with Col. Ellsworth H. Gruber (third from right), commander of the 301st AB&L Group, Capt. Leroy E. Peck (second from right with arms behind back), commander of the Reproduction Company of the 301st, and other Psywar officers in Germany in 1952. Photo provided by U.S. Army

as a memorialization to the recently assassinated President, the center was renamed to the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center. Over the ensuing decades, the center evolved into what is today's United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the Special Operations Center of Excellence. The modern SOCoE exercises branch proponent responsibilities for Psychological Operations (PO), Civil Affairs (CA), and Special Forces (SF). Under current organization, the SOCoE commanding general serves as the school commandant and branch chief for all three branches. Within the SOCoE, daily branch management and administration are performed by individual branch proponent offices. Each proponent is managed by an O-5/Lieutenant Colonel proponent director with subordinate personnel, doctrine, and training divisions.

The PO Branch proponent executes their assigned responsibilities for both active, (AC) and reserve, (RC) component forces. All active proponent PO Soldiers attend their branch qualifying and specialized training at the USAJFKSWCS while reserve component PO forces attend a mix of USAJFKSWCS courses and other courses run by reserve component Total Army School System units. The AC courses include a growing sister-service student population that trains at the USAJFKSWCS since the joint certification of the PO Qualification Course in 2022. These factors over the past two decades have combined to complicate the branch management of the broader Total Army PO Force, as well as its integration into Army and joint requirements.

BRANCH DISAGGREGATION

In 2007, the Army retained AC PO (and CA) units as Army Special Operations Forces and re-designated RC PO (and CA) units as conventional forces under U.S. Army Reserve Command. This placed nearly two thirds of PO Soldiers in the conventional force, and completely separated PO force command and reporting

chains. While unit collective and critical individual tasks remain common across the branch, this conceptual and physical separation impacts all aspects of PO DOTMLPF-P⁰⁴ coordination and integration from tactical to Army command echelons.

Perhaps the most pronounced divergence has occurred in branch-specific qualification, training and education. There are currently five substantively different pathways for delivering basic PO proficiency to AC and RC Soldiers. These courses are executed by multiple training units under different chains-of-command with increasingly divergent versions of similar content due to vast differences in student contact hours, local cadre revision, and the phased sequence of formal updates.

While the PO proponent under the SOCoE is responsible for all curriculum design and development, the enormous differences in delivery methods and timelines between AC and RC PO Soldiers necessitates production of separate POIs and training support packages. The AC PO Soldiers are exclusively military occupational speciality and branch-qualified in resident courses at USAJFKSWCS, including additional ARSOF-utilization and language training prior to assignment to an ARSOF unit. In contrast, the RC PO Soldiers are branch-qualified in hybrid distant learning, short-duration residency courses. Much of the RC PO training is executed by the U.S. Army Reserve Command's 6th Brigade, 102nd Training Division, 80th Training Command (Total Army School System) at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. The 6th Brigade draws its PO cadre from five subordinate battalions located across the country. Unlike their AC counterparts, acquisition of language and advanced skills by RC Soldiers is largely dependent on individual Soldier initiative and availability for training. The challenges in coordinating curriculum and instructional oversight among the various active and reserve PO education and training stakeholders, delivering notionally equivalent but dissimilar curricula, predictably creates a measurable disparity in average student outcomes. Aside from impacts on branch unity, this bifurcated education and training model places institutional risk

on a branch population requiring highly technical knowledge and skills, advanced critical thinking, and a solid analytical foundation to perform critical PO missions common to the Total Army.

In addition to challenges in achieving consistent training outcomes, a 2018 proponent reorganization between the SOCoE and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command split different ARSOF branch DOTMLPF-P functions between the SOCoE branch proponents and the USASOC Force Modernization Center,⁰⁵ further complicating unity of effort. Where the Army has designated the SOCoE as lead for the IA influence key task, without a PO Branch chief and commandant, we lack senior leader synchronization across disparate stakeholders from tactical to theater and even service-level, attempting to craft unified recommendations and solutions.

The net result of the various factors described above is multiple PO chains-of-command, a fragmented educational framework for training AC and RC PO Soldiers to a common standard, and disaggregated branch management structure and DOTMLPF-P responsibilities. For the viability of the PO branch, the criticality of Army IA, and the joint information function in strategic competition, a PSYWAR School with its associated commandant can help mitigate some of these risks by creating a focal point for branch management and coordination to drive necessary change and leader development for this career field.

UNITY OF COMMAND – UNITY OF EFFORT

Unity of command over a school structure is key to ensuring alignment for both doctrine and training modernization in a dynamic and technologically-evolving operational environment. The creation of a Total Army PSYWAR School would align the branch management and school structures in a combined model where the commandant serves as the chief of Psychological Operations under the SOCoE commanding general. The appointment of an O-6/Colonel commandant and PO branch chief will create a central authoritative focal point and unified voice for the evolution and integration of branch capabilities across the total PO force and vertically to the Army, sister-service, and joint stakeholders.

In this model, the commandant would be a Command Assessment Program certified O-6 and selected for PO command through the Army’s job performance panel. The school would also have an O-6 level sergeant major Assessment Program centrally selected E-9 to serve as the branch senior enlisted leader and advisor. The deputy commandant would be appointed from the RC PO force to coordinate training with the USAR 6th TASS Brigade and other RC stakeholders. Figure 2 outlines a proposed provisional structure of the PSYWAR School. Not depicted here, but worth considering, is joint cadre and staff augmentation

PSYWAR SCHOOL ORGANIZATION HIERARCHY




Figure 2: Proposed Provisional PSYWAR School Organization (DRAFT)

TOTAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PO) FORCE SCHOOL FRAMEWORK




Figure 1: PO AC/RC Compo-Specific Education and Training Disparity

that would complement the recent joint accreditation and better accommodate sister-service demand for seats in the PO Qualification Course.

Under the proposed PSYWAR School organization, the PO proponent, AC training unit cadre, and RC PO cadre assigned to the 6th Brigade, currently aligned in three separate command structures, would be directly aligned and functionally integrated in an instructional framework centered at Fort Liberty under the PSYWAR School. This alignment of RC and AC instructional units with school locations is already practiced for branches such as intelligence, military police, quartermaster, engineer, and others. This re-alignment will require a stationing action initiated by the USAR to relocate the 6th Brigade and integrate the headquarters onto the USAJFKSWCS campus at Fort Liberty. The resulting unified structure, basing, and curriculum availability across training stakeholders will create a more robust and responsive ability to achieve instructional outcomes for all components that delivers equivalent knowledge, skill, and ability to perform PO critical individual tasks to a single baseline standard. PO Soldiers pending assignment to ARSOF organizations will continue to receive additional education on specialized capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures unique to ARSOF operations and mission sets.

A PSYWAR SCHOOL FOR 2030 AND BEYOND

Given the technological advances and means available for our adversaries to exploit information to influence and drive crisis and conflict across the globe, we must act now to professionalize and modernize our information related capabilities. Based on the sheer volume of data inundating both commanders and key

target audiences, the operational environment and global strategic competition for influence is even more complex than conditions in 1950, which led to the original establishment of a unified PSYWAR Center and School. As we look to 2030 and beyond, a Total Army and joint PSYWAR School is a mission critical requirement.

Modern PO forces will remain central to facing emerging threats and establishing information advantage as a condition of operational success. To achieve this requires coordination, agility, and timely execution of PO branch proponent functions between ARSOF, conventional, service, and joint stakeholders. Taking a lesson from the past, and embracing ARSOF’s PSYWAR heritage, the establishment of a PSYWAR School under the SOCoE with a O-6/Colonel commandant and branch chief will improve the quality and equivalency of AC and RC PO Soldier training, centralize the integration of DOTMLPF-P branch functions with doctrine, training, leadership and education, personnel, and policy under the branch chief and proponent office, and align PO branch education and management with the most common Army branch management model.

⁰¹ Definition found in current coordinating draft of the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 0360702 for Military Information Support Operations (MISO), a core function of PO Forces.
⁰² While the establishment of the PSYWAR Center and School elevated the visibility of role of PO forces, it was not until 2006 that PO would be formally established as an Army branch for the career development of officer and enlisted professionals.
⁰³ Headquarters, Department of the Army EXORD dated 01 MAR 2007. Subject: USAR Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Forces Transfer from U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC).
⁰⁴ Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy
⁰⁵ The SOCoE PO Proponent Office exercises responsibility for Doctrine, Training, Leadership and Education, and Personnel. The USASOC PO capability manager is responsible for Organization, Materiel, and Facilities. Policy development is shared between offices in their respective areas.

Improving the μ in $\alpha R^2 S O F$

The Case for Educating ARSOF on Inferential Statistics

By Maj. Robert Kava, Dr. Marcus Griffin, Lt. Col. Ray G. McCulloch II

PLANNING

STRATEGY

ANALYSIS

“Commanders want to know about hidden relationships among actors, what actors are pushing the deceptive content or influence campaigns, how deceptive content is being received, how it is being countered, where the actors are, who is supporting or working against them, and what problems this activity poses for their own troops and mission.”

Dr. Rebecca Goolsby, Office of Naval Research, 2018.

INTRODUCTION

The Pentagon faces a pressing challenge: Its Psychological Operations forces' assessment methods must be revised, especially in clandestine social media influence operations. As highlighted by a September 2022 Washington Post investigation, these assessment inadequacies have been a long-standing issue. These shortcomings compromise the effectiveness of information campaigns, risk squandering resources, and compromise strategic objectives. As the United States competes strategically with adversaries adept at misinformation and disinformation, the stakes are too high to ignore the lessons gleaned from over two decades of conflict.

The solution lies in equipping U.S. Army Special Operations Forces Soldiers with a practical understanding of inferential statistics. This training will dramatically improve the quality of research used for decision-making. It will also give Soldiers a deeper understanding of their operational environment through advanced statistics. Furthermore, the training will provide a foundation for understanding the statistics used in AI technology. ARSOF will significantly enhance its contributions to the joint force by investing in this targeted educational shift. The result will be a more precise and practical application of operations using inferential statistics, particularly in Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) and across multiple domains.

IMPROVING THE COMMANDER'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Assessing information operations requires identifying the operational environment and the skills to track and make sense of the data. Soldiers who are not analysts will find this challenging and need to be more accustomed to making decisions based on assessment data. Most Soldiers prefer relying on intuition or “gut feeling.” However, this is an unreliable guiding principle due to the complex variables involved in information operations. Although most staff officers and noncommissioned officers acknowledge the importance of assessment plans, information operations assessment is frequently overlooked due to various reasons, including:

- The perception that evaluation is time-consuming and resource-intensive.
- The assessment process faces challenges from the nature of the data: In war, lives are at stake, placing immense pressure on leaders to “get it right quickly.”
- The absence of a clear understanding of how to assess information operations.
- The assumption is that assessment is unnecessary if information operations appear to be working effectively.

This lack of evaluation makes it challenging for Soldiers to determine the effectiveness of information operations, leading to potential issues such as:

- Wasting time and resources on ineffective information operations
- Failing to capitalize on exploitable opportunities
- Lacking a comprehensive understanding of the adversary's information operations

Nevertheless, assessment is crucial for military commanders to make informed decisions about information operations.

As a use-case example, in October 2019, combat operations in Syria were thrown into disarray when the United States announced the withdrawal of the remaining U.S. troops from the country's northeastern region. This sudden shift left U.S. and coalition forces scrambling to protect retreating troops and adapt to the evolving situation. As Turkish and Russian forces advanced into northeastern Syria, the potential resurgence of Daesh and the weakening partnership between U.S. forces and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces raised significant concerns for ground force commanders.

Success and force protection during the retrograde depended, in part, on understanding the psychological impact of these events on local populations, tribal leaders, coalition forces, and the international community. Operating in such a dynamic environment, commanders needed rapid analysis and recommendations based on constantly updating data. Information Forces and Intelligence staff directorates employed inferential statistics to expedite the processing time, offering commanders reliable assessments of potential outcomes based on primary and secondary data sources—This innovative use of inferential statistics allowed for more informed decision-making and swift adaptation to fast-paced combat operations.

PROVIDING DEPTH OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE OE AND OIE

Inferential statistics are pivotal for understanding the operational environment and operations in the information environment. These advanced methods provide an analytical edge over basic descriptive statistics, specifically correlation, regression, and effect size calculations. For example, correlation analysis can show how trust in Chinese news sources relates to preference for China as an economic partner. Such insights are invaluable for crafting precise psychological operations to influence public perception.

Regression analysis goes a step further by identifying trends between variables, thereby enhancing our predictive capabilities for future scenarios. Similarly, calculating effect sizes helps pinpoint the most impactful relationships between variables, guiding us in choosing the most effective interventions. This is particularly useful in Psychological Operations, where understanding the strength of correlations between attitudes and governance preferences can lead to more targeted and successful campaigns.

Additional methods, including path analysis and structural equation modeling, offer deeper layers of understanding. They allow analysts to dissect complex relationships in populations, shedding light on how individuals might respond to propaganda or disinformation campaigns.

While these advanced methods have limitations—such as the need for normally distributed data and the risk of over fitting—their benefits to operational assessments in the information environment are significant. Not only do they enable more nuanced analyses and predictions, but they also help optimize the allocation of resources for interventions with the highest likelihood of success.

GETTING AHEAD OF THE COMPETITION IN THE GRAY ZONE

In today's rapidly evolving global landscape, the need for timely and accurate assessment of information operations has never been more pressing. The explosion of generative AI has policymakers and military planners racing to control this new technology, not knowing that a fundamental understanding of inferential statistics can curb fears of an information abyss that AI has created. Grasping the fundamentals of inferential statistics enables ARSOF Soldiers to understand the framework of AI's capabilities, thereby leveraging future AI software capabilities to forecast branch and sequence plans during gray zone activities accurately.

Great power competition underscores the urgency of optimizing assessment methods in the information environment. As nations vie for influence and power, understanding the nuances of Gray Zone conflicts and their implications across different stages of warfare is paramount. Gray Zone tactics involve actions that fall short of open war

and often rely on information operations to achieve strategic objectives. Accurate and efficient assessment methods can provide valuable insights into these operations, enabling commanders to adapt and respond effectively.

Implementing the proposed solution, which involves inferential statistics, can help staff officers and noncommissioned officers achieve success more quickly by reducing the time and effort required for assessment. By focusing on correlation, regression, and effect size tests, they can better understand the relationships between variables and the potential impact of interventions. This information allows them to make more informed decisions, optimize operations, and achieve better outcomes.

Moreover, inferential statistics can help reduce the spin-up time for new staff officers and noncommissioned officer, who need to grasp the intricacies of the information environment quickly. By providing a structured and evidence-based approach to assessment, this solution offers a solid foundation for those entering the field, promoting more effective collaboration and decision-making across the team.

Adopting the proposed solution of inferential statistics in assessing information operations is timely and necessary. As the world contends with the challenges posed by GPC and Gray Zone conflicts, it is crucial to provide staff officers and noncommissioned officers with the tools and techniques needed to make informed decisions and enhance the effectiveness of their operations. By embracing this solution, military commanders can gain valuable insights, optimize resource allocation, and better navigate the complexities of the information environment.

CONCLUSION

In today's rapidly evolving world, the United States faces increasing challenges, such as the rise of great power competition with China, the prevalence of Gray Zone warfare, and the emergence of new phases of war. These challenges demand an adaptation in assessment methods within the information environment. The problem of ineffective assessment techniques and approaches hampers commanders' ability to make informed decisions, leading to a lack of focus, wasted resources, and controversy. To overcome these challenges and stay ahead of the competition, using inferential statistics in assessment is essential, providing a critical advantage in this dynamic landscape.

The solution to the original problem lies in embracing inferential statistics in assessment for commanders conducting information operations in today's rapidly changing world. By adopting these advanced assessment techniques, they can optimize their resources and campaigns, ultimately gaining a strategic advantage in the complex and evolving information environment. As time is of the essence, harnessing the power of inferential statistics can make a significant difference in making better, faster decisions that are crucial for success.

JFK SPECIAL WARFARE MUSEUM

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
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The JFK Special Warfare Museum, the regimental museum of Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces, collects and preserves artifacts in order to educate the students of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School on the unique history and skills of Army Special Operations Forces. The museum is open to the public.



FM 3-53 Transforming Army Influence Activities

By Marty Bartram and
Lauraine Maxime-Land
Psychological Operations
Doctrine Division

“While we look ahead to a 2030 Aim Point, the changes we implement today must ensure the Soldiers we deliver tomorrow are ready to meet the emerging threats and challenges of conflict as early as 2027.”

USAFKSWCS 2030 Strategy (p. 2)

As the Army prepares to meet the challenges of 2030, the revision of Field Manual (FM) 3-53 provides evolved doctrine to meet the requirements of the current and anticipated operating environments. Over the past three years, the Psychological Operations (PO) Proponent Doctrine Division completely revised FM 3-53 to ensure it is synchronized with and supportive of Joint Publication 3-04, *Information in Joint Operations*; FM 3-0, *Operations*; and Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-13, *Information*. The next staffing of FM 3-53 will coincide with the release of ADP 3-13, giving the Army the opportunity to provide feedback before the planned publication of the FM by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2024.

Since the publication of the Army’s first doctrine on psychological warfare more than 80 years ago - through the transitions in terms to psychological operations and military information support operations - doctrinal principles for influencing foreign audiences have remained largely unchanged. To meet the future challenges our Army faces, this FM evolves from a singular focus on Military Information Support Operations (MISO) to now include the role of the PO branch and capabilities of Psychological Operations units to influence foreign audiences. According to the latest draft of FM 3-53 (2023), “The role of PO branch is to create and reinforce desired behaviors in selected foreign individuals and groups to achieve military and U.S. national objectives across the range of military operations” (p. 1). PO units fulfill this role through two primary influence activities: MISO and Department of Defense (DoD) deception activities. Individual PO Soldiers assigned to other Army and joint force commander staffs create conditions for commanders to employ Psychological Operations units. These Psychological Operations professionals provide subject-matter expertise for planning and command and control of MISO and deception activities in support of other Army units and the joint force.

This FM 3-53 includes a logic chart that illustrates the flow of the FM and answers the question, “What does a PO unit do?” The logic chart identifies the framework within which PO units are employed—supporting the Army’s operational concept in anticipated environments where the information dimension is a pervasive factor. Additionally, the logic chart captures what PO units do (influence) by linking the Army strategic context to deception and MISO and identifies how influence activities achieve advantages to affect foreign audience behavior. In addressing the question of what Psychological Operations units do, the logic chart creates a consistent response that informs the employment of Psychological Operations unit’s capabilities.

The title change of FM 3-53 from MISO to PO Unit Operations reflects that PO units execute more than a single influence activity. The development of a series of technical manuals concurrent

with the FM highlight the PO branch’s key techniques and processes. Beginning with Trainig Manual (TM) 3-53.11, *The PO Force Influence Process Task: Analyze*, this series codifies the terminology change from the PO process to the influence process.

The FM 3-53 similarly addresses this change, yet places it in a doctrinal context, and it accurately and succinctly amplifies and aligns the influence with the Army operations process.


Transformation and evolution of PO branch doctrine will be further extended to the publication of a series of Army techniques publications dedicated to more specific unit-level capabilities unique to the PO group, battalion, company, and detachment levels. Content from these ATPs will address how each echelon conducts operations in support of the full range of military operations and irregular warfare activities. Additionally, the revision of the ATPs that more specifically address MISO operational techniques and procedures, building partner influence capacity, civil authority information support, and deception activities, will capture key capabilities in confronting and defeating the emerging threats of modern warfare and the competition continuum.

This FM 3-53 revision is a key contributor to Army modernization. As the PO branch’s keystone publication, this manual is the foundation upon which the evolution of organization, training, leader development and education, material, and facility modernization originates. This revision incorporates content from FM 3-0, building upon the presentation of influence as a form of contact and placing it in the contexts of face-to-face, audio, visual, audio-visual, multimedia, and psychological actions that can affect tactical operations. FM 3-53 also recognizes that social media, online gaming, and other internet-based communications allow threats to extend their strategic reach in the human and information dimensions and underscores the need for PO Soldiers to exploit those same media to forestall and mitigate threat effects. FM 3-53 captures the language of PO units conducting MISO and DoD deception activities in support of the Army and the joint force.

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Master Sgt. David K. Thuma NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMY

Professional Military Education for Our Next Enlisted Leaders

By Command Sgt. Maj. Ronald D. Flick, Master Sgt. David K. Thuma NCOA commandant

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Master Sgt. David K. Thuma Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) provides professional military education for active duty and select Reserve component, E-5 through E-8 noncommissioned officers, in the branches of Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations (PO). On an annual basis, the NCOA cadre educate and train over 1,200 highly qualified NCOs. The education and leadership capability of NCOs is a strategic advantage in our competition space. Expanding professional military education, including partner nations, increases the success of future multinational operations, exercises, and missions. *(Note that Reserve Component PO and CA NCOs receive their NCOES training from the USAR's 6th Total Army School System Brigade).*

The aforementioned emphasizes the need for more robust collaborative programs between U.S. and partner nation NCOs. Collaborative relationships prove to be invaluable during multinational operations, peacekeeping missions, or crises. The commitment to collaborative programs on a global scale will serve to aid in preventing adversaries from gaining an advantage over U.S. partner nation militaries. In March 2024, the NCOA will open its doors to international Special Operations Forces as it implements its newly formed Partner Nation Enlisted Leader Development Program.

The intent of the Partner Nation Enlisted Leader Development Program is to highlight the NCOA's commitment to building and strengthening multinational military partnerships while welcoming further development of U.S. and partner force NCO

capability and capacity. As the military leaders from our partner nations continue to progress in their formations and into positions of power and influence within their own nations, our military will continue to strengthen many of those same relationships to enable U.S. partnerships around the globe. The integration of the Partner Nation Enlisted Leader Development Program into the NCOA will serve as the premier environment to provide NCOs with an enhanced professional military education experience.

BACKGROUND

The unique make-up of the NCOA cadre includes operators from SF, CA, and PO. The highly experienced and specialized cadre are masters of their craft and demonstrate the ability to deliver a high-end academic product.

The NCO leader development is a core component of training, education, and professional growth for each of our three career management fields. As such, the quest for professional growth and excellence for CA and SF begins with attendance to the Basic Leader Course and Advance Leader Course, which are integrated throughout each Special Operations qualification course. By contrast, PO Advance Leader Course (active component), unlike CA and SF, is currently a resident standalone PME program at the NCOA.

As an NCO advances to the rank of sergeant first class, they return to the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence (SOCoE) NCOA to attend the academically rigorous Senior Leader Course

(SLC) that focuses on operational and strategic-level planning, military decision making, and training management at the unit level. While attending SLC, NCOs develop a level of knowledge and understanding for the complexity of future missions. They strive to be mentally ahead of their adversaries—in not only tactics and training—but also decisive planning.

When NCOs reach the rank of master sergeant and first sergeant, the highly competitive NCOs return to the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence NCOA to attend the Master Leader Course and Senior NCO Fundamentals Course. This immersive course offers a cross-functional approach to education with the opportunity to collaborate on organizational leadership and joint planning for future operational and strategic expectations. An NCO's success in their respective leadership courses provides them the confidence and competence to employ their specialized training when working with indigenous forces and an increased comprehension of local dynamics in sensitive environments.

BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS

The complex landscape of global economics, military alliances, and international relationships play a pivotal role in providing peace and sovereignty for many nations. Starting in March 2024, the NCOA at the SCoE will welcome the opportunity for Special Operations Forces from U.S. partner nations to attend the Master Leader Course (MLC). Attendance will provide U.S. and partner nation NCOs the ideal learning environment to forge relationships

and build capacity through shared educational experiences in the classroom prior to future integration in the operational environment (*and trust*).

Cultural awareness and cross-cultural competence are essential skills for NCOs. A Partner Nation Enlisted Leader Development Program will use these essential skills to contribute to diplomacy and mutual understanding at a global level. Effective communication, understanding, and respect for partners from diverse backgrounds are crucial for building trust, defusing friction, and ensuring mission success. The Partner Nation Enlisted Leader Development Program will provide NCOs with the tools to bridge cultural divides, foster stronger working relationships, and enhance mission effectiveness. As a result, our NCOs will gain insight into different military doctrines, strategies, and tactics to adapt and integrate into their own units' practices. Partners attending MLC may bring back innovative approaches to leadership, logistics, or planning to enhance operational capabilities for their respective units—all of which will be possible while networking and building relationships.

As international crises tend to escalate rapidly, the availability of well-prepared, adaptable, and collaborative NCOs will offer an essential advantage amongst multi-national armies. These collaborative programs broaden horizons, facilitate knowledge exchange, enhance professional development, build relationships, promote diplomacy, and contribute to global security. The NCOs will emerge as well-rounded, adaptable, and globally aware leaders who will play a crucial role in fostering international cooperation toward maintaining peace in an interconnected world.



Master Sgt. David K. Thuma NCO Academy graduation at the John F. Kennedy Auditorium. (Photo provided by U.S. Army)

The Special Forces WARRANT OFFICER INSTITUTE

By Mr. Guy Griffaw, Special Warfare Warrant Officer Institute



The cadre at the Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute (WOI) train and educate Special Forces warrant officers and warrant officer candidates to fill key positions within 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command and to be versatile, innovative leaders, fully capable of operating in uncertain and challenging environments.

The WOI conducts three courses twice annually. Capitalizing on the vertical monopoly created through the Special Forces Warrant Officer Technical (SFWOTTC) and Tactical Certification Course (TCC), Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course (SFWOAC), and the Special Operations Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education (SOWOILE) to provide students with a branch-focused and progressive approach to their professional military education.

Army modernization is the progressive transformation of the critical elements by which the Army defines, constructs, and operates itself—doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy—from the present or traditional context to the future. Modernization occurs when progressive transformation ventures, successfully implemented across DOTMLPF-P components, holistically enhance the Army’s ability to accomplish its mission. This analysis will help new professionals to develop a practical understanding of Army modernization for dialogue and application.⁰¹

These modernization efforts focus primarily on the framework components of training, and leader development and education. The training component of the DOTMLPF-P modernization framework merits a place in the framework because it is integral to the normalization of change in the other components. Within this framework, training is the complement of knowledge and skills that Army personnel need to perform their duties for the successful operation of the enterprise and the fulfillment of its mission. There can be no lasting change in doctrine, organization, equipment or materiel without the successful adaptation and inculcation of new training methods for sustained mission accomplishment. Failure to adapt in the Training component will undermine and unravel changes in doctrine, organization, and equipment due to mission failure.⁰²

The leader development and education component of the DOTMLPF-P framework focuses on how the Army educates and develops leaders at all levels. Leader development and education are integral to Army modernization because leaders are responsible for both the daily operation and the long-term transformation of the institution. Pertaining to the latter, the Army expects its senior leaders to provide direction that entails aligning people, systems, and resources—and enterprise-level vision—to focus daily activities.

At the WOI, the cadre embrace the learning theory known as constructivism. This learning theory emphasizes the active role of learners in building their own understanding. Rather than passively receiving information, learners reflect on their experiences, create mental representations, and incorporate new knowledge into their schemas. This promotes deeper learning and understanding.

Information may be passively received, but understanding cannot be, for it must come from making meaningful connections between prior knowledge, new knowledge, and the processes involved in learning. The passive view of teaching views the learner as ‘an empty vessel’ to be filled with knowledge, whereas constructivism states that learners construct meaning only through active engagement with the world such as experiments or real-world problem solving.⁰³

The SFWOTTC has a dynamic program of instruction (POI) that evolves with the ever-changing demands of the SF Regiment, directives from USASOC, and the operational environment. At its core, the course is a leadership farm, growing high quality leaders for the Regiment. The Army Leadership and Profession module is akin to the regular Army Warrant Officer Basic Course and sets the tone of the course. The candidates are introduced to the Pineland scenario. Candidates are given a staff mission brief (SMB) for operational deployment to Pineland, and this scenario will be prevalent in all subsequent modules of training. This deployment will feed practical exercises and training vignettes, throughout the course, leading to their inevitable deployment to Pineland as a culmination exercise.

Candidates learn theory as well as practical skill sets. From mastering the intelligence collection process in the Intelligence Activities module to becoming long range planners in the Training Management module they are expected to perform as assistant detachment commanders. This instruction draws from a myriad of sources, ranging from Army doctrine to tangible real-world personal experiences of the as well as the students themselves. The subsequent modules ARSOF Doctrine and Operations, Targeting, and Planning, refines candidates’ skills in strategic thinking, mission analysis, and operational planning.

A 10-day CULEX is the final phase of the course. It focuses on embassy key-leader engagements, intricate dilemmas, and communication skills, which all highlight the candidate’s adaptability, decision making, and leadership abilities while navigating complex scenarios and problem-solving exercises.

As the operational environment continues to evolve, so too must the cognitive development and education level of our future leaders. SF warrant officers must possess the knowledge, skills, and behaviors to excel in complex and ambiguous environments. The SFWOAC trains and develops those traits within the institutional domain of leader development (FM 6-22). SOCofE’s SFWOAC has effectively transformed and modernized in response to this requirement.

At its core, this course places the students at the forefront of all learning endeavors. Practical exercises, coupled with student-

led and designed projects, form the bedrock of the learning experience, and ensure that theoretical knowledge is put into real-world practice. Knowledge, skills, and behaviors (KSB) assessments provide a structured framework for evaluating students’ mastery of critical skills and knowledge.

Critical thinking and organizational problem-solving are essential tools required by our SF warrant officers to ensure success in the operational forces. Students delve into scenarios that mirror the realities of their roles in SF units and various headquarters, such as devising recruitment and retention strategies, navigating intricate SOF planning processes, and facilitating seamless conventional forces to SOF integration.

One distinguishing feature of the SFWOAC is the robust integration with inter- and intra-agency partners. Collaborations with agencies and interagency support to capstones like the Joint Interagency Task Force–National Capital Region, 389th Military Intelligence Battalion, Army Space Missile Defense Command, and Army Multi-Domain Targeting Center empower SFWOAC students with a holistic perspective of whole of government and partnerships to achieve cross-functional expertise. Beyond the classroom, the methodology fosters a culture of continued dialogue post-completion, recognizing that learning is an ongoing journey.

The SFWOAC planning capstone has modernized to keep pace with contemporary defense strategy, SOCOM’s guidance to the force, and the USASOC commander’s intent. Cadre now integrate with operational units to derive real-world problem sets that are geographically focused against a peer and near-peer competitor. SFWOAC cadre leverage interagency involvement within JIATF-NCR and is exploring opportunities to collaborate with 389th Military Intelligence Battalion’s multidisciplinary intelligence capabilities to provide intelligence support, as well as provide our students with practical experience managing critical staff functions during planning. The students, working in operational planning teams (OPTs), generate flexible response or deterrence options at the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented information level—helping the operational unit solve hard and niche problems. The cadre are currently assessing the feasibility of integrating the first class of 2024 with CJSOTF-10 Forward staff to plan “support to resistance” activities, keeping our student’s education and experience at the forefront of our organization’s efforts and operational maturation.

The SOWOILE Course is professional military education for SF warrant officers prior to being assigned as battalion or group operations warrant officers in the SF Regiment. ARSOF warrant officers are authorized to attend the course to prepare them for operations within the ARSOF enterprise, or at the requisite level across the Army according to their branch manager. The course consists of eight modules: strategic warfighting, campaign planning, professional development engagement, military deception, the Joint Planning Process (JPP), training management, professional development and leadership, and the capstone planning event. Central to warrant officer professional education, the capstone planning event has been modernized by looking at a problem from current operations in campaigning to supporting ongoing special operations and irregular warfare activities being conducted



Warrant Officers from the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School take an oath of commission during the Special Forces Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Appointment and Graduation Ceremony at Fort Liberty, North Carolina May 11, 2023. Soldiers who attended the course were educated, trained and certified for MOS 180A in operational and tactical requirements for planning and executing special operations worldwide and to serve as Assistant Detachment Commanders for a SFOD-A. (Photo by K. Kassens)

by theatre special operations commands (TSOC). Previously, the students used the JPP to revise already approved TSOC supporting plans that had not been recently updated.

The SOWOILE uses experiential learning to achieve the desired training and education outcomes. This gives students the opportunity to expand the knowledge they have already developed during the JPP module and apply it to any subsequent problem sets. The use of this model has increased the fidelity and utility of planning results, which provides the TSOC with courses of action that, with limited refinement, are relevant and ready to implement. In many instances, their plans provide the TSOC with a warm start to a problem or fill a gap in current operations and become the foundation for TSOC supporting plans. This learning methodology establishes the framework for a continuum of modernization that leverages student experience, experiential education, and expertise to deliver relevant operational outcomes.

The WOI continues to deliver versatile and innovative warrant officers capable of operating in uncertain and challenging environments. As a result of the three capstone courses SFWOTTC, SFWOAC, and SOWOILE, the SF WOI delivers curricula unmatched by other Army Centers. The expert delivery of Army core curriculum combined with the integration of real-world operational challenges at the SF group and TSOC level offers a one-of-a-kind learning experience. The SF WOI has earned the distinction as a TRADOC and Warrant Officer Career College learning institution of excellence.

⁰¹ Army Chief of Staff, SD 08 STRATEGY NOTE 2021-02, US Army 2021 Modernization Strategy: Investing in the Future, Army Publishing Directorate 02/01/2022, accessed 10/04/2023, armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34818-SD_08_STRATEGY_NOTE_2021-02-000-WEB-1.pdf
⁰² LTC Hassan M. Kamara, Tenets of Army Modernization Land Warfare Paper 153, Association of the United States Army, February 24, 2023, accessed 10/4/2023, www.ausa.org/publications/tenets-army-modernization
⁰³ Saul Mcleod, PhD, Constructivism Learning Theory & Philosophy Of Education, Simply Psychology, Updated on June 15, 2023, accessed 10/4/2023, www.simplypsychology.org/constructivism.html

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IRREGULAR WARFARE ACADEMY THE ORIGINS

By Brig. Gen. Sara Dudley, USAJFKSWCS Deputy Commanding General - Modernization

The Department of Defense is undertaking a Herculean modernization and way-of-warfare recalibration process to transition from two decades of a Global War on Terror. Massive geopolitical changes in the world point toward the ascension of peer and near-peer competitors, the persistence of asymmetric threats, and irregular challenges. The speed of change within computing power, social interconnectivity, weapons capabilities, and governmental instabilities across the globe all contribute to a very different reality of how future wars will be fought.

Absent conventional or nuclear war, we find ourselves confronted with, "...another type of warfare, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins, war by guerillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of aggression...a form of warfare uniquely adapted...these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and there a new and wholly different kind of military training...your education must prepare you for the non-military problems you will face." (President John F. Kennedy's remarks at the 1962 graduation exercises at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York)

The role of Army special operations forces to support this multidomain operations capability is grounded squarely in the roots of the organization, offering irregular warfare options and other special operations to ground force commanders while also providing critical linkages to the joint force. The establishment of the Army's

Irregular Warfare (IW) proponent at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School represents a path forward to support Army modernization and warfighting concepts.

As the Army focuses on large-scale combat operations, ARSOF must define, teach, and then institutionalize how unique IW operations and activities complement and enable conventional forces and whole-of-government overseas activities. That said, as one of the first initiatives as the Army's IW Proponent, the establishment of an IW Academy will explore the full scope of those activities and operations to address the challenges across the competition continuum.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The 2022 Joint Concept for Competing highlights that—within this new strategic environment—the joint force must expand its competitive mindset. The Army and ARSOF must have a shared understanding of irregular capabilities and the ability to rapidly react and offer options to complement the joint force and our whole-of-government partners based upon a foundation of trust born of extensive collaboration and operational experience. Recent Secretary of Defense guidance directs the Services to deliver this institutional and operational irregular national security capability. SWCS must provide this institutional approach on behalf of the Army to develop IW capabilities on par with our traditional warfare capabilities.

			Civil Affairs Operations
			Counter Threat Networks
			Security Cooperation
		Counter Threat Finance	Counter Threat Finance
		Security Force Assistance	Security Force Assistance
	Civil-Military Operations	Civil-Military Operations	Civil-Military Operations
	Military Information Support Operations	Military Information Support Operations	Military Information Support Operations
Counterinsurgency	Counterinsurgency	Counterinsurgency	Counterinsurgency
Counterterrorism	Counterterrorism	Counterterrorism	Counterterrorism
Foreign Internal Defense	Foreign Internal Defense	Foreign Internal Defense	Foreign Internal Defense
Stability Operations	Stability Operations	Stability Operations	Stability Operations
Unconventional Warfare	Unconventional Warfare	Unconventional Warfare	Unconventional Warfare
Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats, JOC 2.0, 2014	DoDD 3000.07 Irregular Warfare 2014	CJCSI 3210.06A Irregular Warfare 2015	Irregular Warfare Mission Analysis 2021

Legend:

Core

Enabling

Related

Operations and Activities

JOC

Joint Operating Concept

DoDD

Department of Defense Directive

CJCSI

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

THE TYRANNY OF LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

To be prudent, the Army must always prepare for the most dangerous course of action—a rapidly escalating scenario that progresses to large-scale combat operations. The art of competition below the level of armed conflict, along with its strategic deterrence effects, signifies a renewed emphasis on the irregular forms of warfare.

The U.S. military traditionally deters adversaries via superior technological capabilities, military equipment, and force projection to change the decision calculus for force-on-force engagements. These traditional engagements within multidomain operations include the employment of large-scale military units across the battlespace. In this regard, the Army

large-scale combat operations model perceives an exceptionally linear, contiguous, and physically defined geographic space for separating the conflict area immediately forward of the line of attack. Although descriptive to maneuver forces, the Army multidomain operations concept does not address the potential operations and activities occurring beyond the strategic flanks and periphery of the predominantly kinetic fight—IW activities and operations offer options.

IRREGULAR WARFARE: ARSOF OPTIONS

In recent years, the Department of Defense understanding of IW and its relevance has evolved considerably. From 2010 to 2014, the Department stated IW consisted of five activities.

A decade later, an IW Mission Analysis conducted by the Joint Staff characterized the activities of IW to include counter threat networks, counter threat finance, stability operations, security cooperation, civil-military operations, Civil Affairs operations, and military information support operations, while additionally eliminating the distinction between core and enabling activities.

In 2021, the Army Combined Arms Center engaged SWCS in earnest to address the transfer of specified proponency for IW to ARSOF (less security force assistance and stability operations). The IW Proponent at SWCS began filling its first billets on Fort Liberty, North Carolina, in the summer of 2023.

In keeping with Army resourcing processes, by first quarter fiscal year 2025 the IW Proponent will be fully staffed to conduct the specified tasks of doctrine, training, leadership and education, and personnel proponency as the Army’s proponent.

IRREGULAR WARFARE ACADEMY: INSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION

Akin to the Maneuver Center of Excellence effort to establish a Large-Scale Combat Operations Academy to address traditional warfare, SWCS will establish an academy intended to address IW.

As part of the SWCS 2030 strategic vision, the IW Academy—in this, its first year—is focused on refining its vision, publishing the first keystone doctrine, and institutionalizing IW training and education within ARSOF curricula. As a logical follow-on to the improvement of our programs of instruction and faculty development, the IW proponent will establish a way ahead to effectively integrate IW into doctrine, training, and education at the other Army centers of excellence.

This five-year goal aligns with Army Program Objective Memorandum and Total Army Analysis processes to ensure our Academy goals are nested with the Army’s publishing of Field Manual (FM) 3-03, generating professional military education, and executing IW-unique certification courses. Complementary to these efforts, the Academy will provide an umbrella to a broad community of interest spanning the whole of government, academia, and the private sector for concept development and thought leadership. To capture these insights, SWCS hosts a biannual IW Forum to bring together this diverse community of interest.

THE ACADEMY ENVISIONS THREE SUPPORTING FUNCTIONAL LINES OF EFFORT:

LINE OF EFFORT 1

Doctrine and Training. Army IW doctrine is aged and not well read. The IW proponent at SWCS—in partnership with the CombinedArmsCenteratFortLeavenworth,Kansas—willpublish the Army’s first updated IW doctrine as FM 3-03. Applicable FMs and Army techniques publications requiring revision will be scheduled in subsequent years. Consistent with doctrinal imperatives and principles, IW and special operations training is a logical extension of those publications, and the descriptions therein reflect the important role ARSOF plays in delivering relative information and human advantage to the Army and the joint force. IW’s people-centric style of warfare may eventually include courses that address social media analytics, language proficiency, mis/disinformation, and regional and cultural training to converge ARSOF effects across the competition continuum. To properly codify IW doctrinal and training initiatives, collective task development must include mission essential tasks, training and evaluation outlines, and Combined Arms Training Strategies, all of which—once properly documented—will potentially lead to IW resourcing like never before imagined.

LINE OF EFFORT 2

Brig. Gen. “Will” Beaurpere, Commanding General, USAJFKSWCS

Leadership and Education. The second line of effort takes a two-pronged approach to address leader development within our professional military education programs of instruction, and to leverage two high-profile, graduate-level advanced civil schooling programs—one provided by National Defense University’s Joint Special Operation’s Master

of Arts program and the other by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Master of Arts in Defense Analysis. In both instances, IW curricula set the standard and foundation upon which the IW Academy will be built. For professional military education, we will begin with a leader and cadre development program to institutionalize a common understanding of IW operations and activities, which will be followed by the development of programs of instruction (E-5 through E-9, O-1 through O-7) made available to centers of excellence across the Army. As for how we leverage advanced civil schooling, fellowships, and similar graduate level opportunities, the Academy’s


near-term approach to these academic opportunities will build upon their dynamic course offerings, relevant research initiatives, and the extensive certifications each of these universities bring to the IW problem set. These academic networks allow access to other top-tier academic institutions, private research institutes, government labs and think tanks, and federally funded research institutions to further our understanding of traditional and irregular forms of warfare.

LINE OF EFFORT 3

Outreach and Community of Interest. The final line of effort offers a focal point for engagement within the broader IW community of interest. As an extension of the network established through the IW Forum and the delivery of IW content

in professional military education and advanced civil schooling, the IW Academy would host international military, diplomats, academics, and other governmental institutions, along with industry professionals and nongovernmental organization partners. These venues garner the diverse expertise required to ensure traditional and IW education is current and relevant. Additionally, this line of effort offers the Academy a means to establish outreach to our partners through permanent or rotating positions to the interagency and academia, such as visiting fellows, professors, international partners, and so on. The combination of community of interest and outreach initiatives extend our partnerships and collaboration beyond our current table of distribution and allowance to capitalize on expertise that wouldn't otherwise access be accessible.

U.S. ARMY IRREGULAR WARFARE PROPONENT’S LINES OF EFFORT



CONCLUSION


In the SWCS 2030 Strategy, the IW Academy is SWCS' institutional answer to the Army's training modernization efforts. To balance the focus on large-scale combat operations, ARSOF must institutionalize how to integrate unique IW operations and activities in the Army and the joint force. As the Army's IW proponent, the establishment of an IW Academy explores those activities and operations to address the challenges in the competition continuum.

The IW Academy at SWCS will be the Army's value proposition to the joint force for ensuring we compete, deter, and gain human and informational advantage over peer and near-peer threats who seek to undermine democratic principles, international rule of law, and our way of life. The combination of our lines of effort leads us to the institutionalization and operationalization of IW to fight and win in 2030.

Illustration by Hazel Ong, LDD

IRREGULAR WARFARE

RESEARCH SYMPOSIUM
May 15-17, 2024



Fort Liberty, North Carolina

Sponsored by the Irregular Warfare Center, the Irregular Warfare Forum is a collaboration between National Defense University's College of International Security Affairs and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

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