

SECRET//NOFORN

Report No. DODIG-2020-045



INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

DECEMBER 30, 2019



(U) Evaluation of Military Service Capacity to Fill Combatant Command Requests for Counterintelligence Support

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INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE

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Results in Brief

Evaluation of Military Service Capacity to Fill Combatant Command Requests for Counterintelligence Support

(U) December 30, 2019

(U) Objective

(U//~~FOUO~~)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

(U) Background

(S//NF)

OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526

(U//~~FOUO~~) Executive Order 12333 defines CI as "information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities."

(U//~~FOUO~~) Furthermore, DoD Directive 5240.02 requires all personnel conducting CI activities to successfully complete formal CI training approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[II]), the Secretaries of the Military Departments, or the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

(U) According to CJCSM 3130.06B, the Global Force Management allocation process is designed to distribute forces to meet CCMD force requirements that cannot be met with assigned forces. The Global Force Management allocation process consists of two supporting processes:

(U) Background (cont'd)

(U) an annual allocation in support of CCMD annual requirements, and an emergent allocation in support of CCMD emerging or crisis-based requirements. All requests follow four steps:

1. (U) requirement submission,
2. (U) requirement validation,
3. (U) sourcing solutions development, and
4. (U) Secretary of Defense approval.

(U) In accordance with various DoD directives and instructions, the duties and authorities of DoD CI personnel differ across the DoD. For example, USD(I) is responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing CI policies and activities; approving DoD CI strategies; and resolving CI challenges that cannot be resolved among the DoD Components. The DIA Director is the Defense CI Manager and provides centralized management of DoD CI activities including exercising CI mission tasking authority over the DoD CI enterprise and publishing guidance, standards, and procedures.

(U) Finding

(S//NF)

OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526



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Results in Brief

*Evaluation of Military Service Capacity to Fill Combatant
Command Requests for Counterintelligence Support*

(U) Finding (cont'd)

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) DIA (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (c) and OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526

[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendations

(U//FOUO) Among other recommendations, we
recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence:

- (U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

- (U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Results in Brief

Evaluation of Military Service Capacity to Fill Combatant Command Requests for Counterintelligence Support

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) We also received comments from the Army, Navy, and Air Force on recommendations related to their CI capacity that are not highlighted in the RIB. Those recommendations, management's comments, and our responses are fully discussed in the body of this report.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) Neither the Office of the Under Secretary for Defense for Intelligence nor the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Staff provided comments to the draft report; therefore, the recommendations directed to both entities are unresolved and open. We request that the Office of the Under Secretary for Defense for Intelligence and the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Staff provide comments on the final report.

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Recommendation Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence	1.a, 1.b	None	None
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	2	None	None
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in coordination with the Services	3	None	None
Headquarters Department of the Army G-2, the Commander of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the Director of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service	None	4	None
Director of Naval Intelligence and Marine Corps Director of Intelligence	None	5	None

Please provide Management Comments by January 30, 2020.

The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations:

- **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.



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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

December 30, 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY G-2
MARINE CORPS DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR OF THE NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
COMMANDER OF THE AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIONS

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Military Service Capacity to Fill Combatant Command Requests for
Counterintelligence Support (Report No. DODIG-2020-045)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) This report contains recommendations that are considered unresolved because the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not provide a response to the report. Therefore, as discussed in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, the recommendations remain open. We will track these recommendations until an agreement is reached on the actions to be taken to address the recommendations, and adequate documentation has been submitted showing that the agreed-upon action has been completed.

DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Your response should be sent to both DODIG (b)(6) and DODIG (b)(6) by January 30, 2020.

(U) The Headquarters Department of the Army G-2, Director of Naval Intelligence, Headquarters Marine Corps Director of Intelligence, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and Air Force Office of Special Investigations agreed to address all the recommendations presented in the report; therefore, the recommendations are considered resolved and open. As described in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, the recommendations may be closed when we receive adequate documentation showing that all agreed upon actions to implement the recommendations have been completed. Therefore, please provide us within 90 days your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the recommendations. Your response should be sent to both DODIG (b)(6) and DODIG (b)(6).

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(U) If you have any questions or would like to meet to discuss the evaluation, please contact ^{DDOIG} [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff during this evaluation.



for Carolyn R. Hantz
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Programs, Combatant Commands, and
Overseas Contingency Operations

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U//~~FOUO~~)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U) Background

(S//NF)

OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526

[REDACTED]

(U) Overview of Counterintelligence

(U//~~FOUO~~) Executive Order 12333 defines CI as "information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities."² As outlined in DoD Directive 5240.02, CI activities are undertaken as part of an integrated DoD and national effort to mitigate actions directed against U.S. national security interests or the DoD and its personnel, information, material, facilities, and activities.³ CI activities support the four CI missions of:

- (U) countering espionage, international terrorism, and the CI insider threat;
- (U) CI support to force protection;
- (U) support to the defense critical infrastructure program; and
- (U) support to research, development, and acquisition.

¹ (U) Commander, USCENTCOM, Action Memorandum, (U) Counterintelligence (CI) Capacity Memorandum, September 17, 2018; overall classification is SECRET//NOFORN.

² (U) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," December 4, 1981, as amended.

³ (U) DoD Directive 5240.02, "Counterintelligence," March 17, 2015.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Furthermore, DoD Directive 5240.02 states that the DoD maintains a CI presence in designated overseas locations through force protection detachments. Force protection detachments support the combatant commander by detecting and warning of threats to in-transit and assigned DoD personnel and resources. According to Joint Publication 2-01.2, CI activities in support of joint operations may include CI collections, investigations, operations, analysis and production, and functional services.⁴ Additionally, CI activities are conducted at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

(S//NF)

NCIS (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526 and OSD (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED].⁷

⁴ (U) Joint Publication 2-01.2, "Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," June 13, 2006; overall classification is SECRET//NOFORN.

⁵ (U) Secretary of the Navy Instruction 3850.2E, "Department of the Navy Counterintelligence," January 3, 2017.

⁶ (U) Air Force Mission Directive 39, "Air Force Office of Special Investigation," May 7, 2015.

⁷ (U) Army Regulation 381-20, "The Army Counterintelligence Program," May 25, 2010; overall classification is SECRET//NOFORN.

(U) CI Training Requirements

(U) DoD Directive 5240.02 requires all personnel conducting CI activities to successfully complete formal CI training approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]), the Secretaries of the Military Departments, or the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Additionally, DoD CI Agents and Special Agents are authorized badges and credentials for use during the conduct of authorized CI activities.

(U) Air Force Office of Special Investigations

(U//FOUO)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U) Department of the Army

(U)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

- (U) OSD (b)(7)(F) [REDACTED]
- (U) OSD (b)(7)(F) [REDACTED]
- (U) OSD (b)(7)(F) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (U) OSD (b)(7)(F) [REDACTED]
- (U) OSD (b)(7)(F) [REDACTED]
- (U) OSD (b)(7)(F) [REDACTED]

- (U) ^{OSD (b)(7)(F)} [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(U) ^{OSD (b)(7)(F)} [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(U) Department of the Navy

(U) ^{OSD (b)(7)(F)} [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) ^{OSD (b)(7)(F)} [REDACTED]

(U) ^{OSD (b)(7)(F)} [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(U) ^{OSD (b)(7)(F)} [REDACTED]

(U) ^{OSD (b)(7)(F)} [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(U) Global Force Management and the Request for Forces Process

(U) As outlined in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.06B, the Global Force Management (GFM) process is designed to provide the Secretary of Defense with the information needed to make resource-informed, risk-based decisions to balance operational commanders' competing requirements with the ability to provide forces for current and potential future operations.⁸ GFM aligns force assignment, allocation, and apportionment in support of the National Defense Strategy, Joint Force availability requirements, and Joint Force assessments.⁹

(U) According to CJCSM 3130.06B, the GFM allocation process is designed to distribute forces to meet CCMD, force, and joint individual augmentation requirements that cannot be met with assigned forces. The allocation process looks across the DoD to identify and recommend the most appropriate and responsive force that can meet CCMD requirements. Each force or joint individual augmentation request is provided to the Secretary of Defense for approval and, upon approval, deployment orders are issued to allocate a force or joint individual augmentation from assigned or unassigned forces.

(U) In accordance with CJCSM 3130.06B, the overall GFM allocation process consists of two supporting processes: an annual allocation in support of CCMD annual requirements, and an emergent allocation in support of CCMD emerging or crisis-based requirements. These processes are designed to help the Secretary of Defense prioritize the use of finite forces against competing operational missions by providing options and risks. The annual process is 12-14 months long and requires the Services, CCMDs, Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to plan and build the base GFM allocation plan 2 years in advance. CCMDs submit requirements for an entire fiscal year in the annual submission. This submission includes requests for assigned forces, replacements for forces currently allocated (rotational forces), and any new (emergent) requirements necessary for that year. Between annual submissions, CCMDs may request additional forces as an emergent RFF.

⁸ (U) CJCSM 3130.06B, "Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures," October 12, 2016; overall classification is SECRET.

⁹ (U) CJCSM 3130.06B defines assignment as "units, equipment, and resources placed on the command authority of a unified commander;" allocation as "forces, individuals, and resources provided to a Combatant Commander, not already assigned to that Combatant Commander;" and apportionment as the "distribution of forces and capabilities as the starting point for planning."

(U) The emergent RFF process is designed to respond to immediate and contingency demands for current fiscal year or next-year requirements and requires modification to the base GFM allocation plan. Emergent requirements are CCMD RFFs that are not anticipated and are submitted outside of the CCMDs' annual submission window.

(U) All requests, regardless of whether they are rotational or emergent, follow four steps:

1. (U) requirement submission,
2. (U) requirement validation,
3. (U) sourcing solutions development, and
4. (U) Secretary of Defense approval.

(U) After CCMDs submit their force requirements, the Joint Staff J35 validates each force request for completeness and verifies that there are proper authorities for the CCMD to conduct the associated mission. The Joint Staff J35 also assigns the priority to each request per the Force Allocation Decision Matrix.¹⁰ The Force Allocation Decision Matrix is designed to align GFM allocation recommendations with DoD priorities, allow the flexibility to meet emergent requirements, and provide a decision framework to formulate allocation recommendations. CCMDs suggest a tier and priority for their RFF based on the Force Allocation Decision Matrix.

(U) Once requirements are validated and prioritized, the J35 assigns requests to the Joint Functional Manager, Joint Force Coordinator, and Joint Force Providers who coordinate with the CCMDs to determine sourcing options and risks, and recommends a sourcing solution for each requirement. The sourcing recommendations are consolidated and provided to the Joint Staff directorates, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff Chairman, and ultimately to the Secretary of Defense for approval.

(U) Roles and Responsibilities for CI

(U) In accordance with DoD directives and instructions, the duties and authorities of DoD CI personnel differ across the DoD and the Services. Specifically, the following organizations have CI management and oversight responsibilities.

¹⁰ (U) According to CJCSM 3130.06B, "the Force Allocation Decision Matrix is designed to provide CCMD forces and resources required to perform operations, and activities in support of guidance for employment of the force objectives; it balance the allocation of forces and resources in support of current operations against the need to address potential threats and opportunities, and, it aligns Global Force Management allocation recommendations with DoD priorities."

(U) Secretary of Defense

(U) According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3241.01A, the Secretary of Defense is responsible for maintaining a coordinated CI program within the DoD.¹¹ Furthermore, the Instruction states that the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Law Enforcement Support, under the direction, management, and control of the USD(I), is delegated authority to act for the Secretary of Defense in executing CI responsibilities, and ensuring that the DoD CI strategy supports and complies with the National CI Strategy, which is written by the Director of the National CI and Security Center who serves as the National CI Executive.¹²

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

(U) DoD Directive 5240.02 states that the USD(I) is responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing CI policies and activities; authorizing DoD components to conduct offensive CI operations; and designating and approving information systems for CI management and reporting. Additionally, the USD(I) is responsible for approving DoD CI strategies and resolving CI challenges that cannot be resolved among the DoD Components.

(U) Defense Intelligence Agency

(U) DoD Directive 5240.02 states that under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I), the DIA Director serves as the Defense CI Manager to provide for centralized management of DoD CI activities, including exercising CI mission tasking authority over the DoD CI enterprise and publishing guidance, standards, and procedures. The DIA Director is responsible for maintaining a process to gather, prioritize, and index CI requirements and the completion of those requirements; maintaining a system to identify and share CI lessons learned, best practices, and proactive CI initiatives; and providing advanced and joint CI training within the DoD.

(U) Defense CI and HUMINT Center

(U) The Defense CI and HUMINT Center (DCHC) was established in August 2008 under the authority, direction, and control of the DIA Director to provide centralized management of the Defense CI and HUMINT Enterprises, develop programs to support DoD Component CI-HUMINT functions, and execute CI-HUMINT activities worldwide. In August 2010, DoD Instruction O-5100.93 assigned to the DIA Director and the DCHC Director the responsibilities of integrating, synchronizing, coordinating, deconflicting,

¹¹ (U) CJCSI 3241.01A, "Counterintelligence Support," May 2013; overall classification is SECRET//NOFORN.

¹² (U) The National CI and Security Center is an entity within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(U) and centrally managing DoD CI, HUMINT, and enabling activities.¹³ Centralized management includes strategic planning, program development and evaluation, professional development, operational coordination and deconfliction, and source deconfliction. The DCHC was also directed to develop and maintain a process to identify and coordinate national and DoD CI requirements and monitor supporting operational activities. This included all validated DoD CI and enabling activity requirements in planning, programming, and budget submissions to the USD(I) and the Director for National Intelligence. Additionally, the Defense CI and HUMINT Enterprise was directed to provide the USD(I) an annual assessment of the capabilities, readiness, performance effectiveness, and integration of the Defense CI and HUMINT Enterprise prior to the beginning of each year's established budget programming timeline. The DCHC was dissolved by the DIA in June 2013 and the responsibilities were reassigned within the DIA.

(U) Joint Staff

(U) According to CJCSI 3241.01A, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for overseeing the activities of the CCMDs, preparing strategic and joint plans, establishing and developing joint doctrine, and providing guidance for joint activities.

(U) Combatant Commands

(U) In accordance with Joint Publication 2-01.2, CCMDs execute the full spectrum of military operations in worldwide operational theaters. The CCMD J2 directs intelligence activities conducted under the command's auspices. Combatant commander authority over CI forces varies from providing requirements to Military Department CI elements during non-contingency operations to exercising CCMD (command authority) of CI forces under a Secretary of Defense-approved plan for all CI functions, with only CI investigations remaining under the administrative control of the Military Departments.

(U) Service Components

(U) In accordance with CJCSI 3241.01A, the Services are responsible for the conduct, direction, management, coordination, training, and control of CI within their respective organizations, as well as providing CI support to CCMDs and DoD agencies as directed. The CCMDs receive their CI support from the CI elements of the Military Departments, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency/Central Security Service.

¹³ (U) DoD Instruction 0-5100.93, "Defense CI and HUMINT Center," August 13, 2010.

(U) Finding

(U)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

(S//NF)

OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526

(S//NF)

DIA (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (c)

(S//NF)

DIA (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (c)

¹⁴ (U//FOUO) The desired dwell ratio is 1:3 which equates to one deployment compared to three times the deployment period not deployed (e.g., 6 months deployed compared to 18 months not deployed). OSD: (b)(7)(F)

When desired dwell ratios are not maintained, Secretary of Defense approval is required to grant an exception to policy for these deployments.

(S//NF) DIA (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (c) and OSD (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (c)

(U//~~FOUO~~)

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and INSCOM (b)(1) 1.2(a) and 1.4(c) EO 13526

(U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and NCIS (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526

Table 1. (S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526

(S//NF)		OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526	
			OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526
Total	INSCOM (b)(1) 1.2(a) and 1.4(c) EO 13526	OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 INSCOM (b)(1) 1.2(a) and 1.4(c) EO 13526 and OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526	INSCOM (b)(1) 1.2(a) and 1.4(c) EO 13526 and OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526

(S//NF)

Source: DIA CI Executive Committee Workbook.

Table 2. (~~S~~//NF)

(S//NF)	OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526					
OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526	INSCOM (b)(1) 1.2(a) and 1.4(c) EO 13526 and OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526	OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526	NCIS (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526 and OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526	OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526	OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526	INSCOM (b)(1) 1.2(a) and 1.4(c) EO 13526 and OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526
						(S//NF)

Source: DIA CI Executive Committee Workbook.

† (U) Unavailable means these numbers are already filling non-RFF CCMD, Service, or other requirements or are otherwise non-deployable for reasons such as leave, temporary duty assignments, and medical or administrative purposes.

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and INSCOM (b)(1) 1.2(a) and 1.4(c) EO 13526

16 (S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and INSCOM (b)(1) 1.2(a) and 1.4(c) EO 13526

(U//FOUO)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

(S//NF)

OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and NCIS (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526

(U//~~FOUO~~)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

(S//NF)

OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526

(S//NF)

OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526, NCIS (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526 and USMC (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526
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(U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)
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(U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)
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(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526
[Redacted text block]

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526
[Redacted text block]

(U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)
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(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526
[Redacted text block]

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526
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(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526
[Redacted text block]

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526
[Redacted text block]

(U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)
[Redacted text block]

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526, INSCOM (b)(1) 1.2(a) and 1.4(c) EO 13526 and USMC (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526
[Redacted text block]

(U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)
[Redacted text block]

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and DIA (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (c)
[Redacted text block]

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and DIA (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (c)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and DIA (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (c)

[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) DIA (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) and OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) DIA (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) and OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

¹⁷ (U) DIA (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) and OSD (b)(7)(F)

(U//~~FOUO~~) DIA (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) and OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) DIA (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) and OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition, Executive Order 13869 authorized the name change of the Defense Security Service to the Defense CI and Security Agency.

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526
[Redacted text block]

(U) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

(U) Director of Naval Intelligence Comments

(U) The Director of CI/HUMINT Directorate, responding on behalf of the Director of Naval Intelligence, provided comments stating that the information represented in

OSD (b)(7)(F)
[Redacted text block]

(U) Our Response

(U) OSD (b)(7)(F)
[Redacted text block]

(U) Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Comments

(U) The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps provided clarification regarding Marine Corps CI Agent authorities related to conduct of offensive CI operations and support to CI investigations.

(U) Our Response

(U) We amended the report to reflect the clarification on page 4.

(U) Director of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service Comments

(U) The Assistant Director, National Security Directorate, NCIS provided comments indicating that there is a 2-week mid-career CI training course.

(U) Our Response

(U) Throughout the evaluation, we asked NCIS, through data calls, interviews, and follow-ups, about their CI training; however, no documentation of the course (dates, curriculum, and requirements) was provided to us, nor was documentation of the course provided in NCIS' response to the draft report. Therefore, we did not amend the report to reflect this change.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1

(U//~~FOUO~~) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:

a. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** ^{OSD (b)(7)(F)}

[REDACTED]

b. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** ^{OSD (b)(7)(F)}

[REDACTED]

(U) Management Comments Required – USD(I)

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, did not respond to the recommendations in the report. Therefore, the recommendations are unresolved and open. We request that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence provide comments on the final report.

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Department of the Army G-2 Comments

(U//~~FOUO~~) ^{OSD (b)(7)(F)} [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(U) Air Force Office of Special Investigations Comments

(U//~~FOUO~~) ^{OSD (b)(7)(F)} [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(U) Director of Naval Intelligence Comments

(U) ^{OSD (b)(7)(F)} [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(U) Our Response

(U) We appreciate the comments received from the Army, Navy, and Air Force to the recommendation; however, we request comments to the final report from USD(I), because the recommendation is directed to USD(I).

(U) Recommendation 2

(U//~~FOUO~~)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U) Management Comments Required – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(U) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not respond to the recommendations in the report. Therefore, the recommendations are unresolved and open. We request that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide comments on the final report.

*(U) Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Department of the Army G-2,
Director of Naval Intelligence and Air Force Office of Special
Investigations Comments*

(U//~~FOUO~~)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) We appreciate the comments received from the Army, Navy, and Air Force to the recommendation; however, we request comments to the final report from the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because the recommendation is directed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(U) Recommendation 3

(U//FOUO)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U) Management Comments Required– Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not respond to the recommendations in the report. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and open. We request that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide comments on the final report.

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Department of the Army G-2 Comments

(U)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) We appreciate the concurrence from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, however the comments received do not indicate any actions taken regarding the recommendation, nor was supporting documentation provided. In addition, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not provide comments. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and open. We will close the recommendation once we receive and validate documentation supporting that the actions to implement the recommendation has been completed. We request the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide comments to the final report.

(U) Recommendation 4

(U//~~FOUO~~)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Department of the Army G-2 Comments

(U)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U) Commander of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations Comments

(U)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U) Director of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service Comments

(U)

OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) We consider the Army's portion of the recommendation resolved and closed, as the Army provided plans and documentation ^{OSD (b)(7)(F)} [REDACTED]. Comments from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service addressed the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and open. We will close the recommendation once we receive and validate documentation supporting that the actions to implement the recommendations have been completed.

(U) Recommendation 5

(U//FOUO) ^{OSD (b)(7)(F)} [REDACTED]

(U) Director of Naval Intelligence Comments

(U) ^{OSD (b)(7)(F)} [REDACTED]

(U) Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Comments

(S//NF) ^{OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and USMC (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526} [REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, addressed the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and open. We will close the recommendation once we receive and validate documentation from Department of the Navy CI enterprise, to include the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; and the Director of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service showing that all agreed upon actions to implement the recommendation have been completed.

(U) Appendix

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from January 2019 through August 2019 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluations," published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) To accomplish our objective, we requested from each of the geographic and functional CCMDs information related to CI workforce capacity and how the CCMDs were validating their counterintelligence. We met with CI personnel from the offices of the Joint Staff, DIA, NCIS, Naval Intelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence, AFOSI, and the Army to get an understanding of the request for forces process and the scope and activities of CI personnel within the various components. Additionally, we visited various CI training schools, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force CI/HUMINT course at Naval Air Station Oceana, Dam Neck, Virginia and the CI Special Agent Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and conducted a video teleconference with the Air Force Counterintelligence course at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, to get an understanding of their CI course requirements, CI personnel recruitment, and curriculum validation process. We also visited USCENTCOM, USSOCOM, MARCENT, and USAFRICOM to determine the challenges of receiving CI support and the mission impact of unfulfilled CI personnel.

(U) We reviewed applicable guidance, DoD directives, and instructions. Specifically, we reviewed the following:

- (U) Army Regulation 381-20, "The Army Counterintelligence Program," May 25, 2010
- (U) CJCSM 3130.06B, "Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures," October 12, 2016
- (U) CJCSI 3241.01A, "Counterintelligence Support," May 13, 2013
- (U) DoD Directive 5240.02, "Counterintelligence," March 17, 2015
- (U) DoD Instruction 5100.93, "Defense Counterintelligence (CI) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Center," August 13, 2010

- (U) Secretary of the Navy Instruction 3850.2E, "Department of the Navy Counterintelligence," January 3, 2017

(U) We reviewed and evaluated the DIA executive committee brief to determine the CCMDs' requests for CI personnel and the Services' CI personnel strength and management of the CI workforce.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, there were no reports discussing the DoD's oversight of the CI workforce capacity.

(U) Management Comments

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Department of the Army G-2



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
1000 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1000

DAMI-CDC

15 November 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
(ATTN: MR. BRYAN CLARK)

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Military Service Capacity to Fill Combatant Command
Requests for Counterintelligence Support (Project No. D2019-DISPA5-0101.000) (U)

1. (U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

a. (U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

b. (U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

c. (U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

d. (U//FOUO) OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

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(U) Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Department of the Army G-2 (cont'd)

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DAMI-CDC
MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
(ATTN: INSCOM (b)(6))

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) Recommendation #5 does not apply to Army CI.

2. (U) POC for this memorandum is [NSCOM (b)(6)], HQDA DCS, G-2, [NSCOM (b)(6)] or [NSCOM (b)(6)]@mail.mil.

INSCOM (b)(6)

Senior Counterintelligence Advisor

(U) Director of Naval Intelligence



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

3850
Ser NIA/19S1165
15 Nov 2019

From: Director, Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Directorate (NIA-X)
To: Director, DoD Inspector General OCO Intelligence Evaluations
Subj: (U) U.S. NAVY RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS IN DOD IG PROJECT NO.
D2019-DISPA5-0101.0000

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) OSD (b)(7)(F)
OSD (b)(7)(F)

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) OSD (b)(7)(F)
OSD (b)(7)(F)

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) OSD (b)(7)(F)

4. (U//~~FOUO~~) The USN point of contact on specific CI questions, comments, or concerns is OS
(NIPR: OSD (b)(6) ; SIPR: OSD (b)(6) ;
JWICS OSD (b)(6)).

STEAN W. MAAS

Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 20441114

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Management Comments

(U) Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

IN REPLY REFER TO
3800
INTEL
NOV 10 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

From: Director, Intelligence Division
To: Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector's General
Subj: MARINE CORPS RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT, EVALUATION OF
MILITARY SERVICE CAPACITY TO FILL COMBATANT COMMAND REQUESTS
FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT (U)
Encl: (1) INFORMATION PAPER, MARINE CORPS RESPONSE TO
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR'S GENERAL DRAFT
REPORT, EVALUATION OF MILITARY CAPACITY TO FILL
COMBATANT COMMAND REQUEST FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SUPPORT (S//NF)

1. The draft report has been reviewed and the Marine Corps response is attached as enclosure (1).

2. Point of contact is OSD (b)(6) and USMC (b)(6) [REDACTED], CI/HUMINT Branch at OSD (b)(6) and USMC (b)(6) [REDACTED].


D. G. JORDAN
By direction

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Management Comments

(U) Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

14 Nov 2019

Information Paper

Subj: MARINE CORPS RESPONSE TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR'S GENERAL DRAFT REPORT, EVALUATION OF MILITARY
CAPACITY TO FILL COMBATANT COMMAND REQUEST FOR
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT (U)

Ref: (a) DoD IG Draft Report, Evaluation of Military Service
Capacity to Fill Combatant Command Requests for
Counterintelligence Support, 30 Oct 2019 (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. The Office of the Department of Defense Inspector's General, via reference (a), requested that the Director, Marine Corps Intelligence (DIRINT) conduct a review of current Marine Corps counterintelligence (CI) initiatives to determine whether trained CI personnel could be increased; and provide any technical comments to the overall content of the report to ensure report accuracy. Additionally, it is requested the Marine Corps perform a review of the draft to determine the appropriate classification markings.

2. (S//NF) BACKGROUND. OSD (b)(7)(F) and
USMC (b)(1) 1.4(c)
EO 13526
[REDACTED]

a. (U//NF) OSD (b)(7)(F)
[REDACTED]

b. (S//NF) OSD (b)(7)(F)
and (b)(1) 1.4c
EO 13526 and
USMC (b)(1)
1.4(c)-EO 13526
[REDACTED]

3. (U) MARINE CORPS CI INITIATIVES.

a. (S//NF) OSD (b)(7)(F) and USMC (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526
[REDACTED]

(1) (U) OSD (b)(7)(F)
[REDACTED]

(2) (U) OSD (b)(7)(F)
[REDACTED]

Classified by: OSD (b)(6) and Intel Div, HQMC
Derived from: DoD C-5240.08
Declassify on: 20281113

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Subj: MARINE CORPS RESPONSE TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR'S
GENERAL DRAFT REPORT, EVALUATION OF MILITARY CAPACITY TO FILL
COMBATANT COMMAND REQUEST FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT (U)

(3) (U) ~~OSD (b)(7)(F)~~ [REDACTED]

(4) (U) ~~OSD (b)(7)(F)~~ [REDACTED]

(5) (U) ~~OSD (b)(7)(F)~~ [REDACTED]

(6) (U) ~~OSD (b)(7)(F)~~ [REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and USMC (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526~~ [REDACTED]

(1) ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and USMC (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526~~ [REDACTED]

(2) ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and USMC (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526~~ [REDACTED]

(3) ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and USMC (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526~~ [REDACTED]

(4) ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and USMC (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526~~ [REDACTED]

(5) ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and USMC (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526~~ [REDACTED]

(6) ~~(S//NF)~~ ~~OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and USMC (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526~~ [REDACTED]

(U) Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Subj: MARINE CORPS RESPONSE TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR'S
GENERAL DRAFT REPORT, EVALUATION OF MILITARY CAPACITY TO FILL
COMBATANT COMMAND REQUEST FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT (U)

OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and USMC (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526

(7) (S//NF) OSD (b)(1)

1.4c EO

13526 and

USMC (b)(1)

1.4(c) EO

13526

4. (U) OVERALL CONTENT/REPORT ACCURACY.

a. (S//NF) USMC (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO

- (U) Although USPACCOM is aware of this, other CCMD's are unclear regarding CI policy as command and control applies between Service and CCMD authorities. CJCSI 3241.01A, Encl A, page A-2, para d.(1) and (2) clearly details when CCMD retains authority, and when Services retain command and control of Service CI entities to conduct CI activities. Recommend USD(I) follow verbiage contained within CJCSI 3241.01A and apply it to DoDI 5240.10 to alleviate this confusion.

b. (S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and USMC (b)(1) 1.4(c) EO 13526

- (U) Misleading statement. Marine Corps CI Agents are authorized to conduct CI investigations after completing training and when assigned to NCIS; and are also authorized to support CI investigations when requested to do so by NCIS. Additionally, Marine Corps CI Agents are authorized to conduct CI Offensive Operations (OFCO) after training, and, per SECNAVINST 3850.2E, have the authorization to conduct OFCO while not assigned to NCIS as long as it is conducted under their authority/oversight from a combined location.

c. (U) OSD (b)(7)(F)

(U) Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Subj: MARINE CORPS RESPONSE TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR'S
GENERAL DRAFT REPORT, EVALUATION OF MILITARY CAPACITY TO FILL
COMBATANT COMMAND REQUEST FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT (U)

OSD (b)(7)(F) and (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526

[REDACTED]

- (U) OSD (b)(7)(F) and (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and USMC
(b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) OSD (b)(7)(F) and (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526 and USMC (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

- (U) OSD (b)(7)(F) and (b)(1) 1.4c
EO 13526

[REDACTED]

5. (U) RECOMMENDATION. OSD (b)(7)(F) and
(b)(1) 1.4c EO
13526

[REDACTED]

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) OSD (b)(7)(F) and
(b)(1) 1.4c EO
13526 and USMC
(b)(1) 1.4(c) EO
13526

[REDACTED]

**(U) Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps (cont'd)**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Subj: MARINE CORPS RESPONSE TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR'S
GENERAL DRAFT REPORT, EVALUATION OF MILITARY CAPACITY TO FILL
COMBATANT COMMAND REQUEST FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT (U)

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) OSD (b)(7)(F) and USMC (b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

6. (U) CLASSIFICATION MARKINGS. All classification markings within
reference (a) are accurate.

Prepared by OSD (b)(6) and USMC (b)(6) [REDACTED]
CI/HUMINT Branch (CIH), OSD (b)(6) and USMC (b)(6) [REDACTED].

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Management Comments

(U) Naval Criminal Investigative Service



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS
NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
27130 TELEGRAPH ROAD
QUANTICO VA 22134-2263

November 19, 2019

FOR: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DOD

NCIS (b)(6)

FROM: NCIS (b)(6), Assistant Director, National Security Director
Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of Military Service Capacity to Fill Combatant Command Requests
for Counterintelligence Support

- (U) Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this report. The following provides the NCIS response, as requested, to the findings identified in the report. Additionally, recommended wording adjustments to the body of the report is provided for your consideration as an attachment.
- (U) Recommendations 1-3 and 5 are addressed to other DoD entities and do not require an NCIS response.
- (U) NCIS agrees with recommendation. 4. This action is carried out annually as part of the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) and Military Intelligence Program (MIP) review. In this process, NCIS reviews current counterintelligence activities and requirements, and uses the data to request additional resources as required. The request for resources is approved for submission by the Director, NCIS.

DISTRIBUTION: EAD National Security, AD National Security Directorate, IG, NCIS

Point of Contact: NCIS (b)(6), Policy Adviser, NCIS
NCIS (b)(6)

Attachment: (U) Recommended Wording Adjustments to the body of the Report

Classified By: NCIS
Derived From: NCIS SCG ID# 04-17.3 Subj:
DON Counterintelligence (CI) Program
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Naval Criminal Investigative Service (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Attachment: (U) Recommended Wording Adjustments to the body of the Report

(U) The following is provided for your consideration.

Page 2, para 3.

(U) Revise as follows:

(S//NF) [REDACTED] NCIS 1.4(c) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] EO 13526
[REDACTED] and OSD
[REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4c

(S//NF) NCIS 1.4(c) EO 13526 and OSD (b)(1) 1.4c EO 13526
[REDACTED]

Page 3, para 1.

(U) Revise as follows:

(U) We request that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Staff; the Chairman of the Joint Staff in coordination with the Services; the Headquarters Department of the Army G2, the Headquarters Marine Corps Director of Intelligence, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations; and the Director of Naval Intelligence, ~~in coordination with~~ and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service provide comments in response to this report. We request management comments be provided by November 19, 2019.

(U) NCIS is not a component of the Navy, it is the Department of the Navy CI service with the Director reporting directly to the SECNAV. Alternatively, the paragraph could be modified to read:

(U) We request that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Staff; the Chairman of the Joint Staff in coordination with the Services; the Headquarters Department of the Army G2; the Air Force Office of Special Investigations; the Headquarters Marine Corps Director of Intelligence, ~~the Air Force Office of Special Investigations;~~ and the Director of Naval Intelligence, in coordination with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, provide comments in response to this report. We request management comments be provided by November 19, 2019.

(U) Justification: A combined USN/USMC/NCIS response would be appropriate to represent the Department of the Navy and consistent with usage in the rest of the report.

Page 10, para 2.

(U) Revise as follows:

(U) OSD (b)(7)(F) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Naval Criminal Investigative Service (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Justification: Completeness.

Page 10, para 3.

(U) Revise as follows:

(U) OSD (b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED]

(U) OSD (b)(7)(F)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Management Comments

(U) Air Force Office of Special Investigations



Office of the Secretary

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

02 Dec 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
(ATTN: AFOSI (b)(6) and (b)(7)(F))

FROM: SAF/IG

SUBJECT: DoDIG Draft Report of Evaluation, Military Service Capacity to Fill Combatant Command
Requests for Counterintelligence Support (Project D2019-DISPA5-0101.000)

(U//~~FOUO~~) OSD (b)(7)(F)
OSD (b)(7)(F)

(U//~~FOUO~~) If you have any questions or concerns with our comments, please contact SA
AFOSI (b)(6) Director of Staff, HQ AFOSI, DSS AFOSI (b)(6) AFOSI (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C)
AFOSI (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C)

SAMI D. SAID
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment 1:
HQ AFOSI comments

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Air Force Office of Special Investigations (cont'd)



Unclassified//~~For Official Use Only~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
QUANTICO VIRGINIA

27 November 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL
(ATTN: AFOSI (b)(6) and (b)(7)(F))

FROM: HQ Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI)/XR

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of Military Service Capacity to Fill Command Requests for
Counterintelligence Support (Project No. D2019-DISPA5-0101.000)

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) OSD (b)(7)(F)
[Redacted]

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Recommendation 1: OSD (b)(7)(F)
[Redacted]

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Recommendation 2: OSD (b)(7)(F)
[Redacted]

Unclassified//~~For Official Use Only~~

(U) Air Force Office of Special Investigations (cont'd)

~~For Official Use Only~~

- c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Recommendation 3: ~~OSD (b)(7)(F)~~
~~OSD (b)(7)(F)~~
- d. (U//~~FOUO~~) Recommendation 4: ~~OSD (b)(7)(F)~~
~~OSD (b)(7)(F)~~
- e. (U//~~FOUO~~) Recommendation 5: AFOSI has no position on this recommendation as it does not impact the USAF.
2. (U) Should you have any questions on this matter, my POC for this matter is ~~AFOSI (b)(6) and~~
at ~~AFOSI (b)(6) and~~
~~AFOSI (b)(6) and (b)(7)(c)~~
~~AFOSI (b)(6) and (b)(7)(c)~~ Col, USAF
(c) HQ AFOSI/XR

~~Unclassified//For Official Use Only~~

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
CCMD	Combatant Command
CI	Counterintelligence
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
DCHC	Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
GFM	Global Force Management
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
NCIS	Naval Criminal Investigative Service
RFF	Request for Forces
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USD(I)	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Whistleblower Protection

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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
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