


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Report No. DODIG-2019-111



INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

AUGUST 13, 2019



(U) Evaluation of USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA's Processes for Determining and Fulfilling Intelligence Requirements for Counterterrorism


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(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of USAFRICOM's and SOCAFRICA's Processes for Determining and Fulfilling Intelligence Requirements for Counterterrorism

August 13, 2019

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) followed established DoD guidance for identifying and prioritizing intelligence requirements and whether SOCAFRICA was capable of satisfying USAFRICOM's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) for counterterrorism.¹

(U) Background

(S//NF) USAFRICOM performs various counterterrorism tasks authorized through execute orders, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. These orders authorize USAFRICOM to conduct operations against terrorist groups and list counterterrorism tasks directed to subordinate units such as SOCAFRICA and U.S. Army Africa (USARAF).

(S) To conduct counterterrorism operations, the USAFRICOM Commander requires intelligence to gain an understanding of the operational environment and take appropriate action. The USAFRICOM intelligence director recommends PIRs for the commander to issue.

(S) USAFRICOM has four counterterrorism-related PIRs, all of which focus on the capability and intent of terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab; Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-Somalia, ISIS-Libya, ISIS-West Africa, and ISIS-Greater Sahara; al-Qaida and its affiliates in the Maghreb; Boko Haram; and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin to conduct operations.

(U) Background (cont'd)

(S) As a subordinate command, SOCAFRICA supports USAFRICOM's PIRs through its own tailored intelligence requirements that support the USAFRICOM counterterrorism mission. In addition, SOCAFRICA

USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4c; USAFRICOM (b)(1)1.4d; DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[Redacted]

(U) Findings

(S) We determined that USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA followed established DoD guidance when identifying and prioritizing its intelligence requirements. Specifically, USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA participated in the joint planning process, and conducted operational planning teams and action officer working groups to determine their intelligence requirements.


(S//NF) However, we also determined that

USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4d; DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[Redacted]

¹ (U) PIRs are defined as intelligence requirements stated as priorities for intelligence support that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or operational environment.

² (U) DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3)



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of USAFRICOM's and SOCAFRICA's Processes for Determining and Fulfilling Intelligence Requirements for Counterterrorism

(U) Findings (cont'd)

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g, DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. The reason for the Army's delay and the accompanying operational impacts were outside the scope of this evaluation. As a result, the DoD OIG recently announced a separate evaluation to examine the Army's delays [REDACTED].

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g, DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

We verified, through review of USAFRICOM's requests for forces and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance execute orders, that the USAFRICOM Commander made repeated requests and identified [REDACTED] an enduring requirement and the top intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance priority of FY19, but that requirement was not satisfied. USARAF supplied less than half of the USAFRICOM Commander's requirement for [REDACTED].

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g, DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4g, DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendations

(S//NF) We recommend that the USSOCOM Commander [REDACTED].


(S//NF) We recommend that the USAFRICOM Commander:

- (S//NF) In conjunction with the USARAF Commander, develop a plan to fill the requirement for [REDACTED].
- (S//NF) Send a formal memorandum [REDACTED] requesting a review of activities performed [REDACTED].

(U) Management Comments

(S//NF) The USSOCOM Director of Intelligence, responding on behalf of the USSOCOM Commander, disagreed with our recommendation. The Director stated that the recommendation did not correctly describe USSOCOM's role and responsibilities [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of USAFRICOM's and SOCAFRICA's Processes for Determining and Fulfilling Intelligence Requirements for Counterterrorism

(U) Management Comments (cont'd)

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g, DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [redacted]

(S//NF) The comments from USSOCOM meet the intent of the revised recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once we verify that the USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4g, DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [redacted]

(S//NF) The USAFRICOM ACJ2 Division Chief, responding on behalf of the USAFRICOM Commander, agreed with the recommendation to develop a plan to fill the requirement for DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [redacted]. However, the Division Chief did not indicate what actions USAFRICOM would take to satisfy this recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but remains open. We request that the Division Chief respond to the final report, specifying actions USAFRICOM will take to work with USARAF to develop a plan to fill the requirement for DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [redacted].

(S//NF) The Division Chief, responding on behalf of the USAFRICOM Commander, also agreed with the recommendation to submit a formal memorandum to the DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [redacted]. However, the Division Chief did not indicate what actions USAFRICOM would take to satisfy the recommendation. Therefore, the

(S//NF) recommendation is resolved, but remains open. We request the Division Chief describe specific actions it will take to formally request DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [redacted]

(S//NF) The Acting Chief of the Intelligence Operations Directorate for the USARAF G2, responding on behalf of the USARAF Commander, disagreed with the recommendation to develop a plan to fill the requirement for DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [redacted]. The Acting Chief stated that the USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4c [redacted]

(S//NF) We acknowledge the Acting Chief's comments on incorporating the SOCAFRICA Commander into the recommendation. However, we did not modify the recommendation because SOCAFRICA is operationally controlled by USAFRICOM and therefore, USAFRICOM has the ability to require SOCAFRICA to be a part of the planning process because as it is a subordinate component command. Additionally, we acknowledge the Acting Chief's comment that development of the plan should include either resubmitting the request for forces DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [redacted]. Although the Acting Chief disagreed with our recommendation, his comment to work with USAFRICOM to resubmit the request for forces DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [redacted] is a potential course of action that addresses the intent of the recommendation. Resubmission of a request for forces may provide USAFRICOM DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [redacted]. We therefore consider this recommendation resolved, but open. We request that the



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of USAFRICOM's and SOCAFRICA's Processes for Determining and Fulfilling Intelligence Requirements for Counterterrorism

(U) Management Comments (cont'd)

(S//NF) Acting Chief provide additional comments detailing how USARAF will work with USAFRICOM to resubmit the request ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) The Chief also stated that upon receipt of the memorandum, ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) In response to management comments, we revised the recommendation to clarify the appropriate action required for the recommendation—that USAFRICOM should formally request ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} [REDACTED] should provide a formal response to USAFRICOM.

(S//NF) The comments from the Chief meet the intent of the revised recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once we verify that USAFRICOM has submitted a formal request ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.

(U) Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
USSOCOM Commander		1	
USAFRICOM Commander		2.a, 2.b	
USARAF Commander		2.a	
DODIG (b)(1), 7e and (b)(3)		2.b	

(U) Please provide Management Comments by September 12, 2019.

(U) Note: The following are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management has agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

August 13, 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3)
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES ARMY AFRICA

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA's Processes for Determining and Fulfilling Intelligence Requirements for Counterterrorism (Report No. DODIG-2019-111)

(U) We are providing this classified final report for your information and use. We conducted this evaluation in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations," published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

(U) We considered management comments from U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), and DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3), to the draft of this report when preparing the final report.

(U) DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly.

- (U) Comments from the USSOCOM Director of Intelligence addressed all specifics of Recommendation 1.
- (U) Comments from the USAFRICOM ACJ2 Division Chief did not address the specifics of Recommendations 2.a and 2.b. We request USAFRICOM provide additional comments to the final report. Comments provided to the final report must be portion-marked, as appropriate, per the security classification guide.
- (U) Comments from the Acting Chief of the Intelligence Operations Directorate for the USARAF G2 did not address the specifics of Recommendation 2.a. We request USARAF provide additional comments to the final report. Comments provided to the final report must be portion-marked, as appropriate, per the security classification guide.
- (U) Comments from the DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3) addressed all specifics of Recommendation 2.b.

(U) Please send a PDF file containing your comments no later than September 12, 2019, to the point of contact in the DoD OIG over the SECRET Protocol Network (SIPRNET). Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the /SIGNED/ symbol in place of the actual signature.

(U) Please provide comments that conform to the requirements of DoD Instruction 7650.03. Send your comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to DODIG (b)(6)@dodig.mil. Copies of your comments must have the actual signature. Classified electronic format comments must be sent via the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) to DODIG (b)(6)@dodig.smil.mil.



Michael J. Roark
Deputy Inspector General for
Evaluations

cc:

Inspector General, U.S. Special Operations Command

Inspector General, U.S. Africa Command

Inspector General, DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3)

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) followed established DoD guidance for identifying and prioritizing intelligence requirements and whether SOCAFRICA was capable of satisfying USAFRICOM's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) for counterterrorism.¹ See Appendix A for a discussion of the scope and methodology of this project.

(U) Background

(U) USAFRICOM Mission, Roles, and Responsibilities

~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ USAFRICOM is the geographic combatant command responsible for all DoD operations, exercises, and security cooperation on the African continent, with the exception of Egypt.² It operates as an economy of force command with limited resources, and to augment its resources, USAFRICOM relies on agreements to share resources with other combatant commands to execute its mission.³

~~(S//NF)~~ USAFRICOM's mission is to disrupt and neutralize transnational threats, protect U.S. personnel and facilities, prevent and mitigate conflict, and build African partner defense capability and capacity to promote regional security, stability, and prosperity. USAFRICOM counterterrorism objectives emphasize providing support to partner nations to contain and degrade violent extremist organizations (VEOs) (see Appendix B).

~~(S//NF)~~ USAFRICOM is tasked with various counterterrorism objectives authorized through execute orders (EXORDs), including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) EXORDs and area-specific EXORDs. These orders authorize USAFRICOM to conduct operations against terrorist groups including:

- ~~(S//NF)~~ counterterrorism activities,
- ~~(S//NF)~~ development of location of targets and the operational environment, and

¹ (U) PIRs are defined as intelligence requirements stated as priorities for intelligence support that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or operational environment.

² (U) Egypt falls in U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility.

³ (U) Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces—it allocates minimum essential resources to secondary efforts.

- (~~S//NF~~) lethal action.⁴

(~~S//NF~~) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4g
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted]

(U) SOCAFRICA Mission, Roles, and Responsibilities

(U) SOCAFRICA, one of USAFRICOM's six subordinate component commands, is a Theater Special Operations Command. While U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has combatant command authority, SOCAFRICA is operationally controlled by USAFRICOM.⁶

(U) SOCAFRICA's mission is to conduct counter-VEO operations working by, with, and through African partners and Western allies to identify, target, disrupt, and degrade elements of VEO regional networks. SOCAFRICA works with partner nations through SOF engagement, builds partner nation and regional capacity to promote stability, and mitigates violent extremism.⁷

(~~S//NF~~) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted]:

- (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted];
- (~~S//NF~~) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g, DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)
 [Redacted];
- (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g, USAFRICOM (b)(1)1.4d
 [Redacted];
- (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g
 [Redacted]; and

⁴ (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff EXORD, "Counterterrorism EXORD," September 2012; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff EXORD, Al-Qaida in East Africa Execute Order (EXORD), May 2011; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff EXORD, East Africa Counterterrorism EXORD, November 2016.

⁵ (~~S//NF~~) DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [Redacted]. The Joint Staff assigned USARAF as the designated force provider for USAFRICOM, and the 207th Military Intelligence Brigade is the assigned force.

⁶ (U) Combatant command authority is nontransferable command authority, which cannot be delegated, of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.

⁷ (~~S//NF~~) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g
 [Redacted]
 [Redacted]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g

(U) USARAF Mission, Roles, and Responsibilities

~~(S//NF)~~ The Joint Staff designated USARAF as the force provider to USAFRICOM, with the 207th Military Intelligence Brigade located in Vicenza, Italy, USAFRICOM (b)(1)1.4d, DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

(U) Priority Intelligence Requirements

(U) To execute their missions, commanders require intelligence. This intelligence enables them to understand the operational environment so that they may make decisions on appropriate action. The staff can nominate intelligence requirements for priority designation. However, the intelligence director is responsible for consolidating those nominations and recommending the relative order of priority to the commander. PIR nominations consider the mission, commander's intent, operational objectives, and timeframe of expected operations.

(U) Overall, PIRs assist the intelligence director in determining and prioritizing the type and level of intelligence resources required to support the command. However, to adequately support the command, the staff must continuously review the objectives and requirements to reflect shifts in the operational environment and mission priorities. In turn, the commanders' PIRs are updated to address new requirements and priorities, and provide the appropriate intelligence resources required to support the command's mission needs.

(U) USAFRICOM FY19 Priority Intelligence Requirements

~~(S//NF)~~ The USAFRICOM Commander's PIRs are reflected in the USAFRICOM Campaign Plan 2000-19, which include five objectives:

- **(U) U.S. influence is increased.** The United States and its allies are established as preferred regional security partners, and U.S. interests in Africa are protected against destabilizing competitor state influence, activities, and aggression.

⁸ (U) The 207th is the military intelligence brigade that conducts full-spectrum intelligence in support of USARAF and USAFRICOM in order to set the intelligence architecture for the theater, disrupt transnational and trans-regional threats, and promote regional stability in Africa while building and maintaining intelligence readiness.

- (U) **African partners contribute to regional security.** African partners, consistent with the rule of law and respect for human rights, secure their sovereign interests, export security, promote economic prosperity, and provide legitimate, accountable, and effective governance.
- (U) **VEO threats are reduced.** VEOs that threaten U.S. interests are degraded and contained for defeat by African partners in accordance with the rule of law and respect for human rights.
- (U) **The USAFRICOM theater is set.** USAFRICOM forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints, agreements, and understanding are aligned in order to conduct day-to-day activities, crisis response, and contingency operations.
- (U) **U.S. Government personnel and property are protected.** USAFRICOM maintains the ability to protect U.S. Government personnel and property.

(S) Four out of 10 USAFRICOM PIRs are counterterrorism-related and include the following:

- (S) **PIR 4:** What is the capability and intent of al-Shabaab, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)–Somalia, or their affiliates to conduct operations both within and external to their current areas of operation? ⁹
- (S) **PIR 5:** What is the capability and intent of ISIS and al-Qaida affiliates in Libya and the Maghreb to conduct operations both within and external to their current areas of operation? ¹⁰
- (S) **PIR 6:** What is the capability and intent of Boko Haram, ISIS–West Africa, or their affiliates in the Lake Chad Region to conduct operations both within and external to their current areas of operation? ¹¹

⁹ (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) Al-Shabaab is a terrorist group engaged in hostilities against the United States. It is also an associated force of al-Qaida that plans and conducts attacks against targets in Somalia, including the African Union Mission in Somalia bases, the Somali government, and civilian targets in urban centers. As for ISIS–Somalia, it is the Islamic State’s branch in Somalia, a terrorist group that is engaged in hostilities against the United States. It aspires to attack U.S. and other Western interests in East Africa.

¹⁰ (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) ISIS, with affiliates in Libya, is the terrorist group engaged in hostilities against the United States. ISIS-Libya operates in remote camps in central and southwestern Libya, has controlled the city of Surt, is focused on rebuilding efforts, and has recently resumed attacks in central Libya. Al-Qaida, with affiliates in the Maghreb, is the terrorist group active in northern Algeria, southern Libya, and western Tunisia. The group’s goal is to unite all Muslims from the Nile to the Atlantic in jihad against Westerners and to curb Western influence in the regions.

¹¹ (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) Boko Haram splintered from ISIS–West Africa in July 2016 and is active in northern Nigeria and Cameroon. The terrorist group primarily attacks civilian targets in northeast Nigeria and northern Cameroon. As for ISIS-West Africa, it is the ISIS node in the Nigeria–Niger–Chad border region. The terrorist group routinely conducts operations (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) in northeast Nigeria and cross-border attacks in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger targeting regional security (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) forces. MOD 1 to the East Africa Counterterrorism EXORD, February 2018, and MOD 3 to the Northwest Africa Counterterrorism EXORD, February 2018.

- ~~(S)~~ **PIR 7:** What is the capability and intent of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, ISIS–Greater Sahara, or their affiliates in the Sahel region to conduct operations both within and external to their current areas of operation?¹²

~~(S)~~ The USAFRICOM Campaign Plan lists three counterterrorism lines of effort (LOEs) that USAFRICOM uses to accomplish its counterterrorism PIRs.

- ~~(S)~~ **LOE 3:** Develop security in Somalia.
- (U) **LOE 4:** Contain instability in Libya.
- (U) **LOE 5:** Support partners in the Sahel and Lake Chad Region.

~~(S)~~ Each USAFRICOM LOE sets the conditions to achieve the theater strategy, which

USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4c

~~(S)~~ Also, the USAFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan and accompanying LOEs support African-led operations that are internationally assisted and USAFRICOM-supported. USAFRICOM provides support through ISR, which is integrated with operations through the intelligence staff officer in collaboration with the operations staff officer for coordinating platforms and sensors against collection targets.¹³ The intelligence staff officer is responsible for identifying targets for collection and prioritizing intelligence requirements to drive ISR. Intelligence requirements designated as PIRs receive increased levels of intelligence support and priority in the allocation of intelligence resources.

¹² ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin is al-Qaida's ally in Mali, formed in early 2017 with the unification of the Mali-based elements of Al-Qaida and its affiliate in the Islamic Maghreb. Jama'at At Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Muslimin is the most active terrorist group in the Sahel, having conducted more than 100 attacks targeting Mali's regional security and peacekeeping forces and Westerners in the region. As for ISIS-Greater Sahara, it is a splinter terrorist group from al-Murabitun that recruits fighters based on pre-existing regional ties and operates along the Mali–Niger–Burkina Faso border. MOD 3 to the Northwest Africa Counterterrorism EXORD, February 2018.

¹³ (U) "Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance" is defined as an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of intelligence operations.

(U) SOCAFRICA Priority Intelligence Requirements

(S) As a subordinate command, SOCAFRICA supports USAFRICOM's PIRs through its
USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4c

[REDACTED]

SOCAFRICA counterterrorism PIRs include:

- (U) **PIR 1:** What are the indications that VEOs or terrorists are targeting U.S. or allied/partner nation interests in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility?
- (U) **PIR 2:** How are terrorist groups exploiting relationships with Africa-based threat networks to expand their operations and influence?
- (U) **PIR 6:** What partner forces' capabilities are limiting SOCAFRICA's ability to impact VEOs through partner operations?

(S//NF) SOCAFRICA has different LOEs assigned for operations in the
USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g
[REDACTED]. Additional information is provided on regional LOEs in Appendix B.

(S) SOCAFRICA supports USAFRICOM PIRs and LOEs by building partner capacity

USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g, USAFRICOM (b)(1)1.4d, DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)
[REDACTED]

(U) Current Policy and Authorities for USAFRICOM Counterterrorism Planning

(U//FOUO) USAFRICOM intelligence priorities are developed in accordance with the National Defense Strategy and DoD guidance, including Joint Publication 2-0 and Joint Publication 5-0.¹⁴ Joint Publication 2-0 provides direction for intelligence support to joint operations, including joint and multinational intelligence activities across the full range of military operations, and lays the foundation to integrate operations, plans, and intelligence into a cohesive team. Joint Publication 5-0 provides guidance for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational planning activities across the full range of military operations.

¹⁴ (U) Joint Publication 2-0, "Joint Intelligence," October 22, 2013; Joint Publication 5-0, "Joint Planning," June 16, 2017.

~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ USAFRICOM executes various tasks through EXORDs and fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) to support the counterterrorism mission. USAFRICOM operates under EXORDs and FRAGORDs including:

- (U) USAFRICOM FY19 ISR FRAGORD—this FRAGORD directs USAFRICOM to manage, coordinate, deploy, employ, and redeploy DoD military and contracted ISR assets in accordance with its campaign plan.¹⁵
- (U) USAFRICOM FY18 ISR EXORD—this EXORD directs FY18 ISR allocation; USAFRICOM components, joint task forces, and subordinate commands are to coordinate operations of airborne ISR assets and prepare for employment of new and additional ISR assets.¹⁶
- ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Modification 1 to the East Africa Counterterrorism EXORD—this EXORD provides the authorization for USAFRICOM to conduct counterterrorism campaign in Somalia.¹⁷
- ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Modification 3 to the Northwest Africa Counterterrorism EXORD—this EXORD provides the authorization for USAFRICOM to conduct counterterrorism campaign in North and West Africa.¹⁸
- ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Modification 4 to the Northwest Africa Counterterrorism EXORD—this EXORD provides the USAFRICOM authorization for direct action in Libya.¹⁹
- (U) Counterterrorism EXORD—this EXORD provides operational guidance necessary to execute the DoD's contribution to the President's National Strategy for counterterrorism.²⁰

¹⁵ (U) The Commander, USAFRICOM, "FY19 ISR FRAGORD 005 to USAFRICOM Campaign Order, ISR Employment," December 28, 2018.

¹⁶ (U) The Commander, USAFRICOM, "FY18 ISR EXORD," August 22, 2017.

¹⁷ (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "MOD 1 to the East Africa Counterterrorism EXORD," October 16, 2017.

¹⁸ (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "MOD 3 to the Northwest Africa Counterterrorism EXORD," February 18, 2018.

¹⁹ (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "MOD 4 to the Northwest Africa Counterterrorism EXORD," February 2, 2018.

²⁰ (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Counterterrorism EXORD," September 2012.

(U) Finding

(U) USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA Followed DoD Doctrine for Establishing PIRs, but Faced Challenges Satisfying Those PIRs

(S) We determined that USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA followed established DoD guidance when identifying and prioritizing their intelligence requirements. Specifically, USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA participated in the joint planning process, and conducted operational planning teams and action officer working groups to determine their intelligence requirements.

(S//NF) However, we also determined that USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g; DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g; DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)
[REDACTED]

June 2014, the Army volunteered to fill the requirement. In September 2016, a request for additional manning by USAFRICOM was directed to USARAF, as the designated force provider, for action. USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g; DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g, DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(U) USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA Followed DoD Guidance for Establishing Priority Intelligence Requirements

(S//NF) We determined that USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA regularly followed DoD guidance when establishing PIRs for the counterterrorism mission. Joint Publication 2-0 discusses the role of the commander and intelligence director in determining PIRs, and Joint Publication 5-0 defines PIRs and the role of joint planning in establishing PIRs.

(U) USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA Followed the PIR Planning Process in Joint Publication 2-0

(U) USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA personnel followed the Joint Publication 2-0 PIR planning process for establishing PIRs. Joint Publication 2-0 states that in the planning process, the staff identifies information gaps about the adversary and the operational environment to formulate intelligence requirements.²¹ The staff can recommend the requirements for designation as priority, but the intelligence director is responsible for consolidating those nominations and recommending the relative order of priority to the commander.

²¹ (U) Joint Publication 2-0, "Joint Intelligence," October 22, 2013. Intelligence requirements are defined as general or specific subjects upon which there is a need for collection of information or the production of intelligence.

(S//NF) USAFRICOM personnel confirmed that they followed the Joint Publication 2-0 PIR planning process as PIR nominations are identified by the intelligence director and consider the mission, commander's intent, and operational objectives. During interviews, USAFRICOM intelligence leadership and staff described the process as continuous coordination among members of the staff to determine whether intelligence requirements are current.

(S//NF) SOCAFRICA personnel also followed the Joint Publication 2-0 PIR planning process for analyzing intelligence gaps related to the operational environment and the enemy. SOCAFRICA personnel then formulate intelligence requirements and

USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4c

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) Additionally, Joint Publication 2-0 states that the combatant commander uses PIRs as a tool to focus the collection of intelligence and use of available intelligence assets. USAFRICOM orders including execute orders, operation orders, and ISR employment execute orders establish requirements and provide guidance on the use of USAFRICOM intelligence assets. To focus intelligence collection and the use of intelligence assets, USAFRICOM staff members validate the requirements through operational planning teams and action officer working groups. Some examples of working groups and planning teams include the Joint Collection Management Board, which uses a joint planning process to guide components to execute the USAFRICOM Commander's PIRs within the Theater Campaign LOE framework and through the Monthly Allocation and Apportionment Directive. USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA intelligence and operations staff confirmed in interviews that they meet through several coordination and working groups to discuss requirements, communicate to resolve ISR allocation issues supporting the commander's PIRs, and address intelligence collection problems. We also reviewed copies of agendas, briefing slides, and standard operating procedures provided by USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA, which showed specific intelligence requirements and outcomes of discussions concerning these requirements, resolution of ISR issues through resource-sharing and reallocation, and specific intelligence gaps and future requirements to address these gaps.

(U) USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA Followed the Joint Planning Process in Joint Publication 5-0

(S) USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA similarly followed the process laid out in Joint Publication 5-0 for joint planning. Joint Publication 5-0 states that the staff has overall responsibility for consolidating PIR nominations and providing recommendation to the commander. This occurs through discussions between the staff through the use of boards, cells, and working groups. The USAFRICOM Director for Intelligence stated that (S) personnel participated in 17 boards, bureaus, centers, cells, working groups, and operational and joint planning teams. Evidence of this was found in the USAFRICOM Campaign Plan, which states that decision making across the staffs will include boards, bureaus, cells, centers, and working groups. Further, it outlines the synchronization for the working groups. Additionally, USAFRICOM staff provided copies of meeting agendas and briefing slides.

(S) The Director for Intelligence reported that SOCAFRICA personnel participate in

USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4c
[Redacted]

(U) SOCAFRICA Faced Challenges in Satisfying Priority Intelligence Requirements

(S//NF) Although USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA followed DoD processes for establishing PIRs, SOCAFRICA had capability gaps, which did not allow it to fully support gathering intelligence to satisfy USAFRICOM PIRs. USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g; DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[Redacted]

(U) SOCAFRICA

DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3)

Unmanned Platforms

~~(S//NF)~~

USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4g, DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

Figure 1 is a photo of an MQ-1C unmanned platform similar to the unmanned platforms used by SOCAFRICA.

(U) Figure 1. MQ-1C Unmanned Platform



(U) Source: DoD

~~(S//NF)~~

USAFRICOM FY19 ISR FRAGORD states that USAFRICOM allocates ISR resources to support intelligence priorities and determines which components and subordinate units get priority for those resources. Further, the FRAGORD states,

USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4g, DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

This occurred because the U.S. Army experienced challenges in meeting testing milestones

DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

*(U) Army Experienced Challenges in Meeting Testing Milestones
on SOCAFRICA MQ-1Cs*

DODIG (b)(1)1.7e
and (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF)

USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g. DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) The significant challenges and delays in the Army's program of record and the accompanying operational impacts, which extend beyond USAFRICOM, are outside the scope of this evaluation. As a result, the DoD OIG recently announced an evaluation on the delays and challenges associated with this Army program of record:

DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF)

USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g. DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

²² (U) DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3)

²³ (U) DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3)

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4g, DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Figure 2 below shows a photo of a B-350 manned platform used by SOCAFRICA.

(S//NF) Figure 2. B-350 Manned Platform



(U) Source: SOCAFRICA.

(S//NF) When the Joint Staff first reviewed USAFRICOM's request for [REDACTED] (FOUO (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)) in June 2014, the Army volunteered to fill the requirement. In September 2016, an additional request by USAFRICOM was directed to USARAF, as the designated force provider, for action. As of FY19, the USAFRICOM Commander has identified [REDACTED] (DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)) as an enduring requirement and the top ISR priority of FY19 (see Appendix C). SOCAFRICA personnel stated that as of February 2019,

USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4g, DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]


²⁶ (U) Worldwide Individual Augmentees are U.S. Army Soldiers that augment forces performing operations and exercises.

(~~S//NF~~) While the USAFRICOM Commander is accepting this risk in the short and mid-term, ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} sourcing history shows that the USAFRICOM Commander made repeated requests and identified ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} as an enduring requirement and the top ISR priority for FY19 (see Appendix C for more information). Due to delayed ^{USAFRICOM (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)}

^{(b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)}

(U) See Figure 3 below for chronology of events surrounding requests for ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3)} and Appendix C for additional details.

~~(S//NF)~~ Figure 3. Origin of Request for USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g; DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)



SECRET//NOFORN

SECRET//NOFORN

(U) Source: DoD OIG.

Finding

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g. DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g. DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g. DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g. DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(U) Comments on the Finding and Our Response

(U) U.S. Army Africa Comments

(S//NF) In response to the finding, the Acting Chief of the Intelligence Operations Directorate for USARAF requested that we clarify in the report that USARAF was requested to provide DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3). He stated that USARAF has not been tasked by USAFRICOM with providing DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3).
[Redacted]

(S) Additionally, the Acting Chief stated that according to Joint Publication 5-0, all planning is resource-informed. According to Joint Publication 5-0, planning must begin with those resources that are likely to be available at execution and risks must be identified where shortfalls exist. According to the Acting Chief, USAFRICOM and

(S) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4c, DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) We clarified in the finding that USARAF has been tasked by USAFRICOM to provide DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [REDACTED]

(S) Also, in response to the Acting Chief's comments regarding Joint Publication 5-0, USAFRICOM FY18 ISR EXORD and FY19 ISR FRAGORD explicitly state that the USAFRICOM Commander assumed the risk and tasked USARAF with providing DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [REDACTED]

(U) DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3) Comments

(S//NF) DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [REDACTED], provided comments regarding information that was used to identify the finding in the report.

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4c, DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) Where the draft report discussed contractor personnel performing tasks in the context of support to kinetic missions, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g. DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) We acknowledge these recommended [REDACTED] adjusted the language in our report on pages 13, 14, 17, and 25.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Revised Recommendation 1

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g. DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g. DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(U) U.S. Special Operations Command Comments

~~(S//NF)~~ The USSOCOM Director of Intelligence, responding on behalf of the USSOCOM Commander, disagreed with the recommendation. The Director stated that the recommendation did not accurately portray USSOCOM's role and responsibilities

USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g, DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ We acknowledge that the USSOCOM Commander is responsible only for USSOCOM [Redacted]. Accordingly, we revised the recommendation. Comments from the USSOCOM Director of Intelligence meet the intent of the revised recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ [Redacted]

(U) Recommendation 2.a

~~(S//NF)~~ We recommend that the Commander of U.S. Africa Command, in conjunction with the Commander of U.S. Army Africa, develop a plan to fill the requirement for [Redacted].

(U) U.S. Africa Command Comments

~~(S//NF)~~ The USAFRICOM ACJ2 Division Chief, responding for the USAFRICOM Commander, agreed with the recommendation, but did not provide further comments.

(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ Although the USAFRICOM ACJ2 Division Chief agreed with the recommendation, he did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but open. The Division Chief did not indicate actions USAFRICOM would take to work with USARAF to develop a plan to fill the requirement for ~~DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)~~. We request that the Division Chief provide a response to the final report specifying the action USAFRICOM will take towards resolving the requirement for ~~DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)~~. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the actions USAFRICOM takes fully addresses the recommendation.

(U) U.S. Army Africa Comments

~~(S//NF)~~ The Acting Chief of the Intelligence Operations Directorate for the USARAF G2, responding for the USARAF Commander, disagreed with the recommendation. The Acting Chief stated that the recommendation should be revised to indicate that the USAFRICOM Commander would work in conjunction with the USARAF Commander and SOCAFRICA Commander to develop the plan. According to the Acting Chief, the

~~USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g, DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)~~
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(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ We acknowledge the comments received from the Acting Chief of the Intelligence Operations Directorate for the USARAF G2 about incorporating the SOCAFRICA Commander in the recommendation. However, we did not modify the recommendation as SOCAFRICA is operationally controlled by USAFRICOM. USAFRICOM has the ability to require SOCAFRICA to be a part of the planning process because SOCAFRICA is a subordinate component command.

~~(S//NF)~~ We also acknowledge the Acting Chief's comment that development of the plan should include either resubmitting the RFF ~~DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)~~. Although the Acting Chief disagreed with our recommendation, he provided a course of action that addresses the intent recommendation as resubmission of a request for forces may provide USAFRICOM ~~DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)~~ it needs to fill the requirement. Therefore, we consider this recommendation resolved, but open. We request that the Acting Chief of the Intelligence Operations Directorate for the USARAF G2 provide

(S//NF) additional comments detailing how USARAF will work with USAFRICOM to resubmit the RFF [REDACTED] with specific milestones and timelines. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the actions USARAF takes fully addresses the recommendation.

(U) Revised Recommendation 2.b

(S//NF) We recommend that the Commander of U.S. Africa Command submit a formal memorandum [REDACTED], requesting a review of activities performed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] should provide a formal response to the Commander of U.S. Africa Command.

(S//NF) As a result of management comments, we revised this recommendation.

[REDACTED]. We modified the recommendation to state that USAFRICOM should formally request a review, and [REDACTED] a formal response to USAFRICOM.

(U) U.S. Africa Command Comments

(S//NF) The USAFRICOM ACJ2 Division Chief, responding on behalf of the USAFRICOM Commander, agreed with the recommendation, but did not provide further comment.

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) Although the USAFRICOM ACJ2 Division Chief agreed with the recommendation, he did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but open. We request the USAFRICOM ACJ2 Division Chief describe specific actions it will take to formally request [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. We will close this recommendation once we verify that the actions USAFRICOM takes fully addresses the recommendation.

(U) ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3)} [REDACTED] *Comments*

(S//NF) ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} [REDACTED], disagreed with this recommendation. ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} [REDACTED] to support USAFRICOM, as intended by recommendation; however, the appropriate action would be for USAFRICOM to formally request ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} [REDACTED] to provide a formal response to USAFRICOM.

(S//NF) Upon receipt of the memorandum, ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} [REDACTED] will conduct an assessment that considers the degree to which conditions and facts restrict the discretionary authority, decision-making responsibility, or accountability of the government officials using the services of contractor personnel ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} [REDACTED], and will provide a formal response to USAFRICOM upon conclusion of its review. ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} [REDACTED] has used this process with other combatant commands.

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) We acknowledge ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} [REDACTED] that USAFRICOM should formally request ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} [REDACTED]. Comments from the Chief meet the intent of the revised recommendation, therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but remains open. We will close this recommendation once we verify that USAFRICOM submitted a formal request ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} [REDACTED] USAFRICOM's use of services of contractor personnel ^{DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)} [REDACTED] provided a formal response to USAFRICOM.

(U) Observation

~~(S//NF)~~ Chinese Components Were Found Inside

USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g, DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ Because of our observation, we decided to conduct a follow-on evaluation of the impact of Chinese components in the ISR supply chain, which may be systemic across all the combatant commands. The evaluation was announced on March 11, 2019, "Evaluation of Security Controls for ISR Supply Chains," Project No. D2019-DISPA-0127.000.

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from October 2018 through April 2019 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

~~(S//NF)~~ We evaluated USAFRICOM's process for determining intelligence priorities in relation to SOCAFRICA's counterterrorism mission using Joint Publication 2-0 and Joint Publication 5-0 as a guide. The scope of this evaluation focused on assessing USAFRICOM intelligence personnel recommendations for PIRs to meet the USAFRICOM Commander's intent with regard to the SOCAFRICA counterterrorism mission. Additionally, we assessed SOCAFRICA's ability to satisfy USAFRICOM PIRs. The scope of this project did not include an assessment of collection methods and disciplines, or exploitation, analysis, and production used to support USAFRICOM's PIRs.

(U) We performed site visits and interviewed personnel at the following locations:

(U) Defense Combating Terrorism Center, Defense Intelligence Agency, Reston, Virginia

(U) Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

(U) Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.

(U) ~~DODIG (b)(1), 7e and (b)(3)~~

(U) Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, Washington, D.C.

(U) Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Washington, D.C.

(U) SOCAFRICA, Kelley Barracks, Germany

(U) USAFRICOM, Kelley Barracks, Germany, and Molesworth, England

(U) USSOCOM, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

(U) We reviewed applicable DoD guidance and EXORDs. Specifically, we reviewed Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Publication 5-0, USAFRICOM FY19 ISR FRAGORD, USAFRICOM FY18 ISR EXORD, MOD 1 East Africa Counterterrorism EXORD, MOD 3 to the Northwest Africa Counterterrorism EXORD, MOD 4 to the Northwest Africa Counterterrorism EXORD, and Counterterrorism EXORD.

(U) We conducted a formal data call to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, USAFRICOM, and SOCAFRICA requesting the following:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Documentation on USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA:
 - (U//~~FOUO~~) Intelligence priorities and specific counterterrorism intelligence priorities.
 - (U//~~FOUO~~) Processes and procedures for determining, selecting, and prioritizing intelligence requirements, including specific counterterrorism intelligence requirements.
 - (U//~~FOUO~~) Issues related to or in fulfilling counterterrorism intelligence priorities and requirements.
 - (U//~~FOUO~~) Resources dedicated to supporting counterterrorism intelligence priorities going back 3 years.
 - (U//~~FOUO~~) Coordination efforts with SOCAFRICA in support of its counterterrorism mission.
 - (U//~~FOUO~~) Processes for identifying counterterrorism intelligence gaps and prioritizing gaps, as they relate to the SOCAFRICA counterterrorism mission.²⁷
- (U//~~FOUO~~) DoD guidance related to USAFRICOM and its support of SOCAFRICA and its counterterrorism mission.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Oversight guidance related to SOCAFRICA and its counterterrorism mission.

²⁷ (U) We defined documents in our data call as any doctrine (policies, procedures, and guidance), reports, writings, letters, memorandums, notes, briefings, and communications including e-mails, telephone records, agreements, schedules, spreadsheets, data, and electronically stored information.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Documentation on context or situational awareness related to USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA issues and challenges regarding the process for determining intelligence priorities or improving intelligence operations, as they relate to the counterterrorism mission; processes for identifying counterterrorism intelligence gaps and prioritizing gaps, as they relate to the SOCAFRICA counterterrorism mission.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We interviewed and collected information from senior intelligence leaders, intelligence personnel, operations personnel, readiness personnel, general counsels, mission managers, and personnel from USARAF and the U.S. Army.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the DoD OIG, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the United States Government Accountability Office issued three reports discussing the DoD ISR allocation process as a whole. Unrestricted Government Accountability Office reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/>.

(U) GAO

(U) GAO-13-361C, "Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Actions Could Enhance DoD's Process for Allocating ISR Capabilities," May 2013

(U) The DoD's process for allocating ISR capabilities to meet geographic combatant command's requirements has improved, but requirements development processes are not standardized across the commands and not all command submissions are complete. Commands use different planning factors and assumptions to develop the requirements they submit to the force management process.

(U) GAO-12-396C, "Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Actions Needed to Improve DoD Guidance, Integration of Tools and Training for Collection Management," April 2012

(U) The DoD's guidance for ISR collection management did not capture all current collection management practices, collection management tools were not integrated, and collection management training was insufficient. GAO recommended that the DoD update collection management guidance and improve tools and training.

(U) GAO-11-465, "Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Actions Are Needed to Increase Integration and Efficiencies of DOD's ISR Enterprise," June 2011

(U) GAO recommended that the DoD compile and aggregate complete ISR funding data, establish implementation goals and timelines for its efficiency efforts, and give priority to examining efficiency in ISR collection activities.

(U) DoD OIG

(U) Report No. DODIG-2017-097, (U) "Evaluation of the DoD Process for Allocating Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capability in Support of Operation Inherent Resolve"

(U) This DoD OIG evaluation focused on whether the DoD allocation process for ISR resources effectively supported the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve Commander's intelligence requirements. The DoD OIG recommended that the Joint Staff revise Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.06B, "Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures," October 12, 2016, to include periodic reviews of the entire ISR Global Force Management Allocation Plan throughout an extended contingency operation.

(U) House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

(U) "Performance Audit of Department of Defense Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance," April 2012

(U) The DoD has invested roughly \$44 billion in acquiring new and enhanced ISR capabilities since 9/11 without a strategy for how these systems fit into its future ISR architecture. The DoD has allowed the Services to procure their own solutions for joint requirements, leading to duplication and inefficiencies. The DoD needs to improve its acquisition process to prevent further duplication of effort and right-size the ISR force for future requirements. The DoD lacks the process and analytical tools to decide how to allocate them to combatant commands in a way that maximizes their value within constrained resources.

(U) Appendix B

(U) Priority Intelligence Requirements, Objectives, and Lines of Effort

(U) USAFRICOM Priority Intelligence Requirements

- **(U) PIR 1:** Are there indications of an impending or actual threat to U.S. personnel or Allied forces and interests in the area of responsibility, Headquarters USAFRICOM, subordinate command headquarters, or other locations outside of the area of responsibility that impact safety and security within the area of responsibility?
- **(U) PIR 2:** Are there indications of increased potential for political instability, mass atrocities, regime threatening violence, a pandemic infectious disease, or other events that may require a USAFRICOM response?
- **(U) PIR 3:** Are there indications of an impending or actual chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high yield explosive incident or attempt to obtain, transport or develop a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capability within the area of responsibility?
- **(S) PIR 4:** What is the capability and intent of al-Shabaab, ISIS-Somalia, or their affiliates to conduct operations both within and external to their current areas of operation?²⁸
- **(S) PIR 5:** What is the capability and intent of ISIS and al-Qaida affiliates in Libya and the Maghreb to conduct operations both within and external to their current areas of operation?²⁹

²⁸ ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Al-Shabaab is a terrorist group engaged in hostilities against the United States. It is also an associated force of al-Qaida that plans and conducts attacks against targets in Somalia, including the African Union Mission in Somalia bases, the Somali government, and civilian targets in urban centers. As for ISIS-Somalia, it is the Islamic State's branch in Somalia, a terrorist group that is engaged in hostilities against the United States. It aspires to attack U.S. and other Western interests in East Africa.

²⁹ ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ ISIS, with affiliates in Libya, is the terrorist group engaged in hostilities against the United States. ISIS-Libya operates in remote camps in central and southwestern Libya, has controlled the city of Surt, is focused on rebuilding efforts, and has recently resumed attacks in central Libya. As for Al-Qaida, with its affiliates in the Maghreb, it is the terrorist group active in northern Algeria, southern Libya, and western Tunisia. The group's goal is to unite all Muslims from the Nile to the Atlantic in jihad against Westerners and to curb Western influence in the regions.

- ~~(S)~~ **PIR 6:** What is the capability and intent of Boko Haram, ISIS–West Africa or their affiliates in the Lake Chad Region to conduct operations both within and external to their current areas of operation?³⁰
- ~~(S)~~ **PIR 7:** What is the capability and intent of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, ISIS–Greater Sahara, or their affiliates in the Sahel region to conduct operations both within and external to their current areas of operation?³¹
- ~~(S)~~ **PIR 8:** To what extent are emerging and established powers (e.g., China, Russia, Iran, North Korea) gaining access and influence in Africa and undermining U.S. interests?
- (U) **PIR 9:** Which trafficking networks are contributing to regional instability and to what extent are they undermining African governance?
- (U) **PIR 10:** What are the capabilities and willingness of African partners to execute assigned missions and support U.S. and regional efforts to enhance local and regional security?

(U) USAFRICOM Campaign Objectives

- (U) **U.S. Influence Is Increased.** The U.S. and its allies are established as preferred regional security partners, and U.S. interests in Africa are protected against destabilizing competitor state influence, activities, and aggression.
- (U) **African Partners Contribute to Regional Security.** African partners, consistent with the rule of law and respect for human rights, secure their sovereign interests, export security, promote economic prosperity, and provide legitimate, accountable, and effective governance.
- (U) **VEO Threats Are Reduced.** VEOs that threaten U.S. interests are degraded and contained for defeat by African partners in accordance with the rule of law and respect for human rights.

³⁰ ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Boko Haram is the terrorist group active in northern Nigeria and Cameroon that primarily attacks civilian targets in northeast Nigeria and northern Cameroon. The terrorist group has displaced at least 1.5 million people and more than 200,000 refugees in the Lake Chad Basin region. On March 7, 2015, the group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and calls itself the “Islamic State’s West African Province.” As for ISIS–West Africa, it is the ISIS node in the Nigeria–Niger–Chad border region that conducts operations in northeast Nigeria and cross-border attacks in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger targeting regional security forces.

³¹ ~~(S//REL USA, FVEY)~~ Jama’at At Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Muslimin is al-Qaida’s ally in Mali, formed in early 2017, with the unification of the Mali-based elements of Al-Qaida and its affiliate in the Islamic Maghreb. Jama’at At Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Muslimin is the most active terrorist group in the Sahel, having conducted more than 100 attacks targeting Mali’s regional security and peacekeeping forces and westerners in the region. As for ISIS–Greater Sahara, it is a splinter terrorist group from al-Murabitun that recruits fighters based on pre-existing regional ties and operates out of the Mali–Niger–Burkina Faso border.

- (U) **The USAFRICOM Theater Is Set.** USAFRICOM forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints, agreements, and understanding are aligned in order to conduct day-to-day activities, crisis response, and contingency operations.
- (U) **U.S. Government Personnel and Property Are Protected.** USAFRICOM maintains the ability to protect U.S. Government personnel and property.

(U) USAFRICOM Lines of Effort

- (U) **LOE 1:** Strengthen Partner Networks.
- (U) **LOE 2:** Enhance Partner Capability.
- (U) **LOE 3:** Develop Security in Somalia.
- (U) **LOE 4:** Contain Instability in Libya.
- (U) **LOE 5:** Support Partners in the Sahel and Lake Chad Region.
- (U) **LOE 6:** Set the Theater.

(U) SOCAFRICA Priority Intelligence Requirements

- (U) **PIR 1:** What are the credible imminent threat indicators of VEOs and non-state actors targeting U.S. or allied/partner nation personnel, facilities or interests in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility?
- (U) **PIR 2:** How are transregional Salafist-Jihadist terrorist groups exploiting relationships with Africa-based threat networks to expand operations and influence in order to establish permanent presence and exploit illicit facilitation?
- (U) **PIR 3:** Where are foreign fighters returning to the USAFRICOM area of responsibility and what capabilities do they bring?
- (S) **PIR 4:** ^{USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4c} [REDACTED]
- (U) **PIR 5:** What indications of political instability, mass atrocities, or regime change exist within the USAFRICOM area of responsibility?
- (U) **PIR 6:** What partner force capabilities are limiting SOCAFRICA's ability to impact VEOs through partner operations?
- (U) **PIR 7:** What are the indications that states and non-state actors are pursuing or proliferating weapons of mass destruction?

(U) SOCAFRICA Lines of Effort

(U) SOCAFRICA. Appendix 1, Annex C, Regional SOF Supporting Plan–East Africa. May 31, 2018.

(U) SOCAFRICA’s operational approach will achieve the above desired conditions toward the strategic end state, primarily along five lines of effort: 1) Clear key terrain/counter–VEOs in Somalia, 2) Support Danab build efforts, 3) Facilitate local governance in cleared areas, 4) Support final governing standard reconciliation with al Shabaab, and 5) Counter the expansion or emergence of VEOs in east Africa.

(U) SOCAFRICA. Appendix 2, Annex C, Regional SOF Supporting Plan–Lake Chad Basin. May 31, 2018.

(U) SOCAFRICA’s LOEs in the Lake Chad Basin include: 1. Build Nigerian military capability in Borno State, 2. Sustain capabilities in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, 3. Enhance multi-national joint task force operational capability, 4. Expand U.S., United Kingdom, and France partner intelligence collection, 5. Support regional defection, demobilization, disengagement, deradicalization, and reintegration.

(U) SOCAFRICA. Appendix 3, Annex C, Regional SOF Supporting Plan–Sahel. May 31, 2018.

(U) SOCAFRICA’s LOEs in the Sahel include: 1) Counter–VEO expansion in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali; 2) Understand and set conditions for future activities in the Sahel; 3) Support French efforts in the Sahel to clear VEO-controlled areas, disrupt VEO support mechanisms, deny VEO safe haven, and prevent VEO attacks against U.S. interests; 4) Facilitate non-lethal operations to improve host nation government and forces legitimacy; 5) Synchronize international SOF efforts.

(U) Appendix C

(~~S//NF~~) Chronology of Events Regarding USAFRICOM

DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

RFF/EXORD	Date	Total # of positions filled	Request/Requirement/Service Feedback
RFF 690	December 2013	(b)(1)1.4c	USAFRICOM requested (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) . Army volunteered to fill the request. INSCOM provided (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) and Worldwide Individual Augmentees provided (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) .
RFF 690 MOD 1	August 2016	N/A	USAFRICOM requested an increase to (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) . Joint Staff did not validate the modification, told USAFRICOM to source through USARAF. RFF was removed and requirements are now included in ISR EXORDs. USAFRICOM response was issuance of USAFRICOM FY17 ISR EXORD MOD 3.
USAFRICOM FY17 ISR EXORD MOD 3	March 2017	N/A	<p>USAFRICOM directed USARAF to provide (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) by August 2017. USARAF issued multiple requests for reconsideration. All requests stated USARAF lacked certified or qualified personnel.</p> <p>In May 2017, USARAF attempted to address the issue by coordinating with Headquarters, U.S. Army to change its Modified Table of Organization and Equipment. USARAF stated it could not do so until USAFRICOM formally identified the mission as enduring requirement.</p> <p>The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed USARAF to provide more detail demonstrating the inability to staff the request. To seek a sourcing solution, USAFRICOM asked USARAF to provide binning data.</p> <p>The 207th Commander sought relief from USARAF on the binning data action, stating it exceeded information typically required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although binning data were submitted anyway, the Joint Staff stated it still needed more detail. USARAF stated it was not required to provide more detail and 207th sought guidance from INSCOM, which stated it was not necessary.</p>

RFF/EXORD	Date	Total # of positions filled	Request/Requirement/Service Feedback
USAFRICOM FY18 ISR EXORD	August 2017	N/A	The USAFRICOM Commander identified filling the DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) capability as the top ISR priority, and an enduring requirement. USAFRICOM stated that DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) would be addressed in MOD 1 of FY18 ISR EXORD and that it was willing to accept risk in the short term while USARAF DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3).
USAFRICOM FY18 ISR EXORD REV 1 MOD 1	January 2018	N/A	USAFRICOM stated DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) is an enduring requirement. USAFRICOM is willing to accept risk in the short term at DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) while USARAF builds the DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3). USAFRICOM also forecast a requirement of DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3).
USAFRICOM FY18 ISR EXORD REV 1 MOD 3	May 2018	DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)	USAFRICOM restated the enduring requirement for DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3). In accordance with INSCOM, USAFRICOM explained the requirement of USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4g, DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3). USAFRICOM reiterated it was willing to accept risk in the short term DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) in FY18 while USARAF builds the DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) capability. USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4g, DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3). INSCOM and Worldwide Individual Augmentees continued to contribute DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3). At this time, USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4g.
FY19 ISR FRAGORD 005	December 2018	DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)	USAFRICOM identifies DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) as an enduring requirement for FY19. The USAFRICOM Commander identifies filling DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) as the top ISR priority and aligned with the annual campaign plan. FRAGORD specifies USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4g, DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3). USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4g, DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) by USAFRICOM. INSCOM and Worldwide Individual Augmentees continue to contribute DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3) each, for a total DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3). Overall, this means USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4g.

SOURCE: DOD OIG.

(U) Management Comments

(U) USSOCOM Director of Intelligence

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
7701 TAMPA POINT BLVD.
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5323

J2

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 4800
MARK CENTER DRIVE, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: (U) Review of Draft Report, Evaluation of USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA's
Processes for Determining and Fulfilling Intelligence Requirements for Counterterrorism
(Project No. D2019-DISPAS-0042.000)

USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4e, DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)




4. (U) USSOCOM does not recommend any changes to the draft DoD Inspector
General report classification markings.

5. (U) Our point of contact is [redacted] DSN [redacted] SIPRNET email
[redacted]

USSOCOM (b)(3) 10 USC 130b and (b)
(6)



Encl
DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3)



Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: DOD IG Report, D2019-SIDPA5-0042.00
Declassify On: 07032044

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(U) USAFRICOM J-23/5



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
UNIT 29951
APO AE 09761-9951

3 July 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA's Processes for Determining and Fulfilling Intelligence Requirements for Counterterrorism, Project No. D2019-DISPA5-0042.000

1. (U) USAFRICOM J23/5 reviewed the draft evaluations and concurs as drafted minus the below misclassified EXORD definitions noted in the attached PDF.
 - a. (U) (~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~) Modification 1 To the East Africa Counterterrorism EXORD - this EXORD provides the authorization for USAFRICOM to conduct counterterrorism campaign in Somalia.17
 - b. (U) (~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~) Modification 3 To the Northwest Africa Counterterrorism EXORD - this EXORD provides the authorization for USAFRICOM to conduct counterterrorism campaign in North and West Africa.18
 - c. (U) (~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~) Modification 4 To the Northwest Africa Counterterrorism EXORD - this EXORD provides the USAFRICOM authorization for direct action in Libya.19
2. The point of contact for this memorandum is COL, William Burch who can be reached at [REDACTED] or by electronic mail at [REDACTED]

William W. Burch
COL, U.S. Army

Classified by: [REDACTED] V CIV AFRICOM
Derived from: ACG 5200.02, USAFRICOM 20130411
Declassify on: 20440703

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

(U) Acting Chief of the Intelligence Operations
Directorate for the USARAF G2



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY AFRICA/SOUTHERN EUROPEAN TASK FORCE
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ARAF-INZ

17 July 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: USARAF G2 response to the DOD IG Draft Report on USAFRICOM and SOCAF Planning Command PIRs

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Purpose: This memorandum summarizes the USARAF inputs to the draft report to seek corrections and add clarifying information to the draft report..

2. (S) Executive Summary: USARAF recommends 6 changes to the draft document that will add clarity to defining the requirement, a critical planning step as articulated in Joint Publication 5-0 and key details in the staffing of the Request for Forces that directly led to the malalignment of the overall requirement.

3. (S) USARAF inputs follow:

a. Page 3 (U) USARAF Mission, Roles and Responsibilities. (S//NF) It is critical to characterize the ~~DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)~~

1. ~~DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)~~

b. Page 8, 4th paragraph, (S//NF) "As of April 2019, USARAF has provided" ~~DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)~~

c. Page 11, new 2nd paragraph, (S) JP 5-0 states that all planning is resource informed. It states that "planning must begin with those resources that are likely to be available at execution and identify risks where shortfalls exist." ~~USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4c~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Acting Chief of the Intelligence Operations
Directorate for the USARAF G2 (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g; DODOIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)

- d. Page 15, 2nd paragraph, ~~(S//NF)~~ "the USAFRICOM Commander, in conjunction with the USARAF Commander and SOCAF Commander, should develop a plan to either resubmit the RFF or fill the requirement..." Binning data and Risk to Mission and Risk to Force information requirements have been provided to the USAFRICOM Commander in compliance with the Joint Staff business rules. If the Joint Staff require information outside of their established guidelines to support the submission of the RFF they should articulate to the USAFRICOM Commander why the exception is required to inform the follow on staffing.
- e. Page 18, Recommendation 2, subparagraph a., ~~(S//NF)~~ "in conjunction with Commanders USARAF and SOCAF, ..." SOCAF commander must be involved in the process ; the USSOCOM (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, and (b)(1)1.4g
- f. Page 29, last paragraph, (U) USARAF never provided a Troops to Task, USARAF submitted Binning Data commiserate with the Joint Staff SOP for submitting RFFs. Joint Staff requires Bining Data submissions in support of RFFs but has not defined and standardized the submission format.

4. (U) The point of contact for this memorandum is [redacted] USARAF G2, Intelligence Operations Directorate Chief: [redacted] or Email: [redacted]

TROIANO.GABR Digitally signed by
IEL [redacted] Date: 2019.08.29 09:24:05.14 +0200

Gabriel Troiano
Deputy Chief of Staff, G2

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3) [Redacted]

DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U)

DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3)

DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)



(U)

DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3)

DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)



(U)

DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3)

DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)



(U)

DODIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3)

DODIG (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(3)



(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

EXORD	Execute Order (lowercase in text)
FRAGORD	Fragmentary Order (lowercase in text)
INSCOM	Intelligence and Security Command
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
LOE	Line of Effort (lowercase in text)
	<small>DODDIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3)</small>
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirement
RFF	Request for Forces (lowercase in text)
	<small>DODDIG (b)(1)1.7e and (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)</small>
SOCAFRICA	Special Operations Command Africa
SOF	Special Operations Force
USAFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
USARAF	U.S. Army Africa
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization (lowercase in text)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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

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