Mission

To detect and deter fraud, waste, and abuse in Department of Defense programs and operations; Promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the DoD; and Help ensure ethical conduct throughout the DoD

Vision

Engaged oversight professionals dedicated to improving the DoD

For more information about whistleblower protection, please see the inside back cover.
The DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) is required by statute to prepare an annual statement on the most serious management and performance challenges facing the DoD, and on the DoD's progress to address those challenges. I am pleased to submit the FY 2024 Top DoD Management and Performance Challenges (TMPC) to fulfill this requirement.

This year, we have identified the same eight overarching challenges identified in FY 2023 due to their continued relevance and persistence. These challenges are complex and enduring, requiring sustained attention from the DoD. While we decided to carry the overall topics forward, the presentation and focus of the challenges differ significantly from prior years, as the discussions of the challenges this year focus heavily on findings independently established by the DoD OIG through our audits and evaluations.

The challenges are neither exhaustive nor listed in order of importance or severity. We identify some, but certainly not all, causes or contributing factors affecting management and performance in each area. In assessing the challenges, we considered completed oversight work by the DoD OIG and other agencies; the status of DoD OIG-issued recommendations, both addressed and unaddressed; the Department's strategic documents, such as the National Defense Strategy and Strategic Management Plan; and input on challenges from DoD officials.

As the TMPC reflects the OIG's assessment of the most significant challenges facing the DoD, it provides a valuable framework for organizing the audits and evaluations described in our forthcoming Annual Oversight Plan. Consistent with our obligations under the law, we remain committed to keeping the Department's leadership informed of issues identified through our oversight work so that DoD officials can take timely corrective actions.

We look forward to continuing to conduct independent and impactful oversight that detects and deters fraud, waste, and abuse; promotes the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DoD programs and operations; and helps ensure ethical conduct across the DoD.

Robert P. Storch
Inspector General
Summary of Management and Performance Challenges Facing the DoD Fiscal Year 2024

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Pursuant to the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) is providing its annual statement summarizing the Department’s “most serious management and performance challenges.” To fulfill this requirement, the DoD OIG analyzed recently completed oversight work, focusing on findings from our audits and evaluations; ongoing and planned DoD OIG oversight work; closed and open DoD OIG recommendations; notes from external outreach events; and the responses to the DoD OIG’s memorandum soliciting input from leaders across the DoD as to the top challenges facing the Department. The DoD OIG also considered the DoD’s strategic documents, priorities, and progress reports. The overall number and general challenge topics remain unchanged from last year. The DoD OIG is presenting eight challenges that it considers the most pressing matters facing the DoD in the upcoming fiscal year and, for each challenge, highlights causes or contributing factors affecting management and performance.

These are the FY 2024 Top DoD Management and Performance Challenges (TMPC) and Challenge Highlights.

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<th>Challenges</th>
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<td>1. Building Enduring Advantages for Strategic Competition</td>
<td>• Challenges in consistently securing and accounting for defense materiel create hurdles in providing assistance to Ukraine.</td>
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<td>• Inadequate contract execution and oversight, among other factors, affect readiness of prepositioned stocks.</td>
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<td>• Personnel shortages in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command contribute to schedule delays and increased costs.</td>
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<td>2. Strengthening DoD Cyberspace Operations and Securing Systems, Networks, and Data</td>
<td>• Limited DoD controls over cybersecurity risk management activities increase risk to DoD information networks and systems.</td>
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<td>• Insufficient assurance that contractors comply with cybersecurity requirements poses risks to contractors’ authority to operate.</td>
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<td>3. Maintaining Superiority Through a Resilient and Modern Defense Industrial Base</td>
<td>• Current government regulations hinder contracting officers’ ability to negotiate fair and reasonable prices with defense contractors.</td>
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<td>• Contracting officials’ misinterpretation of policy, or failure to follow it, expose the DoD to unnecessary risk from excessive costs and foreign counterfeit components.</td>
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| 4. Improving DoD Financial Management and Budgeting | • Scope-limiting material weaknesses hamper auditors’ abilities to perform procedures to draw a conclusion on the financial statements.  
• A lack of coordination among and across personnel, processes, and systems covering the DoD’s diverse sub-entities hinders progress toward effective fiscal management.  
• Lack of clearly defined, established, and consistent identification of reporting entities negatively impacts financial management and audit planning. |
| 5. Adapting to Climate Change and Accelerating Resilience | • Incomplete guidance increases the risk of not adequately assessing the impact of climate change on military installations and readiness.  
• Limited personnel and financial resources constrain long-term climate planning and action.  
• Hurdles must be overcome to ensure that equipment is designed and maintained to withstand climate change. |
| 6. Protecting the Health and Wellness of Service Members and Their Families | • Medical personnel shortages impact the Military Health System’s ability to meet the needs of Service members and DoD civilians.  
• Unclear health care policies negatively impact patient care.  
• Inaccurate or incomplete patient health care information poses risks to treatment and benefits. |
| 7. Recruiting and Retaining a Diverse Workforce | • Lack of consistent, accurate personnel data hampers workforce planning.  
• Insufficient understanding of policies and procedures related to ideological extremism and talent management may impact recruiting and retention. |
| 8. Accelerating the Transformation to a Data-Centric Organization | • DoD culture does not consistently regard data as a strategic asset and prioritize its management throughout the defense ecosystem.  
• Implementation of the DoD data strategy is limited by a lack of measurable action plans, management accountability, and funding. |
The challenges are not listed in order of importance or severity. They affect the DoD’s ability to optimally execute its mission—to provide the military forces needed to deter war and protect the Nation’s security. A holistic review of the challenge highlights reveals that several causes or contributing factors cut across challenge areas (Figure 1). Those causes or contributing factors generally relate to:

- Policy and procedures — missing, unclear, contradictory, or misapplied,
- Workforce — gaps in availability or skills,
- Data — missing, unreliable, or not appropriately managed, and
- Funding — adequacy and accounting.

Improvement in each of these areas is essential to enable the DoD to address these fundamental challenges and ensure the success of its quintessentially important efforts on behalf of the American people.

_Figure 1. FY 2024 TMPC Cross-Cutting Challenge Areas_

Source: DoD OIG.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy directs the DoD to prioritize the deterrence of aggression and to be prepared to prevail in conflict, when necessary, with an emphasis on the People's Republic of China and Russia. Previously, the DoD OIG has examined the challenge of strategic competition through the lens of alliances and security partnerships, weapon system sustainment and modernization, emerging technology, and strategic nuclear defense and deterrence. While these remain pressing and persistent issues, this fiscal year the DoD OIG chose to examine more readily assessed concerns that still have a significant bearing on strategic competition. Specifically, the DoD OIG focused on ensuring that:

- DoD prepositioned stock is functional and rapidly deployable;
- Materiel is transported securely and properly accounted for;
- There are enough trained personnel and appropriate facilities to attend to the maintenance, transport, and accountability of materiel;
- Sufficient personnel are stationed in strategic locations.

The DoD OIG has completed projects on those topics, including projects related to Ukraine Security Assistance and construction on the island of Guam, that have identified issues with security and accountability of materiel, maintenance of pre-positioned stocks, and personnel shortages in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) region.

**Difficulties in Consistently Securing and Accounting for Defense Materiel**

The DoD swiftly and effectively received, inspected, staged, and transferred defense materiel that was en route to Ukraine; however, in some instances there were difficulties in consistently securing and accounting for that materiel. Report No. DODIG-2023-084, "Evaluation of Accountability Controls Relevant Documents

- National Security Strategy, 2022
- National Defense Strategy, 2022
- Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, February 2022
- DoD Pacific Deterrence Initiative, FY 2023
for Defense Items Transferred Via Air to Ukraine within the U.S. European Command Area of Responsibility,” June 8, 2023, noted a deficiency in accountability for defense items passing through Jasionka, Poland, en route to Ukraine. This was due, in part, to the failure in some instances of the Military Services and Defense Agencies to provide the information required by the Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR) on shipping manifests, creating delays in shipping and increasing the risk of gaps in accountability for materiel. These failures to follow policy and procedure represent a concerning trend of noncompliance with the DTR that was previously identified by other DoD OIG work.

Report No. DODIG-2023-115, “Evaluation of Land-Based Security Controls for Equipment Being Transferred by Rail to Ukraine,” September 6, 2023, also observed inconsistent security for materiel transiting through Poland. This inconsistency was attributed to the failure of U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) to specify responsibilities for security and associated oversight. Once equipment was in Ukrainian hands, the DoD needed to maintain accountability through end use monitoring (EUM), or, if particularly sensitive equipment, through enhanced EUM (EEUM). The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) maintains EUM policy, which identifies equipment that requires EEUM; however, Report No. DODIG-2023-074, “Management Advisory: DoD Review and Update of Defense Articles Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring,” May 19, 2023, found that the DSCA did not regularly update the listing. As a result, the EEUM list may not include all sensitive equipment and technology, and may require monitoring equipment that does not need it, such as commercially available night vision goggles. The DSCA agreed with the DoD OIG’s recommendations to regularly review and update the list of equipment requiring EEUM, and is in the process of modifying internal procedures accordingly.

Meanwhile, DODIG-2023-084 found additional factors contributing to the accountability gaps for materiel passing through Jasionka. Specifically, no logistics experts were deployed to facilitate the transfers, and the personnel that were performing the mission were given no additional training on accountability or inventory by USAREUR-AF to ensure they could fulfill their responsibilities. Similarly, Report No. DODIG-2023-090, “Management Advisory: Sufficiency of Staffing at Logistics Hubs in Poland for Conducting Inventories of Items Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring,” June 28, 2023, discovered that, out of the few Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) personnel responsible for EEUM, only one was assigned to conduct inventories in Poland prior to transfer of materiel to Ukraine. Consequently, as the multiple hubs in Poland were geographically disparate, not all materiel requiring EEUM was inventoried before transfer. A shortfall in ODC staff affected EEUM previously, as observed in Report No. DODIG-2020-121, “Evaluation of Department of Defense Enhanced End-Use Monitoring for Equipment Transferred to the Government of Ukraine,” August 27, 2020. The increase in U.S. assistance between 2013 and 2019 was not matched with a corresponding increase in ODC staffing, and thus the ODC was unable to properly perform EUM and EEUM at that time, as well.

The DoD OIG has multiple planned and ongoing projects on Ukraine security assistance and related issues, including evaluations of the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine’s coordination of defense article movement, accountability of lost or destroyed articles requiring EEUM, and replenishment and management of 155mm high explosive ammunition.
MULTIPLE FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO DEFICIENCIES IN MAINTENANCE OF MATERIEL

The large amount of defense materiel earmarked for Ukraine is drawn, in part, from U.S. pre-positioned stocks located in various areas of responsibility. These stocks contain equipment and weapon systems that are strategically positioned worldwide to reduce DoD deployment times and support theater operations. During an audit of the Army’s management of Army Prepositioned Stock–5 equipment, as detailed in Report No. DODIG-2023-076, “Management Advisory: Maintenance Concerns for the Army’s Prepositioned Stock–5 Equipment Designated for Ukraine,” May 23, 2023, the DoD OIG identified deficiencies in the readiness of the military equipment selected to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). Specifically, the DoD OIG found that 25 of 29 M1167 High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles and all six M777 howitzers were not mission ready and required repairs before the U.S. European Command could transfer the equipment to the UAF. These issues stemmed from the contractor not performing the required services on the equipment and were exacerbated by the Army’s failure to conduct adequate contract oversight, which may have identified these problems.

Similarly, Report No. DODIG-2023-053, “Evaluation of Army Pre-Positioned Equipment Issued in Response to Ukraine and the NATO Defense Forces,” February 27, 2023, found that some of the equipment pulled from Army pre-positioned stocks in Germany for provision to a U.S. armored brigade combat team was not mission capable, as required. This was due, in part, to discrepancies between the less stringent procedures for care of supplies in storage (COSIS) as delineated in an Army technical manual, and the more thorough requirements laid out by the Army Materiel Maintenance Policy. Army officials named the COSIS process as the source of the materiel faults, which in this case negatively impacted readiness and command, control, and communications for the receiving unit.

As a further challenge, DoD personnel in the field were, in some instances, insufficiently resourced and ill-prepared for the tasks required of them. DODIG-2023-053 also found that the Army officials responsible for maintaining pre-positioned stocks in Germany failed to fulfill the requirements in an Army technical manual to periodically exercise the equipment in storage because their facilities lacked an appropriate area where they could conduct such operations. Without the prescribed exercise to determine functionality and prevent deterioration, the equipment faults that rendered the vehicles not operationally ready were able to accumulate undetected. The Army will be building an exercise facility at one location, but not until 2028.
Personnel Shortages in the USINDOPACOM Region

The island of Guam, along with the northern Marianas islands, comprises Joint Region Marianas, and is the focus of dozens of military construction (MILCON) projects involving billions of dollars in spending. The projects have been beset by significant delays, owing in large part to personnel shortages across multiple areas. Report No. DODIG-2020-040, “Audit of Cost Increases and Schedule Delays for Military Construction Projects at Joint Region Marianas,” December 11, 2019, examined nine MILCON projects experiencing delays and cost increases, totaling a combined 13 years and $37 million, respectively. The audit found that part of the cause for the delays was a shortage of laborers for contractors, due to a decrease in the approval and renewal of H-2B visas. Additionally, Naval Facilities Engineering Command Marianas identified personnel resourcing shortages as a contributing factor to schedule delays, pointing to challenges in recruiting personnel with the necessary qualifications and experience for many positions, such as construction management engineers. This limited the support they could provide to the island’s numerous projects as construction contract agents. Furthermore, delays related to clearance of munitions and explosives of concern (MEC) were partially due to limited staffing for MEC quality assurance (QA), as detailed in Report No. DODIG-2020-093, “Audit of the Department of Defense’s Processes to Identify and Clear Munitions and Explosives of Concern During Construction on Guam,” June 16, 2020. DoD OIG found that in January 2019, only four personnel were assigned to perform MEC QA at Joint Region Marianas, with one person responsible for some 300 projects and simply unable to cover the workload in a timely manner.

While Report No. DODIG-2022-036, “Audit of the Department of Defense Strategic Planning for Overseas Civilian Positions,” November 16, 2021, did not include Guam in its scope, it considered other locations in the USINDOPACOM region, including Japan and South Korea. This audit discovered that the DoD could not consistently conduct strategic planning for the overseas workforce, resulting in a wide variation in vacancy rates and hiring timelines for civilian personnel, and incurring risk that the workforce would be inadequate to support the DoD’s readiness, global mission, and ongoing operations.

The DoD OIG has 13 ongoing and planned projects concerning USINDOPACOM. Among these is an audit of the DoD’s efforts to build partner capacity (BPC) in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility, which will determine whether the DoD established program objectives, met performance metrics, developed an assessment framework, and met congressional reporting requirements for the effective execution of BPC activities, in accordance with laws and DoD regulations. Other projects include audits and evaluations of munitions storage, environmental threats to naval dry docks, base operations and support services contracts, global health engagement activities, contested mobility requirements, training for personnel supporting surge sealift, and ballistic missile defense.
Selected Projects (find at: https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/)

- DODIG-2023-084, “Evaluation of Accountability Controls for Defense Items Transferred Via Air to Ukraine within the U.S. European Command Area of Responsibility,” June 8, 2023
- DODIG-2023-115, “Evaluation of Land-Based Security Controls for Equipment Being Transferred by Rail to Ukraine,” September 6, 2023
- DODIG-2023-074, “Management Advisory: DoD Review and Update of Defense Articles Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring,” May 19, 2023
- DODIG-2023-090, “Management Advisory: Sufficiency of Staffing at Logistics Hubs in Poland for Conducting Inventories of Items Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring,” June 28, 2023
- DODIG-2023-076, “Management Advisory: Maintenance Concerns for the Army’s Prepositioned Stock-5 Equipment Designated for Ukraine,” May 23, 2023
- DODIG-2023-053, “Evaluation of Army Pre-Positioned Equipment Issued in Response to Ukraine and the NATO Defense Forces,” February 27, 2023
- DODIG-2020-093, “Audit of the Department of Defense’s Processes to Identify and Clear Munitions and Explosives of Concern During Construction on Guam,” June 16, 2020
- (ongoing) “Evaluation of Security Assistance Group-Ukraine’s Role in Coordinating the Movement of Defense Articles to Ukraine” (Project No. D2023-DEV0PE-0111.000)
- (ongoing) “Evaluation of the DoD’s Accountability of Lost or Destroyed Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine Requiring Enhanced End Use Monitoring” (Project No. D2023-DEV0PD-0152.000)
- (ongoing) “Evaluation of the DoD’s Replenishment and Management of 155mm High Explosive Ammunition” (Project No. D2023-DEV0PA-0126.000)
- (ongoing) “Audit of the DoD’s Efforts to Build Partner Capacity in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command” (Project No. D2023-D000RM-0119.000)
Challenge 2: Strengthening DoD Cyberspace Operations and Securing Systems, Networks, and Data

**Challenge Highlights**

- Limited DoD controls over cybersecurity risk management activities increase risk to DoD information networks and systems.
- Insufficient assurance that contractors comply with cybersecurity requirements poses risks to contractors’ authority to operate.

Strengthening cyberspace operations and ensuring cybersecurity for DoD systems, networks, and data is one of the central challenges of the coming decades. As the 2023 update to the DoD Strategic Management Plan described, “Growing dependence on the cyberspace domain for nearly every essential civilian and military function makes [cybersecurity] an urgent issue that must be addressed.” The Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified ensuring the cybersecurity of the nation as one of three high-risk areas that need significant attention.

The DoD Strategic Management Plan contains objectives that seek to enhance the DoD’s overall cybersecurity posture and accelerate the implementation of industry best practices and proven technologies. These objectives include goals such as achieving full operational capability of the Zero Trust Portfolio Management Office, consolidating DoD networks under a single service provider, using modern methodologies for software development, and maximizing the use of cloud hosting for DoD systems.

While the DoD has a vision for the future, the DoD OIG has identified multiple instances of the DoD having limited controls over the implementation of cybersecurity risk management activities, including the specific need to improve verification of contractor compliance with cybersecurity requirements.

**Relevant Documents**

- DoD Strategic Management Plan, FY 2022-2026 ed. (Strategic Priorities 1.3 and 3.4)
- GAO High Risk Areas, 2023 ed.
- National Cybersecurity Strategy, March 2023
- DoD Zero-Trust Strategy, October 2022
- DoD Cybersecurity and Zero Trust Reference Architectures, January 2023 and July 2022
- DoD Software Modernization Strategy, November 2021
- DoD Software Modernization Implementation Plan, March 2023
DoD strategy and programs throughout the cyber domain are challenged by limited controls over cybersecurity risk management activities. In Report No. DODIG-2022-041, “Audit of the DoD's Use of Cybersecurity Reciprocity Within the Risk Management Framework Process,” December 3, 2021, the DoD OIG identified that half of the components reviewed did not properly leverage reciprocity as required by DoD policy. Reciprocity entails acceptance and reuse of another organization's security assessments, and reduces expenditure of resources on redundant tests and the associated risk of delayed system deployment. Critically, while the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) was responsible for overseeing the DoD's implementation of reciprocity, they failed to establish processes to verify compliance. Report No. DODIG-2023-052, “Audit of the DoD's Compliance with Security Requirements When Using Commercial Cloud Services,” February 15, 2023, found that while DoD Component authorizing officials used commercial cloud service offerings (CSOs) that were authorized by the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program and the DoD, they failed to review all required documentation to consider the risks presented to DoD systems by the CSOs when granting and reassessing authority to operate. Without a review of all required documentation, DoD Components may be unaware of vulnerabilities and cybersecurity risks associated with operating systems or storing data in commercial CSOs.

Examining another aspect of monitoring, the DoD OIG has an ongoing audit of the DoD's development and implementation of the Digital Modernization Strategy, which is a strategic plan that details modernization goals and objectives in support of lines of effort laid out in the National Defense Strategy, and is guided by the priorities of: cybersecurity; AI; the cloud; and, command, control, and communications. The audit has a specific focus on the requirements of OMB Circular A-130, “Managing Information as a Strategic Resource,” which directs the DoD's information technology goals be, “specific, verifiable, and measurable,” and tracked by “cost, schedule, and overall performance variances.” In FY 2024, the DoD OIG plans to conduct an audit of the DoD's implementation of the Comply-to-Connect Program. This program was mandated in the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and designed to improve the DoD's cybersecurity posture. The related DoD CIO memorandum of January 2021 established implementation guidance with anticipated completion of the five step implementation process by 2023. As of May 2023, implementation was still at Step 1, and the DoD OIG will explore the reasons for the DoD's delay.
Verifying Contractor Compliance with Cybersecurity Requirements

Many of the DoD’s strategic goals regarding information technology require clear, detailed communication of cybersecurity requirements and expectations to contractors, and subsequent verification that contractors are complying with those requirements. The DoD has experienced some difficulties in meeting these goals. In Report No. DODIG-2023-044, “Evaluation of the Cybersecurity Controls on the DoD’s Secure Unclassified Network,” January 12, 2023, the DoD OIG found that the DoD could not directly monitor and manage the contractors’ cybersecurity activities, and consequently put at risk their authority to operate. This occurred, in part, because the DoD failed to distinctly delineate and prioritize essential requirements in the performance work statement. Likewise, in Report No. DODIG-2019-105, “Audit of Protection of DoD Controlled Unclassified Information on Contractor-Owned Networks and Systems,” July 23, 2019, the DoD OIG identified security deficiencies at nine contractors. The DoD OIG noted among its findings that the DoD failed to establish processes to verify that contractors’ networks met National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) security requirements prior to contract award, and that DoD also failed to verify that contractors implemented minimum security controls for protecting controlled unclassified information (CUI).

Another item touching upon the issue of verification is the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) pilot program, which is a certification framework intended to assess Defense Industrial Base (DIB) implementation of NIST cybersecurity requirements, and was to be incorporated into contracts to describe the specific requirements for handling DoD data. The DoD initiated the program in 2020 with a planned 5 year phase-in period, but the interim rule that introduced the CMMC requirement into the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement was suspended in 2021. The CMMC pilot is being superseded by CMMC 2.0, which will streamline cybersecurity requirements from five to three levels, and align each level with widely accepted NIST cybersecurity standards. The GAO attributed many of the difficulties with the initial CMMC pilot to the lack of detail and timeliness in DoD communication with industry, which fueled concerns on issues such as the scope of anticipated assessments and reciprocity with other cybersecurity standards. To ensure DoD is prepared to implement CMMC 2.0 once operational, the DoD OIG is performing an audit of the DoD’s process for accrediting third-party organizations to perform CMMC 2.0 assessments, and for verifying the organizations meet all associated requirements. The DoD OIG also plans to perform an audit of the Defense Contract Management Agency DIB Cybersecurity Assessment Center’s oversight of contractor cybersecurity for assessing compliance with Federal and DoD guidance.
The DoD OIG has an ongoing project, “Audit of DoD Actions to Implement Software Assurance Countermeasures Throughout the Weapon System Acquisition Life Cycle.” In 2016, the DoD OIG issued a report highlighting a failure of the DoD to communicate requirements and procedures to industry partners in major acquisitions to verify that software assurance countermeasures are appropriately applied. The DoD closed all recommendations from that report, and the DoD OIG may determine, through this ongoing 2023 project, that the DoD successfully addressed these challenges or discover further challenges in this area.

**Selected Projects (find at: https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/)**

- (ongoing) “Audit of the DoD’s Development and Implementation of the Digital Modernization Strategy” (Project No. D2023-D000CT-0115.000)
- (ongoing) “Audit of the DoD’s Process for Accrediting Third-Party Organizations to Perform Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification 2.0 Assessments” (Project No. D2023-D000CR-0167.000)
- (ongoing) “Audit of DoD Actions to Implement Software Assurance Countermeasures Throughout the Weapon System Acquisition Life Cycle” (Project No. D2023-D000CS-0097.000)
- (upcoming) “Audit of the DoD’s Implementation of the Comply-to-Connect Program”
- (upcoming) “Audit of the Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Assessment Center’s Review of Contractor Self-Assessments”
A Sailor and Airman clean the spindle of a MH-60R helicopter aboard the guided missile destroyer USS Roosevelt in the Baltic Sea. Source: U.S. Navy.
A resilient Defense Industrial Base (DIB) is critical to national security. The DIB is composed of manufacturers, service providers, research and development organizations, and other contractors, vendors, and grantees who develop, produce, maintain, and reconstitute DoD weapon systems, munitions stockpiles, and other material. A resilient DIB should be cost-effective, efficient, productive, surge-capable, globally competitive, and have the capacity to innovate and arm the military to ensure its ability to prevail in any conflict. The DoD ranked shaping a 21st century DIB to preserve U.S. military dominance as one of its top three Agency Priority Goals, with specific and immediate focus on supply chains. In the same vein, the DoD released a report in February 2022 on “Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains,” which identified a number of focus areas and strategic enablers critical to addressing vulnerabilities and building supply chain resilience. Cross-cutting recommendations spanning the areas and enablers were identified for action to enhance and grow the industrial base, including building domestic production capacity, conducting data analysis of supply chains, and updating acquisition policies.

The September 2018 interagency report, “Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States,” identified five forces shaping trends across the industrial base and degrading U.S. capabilities, which in turn fostered 10 risk archetypes contributing to DoD supply chain insecurity. These archetypes, such as sole- and single-source suppliers, threaten the health of the DIB, often having a variety of negative impacts, such as cost inefficiencies, deferred maintenance, vulnerability to counterfeit components, and ultimately, diminished readiness and lethality of forces. These same archetypes have been recurrent features in a number of DoD OIG reports over the past several years. The reports indicate that negative impacts were often caused, in part, by regulatory restrictions on the data used in analysis and negotiations, and errors by contracting officials.

Relevant Documents

- Executive Order 14017, “America’s Supply Chains,” 24 February 2021
- DoD Strategic Management Plan, FY 2022-2026 ed.
- Interagency Report, “Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States,” September 2018
**Regulations Impede Use of Best Data for Informed Decisions**

Sole-source contracts are non-competitive procurements that involve negotiation with a single supplier to fulfill the contract requirement. Single-source contracts refer to procurements for which only one company bids on a given agency contract, even though multiple companies may be eligible. The DoD often uses sole- or single-source contracts for depot-level maintenance—a type of maintenance that is more complicated than regularly recurring maintenance.

Report No. DODIG-2022-104, “Audit of Sole-Source Depot Maintenance Contracts,” July 21, 2022, examined a sample of sole-source depot maintenance contracts to determine whether the DoD negotiated fair and reasonable prices. The report concluded that in 21 of 34 contracts, DoD contracting officials may have failed to negotiate fair and reasonable prices, leading to increased costs and decreased readiness. One factor behind this failure is the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which impedes contracting officials’ ability to request cost and pricing data for commercial contracts, and does not provide authority to compel contractors to provide cost and pricing data as a precondition for contract award.

The report recommended 14 process improvements, including requiring cost and pricing data be requested, and documenting contractor responses. Of these, 9 recommendations remain open, and 5 are closed.

Report No. DODIG-2022-043, “Audit of the Business Model for TransDigm Group Inc. and Its Impact on Department of Defense Spare Parts Pricing,” December 13, 2021, found that similar regulatory restraints hindered the ability of contracting officers to negotiate the best possible prices. Specifically, the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), section 2306a, title 10, United States Code, and the FAR do not require contracting officers to request the most reliable sources of cost data when contracts are under a certain threshold, and require the use of price analysis methods that are ineffective in a sole-source environment. TransDigm is an entity that specializes in acquiring manufacturers of sole-source spare parts, and 95 percent of its contracts with the DoD in a 2-year period were below the TINA threshold. DoD OIG auditors estimated that TransDigm earned an excess profit of at least $20.8 million on 150 contracts due to the lack of reliable information for contracting officials to perform cost analysis.
Errors by Contracting Officials

Contracting officers’ failure to follow or properly interpret regulatory policy contributed to suboptimal contract outcomes. In DODIG-2022-104, the DoD OIG found that contracting officials did not develop well-defined requirements for 9 of 34 sole-source depot maintenance contracts, as required by the FAR. The complexity of repairs presented challenges, as contracting officials often did not know the extent of the repairs required until after the contract was awarded. The resultant, inaccurate contracts increased the likelihood contractors would include additional costs to cover their increased risk.

Audit of Sole-Source Depot Maintenance Contracts

Contracting officials did not consistently comply with Federal and DoD acquisition regulations. This led to cost escalation of at least $71.9 million and negative impacts on mission completion and readiness.

Report No. DODIG-2023-069, “Evaluation of DoD Contracting Officer Actions on DoD Contracts Terminated for Convenience,” May 9, 2023, found that in 17 of 63 terminations examined, contracting officers did not document adequate rationale for settling costs and may have inappropriately reimbursed contractors up to $22.3 million. The evaluation attributed the absence of regulation and requirements training for contracting officials as one of the contributing factors.

In addition to financial inefficiencies, threats posed by foreign entities to the DIB and DoD are of particular concern. Report No. DODIG-2022-086, “Evaluation of the Defense Logistics Agency Lifetime Buys of Parts Used in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems,” April 19, 2022, identified the limitations of the modern DIB and associated risk of compromise to national security systems. A lifetime buy of parts, intended to avoid the future risk of shortages, instead incurred the risk of counterfeit parts being introduced into DoD platforms, as the sole trusted supplier was an international business that maintains production facilities in an adversarial nation. Measures intended to mitigate this risk were not employed due to: an oversight in the contract-writing software, disagreements on oversight roles and responsibilities between DoD entities, and misinterpretations of contract management policy requirements.

The DoD OIG recently completed Report No. DODIG-2023-123, “Audit of the Reliability of Army Spare Parts Forecasts Submitted to the Defense Logistics Agency,” September 20, 2023, and has multiple ongoing projects related to the DIB and supply chain management, including audits on spare parts, repairs, and supply chains associated with multiple weapon systems. Planned work for FY 2024 includes an audit of the Navy’s controls and procedures to remove defective spare parts provided by contractors from the DoD supply chain and to obtain restitution from those contractors.
Selected Projects (find at: https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/)

- DODIG-2023-069, “Evaluation of DoD Contracting Officer Actions on DoD Contracts Terminated for Convenience,” May 9, 2023
- (ongoing) “Audit of C-17 Spare Part Pricing” (Project No. D2022-D000AH-0142.000)
- (ongoing) “Audit of B-52 Supply Chain Management” (Project No. D2022-D000AT-0114.000)
- (ongoing) “Audit of Repair Pricing for the F/A-18 Hornet Radar Systems” (Project No. D2023-D000AT-0143.000)
- (upcoming) “Audit of Navy Defective Parts and Contractor Restitution”
The USNS Henry J. Kaiser approaches the USNS Mercy during a multinational humanitarian assistance and disaster relief preparedness mission in the Pacific Ocean. Source: U.S. Navy.
Challenge 4: Improving DoD Financial Management and Budgeting

**Challenge Highlights**

- Scope-limiting material weaknesses hamper auditors’ abilities to perform procedures to draw a conclusion on the financial statements.
- A lack of coordination among and across personnel, processes, and systems covering the DoD's diverse sub-entities hinders progress toward effective fiscal management.
- Lack of clearly defined, established, and consistent identification of reporting entities negatively impacts financial management and audit planning.

As the Secretary of Defense told Congress, “... accountability to both our own forces and the American public is core to our democracy and sets us apart from our competitors on the world stage.”

The DoD has more than $3.5 trillion in assets, and more than $3.7 trillion in liabilities; oversight of these resources requires continuous effort to achieve an environment in which financial data and reporting integrity are the norm. The DoD Financial Improvement and Audit Remediation Report, issued in June 2023, acknowledges, “The financial statement audits have peeled back the top layers and are revealing the Department’s most entrenched and difficult issues.”

DoD Financial Management has been on GAO’s High Risk list for 28 years. Likewise, the DoD OIG has consistently identified that the DoD’s financial management needs to improve. Among other products, the DoD OIG’s annually issued report on understanding the results of the DoD’s financial statement audit highlights continuing challenges for the DoD in addressing scope-limiting material weaknesses, coordinating financial management, and maintaining consistent financial reporting entities. While recruiting and retaining a knowledgeable financial management workforce is an aspect of this challenge, we discuss it in Challenge 7, Recruiting and Retaining a Diverse Workforce, along with the broader need within the DoD to attract and retain employees with critical skill sets.

**Relevant Documents**

- DoD Strategic Management Plan, FY 2022-2026 ed. (Strategic Priority 5.1-5.3 and 2022 Strategic Priority 4.3, 4.5)
- GAO High Risk Areas, 2023 ed. (DoD Financial Management, DoD Business Systems Modernization)
- DoD Financial Management Strategy, FY 2022-2026
- DoD Financial Improvement and Audit Remediation Report, 2023
**Scope-Limiting Material Weaknesses**

Report No. DODIG-2023-070, “Understanding the Results of the Audit of the FY 2022 DoD Financial Statements,” May 16, 2023, aims to focus the Department not just on the total number of material weaknesses, but specifically on those which are “scope-limiting” in that they do not allow auditors to perform sufficient procedures to reach a conclusion on the accuracy of the financial statements. The report identifies 10 categories of scope-limiting material weaknesses.

*Figure 2. Scope-Limiting Material Weaknesses at the DoD Agency-Wide Level*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scope-Limiting Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information Technology</td>
<td>The DoD lacked effective information technology internal controls, which limited the auditors’ ability to rely on information from the financial-related IT systems; therefore, auditors could not perform sufficient procedures to conclude on the financial statements balances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universe of Transactions</td>
<td>The DoD could not provide complete and accurate universes of transactions to support the balances reported in the financial statements. As a result, auditors were unable to perform the necessary procedures to verify the accuracy of the balances presented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund Balance with Treasury</td>
<td>The DoD could not balance its Fund Balance with Treasury accounts with the amounts recorded at the Department of the Treasury, which caused the DoD to have to record unsupported journal vouchers in order to force the DoD’s accounts to match the Treasury. These unsupported journal vouchers did not contain enough information that would allow auditors to verify that the DoD’s balances are accurate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventory and Related Property</td>
<td>The DoD was unable to substantiate the existence and completeness of inventory reported on the financial statements or did not properly account for or value its inventory. As a result, the auditors could not perform sufficient procedures to conclude on the inventory balance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Property, Plant, and Equipment, including Real Property (PP&amp;E)</td>
<td>The DoD lacked sufficient policies or procedures to accurately value and report General PP&amp;E balances. In addition, due to the lack of sufficient internal controls to ensure real property assets were recorded completely and accurately within accountable property systems of record, auditors could not perform sufficient procedures to determine whether the General PP&amp;E balances on the financial statements were fairly presented, resulting in a scope limitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting Entity</td>
<td>DoD management did not correctly apply a financial standard, which limited the auditors’ ability to rely on the information published by DoD management. As a result, auditors could not conclude on the accuracy of the balances presented on the financial statements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Property in the Possession of Contractors (GPIPC)</td>
<td>The DoD did not have adequate internal controls to account for and reconcile their government property provided to contractors for performance of a contract or could not provide sufficient documentation to support the existence and completeness of their GPIPC. This created a scope limitation because the auditors could not perform sufficient procedures to conclude on the balances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program</td>
<td>The JSF Program Office was unable to verify the completeness and value of the JSF Program assets, and the assets were not in an accountable property system of record. Not only were the auditors unable to perform the necessary procedures to conclude on the JSF property balances, but they also could not quantify the extent of the misstatement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Oversight and Monitoring</td>
<td>DoD management did not have sufficient controls over financial statement adjustments, the preparation of the financial statements and related note disclosures, or the execution and reporting of its funding, which increased the risks of misstatements and incomplete balances. As a result, auditors were unable to obtain reasonable assurance that information reported on the financial statements was presented in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental and Disposal Liabilities (E&amp;DL)</td>
<td>In FY 2022, the auditors identified E&amp;DL as a material weakness and determined that the DoD did not have sufficient procedures or internal controls to substantiate the completeness and accuracy of its E&amp;DL. Until the DoD provides a complete and accurate E&amp;DL, auditors are unable to complete procedures to conclude on the E&amp;DL balances.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The DoD OIG.
In July 2023, the DoD OIG issued Report No. DODIG-2023-096, “Management Advisory: DoD’s Ability to Financially Report Joint Strike Fighter Inventory,” on the accounting and reporting of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program inventory. The DoD OIG found that the F-35 JSF Program Office did not have a valid population of inventory in its or its contractor’s possession and did not establish parameters on how to financially report inventory, impacting accuracy of financial statements and potentially leading to uninformed logistical and budgetary decisions. In FY 2024, the DoD OIG plans to continue oversight of government property in the possession of contractors with an audit of the remediation efforts associated with documenting that property. Knowing which property is with contractors and the value of that property is key to accurately reporting government property, which has been a scope-limiting material weakness for the DoD for more than 18 years.

**Lack of Financial Management Coordination Across the DoD**

Many of the weaknesses identified in DODIG-2023-070 hinge on shortfalls in coordination throughout the Department—both among personnel and systems. The DoD is attempting to manage 334 different systems and applications for financial management including disparate and outdated accounting, acquisition, inventory, and logistics systems. These systems also lack interoperability, adequate controls, and automated processes. Because financial management requires more than just the involvement of financial management professionals, coordination between the workforce in other functional areas, such as acquisition, logistics, and policy—and coordination amongst the underlying systems—is paramount. For example, policies, processes, and internal controls over the accountability of inventory not only ensure the inventory is reported correctly on the financial statements, but they also provide real-time accurate inventory data to enable Services and commands to reliably predict reorder timeframes and thereby minimize operational risk.

The DoD OIG has a number of ongoing or planned projects to evaluate the DoD’s efforts to improve its financial management systems, such as the “Audit of the DoD Plans to Address Long-Standing Issues with Outdated Financial Management Systems,” announced February 22, 2023, which focuses on the efforts to modernize DoD Business Systems, as described in the DoD Strategic Management Plan, Priority 5.3.

**Unclear Identification of Reporting Entities**

The DoD has not properly implemented and applied the standard for identifying which entities should be consolidated and included on the agency-wide financial statements. Because the DoD did not report all the entities for which it has a reporting responsibility, it increases the likelihood that the DoD is failing to identify unique risks that may be affecting its organization and its financial statement opinion. In addition, users of the financial statements, including the public, may be misled by the DoD’s failure to disclose all of the relevant and material entities that use taxpayer dollars.

Understanding the Results of the Audit of the FY 2022 DoD Financial Statements

The DoD’s inability to properly identify whether all of its material entities have been consolidated or disclosed increases the likelihood that the DoD is failing to identify unique risks that may be affecting its organization and its financial statement opinion. In addition, users of the financial statements, including the public, may be misled by the DoD’s failure to disclose all of the relevant and material entities that use taxpayer dollars.
and its financial statement opinion. In addition, users of the financial statements, including the public, may be misled by the DoD’s failure to disclose all of the relevant and material entities that use taxpayer dollars.

In FY 2022, the DoD was statutorily required to report on eight entities that represented 83.71 percent of the DoD's assets on the agency-wide financial statements. However, DoD management also can direct the inclusion of entities that do not represent a material portion of the financial statements and previously included 18 of these entities. Beginning in FY 2023, the DoD added two additional reporting entities that represented only 0.15 percent of the DoD’s assets on the agency-wide financial statements. Adding these two reporting entities has no impact on the DoD Agency-Wide financial statement audit opinion and auditing them requires the DoD to commit resources totaling almost $20 million. Because the DoD is a large, complex, and diverse organization, the DoD must establish, document, and maintain a clear, consistent financial reporting structure. Establishing this structure will help the DoD develop a more effective and efficient financial management environment.

**Selected Projects (find at: https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/)**

- DODIG-2023-070, “Understanding the Results of the Audit of the FY 2022 DoD Financial Statements,” May 16, 2023
- DODIG-2023-096, “Management Advisory: DoD’s Ability to Financially Report Joint Strike Fighter Inventory,” July 21, 2023
- (ongoing) “Audit of DoD Oversight of Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contracts” (Project No. D2022-D000AT-0175.000)
- (ongoing) “Audit of Financial Improvement and Audit Remediation Contracts for DoD Components and Agencies” (Project No. D2022-D000FS-0137.000)
- (ongoing) “Audit of the DoD’s Plans to Address Long-standing Issues with Outdated Financial Management Systems” (Project No. D2022-D000FV-0087.000)
A Marine Corps ecologist holds a desert tortoise at the Tortoise Research and Captive Rearing Site at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California. Source: U.S. Marine Corps.
The DoD has identified climate change as a critical national security issue. The effects of a changing climate undermine military readiness, impose significant costs, increase demand and scope for military operations, worsen existing security risks, and threaten U.S. interests. Principally, the DoD seeks to increase resilience and improve combat capability, while reducing its own contributions to climate change.

Over the last 3 years, the DoD has developed an interlocking set of strategy documents and plans that address a range of climate-related concerns such as operational adaptation, transformation and sustainability of the force, impact of DoD activities on local communities, and access to natural resources. The DoD Strategic Management Plan FY 2022-2026 identifies the reduction of climate impacts to DoD installations as an Agency Priority Goal to be accomplished within 2 years.

Independent input from the Department, gathered by the DoD OIG, identified difficulties in translating strategic goals into actionable plans and in effectively engaging with installation communities, both at home and internationally. These concerns illuminate the challenges that persist, despite robust planning and high-level commitment, in the areas of climate-related guidance, resourcing, and equipment.

**Relevant Documents**

- DoD Strategic Management Plan, FY 2022-2026 ed. (Strategic Priority 3, 3.3; and 2022 Strategic Priority 2.3)
- DoD Climate Risk Assessment, 2021
- DoD Climate Adaptation Plan, 2022 Progress Report
- DoD Sustainability Plan, 2022
- DoD Equity Action Plan, 2022
- National Defense Strategy, 2022
Incomplete Guidance

Climate resilience assessments are required by the FY 2020 NDAA, with required elements detailed in the DoD’s Unified Facilities Criteria, UFC 2-100-01. The DoD OIG has found that DoD-level guidance to fulfill this requirement is inadequate, particularly at the installation level. Report No. DODIG-2023-061, “Audit of Military Department Climate Change Assessments and Adaptation Plans in the Southeastern Continental United States,” March 28, 2023, found that Military Departments did not consistently develop required climate resilience assessments at the five installations reviewed. Policy directs that these assessments include an evaluation of existing and projected risks to installations from extreme weather, and delineate specific facilities or assets that are threatened. The report attributes the lack of consistency in assessments, in part, to the failure of the Department and Services to provide comprehensive guidance that includes adequate definitions, approved data sources, and required elements and formats for the assessments.

Limited Resources Constrain Climate Initiatives

Although installations have completed projects to adapt to the impact of climate change, they have expressed that funding for climate projects without an immediate mission impact is difficult to obtain. Report No. DODIG-2023-068, “Evaluation of the DoD’s Management of Land-Based Water Resources to Support Operations,” May 9, 2023, observed that the DoD Executive Agent for land-based water resources was not performing the majority of their assigned responsibilities, primarily because Army leadership failed to provide the required support and oversight, including proper staffing and funding. DODIG-2023-061 and Report No. DODIG-2022-083, “Evaluation of the DoD’s Efforts to Address the Climate Resilience of U.S. Military Installations in the Arctic and Sub-Arctic,” April 13, 2022, were conducted at the installation level. These reports identified leaders at locations as diverse as the Southeastern United States and the Arctic who readily identified numerous climate-related infrastructure projects that could enhance climate resilience, but reported a lack of financial resources for climate-related projects that did not address an immediate risk to mission capabilities.

Audit of Military Department Climate Change Assessments and Adaptation Plans in the Southeastern Continental United States

A 2023 audit of climate change assessments and adaptation plans in the Southeastern United States produced eight recommendations, all of which are resolved but open. All eight address updates to policy, to more clearly delineate requirements and improve standardization.
Ensuring Equipment Is Designed to Withstand Climate Change

Mission accomplishment in a changing climate will depend in part on the DoD’s ability to design and maintain equipment capable of operations in extreme environments. For example, the Force Provider module is the Army’s life support system for base camps. It consists of military and commercial equipment needed to support climate-controlled billeting, food preparation, hygiene, and morale. Each Force Provider module supports 150 personnel. During a visit to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, Army personnel stated that Force Provider modules had been stored outdoors for at least 8 years, exposing them to intense heat and harsh conditions. In FY 2024, the DoD OIG plans to revisit Camp Arifjan and examine the impacts of this exposure on these critical components.

Selected Projects (find at: https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/)

- DODIG-2023-061, “Audit of the Military Department Climate Change Assessments and Adaptation Plans in the Southeastern Continental United States,” March 28, 2023
- DODIG-2023-068, “Evaluation of the DoD’s Management of Land-Based Water Resources,” May 9, 2023
- DODIG-2022-083, “Evaluation of the DoD’s Efforts to Address the Climate Resilience of U.S. Military Installations in the Arctic and Sub-Arctic,” April 13, 2022
- (upcoming) “Audit of the Army’s Management of Force Provider Modules in the U.S. Central Command”
National security requires a healthy, medically ready force, and a ready medical force to support it. The 2022 National Security Strategy states, “Service members are the backbone of America’s national defense and we are committed to their wellbeing.” In his 2023 message to the force, the Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his commitment to “taking care of our people” as one of his top three priorities.

However, challenges to the health and wellness of the force remain. Suicide and management of traumatic brain injury (TBI) care continue to be pressing concerns requiring attention. According to the DoD’s Defense Suicide Prevention Office, there were 94 suicides among active duty personnel in the first quarter of 2023, which represents an increase of 25 percent over the previous year. TBI also continues to have an impact on Service members, exerting lasting effects on their well-being. These persistent issues underscore the need for ongoing support and research.

Adding to the complexity of ensuring the health and wellness of the force is the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing strain on the Military Health System (MHS). DoD OIG work on these topics identified several issues, which were also raised by DoD stakeholders in response to a DoD OIG request for input on management and performance challenges: a shortage of healthcare providers, unclear policy, and inaccurate patient data.

Relevant Documents

- National Security Strategy, 2022
- Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Message to the Force,” 02 March 2023
- Department of Defense (DoD) Quarterly Suicide Report (QSR) 1st Quarter, 2023
- DoD Strategic Management Plan, FY 2022-2026 ed. (Strategic Objective 4, 4.3; Performance Goal 4.3.5)
**Shortage of Providers**

Consistent with Hotline complaints received by the Service Inspectors General and the DoD OIG, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command leaders conveyed a consistent concern to the Inspector General during his travels in the region in 2023: Service members and DoD civilians face challenges to accessing health care, especially in the area of specialty care, due in part to a shortage of medical professionals. Personnel have been referred to local providers off-installation, but still been unable to receive care in a timely fashion. Similarly, the COVID-19 MHS Review Panel's 2023 Report to the Congressional Defense Committees found that the DoD had "chronic shortages" of the specialty providers needed for warfighting, which were exacerbated by the pandemic. This was supported by Report No. DODIG-2022-081, "Evaluation of Department of Defense Military Medical Treatment Facility [MTF] Challenges During the Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic in Fiscal Year 2021," April 5, 2022, which found that during the pandemic "26 of the 30 MTFs reported staffing and manpower shortages as the most serious challenge encountered by medical personnel." MTF officials stated that the shortages were not a result of the pandemic but were compounded by it; they related that DoD-directed personnel cuts planned before the pandemic led to the shortages. These shortages caused burnout and decreased readiness for medical personnel, as well as delays in care and increased risk to patients.

Regarding specialty care, Report No. DODIG-2022-071, “Audit of Active Duty Service Member Alcohol Misuse Screening and Treatment,” March 10, 2022, found that the Defense Health Agency (DHA) and Services failed to adhere to prescribed timelines for screening and treatment for alcohol misuse because, among other reasons, “Service substance abuse centers, MTFs, or residential treatment facilities were understaffed,” resulting in delays in diagnosis and care, and risks to health and readiness.

**Unclear Health Care Policies**

Vague healthcare policy has had negative effects on patient care in a variety of areas. DODIG-2022-071 found that the DHA and Services did not clearly identify timeline requirements for substance abuse specialty care, which resulted in significant variance in assessment and treatment for Service members. For example, the timeline to provide assessment of a substance abuse disorder following...
a referral might be 7 days, 12 days, or even 28 days. Another variable was the frequency of screenings for alcohol use disorder. The report found that because of the lack of clear and consistent guidance, “Service members were not assessed and treated in a timely manner.”

Report No. DODIG-2022-030, “Evaluation of the Department of Defense’s Implementation of Suicide Prevention Resources for Transitioning Uniformed Service Members,” November 9, 2021, stated, “DoDI 6490.10 lacks a clear definition of a warm handoff, provider training protocols, standardized documentation methods, and oversight procedures to ensure compliance.” As a result, Service members may experience interruptions in care and their safety may be jeopardized. Report No. DODIG-2022-006, “Evaluation of Traumatic Brain Injuries in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility,” November 1, 2021, discovered failures to report potentially concussive events (PCEs) to the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) because the governing document, CCR 40-1, was unclear and did not, “specify how, how often, or to whom to report PCEs.” Report No. DODIG-2023-059, “Evaluation of the DoD's Management of Traumatic Brain Injury,” March 28, 2023, found that the “DoD did not implement consistent processes for the management of TBI care because DHA-PI 6490.04 does not clearly define 72-hour followup requirements.” Consequently, only 31 percent of mild TBI patients received a follow-up within 72 hours, and 41 percent of patients received no follow-up care at all.

**Inaccurate or Incomplete Data**

Modern data systems such as the MHS Genesis electronic health records (EHRs) should enable the MHS to better track and manage patient care, provided data is available and accurate. While the DoD is tracking the timeline of the MHS Genesis roll-out in its Strategic Management Plan, it makes no mention of accuracy. Report No. DODIG-2022-090, “Management Advisory: DoD Health Care Provider Concerns Regarding the Access to Complete and Accurate Electronic Health Records,” May 5, 2022, found that 91 percent of healthcare provider respondents reported inaccurate or incomplete patient health care information in MHS Genesis. Furthermore, 56 percent of respondents employing medical devices stated that the transfer of data to Genesis produced inaccurate or incomplete results. DODIG-2023-059 found that officials at nearly half of the MTFs examined reported inaccuracies in TBI data. Similarly, DODIG-2022-006 found that USCENTCOM was using EHRs to track PCEs, but the data was incomplete, which could result in Service members being denied benefits and treatment for TBI.
In September 2023, the DoD OIG and the Inspectors General of the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs, published the joint “Review of Personnel Shortages in Federal Health Care Programs During the COVID-19 Pandemic.” The DoD OIG has multiple ongoing projects related to health and wellness, including a management advisory dealing with concerns with access to health care in the MHS. Planned work for FY 2024 includes an evaluation of the use of multidisciplinary teams for suicide prevention and related care at the command and installation levels.

**Selected Projects (find at: https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/)**

- DODIG-2022-071, “Audit of Active Duty Service Member Alcohol Misuse Screening and Treatment,” March 10, 2022
- (ongoing) “Audit of DoD Health Care Personnel Shortages During the COVID-19 Pandemic” (Project No. D2022-D000AW-0158.000)
- (upcoming) “Evaluation of the DoD’s use of Multidisciplinary Teams for Suicide Prevention and Post-vention at Command and Installation Levels”
Challenge 7: Recruiting and Retaining a Diverse Workforce

Challenge Highlights

- Lack of consistent, accurate personnel data hampers workforce planning.
- Insufficient understanding of policies and procedures related to ideological extremism and talent management may impact recruiting and retention.

The 2022 National Defense Strategy acknowledges that cultivating the workforce we need includes taking better care of Service members and their families, and making deeper investments in people. The Services, particularly the Army, are confronting enlistment shortfalls and struggling to meet annual recruitment goals. Recruiting for the all-volunteer force has been affected by a strong labor market, decreased interest in serving and availability in qualified recruits, and growing distrust in institutions (Figure 3). The DoD has focused on improving recruitment and retention by widening the net for recruits; addressing talent management; growing talent in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) and cyber career fields; and advancing Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility (DEIA) principles.

Despite Government efforts, the April 2023 GAO High Risk Report identified Strategic Human Capital Management as a high risk for Federal agencies, including the DoD, specifically. While the report acknowledged an increase in leadership focus on the issue, it also noted a lack of progress in capacity, action plans, monitoring, and especially, demonstrated progress. Input from DoD Components, gathered by the DoD OIG during the development of this document, similarly identified pressing needs for additional skilled civilian employees, and frustrations with hiring processes and timelines for these employees. Work completed by the DoD OIG found issues with data collection and application of established policies and procedures.

Relevant Documents

- DoD Strategic Management Plan, FY 2022-2026 ed. (Strategic Priority 4.1, 4.2; and 2022 Strategic Priority 3.1, 3.2)
- GAO High Risk Areas, 2023 ed. (Strategic Human Capital Management)
- DoD Human Capital Operating Plan, FY 2022-FY 2026
- DoD STEM Strategic Plan, FY 2021-FY 2025
- DoD Cyber Workforce Strategy and Implementation Plan, 2023
- DoD Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility Strategic Plan
Effective use of data is critical to talent management. Progress in this area requires that personnel enter and maintain data in consistent, accurate ways within a personnel system, and that the systems present data to decision-makers and action officers in a meaningful way.

Report No. DODIG-2022-036, “Audit of the Department of Defense Strategic Planning for Overseas Civilian Positions,” November 16, 2021, found that information in DoD personnel and management data systems was updated separately and inconsistently by each Component, and did not provide human resources officials with reconcilable data on current, authorized, or budgeted positions. This data deficit impeded strategic
workforce planning, acting as a barrier to identifying vacancies and to active recruiting to fill them. Furthermore, Report No. DODIG-2023-073, “Evaluation of DoD Implementation of the Military Equal Opportunity Program’s Data Collection and Reporting Requirements for Complaints of Prohibited Discrimination,” May 18, 2023, and Report No. DODIG-2023-083, “Evaluation of the Collection of Demographic Data in the Military Justice System,” June 7, 2023, both found significant deficiencies in the accuracy and consistency of data collected for the respective programs, including demographic data and other specifics of the complaints or encounters. These shortfalls impeded the DoD’s ability to evaluate existing barriers or inconsistencies, take steps to remedy them, and measure progress toward that end.

The 2022 Defense Business Board (DBB) release, “Strengthening Defense Department Civilian Talent Management,” similarly highlighted the DoD’s failure to recognize the strategic importance of personnel data in order to effectively collect and use it. The DBB observed that there is no robust database for talent management that allows leaders to identify and track workforce skills or develop talent for upskilled roles. The DoD OIG has a number of ongoing and planned projects that will explore these and related challenges, including the “Audit of Army Oversight of DoD Language Interpretation and Translation Enterprise II Contract,” announced February 28, 2022, which will examine oversight of contract translators and may shed light on challenges in tracking demand to match supply. Other planned projects will evaluate the DoD’s Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture Program—shortfalls in the program could inhibit the maximum understanding of foreign languages, regional expertise, and the cultural perspectives of both our partners and potential adversaries—as well as efforts concerning the recruitment and retention of female pilots in the Air Force.

**Incomplete or Incorrect Application of Policies and Procedures**

DoD OIG reports have found that policies and procedures are not always sufficiently detailed and easily understood, impacting hiring and management’s actions. For example, Report No. DODIG-2022-095, “Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism within the Armed Forces,” May 10, 2022, found that efforts to combat extremism within the Services were ineffective due to the lack of clear definitions for terms like “extremism” and “active participation.”

Furthermore, Report No. DODIG-2023-103, “Audit of the Military Service Recruiting Organizations’ Efforts to Screen Applicants for Extremist and Criminal Gang Behavior,” August 3, 2023, found that recruiters did not complete required applicant screening steps. Out of applicants who required screening, recruiters only asked 41 percent the initial screening questions, and did not provide or require completion of mandatory forms and questionnaires for another 40 percent of applicants.
The challenge of turning strategy into actionable guidance extends to talent management. Report No. DODIG-2022-036 found that “DoD data systems, performance metrics, and guidance did not offer human resources officials clear direction or readily accessible tools.” The DBB’s 2023 “Building a Civilian Talent Pipeline” likewise recognizes many hiring officials are “overwhelmed with authorities” they do not understand how to use, and are constrained to use the “complicated,” “time-consuming,” and “frustrating” USAJOBS platform to perform civilian hiring. The DoD OIG has ongoing projects examining these challenges, including the “Audit of DoD-Funded Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics Education Programs,” announced September 26, 2022, which is looking at turning strategic planning into action by evaluating DoD STEM education programs’ integration of underserved and underrepresented students.

In the coming year, the DoD OIG plans to look into how reforms have been implemented in promotion selection boards; the Army’s sexual harassment and assault response and prevention program; and the Navy's sexual harassment complaint process.
Selected Projects (find at: https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/)

- DODIG-2023-083, “Evaluation of the Collection of Demographic Data in the Military Justice System,” June 7, 2023
- DODIG-2023-103, “Audit of the Military Service Recruiting Organizations’ Efforts to Screen Applicants for Extremist and Criminal Gang Behavior,” August 3, 2023
- (ongoing) “Audit of Army Oversight of DoD Language Interpretation and Translation Enterprise II Contract” (Project No. D2022-D000RJ-0104.000)
- (ongoing) “Audit of DoD-Funded Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) Education Programs” (Project No. D2022-D000RK-0179.000)
- (ongoing) “Evaluation of the Air Force’s Efforts to Recruit and Retain Female Pilots” (Project No. D2023-DEV0PH-0153.000)
The USSPACECOM Joint Operations Center is responsible for integrating data and status from multiple operations centers, the Services and agencies to provide the Commander, USSPACECOM with critical Command and Control capabilities. Source: U.S. Space Force.
Challenge 8: Accelerating the Transformation to a Data-Centric Organization

Challenge Highlights

- DoD culture does not consistently regard data as a strategic asset and prioritize its management throughout the defense ecosystem.
- Implementation of the DoD data strategy is limited by a lack of measurable action plans, management accountability, and funding.

The DoD aims to transform into a data-centric organization, where data is not only valued, but is also readily available and consistently used to inform decision-making. As noted by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Data is essential to preserving military advantage, supporting our people and serving the public.” The DoD faces fast paced, high consequence, worldwide strategic decision-making; manages one of the world’s largest workforces; and operates a multibillion-dollar global supply chain and an enormous inventory of facilities and installations. These activities make the DoD one of the world’s largest producers and consumers of data.

Given data’s importance, the DoD must treat it as a strategic asset and prioritize its management throughout the entire defense ecosystem. To meet this challenge, the 2020 DoD Data Strategy provides the guiding principles, capabilities, and goals necessary to navigate the DoD’s transition into a data-centric enterprise. However, the pace and success of this transformation requires a significant cultural shift within the DoD. Input from DoD Components, gathered by the DoD OIG during the development of this document, identified limitations in data standardization and interoperability as key challenges, as well as a lack of education and training in data or information literacy. Similarly, over the last several years, the DoD OIG has noted limitations in the DoD and the Department of Veterans Affairs’ health record interoperability and examined data-driven limitations on interoperable systems and tools for forecasting logistics demand.

Relevant Documents

- DoD Strategic Management Plan, FY 2022-2026 ed. (Strategic Priority 5.4 & 5.4.2)
- DoD Data Strategy, 2020
- National Defense Strategy, 2022 (VII. Building Enduring Advantages, Make the Right Technology Investments)
Developing a Data-Centric Culture

A data-centric culture is one in which data is treated as a strategic asset; data completeness and accuracy is rigorously maintained; data sharing and collaboration across organizational boundaries is expected; and business processes, standards, and products are developed with data in mind. However, there remains much work to be done to build this type of culture across the DoD.

An example of the challenges facing the DoD is the need to shift how it approaches data management, such as data license rights for weapon systems. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, intellectual property licensing rights for defense products and services were viewed as too costly and unnecessary to acquire. However, acquiring and licensing the appropriate intellectual property is vital for ensuring that DoD systems will remain functional, sustainable, upgradable, and affordable. Beginning in 2009, DoD instructions have recognized the need for data licensing, culminating in DoDI 5010.44, “Intellectual Property Acquisition and Licensing,” in October 2019. This policy requires a robust intellectual property strategy by which data licensing is factored into source selection. In FY 2024, the DoD OIG plans to audit whether data license rights are incorporated into weapon systems contract requirements in accordance with Federal and DoD policies.

Relatedly, the DoD did not effectively monitor and hold accountable the contractors that provide data services. Report No. DODIG-2023-093, “Audit of the Reliability of the DoD Coronavirus Disease–2019 Patient Health Data,” July 7, 2023, reviewed a contract to develop a COVID-19 registry for the DoD, in which patient data was to be entered with at least 90 percent accuracy. The DoD OIG found that the data was “not complete, accurate, or representative,” and the team, “identified errors in 24 of the 25 registry records” they reviewed. The DoD OIG noted that the contracting officer’s representative relied on contractor self-reported information, and did not perform independent validation.

Evaluation of the DoD’s Actions to Develop Interoperable Systems and Tools for Forecasting Logistics Demand Across the Joint Logistics Enterprise

Our analysis of an Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment-provided data set identified over 1,100 DoD systems and tools with the potential to forecast logistics demand for campaign planning. However, not one Military Service, combatant command, or Defense Logistics Agency official we spoke with identified any systems across the Joint Logistics Enterprise that met the criteria for interoperability identified in DoDI 8330.01.

Audit of the Reliability of the DoD Coronavirus Disease–2019 Patient Health Data

A 2023 audit of the DoD’s COVID-19 registry data that revealed significant problems produced 13 recommendations, of which 13 are open with 10 unresolved.
Implementing the Data Strategy

In 2021, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum to DoD senior leadership directing actions to accelerate implementation of the DoD’s Data Strategy. This included two enterprise-wide efforts: Joint All-Domain Operations and the Advancing Analytics (Advana) platform.

Joint All-Domain Operations is a strategic approach to DoD operations that integrates the capabilities and resources of all defense domains—sea, land, air, space, and cyberspace—into the planning, analysis, and execution of missions. Within this approach is the concept of Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). The purpose of JADC2 is to connect data sensors, weapon systems, and related communications devices from all of the Military Services into a single network. The JADC2 concept requires secure information sharing and interoperability of programs across common data standards and architectures. Therefore, one of the DoD’s main challenges is the development of policies and authorities that will enable rapid, effective, and secure coordination of capabilities between the Services. In FY 2024, the DoD OIG plans to evaluate whether the DoD developed and implemented standardized data interfaces and data security as part of the JADC2 strategy, in accordance with the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s March 2022 Implementation Plan.

Advana is a data platform meant to help the DoD translate common enterprise data into actionable insights, decisions, and outcomes by making data widely accessible, understandable, and usable across the enterprise. The Deputy Secretary of Defense emphasized that Advana is the “single enterprise authoritative data management and analytics platform” for the DoD and that any other data management platforms require approval to ensure adherence with DoD data standards. The DoD uses Advana to collect, aggregate, and store large amounts of data—approximately 2 petabytes (the equivalent of 2 million gigabytes) as of March 2023—from 450 data sources and at least 55 DoD organizations. While Advana provides significant benefits to the DoD, its implementation has also highlighted the need for increased data accessibility and quality throughout the DoD. In FYs 2021 and 2022, the DoD OIG issued three oversight reports (listed under selected projects) indicating the need for increased transparency, completeness, and accuracy of the underlying data within Advana. In FY 2024, the DoD OIG plans to conduct an audit focused on whether the DoD can rely on Advana’s data repository to make informed decisions on DoD operations and performance.
Selected Projects (find at: https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/)

- (ongoing) “Audit of the Defense Digital Service Support of Programs and Operations” (Project No. D2021-D000CU-0143.000)
- (ongoing) “Evaluation of the DoD Military Information Support Operations Workforce” (Project No. D2023-DEV0PD-0079.000)
- (ongoing) “Evaluation of the Control and Accountability of DoD Biometric Data Collection Technologies” (Project No. D2023-DEV0PD-0080.000)
- (upcoming) “Audit of Data in DoD’s Advancing Analytics (Advana) Repository”
- (upcoming) “Audit of DoD Data License Rights in Weapon System Contracts”
- (upcoming) “Evaluation of the DoD’s Implementation of Joint All-Domain Command and Control Strategy”
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