


USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)



INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

December 1, 2017



(U) Evaluation of the Long Range Strike-Bomber Program Security Controls

Classified By: Anthony C. Thomas, Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments

Derived From: USAF: (b)(1)

Declassify On: USAF: (b)(1)

Released by the DoD OIG FOIA Office on February 2, 2024, under DODOIG-2021-000234.

INTEGRITY ★ EFFICIENCY ★ ACCOUNTABILITY ★ EXCELLENCE

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

INTEGRITY ★ EFFICIENCY ★ ACCOUNTABILITY ★ EXCELLENCE

Mission

Our mission is to provide independent, relevant, and timely oversight of the Department of Defense that supports the warfighter; promotes accountability, integrity, and efficiency; advises the Secretary of Defense and Congress; and informs the public.

Vision

Our vision is to be a model oversight organization in the Federal Government by leading change, speaking truth, and promoting excellence—a diverse organization, working together as one professional team, recognized as leaders in our field.



Fraud, Waste, & Abuse

HOTLINE

Department of Defense

dodig.mil/hotline 800.424.9098

For more information about whistleblower protection, please see the inside back cover.



USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the Long Range Strike – Bomber Program Security Controls

December 1, 2017

(U) Objective


(U) We determined whether the Department of the Air Force, the Long Range Strike-Bomber (hereafter referred to as the B-21 Raider) Program Office, and contractors are protecting classified information and have adequate security controls in place for publically releasing B-21 Raider Program information. In addition, we addressed allegations involving B-21 Raider Program security at a contractor site. The evaluation was performed in response to a congressional reporting requirement and allegations reported to the Defense Hotline.

(U) Findings

USAF: (b)(1)




USAF: (b)(1)



(U) Recommendations

USAF: (b)(1)



USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)



Results in Brief

Evaluation of the Long Range Strike – Bomber Program Security Controls

(U) Recommendations (cont'd)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)



Results in Brief

Evaluation of the Long Range Strike – Bomber Program Security Controls

(U) Management Comments and Our Response (cont'd)

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted content]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted content]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted content]

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
(U) Program Manager, B-21 Raider Program	USAF: (b)(1)	USAF: (b)(1)	USAF: (b)(1)
USAF: (b)(1)	USAF: (b)(1)	USAF: (b)(1)	USAF: (b)(1)
USAF: (b)(1)	USAF: (b)(1)	USAF: (b)(1)	USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Please provide Management Comments by January 6, 2018.

(U) The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations:

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
 ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

December 1, 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION,
 TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, (SECURITY,
 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, AND SPECIAL PROGRAM OVERSIGHT)
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, (FINANCIAL
 MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)
 DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPECIAL ACCESS
 PROGRAM CENTRAL OFFICE


SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of the Long Range Strike-Bomber Program Security Controls
 (Report No. DODIG-2018-037)

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Comments from the B-21 Raider Program Manager to Recommendations B.1a, B.1.b, B.1.c, B.1.e, C.1.a, C.1.b, C.1.c, C.1.d, C.1.d.1, C.1.d.2, and C.1.e addressed all specifics of the recommendations and conformed to the requirements of DoD Instruction 7650.03; therefore, we do not require additional comments.

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at DoD OIG: (b)(6) (DSN DoD OIG: (b)(6)) or DoD OIG: (b)(6) at DoD OIG: (b)(6) (DSN DoD OIG: (b)(6)).


 Anthony C. Thomas
 Deputy Inspector General for
 Intelligence and Special
 Program Assessments

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) We determined whether the Department of the Air Force, the Long Range Strike-Bomber (hereafter referred to as the B-21 Raider) Program Office, and its contractors are protecting classified information and have adequate security controls in place for publically releasing program information. In addition, we also addressed allegations involving program security at a contractor site. This evaluation is in response to a congressional reporting requirement and allegations reported to the Defense Hotline. See Appendix A for the scope and methodology and prior coverage related to the evaluation objective.

(U) Background

(U) On February 18, 2011, the Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to develop a new long range strike platform. The Air Force is developing the Long Range Strike-Bomber, formally designated as the B-21 Raider, to deliver initial capability before 2030. According to the Air Force, the B-21 Raider will be able to hold potential targets around the world at risk, overcome evolving threats, counter adversary anti-access strategies, deny adversary sanctuaries, and enable freedom of movement for joint forces. The B-21 Raider Program is a top modernization priority for the Air Force.

(U) B-21 Raider Special Access Program

(USAF: (b)(1)) (USAF: (b)(1))
[Redacted text block]

(U) B-21 Raider Program Organization

(U//~~FOUO~~) The B-21 Raider Program is organized under the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office (AFRCO) located at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, D.C.

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) B-21 Raider Program Office

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) B-21 Raider Program Contractors

(U) On October 27, 2015, the Secretary of the Air Force announced the Long Range Strike-Bomber contract was awarded to one prime contractor. The prime contractor subsequently selected seven industry partners to serve as subcontractors. All of these cleared contractors are required to have a designated contractor program security officer (CPSO) who is responsible for SAP security administration and management.⁴

(U) Congressional Interest

(U) On October 25, 2016, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense staff met with DoD Office of Inspector General personnel to discuss committee concerns regarding B-21 Raider Program security. The staff indicated that the committee was

USAF: (b)(1)

² (U) The B-21 Raider Program Senior Material Leader position is the equivalent of an acquisition program manager.

³ (U) A PSO is a government official appointed in writing by the appropriate cognizant authority SAP central office or designee, and is responsible for executing oversight and implementation of SAP security requirements for a specific SAP or group of SAPs, or geographically assigned locations. The PSO is appointed to oversee and execute SAP security with responsibilities encompassing all security disciplines.

⁴ (U) For the purposes of this report, contractors with personnel and facilities approved for classified national security information are considered "cleared" contractors. A CPSO is an individual designated in writing by the contractor program manager who will provide security administration and management for a SAP at a cleared contractor location.

specifically interested in “transparency versus security considerations and implications,” the “level of information released to the public,” and how contractors are protecting program information. Subsequently, language tasking the DoD Office of Inspector General to conduct an evaluation of B-21 Raider Program security controls was included in the “Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2017,” Public Law 115-31, May 5, 2017. The legislation included the following provision:

LONG RANGE STRIKE BOMBER. The Inspector General of the Department of Defense is directed to conduct an evaluation and submit a report as described under this heading in Senate Report 114-263 not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act. In addition, the agreement designates the long range strike bomber program as a congressional special interest item for purposes of transfer of funds and prior approval reprogramming procedures.

(U) Hotline Allegation

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

(U) Review of Internal Controls

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

⁵ (U) An authorization to operate is an official management decision to approve an information system to operate. The management official explicitly accepts the risk that the system presents to organizational operations and assets. The DoD JSIG, April 11, 2016, provides standardized cybersecurity and information assurance policy, procedures, and implementation guidance for use in the management of all networks, systems, and components at all classification levels under the purview of the cognizant SAP authorizing official.

Introduction

USAF: (b)(1)

⁶ (U) DoD Manual 5205.07, volume 1 "DoD Special Access Program Security Manual: General Procedures" June 18, 2015.

(U) Finding A

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) B-21 Raider Program Public Release Process

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Major Release Decisions

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

- (U) Program milestones include preliminary design review, critical design review, first flight, Milestone C approval, and initial operating capability.

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

Finding A

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Security Classification Guide

USAF: (b)(1)

⁹ (U) According to Joint Publication 2-0, "Joint Intelligence," October 22, 2013, a Red Team is an organizational element comprised of trained and educated members that provide an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations from the perspective of adversaries.

¹⁰ (U) DD Form 254 "Contract Security Classification Specification" provides security classification guidance to cleared contractors working under the National Industrial Security Program. It specifies classification level and safeguarding requirements, access requirements, and performance requirements. Prime contractors issue DD Form 254 to cleared subcontractors.

(U) Congressional and Media Requests

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

(U) Public Release Security Requirements Memorandum

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

Finding A

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

- USAF: (b)(1)
- USAF: (b)(1)
- USAF: (b)(1)
- USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

¹³ USAF: (b)(1)

¹⁴ (U) A government SAP security officer is a government, or government support position, appointed in writing at a government SAP Facility or organization by the Director or program manager to provide security administration and management. The government SAP security officer receives SAP guidance from the PSO.

Finding A

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Conclusion

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

¹⁶ (U) Classification as a result of compilation occurs when unclassified elements of information are combined to reveal classified information, or when classified elements combine to reveal information at a higher classification level than the individual elements.

Finding A

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

(U) Management Comments on PSO Coordination of Release Requests

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Our Response

USAF: (b)(1)

Finding A

USAF: (b)(1) [Redacted text block]

(U) Management Comments on Program Office's Lack of a Formal Review and Approval Process

USAF: (b)(1) [Redacted text block]

(U) Our Response

USAF: (b)(1) [Redacted text block]

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation A.1

(U) We recommend that the B-21 Raider Program Manager:

- a. USAF: (b)(1) [Redacted text block]

Finding A

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) B-21 Raider Program Manager Comments

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Our Response

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Recommendation A.2

(U) We recommend that the B-21 Raider Program Security Officer:

a. USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) B-21 Raider Program Manager Comments

USAF: (b)(1)

Finding A

USAF: (b)(1)


(U) Our Response

USAF: (b)(1)


USAF: (b)(1)

Finding B (U)

USAF: (b)(1)




USAF: (b)(1)



(U) B-21 Raider Program Office

USAF: (b)(1)



Finding B

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

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USAF: (b)(1)

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USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

Finding B

- USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Prime Contractor and Subcontractor

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Prime Contractor Laptop Not Authorized to Operate

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

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USAF: (b)(1)

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USAF: (b)(1)

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Finding B

USAF: (b)(1)

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USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

capability provided by the information system can generate customizable reports.

Finding B

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Conclusion

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Our Response

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Revised and Added Recommendations

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Recommendation B.1

(U) We recommend that the Information Systems Security Manager, B-21 Raider Program Office:

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) B-21 Raider Program Manager Comments

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Our Response

USAF: (b)(1)

Finding B

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) B-21 Raider Program Manager Comments

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

Finding B

(U) Our Response

USAF: (b)(1)

- USAF: (b)(1)
- USAF: (b)(1)
- USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

- f. USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Finding C

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted]

(U) Security Incident Reporting Procedures

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted]

(U) Security Incident Reporting

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted]

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Security Inquiries and Investigations at Contractor Sites

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

²⁸ (U) DoD Manual 5200.01, volume 3, "DoD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information," February 24, 2012 (Incorporating Change 2, March 19, 2013)

²⁹ (U) According to DoD Manual 5205.07, volume 1, inadvertent disclosure is the involuntary unauthorized access to classified SAP or unclassified HVSACO information by an individual without SAP authorization.

Finding C

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted]

(U) Prime Contractor Security Incident Logs

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted]

³⁰ (U) According to the internal [USAF: (b)(1)] Air Force Life Cycle Management Center [AFLCMC] "Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)," Revision A, December 22, 2016, portable electronic devices include, but are not limited to cellular phones, thumb drives, laptops, and cameras.

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Subcontractor Security Incident Logs

USAF: (b)(1)

- (U) record and track security incidents occurring at each contractor site;
- (U) identify trends or patterns of employees who repeatedly commit various incidents; and
- (U) track the status of an incident to include whether corrective actions were taken and whether the incident was closed out.

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Security Incidents Categorization

USAF: (b)(1)

³¹ (U) We did not visit all seven subcontractor sites.

Finding C

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted text block]

³² (U) DoD Manual 5205.07, volume 4, "Special Access Program (SAP) Security Manual: Marking," October 10, 2013.

(U) Conclusion

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted]

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation C.1

(U) We recommend that the B-21 Raider Program Security Officer:

a. USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted]

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted]

Finding C

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Our Response

USAF: (b)(1)

Finding C

USAF: (b)(1)

■ USAF: (b)(1)

■ USAF: (b)(1)

■ USAF: (b)(1)

• USAF: (b)(1)

■ USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from December 2016 through September 2017 in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, January 2012. Those standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objectives.

(U) We performed site visits and interviewed personnel at the following locations:

- (U) Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, D.C.
- (U) B-21 Raider Program Office, Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, D.C.
- (U) B-21 Raider Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Northrop Grumman, Melbourne, Florida
- (U//~~FOUO~~) GKN Aerospace, St. Louis, Missouri

(U) We did not visit all Government and contractor locations.

(USAF: (b)(1)) (USAF: (b)(1)) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U//~~FOUO~~) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued two reports related to the Long Range Strike-Bomber. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html>.

(U) GAO

(U) Report No. GAO-14-373, "Nuclear Weapons: Ten-Year Budget Estimates for Modernization Omit Key Efforts, and Assumptions and Limitations are Not Fully Transparent," June 10, 2014

(U) This report addressed whether Department of Energy's and DoD's 10-year budget estimates for sustaining and modernizing the nuclear deterrent were consistent with their funding plans. Although the report mentions the Long Range Strike-Bomber, the report did not identify any significant findings and recommendations related to our planned evaluation objectives.

(U) DoD OIG

(U) Report No. DODIG-2015-170, "Audit of the Acquisition of the Long Range Strike-Bomber," September 8, 2015

(U//~~FOUO~~) This audit evaluated the Long Range Strike-Bomber program management's preparations for Milestone B. The audit determined that early planning for the Long Range Strike-Bomber was adequate. In addition, the report's finding showed that the program office had integrated security early in the acquisition, and the program office was providing day-to-day security management for the program. The report did not have any recommendation.

(U) Appendix B

(U) Defense Hotline Allegations and Responses

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Allegation

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Results

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Allegation

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Results

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) Program Office Response

USAF: (b)(1)

[Redacted]

¹ (U) According to DoD Manual 5205.07, volume 1, a staff assistance visit is conducted by the PSO to review security documentation, including security violations and infractions, and provide assistance and direction as necessary.

(U) Management Comments

(U) B-21 Raider Program Manager



USAF: (b)(1)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

637 13 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE AND
SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS

FROM: AIR FORCE RAPID CAPABILITIES OFFICE

SUBJECT: (U) Comments to "Evaluation of the Long Range Strike-Bomber Security
Controls," Project #D2017- DISPA3-0050.000

1. (U) The B-21 Program Office appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the draft report provided on 25 October 2017. The program office has carefully considered the findings and recommendations the report identifies regarding the security controls of the program. While there have been no security incidents to date resulting in the inadvertent release of classified information, the B-21 Program Office agrees the program security processes and procedures can be improved to further decrease the security risk(s) to the program. Additionally, while the program office fundamentally concurs with the findings in the subject report, we are concerned that many of the findings lack the necessary context to adequately support the findings and/or any representative risk to the program of an inadvertent release of classified information. The program office provides additional context below in support of the findings outlined in the report.

2. (U) Program Office responses to Recommendations:

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

USAF: (b)(1)

(U) B-21 Raider Program Manager (cont'd)


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USAF: (b)(1)


USAF: (b)(1)

(U) B-21 Raider Program Manager (cont'd)


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


(U) B-21 Raider Program Manager (cont'd)

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3. (U) In conclusion, while the B-21 program has experienced no security incidents to date resulting in the inadvertent release of classified information, the B-21 Program Office concurs that the program security processes and procedures can be improved to further decrease security risk(s) to the program. The program office continually strives to improve security measures and will work to implement the above recommendations to further improve our existing security posture.

4. (U) Any questions can be directed to my point of contact, B-21 Program Element Monitor [REDACTED]; or by email [REDACTED].



DALE R. WHITE, Colonel, USAF
Senior Materiel Leader, B-21 Raider

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(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFRCO	Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office
AFOSI PJ	Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Office of Special Projects
AIS	Automated Information Systems
CPSO	Contractor Program Security Officer
IA	Information Assurance
ISSM	Information Systems Security Manager
ISSO	Information Systems Security Officer
JSIG	Joint SAP Implementation Guide
PSO	Program Security Officer
SAP	Special Access Program
SCG	Security Classification Guide
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures

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