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
# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

MARCH 17, 2023



## (U) Audit of the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program's Oversight of Operation Allies Welcome Contracts at DoD Installations



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# (U) Results in Brief

## *(U) Audit of the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program's Oversight of Operation Allies Welcome Contracts at DoD Installations*

**(U) March 17, 2023**

### **(U) Objective**

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine whether Air Force contracting personnel executed contract administration procedures for supplies and services supporting the relocation of Afghan evacuees at DoD installations in support of Operation Allies Welcome in accordance with Federal and DoD policies.

### **(U) Background**

(U) On August 29, 2021, the President directed the Department of Homeland Security to lead and coordinate ongoing efforts across the Government to support vulnerable Afghans as they safely resettled in the United States. To support the Afghan resettlement effort, the DoD provided temporary housing facilities for Afghan evacuees within the continental United States at eight installations. At each installation, the DoD was responsible for providing Afghan evacuees with essential supplies and services such as meals, medical services, and facilities sustainment services. This report focuses on the contracts for services that provided support at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey. During the course of Operation Allies Welcome, Government personnel and contractors provided support to over 7,000 Afghan evacuees at Holloman Air Force Base and over 14,000 Afghan evacuees at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst.

### **(U) Background (cont'd)**

(U) The Air Force Contract Augmentation Program is a contingency contract tool for use by Government entities needing urgent assistance. The Air Force Contract Augmentation Program uses pre-qualified vendors to provide cost effective solutions to meet urgent needs. In addition, the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program supports a wide spectrum of activities including irregular and unconventional warfare, disaster response, domestic emergencies, humanitarian response, and civil assistance.

### **(U) Findings**

(U) Air Force contracting personnel executed contract administration procedures for medical, dining, and facility supplies and services supporting the relocation of Afghan evacuees in accordance with Federal and DoD policies. In addition, Air Force personnel performed effective oversight to ensure that invoices included reasonable costs.

(U) As a result, the DoD provided Afghan evacuees at Holloman Air Force Base and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst with essential support services while the evacuees completed the steps necessary to resettle in the United States. In addition, Air Force contracting personnel properly oversaw \$1.3 billion of taxpayer funds spent in support of this mission. Furthermore, through interviews with Air Force contracting personnel and review of contract documentation, we identified ways that contracting personnel and prime contractors reduced costs by \$67.8 million while responding to an urgent need.

### **(U) Recommendations**

(U) We did not make any recommendations in this report.

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**INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500**

March 17, 2023

**MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION  
AND SUSTAINMENT  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**

**SUBJECT: (U) Audit of the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program's Oversight of Operation  
Allies Welcome Contracts at DoD Installations (Report No. DODIG-2023-056)**

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's audit. We are providing this report for information and use. This report does not contain recommendations. We coordinated a discussion draft of this report with officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. They concurred with our report and provided no additional comments. Therefore, we are publishing this report in final form.

(U) We appreciate the cooperation and assistance we received during the audit. If you have any questions, please contact me at [REDACTED].

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

Richard B. Vasquez  
Assistant Inspector General for Audit  
Readiness and Global Operations

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## (U) Introduction

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### (U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine whether Air Force contracting personnel executed contract administration procedures for supplies and services supporting the relocation of Afghan evacuees at DoD installations in support of Operation Allies Welcome (OAW) in accordance with Federal and DoD policies. Specifically, we determined whether Air Force contracting officials executed contract administration responsibilities for dining, medical, and facilities sustainment services.

### (U) Background

(U) On July 14, 2021, the President announced Operation Allies Refuge to support the relocation of interested and eligible Afghan nationals who supported the U.S. Government and their immediate families. Operation Allies Refuge followed through on America's commitment to Afghan citizens who have helped the United States, and provided them essential support at secure locations. The Afghans took significant risks to support U.S. military and civilian personnel in Afghanistan, were employed by or on behalf of the U.S. Government in Afghanistan or our coalition forces, or were a family member of someone who did.

(U) On August 29, 2021, the President directed the Department of Homeland Security to lead and coordinate ongoing efforts across the Government to support vulnerable Afghans as they safely resettled in the United States, which consisted of various operational phases to support Afghan evacuees. Prior to arrival, the Government conducted security screenings and vetting of Afghan evacuees, with the dual goals of protecting national security and providing protection for our Afghan allies. In addition, the Government tested all those who entered the United States, including U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and Afghan nationals, for coronavirus disease-2019.

(U) On August 30, 2021, the President stated that U.S. troops had executed the largest airlift in U.S. history, evacuating over 120,000 people from Afghanistan. Upon arrival at the port of entry and after completion of processing, the Government transported the Afghan evacuees to U.S. military facilities where



(U) they received a full medical screening and a variety of services. The Department of State worked closely with the DoD and the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate the civilian and non-governmental staff working at the military installations to ensure Afghans received basic support.

**(U) DoD Support for Operation Allies Welcome**

(U) To support the Afghan resettlement effort, the DoD provided essential supplies and services such as temporary housing, meals, medical care, and facilities sustainment for Afghan evacuees within the continental United States at eight installations: Camp Atterbury, Indiana; Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Lee, Virginia; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Pickett, Virginia; Holloman Air Force Base (AFB), New Mexico; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey; and Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia. Table 1 shows key information for each installation, including the number of days’ notice received by the installations before the arrival of Afghan evacuees, the arrival and departure dates of Afghan evacuees, the number of days each installation was active in support of OAW, and the total number of Afghan evacuees housed at each installation.

*(U) Table 1. Key Information for Each U.S. Installation Providing Temporary Support of OAW*

(U) Supporting DoD Service	Location	Number of Days’ Notice Before Evacuees’ Arrival	Arrival Date of Afghan Evacuees	Departure Date of Afghan Evacuees	Total Number of Days Installation Was Active	Total Number of Afghan Evacuees Housed
Air Force	Holloman AFB, New Mexico	7	8/31/2021	1/26/2022	149	7,324
	Joint Base McGuire- Dix- Lakehurst, New Jersey	4	8/25/2021	2/19/2022	179	16,503
Navy	Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia	5	8/29/2021	12/22/2021	116	5,081 (U)

(U) Table 1. Key Information for Each U.S. Installation Providing Temporary Support of OAW (cont'd)

(U) Supporting DoD Service	Location	Number of Days' Notice Before Evacuees' Arrival	Arrival Date of Afghan Evacuees	Departure Date of Afghan Evacuees	Total Number of Days Installation Was Active	Total Number of Afghan Evacuees Housed
Army	Camp Atterbury, Indiana	3	9/3/2021	1/25/2022	145	7,192
	Fort Bliss, Texas	8	8/21/2021	12/30/2021	132	11,472
	Fort McCoy, Wisconsin	6	8/22/2021	2/15/2022	178	12,706
	Fort Pickett, Virginia	3	8/28/2021	2/1/2022	158	10,492
	Fort Lee, Virginia	15	7/30/2021	11/17/2021	111	3,108 (U)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) The DoD executed task orders under three contracts to provide Afghan evacuees with essential supplies and services.

1. (U) Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP)
2. (U) Global Contingency Services
3. (U) Logistics Civil Augmentation Program V

(U) This report focuses on the AFCAP contracts for services that provided support at Holloman AFB and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> (U) Contractors provided services on behalf of the DoD for Holloman AFB under contract FA8051-20-D-0004, task order FA8051-21-F-0060 and for Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst under contract FA8051-20-D-0001, task order FA8051-21-F-0058.

### ***(U) Holloman AFB Operations and Task Force Holloman***

(U) On August 24, 2021, the U.S. Northern Command formed Task Force (TF) Holloman to support OAW. TF Holloman was commanded by an Air National Guard brigadier general and was composed of Air Force and interagency personnel. Holloman AFB welcomed its first Afghan evacuees on August 31, 2021, and during the course of OAW, provided support to over 7,000 evacuees. The installation included facilities consisting of several 30 by 90-meter tents. Surrounding these tents were dining facilities, mobile shower facilities, laundry facilities, and a hospital, complete with surgeons, family care specialists, dentists, and obstetrics and gynecology doctors. Figure 1 shows a portion of the facility at Holloman AFB.



### ***(U) Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst Operations and Task Force Liberty***

(U) The U.S. Northern Command formed TF Liberty on August 21, 2021, to support OAW at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst. TF Liberty was commanded by an Air Force major general and was composed of Airmen and DoD civilians, as well as personnel from the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and non-governmental organizations providing support to Afghan evacuees.



(U) Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst welcomed its first arrival of Afghan evacuees on August 25, 2021, and during the course of OAW provided support to over 14,000 evacuees. In addition, over 80 New Jersey Air National Guard Airmen from the 108th Wing and 177th Fighter Wing supported this effort. Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst provided various services such as housing, medical care, and immigration processing for the evacuees. Figures 2 and 3 show the tent village at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst.



### **(U) Air Force Contract Augmentation Program**

(~~CUI~~) According to Air Force contracting officials, AFCAP is a contingency contract tool for use by Government entities needing urgent assistance. AFCAP uses pre-qualified vendors to provide cost-effective solutions to meet urgent needs. In addition, AFCAP supports a wide spectrum of activities including irregular and unconventional warfare, disaster response, domestic emergencies, and humanitarian response and civil assistance. In support of OAW, the AFCAP contracting office awarded one task order on August 21, 2021, and two task orders on August 22, 2021. The three task orders were each cost-plus-fixed fee contracts in support of OAW at Holloman AFB, New Mexico; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey; Ramstein Air Base, Germany; and Goodfellow AFB, Texas.<sup>2</sup> The task orders awarded in support of Hollman AFB and

<sup>2</sup> (U) The Air Force used the contract supporting Ramstein Air Base and Goodfellow AFB for OAW planning and not long-term living arrangements for Afghan evacuees. For this audit, we reviewed only installations that provided long-term living arrangements within the United States; specifically, we reviewed the two contracts that provided support at Holloman AFB and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst.

(U) Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst each had a ceiling of \$500 million at award and a fixed-fee award of [REDACTED].<sup>3</sup> The contractors were responsible for providing essential services, including dining, medical, and facilities sustainment services. Table 2 shows the location, award date, and total funding for the two AFCAP task orders.

(U) Table 2. Summary of the AFCAP Task Orders in Our Review

(U) Contract, Task Order	Location	Award Date	Task Order Total Funding
FA8051-20-D-0004, FA8051-21-F-0060	Holloman AFB	August 22, 2021	\$352,030,086
FA8051-20-D-0001, FA8051-21-F-0058	Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst	August 21, 2021	904,911,315
<b>Total</b>			<b>\$1,256,941,401</b> (U)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

## (U) AFCAP Contract Administration Roles and Responsibilities

(U) The key contract administration personnel responsible for carrying out Government quality assurance surveillance include the procuring contracting officer (PCO), the administrative contracting officer (ACO), and the contracting officer's representative (COR).

### (U) Contracting Officers

(U) The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states that the contracting officer is responsible for ensuring performance of all necessary actions for effective contracting, compliance with the terms of the contract, and safeguarding the interests of the United States in its contractual relationships.<sup>4</sup> To perform these tasks, AFCAP officials assigned two PCOs to the task orders. PCO roles and responsibilities vary by contract. Generally, the PCO develops contract technical documents, executes contract awards, and can delegate any post-award contract administration such as quality assurance surveillance, cost monitoring, and invoice review to an ACO. The PCO retains any contract administration duties that the PCO does not delegate in writing.

<sup>3</sup> (U) The contract for Holloman AFB was definitized on November 29, 2022, and the contract for Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst was definitized on August 12, 2022; therefore, both contracts were issued as undefinitized contract actions.

<sup>4</sup> (U) FAR Part 1, "Federal Acquisition Regulations System," Subpart 1.6, "Career Development, Contracting Authority, and Responsibilities," Section 1.602, "Contracting Officers," Subsection 1.602-2, "Responsibilities."

(U) In addition, FAR Part 46, “Quality Assurance,” requires the PCO to receive from the requiring activity, a quality assurance surveillance plan (QASP) that specifies inspection, testing, and other contract quality requirements to ensure the integrity of the supplies or services.<sup>5</sup> The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) states that the PCO should ensure the QASP is prepared in conjunction with the contract’s statement of work and is tailored to address the performance risk inherent in the specific contract type.<sup>6</sup> QASPs should detail the work requiring surveillance and the surveillance methodology to ensure the contractor complies with all contractual requirements. For the AFCAP task orders, the ACOs had full PCO authority to make real-time changes.

### ***(U) Contracting Officer’s Representatives***

(U) Installation-level command personnel from both installations served as CORs. DoD Instruction 5000.72 establishes requirements for identifying, training, and certifying CORs across the DoD.<sup>7</sup> According to the AFCAP QASP, the CORs should conduct contract oversight and provide status reports to the contracting officers. CORs prepared monthly Performance Assessment Reports (PARs), which identified the contractors’ performance for each task order requirement, as well as any deficiencies during the rating period. The DFARS also requires CORs to include all surveillance documentation in the Surveillance and Performance Monitoring system.<sup>8</sup>

### ***(U) Voucher Review Roles and Responsibilities***

(U) The DoD COR Guidebook details the invoice review and approval responsibilities for the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) contract auditor and contract administration personnel such as the ACO and the COR.<sup>9</sup> According to the DoD COR Guidebook, for cost-reimbursement contracts, only contracting officers such as ACOs can approve invoices for payment. CORs can review, but not approve invoices for payment. The DoD COR Guidebook states that CORs should review billing statements thoroughly and on time, monitor contractor performance, make onsite visits, and perform surveillance to ensure that the Government gets what it paid for.

<sup>5</sup> (U) FAR Part 46, “Quality Assurance,” Subpart 46.1, “General,” Section 46.103, “Contracting Office Responsibilities.”

<sup>6</sup> (U) DFARS Part 237, “Service Contracting,” Subpart 237.1, “Service Contracts—General,” Subpart 237.172, “Service contracts surveillance.”

<sup>7</sup> (U) DoD Instruction 5000.72, “DoD Standard for Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) Certification,” March 26, 2015 (Incorporating Change 2, November 6, 2020).

<sup>8</sup> (U) DFARS Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI) Part 201, “Federal Acquisition Regulation System,” Subpart 201.6, “Career Development, Contracting Authority, and Responsibilities,” Section 201.602, “Contracting officers,” Subsection 201.602-2, “Contracting Officers Responsibilities.”

<sup>9</sup> (U) “DoD Contracting Officer’s Representatives Guidebook,” May 2021.



(U) The DCAA operates under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer. The mission of the DCAA is to perform contract audits and to provide accounting and financial advisory services regarding contracts and subcontracts for the DoD. The DFARS assigns the DCAA responsibility for performing prepayment review of contractor invoices on cost-reimbursement contracts.<sup>10</sup> During prepayment review, the DCAA auditor is required to verify that the contract number, invoice number, and dollar amount on the invoice agree with the attached supporting documentation and that the invoice is free from mathematical errors. The prepayment review is not a detailed review of the allowability, allocability, and reasonableness of specific costs.

## (U) Review of Internal Controls

(U) DoD Instruction 5010.40 requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls.<sup>11</sup> The Air Force internal controls that we reviewed were effective, and we did not identify any internal control weaknesses. We will provide a copy of the final report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in the Department of the Air Force.

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<sup>10</sup> (U) DFARS Part 242, "Contract Administration," Subpart 242.8, "Disallowance of Costs," Section 242.803, "Disallowing costs after incurrence."

(U) Throughout this report we use the term "invoice" to refer to the contractor-submitted vouchers on cost reimbursement contracts.

(U) For the AFCAP contracts we reviewed, DCAA personnel reviewed three vouchers. DCAA personnel selected the first vouchers for each contract and one voucher that was above the \$100 million threshold for mandatory review. Other vouchers went directly to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service for processing and payment.

<sup>11</sup> (U) DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013 (Incorporating Change 1, June 30, 2020).

## (U) Finding

### (U) Air Force Contracting Personnel Effectively Executed Contract Administration Procedures in Support of Operation Allies Welcome

(U) Air Force contracting personnel executed contract administration procedures for medical, dining, and facility supplies and services supporting the relocation of Afghan evacuees in support of OAW in accordance with Federal and DoD policies. Specifically, Air Force contracting personnel:

- (U) possessed the necessary experience to perform contract oversight and completed the required training in accordance with DoD policy;
- (U) performed adequate contract oversight procedures, such as generating and executing QASPs, preparing frequent PARs, and ensuring contractors took corrective actions to address deficiencies in a timely manner; and
- (U) performed both invoice and fixed fee review procedures to ensure costs were reasonable and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

(U) As a result, the DoD provided Afghan evacuees at Holloman AFB and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst with essential support, such as food, shelter, medical, and various other services, to ensure evacuees could safely complete the steps necessary to resettle in the United States. In addition, Air Force contracting personnel properly oversaw \$1.3 billion of taxpayer funds spent in support of this mission. Furthermore, through interviews with Air Force contracting personnel and review of contract documentation, we identified ways that contracting personnel and prime contractors reduced costs by \$67.8 million while responding to an urgent need and improved the quality of life for Afghan evacuees residing at DoD installations.

### (U) Air Force Contracting Personnel Performed Contract Oversight According to Federal and DoD Policies

(U) Air Force contracting personnel performed oversight in accordance with Federal and DoD policies for the purchase of supplies and services supporting OAW. Specifically, Air Force contracting personnel possessed the necessary experience and completed the required training; performed adequate contract oversight procedures; and performed invoice and contract fee review procedures in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and DoD policies. Air Force

(U) contracting personnel and prime contractors also identified ways to reduce costs while responding to urgent needs and implemented changes to improve Afghan evacuees' quality of life at DoD installations.

### ***(U) Air Force Contracting Personnel Responsible for Contract Oversight Were Nominated in Writing and Met the Necessary Experience and Training Requirements***

(U) Air Force contracting personnel tasked with contract oversight at Holloman AFB and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst were nominated in writing, possessed

*(U) Air Force contracting personnel tasked with contract oversight were nominated in writing, possessed the necessary experience, and completed the required training.*

the necessary experience, and completed the required training in accordance with DoD Instruction 5000.72.<sup>12</sup> The Instruction states that the contracting officer

must designate CORs in writing and outlines minimum COR experience and training requirements depending on dollar value, complexity of the requirement, and contract performance risk associated with the contract for which the COR is designated. Contracting personnel identified OAW as a Type C requirement; therefore, CORs must have at least 12 months of agency experience and complete initial and refresher COR training.<sup>13</sup>

### ***(U) Air Force Contracting Officer's Representatives Were Nominated in Writing and Possessed Required Experience***

(U) Air Force contracting personnel nominated 37 CORs at Holloman AFB and 21 CORs at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst in writing and ensured the CORs possessed the necessary 12 months of experience, as required by the DoD Instruction. Specifically, for each COR, Air Force contracting personnel prepared a form that identified the contract, requirement, and COR responsibilities and qualifications. Each form was signed by the respective COR and COR supervisor. In addition, all CORs at Holloman AFB and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst possessed at least 12 months of agency experience.

<sup>12</sup> (U) DoD Instruction 5000.72.

<sup>13</sup> (U) DoD Instruction 5000.72 defines three types of standards: Type A, Type B, and Type C. For each type, the Instruction outlines the minimum experience and training requirements.



### ***(U) Air Force Contracting Officer's Representatives Completed Required Training***

(U) Air Force CORs at Holloman AFB and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst completed the required COR training. DoD Instruction 5000.72 requires CORs to complete initial COR training and any additional training mandated by the contracting activity or agency. According to Air Force contracting personnel, CORs were required to complete contract-specific training. Additionally, the Instruction requires CORs to complete a minimum of 16 hours of COR-specific refresher training every 3 years.

(U) All 37 CORs at Holloman AFB and 21 CORs at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst completed initial COR training. Specifically, all CORs completed Defense Acquisition University course CLC 222, "Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) Online Training." All CORs also completed the Air Force-mandated, contract-specific training.

(U) All 37 CORs at Holloman AFB completed initial COR training within the last 3 years; therefore, none of the CORs were required to complete COR-specific refresher training. Of the 21 CORs at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, 4 CORs completed initial COR training more than 3 years ago and were required to complete at least 16 hours of COR-specific refresher training. Three CORs completed a minimum of 16 hours of COR-specific refresher training, while Air Force contracting personnel confirmed that the other COR did not complete the required refresher training because of an oversight. The COR who did not complete refresher training was assigned to oversee Food Services, Laundry, and Water. Although the COR did not complete the required refresher training, the COR performed effective oversight and we did not identify any negative impact.

### ***(U) Air Force Contracting Personnel Performed Adequate Oversight to Ensure Satisfactory Contractor Performance***

(U) Air Force contracting personnel at Holloman AFB and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst performed adequate contract oversight procedures, such as preparing frequent PARs and ensuring contractors took corrective actions to address deficiencies in a timely manner

in support of OAW and in accordance with the contract requirements. Specifically, contracting personnel prepared monthly PARs for each task order, summarizing the contractors' performance from August 2021 through March 2022, which were in accordance with the QASPs' monthly surveillance requirements.

*(U) Air Force contracting personnel performed adequate contract oversight procedures in support of OAW and in accordance with the contract requirements.*

(U) In the monthly PARs, Air Force contracting personnel clearly stated the deficiencies and issues they identified each month, including instances where the contractors took actions to quickly resolve deficiencies. Contracting personnel also summarized instances where the contractors exceeded the requirements. For example, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]

[illegible]

Because of their oversight, Air Force contracting personnel were able to quickly identify and address issues and deficiencies, as well as notify contractors about performance successes.

***(U) Air Force Contracting Personnel Performed Adequate Oversight to Ensure Reasonable Costs***

(U) Air Force contracting personnel at Holloman AFB and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst performed effective oversight of contractor invoices and contract costs, including fees, to ensure the contractors charged reasonable prices for essential supplies and services in support of OAW. Specifically, contracting personnel performed detailed invoice reviews, regularly oversaw costs throughout the

(U) performance of each contract, and completed independent analyses of costs and fixed fees to determine whether they were reasonable and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.<sup>14</sup>

### ***(U) Air Force Oversight of Invoices and Contract Costs***

(U) Air Force contracting personnel regularly reviewed invoices and costs for Holloman AFB and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst throughout the performance of each contract. According to the DoD COR Guidebook, contracting officers are responsible for monitoring invoice payments according to the terms of the contract.<sup>15</sup> Air Force contracting

personnel performed effective oversight of 60 OAW invoices, totaling \$1.2 billion, submitted for contractor-provided support at Holloman AFB and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst.<sup>16</sup>

*(U) Air Force contracting personnel performed effective oversight of 60 OAW invoices, totaling \$1.2 billion, submitted for contractor-provided support at Holloman AFB and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst.*

Specifically, contracting personnel reviewed 26 invoices, totaling \$346.5 million, for Holloman AFB and 34 invoices, totaling \$822 million, for Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst. Furthermore, an Air Force contracting officer checked cost reasonableness for large purchases and compared the invoices to daily and monthly status reports to ensure the costs aligned. The contracting officer also maintained communication with the CORs, contractors, and other contracting officers to address any questions or concerns relating to invoices. Lastly, contracting personnel performed an independent analysis during definitization to evaluate the prime contractors' proposed costs for each contract element, such as materials, equipment, and direct labor, to determine whether costs were fair and reasonable.<sup>17</sup> Contracting personnel did not identify any unreasonable or unallowable costs at either installation.

(U) In addition to Air Force contracting personnel, DCAA personnel also reviewed the first voucher at each installation, as well as one additional voucher at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst that exceeded \$100 million.<sup>18</sup> The DCAA's review focused on the accuracy of the voucher, confirming whether the contract numbers,

<sup>14</sup> (U) Section 3905, title 41, United States Code.

<sup>15</sup> (U) "DoD Contracting Officer's Representatives Guidebook," May 2021.

<sup>16</sup> (U) These totals include costs outside our scope of review, including base restoration costs. In addition, because both contracts remained open at the time of our review, the invoices and related values represent services billed by the contractors as of December 8, 2022.

<sup>17</sup> (U) DFARS Part 217, "Special Contracting Methods," Subpart 217.74, "Un definitized Contract Actions," Section 217.7401, "Definitions," defines definitization as the agreement on, or determination of, contract terms, specifications, and price, which converts the undefinitized contract action to a definitive contract.

<sup>18</sup> (U) No vouchers at Holloman AFB exceeded \$100 million.

(U) voucher numbers, and dollar amounts matched the supporting documentation, and whether the vouchers were free from mathematical errors. The DCAA did not find any errors when reviewing the vouchers. Finally, Air Force contracting personnel required the prime contractors to regularly provide various financial reports, such as Monthly Performance and Cost Reports, Task Order Situation Reports, and Installation Specific Reports. Contracting personnel reviewed these reports to determine up-to-date estimates on amounts incurred and committed, estimated costs at completion, and costs associated with specific contract elements throughout the performance of the contract.

### ***(U) Air Force Oversight of Contract Fees***

(~~CUI~~) Air Force contracting personnel performed effective oversight of contract fee negotiations to ensure the fees paid to contractors were in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.<sup>19</sup> According to section 3905, title 41, United States Code, the fee in a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract shall not exceed 10 percent of the estimated cost of the contract, not including the fee. Contracting personnel at Holloman AFB negotiated a fixed fee of [REDACTED], while contracting personnel at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst negotiated a fixed fee of [REDACTED]. Therefore, contracting personnel at each installation ensured the contracts complied with the fixed fee limitation. Additionally, Air Force contracting personnel performed a weighted guidelines analysis to determine a reasonable and allowable fixed fee percentage.<sup>20</sup> The weighted guidelines analysis allowed contracting personnel to negotiate the fixed fee award with the prime contractor based on the Air Force's findings. For example, contracting personnel at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst performed a weighted guidelines analysis which calculated an objective fixed-fee rate of [REDACTED] based on the relative importance and risk associated with each area of overall performance. Although the prime contractor proposed a fixed fee of [REDACTED], the weighted guidelines analysis assisted the Air Force in negotiating a [REDACTED].

### ***(U) Air Force Contracting Personnel and Prime Contractors Achieved Costs Savings While Responding to Urgent Needs***

⋮ *(U) Air Force contracting personnel identified ways to reduce costs while responding to an urgent need.*

(~~CUI~~) In addition to performing effective oversight of the contractors that provided essential services at the two installations,

<sup>19</sup> (U) 41 U.S.C. §3905.

<sup>20</sup> (U) A weighted guidelines analysis is a Government technique for developing fee and profit negotiation objectives, within percentage ranges established by regulation.

(~~CUI~~) Air Force contracting personnel identified ways to reduce costs while responding to an urgent need. Specifically, Air Force contracting personnel at Holloman AFB stated that purchasing fuel directly from the Defense Logistics Agency saved the DoD \$1.2 million. From September 2021 to March 2022, the average price per gallon of unleaded fuel ranged from \$3.38 to \$4.32 and diesel fuel ranged from \$3.61 to \$5.12 per gallon. By purchasing fuel from the Defense Logistics Agency, Air Force [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Additionally, contracting personnel at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst further reduced fuel costs by working with the contractor to consolidate generator services and improve fuel efficiency.<sup>21</sup> The contractor replaced small generators with fuel pods and large tractor-trailer mounted units, which according to Air Force contracting personnel, provided economies of scale and significant savings for fuel and refueling staff.

(U) Furthermore, Air Force contracting personnel stated that they saved \$40 million by repurposing the gravel purchased for the camp at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst throughout the installation rather than trucking the gravel to a quarry in Pennsylvania and purchasing new gravel for the installation. As a result of their coordination with Defense Logistics Agency and base personnel, Air Force contracting personnel saved \$41.2 million.

(~~CUI~~) The prime contractors at Holloman AFB and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst also identified opportunities to reduce contract costs. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] As a result, the prime contractors saved the Government approximately \$26.7 million.

### ***(U) Air Force Contracting Personnel and Prime Contractors Implemented Changes to Improve Afghan Evacuees' Quality of Life at DoD Installations***

(U) Air Force contracting personnel coordinated with the prime contractors to improve the quality of life for Afghan evacuees residing at DoD installations. For example, an Afghan evacuee residing at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst

<sup>21</sup> (U) While Air Force personnel could not quantify the exact dollar amount, they noted cost savings were achieved.



(U) requested a solution for bathing infants and children more easily within the female showers. Upon receiving the request, Air Force contracting personnel worked with the contractor to respond to the need, and the contractor installed an off-the-shelf solution in two showers in the female hygiene area. In addition, the contractor at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst replaced all portable toilets with latrine trailers, improving the quality of life for all evacuees. The trailers had flushable toilets, functioning faucets, and interior lighting, which maximized user-friendliness, sanitation, and odor control.

(U) Additionally, Air Force contracting personnel ensured the contractor incorporated more variety into meals. In September 2021, contracting personnel began meeting weekly with the prime contractor, food subcontractor, and Afghan

evacuees to communicate wants and changes between the evacuees and dining staff. As a result of the coordination, the contractor began bringing in evacuees to learn how to better cook and prepare meals, which also boosted morale.

*(U) In September 2021, contracting personnel began meeting weekly with the prime contractor, food subcontractor, and Afghan evacuees to communicate wants and changes between the evacuees and dining staff.*

## (U) Conclusion

(U) The DoD provided Afghan evacuees at Holloman AFB and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst with essential support such as food, shelter, medical, and various other services to ensure evacuees could safely complete the steps necessary to resettle in the United States. Furthermore, Air Force contracting personnel properly oversaw \$1.3 billion of taxpayer funds spent in support of this mission for the two task orders. Finally, Air Force contracting personnel and prime contractors saved \$67.8 million by reducing costs, and made adjustments to improve the quality of life for Afghan evacuees residing at DoD installations.

## **(U) Appendix A**

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### **(U) Scope and Methodology**

(U) We conducted this performance audit from May 2022 through January 2023 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) We reviewed contract performance and cost documentation for Holloman AFB and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst to determine whether contracting personnel oversight procedures were in accordance with Federal and DoD policies. Because our objective was limited to contract administration procedures for supplies and services supporting the relocation of Afghan evacuees in support of OAW, we did not review changing contract requirements or base restoration costs.

### ***(U) Review of Contract Performance Documentation***

(U) For each contract, we obtained the base contract, performance work statement, QASP, PARs, letters of concern, letters of technical direction, and documentation related to the CORs' experience and training. We reviewed the documentation to determine the scope of medical services, dining and food services, and facilities and support services required from the prime contractor; and to identify any deficiencies in the contractor's performance. We also reviewed the documentation and interviewed an AFCAP program manager, flight chief, and PCOs to identify surveillance procedures and determine whether the procedures were effective to address deficiencies in a timely manner. Furthermore, we determined whether CORs assigned to each contract were nominated in writing, possessed the required experience, and completed DoD-required training. Lastly, we determined whether the contract files were complete for the purposes of our review.

### ***(U) Review of Contract Cost Documentation***

(U) For each contract, we obtained contractor invoices, monthly performance and cost reports, and other documentation that described the amounts paid to the prime contractor in support of OAW. Based on the volume of invoices and supporting documentation, we did not perform detailed invoice reviews. However, we conducted in-depth interviews with Air Force contracting and DCAA personnel to identify their procedures and controls for reviewing

(U) contractor-submitted invoices. We determined whether procedures for invoice and contract fee oversight were effective to ensure compliance with Federal and DoD policies.

### **(U) Criteria**

(U) We evaluated oversight procedures according to the following criteria.

- (U) 41 U.S.C. Section 3905, “Cost Contracts”
- (U) FAR Part 46, “Quality Assurance”
- (U) FAR Subpart 1.6, “Career Development, Contracting Authority, and Responsibilities”
- (U) FAR Subpart 16.3, “Cost Reimbursement Contracts”
- (U) DFARS Part 246, “Quality Assurance”
- (U) DoD Instruction 5000.72, “DoD Standard for Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) Certification,” March 26, 2015 (Incorporating Change 2, November 6, 2020)
- (U) “DoD Contracting Officer’s Representatives Guidebook,” May 2021

### **(U) Internal Control Assessment and Compliance**

(U) We assessed internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations necessary to satisfy the audit objective. In particular, we assessed the monitoring, control environment, and control activities components of internal controls. However, because our review was limited to these internal control components and underlying principles, it may not have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of this audit.

### **(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data**

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

## (U) Appendix B

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### (U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued 17 reports, 14 of which related to DoD support for the relocation of Afghan Nationals. The other three reports related to contract administration and oversight.

(U) Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/>.

### (U) DoD OIG

(U) Report No. DODIG-2023-008, "Evaluation of DoD Security and Life Support for Afghan Evacuees at Camp Bondsteel," October 25, 2022

(U) The DoD OIG determined that the Area Support Group-Balkans provided adequate support, such as lodging, security, and medical care at Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. However, the DoD OIG determined that Area Support Group-Balkans may encounter future lodging, security, and medical care challenges for Afghan travelers as the length of stay for Afghan travelers increases. The DoD OIG recommended that the Commander, Area Support Group-Balkans document the lessons learned for lodging, security, and medical care for Afghan evacuees and provide the lessons learned through the chain of command for review and distribution to interagency partners.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2022-114, "Special Report: Lessons Learned From the Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals," August 5, 2022

(U) The DoD OIG identified eight lessons learned within the 11 management advisories related to Operation Allies Refuge and OAW. For example, the DoD did not establish memorandums of agreement (MOAs) with the lead Federal agencies responsible for the resettlement of Afghan evacuees and experienced issues obtaining licensed medical personnel. The DoD OIG also identified lessons learned related to in-processing, sustainment, medical care, and physical security for non-DoD personnel temporarily housed on DoD installations. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this report.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2022-070, "Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals at Camp Atterbury, Indiana," March 9, 2022

(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF Camp Atterbury, Indiana. While TF Camp Atterbury, Indiana housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, TF personnel experienced challenges, such as communicating with Afghan evacuees, tracking medical records, and addressing security incidents. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2022-067, "Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico," March 3, 2022

(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit of TF Holloman at Holloman AFB, New Mexico. While TF Holloman housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, TF personnel experienced challenges due to limited resources in the local economy, such as purchasing needed supplies and providing medical care for Afghan evacuees. Additionally, the base operations and support services contractor experienced challenges hiring personnel. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2022-066, "Management Advisory on the Lack of Memorandums of Agreement for DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals," March 1, 2022

(U) This management advisory informed DoD leadership of the lack of MOAs between the DoD, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of State for DoD support for OAW. During eight site visits, the DoD OIG identified the lack of MOAs as a systemic issue. The DoD OIG determined that the lack of MOAs caused confusion concerning the roles and responsibilities of DoD, Department of State, and Department of Homeland Security personnel, limiting the effectiveness of TF operations. The DoD OIG identified several areas where roles and responsibilities between the DoD, Department of State, and Department of Homeland Security were unclear, including decision making at the TF level, accountability of Afghan evacuees, law enforcement jurisdiction, and provision of services beyond basic sustainment. The DoD OIG made one recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy establish MOAs with the appropriate interagency partners to clarify roles and responsibilities and to define cost-sharing and reimbursement terms and conditions for OAW, in accordance with DoD policy and the Economy Act.



(U) Report No. DODIG-2022-064, "Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals at Fort Bliss, Texas," February 16, 2022

(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF Bliss at Fort Bliss, Texas. TF Bliss used the Doña Ana Range Complex, New Mexico, to support the mission. While TF Bliss personnel housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, TF personnel experienced challenges, such as contractor medical providers obtaining licenses to practice in New Mexico and inadequate implementation of security measures. Additionally, according to TF Bliss personnel, the extensive use of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, for the TF Bliss mission degraded the 2nd Brigade Combat Team's ability to train for future combat missions. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2022-065, "Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan," February 15, 2022

(U) This evaluation determined that the DoD had a supporting role during the biometric enrollment of Afghan evacuees in staging locations outside the continental United States and assisted in screening Special Immigrant Visa applicants. However, the DoD did not have a role in enrolling, screening, or overseeing the departure of Afghan parolees at temporary housing facilities (safe havens) within the continental United States. The evaluation found that Afghan evacuees were not vetted by the National Counter-Terrorism Center using all DoD data prior to arriving in the continental United States. As a result of the National Counter-Terrorism Center not vetting Afghan evacuees against all available data, the United States faces potential security risks if individuals with derogatory information are allowed to stay in the country. In addition, the Government could mistakenly grant Special Immigrant Visa or parolee status to ineligible Afghan evacuees with derogatory information gathered from the DoD Automated Biometric Identification System database. The DoD OIG made two recommendations, including that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security develop procedures for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with the DoD and interagency stakeholders.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2022-063, "Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin," February 15, 2022

(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF McCoy at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. While TF McCoy housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, TF personnel experienced challenges, such as maintaining dining facilities, identifying the required contracted medical skill sets, providing behavioral health services, and holding Afghan evacuees accountable for misdemeanor crimes. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2022-059, "Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey," February 2, 2022

(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF Liberty at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey. While TF Liberty housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, the DoD OIG identified potential procedural obstacles for law enforcement officers investigating potential criminal activity and challenges for other security personnel ensuring only those with proper credentials could access the villages. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2022-055, "Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals at Fort Pickett, Virginia," January 20, 2022

(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF Pickett at Fort Pickett, Virginia. While Fort Pickett housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, TF personnel experienced challenges, such as providing medical screenings and medical care, and ensuring accountability of Afghan evacuees. TF Pickett personnel also experienced security challenges, including controlling access to the joint operations area where Afghan evacuees were located and holding Afghan evacuees accountable for misdemeanor crimes. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2022-050, "Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia," January 5, 2022

(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from a DoD OIG site visit to TF Quantico at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia. While TF Quantico housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, TF personnel experienced challenges, such as ensuring accountability of Afghan evacuees and providing Afghan evacuees with all 13 immunizations required by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2022-051, "Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals at Fort Lee, Virginia," January 5, 2022

(U) This management advisory provided the officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from the DoD OIG site visit to TF Eagle at Fort Lee, Virginia. TF Eagle housed and sustained Afghan evacuees, and aside from one fire and safety issue in the privately-owned hotel used for housing Afghan refugees, the DoD OIG did not identify any significant issues or challenges at TF Eagle. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2022-045, "Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals at Rhine Ordnance Barracks," December 17, 2021

(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for the relocation of Afghan evacuees with the results from the DoD OIG site visit to Rhine Ordnance Barracks, Germany. While Rhine Ordnance Barracks personnel provided sustainment resources and had security measures in place to help ensure Afghan evacuees, Service members, and volunteers were safe, the execution of this effort came at a significant cost to the 21st Theater Sustainment Command. Specifically, the 21st Theater Sustainment Command reported that, as of September 30, 2021, it had obligated \$37.5 million in support of Operation Allies Refuge and anticipated that it would continue to incur additional costs in FY 2022. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2022-040, "Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals at Ramstein Air Base," November 29, 2021

(U) This management advisory provided DoD officials responsible for the relocation of Afghan evacuees with the results from the DoD OIG site visit to Ramstein Air Base, Germany, on September 14, 2021, where the audit team observed the housing conditions and support of Afghan evacuees. The DoD OIG determined that the 86th Airlift Wing and other personnel supporting Operation Allies Refuge at Ramstein Air Base implemented procedures for identifying and screening Afghan evacuees, and provided living conditions and other resources to meet Afghan evacuees' basic needs. Additionally, 86th Airlift Wing personnel had security measures in place to help ensure that Afghan evacuees, Service members, volunteers, and local residents were safe. However, the execution of this effort did come at a significant cost to the command. For the funds spent on the Operations Allies Refuge effort at Ramstein Air Base, the 86th Airlift Wing reported approximately \$56.3 million in FY 2021 costs, and expected an additional \$50 million in FY 2022 costs. The DoD OIG did not make any recommendations in this advisory.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2019-103, "Audit of Air Force Accountability of Government Property and Oversight of Contractual Maintenance Requirements in the Contract Augmentation Program IV in Southwest Asia," July 18, 2019

(U) The DoD OIG determined that the Air Force did not perform oversight of contracted services for maintenance and repairs of Government property because AFCAP IV PCOs did not coordinate with the requiring activity to establish clear Government property surveillance measures in the QASP, such as procedures to oversee contractor performance of routine maintenance tasks and repairs. As a result of the Air Force's lack of oversight of contractually required maintenance services, the Air Force did not have assurance that the base support contractors in Qatar maintained at least \$20.6 million of Government property in accordance with contract requirements. The DoD OIG made eight recommendations, including that the Chief of Air Forces Central Command Contracting Division update Air Force secondary delegation procedures to specify that deployed ACOs receive not only verbal instruction, but also a written delegation to outline the specific contract administration duties each ACO is responsible for performing.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2018-119, “DoD Oversight of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program in Afghanistan Invoice Review and Payment,” May 11, 2018

(U) The DoD OIG determined that DoD officials did not conduct sufficient voucher reviews for services provided under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV contract. In addition, the Army Contracting Command-Afghanistan did not monitor all contract requirements. These conditions occurred because DoD policy regarding voucher reviews did not clearly state what role contracting officials should have in reviewing vouchers or establish an expectation of how the contract administration office could augment DCAA voucher reviews. As a result, the Army paid all vouchers Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contractors submitted from 2015 to 2017, valued at \$2.4 billion, with little or no examination of the supporting documentation, of which at least \$536 million was billed on vouchers that were supported by questionable documentation and warranted further analysis. The DoD OIG made six recommendations, including that multiple offices develop guidance and establish voucher review responsibilities to ensure better monitoring of contractor billings, and that the Army Contracting Command-Afghanistan Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting develop a new QASP specific to the task order requirements in Afghanistan.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2018-074, “The U.S. Navy’s Oversight and Administration of the Base Support Contracts in Bahrain,” February 13, 2018

(U) The DoD OIG determined that the U.S. Navy did not provide effective oversight of the base support contracts in Bahrain. Specifically, CORs relied on performance assessment representatives, who were foreign national direct hires at Naval Support Activity-Bahrain and foreign national contractors at Isa Air Base, to execute all quality assurance oversight of the contractors. However, the CORs did not ensure the performance assessment representatives oversaw all contractual requirements or possessed the knowledge and experience to oversee their respective annexes. As a result, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command did not have assurance that the \$161.5 million the U.S. Navy paid for base support resulted in adequately performed or contractually compliant services and the CORs may not have obtained sufficient evidence to evaluate contractor performance.



(U) The DoD OIG made six recommendations, including that the Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command Europe, Africa, Southwest Asia, establish a summary of the COR's contract oversight responsibilities, provide incoming CORs with contract-specific training on contract oversight responsibilities, review and monitor COR usage of performance assessment representatives, and tailor performance assessment procedures to require review of all contractual requirements.

## (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

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(U) ACO	Administrative Contracting Officer
(U) AFB	Air Force Base
(U) AFCAP	Air Force Contract Augmentation Program
(U) COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
(U) DCAA	Defense Contract Audit Agency
(U) DFARS	Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(U) FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
(U) OAW	Operation Allies Welcome
(U) PAR	Performance Assessment Report
(U) PCO	Procuring Contracting Officer
(U) QASP	Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan
(U) TF	Task Force

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## **Whistleblower Protection**

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