




INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

DECEMBER 17, 2024



Management Advisory: Review of the DoD's Roles and Responsibilities for Facilitating the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid to Gaza Through the Maritime Corridor

INDEPENDENCE ★ INTEGRITY ★ EXCELLENCE ★ TRANSPARENCY





OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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December 17, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Management Advisory: Review of the DoD's Roles and Responsibilities for
Facilitating the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid to Gaza Through the Maritime
Corridor (Report No. DODIG-2025-054)

This final management advisory provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's review. We previously provided copies of the discussion draft management advisory and requested written comments on the recommendation. We considered management's comments on the discussion draft management advisory when preparing the final advisory. These comments are included in the advisory.

Management took action to address the recommendation in the advisory; therefore, we consider the recommendation closed.

We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during this review. If you have any questions, please contact me at [REDACTED]

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "Richard B. Vasquez", is positioned above the printed name.

Richard B. Vasquez
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Readiness and Global Operations



Executive Summary

The objective of our review was to assess the effectiveness of the DoD's efforts to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Our original intent was to conduct a two phased review of the DoD's role in the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza through the maritime corridor, which included the DoD's Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) capability and the Port of Ashdod in Israel.

The first phase was intended to focus on the DoD's roles and responsibilities, and the second phase was intended to focus on the effectiveness of the DoD's execution of those roles and responsibilities. However, because the last shipment of humanitarian aid to Gaza through JLOTS occurred 2 days after we announced our review, we were only able to observe a limited amount of humanitarian aid delivery operations. As a result, this management advisory includes the DoD's roles and responsibilities, as well as the results of our limited observations of humanitarian aid delivery operations.

Given the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) lead role in providing humanitarian aid, we closely coordinated our work with the USAID OIG, which issued its own report regarding the provision of humanitarian aid to Gaza through JLOTS.¹ In addition, the DoD OIG currently is conducting a broader evaluation of the DoD's capabilities to effectively carry out JLOTS operations and exercises that may also inform the DoD's future use of the JLOTS capability.²

The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and Israel's subsequent military response resulted in a humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In response to the humanitarian crisis, and at the direction of the U.S. President, the DoD employed the JLOTS capability to facilitate delivery of aid under USAID direction from Cyprus to Gaza. JLOTS is a pre-existing joint Army and Navy capability for transporting supplies and equipment from ship to shore where fixed port capabilities are inadequate or unavailable. The purpose of using JLOTS was to provide a complementary effort to land routes for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

USAID requested the DoD facilitate delivery of humanitarian supplies and logistics support from Cyprus to Gaza to support USAID's humanitarian operations. Despite external constraints, DoD officials were effective in facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid that USAID requested be delivered to Gaza through the maritime corridor, which included both JLOTS and the Port of Ashdod. DoD officials provided maritime transportation and logistics support related to the screening of humanitarian aid in Cyprus, loading and facilitating delivery of aid through JLOTS or to the Port of Ashdod, and transfer of aid to humanitarian partners on the Gaza shore or at the Port of Ashdod. DoD officials effectively facilitated the screening and

¹ "USAID's Gaza Response: External Factors Impaired Distribution of Humanitarian Assistance Through the JLOTS Maritime Corridor," Report E-000-24-004-M, August 27, 2024.

² On August 5, 2024, the DoD OIG announced a project focused on the DoD's capability to effectively carry out JLOTS operations and exercises, which is the "Evaluation of the DoD's Capabilities to Carry out Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations and Exercises" (Project No. D2024-DEVOPC-0163.000).

loading of pallets of humanitarian aid for the two mission tasking matrix (MITAM) requests we reviewed.³ In addition, DoD officials tracked the completion of MITAM requests daily by using a tracking spreadsheet and daily situation reports. Based on our observations and review of the tracking spreadsheet and daily situation reports, we did not identify indicators that DoD officials inaccurately tracked MITAM requests.

The JLOTS mission started on May 17 and concluded on July 18, 2024, and the DoD used it for 20 days, or 32 percent of that 63-day period. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) officials identified external factors, such as weather, the availability of humanitarian aid for delivery, and the availability of third parties to accept and deliver humanitarian aid, as reasons JLOTS was unavailable for more than two-thirds of the 63 days. Despite these external factors, according to USCENTCOM, the DoD's JLOTS capability facilitated the delivery of the highest volume of aid that the U.S. military has ever delivered to the Middle East. In June 2024, DoD officials started using the Port of Ashdod concurrently with JLOTS for delivering humanitarian aid. Following the conclusion of the JLOTS mission on July 18, 2024, DoD officials continued to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza through the Port of Ashdod.

According to USAID, its initial goal for using JLOTS was to deliver humanitarian aid to feed or assist at least 500,000 people per month for 90 days. Ultimately, USAID requested the delivery of 19,650 pallets of humanitarian aid and the DoD delivered 19,703 pallets of aid through the maritime corridor.⁴ Specifically, the DoD used the JLOTS capability to deliver 10,777 pallets (55 percent) of aid and the Port of Ashdod to deliver 8,926 pallets (45 percent) of aid. USAID officials reported that the humanitarian aid delivered through JLOTS was sufficient to feed 450,000 people for one month.⁵

Because the DoD completed the last shipment of humanitarian aid through JLOTS before our arrival in Cyprus, and because we did not travel to Gaza and Israel, our observations of delivery operations were limited, and we did not identify lessons learned related to the DoD's facilitation of humanitarian aid delivery. We recommended the USCENTCOM Commander conduct an after-action review of its effort to deliver humanitarian aid through the maritime corridor, including the JLOTS capability and the Port of Ashdod, to identify lessons learned for future contingency planning.

The USCENTCOM Chief of Staff partially concurred with the recommendation but did not provide any specific ongoing or planned actions to address the intent of the recommendation. However, during subsequent communications with USCENTCOM officials, they provided two after-action reviews prepared by the 1st Theater Sustainment Command. The two after-action reviews fully addressed the specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is closed on issuance of this management advisory.

³ MITAM is a tool that USAID uses to support tactical-level decision making and to capture, transmit, and track requests for DoD support. We refer to all requests for DoD support using the MITAM process in this advisory as MITAM requests.

⁴ The DoD delivered more pallets of humanitarian aid than USAID requested due to the repair and re-palletization of damaged pallets.

⁵ "USAID's Gaza Response: External Factors Impaired Distribution of Humanitarian Assistance Through the JLOTS Maritime Corridor," Report E-000-24-004-M, August 27, 2024.

Introduction

Objective

The objective of our review was to assess the effectiveness of the DoD's efforts to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Our original intent was to conduct a two phased review of the DoD's role in the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza through the maritime corridor, which included the DoD's Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) capability and the Port of Ashdod in Israel.

The first phase was intended to focus on the DoD's roles and responsibilities, and the second phase was intended to focus on the effectiveness of the DoD's execution of those roles and responsibilities. However, because the last shipment of humanitarian aid to Gaza through JLOTS occurred 2 days after we announced our review, we were only able to observe a limited amount of humanitarian aid delivery operations.⁶ As a result, this management advisory includes the DoD's roles and responsibilities, as well as the results of our limited observations of humanitarian aid delivery operations.⁷

Background

The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and Israel's subsequent military response resulted in a humanitarian crisis in Gaza that left an estimated 1.7 million people internally displaced in Gaza without access to clean water, medical treatment, and safe shelter. In addition, according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), as of March 2024, Gaza's population of 2.2 million people was facing acute food insecurity, meaning they required food assistance.⁸ The IPC also projected that by July 2024, nearly half of the population in Gaza would face catastrophic levels of food insecurity, with 20 percent of its households facing an extreme lack of food and 30 percent of its children suffering from severe malnutrition.

U.S. Government Humanitarian Aid for Gaza

Given the humanitarian situation in Gaza, the U.S. Government, in conjunction with officials from other nations, coordinated with the United Nations to facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza. The U.S. Government led the effort to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and increase the flow of lifesaving aid to civilians in Gaza. Between October 2023 and June 2024, the U.S. Government donated over \$674 million worth of total humanitarian assistance to address the crisis in Gaza.

⁶ The roles and responsibilities identified in this advisory are partially based on testimonial evidence from officials from U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Army Central, and the 1st Theater Sustainment Command.

⁷ Due to security concerns, we did not travel to either Gaza or Israel.

⁸ According to the IPC, the IPC is the international standard for classifying food insecurity and malnutrition.

U.S. Agency for International Development

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead Federal agency for the U.S. Government's mission to deliver humanitarian aid. USAID officials worked closely with regional governments, the United Nations, other donors, and humanitarian partners to coordinate U.S. relief efforts and deliver aid into Gaza. U.S. funding, through USAID, supports trusted humanitarian partners, such as the United Nation's World Food Programme (WFP), to provide essential aid, such as food, water, medical and nutrition items, and shelter to those in Gaza.⁹

Obstacles to Providing Humanitarian Aid

The ongoing conflict in Gaza, resulting in border crossing closures and degraded aid distribution capabilities, has significantly reduced the ability to address the deteriorating humanitarian conditions there. For example, according to USAID officials, the closure of the vital Rafah border crossing resulted in the supply of humanitarian aid declining when it was needed most. According to USAID officials, an insufficient number of trucks with aid reached Gaza from overland border crossings due to shortages of fuel, lack of security, access constraints, and ongoing fighting.

Delays and other obstacles to transporting humanitarian aid through crossings and Israeli checkpoints—particularly in northern Gaza—contributed to a February 2024 United Nations assessment that one-quarter of Gaza's people were "one step away from famine." However, according to a March 2024 Congressional Research Service brief, some food and other essential supplies entered Gaza through Egypt and Israel during the conflict.

In March 2024, the U.S. Government acknowledged that the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza was insufficient to address the growing humanitarian crisis. As a result, the U.S. Government pursued multiple methods to deliver aid into Gaza, including from the sea.

Methods for Delivering Humanitarian Aid Through the Maritime Corridor

The effort to rapidly deliver humanitarian aid into Gaza from the sea involved delivery through a direct maritime transportation route from Cyprus to Gaza, known as the maritime corridor. According to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and USAID officials, the use of the maritime corridor to deliver aid was intended to be a complementary effort to land routes. The maritime corridor was a multinational effort between the United States, the Republic of Cyprus, Israel, the United Nations, and international donors, including the United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and European Union, to move humanitarian aid from Cyprus into Gaza.

⁹ Humanitarian partners are organizations, including United Nations agencies, non-governmental agencies, the U.S. military, local governments, and other donor governments that work together to respond to urgent humanitarian needs across the world.

The WFP is a humanitarian organization that provides relief during times of conflict, disasters, and inequality. The WFP has a presence in over 120 countries and territories to carry out its mission.

The DoD was responsible for facilitating delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza through the maritime corridor via a temporary pier anchored to the Gaza shoreline known as JLOTS. In June 2024, the maritime corridor was expanded to include the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza through the Port of Ashdod.

Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore

In March 2024, the President announced that the U.S. military would lead an emergency mission to establish a temporary port capability, JLOTS, attached to the shore of Gaza to support the maritime corridor. USCENTCOM employed the DoD's JLOTS capability in the maritime corridor to receive large ships carrying aid, such as food, water, medicine, and shelters.¹⁰ JLOTS is a pre-existing joint capability between the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy and is designed to provide logistics operations where fixed port facilities are inadequate or unavailable. According to the DoD and USAID, JLOTS provided an additional humanitarian aid entry point into Gaza.

The JLOTS capability to move humanitarian aid through the maritime corridor included a floating platform off the coast of Gaza, an approximately 1,800-foot floating causeway pier (trident pier) attached to the Gaza shoreline, and a group of logistics support vessels and barges for transporting aid from the floating platform to the trident pier. Figures 1 and 2 show the JLOTS floating platform and the JLOTS trident pier connected to the Gaza coast, respectively.



Figure 1. JLOTS Floating Platform off the Coast of Gaza Used to Deliver Humanitarian Aid
Source: USCENTCOM.

¹⁰ On August 5, 2024, the DoD OIG announced a project focused on the DoD's capability to effectively carry out JLOTS operations and exercises, which is the "Evaluation of the DoD's Capabilities to Carry out Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations and Exercises" (Project No. D2024-DEV0PC-0163.000).



Figure 2. JLOTS Trident Pier Attached to the Gaza Shore Used to Deliver Humanitarian Aid
Source: USCENTCOM.


Port of Ashdod

DoD officials stated that due to historical weather patterns, they understood JLOTS would be a temporary measure to help deliver much-needed humanitarian aid to Gaza. DoD officials also stated they knew from the outset that JLOTS would not be a feasible option toward the end of summer. Specifically, the Mediterranean Sea experiences significant winds and high waves, which would cause JLOTS to become inoperable.

During the JLOTS mission, USAID and the DoD explored other options to deliver humanitarian aid from Cyprus. In June 2024, the DoD started facilitating the delivery of aid through the Port of Ashdod, in addition to the delivery of aid through JLOTS. USAID and DoD officials used these deliveries to test the Port of Ashdod to ensure the capability existed to deliver humanitarian aid. At the conclusion of the JLOTS mission, DoD officials committed to sending the remainder of humanitarian aid still afloat and in Cyprus to the Port of Ashdod for onward movement by humanitarian partners into Gaza.

Multi-Step Process for the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid Through the Maritime Corridor

The delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza through the maritime corridor was a complex, multi-step process. Figure 3 shows the movement of humanitarian aid from Cyprus to Gaza through the maritime corridor.



The JLOTS process included three modules by which the aid arrived at the Port of Larnaca in Cyprus for inspection (Module A), transitioned through JLOTS (Module B), and was transferred to humanitarian partners to distribute to citizens in Gaza (Module C). The Republic of Cyprus was the lead coordinator for Module A, the DoD was the operator of Module B, and the WFP was the operator of Module C.

The process of sending humanitarian aid from Cyprus to the Port of Ashdod included inspecting and loading humanitarian aid onto vessels at the Port of Larnaca (coordinated by the Republic of Cyprus), transporting the aid on vessels to the Port of Ashdod (operated by the DoD), and transferring the aid to humanitarian partners at the Port of Ashdod to deliver to citizens in Gaza (coordinated by the WFP).

Agreements Between the DoD and USAID for Facilitating the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid to Gaza Through the Maritime Corridor

The DoD's facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza through the maritime corridor required coordination with commands and organizations internal and external to the DoD and U.S. Government. To avoid confusion over roles and responsibilities, USAID and the DoD entered into multiple interagency agreements.

Non-Reimbursable Maritime Transportation and Logistics Support

USAID and the DoD entered into an agreement for non-reimbursable maritime transportation and logistics support. On March 27, 2024, USAID requested that the DoD facilitate maritime delivery of humanitarian supplies and logistics support from the Port of Larnaca to Gaza to support USAID's humanitarian response operations. USAID noted within its request that the DoD was uniquely capable of providing maritime delivery support, enabling the rapid delivery of immediate assistance to organizations that could deliver such aid to the civilians in Gaza.¹¹

USAID requested the DoD provide the maritime delivery support on a non-reimbursable basis unless donor or other funding became available for reimbursing the DoD. In addition, USAID requested the DoD provide the support for no more than 90 days, with the possibility of extension. See Appendix A for USAID's original request to the DoD for maritime delivery support.

On April 10, 2024, the DoD agreed that USCENTCOM would provide USAID's requested support until June 4, 2024, or until USAID no longer had need for that support, whichever was earlier.¹² The DoD subsequently extended its support until July 31, 2024. See Appendix B for the DoD's response to USAID's original request for maritime delivery support.

¹¹ Partners since the 1960s, the DoD and USAID have worked together responding to crises worldwide. Of the 70 foreign disasters USAID responds to on average every year, about 10 percent involve support from the DoD.

¹² The DoD agreed to provide support under title 10, U.S. Code, section 2561, on a non-reimbursable basis, subject to changes in funding available to USAID. Consistent with USAID's request, if donor funding for the humanitarian assistance mission became available, the DoD expected that itself and USAID would modify the support arrangement, including reimbursement to the DoD.

On July 21, 2024, USAID requested the DoD continue contracting a merchant vessel until August 20, 2024, on a non-reimbursable basis in support of USAID's humanitarian aid efforts in Gaza. The purpose for the continued contracting of the merchant vessel was for transporting the humanitarian aid afloat and stored at the Port of Larnaca to the Port of Ashdod following the conclusion of JLOTS operations. On July 25, 2024, the DoD agreed to continue contracting the merchant vessel until August 20, 2024. On August 16, 2024, USAID sent a request to the DoD to continue contracting the merchant vessel to complete the DoD's maritime delivery support. On August 30, 2024, the DoD agreed to continue contracting the merchant vessel until September 30, 2024, or until USAID no longer required its use, whichever was earlier.

As part of the agreement and reiterated within the DoD's responses to USAID's extension requests, the DoD acknowledged that USAID would communicate all specific requirements for DoD transportation and logistics support of humanitarian commodities using the Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) process. MITAM is a tool that USAID uses to support tactical-level decision making and to capture, transmit, and track requests for DoD support.¹³

Reimbursable Contracting Support

On April 28, 2024, USAID requested DoD reimbursable contracting support to procure and transport material that humanitarian partners, such as the WFP, would need to process humanitarian aid on the beach in Gaza and then distribute it to beneficiaries. The USAID's request included the procurement and transportation of material handling equipment, vehicles, and other necessary commodities. On June 11, 2024, the DoD agreed to provide the reimbursable contracting support to USAID for the delivery of aid to Gaza through July 31, 2024.

USAID Goal for Providing Humanitarian Aid to Gaza Through JLOTS

The USAID goal for using JLOTS was to deliver humanitarian aid to feed or assist at least 500,000 people per month for 90 days. USCENTCOM officials involved with the planning and operation of JLOTS understood this goal to be to "flood the area" (for example, Gaza) with aid to address the humanitarian crisis. USCENTCOM officials stated USAID's goal consisted of providing humanitarian aid from multiple delivery options, including land, air, and sea. The USCENTCOM officials also stated that USAID officials did not communicate USAID's goal of providing humanitarian aid to 500,000 people per month for 90 days specifically through JLOTS.

¹³ The requests for DoD support may come from the host nation, non-governmental agencies, or the WFP. However, USAID processes the requests through the MITAM process to ensure the requests satisfy unmet humanitarian needs and cannot be completed by civilian entities. We refer to all requests for DoD support using the MITAM process in this advisory as MITAM requests.

USAID's Requested Support for DoD Facilitating the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid to Gaza Through the Maritime Corridor

USAID issued 40 MITAM requests to U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) to facilitate the delivery of 19,650 pallets of humanitarian aid to Gaza through the maritime corridor. The MITAM requests included the MITAM request number, the type of aid and number of pallets for delivery, and where to deliver the aid. See Appendix C for an example of a MITAM request for the movement of aid from the Port of Larnaca to Gaza.

According to a 1st Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) official, the 1st TSC was not responsible for determining what humanitarian aid to move, or when to move the aid.¹⁴ In addition, USAID stated within pallet packaging requirements that the DoD, as the service provider, was not to be held responsible for the loss or damage of humanitarian aid transported or stored.

Before requesting the movement of any humanitarian aid, USAID issued an initial MITAM request to coordinate USARCENT responsibilities and establish a communication process between USAID's disaster assistance response team and USARCENT. Specifically, USAID requested USARCENT track the completion of MITAM requests daily for the movement of aid. USAID also requested a primary USARCENT point of contact to receive and distribute all MITAM requests to 1st TSC officials. USAID was responsible for opening and closing MITAM requests while USARCENT was responsible for daily tracking and reporting on the status of the MITAM requests.

¹⁴ The 1st TSC is a subordinate unit assigned to USARCENT and is responsible for executing operational-level sustainment support to USCENTCOM.

The DoD Facilitated the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid to Gaza Through the Maritime Corridor

Despite external constraints, DoD officials were effective in facilitating the delivery of all humanitarian aid that USAID requested be delivered to Gaza through the maritime corridor, which included both JLOTS and the Port of Ashdod. In addition, DoD officials provided maritime transportation and logistical support related to the screening of humanitarian aid in Cyprus, loading and transporting of aid through JLOTS or to the Port of Ashdod, and transfer of aid to humanitarian partners on the Gaza shore or at the Port of Ashdod. DoD officials effectively facilitated the screening and loading of pallets of humanitarian aid for the two MITAM requests we reviewed. DoD officials also tracked the completion of MITAM requests daily by using a tracking spreadsheet and daily situation reports (SITREPs). Based on our observations and review of the tracking spreadsheet and daily SITREPs, we did not identify indicators that DoD officials inaccurately tracked MITAM requests.

Screening of Humanitarian Aid

Officials from the 1st TSC facilitated the screening of humanitarian aid at the Port of Larnaca for delivery to Gaza through JLOTS and the Port of Ashdod. Because Cyprus is geographically located within the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility, USEUCOM officials supported the 1st TSC by providing logistics personnel to help with coordinating the humanitarian aid screening process in Cyprus. The 1st TSC provided and operated two drive-through inspection systems, known as T-25 scanners, for screening aid at the Port of Larnaca because humanitarian partners were unable to provide scanners.¹⁵

For all scanning operations, Cypriot and Israeli customs officials had to be present as the humanitarian aid underwent T-25 scanning to inspect each pallet for illegal contraband, such as explosives and cigarettes. While 1st TSC officials operated the T-25 scanners and associated computer software, USAID and DoD officials stated that only Cypriot and Israeli customs officials had the authority to identify and review any anomalies from the scanned images and provide final customs approval of the aid.

During this process, 1st TSC officials tracked the number of humanitarian aid pallets scanned and noted which MITAM request each pallet supported on an internal spreadsheet. Figure 4 shows an example of humanitarian aid pallets scanned at the Port of Larnaca.

¹⁵ T-25 scanners are trailer-mounted, drive-through inspection systems that can be easily towed and rapidly deployed to provide high-quality imaging and detection of threats and contraband. International donors of humanitarian aid were responsible for coordinating the arrival and storage of the aid at the Port of Larnaca until the aid was ready for screening.



Figure 4. Humanitarian Aid Pallets Scanned at the Port of Larnaca
Source: 1st TSC.

Once Cypriot and Israeli customs officials provided final customs approval, 1st TSC officials spray painted the pallets of humanitarian aid with checkmarks to indicate Cypriot and Israeli customs officials approved the aid for delivery to Gaza. Officials from the 1st TSC also oversaw and coordinated the loading of the aid directly onto vessels or into a warehouse designated for screened aid.¹⁶ The 1st TSC officials also conducted daily pallet counts of the screened aid stored in the warehouse. Figure 5 shows an example of screened aid stored in a warehouse at the Port of Larnaca.

¹⁶ The Republic of Cyprus was responsible for securing the screened aid in warehouses at the Port of Larnaca.



Figure 5. Screened Humanitarian Aid Stored at the Port of Larnaca
Source: The DoD OIG.

Loading and Transporting Humanitarian Aid

Officials from the 1st TSC worked with Cyprus Ports Authority officials to coordinate a list of the transportation and loading services required for each day's processing of humanitarian aid, also known as stevedoring services.¹⁷ The 1st TSC officials, with Cypriot customs officials and donor organization officials, counted the humanitarian aid pallets as the stevedores loaded the pallets of aid onto the vessels.

The process for loading humanitarian aid varied depending on the type of vessel—lift on/lift off or roll on/roll off vessels. Lift on/lift off vessels required the use of cranes for loading aid, while roll on/roll off vessels required the driving of trucks of humanitarian aid directly onto the vessels. Figures 6 and 7 show examples of the loading of humanitarian aid onto lift on/lift off and roll on/roll off vessels at the Port of Larnaca, respectively.

¹⁷ Stevedoring services include individuals, known as stevedores, who work at or are responsible for loading and unloading ships at a port.



Figure 6. Humanitarian Aid Loaded onto a Lift On/Lift Off Vessel at the Port of Larnaca
Source: 1st TSC.



Figure 7. Humanitarian Aid Loaded onto a Roll On/Roll Off Vessel at the Port of Larnaca
Source: 1st TSC.

Once loading was complete, 1st TSC officials created shipping manifests and provided the manifest to USARCENT and the aid donor community. The shipping manifests included the MITAM request number, pallet count, and a brief description of the aid on the pallets (such as high energy biscuits). See Appendix D for an example of a shipping manifest for humanitarian aid delivered to Gaza through the maritime corridor. Figure 8 shows a logistics support vessel (LSV) with pallets of humanitarian aid at the Port of Larnaca.



Figure 8. Logistics Support Vessel with Pallets of Humanitarian Aid at the Port of Larnaca
Source: 1st TSC.

A DoD-contracted crew or U.S. military personnel sailed the vessels containing the pallets of humanitarian aid either to the JLOTS floating platform to process for delivery to the Gaza shore through the JLOTS trident pier, or to the Port of Ashdod to transfer to humanitarian partners. In addition, USEUCOM personnel provided force protection at sea and were prepared to conduct operations to rescue or evacuate personnel as necessary.

Transport of Humanitarian Aid to the JLOTS Floating Platform

Once at the JLOTS floating platform, U.S. Army 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) officials coordinated the movement of the humanitarian aid from the vessels, across the JLOTS floating platform, and onto U.S. Army watercraft, known as LSVs or Landing Craft Utility (LCU) vessels. The primary methods of transferring humanitarian aid from the vessels to the LSVs and LCUs included using forklifts to transfer the aid onto empty trucks located on the vessels or on the JLOTS floating platform, where DoD contractors would then drive the trucks of aid onto LCUs and LSVs. In some cases, crane operators would move humanitarian aid off the

vessel and onto the JLOTS floating platform for later movement. Once the contractors drove onto the LSVs or LCUs, the LSVs or LCUs departed the JLOTS floating platform and sailed to the JLOTS trident pier.

A U.S. Army movement control team stationed on the JLOTS floating platform kept track of the number of pallets of humanitarian aid transferred from the JLOTS floating platform to the JLOTS trident pier. Figure 9 shows the transportation of aid from a roll on/roll off vessel to an LSV via the JLOTS floating platform off the coast of Gaza.




Figure 9. Humanitarian Aid Transported from a Roll On/Roll Off Vessel to the JLOTS Floating Platform
Source: USARCENT.

Transfer of Humanitarian Aid

Transfer of Humanitarian Aid on the Gaza Shore

Once docked at the JLOTS trident pier, DoD contractors driving trucks of humanitarian aid exited the LSVs or LCUs and drove across the JLOTS trident pier onto the beach in Gaza. Specifically, DoD contractors drove the trucks of aid onto the beach in Gaza and dropped off the aid into a marshaling area, referred to as Module C, which was configured into three sections to allow for the separation between the DoD contractors and humanitarian partners. Once the DoD contractors exited the marshaling area, humanitarian partners coordinated the pickup and distribution of humanitarian aid into Gaza.

DoD contractors were not responsible for signing documentation to confirm the transfer of humanitarian aid to humanitarian partners. A U.S. Army movement control team stationed on the JLOTS trident pier tracked the pallets of humanitarian aid as DoD contractors delivered the aid to the marshaling area on the Gaza shore. Because the U.S. military was not allowed to have personnel on the ground in Gaza, 1st TSC officials confirmed the transfer of aid from the marshaling area through communications with humanitarian partners or through aerial video footage. According to a USCENTCOM official, U.S. military personnel did not enter Gaza throughout the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza through the maritime corridor. Figures 10 and 11 show a DoD contractor driving a truck with humanitarian aid across the JLOTS trident pier and Module C on the Gaza shore, respectively.



Figure 10. Humanitarian Aid Delivered Across the JLOTS Trident Pier
Source: USCENTCOM.




Figure 11. Module C (Marshaling Area) on the Gaza Shore
Source: The DoD OIG.

Note: DoD contractors transported humanitarian aid from the JLOTS trident pier to C-1 for transfer to C-2. Specifically, the DoD contractors delivered the aid at C-2 for humanitarian partners to receive, transfer, or store the aid. Then, humanitarian partners transferred the aid from C-2 to C-3, where the humanitarian partners organized, stored, and prepared the aid for distribution into Gaza.

Transfer of Humanitarian Aid at the Port of Ashdod

After the humanitarian aid arrived at the Port of Ashdod, USARCENT and 1st TSC officials at the Port of Ashdod monitored Port of Ashdod stevedores loading the humanitarian aid onto the trucks of humanitarian partners. The USARCENT and 1st TSC officials counted the pallets of humanitarian aid by MITAM request number as the stevedores loaded the pallets onto the trucks. Humanitarian partners would then move the aid out of the Port of Ashdod either to a warehouse or into Gaza.

Once the USARCENT and 1st TSC officials confirmed that the humanitarian partners picked up the aid at the Port of Ashdod, a USARCENT official would email USAID officials to let them know the associated MITAM request was complete and could be closed. Figure 12 shows DoD contractors unloading humanitarian aid at the Port of Ashdod.



Figure 12. DoD Contractors Unloading Humanitarian Aid at the Port of Ashdod
Source: USARCENT.

Validation of Screening and Loading Procedures

In July and August 2024, we validated that 1st TSC officials effectively provided logistics support on two MITAM requests we reviewed, related to the screening and loading of humanitarian aid for delivery to Gaza through the Port of Ashdod.¹⁸ Specifically, on July 24, 2024, we conducted pallet count testing of screened aid in a warehouse at the Port of Larnaca for MITAM request number 133, which was for the delivery of 635 pallets of canned and dry food products. We manually counted 634 pallets of screened aid for MITAM request number 133 and verified 1st TSC officials counted and documented the same count in their daily SITREP for July 24, 2024. When we conducted pallet count testing on July 24, 2024, DoD personnel and Israeli and Cypriot customs officials had not scanned the remaining pallet for MITAM request number 133, which accounted for the difference between our count of the pallets that had been screened and the number of pallets on the MITAM request.

¹⁸ The last shipment of humanitarian aid to Gaza delivered through JLOTS occurred on June 27, 2024, two days after we announced our review. As a result, we were unable to fully observe the DoD's processes for facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid through JLOTS. We were able to validate the screening and loading procedures for the delivery of aid to Gaza through the Port of Ashdod, which according to DoD officials, were the same procedures for delivery through JLOTS. However, due to the timing of our review and the timing of deliveries, we did not observe DoD officials' procedures for the transfer of aid to humanitarian partners on the Gaza shore or at the Port of Ashdod.

In addition, on August 2, 2024, we observed 1st TSC officials at the Port of Larnaca effectively oversee the screening and loading of humanitarian aid from MITAM request number 147, which was for the delivery of 156 pallets of sugar and all-purpose flour. The screening and loading procedures we observed for MITAM request number 147 matched the screening and loading procedures mentioned earlier in the advisory. Specifically, we observed 1st TSC officials operate a T-25 scanner and spray paint the pallets of humanitarian aid with checkmarks to indicate Cypriot and Israeli customs officials approved the aid for delivery to Gaza. We also observed 1st TSC officials oversee and direct the stevedores loading the pallets of aid onto a DoD-contracted merchant vessel. We further observed the 1st TSC officials who were directing the scanning and loading processes counting the pallets of humanitarian aid during these processes.

We confirmed that the 156 pallets of humanitarian aid designated for MITAM request number 147 matched the number of pallets we observed being scanned and loaded onto the merchant vessel as well as 1st TSC personnel's counts of the humanitarian aid pallets at both the scanning and loading points. We obtained and reviewed daily SITREPs for MITAM request number 147 and validated that 1st TSC officials tracked the delivery of all 156 pallets of aid to humanitarian partners at the Port of Ashdod and the completion of MITAM request number 147.

Validation of Mission Tasking Matrix Tracking

Officials from the 1st TSC tracked the completion of MITAM requests daily, as requested by USAID. We reviewed the 1st TSC's internal humanitarian aid tracking spreadsheet and daily SITREPs to validate that 1st TSC officials tracked the completion of the 40 MITAM requests USAID issued to the 1st TSC for the delivery of 19,650 pallets of humanitarian aid to Gaza through the maritime corridor.


Officials from the 1st TSC maintained an internal humanitarian aid tracking spreadsheet, which they used to generate daily SITREPs, to track the completion of MITAM requests. Within the daily SITREPs and internal humanitarian aid tracking spreadsheet, 1st TSC officials tracked the status of the MITAM requests, from the movement of humanitarian aid from Cyprus, through JLOTS or the Port of Ashdod. For example, 1st TSC officials tracked the number of pallets of aid scanned and the number of pallets of aid ready to be loaded per MITAM request within their daily SITREPs. Because we did not travel to Gaza or the Port of Ashdod, we were unable to physically observe the movement of the pallets of aid either in Gaza or the Port of Ashdod. However, based on our review of the 1st TSC's internal humanitarian aid tracking spreadsheet and daily SITREPs, we did not identify indicators that 1st TSC officials inaccurately tracked MITAM requests. See Appendix E for an example of a SITREP attachment that includes the status of multiple MITAM requests.

Humanitarian Aid Delivered to Gaza Through the Maritime Corridor

The USAID initial goal for using JLOTS was to deliver supplies to support 500,000 individuals per month for 90 days. However, the DoD received 40 MITAM requests from USAID for transportation and logistics support for the delivery of 19,650 pallets of humanitarian aid to Gaza through the maritime corridor. Of this amount, the DoD facilitated the delivery of 10,777 pallets (55 percent) through JLOTS, which according to USAID officials, was sufficient to support 450,000 people for 30 days. The DoD also facilitated the delivery of 8,926 pallets (45 percent) through the Port of Ashdod. Using JLOTS and the Port of Ashdod, the DoD facilitated the delivery of 19,703 pallets of humanitarian aid.¹⁹ Figure 13 summarizes the USAID MITAM requests and the delivery of humanitarian aid through JLOTS and the Port of Ashdod.

¹⁹ The DoD delivered more pallets of humanitarian aid than USAID requested due to the repair and re-palletization of damaged pallets.

Figure 13. USAID MITAM Requests and the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid through JLOTS and the Port of Ashdod



Source: The DoD OIG.

According to the IPC, as of July 2024, 96 percent of Gaza's population was still facing acute food insecurity. However, the IPC also reported that the number of the Gaza population facing catastrophic levels of food insecurity decreased by 49 percent from March 15, 2024, to June 15, 2024. In addition, according to USCENTCOM, the DoD's JLOTS capability facilitated the delivery of the highest volume of aid that the U.S. military has ever delivered into the Middle East.

USCENTCOM officials identified external factors, such as weather conditions, the availability of humanitarian aid, and the availability of third parties to accept and deliver humanitarian aid, that directly affected the availability of JLOTS to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza. As a result, the DoD used JLOTS to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza for 20 days, or 32 percent, of the 63 days from May 17 when it first became operational through July 18 when the DoD concluded JLOTS operations. Despite JLOTS being available for only 20 days, the DoD facilitated delivery of all pallets of humanitarian aid that USAID requested be delivered.

Weather Conditions Affected the Availability of JLOTS

The DoD's use of JLOTS was dependent upon weather conditions for the safety of personnel and equipment. For example, DoD officials should not operate JLOTS in sea conditions where there is a moderate breeze and waves exceed three feet. According to a USCENTCOM official, historically, the time between May and August showed favorable sea conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. However, during the JLOTS mission from May 17, 2024, through July 18, 2024, the DoD removed the JLOTS trident pier from the Gaza shore multiple times because of rough seas.

For example, DoD officials stated that on May 25, 2024, a storm coming from North Africa and rough seas caused portions of the JLOTS trident pier to break free, resulting in damage to the pier. The DoD towed the JLOTS trident pier to the Port of Ashdod for repair and reattached the pier to the shore of Gaza on June 7, 2024. Additionally, DoD officials stated that because of rough seas, they removed the JLOTS trident pier two more times, suspended its use one time, and failed during the final attempt to attach the trident pier to the Gaza shore.

Lack of Humanitarian Aid Affected the Availability of JLOTS

USCENTCOM officials stated that the lack of available humanitarian aid limited both when JLOTS could be used and the number of days JLOTS was needed. For example, according to USCENTCOM officials, JLOTS could have been available for use as early as mid-April 2024, under the assumption that various conditions were met, such as the availability of humanitarian aid. However, USCENTCOM officials stated there was an insufficient amount of humanitarian aid available in Cyprus to deliver through JLOTS.

For example, USAID did not issue its first MITAM request to USARCENT to facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid through JLOTS until May 6, 2024. USCENTCOM officials stated that had more humanitarian aid been available for delivery than what USAID ultimately requested the DoD deliver during the JLOTS mission, that JLOTS potentially could have been used to facilitate the delivery of that aid to Gaza.

Lack of Third Parties to Accept and Deliver Humanitarian Aid Affected the Availability of JLOTS

In addition to weather conditions and a lack of available humanitarian aid, USCENTCOM officials stated that the availability of third parties to accept the humanitarian aid on the Gaza shore and deliver it to the Gaza population affected the availability of JLOTS. For example, during a March 15, 2024 meeting between DoD and USAID officials, they discussed that the delivery of humanitarian aid from the Gaza shore to the Gaza population required trucks, trailers, and drivers. To start the delivery of humanitarian aid from Cyprus to Gaza through JLOTS, this equipment was needed by April 15, 2024; however, according to an April 25, 2024 USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance briefing, as of April 25, 2024, the WFP had not yet secured the equipment (trucks and forklifts) needed to facilitate the onward distribution of humanitarian aid. Following a USAID request on April 28, 2024, the DoD agreed to provide the necessary equipment and vehicles for the onward distribution of humanitarian aid into Gaza.

Conclusion

USAID requested the DoD's support to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian supplies and logistics support from Cyprus to Gaza through the maritime corridor. According to USCENTCOM officials, the DoD used JLOTS for 20 days, or 32 percent of the 63-day period in which it was available, because of external factors, such as weather, the availability of humanitarian aid for delivery, and the availability of third parties to accept and deliver such aid. In June 2024, DoD officials started using the Port of Ashdod concurrently with JLOTS for delivering humanitarian aid. Following the conclusion of the JLOTS mission on July 18, 2024, DoD officials continued to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid through the Port of Ashdod.

The USAID initial goal was to use JLOTS to deliver humanitarian aid to feed or assist at least 500,000 people per month for 90 days. Ultimately, USAID requested the delivery of 19,650 pallets of humanitarian aid and the DoD delivered 19,703 pallets of aid through the maritime corridor.²⁰ Specifically, the DoD used the JLOTS capability to deliver 10,777 pallets (55 percent) of aid and the Port of Ashdod to deliver 8,926 pallets (45 percent) of aid. According to USAID officials, the humanitarian aid delivered through JLOTS was sufficient to feed 450,000 people for one month.

²⁰ The DoD delivered more pallets of humanitarian aid than USAID requested due to the repair and re-palletization of damaged pallets.

Because the DoD completed the JLOTS deliveries before our arrival in Cyprus and we did not travel to Gaza and Israel, our observations of delivery operations were limited, and we were unable to identify lessons learned related to the DoD's facilitation of humanitarian aid delivery. Therefore, the USCENTCOM Commander should conduct an after-action review of its effort to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza through the JLOTS capability and the Port of Ashdod, to identify lessons learned that could be applicable to future contingency planning and humanitarian aid efforts. The results of the DoD OIG's ongoing evaluation of the DoD's capabilities to effectively carry out JLOTS operations and exercises may also be an important tool for the DoD in considering the future use of JLOTS.

Management Comments on the Advisory and Our Response

U.S. Central Command Comments

The USCENTCOM Chief of Staff, responding for the USCENTCOM Commander, provided comments on the advisory. For a full text of the Chief of Staff's comments, see the Management Comments section of the advisory. The Chief of Staff partially agreed with the discussion draft management advisory, stating that there were a limited number of factual errors, errors of omission, and formatting requests that required changes to the final advisory. For example, the Chief of Staff disagreed with the number of pallets of humanitarian aid delivered through JLOTS and the Port of Ashdod. The Chief of Staff stated the number of humanitarian aid pallets delivered through JLOTS and the Port of Ashdod were 10,772 and 8,988, respectively, for a total of 19,760 pallets. The Chief of Staff's number of pallets varied from our number of pallets by 5 (less) for JLOTS and 62 (more) for the Port of Ashdod, for a net total difference of 57 pallets (more) of humanitarian aid.

The Chief of Staff also requested our advisory include the weight of the humanitarian aid pallets delivered through JLOTS and the Port of Ashdod. The Chief of Staff stated 1 pallet equals 0.82 metric tons. According to USCENTCOM, the DoD facilitated the delivery of 19,473,519.8 pounds through JLOTS and 16,248,421.46 pounds through the Port of Ashdod for a total of 35,721,941.26 pounds.

In addition, the Chief of Staff requested clarifying language for a couple sentences in the final advisory to provide context. The Chief of Staff also requested we include a statement from the IPC Famine Review Committee. Specifically, the Famine Review Committee's June 25, 2024 report stated that based upon available evidence, famine was not occurring in Gaza at the time of the committee's report.

Further, the Chief of Staff stated that the discussion draft management advisory did not mention the DoD's efforts to coordinate the delivery of humanitarian aid beyond Module C through the establishment of the Convoy Management Board (CMB) at the request of USAID. According to the Chief of Staff, the CMB, based in Israel, was a multi-organizational effort

composed of USAID, USARCENT, the Israeli Defense Forces, and United Nations personnel. The CMB conducted route planning for delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Gaza and tracked and coordinated convoy movements to ensure successful delivery to intended recipients. The Chief of Staff stated these efforts led to a looting rate of less than 5 percent for aid delivered through the maritime corridor; a reduction from looting rate of up to 30 percent in other entry points to Gaza at the time. The Chief of Staff further stated that the CMB enabled real-time deconfliction of military and humanitarian operations to enable humanitarian aid to safely transfer from JLOTS to United Nations' warehouses.

Our Response

We believe the number of humanitarian aid pallets delivered through JLOTS and the Port of Ashdod in the management advisory are accurate. We calculated the number of pallets delivered through JLOTS and the Port of Ashdod, which were based upon a review of 1st TSC and USARCENT daily SITREPs, by individual MITAM requests.

We worked closely with USARCENT and 1st TSC officials during the review and calculation of the MITAM requests. Officials from USARCENT and the 1st TSC reviewed the discussion draft management advisory and neither provided a response identifying a factual error with the number of pallets we presented. The net difference between our calculations as presented by USCENTCOM is 57 pallets. For the number of humanitarian aid pallets delivered through the Port of Ashdod, we excluded two MITAM requests consisting of 82 pallets of items used to process the humanitarian aid, but not actual humanitarian aid intended to be delivered to the people of Gaza (such as forklifts). Reducing the USCENTCOM stated total of 8,988 pallets by the 82 pallets results in a total of 8,906 pallets, which is 20 pallets less than we reported as delivered. Combined with the 5-pallet difference delivered through the use of JLOTS, results in a total variance of 25 pallets, which is far less than 1 percent difference. Accordingly, a change to our reported numbers is not needed and would not impact our findings in any event. We noted earlier in the advisory a discrepancy in the number of pallets delivered due to the repair and re-palletization of damaged pallets, which could explain the 25-pallet difference.

As for the weight associated with the number of humanitarian aid pallets delivered, USCENTCOM did not provide the assumptions behind its conversion rate of 1 pallet is equal to 0.82 metric tons. We could not verify the accuracy of the conversion rate. Therefore, we are not reporting the total weight of humanitarian aid delivered.

We did not include the June 2024 IPC report statement the USCENTCOM Chief of Staff requested regarding whether there was evidence of famine in Gaza because the advisory includes a July 2024 IPC report statement that documented that the number of the Gaza population facing catastrophic levels of food insecurity decreased by 49 percent from March 15, 2024, to June 15, 2024. We also noted that, according to the IPC, as of July 2024, 96 percent of Gaza's population was still facing acute food insecurity.

The USCENTCOM Chief of Staff stated that the CMB helped the DoD execute its efforts on behalf of USAID to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. Since this effort used DoD resources and personnel, the Chief of Staff stated that we should consider it within the scope of our review. While we acknowledge the value of the CMB, our review focused on DoD's roles and responsibilities and the effectiveness of the DoD's execution of those roles and responsibilities in facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid. Our review of DoD's execution of the delivery of humanitarian aid stopped at Module C on the Gaza coast. Further, we note that the USAID OIG reported that the CMB was able to deconflict military and humanitarian operations and redirect trucks leaving JLOTS to avoid looting, which increased the efficiency of the distribution of humanitarian aid.

Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response

Recommendation 1

We recommend that the Commander of the U.S. Central Command conduct an after-action review of its effort to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza through the maritime corridor, including the Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore capability and the Port of Ashdod, to identify lessons learned that could be applicable to future contingency planning and humanitarian aid efforts.

U.S. Central Command Comments

The USCENTCOM Chief of Staff, responding for the USCENTCOM Commander, partially agreed with the recommendation but did not provide additional details.

Our Response

The comments from the USCENTCOM Chief of Staff did not provide details on actions to address the intent of the recommendation. However, during subsequent communications with USCENTCOM officials, they provided two after-action reviews prepared by the 1st TSC. The 1st TSC after-action reviews fully addressed the intent of the recommendation; specifically, the after-action reviews identified lessons learned applicable to future contingency operations. Therefore, the recommendation is closed on issuance of this management advisory.

Appendix A

U.S. Agency for International Development Request for DoD Maritime-Related Transportation and Logistics Support



UNCLASSIFIED

March 27, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR KELLY BULLINER HOLLY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Request from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to provide maritime-related transportation and logistics support in support of the international humanitarian response to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

USAID requests DoD facilitate maritime delivery of humanitarian supplies and associated logistics support from the port of Larnaca in Cyprus to Gaza for USAID-validated requirements to support the BHA-led humanitarian response operations.

On October 8, 2023, the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires ad interim Stephanie L. Hallett, with the concurrence of Office of Palestinian Affairs Chief George Noll, issued a redeclaration of humanitarian need in the West Bank and Gaza. An October 7, 2023 escalation in hostilities is resulting in acute humanitarian needs in Gaza, against the backdrop of already rising humanitarian needs. Humanitarian needs across Gaza are currently characterized by food insecurity, inter-communal tensions and violence, lack of livelihood opportunities, and restrictions on access to basic services. As of March 23, 2024, an estimated 1.7 million people are internally displaced in Gaza, approximately 75 percent of the population in Gaza. An estimated 50 percent of Gaza’s population is experiencing catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity and the entire population is in need of humanitarian assistance, according to the United Nations.

On March 7, 2024, the President announced that the U.S. military was to establish a temporary pier to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Gaza as part of a sustained U.S. Government effort to increase the flow of aid and commercial commodities into Gaza through all possible routes. Due to the lack of humanitarian access to communities in need, DoD is uniquely capable of providing this maritime delivery support, enabling the rapid delivery of immediate assistance to organizations that can deliver such assistance to the civilians in Gaza and are providing ongoing assistance efforts.

Assessments of humanitarian requirements performed by USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/BHA) will validate the specific requests to DOD, which USAID will transmit via the Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) process. Support to USAID shall be for no more than 90 days, with the possibility of extension, as determined by USAID/BHA based on assessments of the humanitarian situation. USAID will help facilitate the development of a

Source: USAID OIG.

U.S. Agency for International Development Request for DoD Maritime-Related Transportation and Logistics Support (cont'd)

transition from U.S. military support for the delivery of humanitarian aid into Gaza.

USAID requests that this humanitarian assistance and associated costs be provided on a non-reimbursable basis, pursuant to authorities and funding available to DoD for such action. USAID will modify this request should donor or other funding become available for reimbursing DoD for its activities under this request.

The DoD point of contact for this request is [REDACTED]

and [REDACTED]

The USAID/BHA points of contact for this request are [REDACTED]

and [REDACTED]



Laila ElGohary
Executive Secretary

Source: USAID OIG.

Appendix B

DoD Response to U.S. Agency for International Development Request for DoD Maritime-Related Transportation and Logistics Support



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000

APR 10 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: Response to United States Agency for International Development request for Department of Defense to provide Maritime-Related Transportation and Logistics Support in Support of the International Humanitarian Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Gaza

Thank you for your memorandum dated March 27, 2024 requesting the Department of Defense (DoD) provide non-reimbursable transportation of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in support of the United States Government response to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

U.S. Central Command will provide the requested assistance to facilitate maritime delivery of non-DoD humanitarian supplies from the port of Larnaca in Cyprus to Gaza, including the provision of related logistics support, for United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-validated requirements to support the response of the U.S. Government and its international partners to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

DoD will provide this support until June 4, 2024 or until USAID no longer has need for that support, whichever is earlier. DoD will provide support under title 10, U.S. Code, section 2561, on a non-reimbursable basis, subject to changes in funding available to USAID. Consistent with USAID's request, should donor funding for this humanitarian assistance mission becomes available, DoD expects that USAID and DoD will modify the current support arrangement to include reimbursement to DoD. DoD acknowledges that USAID will communicate all specific requirements for DoD transportation and logistics support of humanitarian commodities via the Mission Tasking Matrix process. DoD understands that these efforts will be conducted in coordination with U.S. Embassy Jerusalem.

DoD understands that USAID, along with the Department of State, will lead the transition from U.S. military support to civilian and contractor-led support before June 4, 2024 for all available routes for humanitarian aid into Gaza, and DoD requests a written update on this transition plan within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Kelly Bulliner Ross
Executive Secretary

cc:
CJCS
USD(P)
USCENTCOM

Source: USAID OIG.

Appendix C

Example of a Mission Tasking Matrix Request

USAID/BHA DoD Mission Tasking Matrix (MiTaM)		RESPONSE:	
MITAM #	4	LEVANT CE 2024	
Priority	high	6-May-24	
WHO			
WHO is Requesting US Military Assistance?			
Name, Pos	[REDACTED] Logistics Officer		
Org/Office	USAID Logs		
email	[REDACTED]		
phone	[REDACTED]		
WHAT			
Describe as clearly as possible what you want the military to do		USAID requests movement of 237 pallets of High Energy Biscuits from the Port in Larnaca to designated partner in Gaza.	
WHEN			
Date(s) & Time(s)		Flight arrived LCA 5/3/24@1105L	
WHERE			
Start Point:			
Location		Larnaca Port, Cyprus	
Date & Time for start		5/4/24@0730	
POC on-site & contact info		[REDACTED]	
US Military will load material at the start of Mod B and unload material in Mod C			
Security provided in Mod B			
Describe		Load 237 pallets on vessel in port of Larnaca	
If there is Movement involved, info on the END Point:			
Location Name		MOD C.2	
Date & Time for start		5/9/24@0800	
Consignee POC & contact info		WFP	
US Military will load material at the start of Mod B and unload material in Mod C			
Security provided in Mod B			
Describe		Deliver to receiving/distribution partner in Gaza (C3)	

Source: 1st TSC.

Example of a Mission Tasking Matrix Request (cont'd)

what CARGO needs to be moved?		Total Weight (____) units	Total Volume (____) units
Total #/ pieces	What		
237	High Energy Biscuits (HEBs)	99.45	298.62
	total	99.45	298.62
Hazmat?	No		
Special instructions	All material will be packaged in accordance with the packing instructions located within the UNOPS Database		
WHY	WHY is this requested of the military?		
Why is this being requested?	Military is providing a unique cabapility to facilitate transportation of humanitarian commodities via a maratime route.		

Source: 1st TSC.

Appendix D

Example of a Shipping Manifest

MITAM 4 - LARNACA PORT - CYPRUS - FHA MANIFEST - 08 MAY 2024

Page 1

FHA CARGO MANIFEST - LARNACA PORT CYPRUS				
Wednesday, May 8, 2024			TOTAL:	237 PALLETS
REVIEWED BY:				
MITAM	SEQ	VOYAGE NUMBER	QTY	DESCRIPTION
4	4-01	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-02	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-03	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-04	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-05	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-06	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-07	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-08	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-09	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-10	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-11	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-12	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-13	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-14	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-15	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-16	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-17	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-18	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-19	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-20	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-21	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-22	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-23	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-24	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-25	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-26	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-27	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-28	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-29	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-30	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-31	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-32	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-33	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits
4	4-34	CG-001	1	High Energy Biscuits


Page 1 of 6

Note: This example is one page of a six-page shipping manifest for the transport of 237 pallets of high energy biscuits.

Source: 1st TSC.

Appendix E

Example of a Situation Report Attachment



Note: This example is a humanitarian aid tracker that is attached to daily SITREPs prepared by the 1st TSC.
Source: 1st TSC.

Management Comments

U.S. Central Command



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

07 November 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: USCENTCOM Partial Concurrence to DODIG Report "Management Advisory: Review of the DoD's Roles and Responsibilities for Facilitating the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid to Gaza Through the Maritime Corridor".

1. USCENTCOM partially concurs with the DODIG report. The DODIG conducted multiple interviews as part of their site visit to assess the DoD's capability to utilize Joint-Logistics-Over-The-Shore (JLOTS) for operations and exercises. The subsequent discussion draft originating from the DODIG's office titled, "Management Advisory: Review of the DoD's Roles and Responsibilities for Facilitating the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid to Gaza Through the Maritime Corridor," had a limited number of factual errors, errors of omission and formatting requests that require re-engagement to correct. We strongly request that the issues below are incorporated into the DODIG report in addition to including this memorandum as an appendix.

2. Omission of Major Component of DoD's Roles and Responsibilities. Missing from the DODIG's report is the DoD's effort to coordinate the delivery of humanitarian aid beyond Module C through establishment of a Convoy Management Board (CMB) at the request of USAID. DoD executed this effort on behalf of USAID as part of the role to facilitate delivery of Humanitarian Aid to Gaza through the maritime corridor. This effort utilized DoD resources and personnel and therefore should be considered within the scope of this report and addressed in the review.

The Convoy Management Board (CMB), based in Israel and led by the three-star Army General commanding USARCENT, was a multi-organizational effort comprised of USAID, USARCENT, IDF, and UN personnel. The CMB conducted route planning for delivery of HA throughout Gaza and tracked and coordinated convoy movements to ensure successful delivery to intended recipients. These efforts led to a looting rate of less than 5% for aid delivered through the maritime corridor; a reduction from looting rate of up to 30% in other entry points to Gaza at the time. The CMB enabled real-time deconfliction of military and humanitarian operations to enable HA to safely transfer from JLOTS to UN warehouses. This coordination effort was singled out by USAID as a best practice and requested continuation.

3. Factual Accuracy and Consistency in Reporting. On pages 6, 26, and 29 the number 19,703 is used erroneously to establish the total number of humanitarian assistance (HA) pallets delivered through the maritime corridor. USCENTCOM requests the referenced number change to 19,760 pallets. It is erroneously reported that 10,777 pallets of HA were delivered through JLOTS, and 8,926 pallets were delivered through

U.S. Central Command (cont'd)

SUBJECT: USCENTCOM partial concurrence to DODIG Report "Management Advisory: Review of the DoD's Roles and Responsibilities for Facilitating the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid to Gaza Through the Maritime Corridor".

the Port of Ashdod. The correct calculations are as follows: 10,772 pallets were delivered through JLOTS, and 8,988 pallets were delivered through the Port of Ashdod. Additionally, USCENTCOM requests that the report mentions pallet weights in pounds in tandem with any annotation of pallet figures (.82 MT per pallet). This is in line with all previous messaging to the American public and U.S. government agencies throughout the course of this endeavor.


4. Formatting Request. In the first paragraph of page 28, USCENTCOM requests the following sentence moved to the executive summary on pages 5-6, "... the DoD's JLOTS capability facilitated the delivery of the highest volume of aid that the U.S. military has delivered into the Middle East."

5. Requested Addition. Within the executive summary on page 6, please include the following at the end of the executive summary, "Additionally, by June 25th, 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (FRC) Famine Review Committee (FRC) reported that, "Following the publication of the second FRC report on 18 March, which projected a Famine to occur in the most likely scenario... the response in the nutrition and other sectors was scaled up. In this context, at the moment, the available evidence does not indicate that Famine is occurring."

7. Requested Addition. When addressing weather conditions in the fourth paragraph, USCENTCOM requests the inclusion of the following fact, "...this was a highly rare and unpredictable weather event."

8. Recommendation: Partially concur with comment, include recommended changes and this memorandum as an appendix in the DODIG report.

9. The point of contact for this memorandum is LTC [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]


BRANDON R. TEGTMEIER
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff, USCENTCOM

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CMB	Convoy Management Board
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
JLOTS	Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LSV	Logistics Support Vessel
MITAM	Mission Tasking Matrix
SITREP	Situation Report
TSC	Theater Sustainment Command
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USARCENT	U.S. Army Central
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
WFP	World Food Programme



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