(U) Evaluation of the DoD’s Sustainment Plan for Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams Armored Weapon Systems Transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces
(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the DoD’s Sustainment Plan for Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams Armored Weapon Systems Transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces

February 15, 2024

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD developed and implemented sustainment plans to support Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams armored weapon systems transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF).

(U) Background

(U) Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the President stated that the United States would dramatically increase the amount and types of weapons provided to the UAF. In response to Ukrainian requests for security assistance, the DoD transferred or was transferring 186 Bradleys, 189 Strykers, and 31 Abrams to the UAF as of August 22, 2023. The U.S. Army is responsible for developing and updating life-cycle sustainment plans for these weapon systems, which we determined include sustainment requirements that fall into four major categories: supply, maintenance, training, and facilities.

(U) Finding

(U) As of January 2024, the DoD had not developed or implemented a plan for sustaining the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to the UAF. The DoD provided supply packages containing consumables and spare parts, as well as personnel and facilities to conduct field-level maintenance through the end of FY 2024, consistent with the challenges of fiscal authorities. However, DoD officials acknowledged that the existing efforts did not constitute a sustainment plan and had not yet identified the following sustainment efforts to facilitate Ukraine’s sustainment beyond the end of FY 2024:

• (U) spare parts, consumables, ammunition, and support equipment;
• (U) the recommended depot-level training for Ukrainians;
• (U) personnel who would provide depot-level maintenance; or
• (U) facilities capable of meeting depot-level maintenance requirements.

(U) The lack of sustainment planning occurred because:

• (U) current fiscal authorities used to provide Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams to the UAF did not include a sustainment requirement;
• (U) as of October 3, 2023, the DoD had not issued policy or guidance regarding sustainment of weapon systems transferred to the UAF; and
• (U) according to an official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the DoD had ongoing discussions on whether to seek authority to use other means to provide for sustainment needs of the weapon systems beyond FY 2024 but had not reached a final decision.

(U) Providing weapon systems to the UAF without a plan to ensure sustainment creates additional risks. Specifically, the UAF may not be able to independently sustain U.S.-provided Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams without a sustainment plan in the future. Additionally, the DoD cannot accurately predict sustainment costs or assess long-term readiness impacts to other U.S. missions. One U.S. Army official stated that the DoD’s current practice of drawing down existing U.S. Army stocks to support Ukrainian needs without limits may require the DoD to choose between the readiness of UAF units or the readiness of U.S. Army units.
(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the DoD’s Sustainment Plan for Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams Armored Weapon Systems Transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]), in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD[A&S]), provide recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.01, to identify the policy goals, priorities, and objectives of U.S. sustainment support for weapon systems provided to the UAF.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) As a result of management comments from the USD(A&S) and the Acting USD(P), we revised draft Recommendation 1.b.1 and 1.c to clarify the recipient and intent of those parts of the recommendation.

(U) The USD(A&S) and the Acting USD(P) agreed with four of five parts of the recommendation and stated that they would provide an action plan identifying the policy goals, priorities, and objectives of U.S. sustainment support. The comments addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, these four parts of (U) the recommendation are resolved but open. We will close these parts of recommendation when we receive documentation showing that the USD(P), in coordination with the USD(A&S), has provided recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to identify the policy goals, priorities, and objectives of U.S. sustainment support for weapon systems provided to the UAF.

(U) The USD(A&S) and the Acting USD(P) disagreed with one part of the recommendation, to identify a process under funding authorities to provide sustainment for weapon systems beyond FY 2024. However, their comments met the intent of the original recommendation, so we also consider this part of the recommendation resolved but open. Please see the recommendations table on the next page for the status of recommendations. We will close this part of the recommendation when we receive documentation showing that the USD(P), in coordination with the USD(A&S), has provided recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to identify available fiscal and procurement authorities or the need to seek additional authorities to provide for sustainment needs beyond FY 2024.
### (U) Recommendations Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Recommendations Unresolved</th>
<th>Recommendations Resolved</th>
<th>Recommendations Closed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1.a, 1.b.1, 1.b.2, 1.b.3, and 1.c</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1.a, 1.b.1, 1.b.2, 1.b.3, and 1.c</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) **Note:** The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.

- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.

- **(U) Closed** – DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.
MEMORANDUM FOR FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of the DoD’s Sustainment Plan for Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams Armored Weapon Systems Transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces
(Report No. DODIG-2024-057)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General’s evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management’s comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) The USD(A&S) and Acting USD(P) addressed all of the recommendations in this report in their response; therefore, we consider the recommendations resolved but remain open. As described in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, we will track and close the recommendations when we receive documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendations are completed.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 90 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Send your response to either __________ if classified SECRET.

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

Dana Johnson
Acting Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Programs, Combatant Commands, and Overseas Contingency Operations
(U) Contents

(U) Introduction
(U) Objective ........................................................................................................................................................................... 1
(U) Background ........................................................................................................................................................................ 1

(U) Finding. The DoD Lacked a Plan to Sustain Beyond September 2024 the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams Provided to Ukraine ........................................................................................................................................................................ 7
(U) The DoD Provided Supplies and Training to Ukraine but Lacked a Plan to Sustain U.S.-Provided Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams .................................................................................................................. 9
(U) PDA and the USAI Do Not Include Sustainment Requirements, and the DoD Did Not Provide Supplemental Policy Guidance .................................................................................................................. 16
(U) Lack of Sustainment Planning Increased Risk to Both the UAF and the DoD .................................................................................. 20
(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response ...................................................................................... 22

(U) Appendix
(U) Scope and Methodology .............................................................................................................................................................. 26
(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data .................................................................................................................................................. 28
(U) Prior Coverage ............................................................................................................................................................................. 28

(U) Management Comments
(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ................................................................................................................................. 30

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................................... 33
(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD developed and implemented sustainment plans to support Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams armored weapon systems (Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams) transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF).

(U) Background

(U) The DoD's Cross-Department Working Group Process for Providing Weapon Systems to Ukraine

(U) Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States dramatically increased the amount and types of weapon systems provided to the UAF. The process for providing weapon systems begins with the UAF identifying its need for a specific battlefield capability and communicating this need to U.S. and partner nation officials. The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) receives the requests for the United States, verifies the requirement, and forwards it to the DoD’s Cross-Department Working Group (CDWG). The CDWG, a group of senior leaders from across the DoD, considers the request, including potential sustainment costs or issues, and recommends to the Secretary of Defense the weapon systems the DoD can provide to fulfill Ukraine's needs.

(U) We asked participants in the CDWG to describe their roles and responsibilities, and each stakeholder self-described their role. According to the participants, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD[P]) chairs the CDWG meetings while the officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Materiel Readiness) (ODASD[MR]), USEUCOM, Security Assistance Group–Ukraine (SAG-U) and the Headquarters, Department of the Army’s Strategic Operations Directorate (HQDA G-3/5/7) attend the meetings and provide input on logistics and sustainment needs and challenges.

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1. [U] The original objective focused on the extent to which SAG-U developed and implemented sustainment strategies to support selected U.S. weapon systems transferred to the Government of Ukraine. While planning this evaluation, we broadened the objective to include organizations across the DoD and chose three armored weapon systems (Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicles, and Abrams Main Battle Tanks) as the selected weapon systems to review. Also, while the objective originally referred to “sustainment strategies,” we refer to these in the report as sustainment plans for consistency with DoD-wide terminology. Please see the Appendix at the end of the report for additional information. Lastly, while the objective originally referred to the “Government of Ukraine,” we refer to this in the report as Ukrainian Armored Forces for consistency with DoD-wide terminology.

2. [CUI] The DoD Office of Inspector General is currently performing an audit of the DoD’s controls for validating and responding to Ukraine’s requests for military equipment and assistance (Project No. D2023-D000RH-0034.000).

3. [U] According to OUSD[P] officials, no DoD policy or other written document outlines the roles and responsibilities of CDWG participants or even lists required DoD Components to participate. As a result, we determined the roles and responsibilities based on participants’ descriptions of the CDWG members’ roles.
(U) **Long Lead Times and Multi-Year Sustainment for U.S. Security Assistance to Foreign Partners**

(U) The Arms Export Control Act established the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program as one of the U.S. Government’s means for transferring defense articles, services, and training to international partners and international organizations. FMS provides foreign partners with the ability to purchase weapon systems and equipment using the DoD’s acquisition system, either by using their own funds or with funds provided through U.S. Government-sponsored assistance programs. Because foreign partners purchase items new, FMS cases may take years to fulfill depending on manufacturing capacity. FMS also offers foreign partners flexibility to enter into multi-year agreements based on that partner’s ability to pay and desired level of support. FMS cases also require the U.S. Government to negotiate a “total package approach.” Depending on the terms of the agreement, this approach obligates the U.S. Government to provide additional sustainment items with the weapon systems, such as training, technical assistance, initial support, software, ammunition, and follow-on support for a specified period, usually 2 to 3 years.⁴

(U) Because of Ukraine's urgent need for defense articles and weapon systems, the President authorized aid to Ukraine using authorities granted by Congress other than FMS. Specifically, the DoD has transferred 186 M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (Bradleys) and 189 M1126 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicles (Strykers) to Ukraine as of August 22, 2023, under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA).⁵ Additionally, the DoD was in the process of transferring 31 M1 Abrams Main Battle Tanks (Abrams) under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) as of that same date.⁶ The President first authorized the transfer of these weapon systems in January 2023, stating that the United States would provide the UAF with 109 Bradleys and 90 Strykers through PDA. Later that month, the President stated that the United States would provide the UAF with 31 Abrams, as well as funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment under the USAI. Following these announcements, the United States committed an additional 77 Bradleys and 99 Strykers to the UAF under subsequent PDA orders.

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⁴ (U) The specific items and services included in a total package approach depend on the Letter of Offer and Acceptance between the United States and the partner nation. The Letter of Offer and Acceptance defines the terms of the sale, including specific items and duration of sustainment support.

⁵ (U) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provides the President with the authority under PDA to direct the drawdown of DoD stockpiles to provide immediate military assistance to a foreign nation. The 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 114-92, §1250) created the USAI to enhance the capabilities of the military and other security forces of the Government of Ukraine to defend against further aggression.

⁶ (U) According to The New York Times, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Abrams tanks delivered under the USAI began arriving in Ukraine around September 25, 2023.
Both PDA and the USAI have a number of differences compared to FMS. Specifically, PDA is an authority, not a duration-limited funding source. Additionally, upon notification to Congress, PDA allows for the delivery of defense articles and services directly from DoD stocks to foreign countries and international organizations to respond to unforeseen emergencies, which significantly speeds up delivery time compared to FMS. Congress funds the USAI through appropriations, which limits the DoD’s ability to obligate funds to the time frame directed by Congress. The USAI also differs from PDA by using money appropriated by Congress to purchase new equipment for Ukraine rather than limiting the DoD to pulling from existing military inventory. Neither PDA nor the USAI contains any requirement or obligation to sustain items provided under these authorities. However, PDA and the USAI do not preclude the DoD from providing sustainment. As of June 15, 2023, the United States provided approximately $26 billion in security assistance to the UAF through PDA, $18 billion through the USAI, and $4.7 billion through the Department of State’s FMS programs. Table 1 identifies key features of each type of security cooperation and assistance.

**Table 1. Security Cooperation and Assistance Programs for Foreign Governments and Partner Nations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Governing U.S. Law</th>
<th>Fiscal Authority</th>
<th>Funding Duration</th>
<th>Sustainment Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Arms Export Control Act, Chapter 2</td>
<td>Foreign government purchases, grants</td>
<td>Dependent on Letter of Offer and Acceptance with foreign government</td>
<td>Usually 2 to 3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>Foreign Assistance Act, Section 506(a)(1)</td>
<td>Presidential authority</td>
<td>None, but requires notification to Congress</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAI</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016, Section 1250</td>
<td>Congressional appropriations</td>
<td>Specified by Congress but typically one fiscal year</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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7 According to the Government Accountability Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations, 3rd ed., volume 1, January 2004, Congress authorizes appropriations either as annual appropriations, which limit the ability to obligate those funds only during the fiscal year for which Congress made them, or multiple year appropriations, which are available for obligation for a definite period in excess of 1 fiscal year. All appropriations are assumed to be annual appropriations unless otherwise specified by the appropriation act.

8 While the United States has provided approximately $4.7 billion in assistance to Ukraine through FMS under a category known as Foreign Military Financing, the DoD used PDA and the USAI to provide the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams to Ukraine.
(U) The DoD Sustainment Planning Model and Life-Cycle Sustainment of Complex Weapon Systems

(U) The DoD establishes sustainment requirements for weapon systems through the development of life-cycle sustainment plans (LCSPs). Although the DoD's sustainment requirements identified in LCSPs are not mandatory after the transfer of weapon systems, the LCSPs set standards for maintaining the mission capability of weapon systems over the course of their lifespan, both inside and outside of combat situations, regardless of user. Additionally, according to ODASD(MR) officials, many U.S.-provided weapon systems' established product support plans, such as the LCSPs, could be used to develop similar long-term sustainment plans or a sustainment strategy for equipment provided to Ukraine. The ODASD(MR) officials stated that the use of existing support and sustainment plans could reduce the requirements development and planning burden, as Ukraine may be able to adopt certain aspects from existing approaches used by the United States. As a result, we determined that the LCSPs are the primary reference to identify sustainment requirements for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams the DoD provided to the UAF.

(U) The DoD’s sustainment planning model focuses on sustaining weapon systems over their entire life cycle to maintain mission capability. Joint Publication 4-0, “Joint Logistics,” defines sustainment as “the provision of logistics and personnel services to maintain operations until mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force.” Section 4324, title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) requires that the Secretary of Defense issue guidance to the DoD Components on life-cycle sustainment and product support strategies for covered systems, including certain armored weapon systems and their variants, such as Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams. Specifically, 10 U.S.C. § 4324 requires that the DoD develop and approve an LCSP for covered DoD systems during the acquisition process and identifies specific elements those plans must include, such as:

- (U) performance goals, including key performance parameters for sustainment;
- (U) sustainment risks and proposed mitigation plans for such risks;

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10 (U) Section 4324, title 10, U.S.C., “Life-Cycle Management and Product Support,” January 13, 2021. The term “covered system” refers to a major defense acquisition program as defined in the U.S.C. or an acquisition program or project that is carried out using the rapid fielding or rapid prototyping acquisition pathway under the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016 (Public Law 114–92) that is estimated by the Secretary of Defense to require an eventual total expenditure described in 10 U.S.C. § 4201(a)(2).
• (U) engineering and design considerations that support cost-effective sustainment of the covered system; and

• (U) major maintenance and overhaul requirements that will be required during the life cycle of the covered system.

(U) DoD Instruction 5000.91, “Product Support Management for the Adaptive Acquisition Framework,” provides additional details on what each LCSP must include. Specifically, the instruction states that, among other elements, a complete LCSP includes:

• (U) a comprehensive product support strategy that covers 12 elements of product support, including sustainment categories such as supply, training, facilities, and maintenance;

• (U) risks to sustainment, such as diminished manufacturing sources, material shortages, and plans to mitigate those risks; and

• (U) specific maintenance requirements to ensure continued operation of the system during its expected life cycle.

(U) Four Main Sustainment Categories for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams

(U) As the primary operator of Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams, the U.S. Army has responsibility to develop and update the systems’ LCSPs. Specifically, the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), as part of the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), supports the efforts of the Program Executive Offices, which develop and maintain the LCSPs for each individual weapon system. The LCSPs for the Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams each include sustainment elements divided into four broad categories. Specifically, we determined the LCSPs identify the following main categories of sustainment. Additionally, we included common definitions for the responsibilities within those categories.

• (U) Supply—such as spare parts, basic issue items, components, and other bulk supplies

• (U) Maintenance—both regular maintenance performed by system operators (field-level maintenance) and more significant work performed at specialized facilities (depot-level maintenance)


12 (U) For consistency in this report, we used definitions of the four LCSP categories gathered from both the LCSPs and DoD-wide terminology.

13 (U) The LCSPs refer to two types of maintenance—field and sustainment level. However, the DoD commonly uses the term “depot” level maintenance instead of “sustainment” level maintenance. For consistency in this report, we refer to the types of maintenance as field- and depot-level maintenance. Field-level maintenance encompasses the organizational and on-system maintenance and repairs necessary for day-to-day operations, as well as the intermediate, off-system repair of components and end items for weapon systems and supply chains. Depot-level maintenance entails materiel maintenance requiring: (1) the major repair, overhaul, or complete rebuilding of weapon systems, end items, parts, assemblies, and subassemblies; (2) manufacture of parts; (3) technical assistance; and (4) testing.
• (U) Training—both for operators and maintainers of the weapon systems
• (U) Facilities—locations with the equipment necessary to perform
  maintenance and battle-damage repairs

(U) **DoD Responsibilities for Identifying Sustainment and Security Cooperation Policies**

(U) DoD Directive (DoDD) 5100.01, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components,” identifies that the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense (acting on the behalf of the Secretary) are responsible for providing guidance, including the strategic direction and policy, program, and resource priorities in support of the President's National Security Strategy and Unified Command Plan.¹⁴ DoDD 5100.01 also states that the Under Secretaries of Defense implement policy established by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary, assign responsibilities, and provide policy guidance to the heads of other DoD Components when authorized to do so.

(U) Additionally, the Under Secretaries of Defense develop and initiate programs, plans, actions, and taskings to ensure adherence to DoD policies and national security objectives. DoDD 5100.01 identifies that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.¹⁵ DoDD 5100.01 also states that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD[A&S]) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on all acquisition and sustainment and related matters in the DoD.

(U) In the Office of the USD(A&S), the ODASD(MR) serves as the principal advisor for policies and procedures for maintenance support of major weapon systems and military equipment. The ODASD(MR) establishes and maintains maintenance policies and programs that are managerially and technologically sound and adequately resourced to maintain the desired levels of weapon systems and military equipment readiness to accomplish DoD missions. ODASD(MR) officials stated that the ODASD(MR) established a current operations mission set in early 2023 within its office as an additional requirement to identify and facilitate sustainment support for DoD weapon systems provided to Ukraine.

¹⁴ (U) DoDD 5100.01 “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components,” December 21, 2010 (Incorporating Change 1, September 17, 2020).

¹⁵ (U) The OUSD(P) oversees DoD policy related to security assistance and cooperation efforts through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Partnerships). The OUSD(P) also has Ukraine-specific policy development responsibilities through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Ukraine, Russia, and Eurasia).
(U) Finding

(U) The DoD Lacked a Plan to Sustain Beyond September 2024 the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams Provided to Ukraine

(U) As of January 2024, the DoD had not approved or implemented a plan for sustaining the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to the UAF. Although the DoD is not required to sustain the weapon systems after transfer, the DoD provided the UAF with supply packages containing consumables and spare parts, as well as personnel and facilities to conduct field-level maintenance through the end of FY 2024. However, DoD officials from the ODASD(MR), the OUSD(P), the U.S. Army, USEUCOM, and SAG-U acknowledged that the existing efforts did not constitute a sustainment plan. Additionally, the DoD officials we interviewed had not yet identified the following sustainment efforts to facilitate Ukraine’s sustainment beyond the end of FY 2024.

- (U) ODASD(MR) officials had not identified sources of spare parts, consumables, and ammunition, while USEUCOM officials had not identified sources of support equipment, such as recovery vehicles;
- (U) U.S. Army Sustainment Command and TACOM officials had not identified recommended training for Ukrainians to conduct field- and depot-level weapon systems-specific maintenance and technical calibrations;
- (U) U.S. Army Sustainment Command, TACOM, and SAG-U officials had not identified personnel who would provide depot-level maintenance and battle-damage repair that could not be conducted by operators in the field; and
- (U) ODASD(MR) and SAG-U officials had not identified facilities capable of meeting depot-level maintenance requirements, including weapon system disassembly, diagnostics, repair, calibration, and overhaul.

(U) In May 2023, officials from the ODASD(MR) began developing a sustainment plan for weapon systems provided to the UAF, including Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams, to address these specific sustainment challenges. In response to a draft of this report, ODASD(MR) officials stated that, as of January 2024, the

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16 (U) ODASD(MR) officials referred to this sustainment plan using a number of different terms, including a sustainment concept, a sustainment strategy, and a sustainment plan. For consistency within this report, we use the term “sustainment plan.” Our use of sustainment plan describes a document that defines the roles, responsibilities, sources, and methods of sustainment for weapon systems provided to the Government of Ukraine.
(U) DoD was in the process of internally coordinating the plan, and estimated it would take until March 2024 to complete. Although the DoD is not required to sustain equipment after transfer under PDA or the USAI, the weapon systems are not likely to remain mission capable without sustainment.

(U) The lack of sustainment planning occurred for several reasons. First, the authorities used to provide Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams to Ukraine—PDA and the USAI—do not include a sustainment requirement. Second, the DoD did not issue policy or guidance consistent with LCSP requirements regarding the sustainment of weapon systems transferred to the UAF. Specifically, we determined that the DoD did not issue policy or guidance to:

- (U) define planning factors, including specific parameters, limitations, or duration of U.S. support, such as personnel, materiel aid, and use of U.S. or partner nation depots or repair facilities;
- (U) assign roles and responsibilities to develop and implement a sustainment plan consistent with the needs of each system identified in the LCSPs; or
- (U) identify a process under existing fiscal authorities to provide for sustainment of the weapon systems beyond FY 2024.

(U) Finally, according to an OUSD(P) official, the DoD had ongoing discussions on whether to seek additional authorities or other means to meet the sustainment needs for these weapon systems but did not make a final decision.

(U) We determined that providing weapon systems to the UAF without a plan to meet the life-cycle sustainment needs of the provided systems creates additional risks to both the DoD and the UAF. Specifically, the UAF may not be able to independently sustain U.S.-provided Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams in the future. Additionally, the DoD cannot accurately predict enduring sustainment costs for U.S.-provided equipment or assess the long-term readiness impacts to U.S. Army systems and units that operate these systems. As a result, the DoD may need to commit more resources at significant cost to U.S. taxpayers or risk the ability to perform other U.S. missions. For example, an HQDA G-3/5/7 official stated that continued reliance on drawing down existing U.S. Army stocks without a plan that defines the limits of the DoD’s commitment may require a choice between continued support for Ukraine and meeting the minimum readiness requirements for U.S. Army units.
(U) The DoD Provided Supplies and Training to Ukraine but Lacked a Plan to Sustain U.S.-Provided Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams

(U) As of January 2024, the DoD had not approved or implemented a plan for sustaining the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to the UAF even though, as of June 2023, the DoD obligated over $1.85 billion through PDA packages to provide those weapon systems alongside additional equipment, logistics support, and training available through USAI funding. DoD officials stated that the additional end items and support would sustain the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams for approximately 1 year of use. However, we determined that the items, support, and training aligned with some elements of the four major sustainment categories contained in the LCSPs but not all. Specifically, the DoD provided materiel such as spare parts, basic issue items, and diagnostic equipment, along with facilities and personnel to conduct basic field-level maintenance through the end of FY 2024.17

(U) However, we determined that, beyond this initial level of maintenance and supply support, the DoD did not approve or implement a sustainment plan that identified the processes, training, personnel, or facilities for the UAF to sustain and continue using the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams. When asked, officials from the ODASD(MR), the OUSD(P), the U.S. Army, USEUCOM, and SAG-U stated they had not yet identified how the DoD intended to provide or facilitate a number of sustainment activities consistent with the four major sustainment categories outlined in the LCSPs for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams beyond September 30, 2024. Specifically:

- (U) ODASD(MR) officials had not identified sources of spare parts, consumables, and ammunition beyond the end of FY 2024, and USEUCOM officials had not identified support equipment, such as recovery vehicles;
- (U) U.S. Army Sustainment Command and TACOM officials had not identified recommended training for the UAF to conduct field- and depot-level weapon systems-specific maintenance and technical calibrations;

17 (U) Basic issue items are essential auxiliary items that are required to operate equipment and enable it to perform the mission and function for which it was designated.
• (U) U.S. Army Sustainment Command, TACOM, and SAG-U officials had not identified personnel who would provide depot-level maintenance and battle-damage repair that could not be conducted by operators in the field; and

• (U) ODASD(MR) and SAG-U officials had not identified facilities capable of depot-level maintenance requirements, including weapon system disassembly, diagnostics, repair, calibration, and overhaul.

(U) Officials from the ODASD(MR) began leading an effort in May 2023 to develop and release a sustainment plan alongside other DoD Components. In response to a draft of this report, ODASD(MR) officials stated that, as of January 2024, this effort remained incomplete and relied on the voluntary participation and cooperation of those Components.

(U) The DoD Obligated Some Materiel, Funding, and Personnel to Sustain Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams for Approximately 1 Year of Use

(U) As part of the process to provide Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams to the UAF, U.S. Army officials stated that they worked with the Program Executive Offices for these weapon systems to identify materiel requirements, including spare parts and equipment necessary to sustain the systems. HQDA G-3/5/7 officials also stated that they provided input to OUSD(P) staff regarding those specific materiel needs, as well as funding and personnel estimates necessary to address some of the immediate sustainment needs for those weapon systems. The OUSD(P) staff worked with Office of the USD(A&S) and Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) officials to identify spare parts, support equipment, and personnel requirements and included them in PDA packages to accompany the Bradleys and Strykers provided to the UAF. As a result, the approved obligations identified costs for parts and services and tasked the U.S. Army to provide spare parts and other items, including:

• (CUI)
• (CUI)
• (CUI)
(U) We obtained documentation for a Bradley push package from the U.S. Army that provides detailed information on the line items included in the PDAs and lists 333 specific, different items amounting to 743 individual spare parts or pieces of support equipment at a cost of $4.4 million. HQDA G-3/5/7 officials stated that, even though the DoD provided the Bradleys under PDA, the spare parts and equipment provided in the push packages matched what the DoD would normally provide as part of a typical FMS case. Additionally, the officials stated that they also included an additional number of spare parts that the U.S. Army determined an operator of the equipment would need to sustain those systems under combat conditions. Specifically, the officials stated that a typical FMS case includes approximately 1 year of spare parts and equipment but that the packages provided to Ukraine also included additional items informed by U.S. experience operating the weapon systems in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. As of June 28, 2023, U.S. Army documentation showed that the DoD delivered approximately 82 percent of the Bradley push packages to Ukraine. Although the DoD had not provided Abrams to the UAF as of August 7, 2023, U.S. Army officials stated that the support package being developed for the Abrams includes similar spare parts, equipment, and maintenance personnel support.19

19 (U) According to The New York Times, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Abrams tanks began arriving in Ukraine at the end of September 2023.
(U) DoD Sustainment Provided to the UAF for the Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams Does Not Align with Key LCSP Elements

(U) The DoD did not have a plan that identified the processes, training, personnel, or facilities to provide spare parts and field-level maintenance past September 2024 or depot-level maintenance for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to the UAF consistent with the needs of each system identified within the LCSPs. Specifically, as of August 9, 2023, officials from the ODASD(MR), the OUSD(P), USEUCOM, the U.S. Army, or their subordinate organizations had not identified specific planned sustainment support for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to the UAF that aligned with the LCSP categories of maintenance, supply, training, and facilities. 20

(U) We requested that DoD officials from the OUSD(P), the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Sustainment), the ODASD(MR), the DSCA, USEUCOM, SAG-U, the AMC, and TACOM provide sustainment planning categories and performance requirements for these weapon systems. The information we requested aligned with the four sustainment categories in the corresponding LCSPs and included the sources for spare parts, technical expertise, facilities, or specialized equipment. In response to our requests, those officials from the OUSD(P), the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Sustainment), the DSCA, USEUCOM, SAG-U, the AMC, and TACOM stated that they did not have some of the information we requested, deferred to other DoD organizations, or stated that the information did not exist. Officials from the ODASD(MR), SAG-U, and TACOM also provided some information but stated their belief that current efforts were not sufficient to meet longer-term sustainment needs.

(U) The Stryker, Bradley, and Abrams LCSPs clearly identify a number of sustainment elements that we grouped into the four main categories of maintenance, supply, training, and facilities for the purposes of our evaluation. Table 2 summarizes the key information we requested and the responses we received from DoD officials within each of the four major categories of sustainment.

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20 (U) Specifically, we spoke with officials from the ODASD(MR), the OUSD(P), the DSCA, USEUCOM, SAG-U, the HQDA G-3/5/7, the AMC, and TACOM.
### Table 2. Responses from DoD Officials on Sustainment Capabilities for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LCSP Sustainment Category</th>
<th>Information Requested from DoD Officials</th>
<th>DoD Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>Ability to conduct depot-level maintenance or significant repairs of equipment either in Ukraine or elsewhere</td>
<td>U.S. Army officials identified challenges with: 1) obligating funds under PDA and USAI fiscal authorities beyond the current fiscal year and 2) continued reliance on using existing U.S. Army stocks of spare parts and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Plans or ability to provide continued spare parts, ammunition, and other items beyond 2024</td>
<td>U.S. Army officials identified challenges with: 1) obligating funds under PDA and USAI fiscal authorities beyond the current fiscal year and 2) continued reliance on using existing U.S. Army stocks of spare parts and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Information or plans to train Ukrainian personnel to perform depot-level maintenance on Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams</td>
<td>U.S. Army officials identified challenges with: 1) obligating funds under PDA and USAI fiscal authorities beyond the current fiscal year and 2) continued reliance on using existing U.S. Army stocks of spare parts and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>Facilities capable of conducting depot-level maintenance and significant battle-damage repair of equipment</td>
<td>U.S. Army officials identified challenges with: 1) obligating funds under PDA and USAI fiscal authorities beyond the current fiscal year and 2) continued reliance on using existing U.S. Army stocks of spare parts and equipment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) Source: Responses to requests for information from the OUSD(P), the ODASD(MR), SAG-U, and U.S. Army officials.

(U) Beyond the approximate 1-year supply of consumables and repair parts and the limited field-level maintenance support at the RDC-U, officials we spoke with in the OUSD(P), the ODASD(MR), the U.S. Army, USEUCOM, and SAG-U had not identified how the DoD would provide depot-level sustainment for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams the DoD provided to the UAF. We determined that this is not consistent with the four main categories of sustainment we identified in the LCSPs. For example, we determined that the officials had not identified how or whether the DoD would provide resources or training for Ukrainian personnel to sustain
(U) In response to our request for information sent to multiple DoD Components, only ODASD(MR) officials were able to provide any sustainment planning documentation, and the documents they provided were not final or specific to Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams. Specifically, ODASD(MR) officials provided two draft ODASD(MR) documents that included generalized sustainment concepts to enable Ukraine's continued use of DoD-provided weapon systems. The first document identified how the DoD was working to standardize push packages across types of weapon systems and sequential PDA packages, while the second document provided a support plan that outlined broad categories of sustainment efforts for weapon systems provided to the UAF. However, neither document contained detailed information on how the DoD would facilitate sustainment across the supply, maintenance, training, and facilities categories contained within the Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams LCSPs.

(U) Based on the limited documentation and negative responses that ODASD(MR), OUSD(P), USEUCOM, and U.S. Army officials provided, we concluded that, as of January 2024, the DoD had not developed or implemented sustainment plans for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to Ukraine. The officials we spoke with acknowledged that the DoD-provided training, spare parts, and limited field-level repair facilities as of August 2023 did not support sustainment for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams beyond September 2024.

(U) In May 2023, the ODASD(MR) Began Developing a Sustainment Plan for U.S.-Provided Weapon Systems

(U) In May 2023, the ODASD(MR) established a sustainment working group to develop a sustainment plan for weapon systems provided to the UAF, including Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams. However, as of August 9, 2023, ODASD(MR) officials stated that their efforts were still in the initial stages while they conducted a “campaign of learning” to identify the elements and specific details of what that plan should include, such as depot-level maintenance. The ODASD(MR) sustainment working group included the voluntary participation of officials from a number of DoD Components, including the OUSD(P), the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), the HQDA G-3/5/7, the Defense Logistics Agency, USEUCOM, and SAG-U. According to meeting minutes from the ODASD(MR)-led sustainment working group dated May 30, 2023, the group identified a need to conduct a holistic review of current and future security assistance package sustainment needs and to plan for additional sustainment.
(U) support to the UAF. An ODASD(MR) official stated that participants initiated the sustainment working group in response to a Secretary of Defense inquiry on sustainment of weapon systems provided to Ukraine. In response to a draft of this report, ODASD(MR) officials stated that, as of January 2024, the DoD was currently coordinating the plan and estimated that their sustainment planning effort would be complete in March 2024.

(U) Furthermore, officials from the ODASD(MR) acknowledged that sustainment planning began "late in the game" and was an afterthought for the DoD. ODASD(MR) officials also stated that other DoD Components disregarded the ODASD(MR)’s initial sustainment efforts because the DoD’s main focus was to transfer PDA defense articles to the UAF as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, a USEUCOM official stated that existing push packages were short term and that the current model would not be sustainable or effective over the longer term.

(U) OUSD(P) officials stated that they were not aware of an existing formal policy dictating the level of sustainment for weapon systems provided to the UAF and also stated that the OUSD(P) was aware of the ODASD(MR)’s efforts to develop a sustainment plan. Officials from the HQDA G-3/5/7 stated that current sustainment involved using PDA and USAI authorities to provide spare parts and support equipment, such as testing and diagnostic gear, alongside the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams. However, the HQDA G-3/5/7 officials stated that doing so relied on drawing down existing U.S. Army stocks, and, long-term, the DoD would need to develop a plan to provide sustainment that did not continue to rely on existing U.S. Army inventories.

(CUI) As of August 2023, the ODASD(MR)-led sustainment planning effort collected information and analyzed data across a number of areas.
(U) PDA and the USAI Do Not Include Sustainment Requirements, and the DoD Did Not Provide Supplemental Policy Guidance

(U) We determined the lack of sustainment planning occurred because the authorities used to provide Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams armored weapon systems to Ukraine—PDA and the USAI—do not contain a sustainment requirement, and the DoD did not issue overarching policy or guidance consistent with LCSP requirements. The DoD did not define both the expected U.S. commitment and each DoD Component’s assigned duties for facilitating sustainment support for Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams weapon systems provided to the UAF. Specifically, ODASD(MR) officials explained that the DoD did not establish planning factors, including specific parameters, limitations, or duration of U.S. support, such as personnel and contractors, materiel aid, and use of U.S. or partner nation depots or repair facilities.

(U) We also determined that the DoD did not assign roles and responsibilities to develop and implement a sustainment plan consistent with the needs of each weapon system identified in the LCSPs, including designating a DoD Component with the authority to:

- (U) direct the Military Services and combatant commands to provide necessary information on sustainment requirements for weapon systems, including Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams, based on U.S. experience in fielding those systems and Ukraine’s needs;
- (U) identify facilities and personnel able to maintain, repair, and overhaul weapon systems, including Ukraine’s ability to do so independently; and
- (U) coordinate sustainment responsibilities across DoD Components, contractors, and Ukrainian personnel to ensure weapon systems, including Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams, remain mission capable and effective.

(U) Lastly, we determined that the DoD did not identify existing fiscal authorities or the need to seek additional authorities to provide for sustainment of the weapon systems beyond 1 year. According to an OUSD(P) official, the DoD had ongoing discussions but had not made a final decision on whether to seek authority to use other means to provide for sustainment beyond 1 year. Specifically, a U.S. Army official stated that both PDA and USAI fiscal authorities presented challenges with providing long-term sustainment for weapon systems without a plan to do so.
(U) PDA and the USAI Do Not Include Sustainment Requirements, and the DoD Did Not Define the Specific Parameters or Limitations of U.S. Support

(U) We determined that DoD officials did not develop a sustainment plan for Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to the UAF. This occurred in part because, in the absence of sustainment requirements under PDA and the USAI, DoD senior leadership did not issue policy or guidance defining specific planning factors, such as the parameters or limitations of support to sustain U.S.-provided weapon systems in accordance with their respective LCSPs. In the absence of existing policy, DoDD 5100.01 identifies the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and Acquisition and Sustainment as the principal staff assistants to the Secretary of Defense for all matters related to security assistance programs and acquisition and sustainment, respectively. DoDD 5100.01 requires the Under Secretaries of Defense to implement policy, assign responsibilities, and provide policy guidance to the heads of other DoD Components within their assigned areas of responsibility.

(U) Even though the LCSPs for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams identify specific sustainment requirements for each weapon system, the stakeholders we interviewed were not aware of any formal DoD policy or guidance regarding sustainment of U.S.-provided Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams to meet the LCSP requirements. Specifically, when asked, ODASD(MR), OUSD(P), U.S. Army, USEUCOM, and SAG-U officials stated that they were not aware of any overarching DoD planning guidance on the parameters of U.S. support or how the DoD would provide sustainment of Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to the UAF.

(U) Without policy or guidance such as planning factors, ODASD(MR) officials stated that they could not effectively plan sustainment across various weapon systems, including Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams. OUSD(P) officials stated that the DoD did not establish a policy identifying the level of sustainment for any weapon systems provided to Ukraine but that the DoD generally included a 1- to 2-year sustainment package based on the recommendations of the Military Services. However, officials from the HQDA G-3/5/7 stated that they did not receive guidance on the level of sustainment support for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams, so they defaulted to the types of items provided through previous FMS cases. USEUCOM and SAG-U officials stated that Ukrainian officials identified the level of sustainment support
(U) for weapon systems that they needed and that USEUCOM officials validated those needs and facilitated discussions with DoD officials through the Cross-Department Working Group (CDWG) based on UAF requests for support.

(U) As a result, we determined that DoD officials lacked a common understanding of support and expectations regarding U.S. commitment for sustainment of weapon systems, including the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams, provided to the UAF. The DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) report, “Evaluation of Sustainment Strategies for Air Defense Systems Transferred to the Government of Ukraine,” also identifies the challenges, including a lack of sustainment planning for the Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target (PATRIOT) air defense system, which prompted us to issue a broad recommendation to develop sustainment plans for all weapon systems transferred to the UAF. 21

(U) The DoD Did Not Assign Roles and Responsibilities to Develop and Implement Sustainment Plans

(U) We also determined that the DoD did not develop a sustainment plan for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to the UAF because DoD senior leadership did not assign roles and responsibilities to develop and implement sustainment plans consistent with the needs of each system as identified in the LCSPs. According to the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO’s) “Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,” for an organization to operate effectively, management must assign responsibility and delegate authority to key roles throughout the organization. 22 Under DoDD 5100.01, the responsibility and authority to issue policy and guidance for security cooperation and assistance programs and activities rests with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]), while the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD[A&S]) has the responsibility to set DoD-wide policy and direction for acquisition and sustainment.

(U) Officials from the ODASD(MR), TACOM, USEUCOM, and SAG-U stated that the DoD either did not designate or they were unaware of an office of primary responsibility or lead office responsible for developing the sustainment plan for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to the UAF. ODASD(MR) officials stated that they did not issue any policy related to sustainment of weapon systems transferred to the UAF and instead recommended that we ask TACOM or SAG-U to provide copies of any sustainment plans for Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams.

(U) However, TACOM officials we interviewed stated that Office of the Secretary of Defense officials never tasked them to develop a sustainment plan for the Bradleys, Strykers, or Abrams provided to the UAF. Officials from the SAG-U Logistics Directorate (J4) stated that they were tasked to host a Ukraine Maintenance Strategy Working Group but also could not provide any sustainment plans. While officials from USEUCOM’s Directorate for Plans, Policy, Strategy, and Capabilities stated that they worked with the CDWG to develop the initial push packages for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams, the officials were not aware of an office responsible for developing sustainment plans for those weapon systems.

(U) As of August 9, 2023, ODASD(MR) officials started developing a sustainment plan for weapon systems provided to Ukraine, including Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams. These officials acknowledged that they undertook this effort out of necessity to address significant sustainment gaps that they identified independently and not in response to senior DoD leadership tasking. Additionally, according to ODASD(MR) officials, the ODASD(MR)-led sustainment planning effort did not feature formal roles and responsibilities but reflected voluntary efforts by participants in the working group to share information. ODASD(MR) officials stated that their effort faced significant challenges due to a lack of guidance, no formal tasking from the Department, and an unwillingness by officials within DoD leadership and the combatant commands to share data and information.

(U) The DoD Did Not Identify Fiscal Authorities to Provide Sustainment Beyond 1 Year

(U) Lastly, we determined that DoD officials could not develop a sustainment plan for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams because, based on our review of policy documents and statements from officials, the DoD did not identify existing fiscal authorities or the need to seek additional authorities to provide for sustainment needs of the weapon systems beyond FY 2024. According to an OUSD(P) official, as of October 30, 2023, the DoD had ongoing discussions on whether to seek additional authorities or to use other means to provide continued sustainment but had not reached a final decision.

(U) The current fiscal authorities used to provide weapon systems to the UAF—PDA and the USAI—create challenges with providing sustainment for weapon systems beyond September 2024. Specifically, an official from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Defense Exports and Cooperation) stated that, as of August 2023, the DoD only possessed authority under PDA and the USAI to obligate funding through the end of September 2023 and then spend those obligated funds through September 2024. As a result, we determined that DoD planners lacked the ability to identify long-term sources of funding to sustain the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to the UAF beyond approximately 1 year.
Additionally, HQDA G‑3/5/7 officials stated that the current PDA usage created challenges for sustainment of weapon systems transferred to the UAF as well as U.S. Army weapon systems. During a meeting with the HQDA G‑3/5/7 and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Defense Exports and Cooperation) officials, an HQDA G‑3/5/7 official stated that the U.S. Army encouraged the DoD to transition away from PDA and USAI packages to multi-year fiscal authorities like FMS for sustainment of weapon systems, including the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams. The HQDA G‑3/5/7 official also stated that it would be pertinent for the DoD to establish DoD‑wide guidance or a strategy detailing how the Military Services should plan to support sustainment of U.S.-provided weapon systems.

(U) Lack of Sustainment Planning Increased Risk to Both the UAF and the DoD

(U) The DoD and the UAF faced additional risks as a result of the lack of guidance identifying the extent or limits of U.S. support and roles and responsibilities for planning and executing sustainment for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to the UAF. Without a plan to provide sufficient training and support equipment, the UAF is at an increased risk of being unable to sustain these weapon systems adequately to deter or defend against future Russian aggression. Furthermore, the DoD faced increased risks because it lacked the ability to accurately predict enduring sustainment costs for U.S.-provided equipment or to assess the long-term readiness impacts on other DoD missions.
(U) Ukraine Risks Dependence on U.S.-Provided Sustainment for Its Continued Defense Against Russia

(U) Over the long-term, the UAF risks becoming dependent on continued U.S.-provided sustainment assistance for their successful defense against Russia without a sustainment plan that includes specialized training for Ukrainian personnel and identification of any materiel needs for Ukraine to establish their own maintenance, repair, and overhaul facilities. Specifically, if the UAF does not establish the knowledge base and physical capacity to maintain the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams using its own personnel, equipment, and funding, it will not have the capability to use the equipment once U.S. sustainment support ends. According to a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction report, the U.S. experience in Afghanistan demonstrated that a factor in the failure of the Afghan government to defend against a Taliban takeover was that the Afghan National Defense Security Forces never developed the ability to sustain themselves and remained reliant on ongoing U.S. support. The DoD’s National Defense Strategy identifies that the DoD will support robust deterrence of Russia and work with foreign partners to build capacity and promote resilience along Europe’s eastern flank. However, if Ukraine remains reliant on the United States for its continued defense against Russia, the DoD will not only face increased future costs for that support, but the DoD will also not accomplish its stated National Defense Strategy goals of building partner capacity and promoting resilience.

(U) The DoD Faced Increased Risks Without the Ability to Accurately Predict Sustainment Costs or Readiness Impacts

(U) The DoD faced increased risks to its ability to accurately predict future sustainment costs without a sustainment plan that identifies roles and responsibilities and the level and duration of U.S. sustainment support. As combat operations continue within Ukraine, the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams that the United States provided will require both regular maintenance and battle-damage repairs to maintain mission capability. However, without a sustainment plan that includes a definition of U.S. responsibilities or identifies facilities where depot-level maintenance or overhaul can occur, the United States may not be able to meet Ukraine’s sustainment needs. As a result, the DoD may need to identify additional resources to either support the acquisition, staffing, and use of those facilities or to replace Ukraine’s continued losses, at significant cost to U.S. taxpayers.
(U) Likewise, the unanticipated provision of additional weapon systems, equipment, or spare parts may negatively impact the DoD’s readiness. Without a sustainment plan that is consistent with the LCSP requirements to ensure continued operation of Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams weapon systems provided to Ukraine, the DoD may not accurately determine the total resources required to support both DoD and UAF requirements. Specifically, HQDA G-3/5/7 officials stated that continued reliance on drawing down existing U.S. Army stocks without a plan defining the limits of the DoD’s commitment or expanding U.S. production capabilities may lead to a decision between continued support for Ukraine and meeting the minimum readiness requirements for U.S. Army units. In turn, the defense industrial base may not be able to meet both U.S. and Ukraine requirements. For example, a sustainment plan consistent with the LCSP for the Bradley would identify sustainment requirements, enabling the DoD to calculate the total supplies necessary to procure to meet the needs for both Ukrainian and U.S. Army Bradley-equipped units.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Revised Recommendation

(U) As a result of management comments, we revised draft Recommendation 1.b.1 to remove “Military Services” and instead state “relevant geographic combatant commands.” We also revised draft Recommendation 1.c to clarify that the intent of the recommendation is for the USD(A&S) and USD(P) to coordinate and provide recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to continue identifying funding authorities consistent with DoD policy for sustaining weapon systems provided to Ukraine.

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, provide recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.01, to identify the policy goals, priorities, and objectives of U.S. sustainment support for weapon systems provided by the DoD to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The recommendations to the Secretary of Defense should, at a minimum, do the following.

a. (U) Define planning factors, including parameters, limitations, and duration of U.S. sustainment support, such as personnel and contractors, materiel aid, and use of U.S. or partner nation depots or repair facilities.
(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments

(U) The USD(A&S) and Acting USD(P) agreed with Recommendation 1.a, and stated that the DoD will follow up with the DoD OIG to provide an action plan by February 29, 2024, identifying the sustainment strategy for Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to the UAF.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the USD(A&S) and Acting USD(P) addressed the specifics of Recommendation 1.a; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but open. We will close this recommendation once we receive a copy of the action plan and confirm that the plan defines planning factors, including parameters, limitations, and duration of U.S. sustainment support, such as personnel and contractors, materiel aid, and use of U.S. or partner nation depots or repair facilities.

b. (U) Assign roles and responsibilities to develop and implement a sustainment plan consistent with the needs of each weapon system identified in the life-cycle sustainment plans. The roles and responsibilities should designate a DoD Component with the authority to:

1. (U) Direct the relevant geographic combatant commands to provide necessary information and data on sustainment requirements for weapon systems, including Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams armored weapon systems, based on Ukraine’s needs and U.S. experience in fielding those systems.

2. (U) Identify facilities and personnel able to maintain, repair, and overhaul these weapon systems, including Ukraine’s ability to do so independently.

3. (U) Coordinate the sustainment responsibilities across DoD Components, contractors, and Ukrainian personnel to ensure weapon systems, including Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams, remain mission capable and effective.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments

(U) The USD(A&S) and Acting USD(P) partially agreed with Recommendation 1.b. The USD(A&S) and Acting USD(P) stated that they concurred with the development and implementation of a sustainment strategy for all U.S.-donated articles provided to Ukraine. They also stated that the DSCA consults with the Military Services through implementing agencies and is responsible for oversight of sustainment.
(U) requirements that are defined by USEUCOM, and the USD(A&S) and Acting USD(P) requested that the DoD OIG update the recommendation to remove “Military Services” from Recommendation 1.b.1. Lastly, the USD(A&S) and Acting USD(P) stated that the DoD would follow up with the DoD OIG to provide an action plan by February 29, 2024, identifying the sustainment strategy for Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to the UAF, including roles and responsibilities across the DoD enterprise and all aspects of sustainment requirements for those weapon systems.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the USD(A&S) and Acting USD(P) addressed the specifics of Recommendation 1.b; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but open. As a result of management comments, we revised this recommendation to remove “Military Services” from recommendation part 1.b.1. We will close this recommendation once we receive a copy of the action plan and confirm that the plan identifies roles and responsibilities for implementing a sustainment plan consistent with the sustainment requirements of each weapon system.

c. (U) Identify available fiscal and procurement authorities or the need to seek additional authorities to provide for sustainment needs beyond FY 2024 for weapon systems transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, consistent with the DoD’s policy goals.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Comments

(U) The USD(A&S) and Acting USD(P) disagreed with Recommendation 1.c and stated that the DoD established the CDWG, consistent with the DoD’s policy goals, as the process to identify and prioritize sustainment requirements using appropriated funding for the USAI or Foreign Military Financing authorities. They further stated that the CDWG, as approved by the Secretary, is not an ad hoc group, as characterized in the report, but an established forum that meets to discuss the prioritization of security assistance to Ukraine. Lastly, the USD(A&S) and Acting USD(P) stated that the long-term sustainment of defense articles provided to the UAF is in jeopardy, not because of a lack of process, but because of funding uncertainty resulting from the absence of a supplemental appropriation.
(U) Our Response

(U) Although they disagreed with Recommendation 1.c, comments from the USD(A&S) and Acting USD(P) addressed the intent of the recommendation to ensure that the DoD continued to identify available funding authorities for stated policy goals to provide sustainment for weapon systems provided to the UAF beyond FY 2024. In their response, the USD(A&S) and Acting USD(P) identified that the CDWG identifies and prioritizes authorized funding and procurement authorities to sustain U.S.-provided weapon systems, consistent with DoD policy goals. We revised Recommendation 1.c to instruct the USD(A&S) and Acting USD(P) to identify available authorities instead of identifying a process. Despite the revised recommendation, we believe their response meets the intent of the original recommendation, and we consider the recommendation resolved but open. We will close the recommendation when we receive documentation that demonstrates that the Acting USD(P), in coordination with the USD(A&S), has identified availability of funding authorities to sustain weapon systems provided to the UAF, consistent with DoD policy.
(U) Appendix

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from February 2023 through November 2023 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in December 2020 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) This report was reviewed by the DoD Component(s) associated with this oversight project to identify whether any of their reported information, including legacy FOUO information, should be safeguarded and marked in accordance with the DoD CUI Program. In preparing and marking this report, we considered any comments submitted by the DoD Component(s) about the CUI treatment of their information. If the DoD Component(s) failed to provide any or sufficient comments about the CUI treatment of their information, we marked the report based on our assessment of the available information.

(U) During the planning phase for this evaluation, we revised the project's objective. The original objective focused on the extent to which SAG-U developed and implemented sustainment strategies to support selected U.S. weapon systems transferred to the UAF. However, we determined that the sustainment planning process involved a wider group of organizations than just SAG-U, so we updated both the title and objective to reflect that understanding. The objective also originally referred to “sustainment strategies,” but we refer to these in the report as “sustainment plans” for consistency with DoD-wide terminology.

(U) While planning for this evaluation, we identified the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams as the selected weapon systems to include within our scope. As a result, the scope of this evaluation includes the DoD’s development and execution of sustainment plans for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to Ukraine.
To conduct our evaluation, we identified and reviewed laws, DoD policies, DoD joint doctrine, and sustainment planning documentation for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams to identify relevant requirements and sustainment best practices. Specifically, we reviewed the following:

- (U) DoDD 5100.01, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components,” December 21, 2010 (Incorporating Change 1, September 17, 2020).
- (U) Joint Publication 4-0, “Joint Logistics,” February 4, 2019 (Incorporating Change 1, May 8, 2019).

(U) CUI

(U) CUI

(U) CUI

(U) CUI
(U) We also conducted interviews with and obtained information and
documentation from DoD officials regarding the DoD's efforts to develop and
implement sustainment plans for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams transferred
to the UAF. Specifically, we spoke with or requested information from the
following offices and DoD organizations.

- (U) ODASD(MR)
- (U) OUSD(P)
- (U) DSCA
- (U) USEUCOM
- (U) SAG-U
- (U) HQDA G-3/5/7
- (U) AMC
- (U) TACOM

(U) These interviews and the information we received provided context for ongoing
DoD discussions and efforts. Specifically, we sought and received information
related to sustainment for the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams being provided
to the UAF beyond the initial sustainment, including supply packages containing
consumables and spare parts, as well as training for operators to conduct field-level
maintenance through the end of FY 2024. We compared the testimonial and
documentary information we obtained to the LCSPs for the Bradleys, Strykers,
and Abrams to identify whether the DoD's sustainment planning efforts addressed
all major categories of sustainment identified in the LCSPs for those armored
weapon systems.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, the DoD OIG issued two reports discussing the
DoD's development and implementation of sustainment planning efforts
for weapon systems. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at
(U) DoD OIG


(U) The objective of this audit was to determine whether the DoD tracked, monitored, and shared lessons learned regarding impacts of predictive maintenance on weapon system sustainment. During the planning phase, the objective was amended to determine the extent to which the DoD implemented predictive maintenance in accordance with guidance. The DoD OIG found that DoD officials made progress toward execution of predictive maintenance strategies but did not fully implement predictive maintenance on any of its weapon systems. The report also found that the DoD officials did not develop comprehensive strategic plans, policies, or training tailored to appropriate levels in the life-cycle sustainment workforce necessary to implement predictive maintenance strategies. The report recommended that the ODASD(MR) develop and execute a mechanism to report and provide visibility of predictive maintenance forecasts. The report also recommended that the ODASD(MR) continue updating and distributing the DoD’s “Condition-Based Maintenance Plus Guidebook” to reflect updated guidance. The ODASD(MR) agreed with those recommendations.


(U) The objective of the evaluation was to determine the extent to which the U.S. Army Sustainment Command and the 405th U.S. Army Field Support Brigade maintained and accounted for U.S. Army pre-positioned stocks (APS) of military equipment in their storage areas and planned for the repair of issued APS-2 equipment in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and in support of the NATO Defense Forces. The DoD OIG found that the 405th U.S. Army Field Support Brigade issued APS-2 equipment to the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, and some of the equipment issued from APS-2 was not fully mission capable. The DoD OIG recommended that the U.S. Army develop and implement a maintenance process to track the mission capability of APS equipment. Additionally, the DoD OIG also recommended that the U.S. Army clarify joint inventory requirements at the APS equipment configuration and handover area and provide guidance on identifying and ensuring the availability of personnel to support surge requirements for rapid deployments. The U.S. Army agreed with those recommendations.
MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR EVALUATIONS AND PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

5 JAN 2024

SUBJECT: (U) Response to the Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Evaluation of the Department of Defense’s Sustainment Plan for Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams Armored Weapon Systems Transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (Project No. D2023-DEV0PC-0089.000)

(U) We are responding to the report recommendations contained within the draft version of the subject report, dated November 17, 2023.

(U) The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to view the sustainment of United States (U.S.) -provided equipment to Ukraine as a top priority to ensure that both Ukraine’s defenders, and American taxpayers, are receiving the maximum value from U.S. security assistance. We are therefore appreciative of this independent look at sustainment efforts for Patriot systems transferred to the Ukrainian armed forces (UAF).

(U) It is important to note that long-standing DoD policy and regulations regarding the sustainment of security assistance were not envisioned for a scenario in which U.S. maintainers are not able to service equipment in-country, while the recipient nation is at war. As such, DoD issued new guidance for the sustainment of the defense articles under an accelerated security assistance decision cycle for Ukraine, which also required subordinate organizations to meet these requirements urgently while still adjusting their organizations to adapt to these policies. The sustainment of these systems provided to Ukraine in this situation offers broader lessons about roles and responsibilities for all parties involved for all sustainment requirements of defense articles that become the property of any recipient nation upon transfer. We continue to assess and update this guidance to reflect lessons learned from our sustainment programs, as well as based on evolving conditions in Ukraine.

(U) Recommendation 1a: We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy coordinate to provide recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.01, to identify the policy goals, priorities, and objectives of U.S. sustainment support for weapon systems provided by the DoD to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The recommendations to the Secretary of Defense should, at a minimum, do the following.

a. Define planning factors, including parameters, limitations, and duration of U.S. sustainment support, such as personnel and contractors, material aid, and use of U.S. or partner nation depots or repair facilities.

(U) DoD Response: DoD concurs with Recommendation 1a.

(U) Recommendation 1b: We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy assign roles and
(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (cont’d)

responsibilities to develop and implement a sustainment plan consistent with the needs of each weapon system identified in the Life-Cycle Sustainment Plans. The roles and responsibilities should designate a DoD Component with the authority to:

i. Direct the Military Services and Combatant Commands to provide necessary information and data on sustainment requirements for weapon systems, including Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams armored weapon systems, based on Ukraine’s needs and U.S. experience in fielding those systems;

ii. Identify facilities and personnel able to maintain, repair, and overhaul these weapon systems, including Ukraine’s ability to do so independently; and

iii. Coordinate the sustainment responsibilities across DoD Components, contractors, and Ukrainian personnel to ensure weapon systems, including Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams, remain mission capable and effective.

(U) DoD Response: Partially concur with Recommendation 1b. Life Cycle Sustainment Plans are developed to document product support for U.S. weapon systems used by the United States, and not for partner nations receiving security assistance. We concur in the development and implementation of a sustainment strategy for all U.S. donated articles provided to Ukraine because it communicates to a vast array of stakeholders, many of whom are not accustomed to security cooperation processes, the parameters of sustainment.

(U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), consulting with the Services via Implementing Agencies, is responsible for oversight of sustainment requirements that are defined by United States European Command (EUCOM). We therefore request deletion of “Military Services” from Recommendation 1.b.i.

(U) Concerning Recommendation 1.b. ii. and 1.b.iii., EUCOM is responsible for identifying sustainment requirements. The rapid response needed to provide Ukraine with critical defense articles urgently led to the creation of additional organizations that were designed to provide urgent, combat critical support. During the decision process surrounding the provision of these articles to Ukraine, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy routinely directed DSCA and its implementing agencies to address sustainment needs in accordance with established procedures. However, given existing institutional and policy constraints, DoD’s ability to recommend appropriate facilities, assign appropriate personnel, and coordinate these responsibilities across necessary components and offices has taken longer than anticipated.

(U) Recommendation 1c: We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy identify a process under existing fiscal and procurement authorities or seek additional authorities consistent with the DoD’s policy goals to provide for sustainment needs of weapon systems beyond fiscal year 2024.

(U) DoD Response: DoD non-concurs with Recommendation 1c. DoD established the Cross Departmental Working Group (CDWG) as the process to identify and prioritize, consistent with DoD’s policy goals, sustainment requirements using appropriated funding for the Ukraine
(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (cont’d)

Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) or Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authorities. The CDWG, as approved by the Secretary, is not an ad-hoc group as characterized in the report but an established forum that meets to discuss the prioritization of security assistance to Ukraine. The long-term sustainment of defense articles provided to the UAF are in jeopardy not because of a lack of process, but because of funding uncertainty resulting from the absence of a supplemental appropriation.

(U) For the appropriate recommendations above, DoD will follow up with DoDIG and provide an action plan by February 29, 2024, to address the sustainment strategy for Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams, which will describe roles and responsibilities across the DoD enterprise to identify all aspects of sustainment requirements required for these systems.

William A. LaPlante
Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition and Sustainment

Sasha N. Baker
Acting Under Secretary of Defense Policy
### (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>Army Materiel Command</td>
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<td>APS</td>
<td>Army Pre-Positioned Stock</td>
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<td>CDWG</td>
<td>Cross-Department Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODASD(MR)</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Materiel Readiness)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoDD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
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<td>HQDA</td>
<td>Headquarters, Department of the Army</td>
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<td>LCSP</td>
<td>Life-Cycle Sustainment Plan</td>
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<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of Inspector General</td>
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<td>OUSD(P)</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
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<td>PDA</td>
<td>Presidential Drawdown Authority</td>
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<td>RDC-U</td>
<td>Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center–Ukraine</td>
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<td>SAG-U</td>
<td>Security Assistance Group–Ukraine</td>
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<td>TACOM</td>
<td>Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command</td>
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<td>UAF</td>
<td>Ukrainian Armed Forces</td>
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<td>Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative</td>
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<td>U. S. European Command</td>
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