



The Letort Papers

TALKING PAST EACH OTHER? HOW VIEWS OF U.S. POWER VARY BETWEEN U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL MILITARY PERSONNEL

Richard H. M. Outzen

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The Letort Papers



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Letort Paper

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Richard H. M. Outzen

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FOREWORD

A decade of multinational operations and global engagement has forced the U.S. military into a deeper and more sustained set of military-to-military relationships than previous strategic conditions required. In many cases, this experience has demonstrated differences between how our current generation of officers and their international peers view and discuss the exercise of U.S. power and influence overseas. Anecdotally, it has sometimes seemed as if American officers and their foreign partners were talking past each other—not only coming to different conclusions, but using entirely different premises and reasoning to explain the exercise of U.S. power abroad. In some cases, friction driven by miscommunication has manifested as low-level dissatisfaction and has been contained by professional norms and institutional processes. In other cases, especially when dealing with predominantly Muslim militaries—Turkey and Pakistan, no less than Iraq and Afghanistan—the friction has burst forth into open acrimony, sometimes with lethal results.

U.S. margins for tolerating such negative outcomes will decrease along with our reduced funding, force structure, and presence overseas. Simply put, we must take care to better understand and more seamlessly cooperate with our allied and coalition militaries. In this context, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased to present the accompanying monograph, which addresses the question of how well U.S. officers and their international peers understand one another. The research was conducted in the spring of 2012 by a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), drawing on large pools of U.S. and international officers studying at the National Defense University (NDU). The Paper attempts to support improved understanding by

addressing the following questions: How much do the views of U.S. and international military officers diverge? What are the underlying reasons for that divergence? Do the differences follow predictable patterns? If so, what recommendations can be made?

This Paper contributes to an emerging body of research on the sources and modes of anti-U.S. sentiment in the international arena. It does so in a research area seldom touched by the broader academic community—military-to-military relations—but one of great potential utility to our audience. SSI is pleased to present this example of thoughtful analysis produced by one of our Senior Service Schools.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr." in a cursive script.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

RICHARD H. M. OUTZEN is a colonel in the U.S. Army. He is currently serving with the U.S. Security Coordinator in Jerusalem. Previous assignments have been as a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO), with a regional focus on the greater Middle East. He was commissioned in the Field Artillery and served in tactical staff and command positions in Germany, Turkey, and the United States. Since entering the FAO program in 1999, he has served in security assistance, attaché, and liaison positions in Turkey, Israel, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Colonel Outzen speaks four foreign languages, and has written extensively on matters of strategy, language, and culture. He is a 1989 graduate of Dartmouth College, and a 2012 graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

SUMMARY

This Paper addresses the question of whether anecdotally observed friction between U.S. military personnel and their international partners stems from underlying bias or other factors that cannot be practically remedied. After providing a backdrop of the types of friction that have been observed, and that seem to be escalating, the Paper examines alternative theoretical explanations for such friction. The friction mirrors, in a sense, the broader sharpening of anti-U.S. sentiment observed throughout much of the globe over the past decade. There are two broad explanatory approaches: the friction and sentiment stem from who we are and are thus immutable; or they stem from discrete actions and policies, and thus may be ameliorated to some degree.

The Paper provides a method for measuring variance between U.S. military officers and their international peers, by constructing a survey comprised of questions about U.S. power and military operations overseas. A subset of the questions was constructed in such a way that the questions could not be answered objectively or based on personal experience, and thus could be used as indicators of subjective bias for or against the United States. The variation of responses to all survey questions would indicate the degree of variance between the views of the two populations, while responses to the “subjective” questions would provide the key to understanding whether the source of the variance was subjective/pathological or objective/rational.

Key Findings include:

On questions of U.S. power and influence, the responses of senior international officers differ significantly from those of their U.S. peers nearly half the time.

- Two groups of military officers similar in rank, age, and experience – one U.S. and one international – showed statistically significant variation between aggregate response patterns on 40 percent of the items on a 40-question opinion survey.

On questions of belief, opinion, and bias related to U.S. power and influence, the international group diverged from their U.S. counterparts exactly half the time, and the clustering of responses suggests that U.S. value and belief positions account for 80 percent of the variance.

- A subset of the survey questions was designed to indicate underlying bias for or against the United States in response patterns. Significant variation between U.S. and international responses within this subset was expected to indicate that strongly held opinions or beliefs, rather than differences of interpretation or evaluation, were driving variation. Statistically significant variation occurred in response to half the questions (5 of 10).
- International officer responses showed a fairly wide distribution, whereas U.S. officer responses clustered over a much narrower range, suggesting that where bias drove the variation, it was U.S. rather than international officer bias.

Response patterns to certain questions were unambiguous enough to suggest clear areas for policy focus or strategic communication. Examples include:

- Majorities in both groups thought the U.S. people and government do not understand the world well enough to exercise global leadership effectively. Agreement on that point was near-total—it had the lowest score for significant deviation in the entire survey.
- Nonetheless, both groups still believe it is in the world’s best interest for the United States to remain globally engaged, and to maintain a robust official and business presence abroad.
- The two groups strongly agree that the U.S. Government acts overseas based on hard interests rather than ideology, and that the United States is unique in how it uses its power.
- More than twice as many U.S. as international officers believe in the necessity and benefits of the missile shield program currently being deployed in Europe.
- U.S. officers are nearly unanimous in the belief that drone strikes against terror targets are necessary and justified; international respondents are deeply divided on this issue.
- U.S. officers are far more convinced than their international peers that the United States is genuinely committed to democracy, human rights, the law of war, and counterdrug policies abroad.

Survey and interview data suggest that international officer views of the United States are frequently critical, but seldom cluster in responses that are categorically anti-U.S.

- This evidence helps to refute the notion that criticism of the United States is driven by reflexive, predictable bias—sometimes referred to as “pathological” anti-Americanism. It supports interpretation of anti-U.S. sentiment or criticism as a varied, rational, and contingent.

International military personnel at U.S. commands and schools constitute a valuable resource for sampling opinion on a systematic basis.

- High-level contacts between attachés and general officers should be complemented through regular surveys and focus groups that help us understand differing views among our critical partners. Such tools, as well as the information they yield, can best be leveraged in the various Professional Military Education programs.

The research broadly supports the views of political scientist Joseph Nye, who has argued that America’s subjective attractiveness to the people of other nations, or soft power, ebbs and flows based on practical steps responsive to policy. The response data show that there is significant variation in attitudes and beliefs separating U.S. personnel from international partners, but that the variation stems from considered positions rather than reflexive bias or lack of appreciation. Where bias is a barrier, it is more frequently our bias than theirs. The salient implication is that U.S. strategists and decisionmakers must adopt approaches to systematically measure, understand, and cooperatively resolve differences of attitude and belief that can impact our missions and interests overseas.

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**BACKGROUND THEORY: THE ACADEMIC
STUDY OF ANTI-AMERICANISM**

Primary Explanations for a Growing Phenomenon.

A combination of public polling data and global criticism of U.S. military operations abroad raised academic interest in the study of anti-Americanism in the early 2000s.¹ Public commentators such as Thomas Friedman wondered, “Why do they hate us?” following the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, and “Why does everybody else hate us?” after the invasion of Iraq.² While no clear and immediate remedy seemed available for the negative trends, observers such as David Levinson understood the need for careful study:

For several years running, public opinion research has told us that many people around the world no longer trust the United States . . . and object to U.S. foreign policy . . . [T]oo little serious thought has been given to how and why people form their opinions about the U.S. and what causes them to change. . . . Unless we discover how factors such as these influence people’s thinking and perceptions, we can never expect to have a full understanding . . . and we cannot hope to significantly influence those perspectives.³

The scope, tone, and intensity of popular and political invective against the United States marked this new brand of criticism as related to but distinct from that studied by scholars of the preceding generation. Previous research on international public criticism looks through the lens of ideological processes, rather than engagement strategies. David Apter and Clifford Geertz, for instance, focused their effort on understanding the competing purposes of ideology, both as an expression of rational interest or as a sort of a pressure relief valve for popular discontent.⁴ John Zaller later addressed the role of ideology in summarizing expert and elite opinion for mass audiences, helping maintain interest awareness and mobilize support when elite opinion was discordant or indicated dispute.⁵ The context for such studies was the Cold War paradigm of competing and ideologically coherent opposed blocs, each facing an imperative of maintaining domestic ideological support while undermining the global standing of its rival. Public anger and discontent were more or less assumed to be ideological, with clear instrumentality in a binary power struggle waged across defined borders. Global conflict lent the occasional burst of public outrage a coherent framework.

With the end of the Cold War, though, the explicit ideological basis for public outrage seemed to have dissipated. The sense that ideology would create far less strife and anger in subsequent decades, expressed most plainly in Francis Fukuyama's *End of History and the Last Man*, seemed to augur a world trending toward liberal democracy and parliamentary debate, away from shooting wars and agitated publics.⁶ Samuel Huntington's counterthesis in *A Clash of Civilizations* tempered that prospect somewhat, but in the

years between 1991 and 2001, it seemed unlikely that the United States would face a durable constellation of international terrorists, lethal insurgencies, and broadly negative international opinion in the near- to midterm.⁷ Yet by late-2003, that is exactly the situation U.S. strategists faced.

Much intellectual effort went into diagnosing and remedying the threats of terrorism and insurgency, but only gradually did the concomitant problem of America's deteriorating standing in the eyes of the global public receive detailed attention. Eventually a number of thoughtful works emerged, generally reflecting one of two explanatory approaches. We can refer to these approaches as the "transitory" and the "pathological." In discussing these explanatory approaches, we will use the term "anti-Americanism" in a broad and flexible sense. It encompasses the entire range of negative views of U.S. behaviors and actions, whether they are passionate or intellectual, reasoned or visceral, transitory or pathological.

Transitory Explanation.

Giacomo Chiozza took on the task of explaining what motivates foreign and domestic critics of the United States in his work *Anti-Americanism and the American World Order* (2009). Chiozza began by reviewing current and recent literature on the phenomenon of anti-Americanism, and grouping the leading theoreticians of anti-Americanism into those who see it as irrational and implacable, and those who see it as rational and temporary. The first group he refers to as the *anti-Americanism as a syndrome* school; the second group, with whom Chiozza ultimately sides, he refers to as the *dimensions of anti-Americanism* school. Other

researchers have used more or less the same categories but refer to them as the *pathological* explanation and the *soft power* explanation, respectively.

Chiozza argues that much anti-Americanism is ephemeral, rising in response to particular incidents and dissipating as provocative policies or actions recede in time. While some anti-American attitudes or views may be relatively durable, other types seem to respond to remedial U.S. action, positive messaging, or the passage of time. In Chiozza's view this leaves substantial opportunity for specific U.S. policies to build and maintain goodwill abroad, an approach he consciously links to Joseph Nye's theory of soft power:

Joseph Nye, in particular, has argued that the United States has a unique reservoir of soft power that enhances U.S. ability to exercise global leadership. The argument in this book partially concurs with the soft power thesis. . . .⁸

In addition to accepting that there are different causes and dimensions of anti-Americanism, Chiozza questions the notion that anti-Americanism in the public *ipso facto* damages our ability to exercise power abroad.⁹ He argues that the extent to which anti-Americanism damages or constrains the exercise of American power depends on whether such views are strict ideological constructs, or a mode of public expression with complex and unpredictable impact on actual policies and actions. He traces the argument for strict ideological construction through the writings of researchers such as Paul Hollander, Barry and Judith Culp Rubin, and Jean-Francois Revel, all of whom receive attention below.

Chiozza's second category, individuals skeptical of a direct causal linkage between mass opinion and political actions, includes Philip Converse and John

Zaller.¹⁰ Converse argues that ignorance, ideological incoherence, and low levels of commitment militate against the operational effectiveness of such vaguely accepted ideological programs.¹¹ Zaller lays out the often-contradictory nature of public opinion, sensitive to a diverse array of stimuli and extremely sensitive to observer bias during measurement.¹² In short, these observers argue, we should not draw any hasty conclusions from apparent mass sentiment—things are often not what they seem.

Chiozza concludes that the historical record predominantly shows anti-Americanism as a “loosely constrained belief system” ambivalently held, and only infrequently as a determinative and fixed program.¹³ Anti-American views do not predetermine opposition, but they do complicate through suspicion the advantages of soft power identified by Joseph Nye.¹⁴ The upshot is that periodic waves of criticism or emotional anti-Americanism do not erect a monolithic and deep wall against us, but rather constitute a long-term and complex rub that complicates without foreclosing our options for exercising power.¹⁵ More rooted opposition to U.S. policies or power may not entail personal or cultural hatred at all; conversely, praise for the ideals or people of the United States does not ensure political, diplomatic, or practical support.¹⁶ In Chiozza’s estimate, the pervasive anti-Americanism of the first decade of the 21st century is not really so different from previous waves tied to similar but unrelated international contexts. We seem destined to repeat a dynamic that has recurred since World War II: periodic waves and spikes in anti-American sentiment overlaid on a generally positive cultural and social viewpoint, moderated by the hard power interests of particular international actors.¹⁷

Where Chiozza uses Nye as a starting point for his interpretation of the transitory causes of anti-Americanism, Ole Holsti traces the roots further back in U.S. political tradition in his *To See Ourselves as Others See Us* (2008). Holsti points out that our national leaders from the time of the Founding Fathers saw great utility in tracking and positively influencing the sensibilities of foreign leaders and publics:

Although Thomas Jefferson and his colleagues, in writing the Declaration of Independence, were not aware of the concept of “soft power,” the phrase “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind” in that historic document reflected a belief that the manner in which others viewed the legitimacy of claims to independence by the upstart colonies might in fact influence the prospects for a successful divorce from the mother country. . . . [I]n contrast to hard power, the base of soft power resides in the “hearts and minds” of other countries, especially among the leaders of their political, economic, military, cultural, and other major institutions. . . . Although it is not always possible to establish a causal link between public opinion and government policy . . . leaders . . . who chose to defy Washington acted in ways that were consistent with the preferences of their publics.¹⁸

Holsti argues that both the elite and public views of the United States in other countries should matter to us — the former because of the immediate impact of civil and military decisionmakers; the latter because of their fundamental weight in shaping those decisions over time. Effective statecraft requires that we understand and to some degree heed sensitivities of the host nations, at least if we want political or military support from the government that answers to that public.

Holsti largely supports Chiozza's differentiation of the various and often-conflicting dimensions of foreign sentiment regarding America. He groups those dimensions into the generally positive views of the idealism and promise that America *is*, and the frequently criticized things that America *does* in specific circumstances.¹⁹ The most fervent criticisms often reflect disappointment stemming from local and temporary factors; they ebb and flow over time, and thus can be ameliorated or mitigated over time, as well. The reservoir of abstract good will based on America's underlying character has, on the other hand, remained generally constant in long-interval polling data. Holsti argues emphatically that the United States can only damage its own interests by concluding that our critics hate us because of what we are, and that they therefore are the "real" source of the problem.

Polling data and historical precedent both support a policy approach that assumes the international community generally shares a benign view of the United States (there are, of course, exceptions), and each incidence of criticism should be evaluated and, where possible, remedied on its own merits.²⁰ This is not to deny that some criticism is too self-serving or specious to be taken seriously—as Paul Hollander and others have argued persuasively. Allowing "criticism fatigue" to reduce our attentiveness and impute insincerity or enmity to all criticism, though, would be both a cognitive and a strategic mistake.

If transitory rather than pathological factors drive criticism of the United States, we may expect that this should be reflected within the subset of foreign opinion addressed by the current study, that of foreign senior military officers. We can hypothesize that critical views may emerge in response to specific policy dis-

putes or strategic behaviors, but should be absent on matters of general identity or “what America is.” Such a pattern might suggest areas of U.S. strategic behavior that have generated friction or criticism, but may, through a nuanced approach of discussion and compromise, be rendered less problematic. If, conversely, critical views extend beyond specific and measurable instances of interest conflict and into the area of broad, intangible, and subjective beliefs, our problem takes on a more immutable and strategic character. Under such conditions, one hears the echo of Dean Acheson’s dismissive judgment, “World opinion . . . is pure fancy — no more substantial a ghost than the banging of a shutter, or the wind in the chimney.”²¹ There are a number of analysts who argue that this is indeed the case.

Reflexive or “Pathological” Explanations.

The most provocative and lyrical of those arguing that most anti-American sentiment is irrational and ungrounded in sincere policy criticism was Jean-Francois Revel, a sympathetic and insightful observer of the United States and its people, rather in the tradition of Alexis de Tocqueville. Revel argues in his seminal work, *Anti-Americanism* (2000), that many European critics of the United States are not responding to specific actions or inactions, so much as they are seeking to discredit the powerful symbiosis of political liberalism and capitalism the U.S. embodies.

. . . the anti-Americanism of the extreme Right, it is fueled by the same hatred of democracy and the liberal economy that goads the extreme Left. . . . The principal function of anti-Americanism has always been, and still is, to discredit liberalism by discrediting its su-

preme incarnation. . . . The Blame America First reflex to each and every problem has for long been instinctive among the cultural upper echelons.²²

The wave of European revulsion and criticism that increased in the decade from the fall of the Soviet Union to the 9/11 attacks was not so unprecedented, says Revel, but was fully in keeping with a pattern that pertained through much of the Cold War.

As the sixties unfolded, I had begun to be invaded by doubts as to the validity of this reflexive anti-Americanism, which indiscriminately condemned America's 'imperialistic' foreign policy—Soviet imperialism, in contrast, was but philanthropy—and American society. . . . The astonishing thing is . . . that even outside Communist circles it could gain a certain credibility—and this in countries where the press is free and it is easy to cross-check data. The mystery of anti-Americanism is not the disinformation—reliable information on the United States has always been easy to obtain—but people's willingness to be misinformed.²³

Revel noted that criticism of specific U.S. policies and actions was frequently accompanied by sweeping indictments of U.S. culture and social conditions. The most frequent charges—recurring charges, since they seem to crop up in every new generation's jealous attacks on the United States—are that Americans are ruled by money, have no other values, have commoditized everything and everyone, that poverty and pandemic violence are the dominant social realities, and that we are a democracy only in appearance—one that delights in electing only defectives and miscreants as President.²⁴

The misrepresentations of social relations and living standards in the United States, while gratifying anti-American passions, serve finally to denigrate free market economies. Likewise, the incomprehension or caricaturing of American institutions helps to spread the idea that the United States is not truly a democracy, and, by extrapolation, that liberal democracies are democratic in appearance only. But it's in the area of international relations that the 'hyperpower' finds itself held in particular abhorrence.²⁵

Revel describes a lineal descent from the anti-Americanism of the Vietnam War generation in Europe and the United States, to that of the anti-globalists of today.

The youthful anti-globalists are actually superannuated ideologues, revenants from a past of ruin and bloodshed. . . . America is the object of their loathing because, for a half-century or more, she has been the most prosperous and creative capitalist society on earth. . . . What the current crop of anti-globalizers have in common with the *soixante-huitards* is a simplistic Marxist article of faith: absolute evil is capitalism, incarnated in and directed by the United States.²⁶

The language and fervor of sweeping denunciation, unaccompanied by carefully critical analysis or proof, crept also into the anger of Islamist insurgents and their sympathizers across the globe.

The clumsiest of these fallacies was an attempt to justify Islamist terrorism by claiming that America has long been hostile towards Islam. But the truth is that the United States' actions historically have been far less damaging to Muslim interests than the actions of Britain, France, or Russia.²⁷

Revel sees such criticism as a global phenomenon, not restricted to Middle East war zones and European capitals:

European literary figures are not alone in despising American authors, to whom, nevertheless, they owe so many renewing themes and revolutionary narrative techniques. The daily newspaper Asahi Shimbun, interviewing Japanese writers and philosophers after September 11, recorded not only political attitudes leaning more towards the jihadists than their victims, but literary judgments imbued with condescension and assurance of superiority.²⁸

Revel is not blind to the necessity of legitimate and well-grounded criticism. He notes, however, that the disproportionate type of criticism sometimes observed may indicate a purposeful manipulation of facile prejudice:

There is a big difference between being anti-American and being critical of the United States. Once again: critiques are appropriate and necessary, provided that they rest on facts, address real abuses, real errors and real excesses—without deliberately losing sight of America's wise decisions, beneficent interventions and salutary policies . . . anti-Americanism is at base a totalizing, if not totalitarian, vision.... Anti-Americanism thus defined is less a popular prejudice than a *parti pris* of the political, cultural, and religious elites.²⁹

Revel also highlights the biggest danger stemming from criticism not tethered to facts by context or proportion: that Americans will stop listening.

The Anti-American obsession, in effect, aggravates the evil that it aims to extirpate, namely [American] unilateralism . . . and causes them to keep thinking:

'They're always blaming us, so why consult them at all? We already know they'll only vilify us.' . . . The fallacies of the anti-American bias encourage American unilateralism.³⁰

Barry Rubin and Judith Culp Rubin, writing 4 years after Revel during the emotionally charged aftermath of the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein, carried the pathological explanation further in their work *Hating America* (2004). Like Revel, they are careful to acknowledge that not all criticism of America or U.S. policies constitutes anti-Americanism. They look for true anti-American sentiment in words or actions that show systemic antagonism, that greatly exaggerate U.S. shortcomings, deliberately misrepresent the nature or policies of the United States, or misperceive U.S. society, policies, or goals in a manner that falsely portrays them as ridiculous or malevolent.³¹

Interestingly, the Rubins identify a cascade of factors driving anti-Americanism that is largely independent of specific U.S. policies or actions. The biggest single cause is fear of domination by the dominant global power:

One of our most important conclusions is that there has been a historical continuity and evolution of anti-Americanism, coinciding with the development of the United States, changes in other societies, and the world situation. We have detected five phases in this process. . . . [I]n the current phase . . . those who hold anti-Americanism views see the U.S. domination, both as a great power and as a terrible model for civilization (as the centerpiece of globalization, modernization, and Westernization), to be an established fact. That is why it is the most angry and widespread exemplification of anti-Americanism ever seen.³²

While not denying President George Bush's unparalleled ability to antagonize America's critics personally, the Rubins discount the singularity of his impact, and the role of the war itself, in catalyzing hatred and opposition. The upsurge of anti-Americanism in the wake of 9/11 and the war in Iraq was a natural continuation or fulfillment of a trend that can be traced back 2 centuries.³³

The Rubins focus more attention on the average American's response to such antagonism than do other observers:

In general, there have been two distinct American responses to this supposedly paradoxical hatred of America. Most commonly, there is a sense of anger and annoyance coupled with curiosity. How could people be so antagonistic to a country of such decent intentions and frequent successes? How can the good side of America at home and the positive things it has done internationally be so ignored? This must arise from hostility to America's basic values such as democracy, free enterprise, and liberty. The alternative view is that the hatred is deserved, a result of bad American policies.³⁴

Americans in the Rubins' first category usually proceed to fight with rhetoric and weapons against the country's perceived enemies, while trying to restate the national reasoning more clearly. Those in the second category tend to become active in protest and reform movements, proceeding from the premise that "changing U.S. policies will inevitably dissipate antagonism." The Rubins note that neither approach gives sufficient consideration to the fact that there is a structure and political use to anti-Americanism, as well as a historical trajectory. The Rubins are optimistic that we

can understand this phenomenon more clearly, but not at all optimistic that our ameliorating actions will lessen the vehemence or scope of criticism. After all, there is too much political utility and comfort in such denunciatory theater. As long as the United States remains a powerful and unique model that inspires imitation in the politics, economics, social, and cultural affairs of other nations, anti-Americanism will remain powerful, durable, and varied.³⁵

Paul Hollander, writing contemporaneously with the Rubins, argues that the question is not whether pathology undergirds some criticism of the United States in the early-21st century, but just how widespread that pathology is. He asserted in *Understanding Anti-Americanism* (2004) that “reflexive disparagement” of the United States, by observers both foreign and domestic, is real and widespread.³⁶ Hollander recognizes that in the natural course of public and political events, a prominent power such as the United States will attract criticism, much of it justified, toward specific “. . . institutions, policies, leaders, or cultural trends. . . .”³⁷ When such criticism becomes generalized into “undifferentiated, diffuse, and empirically untenable hostility” toward the United States, it has become something pathological. Anti-Americanism then emerges as a “deep-seated, emotional predisposition that perceives the United States as an unmitigated and uniquely evil entity and the source of all, or most, other evils in the world.”³⁸

Hollander points out that there are both domestic and international varieties of such pathological anti-Americanism. Both have been on the rise in recent decades, he posits, due to a combination of five factors. These are the fall of Soviet communism, eliminating a rival magnet for pathological hatred; U.S. assertions

of military power abroad, above all else in Iraq and Afghanistan; the personality and policies of President Bush; globalization; and the rise of explicitly anti-American Islamic fundamentalism.³⁹ In the broader sense, pathological anti-Americanism stems from the *underlying human need for scapegoats, and the utility of a strong, rich nation for that role*. This psycho-social need and, in a complementary sense, the partially accurate association of the United States with globalization and the frequently justifiable criticism of specific errors or flaws, drives much current anti-Americanism.⁴⁰

The research focus reflected here is an attempt to shed light on the relative merits of the transitory and pathological explanations through examination of a uniquely paired group of subjects: senior U.S. and international military personnel. Two groups of students at the National Defense University (NDU), one composed of senior U.S. military personnel and the other of their international peers, were surveyed to compare critical views and biases in their analysis of U.S. actions overseas.⁴¹ The groups make for a compelling comparison, not only because of the global variety of the international students, but because the two groups are closely matched in terms of rank, experience, and professional culture. A series of questions designed to elicit varying degrees of critical response regarding U.S. power and influence—including a subset of questions that imply a reflexive or pathological basis for critical response—was administered to the two groups, to confirm the presence and cause of the potential variance in responses.

Other Survey Data Relevant to “Anti-Americanism.”

A number of opinion and polling firms, such as Pew and Gallup, have conducted research relevant to the study of views on U.S. power and influence overseas. That body of research provides a useful backdrop for the study of the international military officer opinion regarding the United States. These previous surveys show that public opinion of the United States in many countries has worsened over the past decade. In some cases, such as the unrest following Hosni Mubarak’s fall in Egypt, senior-level military ties have served to stabilize relations and maintain contact amid highly chaotic political conditions.⁴² Evidence of more sympathetic views among senior military officers might validate strategies based on engaging and building relationships with such groups in order to positively affect broader bilateral and multilateral understandings.

The Pew Research Center, a “fact tank” funded by charitable grants and foundations, began measuring opinion among foreign publics in 2001.⁴³ Its Global Attitudes Project has interviewed over 270,000 people in over 57 countries, and published numerous reports. These reports document well the global trends toward viewing the United States as an aggressive and threatening power between 2003 and 2008. While President Barack Obama’s election raised favorable ratings in some countries, the global economic crisis stimulated global concerns that the United States had become a declining power. While global surveys are dynamic, the overall trend is for foreign publics to view the United States through a suspicious and negative lens, with grave doubts about its intentions and future strength.⁴⁴

The picture is even bleaker in several regions and countries, particularly those with Muslim-majority populations. The consistently low positive numbers provide some ammunition for those who believe that reflexive bias or “pathologically” driven anti-Americanism has become a more or less permanent feature of the early-21st-century strategic landscape.

The Gallup Organization also conducts extensive overseas polling, normally in conjunction with research on consumer confidence factors, business climate, and domestic politics. Gallup also produces a regular measure of attitudes toward the United States. While that measure, the “Global Views of U.S. Leadership,” is focused on leadership, and thus reflects more about the President’s popularity than it does about power and influence more broadly, it can serve as a rough proxy for the overall tone of public opinion regarding the United States in a variety of countries. This set of surveys indicates that world opinion of the United States generally saw a bounce in 2008-09, but has dropped since that time, and currently runs less than 50 percent favorable in most countries.⁴⁵ It is against this recently improved, but still generally negative, backdrop of global opinion toward the United States, then, that we may consider a more specific group for study.

A natural next step in the study of anti-Americanism—so far primarily the domain of academics and pollsters—is for specific professional groups to expand data collection toward peer or customer groups relevant to their specific missions. Professional military officers comprise one such group. Increasing levels of international security cooperation have created new opportunities for aggregating and analyzing opinion data related to foreign militaries. One set of opportunities exists in multinational headquarters

and commands in the field, where U.S. and international military personnel operate together on a day-to-day basis. Due to the operational nature of these assignments, though, systematic study is normally not possible without interfering in the conduct of necessary work and missions. A better set of opportunities exists in academic or liaison environments, where a diverse set of foreign military personnel interact with U.S. counterparts with sufficient frequency to ensure both that they have relevant views on the United States, and that they are accessible and willing to participate in opinion-based study. The NDU offers a rich environment, with more than 100 senior-ranking foreign military personnel working alongside several hundred senior U.S. officers and defense civilians. Because no such systematic study appears to have been conducted to date, the current research was designed to provide a useful new data set, based on use of an opinion survey instrument for the comparative analysis of the views of U.S. and international students at the NDU. Building on the context provided through theoretical and polling works, this monograph may help identify specific problems and possible solutions for military commands functioning in an international or multinational context.

RESPONSES OF SURVEYED MILITARY PERSONNEL TO THEMES

Survey Design and Methodology.

The survey instrument was designed, based on themes encountered in foreign media outlets regarding U.S. power, influence, or operations abroad. Media samples were taken from a variety of newspapers in different regions of the globe, including Latin Amer-

ica, Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe, South Asia, and the Far East.⁴⁶ In some cases, questions derived from the media samples reflect wording from statements in editorial essays or columnists' writing, and in other cases, the questions blend elements from multiple sources within a region. Themes and topics raised by individual military personnel in informal settings, both U.S. and international, were also synthesized to inform the questions.

The purpose of basing survey items on these multiple sources was to produce a pool of statements that required respondents to go beyond the limits of their own national press coverage when evaluating statements about U.S. power and influence. Survey respondent answers thus reflect responses to arguments or views found in global press coverage of U.S. power and influence, rather than definitive analysis of the underlying events. This reflects the research goal of determining the variability of analytic frames common between U.S. and non-U.S. personnel, rather than views of specific military or political events seen through a professional frame. Survey respondents were volunteers from personnel assigned to the NDU, including officers from lieutenant colonel through major general, or defense civilians of equivalent rank. Appendix I has a more detailed description of the survey's methodology.

Survey Items, Response Tables, and Summary Charts.

The survey items and responses are summarized below. Each item is followed by a table describing how the two groups (U.S. and international officers) responded on a scale (Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither,

Disagree, and Strongly Disagree) to statements that describe their views and beliefs. Values in the tables are expressed as a percentage of total responses for each item. Two additional statistical measures are given alongside the percentages to indicate the existence and strength of the correlation between the respondents' nationalities and their views or beliefs.

The first measure is an F-Statistic, used by statisticians to determine the likelihood that a given result is statistically significant. In this case, the F-Statistic indicates whether variance between U.S. and international response patterns is random or statistically significant. Statistical significance simply means that a result is unlikely to have occurred by chance.⁴⁷ Not all statistically significant variance is important; to determine importance, a second measure called Eta Squared is used. Eta Squared measures association by describing strength of correlation on a range from 0 to 1.0, with 1.0 being the strongest. Eta Squared was calculated for those items with an F-Statistic over 3.75 (a higher F-Statistic means lower probability of randomness). Eta Squared was calculated to confirm the importance of association, with values over .05 considered strong association (relatively important). Following the last survey item is a summary chart for all 40 items. Appendix I contains a breakdown of responses by region.

Q1: The United States is unique among great powers in its desire to use its power and influence overseas to support the interests of democracy and the international community.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	53.1	28.1	0	12.5	6.3	.373	N/A
International	37.5	37.5	6.3	15.6	3.1		

Q2: U.S. policy in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Latin America is driven by strategic and economic advantage, and U.S. ideology and values are used to justify those interests.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	25	46.9	9.4	15.6	3.1	3.665	N/A
International	37.5	53.1	6.3	0	3.1		

Q3: The United States remains the only credible mediator between the Arabs and the Israelis.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	12.5	25	3.1	43.8	15.6	.734	N/A
International	15.6	21.9	25	25	12.5		

Q4: The U.S. intervention in Iraq was based on a genuine desire to help the Iraqi people become a free, democratic, and stable society.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	3.1	28.1	12.5	43.8	12.5	7.892	.113
International	0	15.6	6.3	28.1	50		

Q5: The United States will never entirely withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan, because it has too much invested and too much to gain from a long-term presence.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	9.4	34.4	15.6	25	15.6	3.849	.056
International	25	40.6	12.5	12.5	9.4		

Q6: The United States has a good record of opposing colonialism and supporting free and democratic governance in the world.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	9.4	53.1	9.4	28.1	0	.584	N/A
International	9.4	46.9	15.6	12.5	15.6		

Q7: The U.S. missile shield project is beneficial to Europe and the Middle East, because it addresses the pressing problem of growing Iranian ballistic missile capabilities.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	34.4	50	12.5	3.1	0	17.534	.22
International	6.3	37.5	34.4	12.5	9.4		

Q8: In countries where the U.S. military has a substantial presence or operations, the host nations should pay a substantial amount of the cost for that presence, since the forces are there to benefit the local people.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	12.5	43.8	18.8	21.9	3.1	12.031	.163
International	0	21.9	21.9	40.6	15.6		

Q9: Other nations should be more grateful and positive about U.S. military activities overseas, since those activities support peace, stability, commerce, and development.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	18.8	50	18.8	9.4	3.1	7.072	.102
International	6.3	34.4	25	21.9	12.5		

Q10: The United States has traditionally helped the Muslim countries of the Middle East, by supporting their independence, protecting them from communism, and encouraging their development.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	6.3	37.5	21.9	21.9	12.5	.452	N/A
International	3.1	28.1	28.1	31.3	9.4		

Q11: U.S. actions overseas have not been overly advantageous or disadvantageous to Muslim countries, but have varied according to U.S. national interest and the facts of each situation.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	43.8	46.9	3.1	6.3	0	.114	N/A
International	31.3	62.5	3.1	3.1	0		

Q12: The United States and Europe share key values and interests, and are committed to the same priorities overseas.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	3.1	50	15.6	21.9	9.4	4.852	.073
International	15.6	56.3	12.5	15.6	0		

Q13: The main question about U.S. power in the 21st century is how to limit and constrain it.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	0	3.1	9.4	37.5	50	25.81	.294
International	12.5	21.9	18.8	40.6	6.3		

Q14: The main question about U.S. power in the 21st century is how to keep Americans internationally engaged and active in a leading role.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	6.3	65.6	9.4	9.4	9.4	.714	N/A
International	18.8	50	18.8	9.4	3.1		

Q15: The nations of East Asia need a robust and active U.S. presence to ensure a stable and productive regional balance.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	15.6	37.5	18.8	18.8	9.4	.715	N/A
International	9.4	28.1	31.3	21.9	9.4		

Q16: The United States contributed significantly to the success of the Arab Awakening, by encouraging and supporting democratic movements.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	6.3	28.1	9.4	43.8	12.5	.179	N/A
International	6.3	25	31.3	21.9	15.6		

Q17: The United States delayed the start of Arab democracy as long as it possibly could, then changed policy once its favored leaders could no longer maintain power.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	3.1	28.1	18.8	25	25	10.418	.114
International	12.5	53.1	15.6	12.5	6.3		

Q18: U.S. withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan show good will and good faith with our local and international partners.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	12.5	34.4	21.9	31.3	0	.327	N/A
International	6.3	40.6	21.9	21.9	9.4		

Q19: The United States is justified in using drone strikes against terrorists and their support networks abroad.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Squared	Eta Squared
U.S.	46.9	43.8	3.1	6.3	0	11.416	.155
International	21.9	34.4	15.6	15.6	12.5		

Q20: I trust the United States to effectively and justly pursue international policies that support human rights, nonproliferation, and democratic reform.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	25	62.5	3.1	9.4	0	9.615	.134
International	6.3	53.1	9.4	21.9	9.4		

Q21: Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and war atrocities by U.S. Soldiers are exceptions—generally U.S. military forces are respectful of the law and human rights.⁴⁸

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	84.4	12.5	3.1	0	0	25.147	.289
International	34.4	21.9	15.6	25	3.1		

Q22: U.S. policies regarding the drug trade, immigration, and human rights are not serious, but are used as an excuse to meddle in the affairs of other countries.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	0	9.4	6.3	34.4	50	15.801	.203
International	9.4	18.8	28.1	31.3	12.5		

Q23: The United States has become very much like an empire, and exercises very broad and effective power over governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	0	12.5	6.3	50	31.3	14.38	.188
International	15.6	25	18.8	31.3	9.4		

Q24: The United States is a declining power.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	0	34.4	12.5	31.3	21.9	.654	N/A
International	3.1	25	25	43.8	3.1		

Q25: The establishment of U.S. African Command shows a deeper and more serious interest in helping the countries of Africa.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	15.6	56.3	6.3	21.9	0	9.711	.135
International	3.1	31.3	21.9	34.4	9.4		

Q26: The United States is a Christian nation and acts to promote Christianity overseas.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	3.2	3.2	29	22.6	41.9	3.34	N/A
International	6.3	18.8	21.9	31.3	21.9		

Q27: I expect big social problems in the United States in the near future, based on poverty, the gap between rich and poor, racism, and social violence.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	0	19.4	16.1	38.7	25.8	8.972	.128
International	6.3	40.6	9.4	43.8	0		

Q28: Other countries would be better off, if their political and social institutions were more like those of the United States.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	6.3	35.5	32.3	19.4	6.3	.249	N/A
International	6.3	31.3	25	34.4	3.1		

Q29: Most people overseas like Americans as individuals, but do not like the American government.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	12.9	41.9	19.4	19.4	6.5	1.519	N/A
International	21.9	40.6	21.9	15.6	0		

Q30: American culture is spreading globally, and is a threat to local cultures in many places.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	16.1	48.4	6.5	22.6	6.5	1.555	N/A
International	12.5	34.4	9.4	34.4	9.4		

Q31: The United States treats its partners overseas equally, and knows how to listen and compromise.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	0	13.3	20	43.3	23.3	2.069	N/A
International	0	34.4	12.5	34.4	18.8		

Q32: If I were in charge of my own country, I would want a robust American presence, with plenty of businessmen, diplomats, and tourists visiting or staying.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
US	23.3	43.3	26.7	6.7	0	.053	N/A
International	21.9	43.8	25	9.4	0		

Q33: U.S. power has been dealt a great blow by the failure of its campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	6.7	23.3	13.3	26.7	30	4.18	.065
International	12.5	34.4	15.6	31.3	6.3		

Q34: A strong U.S. military presence overseas is in the best interests of my country.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	16.7	43.3	16.7	23.3	0	1.015	N/A
International	12.5	34.4	28.1	15.6	9.4		

Q35: Most countries in most regions of the world are better able to resolve their own disputes and problems if there is no significant American military presence in the region.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	3.3	30	16.7	36.7	13.3	.325	N/A
International	3.1	15.6	46.9	34.4	0		

Q36: Globalization is a planned and directed process that primarily benefits the United States.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	0	10	6.7	36.7	46.7	1.396	N/A
International	3.1	15.6	9.4	34.4	37.5		

Q37: Americans care and take into account the interests and goals of partners and allies.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	20	63.3	3.3	10	3.3	4.329	.067
International	6.3	53.1	9.4	31.3	0		

Q38: The United States could stop most wars and economic problems, but chooses not to.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	0	6.7	0	30	63.3	10.506	.149
International	3.1	15.6	15.6	40.6	25		

Q39: Americans generally listen to and respect the opinions of their foreign colleagues, and generally understand what they are hearing.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	6.7	33.3	16.7	36.7	6.7	1.427	N/A
International	12.5	43.8	9.4	31.3	3.1		

Q40: U.S. people and government understand the world well enough to effectively exercise the leadership role their power gives them.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	F-Statistic	Eta Squared
U.S.	3.3	23.3	23.3	33.3	16.7	.001	N/A
International	0	28.1	21.9	34.4	15.6		

#	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Disagree	F-Score	Stength (Eta ²)
1	37.5 (53.1)	37.5 (28.1)	6.3 (0)	15.6 (12.5)	3.1 (6.3)	0.373	
2	37.5 (25)	53.1 (46.9)	6.3 (9.4)	0 (15.6)	3.1 (3.1)	3.665	
3	15.6 (12.5)	21.9 (25)	23 (3.1)	25 (43.8)	12.5 (15.6)	0.734	
4	0 (3.1)	15.6 (28.1)	6.3 (12.5)	28.1 (43.8)	50 (15.6)	7.892	0.113
5	25 (9.4)	40.6 (34.3)	12.5 (15.6)	12.5 (25)	9.4 (15.6)	3.849	0.056
6	9.4 (9.4)	46.9 (53.1)	15.6 (9.4)	12.5 (28.1)	15.6 (0)	0.584	
7	6.3 (34.4)	37.5 (50)	34.4 (12.5)	12.5 (3.1)	9.4 (0)	17.534	0.22
8	0 (12.5)	21.9 (43.8)	21.9 (18.8)	40.6 (21.9)	15.6 (3.1)	12.031	0.163
9	6.3 (18.8)	34.4 (50)	25 (18.8)	21.9 (9.4)	12.5 (3.1)	7.072	0.102
10	31.1 (6.3)	28.1 (37.5)	28.1 (21.9)	31.3 (6.3)	9.4 (12.5)	0.452	
11	31.3 (43.8)	62.5 (46.9)	3.1 (3.1)	3.1 (6.3)	0 (0)	0.114	
12	15.6 (3.1)	56.3 (50)	12.5 (15.6)	15.6 (21.9)	0 (9.4)	4.852	0.073
13	12.5 (0)	21.9 (3.1)	18.8 (9.4)	40.6 (37.5)	6.3 (50)	25.81	0.294
14	18.8 (6.3)	50 (65.6)	18.8 (9.4)	9.4 (9.4)	3.1 (9.4)	0.714	
15	9.4 (15.6)	28.1 (37.5)	31.3 (18.8)	21.9 (18.8)	9.4 (9.4)	0.715	
16	6.3 (6.3)	25 (28.1)	31.3 (94.4)	21.9 (43.8)	15.6 (12.5)	0.179	

Table 1: Summary U.S. and International Responses (U.S. in parentheses)⁴⁸

#	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Disagree	F-Score	Stength (Eta ²)
17	12.5 (3.1)	53.1 (28.1)	15.6 (18.8)	12.5 (25)	6.3 (25)	10.418	0.114
18	6.3 (12.5)	40.6 (34.4)	21.9 (21.9)	21.9 (31.3)	9.4 (0)	0.327	
19	21.9 (46.9)	34.4 (43.8)	15.6 (3.1)	15.6 (6.3)	12.5 (0)	11.416	0.155
20	6.3 (25)	53.1 (62.5)	9.4 (3.1)	21.9 (31.3)	9.4 (0)	9.615	0.134
21	34.4 (84.4)	21.9 (12.5)	15.6 (3.1)	25(0)	3.1 (0)	25.147	0.289
22	9.4 (0)	18.8 (9.4)	28.1 (6.3)	31.3 (34.4)	12.5 (50)	15.801	0.203
23	15.6 (0)	25 (12.5)	18.8 (6.3)	31.3 (50)	9.4 (31.3)	14.38	0.188
24	3.1 (0)	35 (34.4)	25 (12.5)	43.8 (31.3)	3.1 (21.9)	0.654	
25	3.1 (15.6)	31.3 (56.3)	21.9 (6.3)	34.4 (21.9)	9.4 (0)	9.711	0.135
26	6.3 (3.2)	18.8 (3.2)	21.9 (29)	31.3 (22.6)	21.9 (41.9)	3.34	
27	6.3 (0)	40.6 (19.4)	9.4 (16.1)	43.8 (38.7)	0 (25.8)	8.972	0.128
28	6.3 (6.3)	31.3 (35.5)	25 (32.3)	34.3 (19.4)	3.1 (6.3)	0.249	
29	21.9 (12.9)	40.6 (41.9)	21.9 (19.4)	15.6 (19.4)	0 (6.5)	1.519	
30	12.5 (16.1)	34.4 (48.4)	9.4 (6.5)	34.4 (22.6)	9.4 (6.5)	1.555	
31	0 (0)	34.4 (13.3)	12.5 (20)	34.4 (43.3)	18.8 (23.3)	2.069	
32	21.9 (23.3)	43.8 (43.3)	25 (26.7)	9.4 (6.7)	0 (0)	0.053	
33	12.5 (6.7)	34.3 (23.3)	15.6 (13.3)	31.3 (26.7)	6.3 (30)	4.18	0.065
34	12.5 (16.7)	34.4 (43.3)	28.1 (16.7)	15.6 (23.3)	9.4 (0)	1.015	
35	3.1 (3.3)	15.6 (30)	46.9 (16.7)	34.4 (36.7)	0 (13.3)	0.325	
36	3.1 (0)	15.6 (10)	9.4 (6.7)	34.4 (36.7)	37.5 (46.7)	1.396	
37	6.3 (20)	53.1 (63.3)	9.4 (3.3)	31.3 (10)	0 (3.3)	4.329	0.067
38	3.1 (0)	15.6 (6.7)	15.6 (0)	40.6 (30)	25 (63.3)	10.506	0.149
39	12.5 (6.7)	43.8 (33.3)	9.4 (16.7)	31.3 (36.7)	3.1 (6.7)	1.427	
40	0 (3.3)	28.1 (23.3)	21.9 (23.3)	34.4 (33.3)	15.6 (16.7)	0.001	

NOTE: Highlighted survey item numbers (e.g., “5”) indicate a survey item designated as a reflexive bias indicator. Highlighted F-statistic values (e.g., 7.892) indicate a value above the screening (3.75), showing statistically significant variance between U.S. and international values. Highlighted Eta² values (e.g., 0.113) indicate value above the screening level (.05), showing the strength of the variation.

Table 1: Summary U.S. and International Responses (U.S. in parentheses)⁴⁸ (continued)

Preliminary Observations on the Data.

For 24 of the 40 survey items, there was no statistically significant variation between the patterns of answers for the two groups. For 16 of the 40 questions, the international group's answers varied in a statistically significant manner from those of the U.S. group. Observations based on specific question/answer pairs follow. ("Q" refers to survey question numbers). The observations fall into five general categories of related survey questions or themes: the U.S. role in the international system, U.S. global military operations and presence, regional views for the Middle East, regional views for areas other than the Middle East, and general views of the U.S. and its people.

U.S. Role in the International System.

U.S. and international officers agree with impressive consistency that the U.S. Government acts overseas based on hard analysis of interests rather than ideology (Q2 and Q11), but also agree that the United States is unique in how it uses that power (Q1). Majorities in both groups say the United States has a good record of opposing colonialism and promoting democracy (Q6). U.S. officers overwhelmingly reject the notion that others should act to limit or constrain U.S. power, while international officers are almost evenly divided on the issue (Q13). Notably, though, both groups agree on the need to keep the United States engaged globally (Q14). A striking pattern of results emerges from the series of four questions on U.S. commitment to democracy and human rights in the international system (Q20 through Q23). Almost every U.S. respondent trusts the United States to pursue human

rights, nonproliferation, and democracy abroad (87 percent); to generally respect law and human rights in military operations (97 percent); to be serious about its counterdrug and immigration policies (84 percent); and not to behave like an empire (81 percent). The corresponding numbers for internationals were 59 percent, 56 percent, 44 percent, and 41 percent. Only a minority of respondents in both groups believe that the United States is a declining power (Q24). Questions 35 through 38 indicate that neither U.S. nor international officers consider the United States the underlying cause for problems of the international system. Few in either group think that it would be easier to resolve disputes around the world without a major role for the United States (Q35). Majorities in both groups reject the notions that the United States is behind globalization (Q36), or can do significantly more good in the world but chooses not to (Q38).

U.S. Global Military Operations.

U.S. and international officers have nearly opposite views on whether other nations should fund the U.S. military presence and activities overseas (Q8), and whether other nations should be grateful and positive about U.S. willingness to conduct such activities (Q9). U.S. officers are nearly unanimous in endorsing drone strikes against terror targets; a narrow majority of internationals also agree, although there is significant regional variation — and strong objection from respondents from countries where the strikes actually have occurred (Q19). Only a minority of either group believe that U.S. power or prestige suffered as a result of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns (Q33).

Regional Questions – Middle East.

U.S. personnel are skeptical of America's continued credibility as sole mediator between Arabs and Israelis; international officers are more hopeful, though still divided (Q3). Officers from principally Muslim regions (Middle East, South and Central Asia) believe more in the U.S. ability to be sole mediator than do Europeans or Latin Americans. U.S. officers are generally skeptical of official justifications for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM; international officers are even more so (Q4). Majorities in both groups give the United States credit for supporting democracy movements in the Arab Awakening (Q16). A clear majority of international respondents also think the United States delayed Arab democracy by supporting "friendly" dictators as long as possible, though this is a minority opinion among U.S. officers (Q17).

Regional Issues – Other.

More than twice as many U.S. than international officers believe in the necessity and benefits of a missile shield in Europe (Q7). Both U.S. and international officers believe that the United States and Europe share key values, though Europeans appear divided on this issue (Q12). Just over half of U.S. respondents see the U.S. presence in East Asia as vital for the stability of the region, while just over 40 percent of internationals agree (Q15). Over 70 percent of U.S. officers see the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) as a sincere and significant commitment to the progress of African people, whereas only a third of international respondents see it in such a positive light (Q25).

Views of the United States and Its People.

International officers were far more likely (47 percent to 19 percent) to predict large social problems for the United States in the near future (Q27). International and U.S. respondents answered with similar distribution, about whether other countries would be better off with U.S.-style institutions (Q28), and whether Americans are likeable as individuals even for those who dislike the U.S. Government (Q29). U.S. respondents were slightly more likely (64 percent to 47 percent) to agree that American culture is spreading in a way that threatens local cultures (Q30). Majorities in both groups agree that a robust American presence—official, unofficial, and business—is desirable for leaders of other countries (Q32, Q34). Majorities in both groups think the U.S. people and government do not understand the world enough to effectively exercise global leadership (Q40).

Interestingly, majorities in both groups still believe that the United States would try to take into account the goals and interests of its partners, despite this lack of understanding (Q37). Majorities in both groups agree that the United States does not do a good job of listening to its partners and treating them equally (Q31), though in neither case did a majority think Americans as individuals fail to listen to foreign colleagues (Q39).

INTERPRETING RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

Areas of Convergence and Divergence.

Responses to the 40 items in the survey show significant overlap between the U.S. and international officers. Some areas of agreement were predictable; for instance, both groups agree that U.S. actions overseas are driven more by hard power considerations than by ideology, both express skepticism over the U.S. announced motives for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and both agree that the United States has a strong historical record of opposing colonialism and supporting democracy. Some were less obvious; neither group believes the United States is a declining power in the world, and both see it as desirable that the United States remain actively engaged on the international scene. Of note, one three-question series (35/36/38) phrased to reflect generalized anti-U.S. bias elicited similar responses from both groups, with both rejecting the reflexively critical positions.⁴⁹ The survey item of greatest consensus was Question 40. The fact that majorities in both groups agree that the American people and government lack the requisite knowledge to exercise effective leadership internationally, and that the response pattern showed the lowest score for variation in the entire survey (F-Statistic of .001), should give students of American international policy and strategy serious cause for concern.

U.S. military and civilian leaders responsible for international communications and cooperation might do well to focus on the areas of disagreement. Divergence in response patterns on the missile defense in Europe, drone strikes against terrorist targets, and host government financial support to U.S. military

operations and presence indicate that U.S. personnel must carefully check their assumptions before engaging with international counterparts about these and related areas. Some of the differences are nuanced. The U.S. and international groups agree that the United States helped facilitate the Arab Awakening and the removal of Arab dictators, but international differ from U.S. respondents in believing that the United States also intentionally delayed the onset of democratization in the Arab world until the position of favored dictators was no longer tenable.

While there is agreement that Americans as individuals listen to and respect their international partners, the international group does not agree that the United States on a national level respects its partners and treats them as equals. A particular cause for concern might be found in the responses to questions 20 through 23. This sequence deals with perceptions of U.S. commitment to human rights, democracy, non-proliferation, drug trafficking, and other issues related to shared values in the international system. International responses varied from roughly 40 percent to 50 percent in agreeing that the United States supports the “right” position on these matters, but the U.S. respondent group was nearly twice as high, ranging from 81 percent to 97 percent. In other words, we appear not to seriously question that the United States takes the high road on international issues of rights, crime, etc., but for our international partners, the United States has yet to prove its case.

The 10 questions selected as indicators of reflexive or “pathological” bias are keys to understanding the nature of the international group’s critical views of the United States, and for clarifying whether the response pattern supports either of the theoretical explanations of anti-Americanism. Of the 10, statistically significant

variance occurred in five cases.⁵⁰ This result could be used to argue that reflexive or pathological bias underlies some portion of the criticism directed at the United States. Looking at the data further, though, reveals that in most cases — four out of five — the variance stems from a lopsided distribution within the United States side of the response pool, rather than that of the internationals. In other words, U.S. respondents were so certain in their answers that the distribution weighted heavily toward Strongly Agree/Agree or Strongly Disagree/Disagree, whereas the international response pool was more widely distributed. This suggests that variation between the narrowly grouped U.S. responses and the widely grouped international responses is more likely to stem from beliefs or values specific to the U.S. officers — their bias — rather than reflexive opposition from the internationals.

The data in Table 2 do not, of course, constitute proof in a deterministic sense. Neither do they purport to comprehensively explain why the two groups respond to questions of subjective response and bias in different ways with different distribution patterns. They *do* show that the two groups have a variety of starting points on matters of subjective assessment and bias, and that the international distribution is more even — meaning U.S. representatives must seek in dialogue, not presupposition, the starting points for discussions with specific international partners on specific contentious issues. The data also present a solid piece of evidence that no pervasive pattern of anti-U.S. bias exists among international military officers on questions for which subjective opinion predominates. International views show a similar distribution to U.S. views five times out of 10, and in four of the remaining five cases, internationals showed greater variety of opinion than did U.S. officers as a group.

Question	Significant Variance	Lopsided Spread
5	N	N/A
17	Y	IF
21	Y	US
22	Y	US
23	Y	US
26	N	N/A
28	N	N/A
30	N	N/A
36	N	N/A
38	Y	US

Table 2. Significance and Source of Variance on Pathological Questions.

Focus Group Review of Preliminary Observations.

A focus group conducted with a small number of U.S. and international survey respondents to review the aggregate responses largely supports the observations listed in the two preceding sections. The group also offers consensus insights on several of the survey items. The group speculated that international skepticism on the missile shield project (Q7) stemmed from the belief that Iranian missiles may target Israel but not Europe or other regions, and that the Iranian leadership is rational, not irrational. The greater international skepticism regarding human rights abuses or

atrocities by U.S. troops (Q21) were attributed to the fact that ground forces fighting among civilian populations inevitably commit some violence against non-combatants – that the nature of war, rather than some uniquely American trait, makes regular violations likely. On the issue of U.S. seriousness against drugs, illegal immigration, and human rights abuses, the example of Manuel Noriega was raised several times as a counter-example (Q22). On questions relating to U.S. responsibility for the ills of the international system (Q35/36/38), international participants noted that they would have been more likely to lay broad blame on the United States prior to participating in the U.S. military educational system, interacting with U.S. officers and officials, and learning how U.S. political and military systems actually work.

The international focus group felt that the response patterns of U.S. students demonstrated a real need to assess international issues through alternate perspectives and points of view. Several officers noted that the variety of international military views in the study reflected the limits of the U.S. professional military educational system, since officers or personnel were not included from states such as Russia, China, Iran, and Venezuela. The group recommended that the United States try to survey opinions and views from such officers through third parties, such as the United Kingdom (UK) or other allied countries that might have exchanges with or host officers from those countries. Several others noted that the limited variety and sample size of international respondents kept trend measurement at a fairly generalized level, and recommended focused regional studies on particular issues to facilitate more specific policy recommendations.

Another observation raised by the focus group was the utility of the survey data for international officers—specifically, great value was placed on the ability to quantify the beliefs and values of U.S. officers regarding international affairs in order to sensitize officers from the sending countries who might work in coalition or bilateral environments in the future. Finally, several focus group participants raised concern over the quality of international coverage in U.S. news media, speculating that U.S. military and most civilian personnel are not frequently exposed to international media perspectives.

One U.S. focus group member used the metaphor of a “light switch” to describe how he answered certain survey items. Sensing that the items were framed differently than the way U.S. press or officials would frame them, he “flipped a switch” and answered from the perspective that he supposed an Iraqi, an Afghan, or other international would use. This was not the case for all U.S. respondents; for those unable to flip this conceptual switch, the questions or statements posed in an unfamiliar frame occasionally elicited confusion or irritation. Several officers wrote comments on the margins of the survey instrument to indicate disagreement with how particular items were framed or worded.

International Officer Opinion in Light of Pew and Gallup Polling Data.

The responses of the NDU international officers and defense civilians provide a useful comparison and contrast with the polling data from Pew and Gallup. Compared with the Pew data, which reflect fairly broad and persistent negative views of the United

States and its presence overseas, the survey responses seem balanced and optimistic. It may be that the personal experiences of international respondents while at NDU and in the United States more generally have dispelled negative stereotypes and provided important context. It may also be the case that senior military and defense personnel compose a select and elite group for opinion study, a group whose composition ensures variation from measures of broader public opinion. This need not be cause for alarm, though, for that same elite status and role will render their more balanced and positive views to influence public policy in the sending nations more directly.

The Gallup organization's data focus more specifically on America's leadership role in the world, and there is much in our survey data to confirm negative trends in Gallup's work. Simply put, our internationals see the United States as indispensable and unique, but are not sure we are up to the task. Frequently, it seems that negative responses have been shaped by specific exercises of U.S. combat power. The fact that appetite for U.S. leadership per se has not generally diminished, and that most internationals want a robust civilian U.S. presence in their countries, though not necessarily a military one (Q32 and Q34), indicate that the door remains open for influence through non-military instruments of power.

Given that the foreign media themes had some resonance with the international respondents, we may conclude that an informed approach to military cooperation must take into account foreign media themes as well as opinion data focused on foreign general publics. As one observer of foreign media and polling has noted:

... far too little serious thought has been given to how and why people form their opinions about the United States and what causes them to change these opinions and perspectives ... clearly mass media has an enormous influence on world opinion. Unless we discover how factors such as these influence people's thinking and perceptions, we can never expect to have a full understanding of perspectives on the U.S., and we certainly cannot hope to significantly influence those perspectives.⁵¹

Some of the tools and products we need to study our partners and their attitudes effectively already exist, such as the Pew and Gallup data. Other, more focused, tools may be available through the use of surveys and focus groups in the unique personnel pool made possible through our multinational headquarters and institutions for professional military education.

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Implications for Anti-Americanism Theory.

The data from this survey indicate that foreign or international criticism of the United States does not show reflexive or pathological bias in the demographic under study. Simply put, international military officers are not uniformly critical of the United States; they show patterned distribution of responses similar to those of their U.S. peers slightly more than half the time, and do not generally support broadly stated positions of bias or anti-Americanism per se. When critical views are offered, they show great variety among and within regions, and across the five major categories of questions. Those most critical of the United States

on certain regional or systemic issues often showed respect and admiration for the United States generally or for Americans as a people. Conversely, support for specific U.S. positions did not always come with broadly supportive views on the character of the nation or its people. Broadly speaking, these findings support the “soft power” or “transitory” theories of anti-Americanism in foreign populations; in other words, they support the interpretation that criticism and anger toward the United States are reactions to specific actions or policies, “what we do” rather than “what we are.”

The characteristics of the respondent pool must be kept in mind, however, when extrapolating the results. The professional rank and status of the military officer demographic means that they constitute an elite segment of opinion in their respective countries; their views likely do not reflect mass opinion or the views of “the street.” The fact that the participating internationals were mid-course at a prestigious U.S. military educational institution almost certainly provided insights and qualifications to their opinions that could mitigate reflexively negative views, though in some cases the opposite effect might have occurred as well. The data should not, therefore, be interpreted as refuting pathological explanations of anti-Americanism in all populations, all regions, and all areas of opinion. They should be seen as evidence that pathological or reflexive bias does not predetermine critical views among the group of military officers and defense officials that U.S. military personnel will likely encounter as peers during the rest of their careers. This finding has implications for how U.S. personnel and organizations should solicit, analyze, and respond to critical views received through media, official contacts, or personal communications.

Implications for U.S. Policy and Operations.

In 2002, Joseph Nye presented a vigorous defense of multilateralism over unilateralism as a strategic approach, and for a foreign policy that listens closely as well as speaking persuasively and acting decisively.⁵² Nye was right then, and is even more right now. He pointed out that when international partners feel not only that they are listened to, but that their arguments carry weight and are acted upon at least some of the time, they have a greater incentive to make common cause and remain closely aligned with the United States. As a decade of overt interventions and great strategic cost yields to an age of budgetary austerity in the United States, our strategic interests will demand a much greater role for and reliance on the actions of such partners. Listening not just attentively, but effectively, will be a critical skill.

This monograph has shown that we have a tall task ahead of us. The response data show that not only is there significant variation in attitudes and beliefs separating U.S. personnel from international partners, but that the variation stems from considered positions rather than reflexive bias or lack of appreciation. Where bias is a barrier, it is more frequently our bias than theirs. The salient implication is that U.S. strategists and decisionmakers must adopt approaches to systematically measure, understand, and cooperatively resolve, differences of attitude and belief that can impact our missions and interests overseas.

Recommended Mitigation Measures.

Based on this study, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider the following measures to mitigate the problems of understanding and communication that can stem from differing analytical frames, differing viewpoints on relevant geopolitical issues, and the current lack of mechanisms to measure and resolve these differences. First, the DoD should implement survey and focus group methodology at headquarters and schools where the population of international military personnel can sustain them. This can provide a baseline for consistent and frequent measurement of international opinions and the problems or possibilities they indicate. Doing so will give a systematic and rigorous quality to our attempts at improving cross-cultural understanding in multinational and coalition environments.

Second, the DoD should commission a small number of more detailed, focused studies on particular regional or bilateral issues when a greater degree of detailed information would be useful to inform policy or command decisions. One example might be drone strikes; understanding skeptical and critical views through focused study might not necessarily lead to cessation of the strikes, but could help produce partnership strategies for consultation and strategic messaging that reduce their undesired side effects. Another example might be the use of Human Terrain Teams to thoroughly examine and analyze specific regions or population centers that are critical to military operations in various theaters.

Third, Combatant Commands and elements of the Joint Professional Military Education (PME) system should expand curricular and staff activities to deepen awareness and understanding of foreign cultures

and perspectives. Especially for the generation of younger officers raised professionally in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DoD must recognize that the paradigm of reconstructing another nation's security forces under combat conditions is a very different proposition from cooperating with international partners on a sustained basis under dynamic strategic and fiscal conditions. Understanding the perspectives, analytical frames, and cultural mindset of those partners is mission-critical.

Developing the skills to perceive and operate through a variety of cultural paradigms and frames is not a one-lesson or one-course process. It should be seen as a consistently relevant and expanding part of PME—from commissioning source through Senior Service College and beyond. Some of the Senior Service Colleges already provide analytical cultural training that includes descriptive models, diagnostic tools, and practical guidance.⁵³ This initial, abbreviated sort of “awareness” training helps develop the critical context of viewing culture as a system and a process, rather than a marginally important body of customs or traditions. But it is only a start. That start should not be made with our colonels and Navy captains; it should be made with our cadets and midshipmen, lieutenants and ensigns. By the time of Senior Service College, an approach to cultural competency that has been integrated into all phases of PME over the length of a career will yield more than awareness; it will develop a nuanced understanding and the judgment required for the unity of understanding and effort with international partners. In a dynamic strategic environment that requires even junior personnel to work effectively with partners from very different cultures using very different analytical frames, a high standard of early, effective, and continuous competency-based cultural training should be the DoD standard.

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2. Thomas Friedman, "A Theory of Everything," *New York Times*, June 1, 2003, available from www.cnn.com/2003/US/06/01/nyt.friedman.

3. David Levinson and Karen Christensen, *Global Perspectives on the United States: A Nation by Nation Survey*, Great Barrington, MA: Berkshire Publishing Group, 2007, p. xii.

4. David Apter, *Ideology and Discontent*, London, UK: Glencoe Press, 1964, p. 56.

5. John Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 327.

6. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press, 1992.

7. Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, New York: Touchstone Press, 1997.

8. Giacomo Chiozza, *Anti-Americanism and the American World Order*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, p. 5.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

11. Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Apter's *Ideology and Discontent*, 1964, p. 231.

12. Zaller, pp. 93-95.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 199-200.
14. Joseph Nye and Yasushi Watanabe, *Soft Power Superpowers*, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2008; Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2002.
15. Chiozza, *Anti-Americanism*, p. 201.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 29.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-25, 200-201.
18. Ole Holsti, *To See Ourselves as Others See Us*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008, pp. 9-10.
19. *Ibid.*, p. xii.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 216-220.
21. Chiozza, *Anti-Americanism*, p. 7.
22. Jean-Francois Revel, *Anti-Americanism*, San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2003, pp. 4, 12.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-6.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-37.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 171, 176.
31. Barry Rubin and Judith Culp Rubin, *Hating America: A History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. ix.

32. *Ibid.*, p. xi.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 218.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 219-221.

35. *Ibid.*

36. Paul Hollander, *The Only Superpower: Reflections on Strength, Weakness, and Anti-Americanism*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009, p. 6.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-19.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

41. Both the U.S. and international groups included a small number of civilian defense officials, although the great majority were uniformed military officers. The inclusion of a small number of civilian defense officials reflects the student body demographics at the NDU.

42. Phil Stewart, "U.S. Military Chief Argues against Egypt Aid Cutoff," *Reuters* U.S. Ed., February 16, 2012, available from www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/16/us-usa-egypt-aid-idUSTRE81F1V220120216.

43. Pew Research Center, "Pew Global Attitudes Project: About the Project."

44. Richard Wike, "From Hyperpower to Declining Power," available from Pew Research Project website, www.pewglobal.org/2011/09/07/from-hyperpower-to-declining-power/.

45. Gallup Organization, "Global Views of U.S. Leadership," *Gallup.com* website, available from www.gallup.com/poll/142631/Worldwide-Leadership-Approval.aspx.

46. Themes and topics were selected during a several-week period observation process in November 2011. The primary source for articles and essays was the U.S. Government's Open Source Center, which aggregates and, when necessary, translates, foreign press articles for an English-language audience. A sampling of press service reporting in Turkish, German, Hebrew, and Arabic languages was conducted as well, using websites such as *www.hurriyet.com.tr*; *www.nrg.co.il*; *www.dwelle.de*; and *www.aljazeera.net*.

47. Siddharth Kalla, "Statistically Significant Results," Experiment Resources Website, 2009, available from *www.experiment-resources.com/statistically-significant-results.html*.

48. Several respondents objected to the wording on this question, specifically the linkage of Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and atrocities in a like category. The wording in this and several other questions reflects media portrayals in foreign press accounts of U.S. operations, rather than legal or moral categorization. The fact that the several objectors were uniformly U.S. and Western European respondents is instructive, and reinforces the perspective differences between U.S. and most international respondents.

49. One of the questions had a high Gamma value, but the significant variation was one of degree (Strongly Disagree versus Disagree) rather than opposed positions per se.

50. Questions 5, 17, 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 30, 36, and 38.

51. Levinson and Christiansen, *Global Perspectives on the United States*, Vol. III, "Themes and Theory," p. xii.

52. Nye, *Paradox of American Power*, pp. 155-160.

53. Dr. Maarten Aaser, "Inter-Cultural Competence," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, March 26, 2012.

APPENDIX I

SURVEY DESIGN AND CONDUCT

Topics reflecting content found in these media samples were shaped into a series of statements or assertions about U.S. power and influence abroad. Forty statements were included in the survey, covering a variety of global and regional topics. Respondents were given five options to respond to each of the statements: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. Of the statements, 30 were fairly straightforward questions addressing policy or strategy decisions and outcomes. The other 10 questions were worded with an intention of reflecting underlying negative or positive bias, in order to test for reflexive or pathological drivers of negative or positive views of the United States.

Survey answers were collected along with a minimal amount of demographic data: rank, service, and region of the respondent's home country. Additional demographic data was added for two categories—whether the respondent came from an English-speaking country, and whether the respondent came from a predominantly Muslim country. The survey was administered to a total of 64 respondents, 32 from the United States and 32 from a variety of other countries. U.S. respondents ranged in rank from lieutenant colonel to major general, while the international respondents ranged from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general. In both groups, there were a small number of civilian defense executives with rank equivalent to a senior colonel. The respondent pool included students at National Defense University's (NDU) National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and Inter-American Defense College.

The answers were aggregated and subjected to a simple statistical analysis using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software. The first purpose of this analysis was to indicate whether U.S. and international officers differed in a statistically significant pattern when answering the questions. The U.S. respondents served as a baseline or control group, with the international students serving as a test group to gauge divergence. The statistical significance of the variation was assessed using two measures produced by the SPSS, the F-statistic, and the Eta Squared statistic. The threshold for significant variance between the two sets of data for a given question was set at 3.75, and the Eta Squared threshold for strength of association for that divergence was set at .05.

After an aggregate data run to measure significance variation of the international respondents as a group, separate runs were conducted, sorted by region. This provided a breakout of the variation for regional groups, divided into United States, Latin America, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, South and Central Asia, and East Asia. Additional runs were conducted, based on the responses from personnel from Muslim countries only, and from English-speaking countries only.

#	Region 1	Region 2	Region 3	Region 4	Region 5	Region 6	Region 7
1	17/9/0/4/2	2/5/0/1/0	2/2/1/1/1	2/0/0/0/0	3/1/0/2/0	0/2/1/1/0	3/2/0/0/0
2	8/15/3/5/1	4/3/0/0/0	3/3/1/0/0	0/2/0/0/0	2/3/0/0/1	2/2/0/0/0	1/3/1/0/0
3	4/8/1/14/5	0/0/2/3/2	1/1/1/3/1	0/2/0/0/0	2/0/3/0/1	1/3/0/0/0	1/1/1/2/0
4	1/9/4/14/4	0/2/0/2/3	0/0/0/4/3	0/1/1/0/0	0/0/0/1/5	0/0/0/2/2	0/1/1/0/3
5	3/11/5/8/5	1/3/1/1/1	1/2/2/2/0	0/1/1/0/0	3/1/0/1/1	1/3/0/0/0	2/2/0/0/1
6	3/17/3/9/0	1/4/0/2/0	0/4/3/0/0	1/0/1/0/0	1/2/1/0/0	0/1/0/2/1	0/3/0/0/2
7	11/16/4/1/0	0/2/3/1/1	0/3/2/2/0	1/1/0/0/0	0/3/3/0/0	0/1/2/0/1	0/2/1/1/1
8	4/14/6/7/1	0/2/1/3/1	0/1/1/3/2	0/0/0/1/1	0/2/3/1/0	0/0/0/4/0	0/2/1/1/1
9	6/16/6/3/1	1/2/2/1/1	1/2/3/1/0	0/1/0/1/0	0/2/1/2/1	0/1/0/2/1	0/2/2/0/1
10	2/12/7/7/4	1/2/1/2/1	0/3/1/2/1	0/0/1/1/0	0/2/0/3/1	0/1/2/1/0	0/1/3/1/0
11	14/15/1/2/0	2/4/0/1/0	1/5/1/0/0	1/1/0/0/0	5/1/0/0/0	0/4/0/0/0	1/4/0/0/0
12	1/16/5/7/3	1/5/0/1/0	1/2/2/2/0	0/1/0/1/0	3/2/1/0/0	0/3/0/1/0	0/4/1/0/0
13	0/1/3/12/16	1/2/2/1/1	0/1/0/5/1	1/0/0/1/0	1/2/2/1/0	0/2/1/1/0	1/0/1/3/0
14	2/21/3/3/3	1/3/2/1/0	1/2/2/1/1	1/1/0/0/0	3/2/1/0/0	0/3/1/0/0	0/4/0/1/0
15	5/12/6/6/3	0/0/3/4/0	0/3/4/0/0	0/1/0/0/1	1/0/3/1/1	0/2/0/2/0	2/2/0/0/1
16	2/9/3/14/4	1/3/2/1/0	0/1/2/3/1	1/0/0/1/0	0/1/3/0/2	0/1/1/1/1	0/1/2/1/1
17	1/9/6/8/8	1/1/2/2/1	0/5/1/0/1	1/0/0/1/0	2/3/1/0/0	0/4/0/0/0	0/3/1/1/0
18	4/11/7/10/0	0/4/0/2/1	0/3/3/1/0	0/0/1/1/0	2/2/1/0/1	0/2/1/0/1	0/2/1/2/0
19	15/14/1/2/0	1/3/0/2/1	0/5/1/1/0	1/1/0/0/0	1/1/2/1/1	0/0/2/0/2	3/1/0/1/0
20	8/20/1/3/0	0/4/0/3/0	1/4/1/1/0	0/1/1/0/0	0/3/1/0/2	0/1/0/2/1	1/3/0/1/0
21	27/4/1/0/0	2/2/1/2/0	3/3/1/0/1	1/0/0/1/0	2/0/1/2/1	1/0/1/2/0	1/2/1/1/0
22	0/3/2/11/16	1/2/0/2/2	0/0/3/3/1	0/0/0/2/0	2/1/2/1/0	0/2/1/0/1	0/1/3/1/0
23	0/4/2/16/10	0/3/1/3/0	1/2/2/1/1	1/0/0/1/0	2/0/1/3/0	1/1/1/1/0	0/2/1/0/2
24	0/11/4/10/7	1/2/0/4/0	0/0/2/4/1	0/0/0/2/0	0/2/3/1/0	0/2/1/1/0	0/2/1/2/0
25	5/18/2/7/0	0/3/1/2/1	0/1/1/5/0	1/0/0/1/0	0/2/2/0/2	0/1/2/1/0	0/2/1/2/0
26	1/1/9/7/13	0/2/2/2/1	1/2/0/3/1	0/0/1/0/1	0/0/1/3/2	0/0/1/1/2	0/3/0/2/0
27	0/6/5/12/8	0/2/1/4/0	1/3/0/3/0	0/1/1/0/0	1/3/0/2/0	0/1/0/3/0	0/3/0/2/0
28	2/11/10/6/2	1/4/1/1/0	0/1/3/2/1	0/0/0/2/0	0/3/2/1/0	1/2/0/1/0	0/0/1/4/0
29	4/13/6/6/2	0/3/3/1/0	1/0/1/0/0	4/1/0/1/0	2/2/0/0/0	0/3/0/2/0	0/3/0/2/0
30	5/15/2/7/2	0/2/0/4/1	2/3/0/1/1	1/0/0/1/0	1/1/1/3/0	0/1/1/1/1	0/4/0/1/0
31	0/4/6/13/7	0/5/1/1/0	0/1/2/2/2	0/1/0/1/0	0/1/1/1/3	0/1/0/3/0	0/1/0/3/1
32	7/13/8/2/0	1/2/1/3/0	2/2/3/0/0	1/1/0/0/0	1/3/2/0/0	1/3/0/0/0	1/3/1/0/0
33	2/7/4/8/9	1/2/4/0/0	0/3/0/4/0	0/0/0/1/1	2/2/0/2/0	0/2/1/0/1	1/2/0/2/0
34	5/13/5/7/0	0/1/1/4/1	1/1/5/0/0	0/1/1/0/0	1/2/2/0/1	0/2/0/1/1	2/3/0/0/0
35	1/9/5/11/4	0/1/1/5/0	0/2/3/2/0	1/0/0/1/0	0/2/3/1/0	0/0/4/0/0	0/0/3/2/0
36	0/3/2/11/14	0/1/0/3/3	0/0/1/1/5	0/0/0/2/0	1/2/2/1/0	0/1/0/2/1	0/1/0/2/2
37	6/19/1/3/1	0/4/0/3/0	0/4/0/3/0	0/1/1/0/0	1/5/0/0/0	1/0/1/2/0	0/2/1/2/0
38	0/2/0/9/19	0/2/0/3/2	0/1/0/3/3	0/0/1/1/0	0/1/2/1/2	1/1/2/0/0	0/0/0/4/1
39	2/10/5/11/2	0/6/0/1/0	0/3/0/4/0	0/2/0/0/0	1/1/2/2/0	2/1/0/1/0	1/1/0/2/1
40	1/7/7/10/5	0/3/1/2/1	0/2/1/2/2	0/1/0/1/0	0/1/2/1/2	0/1/1/2/0	0/1/1/3/0

NOTE TO TABLE 2: Regional breakdown as follows: Region 1 U.S. (32 respondents), Region 2 Americas (less U.S. - 7 respondents), Region 3 Europe (7 respondents), Region 4 Sub-Saharan Africa (2 respondents), Region 5 Middle East North Africa (6 respondents), Region 6 South and Central Asia (4 respondents), and Region 7 East Asia (5 respondents). Numbers indicate (in order, separated by “/” marks) Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree).

NOTE: Survey item numbers in gray (e.g., 38) indicate a survey item designated as a reflexive bias indicator. F-statistic values highlighted in grey (e.g., 7.892) indicate a value above the screening (3.75), indicating statistically significant variance between U.S. and international values. Eta² values in grey (e.g., .113) indicate values above the screening level (.05), indicating the strength of the variation.

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