


CUI

# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

FEBRUARY 8, 2024



## (U) Evaluation of the U.S. European Command's Planning and Execution of Ground Transportation of Equipment to Support Ukraine from Port to Transfer Locations

Controlled by: DoD OIG  
Controlled by: Evaluations  
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INDEPENDENCE ★ INTEGRITY ★ EXCELLENCE ★ TRANSPARENCY

CUI





# (U) Results in Brief

## *(U) Evaluation of the U.S. European Command's Planning and Execution of Ground Transportation of Equipment to Support Ukraine from Port to Transfer Locations*

February 8, 2024

### (U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and U.S. Army Europe-Africa (USAREUR-AF) implemented security and accountability controls during the planning and execution of transportation of equipment to support Ukraine, from European seaport to ground transportation.

### (U) Background

(U) Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the President announced that the United States would dramatically increase the amount and types of defense items provided to the Government of Ukraine. After more than a year of providing support to the Government of Ukraine, the DoD continued to provide critical defense items ahead of an anticipated 2023 offensive.

(U) DoD agencies and commercial entities contribute to the transport of defense items in USEUCOM's area of responsibility (AOR). USAREUR-AF executes mission command of operational sustainment across the European theater. The 21st Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) conducts the onward movement of defense items from the German ports of Bremerhaven and Nordenham to Ukraine According to the Theater Movement Control (TMCC) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), the 21st TSC Theater Movement Center (TMC) plans, coordinates, and executes movement control of defense items through the USEUCOM AOR. Specifically, the TSC uses the Movement Control Office (39th Transportation Battalion) to coordinate

### (U) Background (cont'd)

(U) the onward movement of defense items through the USEUCOM AOR from port of debarkation. The Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) is responsible for managing port operations for the DoD at Bremerhaven and Nordenham. The MCO also works with the 21st TSC to coordinate the onward movement of defense items through the USEUCOM AOR.

### (U) Finding

~~(U)~~ USEUCOM and USAREUR-AF implemented security controls for equipment transferred from seaport to ground transportation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This occurred because, according to 21st TSC personnel, there was no identified end-user for the equipment being provided to Ukraine, and at the final transfer location, the 21st TSC did not have a dedicated unit to report receipt of equipment. According to 21st TSC personnel, they were refining their current process to track, monitor, and account for equipment while meeting the needs of the Ukraine mission.

(U) Additionally, USEUCOM personnel did not have an English translation of the Deutsche Bahn service requirements for providing rail services. This occurred because USEUCOM personnel relied on local nationals employed by the DoD to manage those requirements. According to 21st TSC and SDDC officials, they did not believe a translated version of the service requirements was necessary because the local nationals managing the contracts were DoD employees.

~~(U)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Additionally, USEUCOM personnel's limited oversight of the execution of the Deutsche Bahn rail service process could have negative operational impacts, such as incorrect planning for rail transport or delays in rail shipping. Without an English version of the Deutsche Bahn military rail



# (U) Results in Brief

## *(U) Evaluation of the U.S. European Command's Planning and Execution of Ground Transportation of Equipment to Support Ukraine from Port to Transfer Locations*

### **(U) Finding (cont'd)**

~~(CUI)~~ service requirements, USEUCOM personnel are unable to verify that what was requested in accordance with the service requirements were timely and cost efficient, and that they adequately met operational needs.

### **(U) Recommendations**

(U) We recommend that the USAREUR-AF Commander develop and implement a plan to ensure that PD equipment traveling through the USEUCOM AOR is equipped with ITV devices or other means and methods to ensure near-real time visibility of PD equipment in accordance with USEUCOM guidance. Additionally, we recommend that the USEUCOM Commander obtain and maintain an English translated version of the annual Deutsche Bahn rail service requirements to promote the proper and efficient use of Deutsche Bahn rail services.

### **(U) Management Comments and Our Response**

~~(CUI)~~ [Redacted]

~~(CUI)~~ [Redacted]

(U) The USEUCOM Chief for Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (EDDOC), responding for the USEUCOM Commander, agreed with the recommendation and stated a new Deutsche Bahn Cargo “BefBedMil” standard was published in German with new rates that covers July 1, 2023, through December 31, 2023. The USEUCOM Chief for EDDOC stated the International Commercial Tender Branch (ICTB) will work to obtain a translated version of this newly published agreement. Additionally, the USEUCOM Chief for EDDOC stated the ICTB will seek out translation for the 2024 agreement.

(U) Comments from the USEUCOM Chief for EDDOC addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once USEUCOM provides the translated version of the Deutsche Bahn Cargo “BefBedMil” standard that covers July 1, 2023, through December 31, 2023, and January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024.

**(U) Recommendations Table**

(U) Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Commander, U.S. European Command	None	1	None
Commander, U.S. Army Europe-Africa	None	None	2 (U)

**(U) Note:** The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.





**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**  
**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
 ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

February 8, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION,  
 TECHNOLOGY, AND SUSTAINMENT  
 UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
 COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND  
 COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND  
 DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY  
 DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF  
 COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY EUROPE AND AFRICA  
 AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of the U.S. European Command's Planning and Execution of Ground Transportation of Equipment to Support Ukraine from Port to Transfer Locations (Report No. DODIG-2024-053)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report. The U.S. Army Europe-Africa addressed Recommendation 2; therefore, the recommendation is closed. However, we encourage USTRANSCOM, in coordination with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, to review and determine how to better use ITV to support future equipment transfer operations. The U.S. European Command agreed to address recommendation 1; therefore, we consider the recommendation resolved but open. We will close recommendation 1 when you provide us documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendation are completed.

(U) Therefore, please provide us within 90 days your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the recommendation. [REDACTED]

(U) We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the evaluation. If you have any questions, [REDACTED]

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

*Dana K Johnson*

Dana Johnson  
 Acting Assistant Inspector General for  
 Programs, Combatant Commands, and  
 Operations Evaluations

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## (U) Introduction

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### (U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and the U.S. Army Europe-Africa (USAREUR-AF) implemented security and accountability controls during the planning and execution of transportation of equipment to support Ukraine from European seaport to ground transportation.

### (U) Background

(U) Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the President announced that the United States would dramatically increase the amount and types of defense items provided to the Government of Ukraine (GoU). After a virtual meeting with the Multinational Ukraine Defense Contact Group in March 2023, the Secretary of Defense told reporters, "Ukraine doesn't have any time to waste." Therefore, security controls and accountability procedures for U.S. defense items are essential to both ensure that critical defense items reach their intended destination and to counter threats of diversion or potential pilferage.

### ***(U) Roles and Responsibilities for Transporting Equipment in the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility***

(U) A variety of government agencies and commercial entities contribute to the transport of defense items in USEUCOM's area of responsibility (AOR). The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is a unified, functional combatant command that provides support to the 10 other U.S. combatant commands, the Military Services, Defense Agencies, and other government organizations. In the DoD, USAREUR-AF is the lead organization for all sustainment activities for USEUCOM, including logistics support and transportation. USAREUR-AF executes mission command of operational sustainment across the European theater.

(U) The 21st Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) conducts the onward movement of defense items from the German ports of Bremerhaven and Nordenham to Ukraine. The 21st TSC Theater Movement Center (TMC) plans coordinates and executes movement control of defense items through the USEUCOM AOR. Specifically, the TSC uses the Movement Control Office (MCO) (39th Transportation Battalion) to coordinate the onward movement of defense items through the USEUCOM AOR from port of debarkation. USTRANSCOM's Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) is responsible for managing port operations for the DoD at Bremerhaven and Nordenham. The SDDC 950th Transportation Company is responsible for the development and execution of surface deployment plans

(U) to deliver and sustain the armed forces in support of USEUCOM. The SDDC also unloads, stages, and maintains records of defense items bound for Ukraine that pass through the ports in the USEUCOM AOR.

### ***(U) Procedures for Securing Equipment at the Bremerhaven Port***

(U) At the Port of Bremerhaven, the SDDC is required to ensure that all government property in its possession or custody is properly secured and safeguarded at all times. The SDDC must also ensure that the security force will be of sufficient strength to safeguard all equipment at staging and operation sites 24 hours per day and 7 days a week when U.S. Government cargo is present at the port.

(~~CUI~~) [REDACTED]

(~~CUI~~) [REDACTED]

### ***(U) Receiving, Accounting, Onward-Movement Procedures at the Port of Bremerhaven***

(U) USEUCOM's "European Manual 4504.01" states that the SDDC and the 21st TSC are responsible for receiving, accounting, and onward-movement for defense items at the Port of Bremerhaven.<sup>1</sup> Additionally, the SDDC follows guidance from the Joint Publication 4-01, "The Defense Transportation Regulation," to transport defense articles.<sup>2</sup> The 21st TSC TMC uses the 21st Theater Movement Control Center Standard Operating Procedures (TMCC SOP) for operational direction on transporting defense items through the USEUCOM AOR.<sup>3</sup>

(U) Specifically, when the SDDC receives notice of a vessel's arrival, the SDDC prepares a staging plan based on the vessel manifest. The 21st TSC stated that the vessel manifest is provided to them by the SDDC. This manifest details the incoming items, cataloged by a transportation control number (TCN). Personnel from the 21st

<sup>1</sup> (U) "United States European Command Manual 4504.01," August 8, 2013.

<sup>2</sup> (U) Joint Publication 4-01 "The Defense Transportation Regulation" July 18, 2017.

<sup>3</sup> (U) "21st Theater Movement Control Center Standard Operating Procedures," October 1, 2018.

(U) TSC identify the cargo bound for Ukraine and determine the weight and dimensions of that cargo. The 21st TSC personnel then work with the MCO to develop and coordinate theater movement plans. To account for defense items arriving at the port, SDDC officials and contractors verify that the TCNs of the offloaded items match the vessel manifest list. The 21st TSC and MCO also use this manifest to coordinate the onward movement of defense items to Ukraine. In accordance with European Command Manual 4504.01, the 21st TSC manages and provides support for the movement of DoD equipment within the USEUCOM AOR. Additionally, the 21st TMCC SOP states that the 21st TSC TMC is responsible for in-transit visibility (ITV) over equipment movements in the USEUCOM AOR. Specifically, the 21st TSC TMC is tasked to provide real time ITV of DoD cargo through the use of Automatic Identification Technology and Logistics Automated Information Systems. Automatic Identification Technology includes a variety of devices such as radio frequency identification tags, sensors, and satellite tracking devices to develop and coordinate theater movement plans. To account for defense items arriving at the port, SDDC officials and contractors verify that the TCNs of the offloaded items match the vessel manifest list. The 21st TSC and MCO also use this manifest to coordinate the onward movement of defense items to Ukraine. In accordance with European Command Manual 4504.01, the 21st TSC manages and provides support for the movement of DoD equipment within the USEUCOM AOR. Additionally, the 21st TMCC SOP states that the 21st TSC TMC is responsible for ITV over equipment movements in the USEUCOM AOR. Specifically, the 21st TSC TMC is tasked to provide real time ITV of DoD cargo through the use of Automatic Identification Technology and Logistics Automated Information Systems. Automatic Identification Technology includes a variety of devices such as radio frequency identification tags, sensors, and satellite tracking devices.

## (U) Finding

### (U) U.S. Army Europe-Africa Implemented Security Controls at the Port of Bremerhaven, but Oversight Could Be Improved

~~(CUI)~~ USEUCOM and USAREUR-AF implemented security controls for equipment transferred from seaport to ground transportation. For example, USAREUR-AF secured Class VII equipment for Ukraine at the Port of Bremerhaven in accordance with the port requirements, ensuring that government equipment was properly secured and safeguarded.<sup>4</sup> [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Specifically, USAREUR-AF did not provide tracking documentation for May through July of 2022 and May through July of 2023 to the evaluations team after multiple requests. Additionally, according to USAREUR-AF personnel, when shipments did not have a military escort or ITV device, USAREUR-AF relied on contractor carriers to report that equipment arrived at its final destination. This occurred because, according to 21st TSC personnel, there was no identified end-user for the equipment being provided to Ukraine, and at the final transfer location, the 21st TSC did not have a dedicated unit to report receipt of equipment.

~~(CUI)~~ USAREUR-AF did not always maintain ITV of PD equipment in accordance with the TMCC SOP. The TMCC SOP requires ITV for assets moving by both commercial and military transportation sources whether they originate within or outside the USEUCOM AOR. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to track all PD equipment traveling through USEUCOM's AOR bound for Ukraine. [REDACTED]

(U) Additionally, USEUCOM personnel did not have an English translation of the Deutsche Bahn service requirements for providing rail services. Without an English translation of the requirements, USEUCOM personnel had limited ability to oversee the execution of rail services within the USEUCOM AOR. This occurred because USEUCOM personnel relied on local nationals employed by the DoD to manage the Deutsche Bahn service requirements. According to 21st TSC and SDDC officials,

<sup>4</sup> (U) Class VII refers to major end items that are large and extremely high-value items such as, launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops, and vehicles.

(U) they did not believe a translated version of the service requirements was necessary because the local nationals managing the service requirements were foreign national DoD employees, who could communicate with their German counterparts at the port.

(~~CUI~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]. Additionally, USEUCOM personnel’s limited understanding of the use of the Deutsche Bahn rail service process could have negative operational impacts, such as incorrect planning for rail transport or delays with rail shipping. Without an English version of the Deutsche Bahn military rail service requirements, USUECOM personnel are unable to verify that what was requested in accordance with the service requirements was timely, cost efficient, and adequately met operational needs.

(~~CUI~~) On July 5, 2023, we issued “Management Advisory: The DoD’s Transportation of Ammunition in Support of Ukraine.” [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

### **(U) USEUCOM Implemented Procedures at the Port of Bremerhaven for Securing Equipment Bound for Ukraine**

(~~CUI~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(~~CUI~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) According to USEUCOM's Manual, 21st TSC is responsible for maintaining ITV of equipment traveling through USEUCOM's AOR. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] During the site visit, MCO officials showed the evaluation team an equipment spreadsheet tracker that contained the stops and destinations for all PD cargo. However, when we requested a copy of this spreadsheet from new personnel who had rotated in to the MCO after our site visit, they could not provide us with a copy. Personnel in the incoming unit that assumed MCO responsibilities stated that they never saw the equipment spreadsheet tracker.

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(CUI) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(CUI) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(CUI) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(CUI) USAREUR-AF personnel did not maintain ITV for movement of all PD equipment. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] The  
21st TMCC SOP requires the use of ITV devices to track equipment traveling through the USEUCOM AOR. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(CUI) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Therefore, USAREUR-AF should develop and implement a plan to ensure that PD equipment traveling through the USEUCOM AOR is equipped with ITV devices or other means and methods to ensure near-real time visibility of PD equipment in accordance with USEUCOM guidance.

### **(U) USEUCOM Did Not Have an English Version of the Service Requirements for Requesting Rail Service**

(U) USEUCOM personnel did not obtain an English translated version of the service requirements of Deutsche Bahn for providing rail services. Instead, they relied on local nationals to manage the requirements for rail service.

#### ***(U) USEUCOM Operated Without an English Copy of Deutsche Bahn Rail Service Requirements***

(U) USEUCOM personnel did not obtain an English translated version of the service requirements of Deutsche Bahn for providing any military rail services. Deutsche Bahn's military rail service requirements include the rail service cost and outlines the process for requesting service. In June 2023, Deutsche Bahn provided a one-time English translated version to USEUCOM in response to our request. After reviewing the English translated version we found that the military rail service requirements were not valid after June 2023 because according to the translated version the service requirements change annually and were to be updated starting in July 2023. However, according to USEUCOM officials, this document is published annually in German by Deutsche Bahn for all services provided. Without an English translated version of the requirements, USEUCOM personnel had limited ability to oversee the execution of rail services within the USEUCOM AOR.

#### ***(U) USEUCOM Relied on Local Nationals Employed by the DoD to Manage Deutsche Bahn Requirements***

(U) Before July 2023, USEUCOM personnel did not have an English version of the Deutsche Bahn military rail service standards; instead, they relied on local nationals employed by the DoD to manage the Deutsche Bahn military rail service requirements for providing military rail services. According to 21st TSC and SDDC officials, they did not believe translated service requirements were necessary because the local nationals managing Deutsche Bahn military rail service

(U) requirements were DoD employees. However, USEUCOM personnel solely relying on local nationals employed by the DoD limits oversight to only individuals that can interpret the Deutsche Bahn standards. Without an English version of the Deutsche Bahn military rail service requirements, USEUCOM personnel cannot verify that what was requested in accordance with the service requirements was timely, cost efficient, and adequately met operational needs. Therefore, USEUCOM should obtain an English translated version of the annual Deutsche Bahn rail service requirements.

### **(U) USEUCOM Could Not Ensure PD Equipment Reached Ukraine and May Have a Limited Understanding of Deutsche Bahn Rail Service Requirements**

(CUI) [Redacted]

[Redacted] Additionally, the USEUCOM personnel's overreliance on German-speaking employees to interpret Deutsche Bahn rail service requirements may lead to limited understanding of Deutsche Bahn requirements and have negative operational impacts, such as incorrect planning for rail transport or delays rail shipping.

### **(U) Management Advisory Associated With This Report**

(CUI) On July 5, 2023, we issued Report No. DODIG-2023-092, "Management Advisory: DoD's Transportation of Ammunition in Support of Ukraine." [Redacted]

[Redacted]

## **(U) Recommendations, Managements Comments, and Our Responses**

### **(U) Recommendation 1**

**(U) We recommend that the Commander of the U.S. European Command obtain and maintain an English translated version of the annual Deutsche Bahn rail service requirements to promote the proper and efficient utilization of Deutsche Bahn rail services.**

### **(U) U.S. European Command Comments**

(U) The USEUCOM Chief (Deployment and Distribution Operations Center [EDDOC]), responding for the Commander of USEUCOM, agreed and stated a new Deutsche Bahn Cargo “BefBedMil” standard was published in German with new rates that cover July 1, 2023, through December 31, 2023. The USEUCOM Chief (EDDOC) stated that the International Commercial Tender Branch (ICTB) will work to obtain a translated version of this newly published agreement. Additionally, the USEUCOM Chief (EDDOC) stated that the ICTB will seek out translation for the 2024 agreement.

### **(U) Our Response**

(U) Comments from the USEUCOM Chief (EDDOC) addressed the specifics of this recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once USEUCOM provides the translated version of the Deutsche Bahn Cargo “BefBedMil” standard that covers July 1, 2023, through December 31, 2023, and January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024.

### **(U) Recommendation 2**

**(U) We recommend that the Commander of the U.S. Army Europe-Africa develop and implement a plan to ensure that PD equipment traveling through the U.S. European Command area of operation be equipped with in-transit visibility devices or other means and methods to ensure near-real time visibility of Presidential Drawdown equipment in accordance with U.S. European Command guidance.**

### **(U) U.S. Army Europe-Africa Comments**

~~(CUI)~~ The USAREUR-AF Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, responding on behalf of the USAREUR-AF Commander, agreed with the recommendation and stated [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(CUI) [Redacted text block]

***(U) Our Response***

(CUI) [Redacted text block]

## (U) Appendix A

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### (U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from January 2023 through November 2023 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in December 2020 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we effectively plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives were met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain our evaluation findings.

(U) We identified and reviewed policies, directives, and DoD guidance. Specifically, we reviewed the following criteria:

- (U) Joint Publication 4-01, “The Defense Transportation System,” July 18, 2017;
- (U) DoD 7000.14-R Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 7, “Financial Liability for Government Property, Lost, Damaged, Destroyed, or Stolen,” January 2021;
- (U) DoD Manual 5100.76, “Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,” April 17, 2012, incorporating change 2 effective October 5, 2020;
- (U) DoD Instruction 5000.64, “Accountability and Management of DoD Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” April 27, 2017, incorporating change 3 effective June 10, 2019;
- (U) Defense Transportation Regulation 4500.9-R, Part II, Cargo Movement, May 2014 including changes through December 16, 2022;
- (U) Defense Transportation Regulation, Part II, Cargo Movement, Chapter 205, “Transportation Protective Service,” November 18, 2022;
- (U) Defense Transportation Regulation, Part II, Cargo Movement, Appendix E, “Security Cooperation Program Shipments: Foreign Military Sales and Building Partner Capacity Cooperative Programs,” August 29, 2022;
- (U) Security Assistance Management Manual, C7.13, “Transportation Plan,” accessed January 19, 2023; and
- (U) Security Assistance Management Manual, Paragraph C7.15, “Transportation of AA&E [Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives] and Sensitive Materiel,” accessed January 19, 2023.

(U) We interviewed personnel from the following DoD organizations:

- (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, J4-Logistics,
- (U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment,
- (U) USEUCOM, ECJ4 Logistics Directorate,
- (U) USAREUR-AF,
- (U) U.S. Transportation Command,
- (U) Headquarters, Department of the Army,
- (U) SDDC 950th Transportation Company, and
- (U) the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

(U) We also interviewed personnel from the USAREUR-AF G-4, Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U), 21st TSC, and 39th Transportation Battalion (a subordinate battalion of the 16th Sustainment Brigade). We contacted these organizations in Europe to determine their respective roles and the extent to which USEUCOM and USAREUR-AF implemented security and accountability controls for moving U.S. equipment.

(U) In March 2023, we conducted a site visit at the port in Bremerhaven, Germany, and met with the SDDC (950th Transportation Company), 21st TSC, and MCO officials responsible for receiving, unloading, monitoring, tracking, and coordinating security for Presidential Drawdown equipment coming into the Kaiserhafen and Nordenhafen piers. Specifically, we interviewed SDDC (950th Transportation Company), 21st TSC, and MCO officials to understand the key accountability procedures, security controls, and access control points for equipment bound for Ukraine.

(U) During the evaluation, we obtained the following supporting documentation:

- (U) SDDC scanned copy of their hand checked vessel manifest list,
- (U) SDDC command brief,
- (U) Pictures of equipment with incorrect serial numbers, and
- (U) Deutsche Bahn English translated version of the rail service requirements.

## **(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data**

(U) This evaluation used computer-processed data. SDDC officials provided the evaluation team with the March 2023 vessel manifest list that was extracted from the system called GATES.<sup>5</sup> To assess the reliability of the data, during our site visit to the Port of Bremerhaven we verified whether the equipment that was offloaded from the vessel was listed on the vessel manifest list. We determined that the data was sufficiently reliable for developing our findings and conclusions.

## **(U) Prior Coverage**

(U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued five reports discussing the accountability and transport of equipment.

### **(U) GAO**

(U) GAO Report No. GAO-23-105856, “NORTHERN TRIANGLE: DoD and State Need Improved Policies to Address Equipment Misuse,” November 2022

(U) This GAO report discusses the Arms Export Control Act and the Global Train and Equip program as well as DoD and State components that oversee and implement programs that support the security services of foreign partners. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is the DoD Executive Agent and is responsible for providing reasonable assurance that recipients comply with U.S. restrictions on security defense articles and services. The report states that not all foreign military sales are subject to monitoring but that recipients sign transfer agreements when receiving U.S. military equipment. The report found that the DoD does not have policies for investigating alleged misuse of equipment, including body armor, computers, and global positioning systems and, in particular, the equipment that is not subject to monitoring. The report made 5 recommendations, including one that the DoD improve its policies to maintain accurate equipment data.

### **(U) DoD OIG**

(U) Report No. DODIG-2022-133, “Management Advisory: The DoD’s Use of Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 Funds,” September 19, 2022

(U) This Audit advisory provides a synopsis of the DoD’s financial report of additional Ukraine supplemental appropriations. The advisory states that the DoD received \$20.1 billion in funding under the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, \$6 billion of which was earmarked

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<sup>5</sup> (U) GATES automates support for receipt, movement, and billing of cargo and passengers. GATES is not structured to support enterprise level ITV tracking, ad-hoc reporting, or timed data mining requirements.

(U) for transfer to the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. Of the \$20.1 billion, \$3 billion has been obligated, including \$241.8 million for Transportation of Things and \$77 million for Travel and Transportation of Persons. The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative is an initiative for the DoD to provide appropriate security assistance to military and other security forces of the government of Ukraine and is part of the Building Partner Capacity (BPC) program that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency oversees. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency oversees program-level logistics planning, provides financial management, develops and implements program policies, operates and maintains applicable BPC activity monitoring and other information management systems, and assists in achieving BPC program objectives. The report recommended that the DoD CFO update the database business rules to ensure it accurately captures the budgetary status of Ukraine supplemental funds.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2020-121, "Evaluation of Department of Defense Enhanced End-Use Monitoring for Equipment/Transferred to the Government of Ukraine," August 27, 2020

(U) This Evaluation report determined that DoD officials generally complied with requirements for enhanced end-use monitoring (EEUM) of some, but not all, sensitive DoD military equipment transferred to the government of Ukraine. The report also determined that Ukraine's security and accountability of U.S. military equipment did not always meet the criteria prescribed by law and regulation. For example, some serial number stickers on U.S.-supplied sensitive equipment became illegible or fell off, making it difficult to conduct inventories. The report also found that Ukraine's storage facilities met physical security requirements set forth in the letters of authorizations (LOAs). The report recommended that the DSCA 1) require loss reports be submitted IAW the LOA, 2) develop a field in the SCIP for lost or missing articles, 3) develop a process to place permanent serial numbers on sensitive equipment, and 4) schedule routine frequency of corrective action visits (CAV) for high risk countries, including Ukraine. The report also recommended that the ODC-Ukraine request written guidance and procedures from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to address alternative measures to replace LOA-directed requirements. This is a classified Evaluation report.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2020-071, "Audit of the Department of Defense's Ground Transportation and Secure Hold of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives in the United States," March 23, 2020

(U) This Audit report determined that the DoD did not always transport arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E) in the United States by commercial ground carriers in accordance with the Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR). Specifically, the report determined that 1) The DoD did not pack some AA&E ground shipments IAW DTR and DoD criteria; 2) the DoD did not verify that information about the contents of all AA&E shipments was in the tracking system; 3) the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) categorized some shipments as not-in-transit and did not track them; 4) the SDDC did not track rail shipments and small package shipments of arms and ammunition; 5) the DoD did not provide commercial carriers with access to installations for delivery of some AA&E shipments; and 6) the DoD did not follow up on 12 of 33 SDDC safety investigation recommendations made in transit accident reports because it lacked the authority to implement and adjudicate the recommendations for non-SDDC organizations. As a result, the public was unnecessarily exposed to AA&E that was stolen, damaged, exploded, ignited, or spilled across public highways. The report recommended that SDDC be given the authority to enforce Military Service compliance with the DTR, that the ASD(S) develop and implement a methodology or controls for preventing AA&E shipments from leaving military installations until an official bill of lading is transmitted to DTTS for tracking, and that a centralized tracking system for tracking rail shipments of AA&E be implemented.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2020-061, "Audit of the DoD's Accountability of Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund Equipment Designated for Syria," February 13, 2020

(U) This Audit report determined that SOJTF-OIR personnel did not account for all equipment in accordance with DoD Instruction and Army Guidance for storing and accounting for equipment designated for partner nation use (Vetted Syrian Opposition), from procurement through transfer of ownership and accountability from the DoD to the DoD-approved partner. The report reviewed the 1st Theater Sustainment Command's processes and procedures for receiving, accepting, transporting, inventorying, securing, and storing equipment in its area of operations. The report made recommendations for developing a central repository system for all supporting documentation for equipment, developing guidance for disposing of equipment, and completing periodic physical inspections of equipment to identify and fix security issues. This Audit report is classified.

# (U) Appendix B

## (U) Management Advisory

Report No. DODIG-2023-092




CUI

# INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

JULY 5, 2023



## (U) Management Advisory: DoD's Transportation of Ammunition in Support of Ukraine

Controlled by: Evaluations  
CUI Category: ~~Operations Security~~  
LDC: ~~CUI/OPSEC~~  
POC: Program Director, [REDACTED]

INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE

CUI

## (U) Management Advisory (cont'd)



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CUI

# (U) Management Advisory (cont'd)



CUI

**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**  
**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

July 5, 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION  
AND SUSTAINMENT  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY  
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF  
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: (U) Management Advisory: Evaluation of the DoD's Transportation of Ammunition  
in Support of Ukraine (Report No. DODIG-2023-092)

(U) This management advisory provides Department of Defense (DoD) officials with information regarding concerns identified during the "Evaluation of the DoD's Transportation of Ammunition in Support of Ukraine." The objective of the ongoing evaluation is to determine the extent to which U.S. European Command and U.S. Army Europe implemented security and accountability controls for moving authorized U.S. equipment to support Ukraine from European ports to strategic transfer and storage locations using ground transportation. This management advisory addresses the impediment to the timely transport of ammunition via rail from the port of Nordenham, Germany to Ukraine.

(U) The U.S. European Command agreed to address all the recommendations presented in the report; therefore, we consider the recommendations resolved and open. As described in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, we will close the recommendations when you provide us documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendations are completed. Therefore, please provide us within 90 days your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the recommendations. Send your response to either [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U) We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the evaluation. If you have any questions, please contact [REDACTED]


FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

Michael Roark  
Deputy Inspector General for Evaluations

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DODIG-2023-092 | i

## (U) Management Advisory (cont'd)



## (U) Management Advisory (cont'd)

CUI

### (U) Introduction

#### (U) Executive Summary

(CUI) [Redacted text block]

(CUI) [Redacted text block]

#### (CUI) Objective

(CUI) [Redacted text block]

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## (U) Management Advisory (cont'd)

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### (U) Background

(U) Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the President announced that the United States would dramatically increase the amount and types of defense items provided to the GoU. After more than a year of providing support to the GoU, the DoD continued to provide critical defense items ahead of an anticipated 2023 offensive. On March 20, 2023, the DoD announced its 34th Presidential Drawdown of equipment in support of Ukraine, valued at \$350 million. After a virtual meeting with the Multinational Ukraine Defense Contact Group in March 2023, the Secretary of Defense told reporters, "Ukraine doesn't have any time to waste."

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

<sup>1</sup> (U) Ammunition is generally referred to as 'Class V' as defined by the Army. Army Regulation 710-2, Supply Policy Below the National Level broadly defines Class V items as "ammunition and missiles".

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## (U) Management Advisory (cont'd)

CUI

### ***(U) DoD Ammunition Transfers to Rail Were Not Always Executed in a Timely Manner to Support Ukraine***

(CUI) [Redacted text block]

<sup>2</sup> (U) We have requested that the Military Sealift Command provide ship logs and invoices to verify the cost to charter the delayed vessels.

<sup>3</sup> (U) Kreisamt des Landkreises Wesermarsch (Gewerbeabteilung), Brake-Unterweser, "Bescheide," November 21, 1953. (English translation: Wesermarsch County District Office (Trade Department), Brake-Unterweser, "Information," November 21, 1953.)

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## (U) Management Advisory (cont'd)

CUI

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

<sup>4</sup> (U) 'Beförderungsbedingungen für den Militärgüterverkehr' or "BefBedMil" zwischen DB Cargo AG und US-Streitkräfte, Britischen Streitkräfte, Französischen Streitkräfte, Niederländischen Streitkräfte, Belgischen Streitkräfte, Dänischen Streitkräfte, Gültigkeit: 01.01.2023 - -30.06.2023. (English translation: "Conditions for Military Cargo Transport" Agreement between DB Cargo AG (Duisburg) and the Armed Forces of the United States, Britain, France, Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark, effective January 1, 2023, to June 30, 2023.)

(U) We requested that 21<sup>st</sup> TSC provide the English version of the USEUCOM agreement with Deutsche Bahn.

CUI

## (U) Management Advisory (cont'd)

CUI

(CUI) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

### (U) Recommendations, Managements Comments, and Our Responses

#### (U) Recommendation 1

(CUI) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

#### (U) U.S. European Command Comments

(U) The USEUCOM Deputy Director for Logistics, responding for the Commander of USEUCOM, agreed and stated that USEUCOM will conduct a complete review of the Deutsche Bahn Cargo "BefBedMil" standard and implement changes to ensure the timely transfer of ammunition to Ukraine. The Deputy Director added that no binding agreement currently exists between DoD and Deutsche Bahn Cargo. For the DoD to obtain an agreement with Deutsche Bahn Cargo, USEUCOM, or a designated USEUCOM Service Component, will need a contract to pay for reserved capabilities. The Deputy Director noted that Deutsche Bahn Cargo does not currently have this type of agreement with any other nation or entity and wishes to remain a neutral party.

#### (U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the USEUCOM Deputy Director for Logistics addressed the specifics of this recommendation. Although the Deputy Director stated no binding agreement currently exists between the DoD and Deutsche Bahn Cargo, but instead a "BefBedMil" standard in which train services are obtained, the action to review the "BefBedMil" standard and implement changes to ensure the timely transfer of ammunition to Ukraine meets the intent of the recommendation. Therefore, we consider this recommendation resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when USEUCOM provides evidence they conducted a review, and provides information on the changes they implemented to ensure timely transport of military cargo.

#### (U) Recommendation 2

(CUI) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

CUI

## (U) Management Advisory (cont'd)

CUI

### ***(U) U.S. European Command Comments***

(U) The USEUCOM Deputy Director for Logistics, responding for the Commander of USEUCOM, agreed and stated that the USEUCOM J4 staff, in coordination with the SDDC, will conduct a review to examine and consider implementing other seaports and logistical networks to rapidly deliver ammunition to Ukraine.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the USEUCOM Deputy Director for Logistics addressed the specifics of this recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation after USEUCOM provides evidence to support that USEUCOM conducted a review to examine and consider implementing other seaports and logistical networks to rapidly deliver ammunition to Ukraine.

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## (U) Management Advisory (cont'd)

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### (U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this management advisory as part of an evaluation looking at security and accountability controls for moving U.S. equipment authorized for support to Ukraine from January 2023 through March 2023 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in December 2020 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives were met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain our evaluation findings.

(U) We identified and reviewed policies, directives, and DoD guidance. Specifically, we reviewed the following criteria:

- (U) Joint Publication 4-01, “The Defense Transportation System,” July 18, 2017;
- (U) DoD 7000.14-R Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 7, “Financial Liability for Government Property, Lost, Damaged, Destroyed, or Stolen,” January 2021;
- (U) DoD Manual 5100.76, “Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,” April 17, 2012, incorporating change 2 effective October 5, 2020;
- (U) DoD Instruction 5000.64, “Accountability and Management of DoD Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” April 27, 2017, incorporating change 3 effective June 10, 2019;
- (U) Defense Transportation Regulation 4500.9-R, Part II, Cargo Movement, May 2014 including changes through December 16, 2022;
- (U) Defense Transportation Regulation, Part II, Cargo Movement, Chapter 205, “Transportation Protective Service,” November 18, 2022;
- (U) Defense Transportation Regulation, Part II, Cargo Movement, Appendix E, “Security Cooperation Program Shipments: Foreign Military Sales and Building Partner Capacity Cooperative Programs,” August 29, 2022;
- (U) Security Assistance Management Manual, C7.13, “Transportation Plan,” accessed January 19, 2023; and
- (U) Security Assistance Management Manual, Paragraph C7.15, “Transportation of AA&E [Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives] and Sensitive Materiel,” accessed January 19, 2023.

(U) We interviewed personnel from the following DoD organizations:

- (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, J4-Logistics,
- (U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment,

CUI

DODIG-2023-092 | 7

## (U) Management Advisory (cont'd)

CUI

- (U) USEUCOM, ECJ4 Logistics Directorate,
- (U) U.S. Army Europe and Africa,
- (U) U.S. Transportation Command,
- (U) Headquarters, Department of the Army,
- (U) SDDC 950th Transportation Company, and
- (U) the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

(U) We also interviewed personnel from the U.S. Army Europe and Africa G-4, Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U), 21st TSC, and 39th Transportation Battalion (a subordinate battalion of the 16th Sustainment Brigade). We contacted these organizations in Europe to determine their respective roles and the extent to which USEUCOM and the U.S. Army Europe implemented security and accountability controls for moving U.S. equipment.

(U) In March 2023, we conducted a site visit at the port in Bremerhaven, Germany and met with the SDDC (950th Transportation Company), 21st TSC, and Movement Control Office (39th Transportation Battalion) officials responsible for receiving, unloading, monitoring, tracking, and coordinating security for Presidential Drawdown equipment coming into the Kaiserhafen and Nordhafen piers. Specifically, we interviewed SDDC (950th Transportation Company), 21st TSC, and Movement Control Office (39th Transportation Battalion) officials to understand the key accountability procedures, security controls, and access control points for equipment bound for Ukraine.

(U) During the evaluation, we obtained the following supporting documentation:

- (U) SDDC e-mail correspondence with Deutsche Bahn on rail mission support,
- (U) SDDC command briefs, and
- (U) Requirements document for transport of military cargo (provided in German).

(U) SDDC officials provided e-mail correspondences and other documents that were translated by a DoD official. We have also requested that SDDC provide the English versions of these documents. The team also observed the SDDC officials at the Kaiserhafen port receive and stage the Presidential Drawdown equipment bound for the Ukraine. In addition, the team conducted a walk-through of Nordenham port operations where DoD officials receive Class V ammunition.

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# (U) Management Advisory (cont'd)

CUI

## (U) Management Comments

### (U) U.S. European Command



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND  
UNIT 30400  
APO AE 09131

HQ EUCOM-J4 6 June 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR Overseas Contingency Operations United States Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

SUBJECT: (U) U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Response to DoDIG Draft Report Project No. D2023-DEV0PD-0070.001

References: (U) Draft Department of Defense Inspector General Report: (U) Management Advisory: DoD's Transportation of Ammunition in Support of Ukraine, May 15, 2023 (CUI)

1. (U) I "concur with comments", IAW the Geographic Combatant Command recommendations within the report. Specifically, there were two items listed under "Recommendations" in the draft report. Implementation details are listed below.
2. (U) In accordance with the Recommendation, the USEUCOM J4 staff will conduct a complete review of the Deutsche Bahn (DB) Cargo "BeBedMil" standard and pursue from DB Cargo to implement changes to ensure the timely transfer of ammunition to Ukraine. Currently, there is no binding agreement between DoD and DB Cargo. In order for the DoD to obtain an agreement with DB Cargo, USEUCOM or a designated USEUCOM Service Component will need to let a contract to pay for reserved capability. To our knowledge, DB Cargo does not currently have this type of agreement with any other nation or entity, and wishes to remain a neutral party.
3. (U) Similarly, the USEUCOM J4 staff will conduct a review to examine and consider implementing other seaports and logistical networks to rapidly deliver ammunition to Ukraine and future operations, with the assistance of the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC).
4. (U) My point of contact for this matter is [REDACTED]

  
 G. L. MORRIS  
 COL, USA  
 Deputy Director for Logistics, USEUCOM

CUI

## (U) Management Advisory (cont'd)

~~CUI~~

### (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

- (U) **GoU** Government of Ukraine
- (U) **SDDC** Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
- (U) **TSC** Theater Sustainment Command
- (U) **USEUCOM** U.S. European Command

~~CUI~~

## (U) Management Advisory (cont'd)

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## (U) Management Advisory (cont'd)

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Alexandria, Virginia 22350-1500  
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DoD Hotline 1.800.424.9098

CUI

# (U) Management Comments

## (U) U.S. European Command



CUI

**UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND  
UNIT 30400  
APO AE 09131**

MEMORANDUM FOR DOD OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: (U) USEUCOM response DOD IG report "Evaluation of the U.S. European Command's Planning and Execution of Ground Transportation of Equipment to Support Ukraine from Port to Transfer Locations (Project No. D2023- DEV0PD-0070.000)"

Reference: DOD IG Project No. D2023- DEV0PD-0070.000

1. This is the official response to DOD IG Project No. D2023- DEV0PD-0070.000, specific to recommendation 2 "that the Commander of the U.S. European Command obtain and maintain an English translated version of the annual Deutsche Bahn rail service requirements to promote the proper and efficient utilization of Deutsche Bahn rail services," and a review of the classification of the document.
2. USEUCOM agrees with recommendation 2. The current translated version is applicable through 30 Jun 23, as depicted in Attachment 1. The reason it was published for half the year was due to potential inflation rates within Europe. The 1 Jul - 31 Dec 23 version, Attachment 2, was published in German with new rates, and the EUCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (EDDOC), International Commercial Tender Branch (ICTB) will work to attain the translated version. Deutsche Bahn provided the 1 Jan - 30 Jun translated version as a "one-time-only" service, which means USEUCOM will need to seek out a translator. This does not operationally affect operations, because as stated in the IG report, there are local German nationals that work for EUCOM and understand the agreement. We expect the 2024 agreement to span the full year, and the ICTB will seek out translation.
3. Upon review of the full IG report, ECJ4 has no objections on the classification of the document.
4. The USEUCOM point of contact is [REDACTED]

GOTTLIEB.DAVID.RA  
YMOND [REDACTED]  
DAVID R. GOTTLIEB, Lt Col, USAF  
Chief, EDDOC

Digitally signed by  
GOTTLIEB.DAVID.RAYMOND  
Date: 2023.11.16 10:38:04 +01'00'

- Attachments:
1. BefBedMil 01.01.2023-30.06.2023
  2. BefBedMil 01.07.2023-31.12.2023

CUI

# (U) U.S. Army Europe-Africa



~~CUI~~

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE AND AFRICA  
UNIT 29351  
APO AE 09014-9351

AEOP

09 January 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR Office of Inspector General (SAIG-PD/ Bryan Clark), Department of Defense, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria VA, 22350-1500

SUBJECT: (CUI) USAREUR-AF Response to Recommendation 1, "Evaluation of the U.S. European Command's Planning and Execution of Ground Transportation of Equipment to Support Ukraine from Port to Transfer Location (Project No. D2023-DEV0PD-0070.000)."

1. (U) I concur with the Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General recommendation that the Commander of U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) develop and implement a plan to ensure that Presidential Draw-down (PD) equipment traveling through the U.S. European Command area of operations be equipped with in-transit visibility (ITV) devices or other means and methods to ensure near-real time visibility of PD materiel.



PATRICK J. ELLIS  
Brigadier General, GS  
Deputy Chief of Staff, G3

Controlled by: United States Army Europe and Africa  
Controlled by: AEOP  
CUI Category: OPSEC  
Limited Dissemination Control: FEDCON  
POC:

~~CUI~~

## **(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations**

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- (U) GoU** Government of Ukraine
- (U) ITV** In-Transit Visibility
- (U) MCO** Movement Control Office
- (U) PD** Presidential Drawdown
- (U) SDDC** Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
- (U) TMC** Theater Movement Center
- (U) TMCC** Theater Movement Control Center
- (U) SOP** Standard Operating Procedures
- (U) TSC** Theater Sustainment Command
- (U) SAREURAF** U.S. Army Europe and Africa
- (U) USEUCOM** U.S. European Command



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