

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Semiannual Report to Congress

October 1, 2022 - March 31, 2023



Defense Intelligence Agency

Office of the Inspector General

Semiannual Report to Congress

1st and 2nd Quarters, Fiscal Year 2023

Additional Information and Copies

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has strived to make this report as transparent as possible while safeguarding sensitive information. Where appropriate, we have removed or rephrased information to avoid disclosing classified material. Although we have worked to provide a comprehensive unclassified report, the classified addendum contains additional reports and details that are not publicly releasable.

This report, with its classified addendum, is posted on our websites located on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and on the Secret Internet Protocol Router (SIPR). A copy of this report, excluding its addendum, can also be found on the Internet at <https://oig.dia.mil/> and at <https://www.oversight.gov>.

For more information, report summaries of our audits, evaluations, inspections, investigations, and announcements of ongoing work are also available online at <https://oig.dia.mil/> and at <https://www.oversight.gov>. Full reports are posted on our JWICS and SIPR websites.

To request physical copies of this report, contact the DIA OIG at (202) 231-1010.

Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN: Office of the Inspector General
7400 Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7400

(Are you aware of fraud, waste,
or abuse in a DIA program?
If so, report it!

DIA Inspector General Hotline

Via phone: (202) 231-1000

Via NIPR email: ig_hotline@dodis.mil



I am pleased to present the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Semiannual Report (SAR) to Congress. This document highlights our oversight efforts from October 1, 2022 to March 31, 2023.

DIA OIG began the fiscal year (FY) by finalizing our 2023-2028 Strategic Plan. The goals and objectives highlighted within our plan include maximizing the value of our oversight for stakeholders; cultivating a diverse, inclusive, and inspired workforce with skills to anticipate and resolve challenges; and optimizing our OIG business operations. Our Strategic Plan drives the work we do, ensuring we remain efficient and effective.

With our strategy in mind, we developed a risk-based framework and conducted an office-wide table top exercise (TTX) to guide our focus areas for oversight projects and align our resources for greatest impact. The TTX offered an opportunity for our staff to share experiences and perspectives that were applied in our risk assessments. By using this approach, we believe we have set the stage to do the right oversight work at the right time, maximizing value for all stakeholders. This effort has positioned us to support DIA's strategic competition efforts to "...outthink, outmaneuver, and outmatch our competitors across all mission and mission-enabling functions."¹

Since our last SAR, our Audits and Inspection and Evaluations (I&E) Divisions completed 7 projects, issued 6 recommendations, and closed 13 recommendations. Additionally, our Investigations Division closed 72 cases.

During this semiannual reporting period, our Audits, I&E, and Investigations divisions focused on issues that pose the highest risk to DIA operations and activities, such as:

Our Audits Division issued several recommendations to strengthen DIA's financial statements, a critical component to maintaining our nation's strategic advantage. This ensures taxpayer dollars are put to best use.

Our I&E Division completed projects in the reporting period that span an array of significant mission areas. They resulted in changes to policies and procedures with far-reaching impacts across DIA and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

Our Investigations Division substantiated allegations that a Senior Leader violated hiring practices and engaged in Questionable Intelligence Activities. In these cases, DIA demonstrated commitment to maintaining an environment founded on trust and accountability.

Furthermore, our oversight work could not be achieved without the support provided by our Management and Administration Division and the Headquarters functions that directly support the Inspector General and Deputy Inspector General.

I am privileged to work with individuals who uphold shared values of integrity, excellence, accountability, initiative, and teamwork to achieve mission, and I am proud of all DIA OIG's accomplishments outlined in this report.

I also want to credit DIA Senior Leaders for their commitment to focus efforts to resolve or mitigate issues highlighted within our FY 2022 Top Management Challenge report. Holding quarterly meetings to track progress on closing open recommendations is beneficial to the Defense Enterprise and the public at-large. As the Acting IG to DIA, I look forward to continuing to deliver impactful oversight that drives accountability and positive change in defense of the Nation.

This product, along with other unclassified summaries and reports, can be found on our DIA website, <https://oig.dia.mil>, and the IG community site operated by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, <https://www.oversight.gov>.


 Jeremy Kirkland
 Acting IG

¹ Statement from LTG Scott D. Berrier, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. Found in Defense Intelligence Agency Strategy, October 2022, (Document is UNCLASSIFIED), 1 cy.

Table of Contents

General Information

The DIA Office of the Inspector General [1](#)

Office of the Inspector General Organization [2](#)

Reporting

Summary of Audits Division Activity [5](#)

Summary of Inspection and Evaluation Division Activity [10](#)

Summary of Investigations Division Activity [15](#)

Appendix A. Statistical Tables [26](#)

Appendix B. Status of Recommendations [29](#)

Appendix C. Audits, Inspections and Evaluations, and Investigations Closed since October 1, 2022 [37](#)

Appendix D. Index of Statutory Reporting [41](#)

Appendix E. Glossary of Acronyms [48](#)

Classified Addendum 49

The DIA Office of the Inspector General

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is one of 75 Federal statutory Inspectors General (IGs) and was established by the IG Act of 1978, as amended. The IG Act requires OIG independence and objectivity, and contains safeguards against efforts to impair or hinder OIG operations.

Mission

To promote the efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity of DIA operations and activities through transparent and independent oversight.

Vision

Deliver impactful oversight that drives accountability and positive change in defense of the Nation.

Values



Integrity

Courageously adhere to the highest ethical principles, confidentiality, objectivity, and trustworthiness.



Excellence

Provide the best services, products, and oversight.



Accountability

Take pride in meeting commitments and hold each other to those commitments.



Initiative


Take ownership to solve problems and challenges and identify opportunities to better the organization.



Teamwork

Collaborate internally (working together) and across organizations to achieve common goals.

Office of the Inspector General Organization



Audits

The Audits Division conducts independent, objective, and nonpartisan oversight of the stewardship, performance, or cost of DIA's operations, programs, and policies. Audits provide essential accountability and transparency over government programs and enable decisionmakers to improve program performance and operations, reduce costs, facilitate decision making by parties responsible for overseeing or initiating corrective action, and contribute to public accountability.

Inspections and Evaluations

The Inspections and Evaluations (I&E) Division conducts systematic and independent assessments of the design, implementation, and outcome of DIA's operations, programs, or policies. The division provides a flexible and effective mechanism for conducting oversight with a multi-disciplinary staff and multiple data gathering and analysis methodologies. The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency's Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation (Blue Book) empowers the I&E Division to develop flexible, tailored approaches for determining efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of agency operations, programs, and policies. Inspections and evaluations provide factual and analytical information, measure performance, assess internal controls, identify savings opportunities, highlight best practices, assess and refer allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, as well as determine compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies.

Investigations

The Investigations Division conducts proactive and reactive administrative and criminal investigations to detect, deter, and report fraud, waste, and abuse within DIA; develops sufficient evidence to successfully resolve all allegations and facilitate successful criminal prosecution or management-directed disciplinary action; and identifies and reports internal control weaknesses that could render DIA programs and systems vulnerable to exploitation. The Investigations Division, at its discretion, investigates Questionable Intelligence Activities, as defined by Executive Order 12333, “*United States Intelligence Activities*,” as amended.

Hotline Program

The Hotline Program is a confidential and reliable means for DIA employees and the public to report fraud, waste, mismanagement, and abuse of authority. The program’s primary role is to receive and evaluate concerns and complaints and determine whether to investigate or refer to the Agency or the responsible element that is best suited to take appropriate action.

Management and Administration

The Management and Administration (M&A) Division provides advisement, guidance, and integrated institutional support on key mission-critical functions that enable OIG components to conduct their work efficiently and effectively. This responsibility includes providing management of budget and acquisition, human resources, space, information technology, and staff operations, such as administrative support services, production, and editorial support. M&A strives to create and improve administrative and business processes to meet the challenges of a dynamic working environment.

Headquarters

In addition to the IG and Deputy IG, Headquarters is comprised of those functions that directly support the IG and Deputy: the Counsel to the IG (IGC), Strategy and Performance Management, and Data Analytics Team (DAT). The IGC provides independent and objective legal advice and counsel to the IG directly and all OIG elements on a variety of legal and policy issues that impact the OIG mission. The Strategy Team manages the office’s strategic planning process that implements the IG’s priorities, to include the office strategy and implementation plans, annual guidance, programming, branding, messaging, and outreach with stakeholders. DAT applies business analytics to analyze historical data, gain new insights, improve strategic decision-making, and drive process improvements within OIG.

SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE



Audit Reports Issued: 3



Recommendations Issued to Management: 0



Recommendations Closed: 5



Recommendations Open: 23



Recommendations Overdue: 21



Inspection and Evaluation Reports Issued: 4



Recommendations Issued to Management: 6



Recommendations Closed: 8



Recommendations Open: 61



Recommendations Overdue: 44



Investigations Reports Issued: 10 (2 of which were substantiated violations)



Recommendations Issued to Management: 4



Recommendations Closed: 1



Recommendations Open: 15



Recommendations Overdue: 12



Cases Opened: 35



Cases Closed: 72



Monetary Recoveries: \$541,930.51



SUMMARIES OF AUDITS ACTIVITY

COMPLETED PROJECTS

Audit of DIA's 2022 Financial Statements, Project 2022-1004, issued November 15, 2022

What We Did. We engaged with an independent public accounting (IPA) firm to audit DIA's Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 financial statements. We evaluated the reliability of data supporting the financial statements, determined the reasonableness of the statements produced, and examined disclosures in accordance with applicable guidance.

What We Found. For more information on the project and results, please see the "Classified Summaries of Audit Division Activity" section on page 51 of the Classified Addendum.

What We Recommend. Our recommendations can be found in the "Classified Status of Recommendations" table A-5 located on page 63 of the Classified Addendum. Our results continue to provide insight to Agency decision makers to use as they address risk gaps related to our FY 2022 DIA Top Management Challenge—Financial Management.

Audit of DIA's Commercial Contract Payments, Project 2022-1006, issued February 3, 2023

What We Did. We determined whether DIA's commercial contract payments were proper, supported, and timely. To address the objective, we used a sampling approach from the Government Accountability Office to enable a 90 percent confidence on whether controls governing the invoice review process were working properly. To review each sample, we gathered supporting documentation to determine whether payments were proper, supported, and timely per Federal laws, regulations, and DIA policies. However, our procedures did not extend to physically verifying equipment and specifications or confirming the quality and extent of services performed. Rather, our procedures for these invoices included (i) comparison of receiving reports to contract details and invoices for goods received and (ii) comparison of contract details to the invoice and the Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) certification confirming services were rendered.

What We Found. Based on the scope of our audit, DIA's commercial contract payments were proper, supported, and timely in accordance with Federal laws, regulations, and DIA policies. For example, the payments tested went to the correct recipients, for the right amount and purpose, and without any duplicate payments for the period tested. Additionally, the payments tested were supported with sufficient documentation and paid within the required 30 days. Our results demonstrate that DIA had reliable controls over its processes that safeguarded disbursements for commercial contract payments. That said, the results do not exclude the possibility of improper commercial contract payments, as the sampling approach we used provided 90 percent confidence in the results, not absolute assurance.

What We Recommend. We did not issue any recommendations to DIA management. Our results continue to provide insight to Agency decision makers to use as they address risk gaps related to our FY 2022 DIA Top Management Challenge—Financial Management.

Independent Agreed-Upon Procedures of DIA's Advanced Purchase Request Process, Project 2023-1001, issued January 13, 2023, reissued on March 31, 2023

What We Did. We performed an agreed-upon procedures engagement on DIA's Advanced Purchase Request (APR) process, which is the process used by DIA to accomplish its acquisition planning requirements. DIA's Office of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) engaged us to conduct this effort and intends to use the results to inform its way ahead to replace its acquisition management system.

The agreed-upon procedures included conducting interviews of selected officials identified by CFO and calculating the number and percentage of APRs with specific qualities. We revised the original report because one of the procedures in the Memorandum of Understanding did not properly identify the data necessary to accomplish the intent of that procedure. Therefore, the revised report removed the results of that procedure.

What We Found. We reported results of interviews, which included the following areas related to the APR process: process for updating and publishing checklists; actual actions completed during the APR process to determine areas of noncompliance; reasons why APRs are not submitted on time; reasons why APR disapprovals have a delayed resubmission to contracting; and confirmation that all APR process steps are being conducted. We also analyzed contracting system reports provided by CFO to calculate the number and percentage of APRs fund-certified after established FY 2022 deadlines.

What We Recommend. We were not engaged to and did not conduct an examination or audit, the objective of which would be the expression of an opinion or recommendations on the subject matter. Accordingly, we did not make any recommendations as part of this agreed-upon procedures engagement. Rather, the report outlines the results of specific procedures CFO engaged us to perform.

Audit of DIA's Privileged User Account Management, Project 2022-1002, terminated December 9, 2022

What We Did. We initiated an audit of DIA's management of privileged user accounts in November 2022. The objective of the audit was to determine if individuals using privileged user accounts are limited to only their required role assignments and functions and that these account privileges are revoked once no longer needed. Due to the acceleration of the OIG Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) statutory reporting requirements in FY 2022 and resource limitations, we paused the audit during the planning phase with the intent to resume later in 2022. With ongoing higher priority projects and limited resources, we terminated the project on December 9, 2022.

What We Found. As we terminated this project prior to beginning fieldwork, we did not obtain sufficient evidence to reach any conclusions.

What We Recommend. We did not issue any recommendations.

ONGOING PROJECTS

Audit of DIA's Emergency and Extraordinary Expenses, Project 2020-1001

Overview. Our objective is to determine whether DIA's Emergency and Extraordinary Expenses (EEE) are properly authorized and that reimbursements have been properly supported. Project results will provide insight to Agency decision makers to address risk gaps related to our FY 2022 DIA Top Management Challenge—Financial Management.

Status. The project was in the reporting phase at the end of the reporting period.

Audit of DIA's Management of the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System, Project 2022-1001

Overview. Our objective is to determine whether processes for the management of the current Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) network and its modernization plan are designed to maintain network resiliency by meeting present and future security and capability requirements. Project results will provide insight to Agency decision makers to address risk gaps related to our FY 2022 DIA Top Management Challenge—Information Security Governance.

Status. The project was in the final report phase at the end of the reporting period.

Audit of DIA's Financial Statements for Fiscal Year 2023, Project 2023-1003

Overview. The objective is to evaluate the reliability of data supporting DIA's financial statements, determine the reasonableness of the statements produced, and examine disclosures in accordance with applicable guidance. We have engaged an IPA to conduct this audit. The IPA will also review the reliability of financial systems, effectiveness of internal controls, and compliance with laws and regulations. Project results will provide insight to Agency decision makers to address risk gaps related to our FY 2022 DIA Top Management Challenge—Financial Management.

Status. The project was in the planning phase at the end of the reporting period.

Audit of DIA's Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation Funds, Project 2023-1002

Overview. Our objective is to determine whether DIA managed its research, development, testing, and evaluation funds to align with Agency mission priorities and to optimize their use. Project results will provide insight to Agency decision makers to address risk gaps related to our FY 2022 DIA Top Management Challenges—Leadership Controls and Oversight and Financial Management.

Status. The project was in the planning phase at the end of the reporting period.

Evaluation of DIA's Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Project 2023-1004

Overview. Our objective is to determine whether, for FY 2022, DIA complied with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum M-21-19, Appendix C to OMB Circular No. A-123, *Requirements for Payment Integrity Improvement*, March 5, 2021, which incorporates requirements from Title 31, United States Code, Sections 3351 – 3358, *Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019*, as amended. Project results will provide insight to Agency decision makers to address risk gaps related to our FY 2022 DIA Top Management Challenge—Financial Management.

Status. The project was in the reporting phase at the end of the reporting period.

Evaluation of DIA's Compliance with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Project 2023-1005

Overview. Our objective is to determine whether DIA's overall information system security Program is effective using the FY 2023 Inspector General FISMA reporting metrics. Project results will provide insight to Agency decision makers to address risk gaps related to our FY 2022 DIA Top Management Challenge—Information Security Governance.

Status. The project was in the fieldwork phase at the end of the reporting period.



SUMMARIES OF INSPECTIONS AND EVALUATIONS

COMPLETED PROJECTS

Evaluation of Analytic Talent Management: Recruiting and Hiring, Project 2021-2003, issued February 06, 2023

What We Did. We evaluated the effectiveness of DIA’s recruitment and hiring for the Analysis Career Field.

What We Found. For more information on the project and results, please see the “Classified Summaries of Inspections and Evaluations Division Activity” section on page 54 of the Classified Addendum.

What We Recommend. Our recommendations can be found in the “Status of Recommendations” table B-19 located on [page 34](#) of this report.

Our results continue to provide insight to Agency decision makers to use as they address risk gaps related to our FY 2022 DIA Top Management Challenge – Human Capital Strategy and Talent Management.

Evaluation of DIA's Enhanced Personnel Security Program, Project 2022-2001, issued February 10, 2023

What We Did. We evaluated DIA’s Enhanced Personnel Security Program in accordance with Title 5 United States Code, Section 11001, “*Enhanced Personnel Security Programs*,” as amended by Public Law 114-113, the “*Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016*.”²

What We Found. For more information on the project and results, please see the “Classified Summaries of Inspections and Evaluations Division Activity” section on page 54 of the Classified Addendum.

What We Recommend. Our recommendations can be found in the “Status of Recommendations” table B-8 located on [page 33](#) of this report.

Our results continue to provide insight to Agency decision makers to use as they address risk gaps related to our FY 2022 DIA Top Management Challenges – Human Capital Strategy and Talent Management, Leadership Controls and Oversight, and Information Security Governance.

²According to Title 5 United States Code, Section 11001, beginning 2 years after the date of the implementation of the enhanced personnel security program of an agency under sub-section (a), the Inspector General of the agency shall conduct at least 1 review to assess the effectiveness and fairness, which shall be determined in accordance with performance measures and standards established by the Director of National Intelligence, to covered individuals of the enhanced personnel security program of the agency.

Enterprise Management Capstone, Project 2022-2003, issued March 13, 2023

What We Did. We analyzed and obtained Agency perspectives on themes and trends from published OIG reporting that assessed DIA's enterprise management roles and responsibilities.

What We Found. For more information on the project and results, please see the "Classified Summaries of Inspections and Evaluations Division Activity" section on page 55 of the Classified Addendum.

What We Recommend. Our recommendations can be found in the "Status of Recommendations" table B-10 located on page 34 of this report.

Our results continue to provide insight to Agency decision makers to use as they address risk gaps related to our FY 2022 DIA Top Management Challenge – Leadership Controls and Oversight.

Evaluation of Analytic Tradecraft Standards, Project 2022-2005, issued March 31, 2023

Overview. We evaluated whether DIA's analytic tradecraft programs were designed, implemented, and overseen in accordance with applicable higher-level governance, including Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, "*Analytic Standards*," January 2, 2015, as amended.

What We Found. For more information on the project and results, please see the "Classified Summaries of Inspections and Evaluations Division Activity" section on page 56 of the Classified Addendum.

What We Recommend. Our recommendations can be found in the "Classified Status of Recommendations" table A-21 located on page 78 of the Classified Addendum.

Our results continue to provide insight to Agency decision makers to use as they address risk gaps related to our FY 2022 DIA Top Management Challenge – Leadership Controls and Oversight.

ONGOING PROJECTS

Support to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Special Review of Intelligence Community Support to Screening and Vetting of Persons from Afghanistan, Project INS-2022-2003

Overview. Our objective is to assess the Intelligence Community's (IC's) support to screening and vetting of persons from Afghanistan in August 2021. We are supporting this special review with the Office of the Inspector General of the IC and the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General.

Status. The special review was in the report writing phase at the end of the reporting period.

Evaluation of Leadership, Culture, and Accountability within the Defense Attaché Service - Stage One and Two, Project 2022-2004

Overview. Our objective is to conduct an 18-month, multi-stage evaluation of leadership, culture, and accountability within the Defense Attaché Service. We will be conducting this project in four distinct stages to ensure comprehensive oversight and publish the results following the completion of fieldwork in each stage. We are currently conducting stages one and two. Project results will provide insight to Agency decision makers to address risk gaps related to our FY 2022 DIA Top Management Challenge—Leadership Controls and Oversight.

Status. Stage one of this project was in the fieldwork phase at the end of the reporting period. Stage two was in the planning phase at the end of the reporting period.

FY23 Report on Classification, Project 2023-2001

Overview. Our objective, in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2020, will be to assess the accuracy of the application of classification and handling markers on a representative sample of finished reports, including such reports that are compartmented. We validated Agency progress on our FY 2022 Report on Classification, Project 2021-2002 recommendations. Project results will provide insight to Agency decision makers to address risk gaps related to our FY 2022 DIA Top Management Challenge—Information Security Governance.

Status. The project was in the report writing phase at the end of the reporting period.

Evaluation of the Strategic Competition Group, Project 2023-2002

Overview. For more information on the project, please see the “Classified Summaries of Inspections and Evaluations Division Activity” section on page 57 of the Classified Addendum.

Status. The project was in the planning phase at the end of the reporting period.



SUMMARIES OF INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY

Reprisal and Abuse of Authority Investigations

We completed six investigations involving allegations of reprisal or abuse of authority from prior reporting periods. We did not substantiate reprisal or abuse of authority allegations in any of the six cases.

During this reporting period, we received 47 reprisal complaints (38 from DIA personnel, 6 referrals from the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DoD IG), and 3 referrals from the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG)):

- Nine complaints are under active investigation by our office;
- Ten complaints did not meet the *prima facie* elements of reprisal;
- Three complaints, although meeting the *prima facie* elements of reprisal, were referred to the DoD IG, as they were determined to have no nexus with DIA (including Agency-related personnel);
- Three complaints, one of which did not meet the *prima facie* elements of reprisal, were referred from DIA OIG to the IC IG, as they were determined to have no nexus with DIA (including Agency-related personnel);
- Three complaints were determined to fall under the purview of the DIA Equal Opportunity & Diversity Office (EO) and were referred accordingly;
- Two complaints were subsequently voluntarily withdrawn by the respective Complainant, prior to DIA OIG completion of its preliminary review;
- One complaint was determined to require additional information from the Complainant. However, the Complainant proved to be non-responsive to subsequent OIG requests for additional necessary information. As a result, DIA OIG closed the complaint and advised the Complainant that, should they wish to refile or resubmit their complaint, DIA OIG was available to work with them;
- One (anonymous) complaint was also determined to require additional information from the Complainant. Since the Complainant could not be contacted, DIA OIG closed the complaint;
- One complaint was not accepted as the Complainant's issue is the basis of ongoing litigation between the Agency and the Complainant;
- The remaining fourteen complaints are presently under review to validate if they meet the *prima facie* elements of reprisal.

When we determined that the reprisal complaints did not meet the *prima facie* elements of reprisal, we notified the Complainants in writing of our determination and of their right to an external review by the IC IG or, in some instances, the DoD IG. We also provided copies of the notifications to the DoD IG and IC IG for their awareness in those cases where the employees sought external review of our determination.

Settlement Agreement



Government Contractor Agrees to Pay over \$500,000 to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations, (OIG Case 2019-005044-OI), issued December 5, 2022

On December 5, 2022, the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia (EDVA) issued a press release announcing that Obsidian Solutions Group, LLC, agreed to pay \$510,991.08 to settle allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by billing the DIA for labor performed by personnel that did not meet contractual requirements.

Obsidian employed personnel who failed to meet the qualifications specified by the contract. Because of this, DIA paid more for labor than could be justified by the personnel's qualifications.

The resolution obtained in this matter was the result of a coordinated effort between the EDVA, the DIA OIG, the DIA Office of the General Counsel, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, and the Defense Contract Audit Agency.

The civil claims settled by this False Claims Act agreement are allegations only; there have been no determinations of civil liability.

SUBSTANTIATED CASES

Nepotism and Unfair Hiring Practices Investigation, Case 2021-000036-OI, issued January 9, 2023

What Was Alleged. We investigated allegations of nepotism and unfair hiring practices by three DIA employees assigned to a combatant command. Specifically, a Complainant alleged that one of the DIA employees, with the assistance of the other two DIA employees, facilitated the hiring process of an individual with whom the DIA employee had a familial/personal relationship.

What We Found. We determined the allegations of nepotism were not substantiated and the allegations of unfair hiring practices were substantiated.

What We Concluded. The three DIA employees engaged in unfair hiring practices in violation of title 5 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), Section 2635.101(b)(8) (5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(8)), “*Basic obligation of public service.*” However, the preponderance of evidence does not support a conclusion that the three DIA employees violated title 5 United States Code, section 3110 (5 U.S.C. § 3110), “*Employment of relatives, restrictions.*”

Questionable Intelligence Activities Investigation, Case 2022-000047-OI, issued March 2, 2023

What Was Alleged. We investigated an allegation of Questionable Intelligence Activity (QIA) violations concerning a DIA Senior Executive official. The Complainant alleged that the Senior Executive had been declassifying documents for almost a year without the appropriate authority.

What We Found. We found that a QIA had been committed when the Senior Executive declassified documents in violation of Executive Order 13526, “*Classified National Security Information,*” December 29, 2009; DoD Manual 5200.001, Volume 1, “*Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification,*” February 24, 2012, incorporating Ch. 2, July 28, 2020; and DIAD 5240.400, “*Information Security Program,*” April 21, 2021. Additionally, we identified management deficiencies that, if previously identified, could have prevented the Senior Executive from unintentionally violating established executive order and policy when declassifications occurred.

What We Concluded. A QIA is defined in Department of Defense Directive 5148.13, “*Intelligence Oversight,*” April 26, 2017, as “any intelligence or intelligence-related activity when there is reason to believe such activity may be unlawful or contrary to an E.O... or applicable DoD policy governing that activity.” Intent is not a factor in determining whether a QIA is committed, so the fact that the DIA Senior Executive did not intend to violate the EO or policy is not pertinent to the conclusion that they did so. However, it was determined that, in a previous “acting” role, the DIA Senior Executive had acted appropriately when declassifying documents. The DIA Senior Executive formalized their retirement during this investigation.

UNSUBSTANTIATED CASES

Reprisal Investigation, Case 2021-000012-OI, issued December 1, 2022

What Was Alleged. We investigated allegations that a DIA Senior Executive, a former DIA Senior Level employee, and a former DIA GG-15 employee committed acts of reprisal. Specifically, the Complainant alleged they were denied a nomination for an overseas follow-on assignment in retaliation for a protected communication. Additionally, the Complainant alleged they were threatened with termination and counseling; placed under administrative investigation; relieved of their supervisory duties; and had their ability to fly C-12 aircraft restricted.

What We Found. We did not substantiate the allegations of reprisal against the DIA Senior Executive, the DIA Senior Level Employee, or the former DIA GG-15 employee.

What We Concluded. Based on the preponderance of the evidence, we determined there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the management officials engaged in the prohibited personnel practice of reprisal against the Complainant in violation of 10 U.S.C § 1034, *“Protected Communication: Prohibition of Retaliatory Actions.”* The Complainant alleged several unfavorable personnel actions taken against them. Of these, one did not meet the standard of an unfavorable personnel action, because although the Complainant’s duties were changed, the change was inconsequential. In the other alleged instances, it was determined that these personnel actions would have occurred absent the Complainant’s protected communications.

Reprisal Investigation, Case 2021-000003-OI, issued December 7, 2022

What Was Alleged. We investigated an allegation that a GG-15 DIA employee committed an act of reprisal. Specifically, the Complainant alleged that their billet at DIA had been eliminated because of a protected disclosure they made that officials at a combatant command were not following DIA COVID-19 policies.

What We Found. We did not substantiate the allegation of reprisal against the GG-15 DIA employee. It was determined that a management official other than the GG-15 DIA employee made the decision to eliminate the Complainant’s billet prior to the protected communication being made. The protected communication was not a factor in the decision. The Complainant’s billet was one of over two dozen billets eliminated as a result of a command-wide billet review. Further, it was determined that the combatant command in question was not required to follow DIA COVID-19 policies.

What We Concluded. While the Complainant did make protected disclosures and the reduction of their billet did constitute a personnel action, the decision to eliminate the Complainant’s billet was made prior to their protected communication, and was found to have been made by the combatant command leadership during a restructuring of billets and not a result of the protected disclosure. Therefore, the GG-15 DIA employee did not violate Presidential Policy Directive 19 (PPD-19), *“Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information,”* October 12, 2012, or 50 U.S.C. § 3234, *“Prohibited personnel practice in the intelligence community.”*

Reprisal Investigation, Case 2020-005023-OI, issued December 22, 2022

What Was Alleged. We investigated allegations that four DIA employees committed acts of reprisal. Specifically, the Complainant alleged they were issued a Letter of Counseling (LOC), their temporary duty (TDY) travel was canceled, attempts were made to delay the Complainant's selection to a different office, a time and labor investigation was initiated with our office, and the Complainant did not receive a copy of their FY 2019 performance appraisal in retaliation for protected disclosures. Additionally, the Complainant alleged that a DIA employee subjected them to harassing behavior, and that a different DIA employee recommended a "defer promotion" on their Promotion Assessment Form (PAF) for FY 2019 because of protected disclosures. Furthermore, the Complainant alleged they were removed from a high-priority project to a lower priority project because of their protected disclosure.

What We Found. We did not substantiate the allegations of reprisal against the four DIA employees. Clear and convincing evidence exists that the responsible management officials would have issued the Complainant an LOC despite their protected disclosures. It was also found that the Complainant's TDY was delayed and ultimately canceled because of their impending transfer out of the division, and the TDY was not seen as mission enabling, and was therefore not a prudent use of the Government's funds. An examination of Office of Human Resources records showed that the Complainant transferred to another office as originally scheduled. The Complainant's allegation that they were subjected to a Time and Labor Fraud Investigation because of their protected disclosures was also not substantiated, as clear and convincing evidence exists that the review of the Complainant's time and attendance was initiated because of specific and documented issues of lack of productivity. The delays in the Complainant's reception of their performance appraisal were seen as minimal due to their willful resignation from the Agency, as credible evidence exists that the Responsible Management Official responsible for completing and returning the Complainant's assessment made attempts to provide the Complainant with a copy of their appraisal. As to the Complainant's allegation that they were harassed, the evidence does not substantiate that allegation, as no witnesses interviewed reported observing this behavior. In regards to the Complainant's assertion that their protected disclosures resulted in a PAF rating of "defer promotion," clear and convincing evidence exists that this rating would have occurred without any of the Complainant's protected disclosures, as the rater felt the Complainant needed additional time at their current grade level to develop their skills. As to the Complainant's allegation that their duties were changed from a high priority project, the change in duties was found to advance a legitimate government interest, and would have occurred absent any protected disclosures the Complainant had made.

Reprisal Investigation, Case 2020-005023-OI, issued December 22, 2022, cont.

What We Concluded. Based on the preponderance of the evidence, we determined there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the DIA employees engaged in the prohibited personnel practice of reprisal against the Complainant in violation of PPD-19, *“Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information,”* October 12, 2012, and 50 U.S.C. § 3234, *“Prohibited personnel practice in the intelligence community.”* Clear and convincing evidence exists that mitigates several of the Complainant’s allegations, namely that they were issued an LOC as reprisal for their protected disclosures; that their TDY was canceled as a result of their protected disclosures; that their transfer to another office was unduly delayed; that they were subjected to a time and labor fraud investigation due to their protected disclosures; that their protected disclosures led to the withholding of their performance appraisal; that they were unfairly issued a “defer promotion” rating due to their protected disclosures; and that they had their duties unfairly curtailed as a response to their protected disclosures. As to the allegation that the Complainant was subject to harassing behavior, none of the witness interviewed could support the Complainant’s allegations.

Unfair Hiring Practices Investigation, Case 2022-000024-OI, issued December 22, 2022

What Was Alleged. We investigated allegations of unfair hiring practices by a DIA Senior Executive Service (DISES) employee. Specifically, the Complainant alleged that the DISES was involved in the hiring process of a GG-14 employee who was personally known to the DISES and his wife (his wife was a former co-worker with the GG-14 employee at another DoD agency). The Complainant alleged that the DISES used their position to influence or pressure the hiring manager, a former GG-15 supervisory contract specialist, to hire the GG-14 employee to fill a vacancy announcement for external applicants. It was further alleged that the hiring manager subsequently resigned from the Agency because they did not feel the GG-14 was the most qualified applicant for the position.

What We Found. During the course of our investigation, we interviewed key witnesses, and reviewed multiple emails and documents, and did not discover evidence to suggest that the DISES improperly influenced the hiring of the GG-14 employee. The DISES’s association with the GG-14 employee (through his wife), by itself, was not considered a discriminating factor, and the recommendation to the hiring manager to meet the candidate did not rise to the level of compulsion or undue influence in violation of prohibited personnel practices. It was determined that the hiring manager did not terminate employment with DIA as a result of the hiring of the GG-14 employee.

Unfair Hiring Practices Investigation, Case 2022-000024-OI, issued December 22, 2022, cont.

What We Concluded. According to 5 U.S.C. § 2302, “*Prohibited Personnel Practices*,” a prohibited personnel action occurs when a hiring official partakes in any action designed to “grant any preference or advantage to any employee or applicant for employment for the purpose of improving the prospects of any particular person for employment.” We determined that the DISES did not engage in a prohibited personnel practice as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302, did not violate the Standards of Conduct under 5 C.F.R. Part 2635, and did not violate any DIA policy. The DISES made an executive referral to the hiring manager in accordance with DIA policy. The totality of the evidence established that the DISES did not unduly or improperly influence the hiring manager’s decision. The hiring manager determined the GG-14 employee was the best qualified candidate based on a review of all the applicants’ written application and input from the interview panel. After the GG-14 employee was hired, the hiring manager resigned from DIA for reasons unrelated to the vacancy or hiring decision.

Reprisal and Abuse of Authority Investigation, Case 2022-000019-OI, issued February 6, 2023

What Was Alleged. We investigated allegations that two DIA Senior Executive employees and a DIA Senior Level employee committed acts of reprisal against them. The Complainant alleged that the DIA Senior Level employee colluded with the two DIA Senior Executive employees to have the Complainant terminated before their trial employment period with DIA ended to protect the DIA Senior Level employee and conceal an inappropriate relationship that the DIA Senior Level employee had with the Complainant. The Complainant also alleged that an LOC, issued in September 2020 to the Complainant and referenced in their termination letter, was “invalid,” and was used by the two DIA Senior Executive employees to terminate the Complainant’s employment. The Complainant further alleged that the DIA Senior Level employee abused his authority to have the Complainant terminated in an attempt to keep his leadership from knowing that he failed to take corrective actions after the Complainant reported that they were working in an unsafe environment. The Complainant also alleged that they alerted the DIA Senior Level employee on numerous occasions of the hostile work environment and discrimination they endured while assigned to a DIA element.

What We Found. The preponderance of the evidence established that the Complainant would have been terminated notwithstanding the protected disclosures. Assuming the failure to withdraw the LOC is a personnel action, the preponderance of the evidence supports it was not precipitated by any protected disclosure. The letter of termination details four instances of misconduct in addition to the misconduct outlined in the LOC. Accordingly, even if the LOC or underlying misconduct was not considered, ample justification for the termination existed.

Reprisal and Abuse of Authority Investigation, Case 2022-000019-OI, issued February 6, 2023, cont.

What We Concluded. There was insufficient evidence to conclude that the two DIA Senior Executive employees and the DIA Senior Level employee abused their authority or violated PPD-19, “*Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information*,” October 12, 2012, and 50 U.S.C. § 3234, “*Prohibited personnel practices in the Intelligence Community*.” Further, we determined that the LOC that was issued to the Complainant was a “valid” document, because the LOC was reviewed by the appropriate Agency human resource official, who advised management that the LOC could be retained in the Complainant’s personnel records. It was determined that the DIA Senior Level employee, who the Complainant alleged reprised against them to cover up an inappropriate relationship, was not involved in the decision to terminate the Complainant. The DIA Senior Level employee was forthcoming about the details of their relationship with the Complainant, so it is not credible that they abused their authority so that leadership would not learn of their relationship with the Complainant.

Violation of the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act Investigation, Case 2022-000038-OI, issued February 10, 2023

What Was Alleged. We investigated an allegation of violation(s) of 38 U.S.C. § 4301, “*The Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 [USERRA]*,” by two DIA management officials. The Complainant alleged that their USERRA rights were violated when their military reserve duty tours were used as a basis to deny their promotion.

What We Found. There was insufficient evidence to conclude that the DIA management officials violated the Complainant’s USERRA rights. Based on interviews of witnesses and reviews of the Complainant’s records for previous promotion cycles, we concluded there was no proof to establish that they were disadvantaged or denied promotion in their civilian career field because of their military service. For the cycle in question, only one of the witnesses interviewed described the Complainant’s work as warranting promotion, while another stated that they performed to the bare minimum standard.

What We Concluded. Generally, USERRA prohibits employment discrimination against persons because of their service in the uniformed services and protects the right of members of the uniformed services to reclaim their civilian employment after an absence due to military service or training. Under USERRA, an agency may not deny initial employment, reemployment, promotion, or other actions or benefits because of military service or training. There is no evidence that the Complainant was denied promotion or otherwise discriminated against because of their military deployments. One of the subjects of the investigation even helped strengthen the Complainant’s PAF while the Complainant was delayed in writing it. The other subject has since retired from DIA, and has no reason to fabricate their answers; they described the Complainant’s work as average, and made recommendations to strengthen their PAF submission. The Complainant elected not to follow these recommendations.

Reprisal Investigation, Case 2022-000009-OI, issued February 16, 2023

What Was Alleged. We investigated an allegation that a DIA Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) employee and a DIA management official retaliated against the Complainant when they issued the Complainant an unfair performance appraisal that subsequently caused their termination during their probationary period. The Complainant also alleged that the DIA management official violated their privacy rights, created a hostile work environment, discriminated against them based on a physical disability, refused to sign compensation documents, damaged their reputation, and caused them to be denied a job opportunity.

What We Found. The DIA DISL and the DIA management official did not engage in the prohibited personnel practice of reprisal against the Complainant. We also did not substantiate the allegation that the DIA DISL and the DIA management official provided an unfair performance appraisal or caused the Complainant's termination in reprisal for a protected disclosure. Further, we determined there was insufficient evidence to substantiate that the DIA management official violated the Complainant's privacy rights, refused to sign compensation documents, damaged their reputation, or caused them to be denied a job opportunity.

What We Concluded. The evidence the Complainant provided did establish a *prima facie* case of reprisal; however, there is ample evidence that comments in the performance appraisal and the recommendation for termination advanced a legitimate Agency interest and those actions would have been taken absent a protected disclosure. The Complainant was advised to report their concerns regarding discrimination to EO, and their claims of a hostile work environment to the DIA Anti-Harassment Office.

Reprisal Investigation, Case 2021-000074-OI, issued February 24, 2023

What Was Alleged. We investigated an allegation of reprisal against a DIA employee. Specifically, a U.S. Navy civilian on temporary duty to a combatant command J2 alleged that the DIA employee retaliated against them after they made protected disclosures by reducing their duties, changing their work schedule, and rejecting their proposed office changes.

What We Found. There was insufficient evidence to conclude that the DIA employee retaliated against the U.S. Navy civilian for protected disclosures. Clear and convincing evidence exists that the change in duties was the result of manning requirements, and would have occurred absent the protected disclosures the Complainant made. The changing of the Complainant's work schedule occurred at the direction of the J2 leadership, and was the result of an office-wide shift in scheduling and not solely directed at the Complainant. The rejection of the Complainant's proposed office changes does not constitute a personnel action.

Reprisal Investigation, Case 2021-000074-OI, issued February 24, 2023, cont.

What We Concluded. The DIA employee did not violate PPD-19, “*Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information*,” October 10, 2012 and 50 U.S.C. § 3234, “*Prohibited personnel practices in the intelligence community*.” It was determined that, though the Complainant did make a protected disclosure, the personnel actions that occurred would have taken place absent their existence.

Significant Management Referrals³

The Office of the Inspector General did not refer any complaints that meet the standard or threshold of “significant” during this reporting period.

Investigative Activity Support

Personnel Vetting

We completed checks for potential derogatory information within OIG records associated with 3,712 personnel (total) in response to 186 requests originating within DIA. These requests involved DIA military and civilians who are seeking job placement or advancement or are under consideration for awards.

³ We define Significant Management Referrals as items that reflect a potential degradation in Agency policy or could potentially pose a concern to the Agency. As such, we refer these matters to DIA management for specific action and required follow up with our Office.

Appendix A. Statistical Tables

Table A-1: Audit, Inspection, and Evaluation Reports and Recommendations with Questioned and Unsupported Costs

Description	Number of Reports	Questioned Costs	Unsupported Costs
No management decision was made by September 30, 2022	0	\$0	\$0
Issued during this reporting period	0	\$0	\$0
Costs disallowed by management	0	\$0	\$0
Costs allowed by management	0	\$0	\$0
No management decision was made by March 31, 2023	0	\$0	\$0

Table A-2: Audit, Inspection, and Evaluation Reports and Recommendations That Funds Be Put to Better Use

Description	Number of Reports	Funds to be Put to Better Use
No management decision was made by September 30, 2022 ⁴⁵	2	\$614,000
Issued during this reporting period	0	\$0
Dollar value of recommendations agreed to by management	1	\$176,000
Dollar value of recommendations not agreed to by Management	0	\$0
No management decision was made by March 31, 2023 ⁶	1	\$438,000

⁴ *Audit of Information Technology Services Contracts*, Project 2018-1006, was published in DIA OIG Semiannual Report to Congress (April 1, 2020–September 30, 2020). We found that more than \$438,000 in award fee payments could have been used for other mission requirements. Management has not closed the recommendation.

⁵ *Audit of Unplanned Price Changes*, Project 2019-1006, was published in DIA OIG Semiannual Report to Congress (October 1, 2020–March 31, 2021). We found that DIA could have saved \$176,000 for other mission priorities if it had analyzed and negotiated price escalation for option periods using data maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

⁶ The \$438,000 for which no management decision was made by September 30, 2022, was overdue by 6 months or more.

Table A-3: Investigations Dollar Recoveries in Reporting Period

Investigation	Case Number	Effective Recovery Date	Dollars Recovered
False Claims	2019-005044-OI	December 5, 2022	\$510,991.08
Time and Labor Fraud	2020-0050007-OI	December 7, 2022	\$30,939.43
TOTAL			\$541,930.51

Table A-4: Investigative Activities⁷

Description	Quantity
Cases Opened in Reporting Period (comprised of Investigations and Management Referrals)	35
Cases Closed (or awaiting Closure) in Reporting Period	72
Cases Still Open at End of Reporting Period ⁸	82
Investigation Reports Issued in Reporting Period ⁹	10
Management Referrals Issued in Reporting Period (Number of Cases)	16
Referred to Prosecutorial Authority (Number of Cases)	0
Number of Persons Referred to State or Local Prosecuting Authorities for Criminal Prosecution (includes military authorities)	0
Total Number of Indictments and Criminal Prosecution Resulting from Prior Referral to Prosecuting Authorities	0

⁷ Description of Metrics: All metrics provided were developed as a result of reviewing all relevant individual cases (including Investigations and Management Referral-related matters), including those opened and closed during the reporting period and cases remaining open at the end of the previous reporting period (April 1, 2022–September 30, 2022).

⁸ This figure represents the sum of:

(a) The number of cases in which an active OIG investigation or pending management referral is still in process (i.e., 58), plus;

(b) The number of cases for which OIG is awaiting final DIA management action in response to an earlier-published OIG Report of Investigation or Management Referral (i.e., 24).

⁹ A summary of these cases can be found in the unclassified “Summaries of Published Investigative Reports” section of this report.

Table A-5: Other Investigative Matters

Description	Quantity
Hotline Program	
DIA OIG Hotline Contacts Received in Reporting Period ¹⁰	7,658
DIA OIG Hotline Contacts Closed in Report Period ¹¹	7,618
DIA OIG Hotline Contacts Not Yet Reviewed/Evaluated	40
DIA OIG Hotline Inquiries Opened in Reporting Period ¹²	242
DIA OIG Hotline Inquiries Closed in Reporting Period	202
Intelligence Oversight	
Cases Opened in Reporting Period	0
Cases Closed in Reporting Period	0
Cases Still Open at End of Reporting Period ¹³	1
Reports of Investigation Issued in Reporting Period ¹⁴	1
Referred to Management ¹⁵	1
Referrals	
Referrals in Reporting Period (external)	0
Referrals in Reporting Period (DIA Management)	26
Referrals Resulting from Published Reports of Investigation	10
Referrals Resulting from Direct Referral of Evaluated Complaints (i.e., DIA OIG Hotlines Inquiries/ Not COVID-19 Related) to DIA Management	16
Referrals Resulting from Direct Referral of Evaluated Complaints (i.e., DIA OIG Hotline Inquiries/ COVID-19 Related) to DIA Management	0

¹⁰ The term “contact” means an unevaluated complaint or request for information or assistance.

¹¹ A “contact” is closed when the DIA OIG Hotline evaluates it and determines it did not merit further action.

¹² When the DIA OIG Hotline evaluates a “contact” and determines it merits further action, an “inquiry” is opened so Hotline representatives can take additional action (e.g., directly address the matter itself, refer the matter to DIA management for information or action, or refer the matter to DIA OIG Investigations for further inquiry or investigation).

¹³ DIA OIG case 2022-000047-OI (“Questionable Intelligence Activities Investigation”) is summarized on pg. xx of this report. This case is considered open as OIG is awaiting final DIA management action in response to the earlier-published OIG Report of Investigation.

¹⁴ DIA OIG case 2022-000047-OI (“Questionable Intelligence Activities Investigation”)

¹⁵ DIA OIG case 2022-000047-OI (“Questionable Intelligence Activities Investigation”)

Appendix B. Status of Recommendations

Online Report Availability

Report summaries of our audits, evaluations, inspections, investigations, and announcements of ongoing work are available online at oig.dia.mil and oversight.gov. Full reports are posted on our JWICS and SIPR websites.

Audits Division Recommendations

Table B-1: Audit of DIA’s Information Technology Services Contracts, Project 2018-1006

Overview. We audited whether IT services acquired by DIA, as a service provider of IC Enterprise Management (EMT), were cost effective, properly funded, and administered in accordance with the IC IT Enterprise strategy. Part of our results identified potential funds that could be put to better use. Specifically, we found that more than \$438,000 in award fee payments could have been used for other mission requirements. As of March 31, 2023, no management decision has been made because the associated recommendation has not been completed. This makes the action overdue by 6 months or more.

Status of Recommendation. We made three recommendations, and two recommendations were closed in previous reporting periods. Management is in the process of acting on the remaining open recommendation.

REC NO. 03	The Office of the Chief Financial Officer, within 180 days of the final report, design and implement a process to collect and analyze relevant data on award and incentive fees paid to contractors. This should include, at a minimum, using the results of such analysis to evaluate the extent, use, and effectiveness of award and incentive fees in improving contractors’ performance and achieving desired program outcomes in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation 16.401(f).	Status: Open
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Table B-2: Evaluation of DIA’s Implementation of Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act—Section 3610, Project 2020-1006, issued March 24, 2021

Overview. We evaluated whether DIA’s contractor reimbursements under Section 3610 of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act were appropriate and governed by language authorizing Federal agencies to reimburse contractors for leave given to keep their employees and subcontractors ready to ensure a timely return to work.

Status of Recommendation. Management is taking corrective action on the one open recommendation.

REC NO. 03	The Office of the Chief Financial Officer, within 180 days of the final report, design and implement controls to monitor the appropriateness and timeliness of proposal analysis and associated supporting documentation for modifications that result in unplanned price changes. Actions could include additional procedures for independent contracting officer reviews for contract modifications, or other methods.	Status: Open
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Table B-3: Audit of DIA’s Unplanned Price Changes, Project 2019-1006, issued March 29, 2021

Overview. We audited whether DIA performed appropriate and timely analysis to support unplanned price changes on DIA contracts between FY 2018 and FY 2020, including changes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We found that DIA could have saved \$176,000 for other mission priorities if it had analyzed and negotiated price escalation for option periods using data maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Status of Recommendation. Management addressed the intent of the one remaining recommendation and it was closed during this reporting period.

REC NO. 02	The Office of the Chief Financial Officer, within 180 days of the final report, design and implement controls to monitor the appropriateness and timeliness of proposal analysis and associated supporting documentation for modifications that result in unplanned price changes. Actions could include additional procedures for independent contracting officer reviews for contract modifications, or other methods.	Status: Closed
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Inspections and Evaluations Division Recommendations

STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Table B-4: Inspection of Personnel Accountability in Conjunction with Natural and Manmade Disasters, Project 2018-2001, issued February 28, 2018

Overview. We inspected the effectiveness of personnel accountability plans, procedures, reporting, and oversight of personnel accountability systems, including controls to monitor program compliance with DoD governance.

Status of Recommendation. Management addressed the intent of the remaining recommendation and it was closed during this reporting period.

REC NO. 02	The Office of Human Resources, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Strategic Intelligence, should develop and codify guidance for accounting for personnel in the event of evacuation to a safe haven.	Status: Closed
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Table B-5: Evaluation of DIA’s Human Capital Services, Project 2017-2008, issued August 3, 2018

Overview. We evaluated the integrity of systems related to DIA’s human capital services, including processes, controls, and business rules, to assess their efficiency and effectiveness in managing human capital. We closed this evaluation on October 1, 2018; however, we reopened it in 2019 at the Agency’s request because the Agency had not developed and implemented a human capital strategy.

Status of Recommendation. Management is taking corrective action on the one open recommendation.

REC NO. 01	Chief of Staff (CS) establish, document, and implement a human capital strategy that aligns with DIA missions, readiness needs, and strategic objectives. Additionally, CS should establish an implementation and management plan that facilitates increased effectiveness, understanding, and accountability of human capital services delivery and processes.	Status: Open
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Table B-6: Evaluation of DIA's Personnel Security Program, Project 2018-2002, issued November 6, 2018

Overview. We evaluated adjudication policies, processes, and practices for assessing, validating, and certifying applicant eligibility for access to national security information. We also evaluated Personnel Security Program interdependencies with other programs and offices that provided information for "whole person" consideration in adjudication decisions. Our evaluation did not address processes associated with periodic reinvestigations.

Status of Recommendations. Management addressed the intent of the remaining two recommendations and they were closed during this reporting period.

REC NO. 03	The Directorate for Mission Services, Office of Security, develop and apply a quality control process for all security adjudication cases.	Status: Closed
REC NO. 04	Office of Security, in coordination with the Office of Human Resources, the Directorate for Operations, Office of Counterintelligence, and the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, should develop an end-to-end personnel security program process focused on the onboarding process of new hires that identifies all security requirements, and roles and responsibilities.	Status: Closed

Table B-7: Evaluation of DIA's Management of Reserve Military Intelligence Capabilities, Project 2020-2005, issued October 29, 2021

Overview. We evaluated DIA's management of the DoD Joint Reserve Intelligence Program across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. We also evaluated DIA's administration and use of reserve military intelligence capabilities to meet mission requirements throughout DIA.

Status of Recommendations. Management is taking corrective action on the six open recommendations.

REC NO. 01	The Military Integration Office, develop and implement codified processes and procedures to comprehensively guide strategic program implementation, coordination efforts, and oversight of the Agency's management of the DoD on Joint Reserve Intelligence Program, in alignment with DoD and DIA policy.	Status: Open
REC NO. 02	The Military Integration Office, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Global Integration, develop and implement codified procedures for consistent engagement with all DoD Components, including combatant commands, integrated intelligence centers, combat support agencies, and Military Services on Joint Reserve Intelligence Program participation and use of Reserve Military Intelligence Capabilities in alignment with DoD and DIA policy.	Status: Open

Table B-7: Evaluation of DIA's Management of Reserve Military Intelligence Capabilities, Project 2020-2005, issued October 29, 2021, cont.

REC NO. 03	The Military Integration Office, in coordination with the Chief Information Officer and the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, develop and implement codified processes to conduct quarterly budget execution reviews in alignment with DIA policy requirements.	Status: Open
REC NO. 04	The Military Integration Office, in coordination with the Chief of Staff and the Directorate for Mission Services, develop a Reserve Military Human Capital Strategy in alignment with DIA's Human Capital Strategy to refine	Status: Open
REC NO. 05	The Military Integration Office, develop and implement codified roles and responsibilities for management and use of reserve military intelligence capabilities across the Agency.	Status: Open
REC NO. 06	The Military Integration Office, conduct a Reserve Military Force Structure Study to ensure effective allocation and alignment of reserve billets throughout the Agency.	Status: Open

Table B-8: Evaluation of DIA's Enhanced Personnel Security Program, Project 2022-2001, issued February 10, 2023

Overview. We evaluated DIA's Enhanced Personnel Security Program in accordance with Title 5 United States Code, Section 11001, "Enhanced Personnel Security Programs," as amended by Public Law 114-113, the "Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016."¹⁶

Status of Recommendations: Management is currently acting on the two open recommendations.

REC NO. 01	Directorate for Mission Services, in coordination with the Chief of Staff, the Chief Information Office, and the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, develop a comprehensive Agency-wide investment plan to include scalable resourcing and IT modernization to ensure the Agency is resourced for the implementation and sustainment of Trusted Workforce requirements.	Status: Open
REC NO. 02	Directorate for Mission Services, develop and implement standard operating procedures to ensure the consistent and lawful application of continuous vetting.	Status: Open

¹⁶ According to Title 5 United States Code, Section 11001, beginning 2 years after the date of the implementation of the enhanced personnel security program of an agency under subsection (a), the Inspector General of the agency shall conduct at least 1 review to assess the effectiveness and fairness, which shall be determined in accordance with performance measures and standards established by the Director of National Intelligence, to covered individuals of the enhanced personnel security program of the agency.

Table B-9: Evaluation of Analytic Talent Management: Recruiting and Hiring, Project 2021-2003, issued February 26, 2023

Overview: We evaluated the effectiveness of DIA’s recruitment and hiring for the Analysis Career Field.

Status of Recommendation: Management is taking corrective action on the one open recommendation.

REC NO. 01	Directorate for Mission Services, in coordination with the Career Field Managers and the Equal Opportunity and Diversity Office, update the Integrated Talent Requirements Board charter to require the inclusion of performance metrics and monitoring in annual recruitment and hiring plans to measure the efficacy of recruitment activities against hiring priorities, including diversity.	Status: Open
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Table B-10: Enterprise Management Capstone, Project 2022-2003, issued March 8, 2023

Overview. We analyzed and obtained Agency perspectives on themes and trends from published OIG reporting that assessed DIA’s enterprise management roles and responsibilities.

Status of Recommendations. Management is currently acting on the two open recommendations.

REC NO. 01	Deputy Director for Global Integration, in coordination with the Directorate for Intelligence, Joint Staff, identify the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager concerns about limitations to the fulfillment of enterprise authorities and request and document the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security’s response to them.	Status: Open
REC NO. 02	Chief of Staff, develop and implement: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • policies and procedures for a consistent Agency approach to program management of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s enterprise functions in accordance with Intelligence Community and DoD policy; and • a governance structure to measure performance and consistency of these functions. 	Status: Open

Investigations Division Recommendations

<p>Table B-11: False Claims and Negligence in Performance of Duties Investigation, Case 2018-005068-OI, issued April 11, 2022</p> <p>Overview. We investigated and substantiated an allegation of contractor cost-mischarging involving a DIA vendor for having fraudulently prepared and submitted inaccurate invoices in support of a DIA IT project.</p> <p>Status of Recommendation. Management is currently acting on the recommendation.</p>		
REC NO. 01	Office of the Chief Financial Officer, determine whether the circumstances surrounding the funding of the associated special project amounted to a potential Anti-deficiency Act violation and, if a violation occurred, take the appropriate steps to correct the violation.	Status: Open

<p>Table B-12: Reprisal, Abuse of Authority, and Violation of the Joint Travel Regulations Investigation, Case 2021-000049-OI, issued August 8, 2022</p> <p>Overview. We investigated, but did not substantiate, multiple allegations of acts of reprisal, abuse of authority, and waste of Government funds involving three DIA civilian employees, two of whom are DIA senior officials.</p> <p>Status of Recommendations. Management is currently acting on two recommendations.</p>		
REC NO. 01	Directorate for Mission Services, ensure that Office of Human Resources (OHR) personnel comply with regulations pertaining to temporary duty travel lengths and approval processes. Provide OHR support staff training on the regulations and requirements of temporary duties and approval processes, so they follow Joint Travel Regulations and Defense Travel System policies.	Status: Open
REC NO. 02	Office of Human Resources, establish a mechanism to track temporary duty lengths to prevent future occurrences or violations.	Status: Open

Table B-13: Time and Labor Fraud Investigation, Case 2021-000066-OI, issued September 6, 2022

Overview. We investigated, but did not substantiate an allegation of time and labor fraud involving a DIA civilian employee who allegedly routinely worked fewer than 8 hours per workday, submitted inaccurate time information to their supervisor, and claimed credit for hours not actually worked.

Status of Recommendation. Management is currently acting on the recommendation.

REC NO. 01	Military Integration Office, ensure supervisors comply with DIA Guide 1404.2-4, <i>“Telework Program,”</i> which states that teleworkers are required to meet the following criteria: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Complete telework training in the Advanced Global Intelligence Learning Environment training system prior to performing duties in a telework status (Course DIA-CMP-2074, <i>“Telework 101”</i>); 2. Submit a Telework Agreement Request form in the DIA <i>myHR</i> system and wait for supervisor approval prior to performing duties in a telework status; and 3. Maintain a <i>“successful”</i> performance level IAW the employee’s performance plan. 	Status: Open
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Table B-14: Reprisal Investigation, Case 2020-005023-OI, issued December 22, 2022

Overview. We investigated, but did not substantiate, multiple allegations of reprisal made by a DIA employee against four DIA supervisory employees (including two DIA supervisory senior officials).

Status of Recommendation. Management is currently acting on the recommendation.

REC NO. 01	Directorate for Mission Services, create a policy that clearly outlines the rater’s responsibilities when an employee departs the Agency outside the annual performance cycle.	Status: Open
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Appendix C. Summaries of Reports Closed Since October 1, 2022

Table C-1: Audits Closed Since October 1, 2022

Report Title and Number	Date Closed	Summary
Audit of DIA's Unplanned Price Changes, Project 2019-1006	November 15, 2022	We audited whether DIA performed appropriate and timely analysis to support unplanned price changes on DIA contracts between FY 2018 and FY 2020, including changes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We found that DIA could have saved \$176,000 for other mission priorities if it had analyzed and negotiated price escalation for option periods using data maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Table C-2: Inspections and Evaluations Closed Since October 1, 2022

Report Title and Number	Date Closed	Summary
FY 2022 Report on Classification, Project 2022-2002	September 7, 2022	We evaluated the accuracy of the application of classification and handling markers on a representative sample of finished reports, including such reports that are compartmented.
Evaluation of DIA's Personnel Security Program, Project 2018-2002	March 13, 2023	We evaluated adjudication policies, processes, and practices for assessing, validating, and certifying applicant eligibility for access to national security information. We also evaluated Personnel Security Program interdependencies, with other programs and offices that provided information for "whole person" consideration in adjudication decisions.
Inspection of Personnel Accountability in Conjunction with Natural and Manmade Disasters, Project 2018-2001	March 28, 2023	We inspected the effectiveness of personnel accountability plans, procedures, reporting, and oversight of personnel accountability systems, including controls to monitor program compliance with DoD governance.

Table C-2: Investigations Closed Since October 1, 2022

Report Number	Date Closed	Summary
2018-005059-OI	10/21/2022	We investigated allegations of unfair hiring practices, abuse of authority, and violations of merit system principles made against two DIA supervisory officials and a DIA employee assigned to U.S. combatant command staffs.
2021-000044-OI	10/21/2022	We investigated allegations that were self-reported to DIA by a contracted commercial firm that, between October 28, 2020, and May 30, 2021, two former employees routinely worked fewer than 8 hours per workday in support of a DIA contract.
2022-000029-OI	10/24/2022	We investigated an allegation of reprisal where a Complainant alleged to have been deprived of serving in a Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) opportunity as a result of having made a prior protected disclosure.
2021-000065-OI	10/24/2022	We investigated multiple allegations made against a DIA supervisory official, one supervisory civilian employee, one supervisory U.S. Navy (USN) officer, and a supervisory U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) officer.
2018-005071-OI	10/25/2022	We investigated allegations of reprisal made by a subordinate the Complainant against three U.S. Army (USA) officers.
2019-005043-OI	10/25/2022	We investigated allegations of reprisal and abuse of authority made against three DIA supervisory officials.
2019-005012-OI	10/25/2022	We investigated allegations of travel fraud and misuse of EEE funds made against a former senior enlisted member.
2020-005036-OI	10/25/2022	We investigated allegations made against a USA officer and a USMC officer for unlawful discrimination, reprisal, abuse of authority, and making false and misleading statements.

Table C-2: Investigations Closed Since October 1, 2022, cont.

Report Number	Date Closed	Summary
2021-000032-OI	10/25/2022	We investigated an allegation of time and labor fraud by a DIA civilian employee assigned to a U.S. combatant command.
2021-000035-OI	10/25/2022	We investigated allegations of time and labor fraud involving a DIA civilian employee.
2021-000004-OI	10/26/2022	We investigated allegations of reprisal and abuse of authority against two DIA supervisory officials and a USA officer and a USN officer assigned to DIA.
2021-000011-OI	10/26/2022	We investigated allegations of reprisal and conflict of interest involving two DIA supervisory officials.
2020-005043-OI	10/28/2022	We investigated allegations of reprisal, abuse of authority, false statements, waste of government funds, misconduct, and the inappropriate disclosure of a medical condition involving four DIA supervisory officials and a military officer assigned to DIA.
2020-005022-OI	10/28/2022	We investigated allegations made against a DIA supervisory official for reprisal and abuse of authority.
2018-005066-OI	11/03/2022	We investigated allegations of reprisal made against three DIA supervisory officials.
2021-000075-OI	11/08/2022	We investigated an allegation of time and labor fraud involving a DIA civilian employee.

Table C-2: Investigations Closed Since October 1, 2022, cont.

Report Number	Date Closed	Summary
2019-005013-OI	11/17/2022	We investigated multiple allegations of misconduct, including reprisal, against a USA officer.
2021-000003-OI	01/04/2023	We investigated an allegation that a DIA supervisory official committed reprisal.
2021-000012-OI	01/11/2023	We investigated allegations that a DIA Senior Executive, a former DIA Senior Level employee, and a former DIA supervisory official committed acts of reprisal.
2022-000024-OI	01/18/2023	We investigated allegations of unfair hiring practices by a DIA Senior Executive.
2020-005007-OI	02/16/2023	We investigated allegations of time and labor fraud involving a DIA civilian employee.

Appendix D. Statutory Reporting Requirements

Semiannual Reporting Requirement		Page(s)
5(b)(1)	Description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations of such establishment disclosed by such activities during the reporting period;	6-14
5(b)(2)	Description of the recommendations for corrective action made by the Office during the reporting period with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified pursuant to paragraph (1);	29-36
5 (b) (3)	Identification of each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports on which corrective action has not been completed;	29-36
5 (b) (4)	Summary of matters referred to prosecutive authorities and the prosecutions and convictions which have resulted;	16-25
5(b)(5)	Summary of each report made to the head of the establishment under section 406(c)(2) of this title during the reporting period;	6-25
5(b)(6)	A listing, subdivided according to subject matter, of each audit report, inspection report, and evaluation report issued by the Office during the reporting period and for each report, where applicable, the total dollar value of questioned costs (including a separate category for the dollar value of unsupported costs) and the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use;	26
5(b)(7)	Summary of each particularly significant report	6-25
5(b)(8)	Statistical tables showing the total number of audit reports, inspection reports, and evaluation reports and the total dollar value of questioned costs (including a separate category for the dollar value of unsupported costs), for reports— (A) for which no management decision had been made by the commencement of the reporting period; (B) which were issued during the reporting period; (C) for which a management decision was made during the reporting period, including— (i) the dollar value of disallowed costs; and (ii) the dollar value of costs not disallowed; and (D) for which no management decision has been made by the end of the reporting period;	26

Statutory Reporting Requirements, cont.

Semiannual Reporting Requirement		Page(s)
5(b)(9)	<p>Statistical tables showing the total number of audit reports, inspection reports, and evaluation reports and the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use by management, for reports—</p> <p>(A) for which no management decision had been made by the commencement of the reporting period;</p> <p>(B) which were issued during the reporting period;</p> <p>(C) for which a management decision was made during the reporting period, including— (i) the dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to by management; and (ii) the dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed to by management; and</p> <p>(D) for which no management decision has been made by the end of the reporting period;</p>	26
5(b)(10)	<p>Summary of each audit report, inspection report, and evaluation report issued before the commencement of the reporting period—</p> <p>(A) for which no management decision has been made by the end of the reporting period (including the date and title of each such report), an explanation of the reasons such management decision has not been made, and a statement concerning the desired timetable for achieving a management decision on each such report;</p> <p>(B) for which no establishment comment was returned within 60 days of providing the report to the establishment; and</p> <p>(C) for which there are any outstanding unimplemented recommendations, including the aggregate potential cost savings of those recommendations;</p>	6-14
5(b)(11)	Description and explanation of the reasons for any significant revised management decision made during the reporting period;	6-14
5(b)(12)	Information concerning any significant management decision with which the Inspector General is in disagreement;	No instances to report

Statutory Reporting Requirements, cont.

Semiannual Reporting Requirement		Page(s)
5(b)(13)	Information described under section 804(b) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–208, §101(f) [title VIII], 31 U.S.C. 3512 note); The DIA financial management systems are not in full compliance with (1) Federal financial management system requirements, and (2) applicable Federal accounting standards. DIA management stated that it expected this material weakness would continue, with a correction target of FY 2024.	51
5(b)(14)	(A) An appendix containing the results of any peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General during the reporting period; or (B) If no peer review was conducted within that reporting period, a statement identifying the date of the last peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General;	46
5(b)(15)	List of any outstanding recommendations from any peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General that have not been fully implemented, including a statement describing the status of the implementation and why implementation is not complete;	46
5(b)(16)	List of any peer reviews conducted by the Inspector General of another Office of the Inspector General during the reporting period, including a list of any outstanding recommendations made from any previous peer review (including any peer review conducted before the reporting period) that remain outstanding or have not been fully implemented;	46
5(b)(17)	Statistical tables showing— (A) the total number of investigative reports issued during the reporting period; (B) the total number of persons referred to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution during the reporting period; (C) the total number of persons referred to State and local prosecuting authorities for criminal prosecution during the reporting period; and (D) the total number of indictments and criminal informations during the reporting period that resulted from any prior referral to prosecuting authorities;	27-28
5(b)(18)	Description of the metrics used for developing the data for the statistical tables under paragraph (17);	27-28

Statutory Reporting Requirements, cont.

Semiannual Reporting Requirement		Page(s)
5(b)(19)	<p>Report on each investigation conducted by the Office involving a senior Government employee where allegations of misconduct were substantiated, including the name of the senior government official (as defined by the department or agency) if already made public by the Office, and a detailed description of—</p> <p>(A) the facts and circumstances of the investigation; and</p> <p>(B) the status and disposition of the matter, including— (i) if the matter was referred to the Department of Justice, the date of the referral; and (ii) if the Department of Justice declined the referral, the date of the declination;</p>	18
5(b)(20)	<p>(A) A detailed description of any instance of whistleblower retaliation, including information about the official found to have engaged in retaliation; and</p> <p>(B) What, if any, consequences the establishment actually imposed to hold the official described in subparagraph (A) accountable;</p>	16-25, 45
5(b)(21)	<p>Detailed description of any attempt by the establishment to interfere with the independence of the Office, including—</p> <p>(A) with budget constraints designed to limit the capabilities of the Office; and</p> <p>(B) incidents where the establishment has resisted or objected to oversight activities of the Office or restricted or significantly delayed access to information, including the justification of the establishment for such action; and</p>	No instances to report
5(b)(22)	<p>Detailed descriptions of the particular circumstances of each—</p> <p>(A) inspection, evaluation, and audit conducted by the Office that is closed and was not disclosed to the public; and</p> <p>(B) investigation conducted by the Office involving a senior Government employee that is closed and was not disclosed to the public.</p>	No instances to report

Whistleblower Protections

Our office continues to inform DIA personnel about the Hotline Program and the protections afforded to Whistleblowers – those who, in good faith, report fraud, waste, and abuse. One of our key priorities is encouraging employees to report wrongdoing, which is an essential service for the public and DIA. We reinforce that whistleblowing supports national security by identifying wrongdoing and promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of Agency programs. They should never be subject to or threatened with reprisal for coming forward with a protected communication or disclosure. Protecting employees when they report wrongdoing is also a key priority. We thoroughly review all allegations of reprisal and fully investigate when appropriate. When a case is substantiated, we refer the matter to the appropriate management officials for further action. The facts developed during our investigations are the foundation for the Agency taking corrective actions. The results of individual investigations and corrective actions taken are reported on [page 21](#) of this report. Also, if during an investigation, we determine an internal control is lacking, we advise the appropriate management officials of this determination.

We preserve the confidentiality of individuals who provide us with information unless the individual consents to disclosure or the Inspector General determines disclosure is unavoidable during an investigation.

We received and acted on 47 complaints alleging reprisal or retaliation during this reporting period:

<u>47</u> Complaints Alleging Reprisal or Retaliation:
<u>9</u> Reprisal investigations initiated
<u>14</u> Complaints currently under review to validate if they meet the <i>prima facie</i> elements of reprisal
<u>24</u> Complaints declined (total) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 10 Complaints did not meet <i>prima facie</i> elements 6 Complaints determined to have no nexus to DIA (including Agency personnel) – subsequently referred to appropriate OIG (e.g., DoD IG, USCYBERCOM IG) 3 Complaints determined to be under EO purview – subsequently referred to EO \ 2 Complaints voluntarily withdrawn by the respective Complainant 2 Complaints unable to be evaluated due to DIA OIG being unable to obtain additional information from respective Complainant 1 Complaint not accepted as the matter is the subject of ongoing litigation between the Complainant and the Agency.

Peer Reviews

§5(a)(8): An appendix containing the results of any peer review conducted by another OIG during the reporting period; or if no peer review was conducted within that reporting period, a statement identifying the date of the last peer review.

- On March 31, 2023, the National Reconnaissance Office OIG led a multi-agency composed of agents and investigators from across the Intelligence Community to complete a joint review of the internal safeguard systems and management procedures (in conformity with CIGIE *Quality Standards for Investigations*) for the DIA OIG investigative operations for the past three years. They issued a pass rating and acknowledged that all recommendations had been implemented.

§5(a)(9): List of any outstanding recommendations from any peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General that have not been fully implemented, including a statement describing the status of the implementation and why implementation is not complete.

- We do not have any outstanding recommendations from any peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General that have not been fully implemented.

§5(a)(10): List of any peer reviews conducted by our office of another OIG during the reporting period, including a list of any outstanding recommendations made from any previous peer review (including any peer review conducted before the reporting period) that remain outstanding or have not been fully implemented.

- The Audits Division supported a peer review of the Central Intelligence Agency OIG and will lead a peer review of the Intelligence Community Inspector General in the latter half of FY 2023.
- The Inspections and Evaluations Division is supporting a peer review of the National Security Agency OIG and will lead a peer review of the National Reconnaissance Office OIG in the latter half of FY 2023.

Summary of Legislative and Regulatory Review

Section 404(a)(2) of the IG Act of 1978 requires IGs to review existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to the programs and operations of their respective organizations. We review legislation, executive orders, DoD and Agency policy, and other issuances to make recommendations in the semiannual reports required by section 405(b). The primary purpose of our reviews is to assess the impact of proposed legislation or regulations on the economy and efficiency in the administration of programs and operations administered or financed by DIA, or the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in these programs and operations. During the reporting period, we reviewed proposed changes to the following:

Description	Number Reviewed
Legislation	0
Department of Defense Issuances	36
Defense Intelligence Agency Issuances	31
Office of the Director of National Intelligence Issuances	4
Executive Orders	0

Appendix E. Glossary of Acronyms

ADA: Americans with Disabilities Act	IG: Inspector General
AGILE: Advanced Global Intelligence Learning Environment	IPA: Independent Public Accounting
APR: Advanced Purchase Request	JDA: Joint Duty Assignment
C.F.R.: Code of Federal Regulations	JTR: Joint Travel Regulations
CARES Act: Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security	JWICS: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
CFO: Office of the Chief Financial Officer	LOC: Letter of Counseling
CS: Office of the Chief of Staff	MIO: Military Integration Office
DDGI: Deputy Director for Global Integration	MS: Directorate for Mission Services
DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency	NIPR: Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router
DIAI: Defense Intelligence Agency Instruction	OIG: Office of the Inspector General
DISES: Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service	OMB: Office of Management and Budget
DISL: Defense Intelligence Senior Leader	PAF: Promotion Assessment Form
DO: Directorate for Operations	PPD-19: Presidential Policy Directive 19
DoD IG: Department of Defense Inspector General	QIA: Questionable Intelligence Activity
EDVA: Eastern District of Virginia	SEC: Office of Security
EEE: Emergency and Extraordinary Expense	SIPR: Secret Internet Protocol Router
EMT: Emergency Management Team	TDY: Temporary Duty
EO: Equal Opportunity and Diversity Office	U.S.C.: United States Code
FY: Fiscal Year	USA: United States Army
FISMA: Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002	USERRA: Uniformed Services employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
IAW: in accordance with	USMC: United States Marine Corps
IC: Intelligence Community	USN: United States Navy
IC IG: Intelligence Community Inspector General	

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