

**NATO ENLARGEMENT AND
THE BALTIC STATES:
WHAT CAN THE GREAT POWERS DO?**

Stephen J. Blank

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FOREWORD

NATO's enlargement has brought it to the borders of the Baltic states who covet membership in NATO. However, admitting them into NATO is one of the most difficult problems for the Alliance because of Russia's unconditional opposition to such action and because of NATO's own internal divisions on this issue. Nonetheless, a new regime or system of security for the entire Baltic region must now be on the U.S. and European agenda.

The key players in such a process are Russia, Germany, and the United States. Their actions will determine the limits of the possible in constructing Baltic security for the foreseeable future. In this study, Dr. Stephen Blank presents a detailed and extensive analysis of these three governments' views on Baltic and European security. Their views on regional security are materially shaped by and influence their larger views on their mutual relations and policy towards Europe. Their views also demonstrate the complexity of the issues involved in constructing Baltic, not to mention European, security. But because NATO enlargement is the most serious foreign policy and defense issue before Congress now, such an analysis can illuminate much of what is happening in the NATO enlargement process and why it has taken its current shape. Therefore the Strategic Studies Institute presents this monograph in order to contribute to this emerging great debate over NATO's enlargement.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN J. BLANK is the Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research at the U.S. Army War College and has been an Associate Professor of Russian/Soviet Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute since 1989. Prior to this appointment, Dr. Blank was Associate Professor for Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education of Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base. Dr. Blank's M.A. and Ph.D. are in Russian history from the University of Chicago. He has published numerous articles on Soviet/Russian military and foreign policies, notably in the Third World, and is the author of *The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin's Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994).

SUMMARY

As NATO enlarges and approaches the borders of the Baltic states, it faces one of the most difficult and complex security challenges in contemporary Europe. While the Baltic states crave membership in NATO, Russia deems that outcome as unacceptable, threatens to break cooperation with the West in such an event, and NATO allies themselves remain divided over the wisdom of Baltic membership. The apparent irreconcilability of NATO's and Russia's positions, and the Baltic states' insistence upon consideration for their security interests, oblige both East and West to collaborate on devising a workable and acceptable security system for the region that respects both Russian and Baltic, not to mention Western, interests. Otherwise, this region might become the flashpoint of a political conflict that could eventually degenerate into a military one.

NATO must simultaneously deter Russia and reassure it and the Baltic states that their security will be enhanced. The key players in this process are Russia, Germany, and the United States. They have the means to shape the future parameters of any Baltic security system and are the principal players in Europe as well. And it is their policies that will define the limits of what can be done in the Baltic, as well as in much of Europe, since Baltic security is inseparable from that of Europe as a whole. Or, in other words, European security is indivisible, and Baltic security is part of it.

However, analysis of Russian policy through 1997 suggests that Russia remains fundamentally incapable of playing a constructive role in this process. Russian policies for Europe are incoherent and attached to models of European security that have little or no relevance to other states or that actually alarm them. Russia still disdains the small states, thinking them to be of no consequence, proposes infeasible and objectionable schemes of pan-

European collective security that do not bind it but would bind NATO, and at the same time pursues unilateralist spheres of influence policies in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Russian policy is also frankly and openly revisionist, demanding border revisions and refusing to sign formal border treaties to recognize the post-1989 changes in Central and Eastern Europe. Its spokesmen make demands for an exceptional position in Europe or for unworkable security systems that do little to advance faith in Russia's coherence or good will. Furthermore, its policy statements reveal a continuing addiction to old-fashioned doctrines of zero-sum games, of viewing everything in terms of correlations of antagonistic military forces, and of desires for exclusive rights over small states.

These obstacles to Russian success in Europe are prominent in Russia's Baltic policies. Russia continues to make threats against the Baltic states of economic war, of criminal subversion from without, and of refusing to recognize borders, while attempting to gain a veto over NATO's activities. Because Russia cannot carry out these threats, it only further antagonizes the Baltic states, makes them more intractable in their own anti-Russian policies at home and abroad, and only worsens the regional situation. Whereas 4-5 years ago Russia might have been able to achieve a genuine neutralization of the region, today that is impossible. Now many of NATO's members are involved in trying to secure the region. Until such time as Russia can devise coherent and responsible policies for Europe, it will continue to lose ground there and be seen as a threat more than as part of the solution.

However, it is precisely due to its military-political capability to be a threat that Germany has attempted to conduct a policy where, on the one hand, it wants to expand (or so it says) the European Union (EU) and NATO to the East but will otherwise do nothing that antagonizes President Boris Yeltsin and Russia. As a result, Germany has steadily backtracked since 1993 on Baltic admission into NATO and proposed terms for Russia's integration into

NATO's policy process—the new NATO-Russia Council—that remarkably prefigured the final agreement on the Council in May 1997. Unfortunately, those terms went far beyond giving Russia “a voice but not a veto” and certainly made it clear that Germany will not accept Baltic membership in NATO anytime soon. Indeed, German Foreign Ministry officials speaking in Moscow openly alluded to the need not to do anything that wounds Russian sensitivities, explicitly giving Russia a veto on future expansion. Thus, it is unlikely that Germany will shoulder the responsibilities of helping to underpin a security regime that is viable for the Baltic. If anything, all the evidence suggests that Germany is trying to force the Nordic states, mainly Finland and Sweden, and the United States to bear this burden while it basically gets a free ride.

Accordingly, it falls to Washington to take the lead here, as it has done in the general process of enlargement. Washington has done so. It has crafted new political and institutional formulas for NATO within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program that will enhance the scope of Baltic and other states' political and military participation in the alliance's activities. It is devising programs like shared air defense and the U.S.-Baltic charter to allay their security concerns while seeking to integrate Moscow through the Council.

Yet here, too, American policy seems to run into difficulties. Evidently, as cited below, many U.S. officials have come to view Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as having outlived its usefulness and as merely a part of the political superstructure needed for reassurance rather than as an operative, vital part of the Alliance. Washington has told Sweden, for example, that it looks towards a collective security system in which all the states of Europe can participate through the PfP program. The language of this program's founding documents is very close to that of Article 4 of the Washington Treaty that calls only for consultations in the event of a threat to security. Thus membership in the PfP program only gives states the right of consultation in the event of a threat to their security, it does not give them

the security guarantee commonly held to derive from Article 5.

Even though the United States is the only state that is really trying to lead the formation of a regional and continental system, its approach attempts to advance NATO's enlargement while maintaining that a clearly increasingly anti-American and revisionist Russia is a democratic partner for Washington. This lack of realism betrays a substantial confusion in policy that is not warranted by Russia's truculent posture or Germany's interest in having others do for it what it will not do for itself, namely play a more active role in areas like the Baltic. While the innovations proposed by the United States to NATO and the PfP program are sound and will enhance Baltic security, it is not clear that they will go far enough to overcome regional tensions, unless the EU and Europe are also brought into the picture so that a true regional stabilization can occur. Likewise, we need to recognize that, however much Europe has changed since 1949, the pledge of collective defense to treaty members under Article 5 is still relevant, and that it is not at all clear if Russia truly has reconciled itself to the *status quo*. As President Clinton recently wrote to Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-Texas), we still need to guard against the possibility of a regression in Russian politics that would threaten the accomplishments of the last decade. Among those achievements is the independence of the Baltic states.

NATO ENLARGEMENT AND THE BALTIC STATES: WHAT CAN THE GREAT POWERS DO?

Introduction.

NATO's enlargement will transform European security. But the Baltic states are not among NATO's first new members because their defense organizations do not yet meet NATO's standards, and they have problems with their Russian minorities and with Russia.¹ Moreover, NATO members' reluctance to admit the Baltic states will probably continue, leaving the latter outside of any functioning European security structure.² Admitting these states to NATO and/or the European Union (EU) presents European governments and security organizations with many difficult challenges, among them deterring Russian threats. H. Plater-Zyberg, a British military analyst, writes, "Moscow will have no difficulty ensuring that the area is not sufficiently stable to join any security structures in the future."³ If he is right, at least some of the Baltic states' entry into NATO, and maybe the EU, might be postponed indefinitely. Many pundits and diplomats also contend that these states are indefensible against Russian threats, an argument the Baltic states vehemently deny.⁴ Thus, these states' future status has become a major question in European security.

Russia unconditionally opposes their entry into NATO, calling it unacceptable.⁵ Russia's 1993 military doctrine also explicitly states that an alliance's expansion to states on its borders, e.g., the Baltic states, threatens vital Russian interests. Logically this means that Russia still seeks a veto over NATO and Central and Eastern European security policies even if it cannot obtain that goal.⁶ In the wake of the recent NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997, Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov said that the issue of the Baltic states and NATO was a condition for future East-West cooperation.⁷ Thus NATO enlargement to the Baltic states

could trigger a strong Russian reaction there, even if it is only rhetorical, economic, and political at first. But a military riposte could follow later and feature still more political, and maybe military, pressure against the Baltic states and NATO.⁸ Moscow will, in either case, probably aim to preserve and/or perpetuate the current regional insecurity and prevent NATO's enlargement to the Baltic. This regional security dilemma confirms that the main problem with NATO's enlargement is that it complicates the task of building security in and around Russia.⁹ Nonetheless, NATO is committed to enlargement and must accept its obligations. While those obligations do not mean automatic defense of the Baltic states if they are attacked (as would be the case for members), it does mean that NATO cannot abstain from a substantive participation in the establishment of a regional security system for the Baltic region. NATO cannot simply wash its hands of those areas in Europe that are only included in the Partnership for Peace and ignore regional security issues either in the Balkans or in the Baltic.

Therefore among those obligations that NATO has incurred due to its enlargement is the challenge of building a durable framework for regional security. Otherwise, NATO's enlargement could aggravate, not reduce, Baltic tensions. NATO and/or all the littoral states, including Russia, might then adopt more confrontational postures. The Baltic states, being outside any European security system and there being no Western consensus over upholding their security and independence, might face strong Russian pressure to rejoin its sphere of influence. Such pressures could trigger a European, not merely Baltic, crisis. Therefore, to prevent such possibilities, we must consider how to enhance Baltic security.

Paradoxically, excluding the Baltic states from Europe's security structures magnifies the Baltic littoral's importance for Europe. Because Russia has made the Baltic states' exclusion from NATO a condition of future cooperation with the West, it is now more urgent for Europe and the United States to find at least an interim solution for

regional security dilemmas. In particular, the key great powers—Russia, Germany, and the United States—who most directly shape the region's security framework must take the lead to assure mutual cooperation. Russia's importance is clear from the map. American preponderance is equally obvious. And both the Baltic states and neutrals like Finland and Sweden accept that German policy greatly influences regional trends and is essential to any regional or European balance.¹⁰

As in the past, European security organizations must deter and reassure Russia while enhancing the security of the littoral states.¹¹ These organizations must also jointly share in any Baltic security plan so that no state or organization obtains a free ride. Free riding occurs when one or more states, or organizations, knowing or believing that some other state or organization can or will formulate solutions for major issues like Baltic security, effectively abstains from serious participation in the solution. Instead that state/s or organization/s then lets other states act alone, gaining a free ride at their expense. If free riding pervades an entire alliance as in the 1930s, security guarantees are devalued and could even become worthless.¹²

Accordingly, to stabilize the Baltic region, states cannot keep looking, as they are now tempted to do, for others to ensure regional security. Free riding undermines Baltic integration in Europe by dissolving the cohesion of the new NATO-led security system. It also fosters renationalized and unilateral security policies. Germany could incline further to make a bilateral deal with Russia over Central and Eastern Europe. As it is, Baltic cohesion, too, is already eroding. Lithuania poses, not as a Baltic state, but as a Central European one that seeks unilateral entry to European organizations, while forsaking Latvia and Estonia. Estonia follows suit regarding its future entry into the EU and supports admitting at least one Baltic state into NATO so that others might later gain a hearing.¹³

Free riding and allied divisions regarding the Baltic could create new and unforeseen regional problems and

clearly are due to the EU's and NATO's hesitations over Baltic issues.¹⁴ Regional cooperation, which is already weakened due to NATO and the EU's reluctance to expand, will further decrease where free riding and renationalized agendas prevail.¹⁵ Russia could then be tempted to extend an unwelcome protectorate over the Baltic states.

To prevent such outcomes and protect the Baltic states, NATO must continue to provide security, deter Russia, reassure, and lead the non-NATO littoral states and Europe's other security organizations, the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), toward regional as well as European military-political integration. Failure to do so will have grave consequences. Ex-Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt wrote that Russia's Baltic policy is a litmus test of its European and security policies.¹⁶ Volker Ruhe, Germany's Minister of Defense, wrote that the Baltic states are the practical testing ground for meeting the challenges of reshaping NATO's missions, territorial scope, the relations between the United States and its European allies, the hoped for partnership with Russia, and, in general, for building the Europe we want to see.¹⁷ German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel also stressed these states' importance for future European security.¹⁸

Thus failure to attend to Baltic issues could jeopardize NATO enlargement and European security. Karl Kaiser, of the German Society for Foreign Affairs, worried that the U.S. Senate may make meaningful security for states not admitted in the first round, like the Baltic states, a precondition for ratifying enlargement. Dutch analysts Alfred Van Staden and Gert de Nooy call the Baltic Europe's most contested area where failure to reconcile Baltic, Western, and Russian interests could reignite East-West confrontation.¹⁹ The 1991 Soviet coups in the Baltic and Moscow led Central and East Europe to press for NATO membership, so renewed pressure in the Baltic could have equally grave consequences for the region, Europe, and Russia.²⁰ Not surprisingly, much European diplomacy now revolves around the issues raised by NATO enlargement

and Baltic exclusion from it. On the one hand this diplomatic activity acknowledges the indivisibility of European security, but, on the other, it also reveals the reluctance to accept the full implications of that fact.²¹

Conditions for Baltic Security.

Although the Baltic region is one of Russia's vital interests, these states must not be abandoned to Russia's sphere of influence. Contrary to Russian policy, vital interests and spheres of influence are not synonymous. An equitable and lasting solution must involve and unite Russia, the other littoral states, the EU, and NATO in a common process. Disunity among these actors would erode a Baltic system, precluding effective actions towards regional security. Russia and the Baltic states must also shun provocative actions. If they both eschew such actions, any state opting out of the system will then incur the costs of seeking to destabilize European security.

Even though Russia could have had Baltic neutrality or "Finlandization" earlier, it is now impossible.²² Today the Baltic states and Russia must not become a source of trouble or conflict to each other. The Baltic states should not choose or be forced to become hostile front-line states against either Russia or NATO.²³ That could lead to large, permanent, peace-time deployments in or around those states and either NATO's and/or Russia's military buildup.²⁴ We must balance NATO recognition of Russia's legitimate interests with an equal resolve to preserve and strengthen Baltic security. Any threat to the Baltic states or acceptance of their diminished security also endangers the other littoral states and thus Europe. Therefore NATO and Russia have substantial responsibilities. Failure to fulfill them will cause perpetual regional tension, not stability.

Russia.

However, the expectation that Russia will act as a responsible actor in a regional security regime is the most unlikely outcome and problematical factor in the Baltic and

European equation. As Monika Wohlfeld of the West European Union's (WEU) Institute for Security Studies writes,

So far, Russia has not been able to make a clear impact on the evolving European security structure. . . . Deprived of the bipolar relationship with the United States, Moscow appears unable—if not downright unwilling—to participate on an equal footing with other Europeans in the establishment of a new network of security institutions, and Russia's participation in the Contact Group and then IFOR is considered by Moscow to be a meager substitute for a more effective instrument with which to wield its influence over European events.²⁵

Much of this failure stems from Russian elites' inability or refusal to accept European realities. They still insist that Russia is a super or great power that must have global equality with the United States and an exceptional place at the "presidium table" of European security.²⁶ Russia seeks status in Europe, not responsibility, and refuses to participate except on its own terms.²⁷ Having signed the Founding Act, Russia still is trying to use its new position to block Poland's and other states' entry into NATO and push for the OSCE to become the coordinator of NATO. Such actions reflect Russia's continuing opposition to anything that smacks of NATO's leadership in Europe.²⁸ As Sergei Rogov, head of the USA-Canada Institute and a highly regarded advisor to the government, recently wrote,

The Russian Federation is unwilling to consent to bear the geopolitical burden of the defeat of the Soviet Union in the cold war or to be reconciled with an unequal position in the new European order.²⁹

Thus Moscow has already served notice of its intention to act as a Trojan horse inside NATO. This revisionist and unrealistic stance diminishes Russia's neighbors' security and aims to preserve that insecurity as a lasting condition of Russian power. Russia still acts as if none of its neighbors can be secure for it to be secure.³⁰ Russia continues to pursue objectives and policies in Europe that its power does not merit, that are unsustainable, and which ultimately

endanger its own security. These policies are reintegrating the CIS, creating an exclusive Russian sphere there, demanding a veto over NATO's and Central and Eastern Europe's activity, and barring Central and Eastern Europe's military modernization.³¹ Russia seeks equality with the United States, its own unchallenged sphere in the CIS, and the demilitarization of Central and Eastern Europe so that the great powers alone could once again revise their status.

Russia has reverted to old thinking about world politics and Europe, such as correlations of forces, especially military forces, zero-sum games, and worst case threat scenarios. Not surprisingly, Russian elites believe that for "Russia to be Russia" it must have exclusive and uncontested dominance over the CIS and an accompanying sphere of influence over the Baltic states. Any Western influence in the CIS and Baltic immediately threatens Russian vital interests even as Russia demands a veto and voice in Western activities. Yeltsin's former senior foreign policy advisor, Dmitri Ryurikov, observed that it was "strange, unjust (or unfair) and wrong" for NATO not to grant Russia such a veto and that "refusal to give Russia this right actually deprives it of the possibility of taking part in settling European security problems."³² In other words, without an empire and that veto, Russia is nothing in Europe, and everyone threatens it. But while the West must not intervene in its sphere of influence, Russia must have security rights or privileges unequal to every other state, i.e., a veto over NATO and its policies.³³

To be sure, Russia has well-founded fears of exclusion from the Baltic during wartime or a crisis. In many wars, closure of the Baltic inflicted grievous military-economic damage on Russia. Today, when Russians view long-range naval and air based strike systems as the main military threat and Russia's Baltic position is the worst peacetime position since Peter the Great, these are not idle fears. Since NATO's sea and air launched cruise missile routes directly traverse the Baltic states, the importance to Moscow of air,

missile, naval defense, early warning systems, and Baltic counter-amphibious operations becomes clear.

Nonetheless, Russia's Baltic policies aggravate regional and European tensions. NATO is significantly demilitarizing and poses no threat to Russia. Moscow, at a minimum, wants the Baltic states, which it considers *Saisonstaaten* (states for a season), to be perennially on NATO's doorstep but barred from NATO.³⁴ Yet this outcome would not moderate Russian opposition to NATO or its enlargement. Russian objectives are much greater as the struggle over NATO's military policy underscores.

Russia prefers to demilitarize Central Europe, preserve it as a buffer outside any viable European security system pending the revival of Russian power and hegemony, and neutralize NATO as an effective security provider. Russian officials insist that NATO must confine itself to regional peace operations under either U.N. and/or OSCE auspices, giving Russia a veto over its activities.

And the new Founding Act with NATO unfortunately goes a long way toward realizing those objectives and restricting the West's ability to influence developments in the CIS. While no state or party has a veto over the other side's internal operations in the NATO-Russia Council, in matters brought to the Council, in the absence of consensus, no action can be taken. Therefore out of area operations in the CIS are ruled out a priori. Spheres of influence peace operations remain the order of the day. As Russian commentators note, the preceding negotiations confirmed that Europe will not let Russia be estranged even if Washington wanted to do so. They are certainly right about Germany and probably now about France as well. Nor is Washington liable to do so since Russia is the key country to Europe and the CIS and its democratic partner. No crisis or question that arises where Russia has an interest will escape discussion in the Council, nor is the West likely to press towards a unilateral conclusion, and a Western consensus will be hard to obtain. Therefore they argue that Russia has obtained a de facto veto in the Council and more flexibility in the CIS.³⁵ Thus Russia's CIS, Baltic, and

European policies are openly and unabashedly coercive and dangerous.

Russia's policies for Europe and the "near abroad" rule out its participation in a truly cooperative, Baltic, and European security regime. Russia's main foreign and defense policy goal, reintegrating the CIS under Russian auspices, necessarily entails a high degree of strategic overextension, internal instability in Russia, and perennial tension throughout the "post-Soviet space" including the Baltic states.³⁶

Moreover, these policies are inherently revisionist with regard to Europe and the CIS.

The very concept of Russia as propounded by Boris Yeltsin and his circle since 1990 has always been deeply problematic because of the *de jure* equation which exists between the Russian state and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). There has never been a Russian state in history within the borders of the RSFSR, and those borders are, with reason, seen as artificial not only by proponents of the greater Russia, but, as the Chechen war shows, by the proponents of a smaller one. The obvious but overlooked point, therefore, is that in the former Soviet space Russia is not a *status quo* power but a revisionist one. The argument in Russia is how to revise the post-1991 *status quo*, not whether to revise it.³⁷

Indeed, one reason for Russia's pro-Western policies in 1991-93 was to win Western support for hegemony over the CIS.³⁸ NATO's enlargement starts a process that forecloses that imperial option in the CIS. Therefore Russian revisionism is not mere rhetoric, as some Western analysts maintain, but aims squarely at the European *status quo*.³⁹ In September 1996, Primakov told the OSCE that,

Today, the balance of forces resulting from the confrontation of the two blocs no longer exists, but the Helsinki agreements are not being fully applied. After the end of the Cold War, certain countries in Europe—the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia—have disintegrated. A number of new states were formed in this space, but their borders are neither fixed nor guaranteed by the Helsinki agreements. Under the

circumstances, there is a need for the establishment of a new system of security.⁴⁰

As Russia also demands guarantees of its integrity against secessionist threats while the Ministry of Defense insists on retaining the old Soviet borders, Primakov confirmed what Alexei Arbatov called the duplicity of Russian border policy.⁴¹ Clearly, demanding revisions of neighboring states' borders threatens them and the *status quo*. Primakov also revealed Moscow's arrogant and foolish belief that small states, like the Baltic states, have nothing to add to Europe's security dialogue nor do they merit security equal to Russia's.⁴²

Moscow's preferred system for its neighborhood dates back to 1994, if not earlier.⁴³ Foreign Ministry officials and prominent analysts outlined a concept calling for a Russian-led CIS to be an equal pillar with NATO in European security under the OSCE's supervision. Russia's veto in the OSCE would safeguard its sphere of influence and restrain NATO's freedom of action. Chernomyrdin reiterated this call for an ostensibly collective security system in Europe at the OSCE's December 1996 Lisbon conference.⁴⁴ Moscow has also proposed a bilateral joint guarantee of Central Europe with the United States and/or NATO, or a five power conference with the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany to form a great power European security directorate and exclude the small states which Russia considers of little consequence and has basically shunned since 1989.⁴⁵ Lately Yeltsin offered the Baltic states guarantees, only to then warn Latvian President Gintis Ulmanis that, unless Riga treats its Russians as Moscow wants, relations will worsen. In other words, Moscow wants its own private *droit de regard* over Baltic citizenship policies on top of the powers vested in the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Meanwhile, Russia still violently opposes the Baltic states' entry into NATO and demands rectification of their nationality policies.⁴⁶ Russian guarantees have little value or chance of being accepted under such conditions.

Since unilateral or joint guarantees are not a fruitful road for Russia, Moscow's most likely option is the new NATO-Russia Founding Act. Here Russia seeks a veto power over NATO's actions, a voice in NATO, and the power to set conditions for NATO's enlargement, conventional and nuclear deployments, or other subsequent military operations through participation in NATO. Once inside NATO, Moscow could obstruct any future enlargement, even of those states chosen in Madrid.⁴⁷ NATO would then ideally become a mere European peacekeeping organization operating under the OSCE's purview.⁴⁸ Russia would remain Europe's largest military power, the only one that can act unilaterally and still have its sphere of influence. And through the parallel negotiations on a new Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), it hopes to formalize Central Europe's demilitarization since a purely Russian imperial program cannot enhance regional, European, or Russia's security but a major international treaty can do so.

Russia's Baltic policy comports with Moscow's larger program. Nor is this policy, or the perceptions upon which it rests, confined to the lunatic fringe that views the Baltic states only as giant criminal enterprises and intelligence "launch pads" aimed at Russia.⁴⁹ On February 11, 1997, the government, at Yeltsin's instructions, issued a new statement of its Baltic policies. This statement supposedly aimed to promote mutual friendship and a model of relations based on economic integration and bilateral cooperation (not regional cooperation which Russia opposes), indivisibility and security of the countries, and respect for human and ethnic minorities' rights.⁵⁰ However, Russia has strange ideas about achieving these goals. First of all, Baltic states' membership in NATO would have a lasting and serious negative effect on relationships with Russia.

Conversely, the preservation of their non-bloc status (and this does not necessarily mean neutrality—author) would be able to create a basis for bilateral and unilateral steps, and quite

concrete ones, capable of dispelling the apprehension for security which is still lingering in the Baltic states.⁵¹

Second, protecting Russian minorities' rights in the Baltic remains a long-term policy goal. Russia spelled out the conditions for citizenship that it insists Estonia's and Latvia's Russian minorities must receive, seeking to dictate those countries' fundamental citizenship legislation. Furthermore, progress on treaties delimiting the Russo-Baltic borders will not occur unless those states follow Russia's recommendations on the broader issues of Russo-Baltic relationships. As NATO and the EU have told candidates that they must resolve border issues, Russia is attempting to blackmail those states with permanent exclusion from NATO and possibly the EU (Russia has claimed to support Baltic entry into the EU—an example of the contradictions in its Baltic and European policies, given this statement) unless they surrender vital aspects of their sovereignty regarding legislation and foreign policy.⁵²

Third, Moscow complains that economic ties are undeveloped because the Baltic states use Russian goods against Russian interests. It also argues that state and customs controls must be strengthened. Yeltsin specifically issued here a call to create favorable transport conditions to Kaliningrad, i.e., opening a corridor through Lithuania. Moscow has already demanded one through Poland and been rebuffed. This new demand aims to ensure a military route to Kaliningrad that would separate Poland as a NATO member from the Baltic states.⁵³

Moscow also demands increased cultural cooperation to overcome Baltic fears of its "cultural imperialism." But this agreement can create a basis for future cultural-political agitation within those states where Russia could then intervene from outside in their politics.⁵⁴ Finally, Moscow demands an end to Baltic-based criminal threats against Russia. Since Russian criminals have confessed to fomenting ethnic animosities inside the Baltic states, and Baltic governments believe Moscow directs such operations, they wholly reject this arrogant and hypocritical demand.⁵⁵

After the Helsinki Summit with President Clinton in March 1997, Yeltsin and Primakov talked about a new approach to the Baltic and giving them guarantees. But later statements by Primakov to the EU's commissioners and the demand for guarantees concerning minorities as a precondition to border treaties signal Moscow's evident intention to use the issue of Russian minorities abroad to exclude the Baltic states from any European security organization, not to ameliorate their condition, something which Russia has not tried to do since 1992. These gambits represent a probable futile effort at coercive diplomacy, i.e., forcing the Baltic states to turn to Moscow for security guarantees, thus fulfilling Russia's policy objectives.⁵⁶

Trying to intimidate the Baltic states is long-standing. In December 1996, Valery Loshchinin, Director of the Second European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that Russian diplomacy's strategic task in the Baltic is to overcome the negative heritage of the past (which included efforts to use the Russian troops there to force changes in policy towards Russians⁵⁷ or to keep the Baltic states out of the Council of Europe) and form medium-term good neighbor relations with the Baltic states. While Lithuania and Russia have good relations, relations with Latvia and Estonia are complicated because of their "massive gross infringement on human rights" of the Russian-speaking population.⁵⁸ Russia, he said, proceeds from Yeltsin's instructions to use trade and economic policy to undo these alleged violations (few of which are perceived by outside observers or even in the Foreign Ministry's own journal, *International Affairs*).⁵⁹ Russia has arrogated to itself the right to intervene in these states' domestic policies.⁶⁰ Russian policy's economic aim is "to eliminate or reduce to the minimum parasitic mediation of the Baltic states in Russia's foreign trade." Since 40 percent of Estonia and Latvia's budget revenues are allegedly ensured at the expense of the transit of Russian goods, Loshchinin urged an enhanced economic position for Russia in the Baltic states' energy, banking, shipping, industries, and trade.⁶¹

From a government notorious for its own corruption, these are brazen accusations, as is the ever recurring threat of sanctions, but they fit with Russia's coercive CIS and European policies and precisely forecast the February 1997 statement. Indeed, Russian leaders regularly charge the Baltic and CIS states with mistreating local Russians and demand that the Baltic states, Ukraine, Kazakstan, etc., revise their domestic legislation, surrender territory to Russia, or grant Russians dual citizenship rights and preferences like those of extra-territoriality, the 19th century's most visible sign of colonial rule.⁶²

Yet these policies are utterly irresponsible. As Russia is economically and militarily prostrate, such confrontational and hegemonic policies will inevitably trigger imperialism, ethnopolitical conflict, and even possibly protracted war, where Russia risks collapse. Already by 1992, Russian generals reportedly realized their Baltic position was untenable, and the army's current condition rules out invasion for a long time.⁶³ Yet while NATO has no intention of invading or threatening Russia and its members are cutting their defense spending, Russia's army openly rehearses and discusses invasion scenarios directed at the Baltic states, against quite incredible threat assessments. Or Russian spokesmen threaten to attack or target them with nuclear and conventional weapons.⁶⁴ Though this kind of posturing seems illogical, this has been the pattern for some time and reflects the irresponsibility of many of Russia's past policies in Europe.

This neo-imperial and coercive policy is rooted in Russian domestic politics. Yeltsin's 1995 decree calling reintegration of the CIS as a single unified political-economic-military space a major state task for all ministries, explicitly stated that one reason for this policy is to counter growing separatist trends within Russia itself.⁶⁵ Primakov frequently reiterates this point and its accompanying rationale, stating that, despite Russia's economic and military weakness, it must now pursue a great power policy based on its potential. Foreign policy must create the most favorable conditions for accomplishing

critical internal policies such as safeguarding Russia's integrity and access to international organizations and markets. That great power policy is also the best policy for solving Russia's current and future problems, and for regaining its deserved status as one pole of the multipolar world against U.S. unipolar hegemony.⁶⁶

Consequently foreign policy should divert people from the difficult domestic situation by pursuing an imperial solution based on Russia's potential, not a sober evaluation of reality. This program entails Russia's strategic overextension as it poses as Eurasia's gendarme with a free hand to quell unrest in its sanctioned sphere of influence. Russian forces must then be perpetually stationed throughout Russia's periphery in a vain effort to police it and impose Russia's authority there.⁶⁷

This policy's ultimate logic means war. And, despite Russia's present weakness, it represents a *prima facie* reason for Russia's neighbors to apply to NATO. If this is Russia's program when prostrate, what will Moscow do if it recovers without countervailing forces to impede this grand design? Critics of NATO enlargement who ask where is the threat overlook this dimension of the issue. They fail to realize what NATO Secretary General Javier Solana aptly stated, that potential new members seek membership for the same reason as did the old members.⁶⁸ Namely, they sought political guarantees and European integration that included Germany.⁶⁹

Yet while they threaten the Baltic states, Russian leaders loudly protest the "growing threat" from NATO's enlargement. Admiral Feliks Gromov, Commander in Chief of the Navy, wrote that the increased defense cooperation among Baltic, NATO, and Nordic states and pressures to demilitarize the Kaliningrad Military District would leave that district defenseless, threaten Russia's maritime interests in the Baltic Sea, and render it vulnerable to blockade. NATO's enlargement threatens Kaliningrad province which is cut off from Russia proper, vital Russian maritime interests, and European stability.⁷⁰ Thus Gromov wrote:

It is naive to say that the approach of the [NATO] bloc's armed forces toward the Russian border will increase anybody's security. Quite the contrary, such an action will undermine any attempts to strengthen stability on the European continent. The ultimate aim of such consolidation of the above mentioned countries is clearly the limitation of Russia's influence in the region, the securing of unilateral political, economic, and military advantages and, as a result, crowding Russia out from the community of Baltic states, limiting to the maximum its access to the Baltic Sea, and possibly also revising the Helsinki accords on the inviolability of the European borders.⁷¹

Indeed, in Russian military writing on the Baltic one finds a visible current of despair. Admiral Yegorov, CINC of the Baltic Fleet, observes that this fleet historically has been Russia's main factor of stability in the Western maritime direction. Today, Russia's vital interests in the Baltic Sea are growing, but the economic-political-military situation is deteriorating. The Baltic Fleet must play a political and deterrent role, but it is undergoing the same crisis as the rest of the Navy and cannot perform its function unless other, ground forces are placed under its direction.⁷²

Western analyses agree on this area's rising strategic profile. Sweden's Supreme Commander, General Owe Wiktorin, stated:

More than 60 percent of Russia's strategic nuclear capacity, compared to 25 percent a couple of years ago, will now be deployed in the north. The strategic importance of the Kola Peninsula brings, in its turn, a concentration of ground, sea, and air units to the area. Hence Scandinavia and Sweden will remain in the strategic limelight for a long time to come. In this context, it is also appropriate to recognize that Sweden still constitutes a major [littoral state on] the Baltic Sea. The Baltic forms now, as it has for many centuries, an economic intersection-zone. Sweden and Germany are the dominating powers around the Baltic, neighboring Poland, the three fragile Baltic states, Russia and the Kaliningrad Oblast. The Baltic is Russia's gateway to the West and has, as such, increased in strategic importance.⁷³

Russian deployments confirm this assessment. The Kola naval complex will become the northern and sole naval

nuclear bastion of the Russian fleet. Large modernized air and naval forces will be deployed there to lend this fleet combat stability. Russia's total forces in the Baltic equal those of 1989 despite the end of the Cold War and the massive decline of Soviet armed forces. The decision to maintain these deployments despite those events underscores the area's increased strategic significance for Moscow as it is now a front-line area. Many forces in Kaliningrad are forward-deployed; and the CFE treaty's provisions for deployment in the front-line Leningrad Military District were eased to allow more Russian forces there.⁷⁴ Everyone accepts the Baltic's rising strategic centrality.

Still, Russia's way of expressing its concerns misreads European realities. Russia's leadership uniformly views NATO as strictly an anti-Russian military alliance, ignores NATO's substantial demilitarization, still sees European security in terms of rival blocs pursuing zero-sum and antagonistic goals, willfully distorts NATO's position on nuclear missiles, and greatly overrates Russia's power and position in Europe. Russian elites also have recourse to a diverse inventory of threats against the Baltic states and Europe.⁷⁵ Russian elites often rattle their nuclear sabers, threatening to retarget the Baltic and European states if NATO expands.⁷⁶

However, Russia's endless harangues of the Baltic states for mistreating local Russians, constant threats of invasion, demands for revised borders, economic pressure, boycotts and sanctions, plus depictions of the Baltic states as essentially criminal enterprises, do not advance Moscow's or local Russians' interests.⁷⁷ These actions only increase distrust of local Russians, especially as local Russian groups are probably funded from Moscow. These threats fan Baltic nationalism, intensify regional tensions and Baltic states' fear of Russia, increase their governments' pressure to join NATO, and alarm the West concerning Russian aims. Yet since these tactics constantly fail, they encourage a Baltic belief that Moscow is bluffing or cannot carry out its threats.⁷⁸ Nor do they lead the Baltic states to abandon their

(perhaps misplaced) belief that ultimately the West will rescue them. Russia's futile policies only heighten regional tension, hindering the quest for regional solutions.

Thus these policies diminish Russia's security, and would make sense only if Moscow had determined that its interests required a high degree of "controlled tension" in the Baltic region. But such tension is wholly counter-productive to a Russia which needs peace above all. Russia's addiction to old thinking leads Moscow to make threats and demands that cannot be carried out unless it risks its own stability along with that of the Baltic states and Europe. Since Moscow cannot or will not distinguish among the threats it faces to create a national security program based on a hierarchy of real threats, its spokesmen invoke multiple, omnidirectional threats.

In fact, one of the most striking tendencies of current Russian security policy is the divorce between political and military realities. Vladimir Ivanov, of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations and the USA-Canada Institute, wrote that the 1993 defense doctrine showed that "foreign policy cannot unquestionably be considered a factor that sets the context and requirements for the military policy of Russia." Military policy and a doctrine of national interests based on it have moved to the forefront of Russian policy.⁷⁹ Interests, goals, and real capabilities are disconnected in Russian policy. Moscow pursues unachievable goals while possessing a quasi-Soviet mindset of empire, universal threats to Russia, and cold war bipolarity. This mindset is a recipe for disaster.

Russia's incapacity or even conscious refusal to recognize NATO's changes since 1990 and current political-military character perpetuates obsolete bloc-like approaches to European security. Conversations with Russian analysts often suggest that they would prefer a strict division of responsibilities or spheres of influence in Europe with the Baltic on their side. They also harbor the notion that Russia alone, or as leader of the CIS, must have security equal to NATO's but greater than every Central European state's security. That is, Russia wants unequal

security for itself at everyone else's expense.⁸⁰ These discussions also reveal an unwillingness or refusal to come to grips with European or international reality, a failing that has marred Russian policy and is so perceived abroad.⁸¹

Accordingly, Russia will keep pressuring the Baltic states to reestablish or invoke its hegemony. Certainly Moscow construed the refusal to take these states into NATO as a Russian victory and a base from which to proceed towards a redivided Europe.⁸² Yet Moscow also knows that it cannot conduct military adventurism in the Baltic states that would provoke a protracted local, if not general European, war. Moscow's foreseeable pressures on the Baltic states are largely rhetorical, diplomatic, political, and economic to probe the limits of the possible and expand Russia's sphere of action. But if Russia recovers and NATO and European integration stagnates, we can expect more pressure on the region. Western concessions will trigger new demands, not reconciliation. Conversely, NATO's resolution will more likely force Russia to accept the *status quo* and the new reality.

That conclusion will also positively benefit Russia's democratization because one factor that drives Russian pressure is the ascendancy of the nationalist and Realpolitik lobbies that will always raise the Baltic issue, even when there are no grounds for doing so, to play to neo-imperial lobbies and sentiment, and stifle reform. Both ex-Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Zbigniew Brzezinski see that the opposition to NATO represents the Nomenklatura's last ditch stand for domestic power by playing the xenophobic and imperial cards.⁸³ This is happening now where the government, led by Yeltsin and Primakov, repeatedly beats the drum of Baltic oppression of Russians and possible threats to Russia if NATO expands there.⁸⁴ Many elites also raise possible military threats to the Baltic in this context.

Due to this failure to grasp reality, Moscow continues to pursue a unilateral hegemony in an area that cries for multilateral solutions. NATO's enlargement shows us that the result of Russian policies is Moscow's steady loss of influence in Europe. Moscow's current capabilities cannot

be used to shape a Central and Eastern European security system. They remain essentially negative factors that can only disrupt, obstruct, or sabotage such frameworks. Thus, Polish officials believe, on the basis of their conversations in Moscow, that Russia intends to interpret the Founding Act unilaterally and selectively, i.e., contrary to the spirit of the entire enterprise.⁸⁵ The absence of viable Russian ideas for European security underscores this failure to offer Europe a constructive policy. Foreign states can only view Russia's policies negatively.

Russia, as presently constituted and governed, cannot conduct a measured European policy proportionate to the real opportunities and threats in Europe and the Baltic. Similarly, Russia's reckless nuclear and military threats, premeditated violation of treaties that it signed, e.g., the OSCE code of conduct in 1994 and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and its reversion to old thinking, offer Europe little hope. Russia today cannot exercise enough "self-deterrence" or self-control to reassure its neighbors concerning its intentions and aims. Therefore, to stabilize the Baltic, the West, including the littoral states, must constantly provide the deterrence and reassurance that Russia has rashly spurned. For this region to achieve true security, the West, broadly conceived, must take up Russia's former system-shaping role in the Baltic.

Thus Russia's constant stream of threats, which cannot materialize, breeds precisely the results it most fears. Moscow, still without realizing it, has obliged Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Poland, and most of all the United States, to be fully occupied for a long time with ensuring (*de facto*, if not *de jure*) Baltic stability. All these states are now jointly and collectively involved in providing soft security to the Baltic. These programs, if not equal to military guarantees, represent a great change from 1990 and a major loss for Russia. Russia's bluster has precluded the Baltic's neutralization. The Baltic states are now and will be an object of the West's lasting and detailed interest, Moscow's worst fear. By creating constant tension, Moscow

has foreclosed Baltic neutrality or Finlandization and undermined its own best interests.

Yet, on the other hand, Western interests are not the same thing as a Western consensus. The absence of a Western consensus on regional issues could create a security vacuum where many states seek a free ride on the U.S.' back, or the United States tries to pass the buck to its European allies. We could then end up with a chain of buck-passing and free riding on other states where ultimately no state takes responsibility for protecting and stabilizing the area.⁸⁶ Then the Baltic states' worst fears, their involuntary placement within a Russian sphere of influence and vulnerability to Russia, might then take place.

Germany.

Germany's rising power, geography, and historical connection to the Baltic give it a large and growing role in shaping the region's future.⁸⁷ Therefore German power must be firmly anchored in European security institutions which constrain, channel, but also legitimize German policies. Only U.S. power, manifested in NATO, makes German power acceptable to Europe in security issues, just as the EU's international integration makes German economic power acceptable across Europe.

This relationship must continue, for if NATO does not expand, its, the U.S.' and the EU's power cannot then be deployed across Eastern Europe, excluding the area from any security arrangement. Germany then might have to repeat its history of bilateral arrangements with Russia despite other European states' preferences. Were this kind of relationship to ensue, Russia, due to its size and power, might come, in time, to be the dominant Central and Eastern European military power in return for German economic hegemony. The rest of Europe and the United States might then unite against German hegemony as before. To avert these antagonisms, known to historians as the "nightmare of coalitions," Bonn officially supports NATO and EU expansion so that its economic power will be

fully accepted. An undefined situation in the East is anathema to Bonn which has repeatedly said that it will not be NATO's eastern frontier.⁸⁸ Either NATO gives it security, or it has to make a deal with Moscow for security.

NATO's and EU's enlargement determine whether unification augments rather than lessens and complicates Germany's security. This explains Ruhe's and Kinkel's statements on the importance of the Baltic states and region. This logic also explains Germany's support for EU negotiations and agreements with the Baltic and other Central European states towards their eventual incorporation into the EU. Their EU membership would stabilize those states and create a tremendous outlet for German exports and investments. Ultimately, the EU's expansion will also give Germany an ever greater voice in the EU's future activities.⁸⁹

However, an equally compelling logic or danger, namely a revisionist and dissatisfied Russia, endangers this approach. Just as Germany wants guarantees against all security problems from the East, Bonn also believes that Russia is the key to East European and European security. Nothing can or should be undertaken to unsettle Yeltsin's government. Without admitting it, Germany concedes to Russia a veto power on NATO's further enlargement and is probably greatly relieved that Russia does not oppose Baltic incorporation into the EU. German policy here continues the Ostpolitik tradition that gave Moscow a veto on the extent and pace of Central and Eastern Europe's internal and external transformation and led Bonn into some very unsavory policies *vis-à-vis* East Germany and Communist Poland.⁹⁰

Consequently, whereas Germany formerly embraced a "parallel strategy" to bring Central Europe into NATO and the EU at roughly the same time, the discovery of the region's diversity, of its high economic costs and burdens, of Russia's stout opposition to NATO enlargement and possibly EU's enlargement, divided and then paralyzed German policy. This paralysis has led Bonn to abdicate its leadership role and slow the process of European

integration. Not surprisingly, other EU members like France and Italy also developed second thoughts even about EU expansion or Baltic compliance with European norms on minority policy. Instead, it was U.S. pressure to enlarge NATO and the EU that kept the momentum for enlargement going.⁹¹ Much of German hesitation sprang from Russian pressure, but it also was due to the fact that Prime Minister Helmut Kohl and Kinkel worry much more about Russian reactions than does Ruhe, and they control the policy.

Thus the Baltic states cannot take German advocacy for granted, even in the EU. And it is clear to most, if not all, observers that even if NATO does expand eastward by 1999, EU will not follow suit at least until 2002 or 2003.⁹² The EU's capacity and will to expand remain dependent on NATO's pressure for its expansion, as was seen in its mid-1997 decision to begin accession talks with five new states: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovenia. Without NATO's decision to take in three new members and U.S. pressure to expand the EU and not leave the Baltics wholly in the cold, that decision would not have happened. If the EU and/or NATO should nevertheless falter in their current enlargement plans, Central and Eastern European economic and security agendas could then become renationalized. That would mean a (probably tacit) Russo-German bargain over the area that substantially transforms the regional security picture.

Indeed, this bargain will probably occur through NATO's charter, with Russia giving Moscow substantial opportunities for influencing or obstructing NATO in Central and Eastern Europe, or a bilateral Russo-German agreement if that alternative fails. Any future Russo-German understandings would not be a Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement for war and for new territorial aggrandizement along agreed spheres of influence, but would more likely resemble the Russo-Prussian compacts of the 18th and 19th centuries. Those accords marked out mutual spheres of interest where territories were not necessarily occupied but came under either state's tutelage.

Indeed, the Founding Act, under German prodding, proposes the following scheme to Russia: a new CFE treaty with much lower ceilings in treaty-limited equipment (TLE), no conventional or nuclear forces on NATO's new members' territory, formalized consultation in the NATO-Russian Joint Council on questions of European security, a pledge to consult the Council should any of its members detect a threat to security, restraints on foreign and U.S. troops being stationed in Central Europe, and a promise that NATO would not use force out of area in peace operations without U.N. or OSCE approval, where Moscow has a veto, and cooperation towards joint operations on a case by case basis under the authority of the Security Council or the OSCE and where Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) are used, early joint participation in them. There also were reports of a tacit "moratorium" on the next round of enlargement until at least 2005.⁹³

Most of these concessions to Russia's point of view were first suggested by Russia in 1995, only to be taken up by Germany and then contained in the Founding Act.⁹⁴ Clearly this agreement casts a large shadow over Central and East European security. On the one hand NATO is enlarging to the East and supposedly getting new missions which make it a kind of international peacekeeper or peacemaker. On the other hand, European states not in NATO have to look elsewhere for self-defense. French sources wonder if the Joint Council is to take precedence over the North American Council or serve as an "appeals court" for decisions rendered in the NAC. As Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher and former Secretary of Defense William Perry have recently written,

The alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to today's reality: the danger to the security of its members is not primarily potential aggression to their collective territory, but threats to their collective interests beyond their territory.... The security concerns of most countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union will be addressed outside the context of NATO membership.⁹⁵

Given this expansion of the missions to be ascribed to NATO, it is hardly surprising that critics of the Founding Act also charge that it signals NATO's fundamental transformation from an alliance for the collective defense of its members to a collective or cooperative security system.⁹⁶ As international relations theory well recognizes, this is the easiest security system in the world to break.⁹⁷ This hardly seems the way to advance small European states' security or moderate and deter Russian adventurism. Yet this outcome clearly coincides with both German and U.S. preferences as stated below. And, if this system does break down and no longer legitimizes German power throughout Europe, open spheres of influence and bloc politics become the only possible alternatives.

If anything, NATO and EU expansion represent the least contentious, if not wholly satisfactory, formula for Europe. The other alternative would be no security system east of Germany. Obviously we cannot wholly surmount Europe's Cold War division into rival and greatly differentiated military-political-economic-cultural blocs in a single step.⁹⁸ But any new division outside of the EU and NATO only creates security vacuums, spheres of influence, blocs, and a weaker U.S. ability or will to lead in Europe.

For the Baltic states, then, Germany's policy failure came as something of a betrayal though they cannot and will not say so openly. In 1992, partly because Russian troops were still in Germany, Germany and its *laender* (federal governments) were eager to participate in Baltic multi-lateral ventures aiming at economic and political security. These ventures also involved and showed good faith to Moscow. Officials stated that integration projects inhibited potential regional nationalist outbreaks and eased fears about German nationalism. They understood that integrating German power in a larger project was the only way to make it palatable.⁹⁹ But by early 1994, Ruhe talked about involving Nordic states in European security, thereby reducing Bonn's burden. While he stressed that the West must help Russia make correct decisions, Russia had to make them.¹⁰⁰

Kinkel, already in 1993, saw the Baltic as a hinge to Russia that could draw it into cooperation and integration. Regional economic success would mitigate Moscow's hegemonic tendencies. Although policymakers understood and sympathized with the Baltic states' plight, they rejected ideas of "barricading" the region against Russia. Baltic economic success, helped by Germany, would attract a reviving Russia into cooperative relationships, easing Bonn's burden of helping to structure regional relationships. Bonn expected only peaceful scenarios. Once Finland and Sweden joined the EU, it would focus on free trade agreements with the Baltic states and common security programs. Since Russia did not then oppose Baltic membership in the EU, that would help cement peaceful ties between them and Russia and be the main instrument for European security. Bonn also advocated melding Russian and NATO peace operations and forces that did not infringe on NATO's Article 5 and linked Europe, Russia, and the United States.¹⁰¹

As Claus Genrich reported,

According to German ideas, Russia should be able to discern from a promising development of the Baltic states, that cooperation is apt to be more effective than hegemony and delimitation. Bonn has full understanding for the Balts' security concerns. However, Germany is seeking to awaken Baltic consciousness of the fact that they cannot obtain security "against" Russia. German Baltic policy might describe how the mode of thought emphasizing influence and power categories could be replaced by cooperation and reciprocal links. Russians would then realize that a prosperous Baltic region might well act as the propelling force for the development of their own country. . . .

Bonn's diplomacy aims in talks with Russian partners to preclude any suspicion that, by promoting Baltic interests, Germany intends to isolate Russia. The Bonn people say that it is one of the duties of an advocate to counsel his client. It is therefore appropriate to persuade the Balts to discard the idea that they need to throw up fortifications against their neighbors. Initiatives toward the stabilization of relations between the Baltic countries and Russia represent the only

promising method for outsiders to give a market economic impetus to Russian border regions. The gradual equalization of living standards on both sides of the border is the indispensable prerequisite for a permanently useful relationship.¹⁰²

While Russia has not yet learned this lesson, the Balts' consciousness has been raised, or their arms twisted. Yet this logic and the premise that Russia is the most important state to European security has driven German policy and paralyzed Germany's overall European policy. Any view assuming that Russia must be placated before Europe can be secure inevitably gives Moscow a veto over European stabilization and encourages its obstructionist tactics.¹⁰³ That policy delays Central and Eastern Europe's stabilization, too easily tempts Russian elites to keep playing at empire, and hinders European integration.

German relations to the Baltic demonstrate this process. By 1994 Kinkel urged Russian troops to leave the Baltic (which they did that summer), and both Russia and the Baltic states to make mutual overtures concerning the Russian minorities. He also advocated future full membership for the Baltic states in the EU and an overall security strategy based on cooperation where the Baltic states and region were mediators and role models between East and West, but not NATO members.¹⁰⁴ He rejected all talk of special Russian relationships in the CIS, but has yet to outline an active strategy against it.¹⁰⁵ Baltic elites soon grasped his policy. Whereas many Estonians, in 1991, viewed Germany as a country that could neutralize Russian pressure against Estonia, by 1994 nobody believed that Germany would risk its partnership with Russia for Estonia's sake.¹⁰⁶

By 1995 Ruhe advised Latvia not to seek security only along the Poland-Germany axis, but also to seek integration with Europe by cooperating with the Nordic countries.¹⁰⁷ Although he insisted that Russia must also compromise with the West, he indicated that Germany had, more than any other country, sought to integrate Russia and had made concessions (implicitly unilateral ones) to its viewpoint. He

told the Baltics there must be no gray areas in Europe. Germany sought security arrangements that included them and Russia. Meanwhile the Baltic states should keep pursuing EU membership. In other words, they should not rely so much on NATO, but on EU and Scandinavia, policies that Germany supported.¹⁰⁸

Indeed, in mid-1995 the Baltic states signed the European agreements with the EU, ostensibly putting them on the road to the EU. Kinkel echoed Ruhe's remarks and publicly stated that the changes needed to qualify for the EU will modernize and strengthen the Baltic states and make their reforms irreversible. Moreover, the Baltic security architecture will not be at their expense nor should the region be a gray area in Europe. Regional security demands cooperative structures.¹⁰⁹ While Germany also took part in Baltic PfP and naval exercises and helped train the Baltic Battalion (Baltbat) and Latvian officers; Kinkel apparently told Lithuania and Latvia in August 1995 that Baltic entry into NATO was not on the agenda and could only be considered after Poland entered.

By 1996, German policy bent further toward Moscow. Kohl openly opposed anything that might annoy Russia. He attacked Washington for raising the issue in an election year (as if democratic debate should be banned). This would then reverberate in Moscow, presumably to Yeltsin's detriment. He emphasized EU's (i.e., Germany's) trade with Russia as a factor leading to its integration and implicitly as a factor working against the Baltics.¹¹⁰ At the annual Wehrkunde conference, Kohl repeated the need to cooperate with Russia, urging a special NATO-Russia accord "that could become the core of Europe's security architecture."¹¹¹ By May 1996, Kinkel's public opposition to Baltic entry into NATO due to the Russian factor became clear, but he also now believed these states would not enter into the EU anytime soon, because each leading member had its own special protege. When Germany would mention Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, France would cite Romania.¹¹² Kinkel's argument here overlooked the equally strong domestic opposition among EU member states to any

expansion that would reduce the subsidies that key sectors of their industries get from the EU, or force other unwelcome reforms upon them. These obstacles have held EU enlargement hostage to domestic lobbies.

German policy further crystallized during 1996. Estonia reported that Germany seemed hobbled by domestic and foreign policy factors, i.e., Russia, but that Kohl was well disposed towards the Baltic states' security agenda. Still, their situation was not threatening enough to create German support for their entry into NATO, especially given the Foreign Ministry's coolness towards the idea. Ruhe had to tell them that they would not get in before 2000. And since NATO expansion will not occur before 1999, this now means that they will not get into NATO or probably the EU until 2002 or 2003.¹¹³

Nor is NATO likely to take them if threats do materialize. An alliance afraid to take new members lest they be threatened will not defend them when the threat appears. Thus the Baltic states are now resigned to German opposition to their rapid entry into NATO. But they are visibly impatient and even angry because they feel that without Germany they lack a strong partner. As Sweden and Finland are in no hurry to join NATO, the Baltic states lack friends at court to press their cause while Russian hostility remains high and constant.¹¹⁴

Although in 1996 Kinkel claimed to see all three states as a single strategic unit, he still opposed their entry into NATO. NATO enlargement should not create division lines or gray zones. But he did support their future entry into the EU.¹¹⁵ Ruhe now cited the Baltic states' importance, but emphasized the need for a charter with Russia, soft security such as inter-military cooperation of a bilateral, multilateral, or PFP nature, and the Baltic Council where all the littoral states participate. He urged a cooperative European system including Russia, but also stressed balancing that with strong Transatlantic cooperation. He emphasized that the Baltic PFP should be given a stronger regional focus where Sweden and Finland would lead in coordinating a kind of Baltic bloc or security community.¹¹⁶

But Sweden and Finland reject this solution, precisely because they and the Baltic states then confront Russia directly while Germany remains aloof and enjoys a free ride.

If Finland and Sweden led in forming a Baltic or Nordic bloc that could be seen as a counter to Russia, that would violate the cardinal point of both states' policy: never to confront Russia directly alone and if either or both state/s must do so, they must have ironclad guarantees from real allies. In such a Baltic bloc, Bonn gains because others confront Russia on its behalf and provide a semblance of regional security, while it bears no major responsibility for guaranteeing Finland and Sweden against Russian retaliation. As Karl Lammers, Foreign Policy Spokesmen of the ruling Christian Democratic Union faction in the Bundestag, recently said,

The question is what role the Baltic states can play both for Russia and the EU. They can be a bridge to Europe for Russia. This would have to be made clear through trilateral cooperation. As long as NATO does not guarantee the Baltic states' security directly, it could be the task of the EU and the two nonaligned countries, Sweden and Finland, to have a security policy influence on that region. Integrated European military structures could be developed, modeled on the Eurocorps, in which the Baltic states could participate in a suitable way.¹¹⁷

Germany clearly wants to push the burden of dealing with Russia in the Baltic onto Sweden and Finland for whom not confronting Russia directly is a basic precept of policy. That Germany supports such an alternative only reflects the extent of German buckpassing and free riding while it tries to expand its security at the expense of its Baltic and Nordic partners.

From the foregoing, it is clear that all the concessions made by NATO to Russia since 1994 display Germany's desire to have its cake and eat it too. By late 1996, German officials were competing among themselves to devise concessions they could give Russia. Kinkel lobbied for putting Russia in a stronger position *vis-à-vis* NATO in talks on security policy cooperation. His ministry asserted

that Russia would accept NATO expansion because Moscow's protests were mainly for domestic consumption. To show Russia that NATO expansion would not produce gray zones or new divisions, he offered Russian participation in a joint NATO-Russia consultative "security committee" of 17, or S-17.¹¹⁸ NATO and Russia would conduct "institutionalized consultations on issues of disarmament and non-proliferation of arms of mass destruction, peacekeeping measures, and all issues of mutual interest." It should be noted that this foretold the language of the Founding Act which creates the NATO-Russian Council and a whole structure of bilateral contacts throughout the NATO organization with free rein to discuss all issues of mutual interest.¹¹⁹ In tune with his beliefs stated above, he argued that these concessions are needed for Russian domestic politics. More committees on this S-17 pattern would be formed at all levels of NATO's military hierarchy, placing Russia throughout NATO, where it could effectively influence NATO decisionmaking or threaten to use its veto in the Joint Council.

Bonn also supports "joint crisis-management in the Euro-Atlantic security space," i.e., Russian involvement in the Combined Joint Task Force arrangement, presumably replicating SFOR in Bosnia where Russia accepted NATO's command. (But Moscow would be loath to do so elsewhere in Europe).¹²⁰ This would mean Russian liaison staffs at the WEU, as well as at Brussels and SACLANT's Norfolk, VA, headquarters, which is to be the center for future crisis operations.¹²¹ And it is the basis for the NATO-Russian mechanism that was agreed to at the Helsinki summit and the Founding Act. Thanks to this agreement, Russia gains a formalized voice and right of participation in many, if not all of NATO's deliberations. Russian spokesmen from Yeltsin down insisted that the Helsinki summit and the Founding Act gave them a veto over NATO's activities outside of its current remit, i.e., anything east of Germany and especially the CIS, without which the whole enterprise is meaningless. Since NATO denies this understanding that Moscow continues to reiterate, the sources of future tension are already apparent.¹²²

Finally, Ruhe proposed that no NATO troops be stationed on the territory of new NATO members and that other concessions should also be made as Russia has demanded.¹²³ This suggestion paralleled that of Karl Lammers, a high ranking member of the ruling Christian Democratic party's Parliamentary faction, that only European troops be stationed in a NATO Polish force, whose size would be determined by agreements on arms limitations. Since Lammers believed the threat to Russia is U.S. forces, he implied that NATO (i.e., Germany) and Russia would jointly decide the practical extent of regional security. "It is necessary to seek an expansion that would be acceptable to Russia."¹²⁴ It would be interesting to see what would happen in a real crisis, since few if any member states want to spend money for modernizing NATO's forces.¹²⁵

By January 1997, German sources hinted at a deal formally to exclude the Baltic states from membership for 5-10 years in return for Russian acceptance of NATO expansion. Kinkel again hinted at possible EU membership for Estonia alone (the strongest Baltic economy), even though this undermines his previous concept of those states' strategic unity and fosters a further erosion of regional solidarity.¹²⁶ And since the Founding Act, matters have become still clearer.

In June 1997, Junior Foreign Minister Helmut Schaefer, speaking in Moscow, publicly called for a halt to NATO expansion after the first round lest "a hurt and wounded Russia" be further antagonized. He observed that Russian officials' strong opposition to NATO's enlargement had been "unexpected and frightening." Therefore, he continued, "After the first round, we should think about a security system for the whole of Europe before more harm is done. . . . I warn all those in Germany who, out of jingoism, want to take all sorts of countries into the alliance."¹²⁷

For his part, Kinkel now says that the Baltic states "objectively find themselves in a certain risk situation." Accordingly, Euro-Atlantic security structures should devise ways of drawing them closer without their acquiring a special status through bilateral agreements (i.e., special

agreements with the United States to circumvent their exclusion from NATO) that might impede their future admission. While NATO should unequivocally restate (as it did in Rome in 1991) that "its security is inseparably bound up with that of all Europe," and its support for all democratic European states, including the Baltic states, they still should not come closer to NATO membership.¹²⁸ Even though German businessmen now warn about the danger of a Baltic "gray zone," and there are those who support guarantees for the Baltic states, this is not to happen anytime soon.¹²⁹ Consequently, he offered a 12-point program even in 1996 along the lines stated here which fits with the recognition of Russian interests as embodied in the Founding Act and *the transformation of NATO into a collective security system which nonetheless retains its autonomy*. Indeed, Kinkel continues to maintain that Germany regards itself as the advocate of bringing the reformed new states closer to Transatlantic and European institutions.¹³⁰

Reportedly the Baltic states, who had little choice anyway, were happy to see Germany's and NATO's concern for their welfare, but were clearly interested in getting NATO to commit itself as much as possible to a second round where they might enter NATO. While this is the implied U.S. position, it cannot be said for sure if this is Germany's position, given Schaefer's outburst and Kinkel's ambiguity and ambivalence.¹³¹ And because the NATO-Russian Council will surely have to confront this issue, we can expect more contentiousness over the Baltic and a disunited NATO as well.

But logical consistency does not seem to matter in a German policy composed equally of fear, appeasement of Russia, drift, and ambivalence about European security. Indeed, observers in Bonn report the government's uneasiness over the prospect of a public debate over its policy and NATO's enlargement, something that Germany desperately needs.¹³²

German Policy, the EU and NATO: The Challenge for the United States.

Clearly Germany, Europe's strongest state and potential advocate for the Baltic states, has defaulted on them. Although it seeks an expanded PfP for the Baltic to blur the distinction between membership and nonmembership in NATO, the all-important guarantee, signifying that Europe will resist threats to these states' independence, integrity, or sovereignty, is lacking. And Bonn will choose Moscow over the Baltic states. German policy evidently cannot transcend geography, its ingrained habit of looking to Moscow as well as to Paris and Washington, and the notion that Eastern Europe is a liability or source of danger, not an opportunity. Its policies also seem to be based on fundamental misconceptions.

Russia's opposition to NATO is not purely for domestic consumption. As Primakov has said, Russia opposes NATO enlargement in principle, irrespective of whatever arguments are made for it.¹³³ NATO's enlargement unites Russia's elites in a competition where each faction seeks to outdo each other in its opposition to NATO, while the public basically remains apathetic. Nor can economic cooperation, concessions, and soft security alter Moscow's policy toward the Baltic. Quite the contrary, Moscow only interprets these as a green light for further pressure regionally and in Europe as a whole. Indeed, Moscow has steadily and successfully raised the ante once it grasped NATO's inner hesitations and divisions.

Nor does Russian policy rely so much on economic blandishments. Germany seems to have overlooked Russia's policy as described above and the fact that under Western pressure Baltic policy has shifted, if grudgingly, while Moscow's stance has become tougher as it senses Western irresolution and confusion, exactly the opposite of what it predicted. Giving Russia a veto over NATO's future enlargement or activities inside the CIS or the Baltic, or the Balkans does not end Moscow's revisionism and unilateralism.

Russia's insistence on a free hand in integrating the CIS creates a line of demarcation, as in the Caucasus. Here Moscow does what it accuses NATO of doing as it returns to Turkey's border.

Furthermore, while it may not be fashionable to admit this, Russia, not NATO, started drawing the lines by its own neo-imperial actions in the CIS and increasingly antidemocratic policies, both beginning in 1993. Russia's threats to Ukrainian and Baltic sovereignty, demands concerning borders and the Russian *diaspora*, imperial policies in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, its support for coups in Azerbaijan, its coercive use of military force to compromise the integrity of Georgia and its sovereignty, and to force Armenia and Georgia to give it permanent bases did in advance what it claims NATO would do by moving East. Russia did all this on the boundary of a NATO member, Turkey.¹³⁴

Germany cannot create cooperative security regimes without gray zones and lines of division while Russia successfully insists on such lines for itself, a neo-colonialist hegemony over the CIS, and a Europe where some states enjoy security guarantees but others do not. In effect, Germany urges others take the lead in the Baltic and take risks that it will not assume for itself even within NATO and the EU. It refrains from taking an active position even inside these organizations where its power is strong, but bounded, apparently seeking the benefits of buckpassing, free riding, and consorting with everyone. Its policy represents a vain effort to reconcile Russia's veto on NATO, a strong transatlantic connection, and equal security for all or even part of Central and Eastern Europe.

Furthermore, the reliance on the EU is utterly unfounded. If NATO will not act, neither will the EU. Brussels resents NATO and Washington's pressure that it fulfill its supposed historic responsibility of integrating Eastern Europe, while NATO shirks this task but claims it is acting under U.S. leadership to move into Central Europe. The EU will not be rushed by some U.S. timetable, official or not. Neither will it easily amend its own

procedures of minute observations of candidates' every attribute before acting. The EU will make "objective" judgments," not "political" ones. Nor will the EU be rushed into making a decision that might jeopardize it, or the Baltic states, even if Estonia is now a candidate for future EU membership.¹³⁵

A deeper examination of the EU's record and its futile quest for a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) shows Germany's faulty judgment. Jacques Delors, the EU's former Secretary-General and architect of the Maastricht Treaty, wrote in his memoirs that he never believed Europe could obtain the CFSP.¹³⁶ The EU's leading members lack the will, the resources, the commitment, or the unity of approach to craft and enforce a coherent Central European policy. As Hans van den Broek, the EU Commissioner for external relations with Central and Eastern Europe, recently said, "Shaping the future of Europe is more important than preparing the accession of new members to the EU."¹³⁷

It is quixotic to rely on the EU to bail out NATO and make it bear the burden of the Baltic. That just means that NATO passes the buck to the EU in search of a free ride. And even if the EU does admit those states, that would not happen for at least 5-6 years. Anyone familiar with the EU's inability to agree on foreign and defense policy cannot be optimistic. Just as France, Germany, and Great Britain seem incapable of agreement on foreign and defense policies, Bonn cannot make the political decisions it should be making. While Bonn's acceptance of Russia's *droit de regard* (right of supervision) of Eastern and Central Europe is appeasement, it is appeasement to secure selfish but hidden German interests supposedly in Europe's name. It also is appeasement in the hope of a future hegemony through European security agencies and an accord with Russia over Central Europe.¹³⁸ Apparently Germany, as Schaefer suggested above, will also reject any future Baltic membership in NATO to appease Russia.¹³⁹ Fraser Cameron of the European Commission concluded that,

Sitting on the fence may at times be uncomfortable, but it is the preferred German position. Thus Germany is in favor of widening and deepening the EU; of enlarging to the east and to the south; of enlarging NATO and seeking a strategic partnership with Russia; of strengthening WEU and NATO—but not increasing its defense budget.¹⁴⁰

Conclusions for NATO and the United States.

Clearly, if the United States does not lead in the formation of a Baltic (and European) security system, nobody else will. Instead, other states will make deals without us, against our interests, and Europe's overall security. Although Poland, Finland, Denmark, and Sweden have made important contributions towards soft security in the Baltic, they cannot assume the unilateral or even joint burden of directly confronting Russia in the Baltic without NATO's firm support. This, too, may be buckpassing, but at least it derives from history and real power realities. These states need great power commitments to transcend their present levels of activity. In the Baltic, Washington must balance against Moscow's imperial tendencies and Bonn's inclination to appease them.

Indeed, Washington has already undertaken numerous regional initiatives dating back to helping Russia withdraw its troops from the Baltic in 1994. It has led the way to an integrated regional air traffic control system, the basis for extending NATO's air defense system eastward. This system goes beyond proposals for subregional security guarantees or associations, where the Nordic countries take the lead. And there also are specific agreements with major West European states in areas like air defense, specifically identification of friend or foe (IFF).¹⁴¹

U.S. policy already transcends purely regional or subregional solutions to regional issues and is deeply involved with Baltic security programs. For instance, President Clinton's discussions with Swedish Prime Minister Goeran Persson, in August 1996, revealed much about both states' policies and led Clinton to support Sweden's five-point Baltic policy.¹⁴² Even earlier, Swedish

Foreign Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallen reiterated Swedish support for Baltic membership in the EU because only thus will their voices be heard. While Sweden cannot guarantee their security in NATO, it supports their right to membership if enlargement does not occur at the expense of those states who are not admitted or do not wish to be admitted to NATO. These states, like Sweden, must gain chances for more cooperation with NATO.¹⁴³ Sweden also believes that Baltic membership in the EU will promote regional cooperation with Russia, and help the Baltic states conduct generous minority policies.¹⁴⁴ This line of reasoning differs from Bonn's past policy which does not seem to tie Baltic membership in the EU to better treatment of Russian minorities, but apparently rather reverses that order. Swedish officials hinted they might use their veto power in the EU to this end because they fear a nightmare scenario where everyone else takes a free ride and Finland and Sweden must face the burdens and risks. In this scenario NATO expands in Central Europe, Russian pressure against the Baltics grows, the United States cuts back its European role, and EU enlargement only encompasses Central Europe and ties up that organization.¹⁴⁵ The risks in Baltic admission to the EU are that the EU then must give some sort of guarantee, if only a "soft security" one, to the Baltic states. Everything shows that it is unwilling to admit them or give them a real commitment. The Baltic states, Sweden, and Finland would be left in the lurch.¹⁴⁶

Therefore, Persson's five-point plan envisioned a broader regional program. Sweden will:

- Increase existing bilateral cooperation in economics, and in environmental and energy policy with the Baltic states.
- Expand regional cooperation within the framework of the Baltic Sea Council.
- Support EU enlargement to include the Baltic states. President Clinton announced his support for this as well.

- Expand the PfP role in the Baltic and convey Baltic states' desire to join NATO. Since Washington ruled this desire out, it was happy to support their membership in EU and to pressure the EU accordingly.
- Stress direct dialogue with Russia.¹⁴⁷

President Clinton supported this program and was pleased that Sweden was adopting a regional "leadership role."¹⁴⁸ Washington also supported establishing a regional PfP headquarters in Sweden for peacekeeping operations.

However, these discussions also revealed disturbing facts about the U.S. position on the more general European security issues. Swedish journalists also learned that Washington wants the PfP program to resemble NATO as much as possible and NATO to appear increasingly as a collective security organization.¹⁴⁹ In that case, these officials argued, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, calling for collective self-defense, will be seen as a last resort. Since PfP and NATO both call for consultations under Article 4, if consultation works, "we will never have to use Article 5."¹⁵⁰ The effort to renounce or depreciate Article 5 was "shouted from a megaphone." Sweden heard U.S. concerns that the EU does not want to expand and has little security relevance, while the IFOR in Bosnia was already a regional peacekeeping force.¹⁵¹ One Swedish diplomat said that a senior U.S. official told him that NATO was a force for cooperation for collective security rather than collective defense. Article 5 was an asset "more for the credibility for the political superstructure than something that it actually could be necessary to use."¹⁵²

In the U.S. view, PfP forces will ultimately resemble NATO's forces and gain assignments to do peace operations, humanitarian intervention, and conflict management within the framework of the WEU's 1992 Petersberg Agreement. Sweden could participate in those operations and cooperate with NATO while retaining its current defense profile.¹⁵³ Washington also supports building up an

ESDI only within NATO.¹⁵⁴ Sweden and Finland could then be models of civilian control and decisionmaking for future members' armed forces and cooperate with NATO through the PfP. Their nonalignment calms Russia and shows the Baltics that NATO is not the only road to security. Washington aspires to reciprocal membership for all members of the EU and NATO where an ESDI is in NATO, not a moribund WEU.¹⁵⁵

These statements of U.S. policy fully conform to U.S. efforts to depict NATO enlargement as a major step in the transformation of NATO and, more broadly, of European security into a cooperative or collective security arrangement rather than a purely mutual security alliance for collective defense as it has been until now. Certainly they comport with the statement by Christopher and Perry above. NATO's enlargement is also the cornerstone of European democratization, and the enlargement of market democratic states is a fundamental element of a national security program of democratic enlargement.¹⁵⁶ While the new members may crave the guarantee of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Washington evidently believes that in the new Europe, Article 5 will not be needed because collective security will reign within NATO and cooperative security throughout Europe. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has stated, enlargement makes it more likely that American forces will not have to be used in Europe. This was the point made by Henry Kissinger in his critique of the Founding Act and the Helsinki summit, but what he failed to grasp is that this appears to be the conscious intention the allies, specifically Germany and the United States.¹⁵⁷ Kinkel openly speaks of the NATO area and Europe as one of collective security, and the United States, from President Clinton on down, sells NATO enlargement, not as a military-defensive alliance but as a project for the enlargement of democracy and integration, and almost a trade policy.¹⁵⁸

For example, a State Department paper presented in April 1997 to the III Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, an academic organization

devoted to studying ethnic issues in Central and Eastern Europe, stated,

The countries of our region [Central Europe] can become modernized only through integration; thus our NATO agenda is based essentially not on geopolitical considerations but on the desire to get integrated. . . . By enlarging NATO, we want to prevent wars, not to win them.¹⁵⁹

Secretary of State Albright duly invokes a productive paradox that allegedly operates here. NATO is an instrument of preventive diplomacy in that the further it advances, the less risk there is that it will be needed.¹⁶⁰ Therefore, NATO members can all demilitarize safely. Threat scenarios involving NATO members will not arise. The classical concept of collective security where all parties are presumed in advance to share a common belief on the origin, nature of, and appropriate response to crises and aggression is postulated as a *fait accompli*. Thus consultation under Article 4 will suffice when some crisis happens. The hard cases are finessed away through a response made up in equal parts of hope, wishful thinking, a neo-Wilsonian ideology, and the unproven belief that Russia is a democratic partner of the United States who accepts a new U.S.-led alliance system in Europe.

Obviously Russian realities do not conform to this belief system. Russia's revisionism is incompatible with the U.S. vision of a neo-Wilsonian collective security. What happens then to the hard security issue, i.e., collective defense? Who ensures that the Balts or anyone else are not left in a Russian sphere or limbo? Who helps defend against attack or subversion? And what happens if they are threatened? The implicit premise is that in the event of a threat everyone will consult under Article 4 and/or the Partnership for Peace protocols and agree on a response. But if they do not agree, what then? If consultation under Article 4 does not work, or, more likely, ends up with inter-allied divisions as in Bosnia, then allied action, whether it occurs under Article 5 or some other article of NATO's key documents becomes irrelevant. Allied discord would prevent action under any article,

Articles 4 or 5, or the PfP accords gaining nothing for the Baltics or anyone else who feels threatened. Moreover, authoritative Russian commentators know fully well that the allies will not wish to provoke a political confrontation, let alone a major crisis, with Russia over the Baltics. Thus they believe that Russia will have a *de facto* veto in the new Council, even if nobody there wanted to plead Russia's case. However, Germany and France will not let the United States act unilaterally too often, and, if they do, the Council will then break down into a stalemate once Russia vetoes anything against its interests. Indeed, Russians are already complaining that its first meeting showed that NATO really intends to disregard Russia and its interests.¹⁶¹

Russia's upcoming emplacement in NATO, its determination to use the new agreements in a unilateral manner, the vacillations of our allies, many of whom are apparently ready to "plead Russia's case," and NATO's palpable unwillingness to confront hard military questions such as paying for defense modernization, make these all troublesome issues that we are still not confronting. Russia's presence in NATO via the Council only enhances its incentives and opportunities to incite and foment divisions among members. Moscow will not find it hard to obstruct a coherent NATO reply to its efforts to expand its sphere of influence because Western hesitations have already left peace operations and other security operations in the CIS to an organization where Moscow has a veto.

Washington has concurrently sought substitute solutions to the security problem through innovations applying both to the Baltic and to the larger PfP program. Thus it created a Baltic Action Plan in August-September 1996. This plan has three key elements: assisting the Baltic states to join European security institutions, encouraging improved relations between them and Russia, and expanding U.S. relations with them to include "cooperation charters" with each state detailing cooperation in security, political issues, and economics.¹⁶² It also entails support for the regional air defense system and the Baltic battalion made up of soldiers and officers from all three Baltic

states.¹⁶³ Washington believes that such cooperation under the PfP and Article 4 eliminates the need for stronger guarantees that provoke Russia. Washington also asserts that this cooperation also deters Russia from threatening the Baltic states lest NATO's reaction makes it lose the benefits it would gain from improved Russo-Baltic and East-West relations. Meanwhile, Washington hopes for future changes in the situation even though the plan, which it hopes will be ratified in a forthcoming Baltic charter, does not provide security guarantees. Thus it will not rule out future Baltic membership in NATO—much to Russia's dismay.

The Baltic states have reacted with restraint to the Baltic Action Plan. Estonia is even opposed to a charter with NATO lest it establish a special NATO-Estonian relationship outside membership that would delay Estonia's entry into NATO.¹⁶⁴ Still, this and other initiatives, like the regional air defense plan for Central and Eastern Europe, imperfect as they are, are still material advances toward integration and preventive security. While nobody will give guarantees, integration through soft security, which might ultimately reduce regional tension, is clearly occurring.

U.S. policy also follows along the paths outlined in the conversations with Sweden. In July 1997 NATO chose its first members for accession. NATO understands that Russia will seek to tie up NATO, link enlargement to the CFE treaty, and seek a veto over enlargement. Thus NATO decided that Polish, Czech, and Hungarian security, not to mention Baltic security, will not be contingent on Russian security arrangements that are inimical to their interests and to security in Central Europe. The conclusion of the Founding Act casts doubt on its decision not to tie new membership to any separate deal with Russia. But now, only time and NATO's resolve will tell.

At the OSCE and NATO December 1996 meetings in Lisbon and Brussels, Washington offered specific Baltic initiatives. While the original PfP program listed 22 areas of cooperation—peace and humanitarian operations, democratization of civil-military relations, crisis management,

interoperability, and logistics—as proposed by then Secretary of Defense Perry, the new, expanded PfP involves partner states in planning and executing actual military operations, disaster relief, peacemaking, and delivery of humanitarian aid.¹⁶⁵ The meetings' communiqués listed the specifics of this expanded program to include greater political and military cooperation among the partners and, as Washington told Stockholm, drew the partners ever closer to actual membership in practice.¹⁶⁶

This approach has two fundamental advantages. First, it solidifies and advances NATO's capability to function as a true security organization and an instrument for effective collective action based on the members' consensus. Second, this program advances beyond NATO's 1991 Copenhagen meeting, when NATO first expressly stated its direct and material concern for Central and Eastern European security. Today, the more NATO interacts with regional governments, the more they come to depend on it and the more obliged it should feel towards them. If NATO continues to believe in its enlargement and that this "creeping integration" is desirable and inevitable, then this line of action is the best way to steer the process. NATO then would not suddenly face demands for membership when a major threat arises.¹⁶⁷ In that case, a NATO that had declined in peacetime to defend Central Europe and that had passed the buck would face demands for action in a time of crisis, or even war. That would probably split NATO and prevent it from acting under either Article 4 or Article 5.

By controlling the process, the United States and NATO can devise a program that eliminates many of the new states' fears and concerns while integrating them as closely as possible in a "semi-Article 5" relationship on a Pan-European basis. That phrase denotes a relationship based on the PfP language which is close to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, but adds a political dimension to the PfP. By adding the members' input and a political structure to the PfP, we would realize some of the goals that the Clinton administration presented to Swedish representatives in 1996.¹⁶⁸

NATO's present consensus probably will not permit further steps, but this is already a considerable amount. Still, to secure the Baltic region and Europe, Washington must keep driving the European consensus. If it shirks its duty, others will follow suit, triggering an epidemic of free-riding and NATO's practical dissolution. This control over the admission process must be exercised throughout all its phases lest new and/or old members turn selfish about other regional states' membership and balk at defending them, at a time when Russia's policy becomes still more aggressive and attempts to frighten NATO. The rejected candidates should not have to think that Russia is their only choice.¹⁶⁹ Instead, the program that came together at the end of 1996 offers the right blend of control, transparency, and U.S. steering of the operation to prevent Europe's door from closing prematurely. It preserves partners' equality within PfP, extends their responsibilities and learning curve while preparing them for entry, and holds the door open for Russia should it accept the project.¹⁷⁰ However, it does so at a price. Namely it substantially alters the nature of the NATO alliance away from its traditional restriction to a collective defense pact towards a new relationship in line with ideas of cooperative and collective security. But it is those very ideas that seem to exercise the most influence on U.S. policy.

The Need for Continuing U.S. Leadership.

Still, problems remain. It may grate on European, and especially French, ears to hear this, but it remains true that an ESDI or CFSP is no closer to fruition today than before, and notions of the WEU as a European pillar remain stillborn. Without U.S. support or NATO's acquiescence, other agencies, like the WEU, let alone Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), cannot perform major security tasks.¹⁷¹ Only the United States can devise a durable multilateral Baltic security regime. If we keep proclaiming our leadership in Europe, then we must display that leadership in action.

The OSCE's abilities pertain only to conflict prevention and mediation where both sides are willing to negotiate.

Although Russia often proclaims its desire for the OSCE to lead European security, Moscow defies it with impunity.¹⁷² The OSCE's successes in the Baltic stem from these states' susceptibility to Western pressure more than the OSCE's own institutional legitimacy. This inclination to the West induces the Baltic states to heed its advice on minority policy, since they know that otherwise they will not obtain entry to the West or security from Russia.¹⁷³

Because the OSCE clearly cannot respond to Baltic security challenges but the EU and NATO can, it is senseless to deny the Baltic states both EU and NATO membership when appeasing Russia only brings increased demands and truculence. This does not mean necessarily admitting the Baltic states into NATO. But it does mean much more clarity and a tough-minded policy that is not based on wishful thinking regarding Russia.

Thus we are evidently laboring under several misconceptions as we defend and advance NATO's enlargement. First, while we seek Russia as a strategic partner on nuclear issues, its openly expressed goals and policies are inimical to European peace and stability and to the role of partner.¹⁷⁴ Russian policy openly demands an exclusive sphere of influence in the CIS and attempts to prevent Central and East Europe from achieving true military security and equality to it in Europe. Such demands are clearly unacceptable to those states and should be equally unacceptable to NATO, which cannot renounce its freedom to act to defend its members. If official Russian statements on European security were published and explained, they would create more public support for NATO's enlargement. Such publication would create greater awareness of Russia's goals as stated above. Certainly Russian public statements indicate that Moscow's delegation and officials believe that the Founding Act and Helsinki summit gave them a veto over NATO and no reason to change their Baltic policies. Indeed, Yeltsin offered new unilateral guarantees of Baltic security, but not of borders or an end to threats against the Baltic states. Therefore, these "guarantees" were rejected.¹⁷⁵

A second misconception flows from the first one about Russia as a partner. Moscow's policies indicate a continuing need for a robust interpretation of Articles 4 and 5 which guarantee, first, consultation, and then if a *member* is attacked, collective defense. Thus, despite the concessions that Russia has won from NATO, it remains unpersuaded of the benefits of NATO or possibly even the EU's enlargement or of the virtues of the *status quo*. Russia will continue to threaten the CIS, and beyond that, Eastern Europe, if it is not checked. Moscow seems determined to create permanent tension in the Baltic or *vis-à-vis* Poland to prevent a more stable situation or such membership from arising.¹⁷⁶

There are other misconceptions as well. All the soft security innovations are useful and beneficial, but Russia has refused to participate fully in the PfP and deliberately seeks to obstruct NATO. And although PfP is close to the Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, it does not give PfP members, like the Baltic states, the right to activate consultation mechanisms. Instead, it states that under certain conditions NATO will consult among the PfP members or purely among alliance members. Nor does the Baltic states' association agreement with the WEU give them that right there, either.¹⁷⁷ Yet while we contend that NATO's main purpose is democratic extension and enlargement, not the collective defense that makes the former possible, Russia and most of Central and Eastern Europe still think in other, older terms, notwithstanding their rhetoric. While democratization is a truly historic and enduring benefit of NATO, NATO's purpose remains, first and foremost, collective defense which provides the basis for democratic integration. Putting democratic integration first confuses NATO's benefits with its purpose and, by obscuring its purpose, makes it possible to weaken NATO's cohesion while Russian policy continues to justify the need for collective defense albeit at lower force and spending levels.

We should not refrain from making NATO's case. Failure to state the real and sound reasons for NATO's

enlargement engenders suspicion and cynicism at home. Then, far too many observers cannot discern a rational reason for enlarging NATO, creating suspicions that we have something to hide. As a result, we have inadvertently undermined the priceless assets of the competence and resolution of U.S. foreign policy.

Thus we should forsake the idea that Article 5 is moribund or should be and that NATO is essentially for purposes of collective security. Much of today's writing on collective security either misunderstands the concept or twists it into strange shapes to minimize or conceal its objectionable features and promote the author's agenda.¹⁷⁸ There is good reason for such academic strategies for they seek to mask the crippling weaknesses that invalidate the concept as a viable basis for European security. NATO's first purpose is collective defense, not the validation of a concept that was and remains inherently defective in practice.

Another misconception is that somehow we can farm out our leadership role to Germany as a mediator and to the EU as a security provider. Neither of these entities can lead Europe or be persuaded to do what Washington or NATO will not do for themselves or their allies. Such efforts only breed resentment, misunderstanding, security failures, and help renationalize German security policy. Such efforts also represent our own attempts at buckpassing and free riding. And if we engage in those pastimes, who can blame others for doing so?

There is no fundamental obstacle, save the EU's timorousness, to implementing a program outlining what Central and Eastern Europe must do to gain membership and committing itself and those states to follow it. And if European governments truly believe their rhetoric about the EU as a security provider they would rush to implement it for the entire region, not just the Baltic. The disinclination to do either of these things means that NATO, specifically Washington, must push the EU rather hard lest the divisibility of European security harden. We cannot lead by

subcontracting foreign and defense policy to a divided and disunited Europe.

EU membership for the Baltic states seems particularly useful if Russia intends, as suggested above, to launch a campaign of economic warfare and internal subversion in the Baltic states. Baltic efforts to meet the EU's entry requirements would certainly strengthen them against such efforts, but if those requirements remain invisible or are constantly expanded, there will only be endless equivocation. They will rightly lose heart then as the EU will have clearly shown it does not want them.

Thus the United States must again lead. Some of the aforementioned initiatives increase Baltic states' ability to play in NATO and learn how it works. Russia should be urged to participate more fully in the PfP program in order to test its *bona fides*. While NATO can certainly afford to be magnanimous and extend partnership with Russia, that magnanimity cannot come to mean a pretext for a new division of Europe into rival spheres of influence.

Concluding Proposals for Future U.S. Policy.

Since nobody else can lead in the Baltic or Europe, failure to lead will erode allied cohesion, increase buckpassing and free riding, and create worse divisions in Europe than would NATO expansion. Accordingly, Washington ought to take the following steps, realizing that all previous expansions of NATO have created lines, as well as conditions for further expansions that have superseded those lines.¹⁷⁹ Because NATO is both an institution for collective defense and an evolving civic community whose doors are perennially open to all who qualify, we must continue to make it clear that those doors will remain open and decisively rebuff speculation and Russian pressure that there only be one expansion.¹⁸⁰

This means inviting Russia to join Europe, but the invitation, as stated above, should not be an open-ended one. Russia should not be allowed to obtain an unequal security or status compared to other states. NATO cannot

grant special rights to Russia in the CIS or Central Europe or the right, omnipresent in German proposals, to paralyze NATO. Nor can it give Russia a veto over Central Europe's defense. Granting Russia such terms and/or a veto drives a stake through the hopes for European security.

Instead U.S. policy should foster the spread of integrative processes through public pressure on the EU to move forward and eastward and on prospective NATO members to meet NATO's standards as set forth in the 1995 NATO Enlargement Study.¹⁸¹ U.S. policy appeared to be contradictory on this point. On the one hand, Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter denied that NATO and EU membership are parallel processes. On the other hand, we are pressuring the EU to accelerate its membership process for the Baltic and other East European states. Robert Simmons, deputy head of the Office of European Security and Policy at the State Department, told Sweden's delegation in August 1996 that the new NATO will back the ESDI that the EU is pushing for and,

The logic of the processes in both the EU and within NATO indicates that ultimately they will mean reciprocal membership of both the EU and NATO. It seems logical that an adjusted NATO, which has a relationship with the EU, should be attractive to all members of the EU.¹⁸²

Finally, in May 1997, Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott stated that we support EU's deepening in the West and broadening to the East and view NATO's enlargement as creating an environment that is conducive to the EU's enlargement as well. The two processes are parallel and should both support a deeper transatlantic community.¹⁸³ Sadly, it is unlikely that, even with American pressure, the EU will bail NATO out in the East. While this pressure is necessary, it must be upgraded, for to hope or pretend that the EU will bail out NATO is merely another form of buckpassing on the hard cases. Nor will the EU act unless America galvanizes it through NATO. Proposals for a CFSP, ESDI, or to make the WEU the center of European defense activity are meaningless where European countries

will not spend the resources or harmonize their foreign and defense policies. The entire discussion of European security would gain from candor regarding the WEU's and the EU's unreadiness for foreign and defense policy coordination as shown most recently in Albania's crisis.¹⁸⁴

Furthermore, there are many reasons why the post-Soviet states must have a tangible economic and defense prospect of security before them. Moscow's past record of economic warfare against the Baltic states and Ukraine should suffice as an example of that need. The real and apparently quite imminent danger here is that we may believe that we really have completed our mission and rely on guaranteed consultations for PfP members and the Joint Council with Russia alone and not on the alliance's inherent capabilities.¹⁸⁵ We would then have failed to deter as well as to reassure all the Baltic players. This would be a fatal error. Russia's policy in the CIS and the Baltic overtly threatens their integrity and sovereignty and then the security of the first tier of Central European states beyond their borders. This is not a fashionable view or one that people are hurrying to make public. Nevertheless, the evidence presented here, official statements of Russian leaders and much of Russia's elite discussion, reflects that conclusion.

Indeed, Russian diplomats' words and actions regarding the Baltic constitute a frank espousal of coercive diplomacy. Yet, since the wherewithal for such strategies is utterly lacking, the pursuit of such a strategy, ostensibly on behalf of Russians in the CIS and the Baltic states, could trigger a major crisis of the Russian state. If Russia crashes while trying to pursue a policy of "imperial overstretch," that would have far-reaching and profoundly dangerous results, both politically and geographically all across Europe. As Roman Szporluk of Harvard University wrote, the demand to pursue a policy based on "saving" the 25 million or so Russian *diaspora* sacrifices the interests of the 125 million Russians in Russia proper to an adventurist policy.¹⁸⁶ And the essence of that kind of policy is that Moscow cannot calibrate ends and means or know where to stop.

Thus we cannot do without Article 5 and should stop saying that we are approaching a time when it is superfluous or unnecessary. While it is right to blur the boundaries between membership and PfP, it is wrong to give others the impression that NATO can be divided, or that it will passively stand by in cases of aggression or threats to security in Europe. That will only invite aggressive probes, crisis if NATO reacts strongly, disillusionment when NATO does not respond effectively, and, inevitably, erosion of alliance cohesion. Any hint that NATO will not respond to Russian probes will rapidly tempt Germany to make its own deal with Russia regarding Central and Eastern Europe.

Moreover, sensitive Russian observers know that a profound connection exists between the extent of Russia's stabilization and democratization and the fervor for NATO expansion.¹⁸⁷ To the extent that the former fails, the latter grows as has been the case since 1993. A Russia that thinks and acts along the lines of Kinkel's analysis or of the Wilsonian impulse in U.S. foreign policy might become a fit partner for us in Europe. But that is not and will not be Yeltsin's Russia. Instead Russia's demands are at odds with both European security and its own domestic tranquility. They can only be met by NATO's firm but measured riposte, a riposte that, as the more intelligent Russian analysts know, will once and for all terminate the erotic lure of empire in Russia's European policies and help consolidate true democracy at home. When and if that happens and to the extent that it does, we can then move onto the next stage of a project which could well become security from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

But if we ignore the Baltic and accept the idea that the divisibility of European security must be implemented in its most rigid and enduring form, and that the East-West divide of the last 5 centuries must also be perpetuated for the long term, neither small states, Russia nor the West will enjoy much security. Hence statements about Article 5 being superfluous are very unfortunate, for they betray a

misunderstanding of NATO and of the reality of European politics today.

Once Russia opted for its hegemonic sphere of influence in the CIS and for an unaccountable government that is not bound by democratic laws or anchors, it divided Europe, if not along Cold War lines, then along new geopolitical lines. NATO's enlargement, if anything, overcomes many of the lines of division in Europe, going back to the Renaissance and also creates the least possible threatening conditions for overcoming more of those lines in the future. This does not mean that we must now expand NATO to the Baltic states. But it does mean that we cannot simply leave them in the lurch. We now have the power and bear the burden of devising a regime for that region which retains the possibility of its full integration into Europe. The EU should move east, PfP and NATO should both grow, and Russia should be deterred from further unprofitable and dangerous adventures. In other words, we still must provide both reassurance and deterrence. Nobody else can or will. We may complain about this burden and this opportunity, but we can no longer shirk them.

ENDNOTES

1. Rita F. Peters, "The Baltic Search for Security," *Perspectives*, Vol. VII, No. 2, November-December 1996, pp. 4-5, *The Monitor*, September 20, 1996.

2. Thus Slovenia's Prime Minister Janesz Drnovsek reports that, "The Americans emphasize that NATO expansion will be a continuous process that will occur over a number of rounds. The Europeans are more skeptical about future NATO expansion and believe that it would be good if as many countries as possible are accepted now," Ljubljana, *Delo*, in Slovenian, May 26, 1997, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Eastern Europe* (henceforth *FBIS-EEU*)-97-150, May 30, 1997; Ronald Dietrich Asmus, "NATO Enlargement and Baltic Security," Bo Huldts and Ulrika Johannessen, eds., *1st Annual Stockholm Conference on Baltic Sea Security and Cooperation*, Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Conference Papers No. 20, 1997, pp. 11-12.

3. H. Plater-Zyberg, "NATO Enlargement: Benefits, Costs, and Consequences," Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Camberley, Surrey, England, 1996, p. 8; London,

The Daily Telegraph, in English, July 19, 1996, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe*, (henceforth *FBIS-WEU*)-96-140, July 19, 1996, p. 1; Thomas L. Friedman, "The Big Bang," *New York Times*, November 27, 1996, p. A25.

4. Asmus; Friedman; Rene Nyberg, "The Baltic Countries and the Northwest of Russia: A European Challenge," *European Security*, Vol. III, No. 3, Autumn, 1994, p. 537; Vygaudas Usackas, "NATO's Role in Baltic Security: A Lithuanian View," in Huldt and Johannessen, pp. 78-79.

5. Moscow, *Izvestiya*, in Russian, July 6, 1996, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia*, (henceforth *FBIS-SOV*)-96-131, July 8, 1996, pp. 17-18; "Secret Yeltsin-Clinton Correspondence," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, (henceforth *CDPP*), XLVIII, No. 27, July 31, 1996, p. 20; Michael R. Gordon, "Russia Accepts Eastward Growth of NATO, but Only Inch by Inch," *New York Times*, March 5, 1997, pp. A1, 8. More recently, Yeltsin and Primakov have both stated that any effort to admit former Soviet republics to NATO would cause Russia to revise its relationships with NATO and its members.

6. "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," *Rossiyskie Vesti*, November 18, 1993, in Russian, *FBIS-SOV-93-222-S*, November 19, 1993.

7. Moscow, *Novoe Vremya*, in Russian, No. 15, April 20, 1997, *FBIS-SOV-97-084*, April 20, 1997.

8. *The Monitor*, January 10, 1997; Tallinn, *ETA*, in English, November 26, 1996, *FBIS-SOV-96-230*, November 29, 1996.

9. Robert Legvold, "The 'Russian Question'," Vladimir Baranovsky, ed., *Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda* Oxford; Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1997, p. 67.

10. Jaako Blomberg, "Finland's Evolving Security Policy," *NATO Review*, Vol. XLI, No. 1, February, 1993, pp. 12-15; Vilnius, *Elta*, in English, January 6, 1997, *FBIS-SOV-97-004*, January 8, 1997.

11. Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980's," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. LXI, No. 2, Winter, 1982/83, pp. 309-324.

12. For a discussion of the term free riding or buck-passing and its harmful consequences for security, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks; Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization*, Vol. XLIV, No. 2, 1990,

pp. 138-168; and Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 12-127, 156-157.

13. Vilnius, *Elta*, in English, February 4, 1997, and Moscow, *Interfax*, in English, February 4, 1997, both in *FBIS-SOV-97-025*, February 7, 1997; Warsaw, *Sztandar*, in Polish, October 24, 1996, *FBIS-SOV-96-211*, October 24, 1996.

14. See Carl Bildt's remarks in Stockholm TT, (*Pohjoismaiset Uutiset Database Version*), in Swedish, March 21, 1997, *FBIS-WEU-97-080*, March 21, 1997.

15. Posen, Snyder and Christensen highlight the erosion of mutual cooperation under such circumstances.

16. Carl Bildt, "The Baltic Litmus Test," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. LXXIII, No. 5, September-October, 1994, pp. 72-73.

17. Volker Ruhe, "NATO Positions for Growth," *Defense News*, October 21-27, 1996, p. 33.

18. Tallinn, *BNS*, in English, August 29, 1996, *FBIS-SOV-96-170*, August 30, 1996, pp. 52-54.

19. Alfred Van Staden and Gert De Nooy, "The European Security Space: An Analysis of Possible Arrangements, Commitments, and Instruments," and Karl Kaiser, "Expanding the European Security Space," both in Guido Lenzi and Laurence Martin, eds., *The European Security Space, Working Papers by the European Strategy Groups and the Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union* Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1996, pp. 3, 22.

20. Stuart Croft, "Competing Visions of European Security and the Inevitability of NATO Enlargement," paper presented to the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, March 18-22, 1997, p. 16.

21. The Founding Act of May 27, 1997 between Russia and NATO openly declares both sides' commitment to the indivisibility of European security. *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, May 27, 1997*, NATO Internet.

22. Stephen Blank, *Russia and the Baltic: Is There a Threat to European Security?*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993, pp. 16-19, raised just such an option.

23. As Jacques Freymond of the University of Geneva observed, small states should not become a source of trouble to other states. Jacques Freymond, "How the Small Countries Can Contribute to Peace," August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland, eds., *Small States in International Relations*, 17th Nobel Symposium, Oslo, 1971, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971, pp. 178-179.

24. Copenhagen, *Information*, in Danish, September 27, 1996, *FBIS-WEU-96-190*, October 1, 1996.

25. Monika Wohlfeld, "A Survey of Strategic Interests of the Countries of the European Security Space," in Lenzi and Martin, eds., p. 12.

26. Dmitry Trenin, "Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy: NATO Expansion Can Have Negative Consequences for the West," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, February 5, 1997.

27. Legvold, p. 69.

28. Warsaw, *Polskie Radio First Program Network*, in Polish, June 4, 1997, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Military Affairs* (henceforth *FBIS-UMA*)-97-155, June 4, 1997; Warsaw, *Rzeczpospolita*, in Polish, June 5, 1997, *FBIS-EEU-97-157*, June 6, 1997; Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in English, June 5, 1997, *FBIS-SOV-97-156*, June 5, 1997; Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in English, June 6, 1997, *FBIS-SOV-97-157*, June 6, 1997; Florence *La Nazione*, in Italian, June 8, 1997, *FBIS-WEU-97-159*, June 8, 1997.

29. Moscow, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, in Russian, September 28, 1996, *FBIS-SOV-96-211-S*, September 28, 1996.

30. Wojtek Lamentowicz, "Russia and East-Central Europe: Strategic Options," and Yuri Davydov, "Russian Security and East-Central Europe," in Baranovsky, pp. 355-385.

31. Davydov, Lamentowicz, Andrei Zagorsky, "Russia and European Institutions," and Vladimir Baranovsky, "Conclusion: Assessing Russia's Interaction With Europe," all in Baranovsky, pp. 364-365, 379-382, 525-527, 539-540, and 545-555, respectively.

32. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Observations and Analysis*, (henceforth *FBIS-FMN*)-February 12, 1997, "Solana CIS Trip Irks Officials"; Paul Goble, "Strange, Unjust, and Wrong," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, (henceforth *RFE/RL*) February 13, 1997.

33. *Ibid.*

34. "Military Alliances," *CDPP*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 43, November 20, 1996, p. 21; and the article by Russia's leading defense correspondent, Pavel Felgengauer, Moscow, *Segodnya*, in Russian, October 18, 1996, *FBIS-SOV-96-214-S*, November 6, 1996.

35. "Russia, NATO Agree on Act Formalizing Relations," *CDPP*, Vol. XLIX, No. 20, June 18, 1997, where a Foreign Ministry official said "We got everything we wanted." Henry Kissinger, "Helsinki Fiasco," *Washington Post*, March 30, 1997, p. C7; Henry Kissinger, "The Dilution of NATO," *Washington Post*, June 8, 1997, p. C9; Friedbert Pfluger, "NATO's Bad Bargain," *New York Times*, May 16, 1997, p. A33; *Founding Act*, Moscow, *RIA*, in English, May 17, 1997, *FBIS-UMA-97-137*, May 17, 1997, "Rogov on Founding Act's Benefits, Problems," *Johnson's Russia List*, djohnson@cdi.org, May 28-29, 1997, from *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, May 28, 1997, Moscow, *Itogi*, in Russian, May 27, 1997, *FBIS-SOV-97-109*, May 27, 1997.

36. As Sergei Rogov, Director of the USA-Canada Institute (ISKAN) pointed out, today's Russia has a proportionally greater military burden than did the Soviet Union, lecture to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, PA, January 22, 1997.

37. James Sherr, "Russia and Ukraine," *Seminar on Russia and the NIS*, Ankara, Turkey: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Center for Strategic Research, 1996, SAM Papers No. 1, Minutes of a conference at Antalya, March 29-31, 1996, p. 45.

38. James Sherr, "Russian Great Power Ideology: Sources and Implications," Conflict Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst, Camberley, Surrey, July 1996, pp. 2-3.

39. Stephen Sestanovich, "Giving Russia Its Due," *The National Interest*, No. 36, Summer, 1994, pp. 3-13, is the most overt exponent of the argument that Russian policy is, in fact, one of stability, not of revisionism, and hankering after hegemony in the CIS. See also Goble; *FBIS-FMN*, February 12, 1997; Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, *Will the Union Be Reborn?: The Future of the Post-Soviet Region* John Henriksen, trans., Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1997, which contains a frank aspiration of revisionism to restore a union (not a Soviet Union) and lays out a strategy for doing so.

40. "Address by Y.M. Primakov to the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, September 20, 1996," p. 2. Transcript made available by the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States.

41. Moscow, *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya* in Russian, July-September, 1994, *Foreign Broadcast Information*

Service, *Central Eurasia, FBIS Report* (henceforth *FBIS-USR*)-94-129, November 29, 1994, p. 48.

42. Vladimir Baranovsky, "Russian Foreign Policy Priorities and European Multilateral Institutions," *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXX, No. 1, January-March 1995, pp. 33-50; Moscow, *Izvestiya* in Russian, June 19, 1997, *FBIS-SOV-97-169*, June 19, 1997.

43. "All This Is Ours," *The Economist*, November 26, 1994, p. 60, "Statement by the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation V.S. Chernomyrdin At the Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the OSCE Participating States," Lisbon, December 2, 1996.

44. "Can Russia Ever Be Secured?," *The Economist*, December 7, 1996, pp. 45-46.

45. *Ibid.*

46. This was repeated by the Russian Ambassador to Latvia as well, Moscow, *RIA*, in English, June 11, 1997, *FBIS-SOV-97-162*, June 12, 1997, for still more recent attacks on the Baltic states, see Stockholm, *Dagens Nyheter*, in Swedish, July 12, 1997, *FBIS-WEU-97-224*, August 12, 1997; *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newslines*, August 26, 1997.

47. Kissinger; Pfluger, p. A33; *Founding Act*.

48. *FBIS-SOV*, June 5 and June 6, 1997; *Founding Act*.

49. Graeme Herd with Ene Rongelep and Anton Surikov, *Crisis for Estonia? Russia, Estonia, and a Post-Chechen Cold War*, London Defence Studies, No. 29, Centre for Defence Studies, London, 1995, pp. 38-44.

50. Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in English, February 11, 1997; *The Monitor*, February 12, 1997; Paul Goble, "Analysis From Washington—Putting Pressure On Baltics," *RFE/RL*, February 14, 1997.

51. *ITAR-TASS*, February 11, 1997.

52. *Ibid.*; Graeme Herd, "Letter on Baltic Security Policies," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, June, 1997, pp. 251-253; Goble, "Putting Pressure on Baltics."

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Ibid.*

55. *Ibid.*

56. Herd, pp. 251-253; Moscow, *NTV*, in Russian, May 7, 1997, *FBIS-SOV-97-127*, May 7, 1997; Poznan, *WPROST*, in Polish, May 11, 1997, *FBIS-SOV-97-133*, May 13, 1997; Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in English, May 5, 1997, *FBIS-SOV-97-125*, May 5, 1997; Copenhagen, *Berlingske Tidende*, in Danish, April 16, 1997, *FBIS-SOV-97-086*, April 16, 1997.

57. Moscow, *ITAR-TASS World Service*, December 10, 1996; Blank, *Russia and the Baltic*, pp. 1-9.

58. *ITAR-TASS World Service*, December 10, 1996.

59. *Ibid.*; Valentin Alexandrov, "A Mission Abroad - To Latvia," *International Affairs* (Moscow), May 1992, p. 60; Andreas Oplatka of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* reports that Western diplomats describe Russians in the Baltic who, thanks to Moscow's propaganda, perceive themselves to be repressed and the victims of discrimination, as "losing touch with reality." Andreas Oplatka, "Estonians, Russians, and the Burden of History," *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, September 1996, p. 9.

60. *ITAR-TASS World Service*, December 10, 1996; *ITAR-TASS*, February 11, 1997; Goble, "Putting Pressure on Baltics."

61. *ITAR-TASS World Service*, December 10, 1996.

62. Moscow, *Kommersant-Daily* in Russian, July 29, 1994, *FBIS-SOV-94-147*, August 1, 1994, p. 1; Moscow, *Rossiyskiye Vesti* in Russian, August 16, 1994, *FBIS-SOV-94-159*, August 17, 1994, pp. 12-13; *The Monitor*, June 9, 1995, March 15, 1996, and January 10, 1997.

63. Anatol Lieven, "Baltic Iceberg Dead Ahead: NATO Beware," *The World Today*, July 1996, p. 176.

64. Moscow, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, in Russian, May 17, 1995, *FBIS-SOV-95-095*, May 17, 1995, pp. 6-7; "Military Alliances," *CDPP*, Vol. XLVII, No. 25, July 19, 1995, p. 31; Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in English, June 28, 1996, *FBIS-SOV-96-126*, June 28, 1996, p. 18.

65. Moscow, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, in Russian, September 23, 1995, *FBIS-SOV-95-188*, September 28, 1995, pp. 19-22.

66. Trenin; Moscow, *Trud*, in Russian, June 25, 1996, *FBIS-SOV-96-124*, June 26, 1996, pp. 18-19.

67. See the two articles by Sherman Garnett, "Russia's Illusory Ambitions," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. LXXVI, No 2, March-April 1997, pp. 61-76; and "Russia and Its Borderlands: A Geography of Violence," *Parameters*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, Spring 1997, pp. 4-21.

68. "Speech by Mr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO at the Royal Institute of International Relations, Brussels, January 14, 1997," NATO Internet, p. 4.

69. Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992, pp. 280-282, 345-346.

70. Admiral F.N. Gromov, "Znachenie Kaliningradskogo Osobogo Raiona dlia Oboronosposobnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii," *Voennaya Mysl'*, No. 5, September-October 1995, p. 13.

71. *Ibid.*

72. Kaliningrad, *Kaliningradskaya Pravda*, in Russian, October 19, 1996, *FBIS-SOV-96-211*, October 31, 1996.

73. Quoted in Captain Jorgen Ericsson, Royal Swedish Navy, "Swedish Security Policy at a Crossroads," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. XLIX, No. 2, Spring 1996, p. 75.

74. Richard A. Bitzinger, "The Nordic/Baltic Region: A New Strategic Significance?" *Defense Analysis*, Vol. XII, No. 3, 1996, pp. 371-375.

75. On January 22, 1997 the Russian government released a letter from generals and admirals urging the retargeting of European capitals with nuclear weapons should NATO expand. See also Paul A. Goble, "The Russian Response to NATO Expansion," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, October 2, 1996. These are only a few of the many efforts to brandish such threats.

76. At the recent Davos conference—in February, 1997—Russian spokesmen threatened that NATO enlargement might cause an upsurge of European terrorism by "disaffected" elements, not just Russians. Obviously this was a clear threat to use intelligence assets to foment terrorism. *The Monitor*, February 4-5, 1997.

77. Herd, Rongelep, and Surikov, pp. 38-44.

78. Lowell Barrington, "The Domestic and International Consequences of Citizenship in the Soviet Successor States," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. XLVII, No. 5, 1995, pp. 752-755.

79. Vladimir I. Ivanov, "Russia's New Military Doctrine: Implications for Asia," Michael D. Bellows ed., *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities*, Washington, DC: Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, p. 223.

80. This was revealed at the Russian Presentations to the XV Biennial Conference of European Security Institutions, Moscow, January 24-26, 1996, and is visible in the Conference Report of John Borawski for the Conference "European Security After the Great Debate," Moscow, Hotel Baltchug Kempinski, January 24-25, 1997, that was organized by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Moscow Public Science Foundation.

81. *Ibid.*; Trenin; Oplatka, p. 9.

82. As can be seen by Bonn's increasing number of concessions to Russia which give every sign of being formalized into a package of concessions to Moscow, Moscow's screaming and yelling has effect. And as Secretary Perry indicated, the Baltic states' problems with Russia debar them from NATO, reasoning that gives Moscow every reason to keep up the pressure as in its recent Baltic policy statement. *ITAR-TASS*, February 11, 1997; Steven Erlanger, "Albright Flies Toward Vexing Issues," *New York Times*, February 16, 1997, p. A12.

83. Andrei V. Kozyrev, "NATO Is Not Our Enemy," *Newsweek*, February 10, 1997, p. 31; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Global Viewpoint: Ultimately, Bigger NATO Will Be of Benefit to Russia," *Harrisburg Patriot-News*, February 9, 1997, p. B9; *Idem.*, "NATO and Russia," Stephen Cambone, ed., *NATO's Role in European Security*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995, pp. 44-48.

84. For example, Primakov's statements on January 9 and February 7, 1997, that the government should not balk at imposing sanctions on Estonia for mistreating its Russians and his refusal to sign a border treaty with Tallinn or Riga until this alleged mistreatment stops, *The Monitor*, January 10, and February 8, 1997; for others, see Stephen J. Blank, "The Baltic States And Russia: The Strategic and Ethnic Contexts," paper presented to the II Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, Columbia University, New York, NY, April 28, 1996.

85. Wohlfeld, p. 12; *FBIS-EEU*, June 6, 1997, and the two articles by John Borawski, "The NATO Enlargement: What Does Russia Want," *European Security*, Vol. V, No. 3, Autumn 1996, pp. 381-395; and "NATO Enlargement and Russia," *Perspectives* (Ankara), Vol. I, No. 2, July-August, 1996, pp. 118-131.

86. Christensen, and Snyder, 138-168; Posen, pp. 12-127, 156-157.

87. Jacqui Moorhouse, "Central and Eastern Europe: Accession to the European Union," *Aussenpolitik*, English Edition, No. 4, 1996, pp. 368-378.

88. Peter Rudolf, "The Future of the United States as a European Power: The Case of NATO Enlargement," *European Security*, Vol. V, No. 2, Summer, 1996, pp. 179-180; see also the quotations of Ruhe on this point in Christoph Bertram's article, in Berlin, *Die Zeit*, in German, January 7, 1994, *FBIS-WEU-94-006*, January 10, 1994, pp. 17-19.

89. Moorhouse, pp. 368-378.

90. Frankfurt am Main, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung* in German, January 15, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-012*, January 19, 1995, p. 9; Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent*, New York: Random House, 1993, *passim*.

91. "Germany's Lostpolitik," *The Economist*, December 7, 1996, p. 46; *FBIS-SOV*, April 16, 1997.

92. Craig Whitney, "Kicking Troubles Down the Road," *New York Times*, June 19, 1997, p. A12; Paul Goble, "Squaring the Circle of European Security," *RFE/RL*, January 22, 1997; and for earlier signs of this reluctance to act, see Lionel Barber, "Brussels Keeps Shut the Gates to the East," *Financial Times*, November 16, 1995, p. 17; Madrid, *El Pais*, in Spanish, December 10, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-238*, December 12, 1995, p. 9; Barry D. Wood, "The State of the Union: Enlargement," *Europe*, November, 1996, pp. ESR 8-9.

93. *The Founding Act*, Erlanger, p. A12.

94. *Ibid.*

95. Even before the Founding Act was signed, Poland was demanding that it be present at all Russia-NATO talks, hardly a sign of confidence in the result, and this demand has not abated since then. See Warsaw, *PAP*, in Polish, May 23, 1997; *FBIS-EEU-97-143*, May 23, 1997, as for Christopher and Perry see Warren Christopher and William J. Perry, "NATO's True Mission," *New York Times*, October 21, 1997, Paris, *Le Figaro*, October 8, 1997, in French, *FBIS-WEU-97-281*, October 8, 1997.

96. Kissinger.

97. For a discussion of collective security, see George W. Downs, ed., *Collective Security Beyond the Cold War*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994, which offers the latest systematic discussion of this concept; and Stephen Blank, *Helsinki in Asia?*, Carlisle Barracks,

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993, pp. 16-19, and the sources cited therein.

98. See the conditions for a lasting detente in Europe laid out in 1972 by Josef Korbel, only most of which, by no means all, have been fulfilled. Josef Korbel, *Detente in Europe: Real or Imaginary?*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972, p. 6.

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101. Frankfurt am Main, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, in German, July 2, 1993, *FBIS-WEU-93-137*, July 20, 1993, pp. 30-31.

102. *Ibid.*

103. Sam Nunn, Robert Blackwill, Arnold Horelick, "Stopping the Decline in U.S-Russian Relations," Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1996, argues explicitly that Russia must approve the European *status quo* before NATO enlarges.

104. Berlin, *Die Welt*, in German, March 5, 1994, *FBIS-WEU-94-044*, March 7, 1994, pp. 15-16; Copenhagen, *Berlingske Tidende*, in Danish, February 3, 1994, *FBIS-WEU-94-030*, January 14, 1994, pp. 42-43; Frankfurt am Main, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, in German, February 12, 1994, *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

105. *Ibid.*

106. Oleg Samorodni, "Interests Coincide," *The Baltic Independent*, December, 9-15, 1994, p. 6.

107. Frankfurt am Main, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, in German, August 23, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-163*, August 23, 1995, pp. 86-87; *Open Media Research Institute, Daily Report*, August 24, 1995.

108. Frankfurt am Main, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, in German, September 13, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-177*, September 13, 1995, p. 6.

109. Frankfurt, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung*, in German, August 20, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-163*, August 23, 1995, pp. 7-8.

110. Bonn, *Bulletin*, in German, March 4, 1996, *FBIS-WEU-96-051*, March 14, 1996, pp. 10-12.

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**Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.
Commandant**

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

**Director
Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon**

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