



DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAM FOR MILITARY PRACTITIONERS

Raymond A. Millen, Ph.D.
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PKSOI Paper

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AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS FOR
MILITARY PRACTITIONERS**

**U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute**

July 2021

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ISBN-13: 978-1-7325659-8-2

FOREWORD

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs pose daunting challenges. As Dr. Raymond Millen notes, the political-military context at the end of a conflict requires due deliberation, since DDR programs are not suitable in every instance. They are difficult enough to implement even under favorable circumstances, so the US government should not view DDR programs as a panacea for all post-war environments. In too many instances, the conduct of DDR has been rather slapdash, then pawned off to security sector reform as a recourse. Such an abrogation of responsibility hampers security sector reform activities, resulting in greater expense and time.

DDR programs are most pertinent for countries struggling to recover from an insurgency. The signing of a peace agreement signals the commencement of DDR. Organizing and preparing for DDR programs must occur early in peace negotiations—integrating DDR partners into the effort, crafting a strategy for implementation, and positioning resources to support the enterprise. Delaying the groundwork until the peace agreement is approved places DDR implementation behind the metaphorical power curve. Some disarmament and demobilization may occur, but meaningful reintegration will not be realized.

Dr. Millen correctly asserts that momentum is sustained by efficient execution and dispatch. This is particularly true for disarmament and demobilization, with an ambitious goal of completing both in a single day. He reasons that the use of liaison officer teams, DDR support centers, and well-designed DDR sites can overcome typical obstacles that have stymied DDR

ventures in the past. The crux of DDR is attaining accurate information on the number of former insurgents and weapons. Accurate numbers determine the number and size of DDR sites, so leveraging liaison officer teams becomes a prerequisite.

The establishment of reintegration cantonments underscores the commitment to honor the promises of the peace agreement. Reintegration activities are the most important phase of DDR but paradoxically have received the least attention in the past. Depletion of funding and prolonged delays frequently cause the premature culmination of reintegration. As a result, many ex-combatants leave the program in frustration, and the country is burdened with acute problems which leave it in a fragile state. Dr. Millen's reintegration design seeks organizational efficiencies, lower expenditures, and enhanced performance of supporting activities.

This book emphasizes the psychological dimensions of former combatants: promoting their perceptions of safety; sustaining their sense of honor; preserving their dignity; and bolstering their optimism of the future. The DDR program establishes an environment of security for ex-combatants so they can disarm and demobilize without fear of attack. Honoring their patriotism without prejudice fosters pride and contentment. Because many combatants experience trauma from combat and sexual assault, psychosocial counselling and group therapy help them reach closure. Similarly, transitional justice processes provide an opportunity for combatants involved in low-level atrocities to seek forgiveness. Education, life-skills, and vocational training provide an opportunity for veterans to contribute to the economic and societal recover of the

country. Altogether, the goal is to facilitate the veteran's re-entry into society without rancor or humiliation.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs for Military Practitioners serves as a guide for organizing, planning, preparing, and executing activities in support of such operations. As the book underscores, the military's supporting role is not passive; instead, it practices active engagement by incorporating the experience and expertise of DDR partners. Achieving a sense of teamwork among diverse organizational cultures requires creative thinking. While recognizing that DDR is essentially a civilian-led venture, the military can furnish key enablers that enhance performance and effectiveness. PKSOI regards this book as a valuable reference for military and civilian organizations coming together to implement meaningful DDR.

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May 2021

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Introduction

Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) programs have gained greater prominence since the end of the Cold War. By design, they assist countries beset by protracted insurgencies to find a way to stop the fighting, demilitarize, and achieve prosperous amity. Security and stability are achieved through the disarmament and demobilization of former warring factions. Reintegrating ex-combatants into society is much more involved, requiring a variety of supporting programs to assist in the transition to civilian life as a productive, peaceful citizen.¹ Ideally, DDR programs should proceed smoothly, but in reality, they are fraught with complexity and conflict. The central question is if everyone desires peace and a return to normalcy, why are DDR programs so difficult to implement?

The answer is that insurgencies do not erupt without cause. Government corruption, disenfranchisement, incompetence, persecution, and general poverty often drive people to revolt when they see no other way out. As is often the case, war enflames the passions of the people, with vicious vitriol and malevolence reigning. Contrary to expectations of quick victory, the vast majority of insurgencies persists for years, even decades. In contested areas, towns are devastated, death is prevalent, essential services are nonexistent, and economies are ruined. The country becomes militarized, as insurgent forces combat government security forces (both military and police). Local militias materialize to protect home communities, ostensibly to repel insurgent incursions, but in reality, they can become predatory too.

Exhausted, but unwilling to yield, the warring factions (i.e., government security forces and insurgents) frequently appeal to the United Nations (UN) to mediate an end to the conflict. In response, the UN has developed DDR programs, amassing a broad body experience and knowledge. Along with UN offices and organizations, a host of international organizations, nongovernment organizations, charities, and designated countries have devoted substantial resources to assist with DDR.

Logically, these enterprises should suffice since the warring factions profess a desire for peace. However, in a conflict with no-victor, no-vanquished, peace negotiations culminating with a peace agreement have become a prerequisite to DDR. In fact, past attempts to implement DDR without a peace agreement have ended with dismal failure and a resumption of fighting. While peace negotiations can extend into years (while fighting often continues), they serve as a venue for bargaining and compromise among the warring factions. Here, UN mediators have proven invaluable in guiding negotiations towards a peace agreement. Normally, peace agreements address some core grievances which sparked the insurgency. Power-sharing arrangements include representation of former insurgents in the new government, military forces, and police services. Constitutional reform (e.g., centralized and decentralized government), specifying democratic structures and civil rights, is often touted but not an immediate concern of DDR. Its promise falls under security sector reform.

To forestall fighting and provide a sense of security among the warring factions, they must be physically separated. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, NATO

intervention forces established zones of separation and withdrew the warring factions into temporary camps. While successful, it involved tens of thousands of NATO troops. Replicating such numbers of troops is not possible for the vast majority of DDR programs. Many UN DDR programs have adopted the withdrawal of factions into camps and used these camps to conduct DDR activities. However, these camps at times became somewhat permanent, and the DDR programs lost momentum. These programs can become self-defeating since former insurgents self-demobilize out of frustration, or the encampments become a way of life, stretching into years. The issue becomes one of timing: deploying sufficient US troops, coalition troops, or international peacekeepers and international police to create confidence in security when it appears the peace agreement is close to completion; ensuring the camps remain temporary; and designing the DDR program for relatively swift implementation.

The signing of a peace agreement signals the immediate implementation of DDR. Prior experiences, however, indicate that DDR programs are often overwhelmed by the vast numbers of participants. Organization, preparation, funding, and resources are not up to the task. It is only through the perseverance, sacrifice, and dedication of DDR implementers that the programs have had a semblance of success. That semblance is in the form of disarmament and demobilization, but scant reintegration.

The reasons for shortfalls are well-recorded in DDR literature. Invariably, the numbers of insurgents reporting for DDR are far vaster than estimates. Correspondingly, the number and types of delivered weapons become a logistical nightmare. A hefty

portion of insurgents abandon the program (i.e., self-demobilize) out of frustration due to delays and disorganization. Scores of thousands do not enter DDR because they are unaware of their eligibility, are intentionally denied participation by their leaders, or remain unaware of the program. While absentees ease the burden of processing former warring factions, they become a long-term burden to the country. Suffering from psychological problems, drug and alcohol addiction, unemployment, and poverty, they can become willing recruits for militant and criminal groups. Further, disabled veterans and widows become the forlorn forgotten without any prospects.

Disarmament poses a unique set of challenges that have yielded hard lessons for DDR practitioners. Offering cash for weapons may create a flourishing arms market, with enterprising former insurgents and ordinary civilians turning in unserviceable and obsolete weapons for lucrative profits. Some will ply this trade for as long as it remains profitable. Others will take the money and buy more modern, quality weapons. The host nation government may see an opportunity to use DDR to disarm the entire population, which creates mistrust among the populace regarding political motives, thereby undercutting DDR participation. Relinquished weapons that are poorly guarded and secured become easy marks for theft.

Warring faction leaders may promise to abide by the peace agreement quotas for the military and police, but they often attempt to slip more of their loyal subordinates into both services. Further, it is not unusual for insurgent leaders to maintain private militias for their personal use. Both subterfuges become a vexing problem for security sector reform, which

endeavors to create smaller, professional military forces and police services. If DDR practitioners ignore these ploys, security sector reform becomes more prolonged and expensive.

Rarely do existing built-up areas accommodate DDR activities. Abandoned military garrisons (e.g., forts or bases) might suffice if large enough and close enough to rebel consolidation camps, but these two conditions are so rare that basing a DDR plan is impractical. Attempting to conduct DDR activities in urban areas imposes its own set of problems as well. While enterprising businessmen would be quite happy to rent space at exorbitant prices, the influx of former insurgents would engulf capacity; DDR activities would vie for essential services with the local populace and create animosity; maintaining positive control of vast numbers of ex-combatants in an urban sprawl for DDR activities would prove futile; and inserting former insurgents among the local populace would do little to endear the public to the DDR program, particularly reintegration.

The practical alternative is using open spaces and the occasional sports stadium for DDR activities. Site design and preparation require reconnaissance, organization, and coordination of resources. DDR programs are mainly prosecuted by civilian organizations with the host nation government as the primary customer. Whenever the US military is tasked with supporting a DDR mission, it must understand that it cannot succeed without substantial civilian involvement. Since unity of command is inappropriate in this setting, achieving unity of effort becomes the overriding challenge. Achieving a sense of teamwork, optimizing the experience and expertise,

and synchronizing the activities among civilian organizations (which may not desire to interact with the military) takes organizational and tactful finesse.

DDR programs require decentralized execution and aligned to local conditions. Since insurgents operate in specific geographical areas, it makes sense to conduct DDR in their areas of control. DDR sites must be relatively close to temporary consolidation camps as a matter of logistics. DDR personnel with equipment, supplies, and other necessities must subsist and operate for months within these local areas, which may be in remote areas with limited access. Time is needed to transport and stockpile supplies and equipment for the DDR programs, so preparation must begin weeks before the peace agreement is signed.

With proper preparation and organization, disarmament and demobilization can occur rather rapidly. Nonetheless, reintegration requires much more time (six weeks or more), specialized personnel, and resources. Reintegration should be the capstone of DDR, but all too often it rarely reaches fruition due to a lack of time, funding, and resources. Hence, demobilized insurgents and government forces are released into society without the requisite vocational skills and assistance to contribute to economic prosperity. They become a burden to society, shunned and loathed by the populace. Accordingly, the country cannot truly recover, finds it difficult to escape the straightjacket of fragility, and is faced with the probability of renewed conflict.

It appears that international organizations, NGOs, intervening countries, and other benefactors place too much faith in security sector reform to overcome the deficiencies of a poorly administered DDR. Unfortunately, under these circumstances, the pillars

of security sector reform rest on a foundation of sand, expending extraordinary time (i.e., years or decades) and expense. Rather than recovering, too many of these countries become perennial wards to benefactors. Hence, greater attention and effort to DDR sets the proper conditions for security sector reform to prosper.

The vast majority of DDR literature addresses the challenges, pitfalls, and errors of past programs, but it offers few practical tools, other than checklists. The intention of this book is to examine the major issues surrounding DDR and suggest ways to implement functional programs: 1) the political-military context; 2) organizing and planning for DDR; 3) preliminary activities during peace negotiations or the immediate aftermath of a peace agreement; 4) peace agreement activities; 5) disarmament; 6) demobilization; 7) reintegration; and 8) monitoring and evaluation.

Understanding the political-military context—both in the country and regionally—is paramount because a DDR program may not be the proper instrument for certain situations. DDR is difficult enough to implement even under appropriate circumstances and nigh impossible in other settings. Thus, understanding when DDR is the appropriate tool for a situation avoids frustration and wasted effort.

The US military is very good at task organizing and planning for missions, and it interfaces well with civilian organizations. As in any human endeavor, someone must have the authority and responsibility to oversee a DDR program. US military support to DDR does not mean it is a militarized operation. For example, while General Dwight D. Eisenhower created unified command during the Second World War, he practiced unity of effort. Besides coalition commanders and staff officers, Eisenhower interacted closely with

US government agencies, foreign political figures, civil affairs personnel, and international organizations. Hence, military support to DDR must combine the best features of all interested partners for efficiency and effectiveness.

Military support to DDR must begin early during peace negotiations. A multiplicity of preparatory actions is needed to shape the conditions for success that transcend normal logistical activities. Gathering accurate numbers on insurgent forces by gender, sex, and age sets the number and size of DDR sites. Similarly, determining the number of weapons by type and caliber helps to establish the extent of administrative and logistical support for each disarmament site. From past DDR experiences, banking on insurgent leaders to provide accurate numbers has proven disappointing. DDR sites selection, the development of DDR sites, and the staging of personnel, supplies, and equipment nearby are basic necessities. These preparations require time and methodical staff work before a peace agreement is finalized.

Once the peace agreement is signed, US military support to a DDR program must commence immediately. The populace, host government security forces, and insurgent groups must be aware of the peace agreement and the initiation of DDR. They must understand the goals, eligibility criteria, and benefits of the DDR program. To achieve this awareness requires a dedicated effort and perseverance.

Primed for the arrival of insurgents, the disarmament and demobilization sites must optimize efficiency with the objective of completing both requirements quickly. Although a challenge, effectiveness depends on the organizational ingenuity of DDR personnel.

Reintegration consumes the vast majority of DDR personnel, resources, funding, and time. As the highlight of DDR, reintegration activities are the ultimate determinate of success (not disarmament and demobilization). Efficacious reintegration/reinsertion and resettlement of veterans into society signals the return to normalcy and provides a solid foundation for security sector reform.

Monitoring and evaluation of the DDR program offer more than just analyzing measures of performance and effectiveness. Monitoring and evaluation teams render invaluable assistance to DDR operations by sharing best practices and directly assisting with program execution when needed. Additionally, the monitoring and evaluation final report provides insights for future DDR programs. In this manner, it creates an available archive for future DDR programs.

Chapter One – The Political-Military Context

The vast majority of DDR programs occur in the aftermath of an insurgency. Confronted by an enduring stalemate—sometimes lasting decades—insurgent and government leaders request a neutral party (normally the UN) to mediate the peace process. If successful, negotiations result in a peace agreement, which includes provisions for DDR and security sector reform. While the UN has overseen scores of such programs since the 1980s, the United States has rarely engaged in DDR.

In a few cases, limited DDR programs have ensued in the aftermath of a conflict, in which the United States or a US-led coalition supported insurgents and defeated the enemy government. Of note, the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo ended with substantial NATO occupation forces and demarcation lines separating the warring factions. DDR in Bosnia-Herzegovina partially applied to the Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats, while practically ignoring the Bosnian Serbs. Consequently, Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a de facto divided country. DDR in Kosovo was somewhat more effective since only Kosovar militia remained. In both cases, coalition authorities gave up on DDR and charged ahead with security sector reform. The combination of large NATO contingents and substantial ethnic cleansing had created stability, but enduring peace was by no means assured. In contrast, the overthrow of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the Qadhafi government in Libya resulted in relatively few or no occupation forces. Ignoring the Taliban militias, the NATO coalition (ISAF) tried to apply DDR to allied militias only,

with incomplete results and the resumption of an insurgency a few years later. In Libya, DDR became impossible because anarchy reigned, and still reigns (i.e., a Hobbesian environment). Hence, regardless of the circumstances leading to US intervention, the conditions must be set which promote the successful implementation of DDR.

As an aside and peripheral to DDR, in situations where the United States or US coalition has defeated an enemy country, a formal surrender is necessary. This is particularly so if the defeat results in regime change and occupation of the country. A formal surrender document and ceremony, with representation of US/coalition and enemy government officials, are paramount in signaling the official end of hostilities, acceptance of surrender terms, and a declaration of peaceful cooperation with occupation forces. Without official sanction, indigenous armed groups have no reason to stop fighting, so an environment of insecurity and mistrust continues. If some armed groups continue fighting after a formal surrender, they do so as insurgents and are subject to counterinsurgency operations. Accordingly, friendly militias should not undergo DDR until the emergency is over.

During an ongoing insurgency, DDR is ill-advised since insecurity pervades the country. If a DDR program is adopted, those groups and individuals who opt to go through DDR, along with their families, are targeted by active insurgents or are victims of pervasive mayhem. International mediation is nigh impossible because the UN and intervention forces are viewed as supporters of the host nation government and lose their neutral status.² For ongoing insurgencies, a national reconciliation program in conjunction with

counterinsurgency operations is more suitable, even if only a few militant groups (i.e., spoilers) remain active. A national reconciliation program requires host nation commitment, adequate resources, sophisticated information operations, and safe ways for insurgents to reconcile and resettle as individuals or groups. Most features of a national reconciliation program align with DDR programs, so once a country defeats an insurgency, it is well-positioned to conduct DDR (see endnote for more on national reconciliation programs).³

In the aftermath of a conventional or unconventional conflict resulting in regime change, US and coalition authorities normally establish military government (i.e., transitional military authority). DDR is not needed for enemy combatants. In accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict and Geneva conventions, enemy prisoners of war are incarcerated until processed and released back into society upon a formal surrender.⁴ While a formal surrender is authoritative, accompanying policy proclamations and ordinances serve to allay populace fears and acceptance of the military occupation (no matter how short). Formal peace treaties normally ensue years after the end of the conflict and may prescribe the size and composition of the armed forces for rearmament (e.g., Germany following the First and Second World Wars and Japan following the Second World War). A truncated form of DDR may occur for resistance groups in liberated countries, such as occurred in France, Italy, and Belgium during the Second World War, but the provisional government assumes responsibility for them.

DDR programs are unsuitable for disaster response and humanitarian assistance missions. In view of widespread instability and insecurity prevalent in such environments, armed individuals, criminal elements, and

militias are unlikely to disarm and demobilize voluntarily. A deployed military contingent, along with host nation security forces, may need to address threats, including forced disarmament. The mission leadership and host nation government may encourage weapon turn-ins but should not offer cash payments since this only serves to enrich arms traffickers.

Clearly, DDR programs are most appropriate for countries seeking a way out of a long insurgency. Both the government and the rebel leadership signal this desire by a willingness to engage in peace negotiations, with the goal of achieving a peace agreement.⁵ A finalized peace agreement is imperative, for without it, a DDR program is likely to fall short of expectations. In the wake of an incomplete DDR program, security sector reform programs become exponentially more difficult and time-consuming to implement.

For this reason, DDR is often associated with long-term security sector reform (SSR). The immediate objective of DDR is to establish security and a sense of confidence in the personal safety among former combatants. Disarmament and demobilization seek to achieve a stable environment through demilitarization. Reintegration seeks to prepare former combatants for reentry into society peacefully and to diminish the probability of recidivism or criminality. By implication, DDR creates the conditions for smaller, professional military and police forces (i.e., an SSR function). A secure environment permits the pursuit of security sector reform under the aegis of the rule of law: democratic government and constitutional reform; military reform; police reform; and judicial reform. DDR and SSR practitioners should keep abreast of each other's activities in order to avoid duplication and counter-

productive interference. In short, DDR and SSR practitioners should take care that their activities are mutually supporting.⁶

Even if the conditions are conducive for DDR, the enterprise is replete with challenges. A prolonged insurgency ruins the economy, severely disrupts the delivery of essential services, extensively damages infrastructure, and shreds the social fabric of communities. Widespread government corruption and incompetence are often the norm. Few professional figures (e.g., judges, lawyers, doctors, and teachers) may be available. The government and rebel forces are excessively large and well above reported estimates. Thus, such states are fairly fragile.⁷ Consequently, DDR programs require extensive planning, organization, resources, and funding.

Chapter Two – Organizing and Planning For DDR

Whenever US senior policy makers direct the implementation of DDR in a foreign country, the Department of State has policy oversight over assistance, with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other State Department offices primarily responsible for implementing DDR programs.⁸ When directed to support DDR, the Department of Defense can furnish planning, organizing abilities, and resources by standing up a DDR task force. In this capacity, the US military possesses significant resources, experienced planning staffs, and manpower to assist with DDR programs. Traditionally, the military establishes security and manages disarmament and demobilization programs, while civilian organizations focus on reintegration programs; however, the military remains engaged with all aspects of DDR programs to render assistance where needed.⁹ Due to various legal restrictions on foreign assistance funding, the Department of State provides guidance on prohibitions and authorizations for various parts of DDR programs. As such, the DDR task force legal and finance sections must scrutinize the funding guidance before US government funds are obligated.¹⁰

DDR Partners

Whenever the military assumes a large role in a DDR program and organizes as a DDR task force, it should reach out to potential partners for mutual support. Aside from US departments, bureaus, and agencies

(particularly the State Department and USAID), a host of international organizations, nongovernment organizations, multinational partners, and host nation entities can render invaluable funding, assistance, and experience. Normally, funding for DDR is underestimated, so identifying donors and financial resources is a critical factor for completing reintegration.¹¹ For simplicity, this study refers to all participating organizations as DDR partners, which can contribute to one or more portions of the DDR program. Due to their expertise and experience, Department of State and USAID officials should interact with and coordinate support from international organizations, nongovernment organizations, and host nation entities.

The most prominent international organization is the United Nations (UN), which commonly establishes a UN Peacekeeping Mission for DDR, authorized under the United Nations Charter (i.e., Chapter VI or VII).¹² Its involvement in interventions adds legitimacy because it maintains a stance of neutrality, thereby fostering trust. The UN and its Department of Peace Operations (UN DPO) have decades of experience in DDR programs and have a broad body of knowledge. UN DPO can provide seasoned staffs, logistical capabilities (e.g., equipment, transportation, and engineers), and assistance to public information activities. Its *Operational Guideline to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards* serves as a fundamental field guide.¹³ The UN and the World Bank manage trust funds from donors dedicated to DDR, so they have fewer legal restrictions and less complexity than US government legal requirements. However, the UN does not fund reintegration, and funding lags are common. As a funding option, the US government can participate in World Bank “parallel trust fund”

processes. Consequently, the DDR task force finance staff section must track all the funding mechanisms to ensure the DDR program is fiscally sustained and responsive throughout.¹⁴

Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) and civil society organizations represent a host of private and nonprofit sub-organizations providing a variety of services of potential assistance to DDR programs. NGOs can attract donors in support of demobilization and reintegration activities. They can provide expertise and training workshops on organizational and planning considerations, as well as furnishing management, logistical, and communications support for demobilization processes. Further, many NGOs specialize on care for medical needs, women and girls, child soldiers, and disabled veterans, among other humanitarian efforts. While search engine results provide information on NGOs, USAID should assume the lead for contacting and requesting their participation.¹⁵

Depending on the situation, multinational or coalition forces may participate in DDR. They operate under home government funding and operational restrictions, so the DDR task force must understand their mission parameters. Similarly, region organizations, such as the African Union and the European Union, may contribute directly or indirectly to DDR. For example, regional organizations may provide peacekeepers or assist in the policing of the host nation's borders to prevent the illicit movement of arms and militias, as well as preventing the establishment of militant enclaves in neighboring countries. Border security enhances warring faction confidence in a safe environment, thereby encouraging participation in disarmament and demobilization.¹⁶

To demonstrate commitment and ownership of DDR, the host nation government should establish a fully resourced ministry of reintegration. Compared to funding and resourcing the war effort, the host nation government can well afford the fractional cost of the new ministry. The US government must make clear that host nation government failure to commit to DDR could result in the withdrawal of US participation.¹⁷ The ministry would oversee host nation DDR-related funding, public affairs (i.e., media), charity donations (e.g., clothing and shoes), basic education, vocational training, logistics (e.g., transportation, site construction, site utilities services, and food service), resettlement, and liaison personnel to the DDR task force, DDR support centers, and reintegration cantonments. The ministry of reintegration establishes offices in sub-national government administrations (e.g., provinces and districts) in order to coordinate and manage DDR activities at the local level. By mutual agreement, representatives from insurgent forces should participate in ministry of reintegration planning.¹⁸ If needed, the US government may assign ministerial advisors to assist counterparts.¹⁹

Unity of Effort

In view of the diverse number of organizations (and organizational cultures) involved in DDR, unity of effort becomes a predominate organizational challenge. The DDR task force commander must oversee the staff's development of a task organization which includes all DDR partners. For the DDR task force, command and control is less important than its coordinating and cooperation functions.²⁰ While the military provides

support, DDR is essentially implemented by civilian organizations. As such, the DDR task force requires a senior Department of State political advisor and a senior USAID advisor in order to interface with the host nation government authorities, insurgent leaders, militia leaders, international organizations, and NGOs. While the host nation government may have diminished capacity, it is the primary partner and must assume ownership of the DDR program. Abundant DDR partners can devote sufficient technical, organizational, planning, and logistical assistance to the host nation government, civil society, and local communities, so they can manage the DDR program without being overwhelmed.²¹

The DDR task force invites the senior representatives of the host nation government and insurgent forces, as well as DDR partners to participate in regular meetings in order to harmonize diverse policies, coordinate activities, reduce redundant or conflicting activities, share information, and resolve issues. Determining the host nation government's role in the DDR program is crucial for buy-in and cooperation, both at the national and local community levels. The overall goal is to promote a transparent, coherent strategy which embraces all DDR partners. The DDR task force should manage a sharable data storage site (e.g., The Cloud) accessible to all DDR partners for operational planning and coordination.²² Because of the sensitive information on the sharable storage site, the DDR task force must establish a cyber security policy for all DDR partners to follow. NGOs often work in specific regions in the country for decades, so they have a plethora of experience and knowledge to offer. Some international organizations and NGOs may limit or refuse cooperation with military forces in order to maintain their neu-

tral status.²³ Regardless, the DDR task force seeks to foster congenial relations through interaction in order to promote cooperation.

DDR Strategy Planning

DDR strategy planning should begin at the commencement of peace negotiations. Of import, DDR partners specify their contributions to the DDR program: designated personnel numbers to DDR support centers in support of DDR sites; earmarked funding; and material contributions. The deliberate decision-making process, including mission analysis and strategy formulation, is a forte for military planners. Among military commanders and staffs, the orders process is the norm and easily digested. However, civilian organizations would find detailed operations orders perplexing and frustrating. For them, a DDR planning matrix (Annex A) and annotated map display (Figure 1) would be most useful and comprehensible. A planning matrix captures the comprehensive activities of all DDR partners by displaying: time-tables, tasks, responsibilities, allotted resources, and special instructions. Additionally, the planning matrix and annotated map are most useful for government and insurgent leaders, providing transparency and a viable plan of action to foster trust and confidence in the DDR strategy and implementation. To enhance confidence and perceived fairness, the DDR program should aim for concurrent implementation of all warring factions. To forestall delays, the use of liaison officer teams and DDR support centers identifies problems early and resolves them quickly at the lowest levels.²⁴ As an admonition, a poorly planned or executed DDR program may result

in a resurgence in fighting, so the DDR task force must have well-designed and resourced DDR sites for speed of execution and efficiency.²⁵




Figure 1: Idealized Schematic of DDR Plan

In terms of assigning priorities and aligning resources, DDR planners must recognize that the conflict did not affect all areas of the country equally. Some areas will be devastated, while others have suffered little or not at all. Obviously, the most severely impacted areas should receive priority of effort.²⁶ However, even slightly impacted areas require attention since reintegration and resettlement of ex-combatants will affect them as well. As such, relatively untouched communities may be more willing to accept former combatants as residents and perhaps provide volunteers for reintegration programs.

While DDR planning and logistical support is centralized, implementation of DDR is always decentralized at the local level, meaning local ownership of the DDR program is essential.²⁷ Irrespective of the detailed planning and coordination at the DDR task force level, effective DDR implementation can only occur at the tactical level. One organization technique to garner greater cooperation among DDR partners at the local level is the DDR support center.


DDR Support Centers

Since DDR programs require decentralized implementation, the establishment of a DDR support center near each DDR site promotes greater partner cooperation and orientation at the local level.²⁸ Modeled on the provincial reconstruction team design, a DDR support center requires a level, spacious field with good drainage. Improved roads and nearby airfields are needed for assured access. The center offers a convenient and safe place for DDR partners to enhance coordination, cooperation, and collaboration.²⁹

At a minimum, a center includes office space for: headquarters, operations/intelligence, logistics, communications (i.e., HF and VHF radios, computers with internet access, and satellite and cell phones), engineers, public affairs, finance, legal, postal, medical, police, liaison officers, translators/interpreters, monitoring and evaluation, and facilities manager. The facilities manager office assigns accommodations, manages meeting room schedules, utilities services (e.g., water, electricity, and waste disposal), and general maintenance and repairs. Common facilities include: accommodations, showers/latrine, office space, meeting rooms, conference room, motor park, vehicle main-

tenance, fuel point, supply warehouse, fitness, dining, internet, and recreation/relaxation. Accordingly, office furniture, supplies, and other accessories are necessary (Figure 2). A weapons storage container is needed for DDR participants wishing to retain their personally owned weapons. Accommodating DDR partners in DDR support centers facilities flexibility and adaptation as local conditions change and local solutions are more suitable.³⁰

Because of their unique capabilities, trained civil affairs personnel should manage the DDR support centers, minimizing any military features. The Department of State and USAID have a prominent presence in the centers and share the leadership role in meetings, discussions, and planning. The idea is to combine the strengths of the military—organization, planning, and resources—with the extensive experience and expertise of civilian organizations. Civilianization of DDR support centers creates an environment that encourages the participation of civilian organizations by establishing rapport and trust. While the US military's devotion to temperance is admirable, DDR partners do not share that prohibition. A lounge serving beer and wine, with a limit of two drinks per person, would be a welcome compromise. Often, informal gatherings over food and beverages are more productive than formal meetings. The principal advantage of a center is to provide services that will attract all DDR partners. Social interaction on a daily basis is an effective way to break down organizational cultural barriers and garner greater cooperation and collaboration.³¹



Support Center Main Facilities:

1. Main Office Complex*
2. Maintenance Facility
3. Metro Pool/Parking areas
4. Administration Offices
5. Living Quarters
6. Dining Facilities
7. Warehouse
8. Generators
9. Internet Center
10. Clinic and Visitors Quarters
11. Medical Clinic
12. Shower and Bath facilities
13. Ceremony Ground/sports field
14. Multi-purpose complex
15. Cargo Unloading Area
16. Convoy Access Gate
17. Pedestrian Entrance
18. Service Road

- * Main Office Complex
 - a. Directory/executive offices
 - b. Main conference room
 - c. Communication
 - d. Internet Center
 - e. Support Staff (Main floor)
 - f. NGO/IGO office space
 - g. Alternate Conf. Room
 - h. Main Entrance

-  58 by 58 foot re-locatable
-  33 by 35 foot re-locatable (750- Personnel bed down)
-  13 by 16 foot re-locatable
-  15 by 60 containerized wash and bath unit

Figure 2. Idealized DDR Support Center

DDR programs are civilian-led with the military supporting the effort. Disarmament and demobilization sites are expeditious, standardized operations, so civilian management is less an issue. However, reintegration cantonments operate under direct civilian management over an extended period. As the implementation agency for US foreign policy, USAID is apt for the management of reintegration cantonments. These arrangements do not imply that the military has a passive role. The military is part of the whole of government team, so active interaction is crucial to the practical implementation of DDR programs.

The central activity of a DDR support center is formulating plans and providing resources for the implementation of the DDR program in its assigned area. The design of the disarmament site, the demobilization site, and reintegration cantonment is the initial mission task. Liaison officer teams provide the crucial information on the numbers of DDR participants and numbers of weapons by category, which determine the required number of DDR sites, as well as the size and resourcing of each disarmament and demobilization site and reintegration cantonment. DDR site survey teams select areas relatively close to the rebel consolidation camps for the disarmament and demobilization sites and the reintegration cantonment. A large part of planning is dedicated to eliciting the assistance of all DDR partners in support of the sites/cantonment. Identifying and coordinating the resources DDR partners can bring to the table ultimately spell the difference between success or failure in the mission. Since past DDR programs have faltered as a result of insufficient time and funding, planners focus on creating efficiencies in execution and defraying costs. The DDR support center commander places emphasis on the contributions

of DDR partners to the enterprise. The bywords for well-functioning teamwork are relationships, rapport, and cooperation.

Although the DDR support center directly supports the disarmament and demobilization sites, the majority of effort is oriented towards the reintegration cantonment. For reintegration, the center provides: the medical personnel and equipment for the clinic; DDR partner personnel for teachers, instructors, and counsellors; DDR partner material donations; classes of supply (e.g., construction materials, shelters, food, and office furniture); contracting services (e.g., waste disposal, water, generators, and security); fire-fighting equipment and personnel; and administrative support (e.g., personnel, printing, paper, computers, and electronic devices). Basically, the center provides all services and logistics for DDR sites to function.³²

Quick erection, modular shelters permit the establishment of a center within a week. Since most DDR missions are prolonged, shelters may be eventually replaced with modified metal connexes. Security measures are normally necessary to protect DDR personnel and supplies. The construction of barrier walls may raise concerns among DDR partners because they connote military camps. The DDR task force leadership must address this necessity with DDR partners to reach consensus. A simple wire barrier with lights might suffice to prevent intrusions. To relieve military personnel of DDR support center security tasks, private security companies may serve this function in an unobtrusive manner. Mostly, they serve to control vehicle and pedestrian traffic to and from the center, as well as a deterrent from pilferage of warehouse facilities. Normally, a small military contingent requires space at the

center to serve as local security for DDR sites and as a quick reaction force. The DDR support center leadership should select an unobtrusive area within the compound to accommodate the military contingent and permit quick access to and from the center.³³

Chapter Three – Preliminary Activities during Peace Negotiations or the Immediate Aftermath of a Peace Agreement

Normally in the aftermath of an insurgency and at the request of the host nation government, UN mediators oversee peace negotiations between the host nation government and insurgent leaders for the purpose of establishing a mutually beneficial peace agreement, with the eligibility criteria, security arrangements, and the DDR implementation program embedded in the agreement. Because participation in DDR is voluntary, the security arrangements and the DDR implementation plan are essential to establishing warring factions' confidence in personal safety and proffered reintegration benefits.³⁴ Peace negotiations culminating in a peace agreement may take months, so the DDR task force should use this time to organize and coordinate DDR program activities.³⁵

The experience of earlier DDR programs reveals that female combatants were denied participation in peace negotiations, DDR benefits, and an opportunity to serve in the government ministries, military forces, and police services. Because of their substantial contributions to the patriotic cause and indispensable support to DDR, female leaders and selected female representatives from all warring factions must have unfettered participation in peace negotiations and the drafting of DDR provisions in the peace agreement. Female fighters frequently gain emancipation, eminence, and respect during a conflict, so their investment in the peace process is essential for the productive reintegration of all eligible females. Several UN Women, Peace,

and Security resolutions recognize the international rights of women to secure specific provisions in the peace agreement and to enjoy the full benefits of the DDR program (i.e., power-sharing, resource-sharing, security arrangements, access to justice, and monitoring). To assist women during peace negotiations and the DDR program, military gender advisors from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations are part of the mission. Thus, the UN mediator will insist on full female representation during peace negotiations, so as to secure full participation and benefits for them in DDR.³⁶

Specifying the eligibility criteria in the peace agreement is instrumental for DDR planners and implementers, because DDR is so expansive. The DDR program is not limited to combatants carrying weapons; it also includes auxiliary and support personnel of all ages and genders: voluntary or impressed laborers and porters, sex slaves, spies, domestic caretakers, nurses, farmers, foragers, administrators, and logisticians. Identifying female insurgents for the DDR program is often difficult because insurgent leaders and colleagues may seek to exclude them due to cultural bias, self-interest (e.g., retaining them as wives, servants, or slaves), and fear of prosecution for sexual exploitation. Hence, female combatants (adults and children) may be unaware of the DDR program or wish to avoid participation out of shame and fear of social stigmatization if they were sex slaves. They may have served as fighters, auxiliary personnel, girlfriends and “wives” (forced or willingly), family matriarchs, and leaders. A substantial number of combatants have self-demobilized (e.g., estranged female combatants, disabled veterans, elderly veterans, and war widows); they are often forgotten and destitute. The public awareness program and liaison

officer teams must inform all qualified people that they have the right to participate in the DDR program.³⁷

Child soldiers comprise a substantial part of insurgent groups. Identifying child soldiers and the circumstances behind their recruitment (voluntary, kidnapped, or impressed) helps DDR planners arrange for their separation from the military chain of command, for care, and for special processing once the DDR program begins. A child soldier is anyone under 18 years of age, whether impressed or not. Because the impressment of children is a war crime under international law, insurgent leaders are not forthcoming regarding children in the ranks. The peace agreement should include provisions for the inclusion of child soldiers in the DDR program. Frequently, during prolonged insurgencies, adult combatants were impressed as children, as young as eight years old. Aside from experiencing the trauma of conflict, child soldiers are often sexually assaulted by fellow insurgents, so psychological counselling is crucial to their reintegration into society.³⁸

Determining the graduated benefits packages for senior leaders, subordinate leaders, and junior enlisted fighters, as well as single parents, families, disabled veterans, elderly veterans, and widows, requires meticulous staff work since they are major inducements for DDR participation – and they are expensive. While some benefits are fungible, such as basic education, vocational training, medical treatment, counselling, and take-home packages, money garners the most attention during peace negotiations. Female and child soldiers are a special category and require additional financial assistance. Finance personnel must maintain a running breakdown of costs by category and advise the DDR task force command and staff of available

funds and deficits. Past DDR experience suggests that reintegration falls short of completion due to the exhaustion of funding, so early identification of funding shortfalls allows the DDR task force and DDR partners time and rationale for increased donations.³⁹

US civilian and military officials should be involved as observers during peace negotiations and provide expertise when queried. Accordingly, DDR task force planners, with input from DDR partners, should craft the DDR provisions for the peace agreement, attach the DDR planning matrix, and provide an annotated map showing the DDR sites. This participation provides an opportunity for US officials to interact and establish rapport with all stakeholders. Insurgent leaders often inflate the number of fighters and weapons as bargaining chips during negotiations. Then, they deflate the same numbers upon signing the peace agreement so as to retain a personal militia. Either way, their information is unreliable.⁴⁰ Consequently, the DDR task force should employ liaison officer teams to attain accurate numbers.

Establishing Immediate Security

In the aftermath of insurgencies, the initial task of peacekeeping/intervention forces is the physical separation of the government and insurgent forces to monitor and enforce the ceasefire. The consolidation of former insurgents into temporary camps, away from active combat zones, gives them an added sense of safety and helps prepare them for the DDR program. The number of camps depends on the number of distinct insurgent groups. Because of existing ani-

mosities, DDR support centers avoid consolidating different insurgent groups into one temporary camp. DDR officials and liaison officer teams must emphasize to encamped former insurgents that the stay in the camps is a prelude to DDR and will be as short as possible. While technical means (i.e., aerial surveillance) supplement the monitoring of government and rebel activities, ground forces are needed to verify compliance. Zones of separation increase their security, especially if monitored by US troops, coalition troops, and international civilian police. To increase confidence in established security, representatives from the former warring factions may visit patrol command posts in their sector. Checkpoints on established thoroughfares permit legitimate pedestrian traffic and commerce. All other lanes and roads are temporarily blocked as a means to prevent illicit traffic and potential adversarial infiltrations. Accordingly, regular patrols, observation posts, and security positions require sufficient manning to deter any nefarious activities while the combatants are in their camps.⁴¹

The employment of host government national police to secure zones of separation is detrimental to the DDR program because rebels do not trust them; they should remain in their assigned communities for the sake of maintaining public order and preventing the emergence of a security vacuum. In view of their neutral and trusted standing, international security forces are needed to create the conditions for DDR participants' security and confidence in the DDR program. In some situations, local police may enjoy the trust of respective forces, so joint international and local police patrols would prove beneficial.⁴² Once the DDR program is complete, the DDR task force removes the zones of separation.

Liaison Officer Teams

Liaison officer teams are the most assured way to gain accurate information on insurgent numbers and weapons. Warring factions' acceptance of liaison officer teams demonstrates a commitment to DDR. During peace negotiations, the DDR task force commander should introduce liaison officer team leaders to warring faction leaders as a way of preparing for DDR activities. DDR officials should carefully select liaison officers who are personable, able to work independently, and comfortable with uncertainty. Liaison officers build rapport and trust with faction leaders for the purpose of gaining their permission to have liaison officer teams visit the rebel consolidation camps. Establishing trust is paramount since rebel leaders may be reticent to reveal the size and composition of their forces, as well as the quantity and types of weapons. Liaison officers explain that their purpose is to provide information for the efficient reception and processing of their fighters at DDR sites (although monitoring activities are implied). Since all liaison officer teams are gathering information, greater transparency is achieved, thereby increasing confidence in the security aspects of the DDR program.⁴³

These faction leaders should accompany and introduce the liaison officer teams to their encamped units. As part of the introduction to camp personnel, the liaison officer team leader explains the purpose of the DDR program, the proposed timetable for implementation, and the planned benefits for reintegration. The size of the liaison team is tailored to available transportation, portable supplies (i.e., food and water), and

work/living accommodations (i.e., small shelters, field desks, and communications). In short, it must be large enough to accomplish its tasks while remaining as unobtrusive as possible.

The liaison officer team includes female members to interact with and solicit information from female combatants, both adults and children. The inclusion of a few NGO and international organization personnel, particularly if they have experience in the geographic area, is beneficial for building trust and assisting in the identification of female and child soldiers, disabled combatants, auxiliary personnel, and families. The liaison officer team should encourage frequent visits by NGO and international organizations for the purpose of delivering aid and protecting female and child soldiers. Such NGO and international organizations activities continue throughout the DDR program. Since immediate access to consolidation camps is essential, NGO and international organizations personnel should operate out of the DDR support centers.⁴⁴

Building and maintaining rapport with rebel personnel is essential since the liaison team needs their cooperation in determining accurate data. Ensuring encamped personnel have adequate food, water, shelter, and emergency medical care assists in building trust and keeping them in the camp. Informing the DDR support center of camp conditions alerts NGO and international organizations of the kind of assistance needed.⁴⁵

The number and composition of former combatants, as well as the number and types of weapons, are the overriding priority for data collection. Liaison team personnel explain that this information is important for ascertaining the amount of needed support for each

DDR site. Team members request available rosters of personnel and weapons for recording. Since the peace agreement includes former insurgents designated for the new armed forces and police, the liaison team gathers a prioritized list of volunteer candidates from the rebel leadership. The liaison officer team provides this list to the DDR support center staff for vetting purposes. Military and police candidates are an important part of the peace agreement because insurgent leaders may seek to increase their influence and representation in the new government. While service in the military and police is a security sector reform issue, the DDR support center staff and liaison officer team should vet candidates for obvious disqualifications (e.g., human rights violations, corruption, or infirmities), ensure the numbers accord with the peace agreement, and verify they meet gender or ethnic diversity guidelines. Insurgent leaders must replace unsuitable candidates or agree to provide fewer candidates for the military or police. The liaison officer team collects the biometrics (pictures and fingerprints) of candidates and explains that they will proceed to the training centers following the demobilization ceremony.⁴⁶

Past DDR experience reveals that the aggregate number of insurgents is vastly underestimated at the conclusion of peace negotiations. Liaison officer teams are therefore key in furnishing DDR planners with accurate information, which determines the number and size of DDR sites, in addition to the amount of administrative and logistical support required for each DDR site.⁴⁷ Liaison officer teams must ensure all available personnel are aware of the eligibility criteria and explain that those who qualify have the right to participate and receive DDR benefits. Female members in the liaison officer team, NGOs, and international or-

ganizations are most effective in eliciting information from female insurgents regarding their particular status. Such interactions with female fighters may prove useful in identifying other female adults and children reluctant to come forward. Self-demobilized fighters are often absent from the consolidation camps, so the liaison officer teams must ascertain their whereabouts for transportation to the reintegration cantonment.⁴⁸

The numbers and calibers of weapons are often vastly underestimated during peace negotiations. Identifying crew-served weapons, light and armored vehicles, large caliber individual weapons, and munitions in the encampments, depots, and caches provides the necessary information for administering the disarmament sites. The quantity and types of weapons and munitions determine the amount of support needed at the disarmament site for record collection, packing, and transportation. The liaison officer team should be well versed on weapon categories for accurate recording. The DDR task force command must provide guidance on the disposition of small arms (i.e., rifles and pistols) in view of cultural mores and individual rights.⁴⁹

A gun culture is prevalent in many societies, either for self-defense, defense of the family, or prestige. Since relinquishing personal weapons is voluntary during disarmament, the liaison officer team must determine the number of small arms for turn-in and the number for personal retention. For those wishing to retain their personal weapons, arrangements for the temporary storage during the DDR program is necessary, ideally at the DDR support center. Offering cash payments for weapons as an incentive is counterproductive. Such a program often results in the delivery of obsolete and

unserviceable weapons; sellers will then have money to buy better weapons, thereby creating an arms-trafficking market, which includes traffickers outside of the country. To forestall a mercenary mentality with disarmament, the liaison officer team emphasizes that participation in DDR includes individual reintegration benefits, as well as various assistance, reconstruction, and development projects for local communities. Food for guns programs may also serve as an immediate incentive.⁵⁰ Regardless of the host government's gun control laws, the DDR task force must make clear that it will not collude in completely disarming the populace.

The liaison officer team should exploit the use of existing technology and biometrics to record accurate information on former combatants and weapons. Drones and other technical means can alert the teams to the presence of weapon systems outside of the temporary camp for investigation and positive control. Digital pictures, electronic fingerprint devices, and the recording of names are uploaded into a sharable data storage site (e.g., The Cloud). Depending on available time, the team collection of biometrics and uploading on the data storage site helps speed up in-processing at DDR sites and helps thwart fraudulent infiltrators seeking DDR benefits.⁵¹

The liaison officer team should provide encamped personnel with frequent updates on the peace negotiations, the details of the peace agreement, the intent of transitional justice processes, and the status of DDR program preparations. Since rumors invariably circulate in camps, liaison officer team members should solicit and address such hearsay in order to allay fears and maintain morale. Daily interpersonal contacts with en-

camped personnel serves to build trust and confidence in the DDR program. For control and coordination, warring faction command structures should remain in place until reaching the demobilization site.⁵² Finally, the liaison officer team should coordinate transportation requirements with the DDR support center and accompany the former combatants to the disarmament site, the demobilization ceremony, and the reintegration cantonment.⁵³

DDR Site Surveys

Once the DDR support center planners have a good idea of the number of participants involved in DDR program, they deploy site survey teams for designated disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration cantonment locations. These DDR sites should be located relatively close to the rebel consolidation camps and within the zone of separation. Each site must be large enough to accommodate the participants with a degree of separation from the sister sites to avoid congestion and confusion. Engineers are best suited to locate sites that have the following features: access from major roads, relatively flat and large fields with good drainage, and a nearby airfield if possible. While existing facilities at proposed DDR sites (i.e., warehouses and stadiums) are desirable, they must not be the sole determinate for the selection of site locations. For the demobilization site, some shelters for shade, temporary stands for local observers, and stage platforms are fast to erect and dismantle (see demobilization section). Survey teams pay particular attention to the location and size of reintegration cantonments, since they require substantial logistical support and preparation (see reintegration cantonment section).⁵⁴

Site survey teams should visit nearby communities to solicit paid labor for site preparation, construction equipment, possible food and beverage catering, site guides and guest speaker escorts, music or bands, administrative support, and transportation. Optimizing local resources and labor defrays costs and logistical support which the DDR task force would otherwise need to ship in. The liaison officer teams meet with the site survey teams on locale to discuss the number of participants and to gain a greater understanding of the layout.

Site survey teams brief the DDR task force command and staff, as well as the DDR support center leadership on site locations, layout diagrams, pictures or overhead imagery, anticipated shortfalls, and recommendations. Force requirements for site security are also raised for decision.

Chapter Four – Peace Agreement Activities

By signing a peace agreement, the former warring factions commit to new political arrangements. This includes political power-sharing at all levels of government, judicial reforms, participatory government, socio-economic reforms, representation in the armed forces and police services, amnesty provisions,* and transitional justice processes. Explicit provisions for the DDR program in the peace agreement are instrumental in sustaining the momentum of the peace process. The peace agreement must specify the eligibility criteria and underscore the rights, safeguards, and well-being of female and child soldiers as an integral part of DDR. The signing of the peace agreement actuates the immediate implementation of DDR, so the preliminary activities should be complete.⁵⁵ DDR officials should remain alert to attempts among former warring faction leaders to place additional loyal subordinates in important government, military, and police positions, in contravention of the peace agreement. While the vast majority of this maneuvering lies in the domain of security sector reform, DDR implementers must strictly ensure that former warring factions adhere to the numbers designated for the government, military, and police. This area underscores the information collected by liaison officer teams.

* Amnesty provisions are controversial, so the DDR task force legal section must provide guidance on the prohibitions and conditions for amnesty. For a discussion on amnesty as part of a DDR program, see: Mark Freeman, "Amnesties and DDR Programs," in *Disarming the Past: Transitional Justice and Ex-combatants*, ed. Ana Cutter Patel, Pablo de Greiff & Lars Waldorf, International Center for Transitional Justice (2009), 37-48.

Again, for transparency, equal treatment of all factions, and ease of understanding, DDR planners attach the DDR planning matrix to the peace agreement. They also provide the principal leaders with annotated maps depicting the zones of separation, permitted passage points through the zones of separation, temporary consolidation camps, and DDR sites with implementation dates. This transparency serves to increase confidence in the security arrangements and in the competency of the DDR officials.⁵⁶

In addition to DDR activities and international roles included in the peace agreement, a memorandum of agreement between the host government and US/coalition representatives establishes the parameters of the relationship.⁵⁷ Since the memorandum is a legal document, the DDR task force legal staff section and host nation government counterparts reach agreement on areas germane to DDR implementation, such as support centers, area access for DDR personnel, legal jurisdictions, real estate for DDR sites, and host government support for the DDR programs.⁵⁸

Public Awareness Program

The public awareness program also reflects the host government's commitment to DDR. While the host government ministry of reintegration manages the program, DDR task force public affairs personnel should indirectly supervise its implementation. When needed, public affairs provide logistical support and expertise to the program. The purpose is to ensure the populace is fully informed of the peace agreement and the DDR program.⁵⁹

The scope of the public awareness program depends on host government and local community commitment, motivation, assistance, and funding. As the host government and local communities may lack capacity, experience, resources, and zeal for the program, DDR task force public affairs personnel must practice patience, persistence, and optimism. Host nation professional journalists and public personalities must craft and deliver the messages because they possess the requisite linguistic and cultural skills to connect with audiences. Specific messages for female and child soldiers, war widows, elderly veterans, and disabled veterans are also needed in view of their unique circumstances.⁶⁰ Messaging should include: announcement of the peace agreement; announcement of the purpose, objectives, and benefits of the DDR program; DDR eligibility criteria; dates and locations for DDR sites; and public safety warnings.⁶¹

Frequent announcements of the peace agreement notify all concerned that fighting has ceased. While news programs and newspapers provide the highlights, publication and dissemination of the full peace agreement to local communities are necessary. Outreach includes friends and relatives of insurgents, who remain in contact and can inform them of the DDR program. A public fully informed of the peace agreement is less susceptible to rumors, misinformation from spoilers, and misunderstandings. The immediate goal is to encourage the general population to turn-in small arms and munitions to disarmament sites and report their locations by stressing the establishment of a safe and secure environment.⁶²

Few will know what a DDR program (including benefits and transitional justice processes) entails, so

public announcements must provide sufficient detail to forestall misunderstandings.⁶³ Some former insurgents (e.g., disabled veterans, elderly veterans, and widows) may not have entered the consolidation camps, and insurgent leaders may wish to exclude female and child soldiers from the DDR program. Female combatants may hesitate to participate in DDR in view of the social stigma associated with female fighters. Child soldiers must know that their recruitment is illegal and should cooperate with DDR officials. Hence, the announcements must include eligibility criteria to maximize participation.⁶⁴ To deter ineligible participation for those seeking benefits, communications must mention vetting procedures. The activation date and location for each DDR site alerts the populace of local DDR activities, thereby precluding potential candidates from traveling to the wrong locale or on the wrong date. Broadcasts must include explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) warnings against picking up unexploded ordinance and land mines as a matter of public safety.⁶⁵ The delivery of tape markers to local communities and instructions for the populace to mark such ordinance and inform local authorities of locations should suffice. Local authorities should report such information to the nearest DDR support center for action.

The program should maximize all means of dissemination. Television, radio, and newspapers are the prevalent venues, with supplemental leaflets to rural areas. Internet social media platforms and mobile phone text messaging are also effective propagation means.⁶⁶ Leaflets featuring cartoons and pictures are more effective for illiterate segments of the population. Government authorities should provide DDR details to local communities (i.e., mayors, religious figures, journalists, and businessmen), as well as participating

in town hall meetings. Broadcast interviews of government and DDR officials, former insurgent leaders, and select DDR participants (including female and child soldiers) add greater credibility to the program. While loudspeaker broadcasts mounted on aircraft or trucks have been used in the past, the sound is often garbled and hence of limited effectiveness.

Publicity of each phase—disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration—is essential. Viewing the progress in the program, insurgent and government forces, their families and relatives, and the populace at large grow more confident that security and normalcy are returning. News stories on DDR participants, DDR officials, host nation government leaders, and engaged community leaders reinforce public understanding of the program and acceptance of former fighters returning to their local communities.⁶⁷ The public awareness program should also solicit voluntary assistance from citizens in support of the DDR sites, particularly for reintegration.

Chapter Five – Disarmament

The objective of disarmament is to establish an immediate climate of security and safety, so citizens can pursue their interests without fear of attack and general anxiety. Understandably, disarmament receives top priority in DDR. Effective disarmament includes all the major warring factions, as well as militias and other security groups which arose as a result of the insurgency. DDR officials must ensure that disarmament is fully transparent, widely publicized throughout the country, and equally administered to all warring factions (i.e., all insurgent and government forces, militias, and self-defense groups).⁶⁸

The separation of warring factions, insertion of neutral security forces, introduction of liaison officer teams, and the public awareness program should have established a sense of security and confidence in the disarmament program.⁶⁹ Liaison officer teams should have provided the DDR task force command and DDR support centers with a solid idea of the number of participants and weapons for each DDR site. Hence, once the DDR sites are activated, the implementation process should proceed quickly. The liaison officer team should plan the movement and escort the rebel group from the consolidation camp to the disarmament site, as well as keeping the DDR support center apprised of the estimated time of arrival. Since time is of the essence, completing disarmament as quickly as possible requires meticulous planning. Upon arrival, the liaison officer team places insurgent leaders at the front of the line, verifies that all weapons and magazines are unloaded, and renders assistance to the operation of the

disarmament site.⁷⁰

As the initial phase of DDR, disarmament entails the swift separation, collection, documentation, transportation, storage, and disposal of weapons, weapon systems, munitions, and equipment. While some collected weapons and repair parts may be reused for the new military and police services, the vast majority are earmarked for destruction. Most DDR literature specifies small arms and light weapons (SALW) but does not differentiate between personal weapons for self-protection and for military purposes.⁷¹ To emphasize, disarmament is a voluntary act and self-defense is a universal right, so DDR officials do not compel participants to turn-in their personally owned weapons. If amenable, participants may turn-in, register, and tag personally owned weapons for safekeeping until graduating from the DDR program. The DDR support center is a secure location for the temporary storage of such weapons in lockable International Standardization Organization (ISO) containers. Irrespective of the host nation's gun control laws, the DDR task force strives to foster a restoration of normalcy and nonviolence. The elimination of military SALW, heavy weapons, munitions, and explosives achieves the major objective of disarmament.⁷²

For speed and efficiency, a well-organized disarmament site is essential (Figure 3). The site survey for the disarmament site provides sufficient space, drainage, and access roads. The weapons turn-in process is accelerated by establishing separate turn-in lanes by weapon categories: 1) small arms and light weapons, including ammunition; 2) heavy machine guns and portable rockets, including ammunition; 3) light mortars and mines, including ammunition; and 4) weapon

systems and vehicles (i.e., tanks, armored personnel vehicles, heavy mortars, artillery, and trucks). Those participants without weapons form into a designated lane for a guide to escort them directly to the demobilization site. Signs for lanes likely require words and symbols depending on the literacy level of the participants. Documentation is simplified by noting the name of fighter, type of weapon, serial number (if legible), and disarmament site designator, using either paper forms, laptop computers, or other electronic devices (see endnote).⁷³ Interpreters from the DDR support center should assist with the proper spelling of names.

Uploading the data on a sharable data storage site (e.g., The Cloud) simplifies tracking and subsequent in-processing.⁷⁴ Because ordinary civilians may bring in abandoned weapons and munitions, a separate collection facility or lane is necessary to ensure they do not accidentally intermingle with DDR participants. Upon handing in their weapons/munitions, DDR participants immediately follow guides to the nearby demobilization site.⁷⁵

The liaison officer team and chief of the disarmament site should ask the DDR task force for guidance on the disposal of individual military gear (e.g., ruck sacks, load bearing equipment, knives, and radios). If earmarked for disposal, the collection lanes need separate crates for such items. Combatants retain their uniforms until exchanged for civilian clothes at the reintegration cantonment.⁷⁶




Figure 3. Idealized Disarmament Site

Because theft of turned-in weapons and munitions has plagued earlier DDR programs, sufficient security measures are required until they are properly disposed. Assigned DDR personnel physically supervise the documentation and crating of weapons and munitions to deter pilferage. Crates are marked and reflected on documentation for chain of custody. Armed escorts and convoy commanders for cargo trucks transporting collected weapons to the central collection/disposal facility are a necessary precaution against brigands. The central collection/disposal facility must have multiple security measures to safeguard weapons and munitions. The facility requires a large, open area with permanent fence barriers, barrier lights, an armed security force, and sufficient numbers of lockable International Standardization Organization (ISO) containers at a minimum. To maintain a chain of custody, convoy commanders sign over the documentation to appointed security force authorities at the facility. The facility's security force commander should establish an SOP for the receipt, safe storage, and destruction of weapons, ammunition, and explosives in accordance with Army regulations. The facility security force commander monitors the destruction of weapons and ammunition, reporting the progress to the DDR task force staff. The security force commander allocates containers for weapons and ammunition earmarked for the new military and police services, ensuring chain of custody procedures are maintained. While the number of turned-in weapons and munitions may require more than one collection/disposal facility, the number should be kept to the absolute minimum for control and security purposes.⁷⁷

Heavy weapon systems and vehicles collected at the disarmament motor pool are rendered inoperable,

loaded on heavy equipment transports, and conveyed to designated boneyards. Official inspectors can select an approved number of weapon systems and vehicles for the new armed forces; however, this number is generally small since security sector reform seeks to establish a light infantry military. Normally, exposure to the elements suffices to cause sufficient deterioration, so the host nation government can destroy weapon systems and vehicles at leisure.

If local facilities are not available for the disarmament site, the erection of large shelters for the collection, documentation, and preparation of weapons/munitions for transportation provides protection from the elements. The number of crates and trucks is contingent upon the estimated number and types of weapons, so the liaison officer team estimates are crucial. Paid local labor for packing weapons in crates and loading them on trucks, assistance with documentation, and attendants for guiding DDR participants into the proper lanes and to the demobilization site are immensely helpful. If a security presence is desired, soldiers should remain friendly with weapons shouldered.

Since host government military units and police departments consolidate in their bases and compounds, accountability of them and their weapons is simplified. DDR officials verify accountability of weapons in the arms rooms and supervise the transportation of excess weapons to the central collection/disposal facility. Liaison officer teams may serve to implement this task.

The DDR support center tracks progress with the disarmament process, providing support personnel with radios for communication. The center's public affairs office ensures the news media have full access

to the disarmament site. An explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) unit should follow leads on the locations of unexploded ordinance for proper disposal and render technical assistance at the disarmament site.⁷⁸ Ideally, disarmament, demobilization, and in-processing of participants in the reintegration cantonment should occur in a single day. Admittedly, this is a challenge, particularly due to unforeseen delays. Past experience notes that participants abandon the DDR process out of frustration whenever they experience delays and disorganization, which makes them fertile candidates for recruitment in militant or criminal organizations. An alternative is to have participants overnight in the reintegration cantonment and proceed with demobilization on the following day.⁷⁹ Because this alternative creates control and scheduling problems, the command and staff of DDR support centers must anticipate potential problems and have resources to resolve them quickly.

Chapter Six – Demobilization

Demobilization is the most tangible sign that the conflict is over. It entails the formal and orderly discharge of former fighters, who are thereafter referred to as veterans. It represents the initial stage in dismantling military organizations and established chains of command. Demobilization supports security sector reform by demilitarizing the state and creating smaller, financially supportable, and professional military and police forces, which are subordinate to civilian authorities.⁸⁰ Because wartime service is a significant chapter in people's lives, DDR officials must recognize and properly honor their service, irrespective of affiliation. As such, demobilization activities require detailed planning, coordination, and execution.

If available, a stadium is an excellent location for the demobilization ceremony since it will likely have bleachers, water, electricity, shelter, drainage, and bathrooms.⁸¹ Absent one, then a large open field will suffice. DDR officials and volunteers prepare the field with a design, which promotes a logical flow of people and events (Figure 4). Markers on the right of the parade ground denote the files for DDR participants to line upon. Individual DDR participants immediately proceed to a rank without unity integrity, signifying the first step in dismantling the chain of command. Similarly, female combatants and child soldiers occupy ranks designated solely for them as a way to break former bonds and for their protection.⁸² A stage with audio capability for guest speakers, a symbolic destruction of a weapon (e.g., sawing off the barrel), and a formal peace agreement ceremony (e.g., the in-

surgent leader handing a sword to a government or UN official) allows a clear view for the audience and DDR participants. A band or recorded music provides a festive air to the ceremony and is a common feature of demobilization activities. Family, friends, and relatives of DDR participants, as well as local people, are encouraged to view the celebration from portable bleachers. Several water points in unobtrusive places are recommended for hydration.

DDR support center officials may contract local vendors to provide food and beverages to the audience and perhaps the veterans if the time schedule permits.

As DDR participants enter the demobilization site, DDR officials record their names and show them where to line up in the ceremony field. To assist in recording names, DDR support center interpreters and perhaps host nation volunteers should assist with name spellings, which are later needed for certificates and in-processing at the reintegration cantonment. Ideally, insurgent leaders should arrive first and occupy the first rank on the ceremony field. Those earmarked for the new military and police forces are guided to reserved ranks for an orderly movement to the transportation point for travel to their respective training centers following the demobilization ceremony.

The employment of electronic documents for recording personal data of DDR participants and storing them on a sharable data storage site (e.g., The Cloud) may substantially accelerate the in-processing of DDR participants at the reintegration cantonment. If a sharable storage site is not available, data may be saved and shared on computer memory sticks or compact discs. While DDR participants are waiting in the ranks for the demobilization ceremony to begin, DDR personnel may continue to collect personal data.⁸³




Figure 4. Idealized Demobilization Site

The central feature of the ceremony is the official discharge of the veterans and loyalty oath. Again, a conflict represents a significant period in one's life. Irrespective of national attitudes towards insurgent and government forces, each veteran fought for a cause he/she believed in. All are honored without prejudice or humiliation because the goal is for veterans to return to their communities and live a peaceful life. At the end of the ceremony, veterans file past desks to receive their discharge certificates in manila folders. Pre-printed certificates with the date and the government official's signature are required for DDR officials at the desks to fill in the names of the veterans from the sharable data base and scan the completed certificate into the same data base. A discharge certificate is an important proof of service for future employment, government service, voting eligibility, and election candidacy. To avoid possible discrimination, discharge certificates do not include the service unit.⁸⁴ Upon receipt of their discharge certificates, veterans proceed quickly to the reintegration cantonment. If time is an issue, veterans may receive their discharge certificates at the reintegration cantonment. However, those veterans destined for government, military, and police service should receive their discharge certificates before boarding transportation.

The DDR support center public affairs office coordinates for full media access to the demobilization ceremony. More so than disarmament activities, media exposure of demobilization truly signals the end of the war throughout the country. Pictures, video footage, and interviews of veterans, government officials, and DDR officials informs the public of the event. Besides publicity, one of the goals is gain greater acceptance of veterans into local communities. A secondary goal is to encourage former combatants, who self-demobilized,

to enter the DDR program by reporting to a reintegration cantonment.

Ideally, the reintegration cantonment is within walking distance for veterans to proceed quickly. If not, the DDR support center transportation section provides transportation. Veterans designated for the military and police board buses or trucks for the training centers, which the DDR support center transportation section coordinates. International organizations (e.g., UNICEF) and pertinent NGOs may wish to collect former child soldiers and move them to interim care centers (ICC) after the ceremony. These centers provide food, medical care, education, vocational training, and psychological counseling to former child soldiers for an extended period of time before reuniting them with the families or resettling them in other communities. DDR officials should have child soldiers' personal data available to assist the interim care center personnel. These child soldiers receive their discharge certificate before proceeding to the interim care centers as well. If feasible, the reintegration cantonment management office contacts interim care center officials to invite child soldiers to enjoy the benefits of reintegration cantonment programs. This may involve day trips to the reintegration cantonment for education and vocational training activities, counselling, and transitional justice processes.⁸⁵

Veteran commanders earmarked for leadership roles in the government ministries, military commands, and police commands load vans for leadership training centers, which the DDR support center transportation section coordinates. The departure of leaders represents a definitive dissolution of the major chain of command. Their special benefit packages are provided at the training centers.⁸⁶ The training of military and police recruits and leaders is part of security sector re-

form, which the host nation government manages. In short, transportation of key leaders represents a DDR hand-off to security sector reform programs.

Monitoring and evaluation teams, with assistance from liaison officer teams, should verify the candidates destined for government, military and police positions as they board transportation. This requirement ensures that the number of candidates is in accord with peace agreement. Monitoring and evaluation teams must inform the DDR support center staff of any discrepancies for guidance.⁸⁷

Since host government military and police forces expand during an insurgency far beyond normal levels, a portion of them must demobilize (i.e., downsize) to peacetime levels. Demobilization ceremonies can occur in military bases and police compounds. For greater efficiency, the host nation government may consolidate those earmarked for demobilization at a larger base or compound. Since the discharge process is a normal activity for military service and police members, the ceremony and awarding of discharge certificates need no assistance from the DDR task force. Guest speakers and activities are left to the military service and police chiefs. The DDR task force may opt to send some representatives to observe the occasion, following established protocols.

Much of the literature on DDR includes an encampment for DDR participants at the disarmament and demobilization sites, suggesting that these activities are so time consuming as to warrant such measures.⁸⁸ If unforeseen delays do occur, DDR participants may proceed to the reintegration cantonment immediately after disarmament, billet there overnight, and then conduct demobilization the following day. The DDR support center commander must approve this exigen-

cy since delaying demobilization creates administrative and logistical challenges. Accordingly, the DDR support center commander must apprise the DDR task force command and staff immediately.

Chapter Seven – Reintegration

Reintegration programs assist veterans to re-enter society as productive, peaceful citizens, and aim to diminish the probability of recidivism (i.e., a return to militancy or joining a criminal network). It continues the process of eroding the cohesive bonds of command structures. The economic aspects involve vocational training and job placement for sustainable employment and income. The social features include, health care, transitional justice proceedings to address atrocities, and resettlement into local communities. Prolonged conflicts create deep acrimony among the populace towards combatants, so various parts of reintegration aim to ameliorate residual tensions. Because reintegration is a long-term endeavor at the local level, it requires tremendous assistance from international organizations, NGOs, the host nation government, the subnational governments, and the local communities. Experience reveals that reintegration is so complex, time-consuming, and expensive, that it rarely attains success, so reintegration cantonments must overcome these barriers through organizational effectiveness and efficiencies.⁸⁹

A subset of reintegration, reinsertion embodies short-term assistance measures to include, medical screening (e.g., physical and dental care and trauma counseling), education, stipends, clothing, food, and accommodations while in the cantonment. Upon graduation, resettlement assistance may extend medical and education benefits, as well as home and subsistence allowances and loans. No definitive line exists between the two (i.e., the DDR literature is mixed), so DDR implementers can treat them seamlessly as an

integrated whole for implementation. The unifying objective is to assist veterans with their adjustment to civilian life and lessen recidivism. Since reintegration/reinsertion is so complex, lengthy, and expensive, it requires meticulous planning and coordination with DDR partners and various host nation ministries and organizations. Due to the variegated norms, relationships, and cultural traditions within a country, implementation of reintegration/reinsertion requires significant local community involvement and must remain oriented there.⁹⁰

DDR support center planners in collaboration with DDR partners produce the reintegration program schedule in accordance with DDR task force guidance. A period of six weeks for reintegration provides a good planning framework, though some DDR literature extends reintegration from six months to a year. DDR planners and partners identify needed resources and personnel for the reintegration program. DDR partners provide the lion's share of support so close coordination of their contributions avoids confusion. When feasible, DDR planners and partners solicit contributions of local teachers, businessmen, farmers and others for the program. Lastly, veterans which possess educational and other skills are encouraged to share their knowledge with coursework.

If the number of former combatants is so large that a single reintegration cantonment is insufficient, DDR support center planners may build additional cantonments with priority to female and child veterans and families. The liaison officer teams should have provided sufficient estimates to alert the DDR task force to contribute additional resources to the pertinent DDR support centers. Since a conflict does not uniformly

impact the entire host nation country, the areas with fewer ex-combatants to process may have fewer, centralized cantonments. Of course, this situation would require greater transportation support for ex-combatants from their consolidation camps to the DDR sites. Accordingly, DDR planners must consider potential friction if disparate groups are brought to a centralized DDR site. While some DDR literature recommends a phased schedule to accommodate cohorts of former combatants, DDR planners should avoid this because delays in the process can cause frustration and lead to self-demobilization.⁹¹

Demobilized host government military and police services also participate in reintegration. If an abandoned military base is available, it should serve as a ready-made location for reintegration. If not, reintegration cantonments are needed. Regardless, the reintegration program applies to all demobilized military service and police personnel.

Cantonment Construction

While requiring significant logistics and construction preparation, cantonments are preferable to conducting reintegration in local communities (i.e., cities and towns). Having a cantonment in an open field precludes the requirement for paying rent, finding sufficient space for reintegration activities, and paying for utilities (e.g., electricity, water, and waste disposal). Realtors and utilities providers are often tempted to raise rents and prices for services, which can cause inflation. Further, a cantonment does not inconvenience the local populace by competing for resources. Consolidation of veterans into cantonments signals to the populace that ex-combatants have demilitarized and

no longer pose a threat. Finally, a cantonment is organized for efficiency and order. In short, the benefits outweigh the costs.⁹²

The site survey team will have already identified a location near the demobilization site, and ideally near a developed urban area, with sufficient room, level ground, good drainage, improved road access, and a nearby airfield.⁹³ The site survey team should have arranged for local construction businesses and labor to help with cantonment construction and set-up. If necessary, the reintegration cantonment office coordinates assistance from veterans to complete set-up requirements (e.g., shelters). Cantonment construction is the bailiwick of engineers and should be uniform in design for positive control and efficiency (Figure 5). Basically, the cantonment comprises in-processing, medical/dental, accommodations, bathroom, dining, supply issue, education, vocational training, multifunctional (e.g., worship, meeting, and transitional judicial processes), and minor warehouse facilities. Athletic/parade grounds and an area set aside for agricultural and animal husbandry training are also prominent features. Generators, water storage, and waste disposal services are normal requirements. In short, cantonments must be comfortable and utilitarian to accommodate a six-week or longer stay. Barriers are required to prevent pilferage and some security for the veterans, DDR partners, and workers, but they should not resemble an internment camp for obvious reasons. Simple wire fencing with perimeter lights should suffice to deter intrusions, but if veteran confidence in security is an issue, barrier walls are an option. Security contingents (e.g., a private security company) serve to control pedestrian and vehicular traffic entering and exiting the cantonment, as well as a deterrence to intrusions.⁹⁴

Cantonments are built for expansion so as to accommodate veterans over and above the estimates. Some people may arrive late to the cantonment, having missed the date for disarmament and demobilization. Disabled and elderly veterans normally are not part of the active rebel groups in consolidation camps, so they may need to travel far to reach a reintegration cantonment.⁹⁵ A weapons turn-in point (lockable International Standardization Organization (ISO) container) is needed for late arrivals, as well as extra accommodations for them upon in-processing.⁹⁶ The reintegration cantonment office conducts an extemporaneous demobilization ceremony with discharge certificate for late arrivals. The ability to fit them into the reintegration schedule depends on the date of their arrival. Consequently, the cantonment may remain in operation past the six-week estimate.

Cantonments are temporary, so quick erection, modular shelter kits are ideal (i.e., shelter, floorboards, and electrical conduits). Since they are reusable, configurable, and easy to transport, they are an economical investment. Under engineer supervision, local labor can erect and later dismantle shelters in a couple of days. Cantonments should be large enough to accommodate more facilities if needed. If circumstances dictate a more permanent cantonment, wooden structures or modified metal connexes are appropriate. After DDR is complete, the local communities may wish to transform cantonments into permanent civic centers as a means of enduring community support.⁹⁷




Figure 5. Idealized Reintegration Cantonment

Reintegration Cantonment Office

The reintegration manager has a prominent office in the cantonment, overseeing all operations and setting policies. DDR partners check in daily for guidance and attend scheduled meetings. The DDR support center coordinates closely with the cantonment office for the provision of: medical personnel, supplies, and equipment for the clinic; DDR partner personnel for teachers, instructors, and counsellors; DDR partner material donations; classes of supply (e.g., construction materials, shelters, food, and office equipment and supplies); radios or cell phones; contracting services (e.g., waste disposal, water, generators, and security); fire-fighting equipment and personnel; administrative support (e.g., personnel, printing, paper, computers, and electronic devices), and interpreter/translation services. Specifically, the cantonment office accommodates the services of DDR partners and local community institutions for reintegration activities. To underscore host nation ownership, ministry of reintegration representatives have office space to monitor and advise on the cultural and social matters vis-à-vis reintegration activities. The cantonment office manages the reintegration schedule, as well as providing DDR policies and items of interest to participating veterans. The cantonment office establishes a pass system for veterans for exigent circumstances. Lastly, the DDR support center and cantonment office produce the quick reaction force plan in case of attack, as well as safety measures for veterans (i.e., evacuation or bunkers).⁹⁸

Due to the size of the reintegration cantonment, a facilities management office is needed to assign accommodations, supervise usage schedules for training facilities, contract utilities services, and arrange for

general maintenance and repairs. These functions are crucial, so the office must have a surge capability for initial in-processing.

The reintegration cantonment manager or designated representative should hold frequent town hall meetings. Aside from sharing information on changes to the schedule and policy updates, town hall meetings provide an opportunity for veterans to ask questions, raise issues of concern, and seek clarification on policies. Town hall meetings are appropriate venues for addressing rumors, which always abound in such settings. Mostly rumors are the result of idle talk, but at times, they can emanate from spoilers' misinformation. Addressing rumors early is always a good practice. Since female veterans, child veterans, and families have different concerns and require protection, separate town hall meetings for them are necessary.

The reintegration cantonment office provides escorts for visiting dignitaries, host nation authorities, DDR partner delegations, news media journalists, and monitoring and evaluation teams. Publicizing visits and reintegration activities serves to inform the public of DDR progress and reinforces the return to normalization. Further, such visits and publicity motivate veterans to strive at reintegration activities.⁹⁹

The reintegration cantonment office arranges for community service or construction projects (e.g., schools, repairs, and desired facilities) with the local communities as a way for veterans to reconcile with the populace and to incentivize local community participation and acceptance of veterans. The cantonment office representatives coordinate with local community leaders to identify projects and resources needed for completion. Veterans may take issue with these

projects since they require manual labor and consider it undignified. This is understandable since many projects include repairing war damage, infrastructure refurbishment, and the like. The DDR leadership must explain that the community projects are integral to reintegration and resettlement. First, these projects serve to assuage bitter feelings among the population regarding the destruction resulting from the conflict. Second, many people may consider reintegration as rewarding those responsible for the conflict, while they suffered. Third, regardless of who caused the damage, veterans can demonstrate community-mindedness and a step to rebuilding the country. Such outreach helps mollify hostility towards veteran resettlement. The DDR support center leadership and cantonment office manager may consider providing veterans with extra pay for the labor.¹⁰⁰

The cantonment management office provides vocational training certificates to veterans completing their training. Certificates provide a sense of accomplishment and form a part of a veteran's skills portfolio. Along with the service discharge certificate, the vocation training, education, and community service certificates enhance the veteran's resume for employment opportunities. Certificate printing capability is more practical at the DDR support center, since it is a secure location for printers, card stock paper, toner, and contracted maintenance.

Orientation Briefing

The cantonment office manager or appointed representative provides an orientation briefing to the veterans as part of in-processing. The orientation provides pertinent information on the peace agreement, their basic rights derived from the peace agreement and the new constitution (if revised), the goals of the reintegration/reinsertion program, and the ultimate objective of safely reintegrating veterans into communities of choice. It addresses the planned duration of reintegration and major activities of the program. It clearly emphasizes that participation in reintegration is entirely voluntary, that if some wish to leave, they are free to do so. In this manner, the cantonment becomes a symbol of assistance and not internment. It informs all veterans of planned benefits during and after reintegration. It includes the use of town hall meetings to address questions, issues, and problems. Lastly, the orientation informs adult male veterans that visits to segregated areas (i.e., female, child, and family accommodations) are prohibited, and any violation of this policy will result in immediate expulsion from the cantonment. Well-informed on the reintegration activities, veterans are more likely to remain through graduation.¹⁰¹

In-processing is time-consuming and likely to create a congestion problem. To alleviate this, the reintegration cantonment office may initially direct groups (e.g., female and child veterans and families) to clothing issue and to their accommodations. DDR personnel may consider arranging for recreation activities (i.e., sports and games) if delays are foreseen. This staggered arrangement optimizes the available number of administrators, medical personnel, and counselors for in-processing.

In-processing

The in-processing facilities segregate single adult males from single adult females, child soldiers, and families as a way of terminating military command structures, as well as providing protection for women and children. Female specialists from DDR partners (e.g., civil society organizations and humanitarian agencies) should interview and attend to female and child veterans to encourage candid dialogue and foster confidence. In place of the former command structures, the cantonment office selects veterans as supervisors of each accommodations shelter in order to keep veterans informed on reintegration activities and daily formations, as well as overseeing personal area neatness. Former junior leaders are suitable to preserve a modicum of discipline and compliance to the program.¹⁰²

Ideally, initial personal data recorded at the demobilization site accelerates the completion of personal data and verifies the status of each veteran. Original residency, dates of service, unit identification, the name of an immediate leader, and circumstances of recruitment (volunteer or impressment) not only verify service but also serve to thwart infiltrators (i.e., either spoilers or illicit benefits seekers). Interpreters and trusted veteran volunteers assist in the verification process as well. Biometrics (picture, fingerprints, and perhaps DNA) are taken and uploaded into the sharable database. Biometrics collection ensures veterans do not try to enter other reintegration programs for additional benefits. Additionally, biometrics helps identify veterans who later may become militants again or criminals. Safeguarding this data is essential

since prospective persecutors could use it for nefarious purposes. The veteran then receives an identification card with picture and food ration card.¹⁰³ Paradoxically, an identification card is highly valued among veterans because it signifies that they are an individual and not just another nonentity.

The interviews of male veterans should include their preference for resettlement. Most will likely wish to return to their home communities and reunite with family and friends. Others may no longer have family or homes as a result of the conflict. After experiencing independence and gaining self-confidence, many may not wish to live under former authorities. Some may have perpetrated atrocities and destruction in their home communities, so they may be unwelcome. For perpetrators, participating in transitional justice processes serves as an atonement for their actions, even if they do not return to their home communities.¹⁰⁴

For female veterans, individual interviews are needed to determine whether they are in forced marriages, were impressed as sex slaves, and/or have children as a result. The pertinent question for “married” females is whether they wish to separate from their alleged husbands. Since many societies view sexual relations among unmarried women as taboo (forced or not), interviewers need to ask if they would like to return to their home communities or relocate elsewhere. Further, community animus towards female veterans might exist because they broke traditional gender roles by engaging in violence or demonstrate personality traits often reminiscent in masculine-dominated societies. After experiencing greater responsibilities, independence, and leadership positions, they are likely to reject traditional social

conventions. Further, given the social stigma attached to female fighters, they are more reticent to advertise their status as a veteran. All these factors reduce their prospects of marriage in their towns of origin, so they may wish to resettle in another community. Whether they resettle elsewhere or return to their families/home communities, relevant DDR partners should mediate or contact existing women's organizations to assist them with resettlement.¹⁰⁵

For single parents and families, childcare facilities in the cantonment are necessary while they attend education and training. Interested DDR partners may use the athletic fields and multi-use facilities for preschool education, sports, and games to keep children entertained. With the assurance their children are cared for, parents can focus on the reintegration programs.¹⁰⁶

Interviews with child soldiers seek to locate their families or relatives. Ideally, The ICRC, UNICEF, or NGO interim care centers are the preferred pathway for reuniting them with family or relatives. A gray area exists for child soldiers between 15 and 18 years of age, so they may not be eligible for interim care centers. Thus, the DDR cantonment office must involve these child veterans in reintegration or contact the relevant host nation ministry which manages youth halfway houses for orphaned children.¹⁰⁷ Since many adults are former child soldiers, the reintegration program must attend to their special circumstances. Accordingly, former and current child soldiers need psychological counseling, basic education, and vocational training, while DDR authorities locate their families or relatives.¹⁰⁸

DDR Participation Inducements

Inducements are integral to DDR and one of the major attractions for participation. The DDR task force, in consultation with DDR partners, needs to determine exactly which benefits to offer veterans. These inducement offers must be conveyed in the public awareness program and reinforced by liaison officer teams, DDR partners, in-processing orientation briefings, and town hall meetings. Regardless of these efforts to inform former combatants, DDR officials should expect veterans to be misinformed by rumors and spoiler's propaganda.

A stipend for veterans and for veterans with families during reintegration is a popular inducement. The DDR task force must set the policy and procedures for payday. For example, paying the stipend in cash (perhaps weekly) requires pay officers and security. Few if any veterans have bank accounts. While staying in the cantonment, money is not an issue since the basic needs of participants are met. However, the families of veterans not staying in the cantonment may depend on the stipends, so policy must accommodate that requirement. Lump sum cash payments for stipends and other financial assistance are not recommended since recipients may spend all the money quickly, leave the program early, or become targets of robbery.¹⁰⁹

Reintegration program activities are inherent inducements: medical care, clothing/shoes issue, basic education, vocational training and training certificates, job placement, accommodations, and food. The DDR task force and the host nation government (or ministry of reintegration) must determine which take-home packages and continuing assistance are appropriate and

what form they take. All determinations of assistance must be clearly stated, transparent, and equitable to ensure they do not create animosities among veterans and the population at large. The method of dispensing assistance requires careful thought in order to prevent usurpation or misuse of benefits (e.g., coercion, robbery, and corruption).¹¹⁰

Medical Treatment and Initial Counselling

All veterans receive a medical examination to ensure they have no communicable diseases so as to forestall a potential epidemic. For ailments requiring further attention, the medical personnel schedule follow-up appointments at the clinic. Since dental hygiene during an insurgency is likely poor, a dental check-up and follow-up appointment are required. Professional counsellors (i.e., psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers) must conduct initial and extended psychosocial counselling. Since female veterans (adults and children) have often been victims of sexual violence, have suffered genital trauma, and have been exposed to sexually transmitted diseases, they require special medical care from DDR partners (e.g., civil society organizations and humanitarian agencies). Male adults and children also suffer from sexual violence, which evokes shame, dread of family ostracism, and fear of criminal prosecution (i.e., for homosexuality). Initial counselling aims to identify those in need of extended counselling and group therapy. Psychosocial counselling for male, female, and child victims of sexual assault is absolutely necessary. Similarly, many female and child soldiers may be traumatized for committing or observing atrocities, so individual

counselling and group therapy are also in order. Child soldiers may have the additional burden of becoming socialized towards violence, which makes peaceful reintegration more difficult. DDR female medical and counselling personnel should attend to the needs of female and child veterans. Disabled veterans deserve special care with the provision of prosthetics, crutches, or wheelchairs.¹¹¹

Since insurgencies last a decade or more, adult males may have once been child soldiers, so they too may suffer from the lingering trauma of war and sexual assault. The importance of initial and extended counselling is to arrange for long-term counselling with host nation professionals and international organizations upon resettlement.¹¹²

Clothing and Bedding Issue

A clothing and shoes issue point for veterans is necessary. Insurgents have few opportunities to acquire shoes, clothing, and laundry services, so their clothing is often threadbare, soiled, and even missing. Exchanging military uniforms for civilian clothes is another step towards demilitarization. While some NGOs specialize in clothing and shoe donations, host nation charities can supplement stocks with culturally appropriate clothing. Women will need feminine hygiene products as well.¹¹³ The issue point should also include bedding (i.e., sheets, blankets, and pillows), unless already placed on cots during the preparation period.¹¹⁴ Clean civilian clothing, for the first time in ages, provides an amazing boost to individual morale and a sense of civilianization. The cantonment office should consider a second issue of clothing as well as laundry services during the reintegration period.

Accommodations and Bathrooms

Physical segregation of veterans is necessary to finalize the dismantlement of command structures, to protect victims of past coercion and sexual violence, and to dissolve forced marriages (if the wives desire it). Separate accommodations and bathrooms are established and enforced for single adult males, adult females, male child soldiers, female child soldiers, and families.¹¹⁵ Normally, veteran families comprise former insurgent couples with or without children. The cantonment office determines whether quarters should extend to veterans who wish to have their families join them during reintegration. Frequently, families of veterans participating in reintegration establish make-shift camps near cantonments, so bringing them into the cantonments signals a recognition that they are an important support component for spouses.¹¹⁶ Disabled veterans should have accommodations and bathrooms reserved for them since they need access ramps and more room to move about.

A wide street separates the adult male section of the camp from the other sections. Cantonment policy is to prohibit adult males from crossing the road to visit females, children, or families, and vice-versa. The cantonment office should consider erecting wire fences and bright lights along the road to deter prohibited visits. Only the cantonment office manager may permit mutual visits in public areas.

Separate facilities for education, vocational instruction, life skills training, counselling, athletics, and other activities for female, child, and family

veterans are recommended. If resources do not support this option, staggering days or times of instruction and other activities should suffice to limit prohibited interaction between single male veterans and others.

Basic Education

Decades of conflict deprive combatants of basic education, particularly literacy and math skills. This plight is even more pronounced with adults who were once child soldiers and therefore have little or no formal education. Due to social mores, female veterans (and their children) may have limited or no basic education. For them, academic opportunities are essential to their pursuit of a new life, independence, and employment. Since the reintegration period is relatively short, pertinent DDR partners must develop elementary instruction plans to help veterans acquire skills needed to function in society.¹¹⁷

DDR partners should supplement their educators with veterans who were teachers prior to joining the conflict. Enlisting the services of local teachers yields several advantages. Local teachers possess endemic linguistic and cultural skills that surmount common barriers between outsiders and the populace. They may even know some of the veterans who were once their students. The greatest benefit is connecting veterans with teachers who reside in the local communities where veterans will resettle. It might prove beneficial for DDR authorities to provide funding assistance in the form of vouchers (i.e., tuition and books) for a fixed period to veterans and their children for continuing

education once resettled. Night school is more appropriate for veterans since they need to make a living and sharing a classroom with younger students would be undignified.¹¹⁸

Basic education instruction should also include personal health maintenance, personal values (e.g., gender sensitivity, domestic violence, sexual assault, and human trafficking), civics for democratic institutions (e.g., electoral process, political rights, party programs, and citizen responsibilities), and conflict resolution (e.g., resolving personal disputes peacefully).¹¹⁹ Teachers provide the syllabi for DDR support center administrators and the cantonment office for review as early as possible.

Life Skills Training

Life skills are frequent tasks that people perform in the course of their daily lives (i.e., home economics). Decades of conflict among combatants causes such skills to atrophy. Current and former child soldiers will have very few life skills. Life skills training teaches veterans how to shop, pay for items, and count change. Job application and interview training furnishes veterans with an edge for the job market. Opening a bank account, paying bills, and managing a personal budget offers a secure way to protect savings and teaches responsible economy. Other tasks, such as cooking, following a recipe, and simple home repairs encourage self-reliance. If time allows, instructors may escort small groups of veterans to the local bank and establish an account. Such a venture permits direct deposit of stipends into bank accounts, thereby protecting veterans from usury, robbery, or theft after payday and graduation.¹²⁰

*Extended Individual Counselling
and Group Therapy Sessions*

Extended individual counselling and group therapy sessions serve as a catharsis for both male and female veterans, especially those with traumatic and sexual assault experiences. Psychosocial professionals from DDR partners and host nation institutions (including religious associations) are crucial to veterans' mental health. If trauma is left untreated, veterans will likely suffer from depression, severe anxiety, paranoia, drug and alcohol abuse, and violent tendencies. Consequently, they cannot form healthy relationships and may end up homeless, incarcerated, or vulnerable to criminal or militant recruitment. Sessions should discuss the value of family and community ties, techniques for peaceful conflict de-escalation, and expectations regarding resettlement. In view of the devastation wrought by prolonged insurgencies, veterans must understand that many people may harbor fear, mistrust, and loathing towards them. Reconciliation between veterans and people within their resettled communities requires positive outreach. Group sessions are an effective way to discuss initiatives for veterans to bridge the alienation gap, such as community service projects (e.g., building construction, infrastructure repair, and beautification) and community town halls featuring them as speakers.¹²¹

Child soldiers require specialized counselling and group therapy because they were particularly susceptible to insurgent indoctrination and socialization, which replaced the traditional role of the family. Further, without counselling, they are more likely to join militant

or criminal groups after reintegration. Aside from the cultivation of unit cohesion, child soldiers are given drugs, become inured to violence, and participate in atrocities, often targeting their own families. As likely, the majority of child soldiers were victims of sexual assault or used as sex slaves. In addition to addressing enduring trauma, sessions aim to educate child soldiers on socially acceptable behavior and coming to terms with perpetrated atrocities. As such, in addition to psychosocial professionals, family and friends may help with their recovery. Further, transitional justice processes help child soldiers involved in atrocities understand their culpability, atone for their acts, and attain reconciliation with their families and communities.¹²²

Sessions need to address hazards to health, such as transmittable diseases, drug and alcohol abuse, and poor personal hygiene. Veterans need information on services providing family planning, immunizations, and endemic disease prevention. The trauma of sexual violence, as well as enduring health problems due to genital and anal injuries, abortions, and transmitted diseases not only require heightened awareness but also prolonged treatment by medical, psychiatric, and religious institutions. Due to personal shame and feeling of isolation, veterans may not be forthcoming, but the sessions let them know they are not alone.¹²³

Vocational Skills Training

Sustained employment for all veterans is a significant factor in forestalling recidivism, especially from residual militant or criminal organizations using

unemployment as a means of recruitment. In consultation with local community leaders, DDR support center planners must study the local economy to determine which vocational skills are most relevant, without undue competition for jobs. Relevancy is contingent on the local economies and economic conditions (e.g., recession, war damage, and loss of businesses). In other words, vocational skills training must reflect the local job market. Flooding the job market with redundant vocations can cause discord in local communities as veterans compete for scarce jobs. Still, finding a job may be difficult due to local prejudices and employer discrimination. Moreover, competition generated by returning refugees, displaced persons, and unemployed people often creates a dearth of employment opportunities. A certain amount of discontent within local communities may exist, since many citizens view insurgents as criminals and consider reintegration as rewarding treachery. DDR authorities, DDR partners, and host nation authorities must remain sensitive to these attitudes, publicly explain that employment reduces the rate of recidivism, and ensure vocational training does not exacerbate tensions. Vocations, which benefit the local community and stimulate the economy, are particularly useful in gaining acceptance. If feasible, the cantonment office manager should consider offering vocational training to interested local civilians so as to mollify grievances.¹²⁴

Like basic education instruction, vocational skills training requires sufficiently detailed syllabi to ensure training topics are covered within the allotted timeframe. The syllabi inform the DDR support center administrators and the cantonment office manager of the time requirements and topics of instruction.

More importantly, the syllabi help instructors focus on essential information to impart within the timeframe.¹²⁵

The desires of veterans are important factors as well. Many veterans may wish to return to their former line of work, so the training may give them additional skills. Some may desire new career fields, so offering vocational counselling, aptitude tests, and a variety of vocational skills training is apt. A select few however may have joined the insurgency as a path to social or economic upward mobility. Ambitious, they will want meaningful vocational skills, which may be beyond the vocational skills training. Female veterans frequently join insurgents to escape poverty, domestic abuse, or sexual violence. Female veterans should also have the opportunity to seek vocations that were hitherto denied or discouraged. DDR planners must not assume that former traditional roles for women are still desirable, particularly once they have experienced higher responsibilities, self-reliance, and positions of respect during the insurgency. Many male and female veterans have gained experience on a host of special skills, so vocational training options should build on their knowledge. As such, DDR authorities should arrange for those with demonstrated ability and aptitude to attend technical schools or schools for higher learning.¹²⁶

DDR partners (especially NGOs and USAID who are familiar with local conditions) can offer a range of vocational skills training, ensuring alignment with the economy. However, potential employers from the local communities should also provide vocational training because they have a more precise idea of available jobs, reflect cultural and social norms, and bring greater community involvement to reintegration.

For example, farmers, businessmen, carpenters, construction company managers, and artisans bring an array of skills and practical experience, which veterans can readily grasp. Inducements for local instructors and veteran employment may include payment for training instruction, tax breaks, repair of war damage, or renovations of their businesses. Such involvement provides an opportunity to observe and mentor veterans for prospective employment. Hence, vocational skills training can serve as apprenticeships or jobs fairs between veterans and prospective employers.¹²⁷

Workshop facilities for vocational training are dependent on the loan of equipment, tools, office furniture, and office supplies. Both DDR partners and local occupational professionals can provide the desired resources to enhance the training. The cantonment should have an area set aside for farming and livestock cultivation training. Aside from agricultural experts from DDR partners, local volunteer farmers are a ready resource for practical application. Veterinarians from DDR partners are particularly valuable teachers for livestock care.¹²⁸

Athletic Fields/Parade Grounds

Daily sports (e.g., soccer and volleyball) are not only necessary for recreation and health but also to burn off excess energy and alleviate boredom.¹²⁹ Separate sports fields for adult males, adult females, and children are obviously prudent. Impromptu games during downtimes or unexpected lulls are preferable to veteran loitering. Expending energy through physical

activities also promotes restful sleep each night. The cantonment office should consider having veterans form into sports teams and dedicate a day for a sports competition with trophies. Local schools and DDR partners can provide a ready source of equipment and referees.

Athletic fields can serve the dual purpose of parade grounds. Daily accountability formations can serve to disseminate information to complement town hall meetings. Formations are a practical way to recognize veteran achievements publicly, such as presenting certificates, praising good performance, and awarding trophies. The reintegration cantonment office must arrange for audio support and a raised platform for speakers during such events.

Dining Facilities

The goal of the dining facilities is to provide nutritious, palatable, and culturally appropriate food. Adult male veterans should have a separate dining facility (or different dining hours) to prevent unwanted interaction with female veterans, child veterans, and families. The issued ration cards are necessary to prevent the pilferage of food for later sale. The DDR support center should consider contracting host nation food service companies before engaging outside sources. While the storage of some products is necessary for the operation of the dining facilities, the majority of foodstuffs should be secured at the DDR support center warehouse. DDR partner veterinarians should serve as inspectors of foodstuff storage and dining operations.¹³⁰

Veterans interested in the food service should

intern at the dining facilities. Accordingly, they can learn such skills as food preparation, use of recipes, facility sanitation, the ordering, budgeting, and storage of foodstuff, and proper waste disposal. The DDR management office should invite local restaurant owners and chefs to visit the dining facilities and meet veteran interns for the purpose of potential employment. Veteran interns are awarded a food service certificate at graduation.

The use of food refuse dumps is avoided to prevent scavenging by the local populace. A common problem in poor countries, food scavenging exposes people to disease, food poisoning, and internecine violence. DDR support centers should contract refuse disposal with local farmers and transport trash to host nation dumps (or landfills). For leftover nonperishable food, such as individual items in rations (e.g., meals ready to eat—MREs), the DDR support center and cantonment office may donate residual items (e.g., crackers, jam, and condiments) to religious or charity groups rather than throwing them away.

Multi-use Facilities

Multi-use facilities provide a place for worship, accommodating all religions. Scheduling times and days of the week for different denominations ensures veterans have the opportunity to worship without prejudice. While local religious figures are encouraged to lead services, DDR partners may need to provide clergy if a gap exists.

These facilities serve as a venue for town hall meetings and should have a bulletin board with the reintegration schedule, town hall meeting dates and times, rules, and important information to disseminate. Depending on the number of DDR participants, more than one multi-use facility may be needed for town hall meetings, or the parade grounds may serve that purpose.

These facilities can serve as a center for arts and crafts, games, and group counseling/therapy. As such, a facility manager is needed to prevent scheduling conflicts, provide chairs and tables, and other uses as identified by veterans. To ensure the separation of adult males with other veterans, at least two facilities are needed, located in their assigned areas.

*Transitional Justice Processes: Truth and Reconciliation
Trials, Truth Commissions, and International Criminal
Tribunals*

Horrendous atrocities, such as executions, maiming, gender-based violence, and wanton destruction, are common features in a protracted conflict, ranging in the tens of thousands.¹³¹ Insurgents and government security forces, as well as local militias, are guilty of atrocities, so transitional justice processes require transparency and equal treatment. In view of the vast number of atrocities and disruption of social and legal systems, the host nation judicial system would be overwhelmed with formal judicial cases. The provisions for amnesty form a significant part of peace negotiations and the final peace agreement. During reintegration, some major perpetrators may seek a blanket amnesty. DDR

authorities are not permitted to offer blanket amnesty for “international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.”¹³² Because amnesty is often a political issue, particularly in regards to true reconciliation, it is reserved for international law and host nation judicial authorities. For lesser crimes, transitional justice processes focus specific attention on low-level perpetrators.¹³³

The International Center for Transitional Justice defines transitional justice as:

a field of activity and inquiry focused on how societies address legacies of past human rights abuses, mass atrocity, or other forms of severe social trauma, including genocide or civil war, in order to build a more democratic, just, or peaceful future.¹³⁴

While international organizations may provide a fair amount of support, the host nation government and the populace must earnestly support these transitional justice processes to be effective. This support must manifest in the peace agreement, the media, and the provision of resources. Hence, transitional justice processes reflect the national and local—not international—concepts of justice.¹³⁵ Again, these proceedings do not include war crimes and crimes against humanity, which are formal trials adjudicated by the host nation judicial system or the UN International Court of Justice.¹³⁶

The context behind an atrocity is important to transitional justice. Many atrocities occur during the frenzy of combat, under the influence of drugs, and as a calculated act of terrorism. Some atrocities are coerced, wherein insurgent leaders force new recruits

(both voluntary and impressed) to commit them as a form of control. Insurgents involved in atrocities are less likely to defect since the government regards them as criminals. As such, it is not unusual for fighters (even child soldiers) to commit atrocities against their families and their home communities. While male combatants commit the majority of atrocities, female combatants and child soldiers are culpable as well and can be every bit as vicious. Because of their unique circumstances, child soldiers are considered both victims and perpetrators, so formal trials are inappropriate since child soldiers are often denied due process, denied legal counsel, and sentenced to prison. Child veterans are encouraged to participate in transitional justice, but it must be voluntary and include the parent or legal guardian's consent.¹³⁷

The objectives of transitional justice processes are to establish truth (i.e., justice) and reach reconciliation between perpetrators and victimized local communities, through an atmosphere of clemency. A key attribute is an articulation of the rights and claims of victims, eyewitnesses, and afflicted communities (i.e., victim-centric). It is more a venue for listening rather than a traditional trial. As Lars Waldorf explains, "Truth commissions can reveal the specifics of individual cases, the scope and systematic nature of abuses, and the complicity of key actors and institutions." Achieving complete truth is dubious, but dispelling the various fictional narratives of past events ameliorates grievances and promotes the healing process. Reconciliation is achieved through personal accountability and atonement on one side and forgiveness by the other.¹³⁸

Judges from the host nation government and relevant DDR partners preside over transitional justice

processes, which can take place anywhere which permits sufficient room. Government authorities and external civilian organizations working in the country during the conflict normally conduct immediate investigations of atrocities and gather evidence, so the task is to identify witnesses to attend the proceedings. The DDR support center coordinates transportation requirements for witnesses and affected relatives in accordance with the judicial docket, as well as arranging for their accommodations and feeding.

During the informal proceedings, the judge or appointed official recounts the atrocity and its impact. The professed perpetrator appears before the witnesses, affected relatives, and local authorities, truthfully explains the circumstances behind the atrocity, and apologizes. Context is important since those veterans who were impressed or kidnapped – especially child soldiers – deserve greater compassion. Moreover, establishing ultimate culpability provides mitigating circumstances. Victims, witnesses, and concerned relatives are afforded the chance to confront perpetrators and express the impact of their actions. Hence, the dialogue between the victims and the perpetrators (i.e., listening) is a significant component of transitional justice. At the end of the proceedings, the judge renders a culturally appropriate decision, which can be monetary compensation, restitution, or a cleansing ritual by village elders.¹³⁹

Since fear, mistrust, and animus are significant obstacles for the resettlement of some veterans, forgiveness and redress are necessary for acceptance in their communities. Media coverage and interviews of perpetrators and victims serve to inform the public of the incidents for greater understanding and acceptance

of resettled veterans. If the local community refuses to accept a veteran or the veteran desires to resettle elsewhere, the cantonment office must find a receptive community, either where distant relatives or friends reside, or as a fresh start. Regardless, actual acceptance will take time and is contingent on the veteran's adherence to the rule of law.¹⁴⁰

It is important not to assume the conflict drew distinct lines between patriots and rebels throughout the country. Little animosity towards veterans may exist in some communities, particularly those relatively untouched by the conflict. Some communities may see veterans as patriots and have maintained close relations with them, whether government or insurgent fighters. They may also view veterans as guiltless instruments of politicians and welcome them back into the communities.¹⁴¹ This reality instructs DDR personnel to maintain strict neutrality towards veterans, political parties, and domestic politics.

While reconciliation is the main objective, these processes can provide documentation for later prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity, leadership culpability, and conspiratorial conduct. Pertinent veterans may even serve as witnesses. Still, documentation requires tight control to prevent politically motivated persecution and to encourage veteran candor at transitional justice proceedings.¹⁴²

Graduation

The DDR support center and cantonment office coordinate for all aspects of graduation. Under the

supervision of the facilities management office, the morning of graduation is devoted to the turn-in of bedding, ration cards, and perhaps the breakdown of cots and shelters if the cantonment is to close. Parade grounds are most conducive for the graduation ceremonies. Attendance of distinguished guest speakers (e.g., government ministers, UN officials, and flag officers) underscore the importance of the occasion. Audio equipment and a raised stage for speakers are necessary for the ceremony, as are viewing stands for families, friends, interested local people, and DDR partners. This is the opportunity to present education, life skills, vocational skills, and reintegration graduate certificates. Public affairs must arrange for news media coverage, including spot interviews of graduates and guest speakers. After graduation, veterans collect their take-home packages. The DDR support center arranges for the transportation of veterans to their places of resettlement, not simply for convenience but also to protect them from potential robbery.¹⁴³

Resettlement Issues

DDR task force planners, DDR partners, and the host nation government must study the provision of temporary financial assistance for food, rent/mortgage/home construction, medical care, childcare, and unemployment to veterans and families until they are able to subsist on their own. Financial assistance should occur on a scheduled basis (rather than a lump sum) and should correspond with average household incomes. Access to land for veterans pursuing agricultural vocations is essential for sustainable employment, but DDR planners and local authorities must ensure land rights are strictly honored so as to

avoid friction in the impacted community. Similarly, assistance with housing (i.e., rent or ownership) or land access and home construction must acknowledge the rights of local citizens. Sudden competition for housing or construction materials can cause turmoil in resettled communities, so DDR support center planners and local authorities should spread resettlement as widely as acceptable.¹⁴⁴

Disabled veterans need special assistance with resettlement and quality of life. Housing modifications (e.g., ramps, bathroom, kitchen, and furniture) are not a convenience but a necessity. Some may need to live in special facilities and receive prolonged medical care due to their infirmities. DDR cantonment management offices should contact host nation charitable organizations, religious communities, veteran associations, and relevant NGOs for such assistance.¹⁴⁵

Appropriate take-home packages, such as tools, seeds, clothing/shoes, and work accessories can provide returning veterans with a head start for their chosen profession. For veterans seeking to start their own businesses, start-up loans and business development services bolster entrepreneurial pursuits.¹⁴⁶ The host nation government, local community leaders, DDR partners, and public awareness broadcasts can ameliorate resentment and perceptions of partiality by explaining that assistance aims to diminish recidivism as a result of unemployment and general desperation. Broadcasts should also underscore the economic prosperity employed veterans bring to their communities. Local community leaders can further assist in resettlement by highlighting the benefits of community projects emanating from reintegration. In this manner, reintegration of veterans promotes economic recovery and prosperity in communities.¹⁴⁷

DDR support centers should arrange for local communities to host town hall meetings with veterans to share their experiences. Citizens need to understand the circumstances behind a veteran's recruitment, impressment, or even kidnapping. Common features of veteran experiences are a revulsion of violence, disillusionment with the cause or leadership, repulsive behavior of other fighters, and the devastation caused by the conflict. Rather than romanticizing war, veterans can expose the harsh realities of being a combatant (e.g., fear, exhaustion, deprivation, and illness). Moreover, exposure to veteran discussions reveals that relatively few of them are violent, particularly the older ones. Most veterans will feel disconnected from their families and friends who have not shared their experiences and are no longer part of their social group. Town hall meetings may serve as a way to reconnect and gain social understanding. Additionally, veterans' sharing their hardships and stressing their commitment to peace and family-life can dissuade youths from seeking adventure in a future conflict. Media coverage of town hall meetings and interviews of veterans for public awareness not only informs the populace, but they also dampen militant recruitment.¹⁴⁸

As previously discussed, due to social taboos, female veterans who were sex slaves or are single parents need the option to resettle elsewhere than their original communities. Counseling should explore the option of resettling in a distant community, either with relatives, friends, or a fresh start. Irrespective of where they settle, female veterans may experience societal resistance regarding their chosen vocations and independence. They will likely need assistance for subsistence and housing for a longer term. Continued counselling, education, and vocational training with

long-term assistance seeks to prevent destitution, homelessness, prostitution, and militant recidivism.¹⁴⁹ Similarly, child soldiers not taken to interim care centers, or who are now adults, will likely require assistance for extended counselling, education, and vocational training. Here, resettlement is contingent on the receptiveness of parents and relatives. Some will need to resettle elsewhere because their former homes no longer exist.¹⁵⁰

While DDR formally dissolves the military chain of command, it would be unrealistic to expect the old bonds to disappear completely. Frequently, veterans joined the government military, militia, or insurgent forces out of a sense of patriotism or defense of home communities. Further, the cohesion formed by shared hardships and perils creates enduring bonds as memories of the conflict fade. Hence, veterans should feel free to participate in veteran associations, unit reunions, veteran support groups, and veteran-supported political activities. Peaceful associations often bolster personal pride and honor, as well as social interaction with fellow veterans. Since local militias normally return to their home communities and retain a semblance of former command structures, it may be more effective to channel their energies to the benefit of the local populace. Veteran associations may promote veterans as community leaders, provide employment assistance, and share camaraderie. Host nation governments (i.e., central, provincial, district, and local) should encourage veteran associations to promote peaceful political and social change, charity work, and community improvement projects.¹⁵¹

Chapter Eight – Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation track and provide feedback on measures of performance and measures of effectiveness regarding the DDR programs. Monitoring and evaluation are part of the DDR plan, so they occur simultaneously with all phases of preparation and implementation. Measures of performance (outcomes) assess how efficiently DDR implementers accomplish their assigned tasks. These are usually quantitative in nature, such as the number of participants demobilized, the number of weapons turned in, the number of reintegration graduates, the number and costs of benefits successfully delivered, and the percentage of veterans employed. Short-term in nature, measures of performance variables are controllable. In contrast, measures of effectiveness (outputs) assess the positive and negative results of the DDR programs. These are more subjective or emotive in nature, such as the receptiveness of local communities to accept veterans, veteran satisfaction with the new lifestyle, and veteran decisions to or not to join militant or criminal organizations. While measures of effectiveness can be measured in terms of statistical trends, they are generally beyond the direct control of DDR authorities.¹⁵²

To build trust and rapport with DDR implementers, monitoring and evaluation teams should provide assistance when appropriate, alert the DDR support center leadership of specific problems requiring immediate assistance, and record best practices to share with the DDR task force. All analysis and solutions are uploaded in a sharable data storage site

(e.g., The Cloud). These teams should comprise task force personnel and DDR partners, to include host nation government analysts.¹⁵³

Monitoring and evaluation teams are most effective when assigned to DDR support centers. They should visit rebel consolidation camps and government bases to gauge the success of the public awareness program and liaison officer teams' dissemination of information on eligibility criteria and the DDR program. Interviewing groups and individuals by gender and age on their knowledge of the DDR program should provide a general pattern. They alert the DDR support center leadership of attempts to exclude female and child soldiers from the DDR program. These teams should also visit local communities with the same objective.¹⁵⁴

Monitoring and evaluation teams inspect disarmament and demobilization sites, looking at the design and observing the orderliness of operations. They note the reason for delays and bottlenecks in the process and make recommendations on improving efficiency. These teams specifically check on the status of recruits earmarked for the military and police services, reporting any discrepancies. Again, experience suggests that faction leaders may attempt to increase their representation in the services, over and above the numbers stipulated in the peace agreement.¹⁵⁵

Along with liaison officer teams, monitoring and evaluation teams render a critical service at the reintegration cantonments. They note measures of performance for the various programs, as well as the orderly management of the cantonment. The teams interview veterans to gauge their satisfaction with the programs and areas in need of improvement,

particularly in regards to benefits and assistance programs. They can anticipate measures of effectiveness by conducting surveys of local communities prior to the resettlement of veterans. Accordingly, they ascertain the attitudes of people regarding the resettlement of veterans and community projects they would like to see. They review the economic sector to determine whether vocational training is correctly aligned with economic opportunities and whether the jobs will contribute to economic growth.¹⁵⁶

Throughout the DDR program, monitoring and evaluation teams record estimated and actual investments in terms of financing, personnel, equipment, construction materials, technology, contracted services, and other categories as identified. The DDR task force monitoring and evaluation staff section gleans this data for a comprehensive report on the DDR program, archiving it on a sharable data storage site (e.g., The Cloud) to capture best practices of the DDR programs, as well as identifying pitfalls to avoid. Along with DDR task force after action reports, the monitoring and evaluation final report can serve as a guide for future DDR programs.¹⁵⁷

Monitoring and evaluation teams must continue activities after the completion of the DDR program to measure general stability. An enduring presence is needed to conduct accurate measures of effectiveness. As such, these teams conduct surveys and polls of resettled veterans, the populace, community leaders, and employers. Specific questions should gauge the attitudes of the local community leadership, populace, and business people concerning resettled veterans. Polling should cover veteran involvement in community improvement projects and town hall

meetings, as well as veteran work performance, social interaction, and peaceful reform engagement. Another important metric is the impact of resettlement on the local economies, both beneficial and detrimental. Periodic national polls measure general attitudes as veterans become established citizens.¹⁵⁸

Conclusions

As evidenced in this book, DDR is a complex enterprise because it involves a large variety of partners and participants. While the US government has on occasion conducted DDR, the programs essentially covered disarmament and demobilization, and then appeared to shift its attention to security sector reform. In view of the limited US experience in DDR, this book serves as a guide for organizing, planning, and implementing this difficult program.

The establishment of a DDR task force as an organizational expedient is not that controversial. Because of its capabilities, the US military has created task forces for humanitarian assistance and disaster response on numerous occasions. A DDR task force seeks to enhance the expertise and experience of diverse civilian organizations by promoting teamwork. The use of DDR support centers is a logical outgrowth of the provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) from the stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Like PRTs, DDR support centers would provide a secure and congenial setting for civil-military cooperation. While the initial investment may appear extravagant, DDR support centers would prove more cost effective and efficient in the long term.

DDR literature provides an abundance of challenges associated with DDR. The persistent underestimation of former warring faction personnel and weapons warrants special attention. Similarly, the thousands of former combatants (i.e., women, children, disabled veterans, and widows) denied participation or ignored

may stymie recovery, become a burden to society, or engage in criminal or militant activities. Liaison officer teams offer a way to acquire more accurate information on eligible ex-combatants and weapons. The initial challenge of course is gaining approval from warring faction leaders for the insertion liaison officer teams. Aside from financial inducements, the effectiveness of liaison officer teams rests on establishing rapport and fostering trust among leaders, as well as the rank and file. Hence, team members require careful selection (not everyone is suited for this task) and training. The use of aerial surveillance platforms would have limited value and may increase paranoia among insurgents in temporary camps.

For the disarmament and demobilization sites, expeditious processing is the principle. DDR participants must sense and experience unremitting progress. DDR planners and implementers must anticipate potential obstacles and bottlenecks and develop viable expedients. While waiting in line or formation is inevitable, music, beverages, and snacks may ameliorate the tedium. Extemporaneous media interviews and personal data collection are also beneficial in helping participants pass the time. Every expedient must be considered to make the event memorable and illustrious.

Like the DDR support center, the reintegration cantonment requires a significant investment in resources. Logically however, reintegration represents the culmination of DDR efforts to help a country recover from a devastating insurgency. The reintegration cantonment provides an organized venue for DDR partners to administer to the needs of veterans. Reintegration activities concentrate on the

self-worth of individuals and their contributions to society. Medical, counselling, education, vocation and life skills training, employment assistance, transitional justice processes, and resettlement assistance prepare veterans for re-entry into society as productive, peaceful citizens. Veteran community service projects and town halls not only serve to enhance reconciliation but also to de-romanticize life as a combatant.

Annex A: Example Planning Matrix

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Planning					
Timetable	Task	Responsibility	Partners	Needed Resources	Remarks
Preliminary Actions					
D minus ##	Peace Negotiations	-UN or U.S. envoy -DDR task force observers	UN, IGOs, NGOs, HN and insurgent representatives	-Neutral, secure facilities -Security forces	Minimum of three rings of security
D minus ##	DDR Support Centers Operational	DDR task force and engineers	UN, IGOs, NGOs	-Quick erection modular shelters -Barriers	-Center design
D minus ##	DDR Site Surveys	DDR support centers and engineers	UN, IGOs, NGOs	-Transportation	-Site designs -Level, open ground with good drainage -Good access roads -Near airfield -Near urban area if available -Local labor identified for site preparation and guides
D minus ##	Liaison Officer Teams Deployed	DDR task force and DDR support centers	UN, IGOs, NGOs	Transportation	-Introduce teams to warring faction leaders -Teams gather info on personnel and weapons numbers by category
D minus ##	Disarmament Site Preparation	-DDR support centers -Engineers	UN, IGOs, NGOs	-Quick erection modular shelters	-Prepare according to site design
D minus ##	Demobilization Site Preparation	-DDR support centers -Engineers	UN, IGOs, NGOs	-Bleachers -Stage -Audio equipment -Parade ground prepared	-Prepare according to site design -Coordinate vendors for beverages and food.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Planning					
Timetable	Task	Responsibility	Partners	Needed Resources	Remarks
D minus ##	Reintegration Cantonment Construction	DDR support centers and engineers	-UN, IGOs, NGOs -Local labor	-Quick erection modular shelters -Barriers	
D minus ##	Central Weapons Collection and Disposal Site Construction	-DDR task force -Site commander	HN government	-Destruction facility -Repair facility -Weapons sorting facility -Weapons storage containers -Barriers -Lights -Security positions	-Prepare according to site design
D minus ##	Comprehensive Peace Agreement	UN or U.S. Envoy	-HN government -Insurgent leadership -UN -IOs -NGOs		-Power sharing in new government -Women and child soldiers included in peace agreement -Identify personnel for new military and police forces
D minus ##	DDR Operational Design and Strategy Complete	TF commander and staff	-Ministry of Reintegration -UN -IOs -NGOs	As per Task Organization	-Determine Ends, Ways, and Means; Risk Mitigation -Establish ZOS and temporary consolidation camps. -OPORD published -DDR planning matrix attached to peace agreement -Map overlay with ZOS and site locations/DTG provided to warring factions

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Planning

Timetable	Task	Responsibility	Partners	Needed Resources	Remarks
D minus ##	U.S.-Host Nation Government Memorandum of Agreement	TF commander and staff	U.S. envoy and host nation (HN) government representatives		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Scope and size of SSR -Management oversight -National security forces size and composition -Training -Basing -Funding -Facilities -Personnel and property security -Identification cards -International law obligations -Term of SSR
D minus ##	Public Awareness Program	DDR TF PAO	HN Ministry of Reintegration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Media (Radio/TV/ Newspapers) -National and Local authorities (town halls) -Social Media -SMS -Leaflets -Transportation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Peace Agreement signed -DDR program objectives -DTG and Location for each DDR site -DDR eligibility criteria -DDR benefits -UXO warning

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Planning					
Timetable	Task	Responsibility	Partners	Needed Resources	Remarks
Disarmament and Demobilization Phase					
D-Day	Disarmament Site Implementation #1 to #nth	-DDR support centers	-Ministry of Reintegration -UN -IOs -NGOs -Local community volunteers	-Weapons Collection Facilities -Record keeping Personnel -Guides -Record keeping devices -Crates -Transportation	-Transport DDR participants from consolidation camps -Collect weapons/munitions by type -Crate weapons/munitions -Transport collected weapons to central collection/disposal site -Determine serviceability of weapons/munitions at central collection/disposal for new national security forces
D-Day	Demobilization Site Implementation #1 to #nth	DDR support centers	-Ministry of Reintegration -UN -IOs -NGOs -Local community volunteers	-Certificates of service -Printers -Media coverage -Band -Guest Speakers -Transportation for Guest Speakers and VIPs	-Demobilization Ceremony -Guest speakers and transportation -Issue Certificates of Service -Transport recruits to military and police training centers -Media coverage -Transportation of DDR participants to cantonment -Issue discharge certificates
Reintegration Phase					

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Planning

Timetable	Task	Responsibility	Partners	Needed Resources	Remarks
D plus ## to D plus ###	Reintegration Cantonment Implementation #1 to #nth	-Cantonment management office -Facilities management office	-Ministry of Reintegration -Local Communities -UN -IOs -NGOs	-Office furniture and supplies	-DDR support center coordination -Reintegration schedule -Operations and maintenance
	In-processing of Veterans	-Cantonment management office -Facilities management office	-Ministry of Reintegration -Local Communities -UN -IOs -NGOs	-In-processing facilities -Admin Clerks -Record keeping devices -Doctors/dentists -Councilors -Supply clerks	-Orientation briefing -Separate veterans by gender/age/family/disability -Veteran interviews -Medical check -Dental check -Biometrics and Picture ID issue -Ration card issue -Issue clothing/shoes -Stipend (if authorized) -Assign accommodations
	Basic Education	-Cantonment management office -Education officer	-NGOs -Local community teachers	-Education facility -Education materials	-Syllabi -Child soldiers/adults -Establish links with local teacher

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Planning

Timetable	Task	Responsibility	Partners	Needed Resources	Remarks
	Life Skills Training	-Cantonment management office -Education officer	NGOs	- Education facility -Life skills materials	-Syllabi -Home economics -Bank account -Civics and health awareness
	Vocational Training	-Cantonment management office -Education officer	-Local community businessmen and craftsmen -NGOs	-Vocational facility -Vocational materials -Garden plot -Livestock area	-Syllabi -Jobs fair and apprenticeship.
	Extended Counselling and Group Therapy	-Cantonment management office	-HN counsellors -NGO/IO counsellors	Multi-use facility	-Trauma counselling -Psychosocial counselling
	Community Improvement Projects and Veteran Town hall Initiatives	-Cantonment management office	-Ministry of Reintegration -Local community leaders	Veteran volunteers	Part of reconciliation efforts
	Truth and Reconciliation Trials	DDR TF Judge Advocate	-UN -HN government	Multiple-use or local community facility -Witnesses transportation and accommodations	-Transportation of witnesses -Determination of forgiveness -Acceptance of reintegration to home community.
	Sports Activities	-Cantonment management office -Training officer	-Volunteers -Local community volunteers	-Sports fields -Sports equipment (soccer/volley balls)	-Down time activities
	Graduation Ceremony	-Cantonment management office	HN government -UN -NGOs -IOs -Local community volunteers	Main Parade Field	-Award certificates of reintegration completion, vocational training, and other training. -Guest speakers -Band -Issue take-home package. -Transportation to home communities.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Planning					
Timetable	Task	Responsibility	Partners	Needed Resources	Remarks
Cantonment Breakdown and Movement to Next Site					
D plus ## to D plus ###	-Equipment turn-in -Shelter breakdown	-Cantonment management office	-Ministry of Reintegration		-DDR support center coordination
NOTES					

Endnotes

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ISBN-13: 978-1-7325659-8-2