


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
Report No. DODIG-2019-077



# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

APRIL 15, 2019



## (U) Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques

Classified By: DoD OIG (b)(6)

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## (U) Results in Brief

*(U) Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques*

April 15, 2019

### (U) Objective

(U) We determined whether the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence's, the U.S. Southern Command's, the U.S. Central Command's, and the U.S. Special Operations Command's oversight of intelligence interrogation approaches and techniques adhered to applicable DoD policies and regulations.

(U) We did not focus on the Defense Intelligence Agency's role because the Defense Intelligence Agency's responsibility for intelligence interrogations was providing oversight of counterintelligence and human intelligence (CI/HUMINT) training, not overseeing the performance of combatant command intelligence interrogations.

### (U) Background

(U) Intelligence interrogation is the systematic process of questioning a captured or detained person to obtain reliable information to satisfy foreign intelligence collection requirements. DoD Directive (DoDD) 3115.09 and Army Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3 are the guiding policies for intelligence interrogation performance and oversight. DoDD 3115.09 establishes roles and responsibilities for intelligence interrogations and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) and combatant command interrogation oversight. FM 2-22.3 identifies the 18 intelligence interrogation approaches and the 1 intelligence interrogation technique that are authorized for use.

### (U) Finding

(U) We determined that OUSD(I) developed and coordinated DoD policy, and reviewed, approved, and ensured coordination of DoD Component intelligence interrogation policies, directives, and doctrine.

(U) However, we also found inconsistencies in OUSD(I)'s oversight of the implementation of DoD policy regarding combatant command intelligence interrogation approaches and techniques. For example, the methodology for a December 2013 OUSD(I) assessment stated that a survey was used to collect interrogation data from the combatant commands, but the data were not verified by OUSD(I) personnel due to funding limitations. In addition, the methodology for an October 2017 OUSD(I) assessment of combatant command intelligence-related policies and records did not include an assessment of the combatant commands' intelligence interrogation program.

(U) The inconsistencies in OUSD(I)'s intelligence interrogation implementation oversight occurred because OUSD(I) officials focused on intelligence interrogation policy reviews rather than developing procedures for, and conducting policy implementation oversight of, intelligence interrogations. As a result, OUSD(I) cannot ensure that the combatant commands' intelligence interrogation programs are employing interrogation approaches and techniques consistent with the applicable policies and regulations.

(U) With regard to the three combatant commands we reviewed, we determined that U.S. Southern Command's intelligence interrogation policies and oversight procedures met the requirements of DoDD 3115.09.

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## (U) Results in Brief

### *(U) Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques*

#### (U) Finding (cont'd)

(S//NF) However, we found that USCENTCOM's CI/HUMINT Operations Division (CCJ2-X) did not maintain all intelligence interrogation records or have access to the central data repository or the systems and databases that maintain USCENTCOM intelligence interrogation-related records. OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c); USCENTCOM

(b)(1) 1.4(a), (c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(U) As a result, the USCENTCOM CCJ2-X could not conduct independent oversight of USCENTCOM intelligence interrogation-related records (such as the interrogators' operational and source administrative reports) without direct access to the central data repository or the systems and databases that maintain USCENTCOM intelligence interrogation-related records. Independent oversight provides reasonable assurance that intelligence interrogation operations, reporting, and compliance are achieved.

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

#### (U) Finding (cont'd)

USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(U) USSOCOM officials also stated that they were waiting for OUSD(I) to publish the revised DoDD 3115.09 before updating USSOCOM policy. As a result, if USSOCOM restarts its intelligence interrogation program, USSOCOM could perform intelligence interrogations that are not authorized or were not approved by the appropriate individuals within the chain of command because the USSOCOM policy lacked current DoDD 3115.09 oversight and records management requirements.

#### (U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develop formal combatant command intelligence interrogation oversight procedures and develop a schedule for conducting intelligence interrogation policy implementation oversight.

(U) We recommend that the Commander of U.S. Central Command review and update Central Command Regulation 381-21 to:

- (U) Reflect U.S. Central Command's current operating procedures for maintaining and overseeing U.S. Central Command's intelligence interrogation-related records.
- (U) Require Headquarters, U.S. Central Command personnel to have access to all of the data repositories that maintain U. S. Central Command's intelligence interrogation-related records.

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## (U) Results in Brief

*(U) Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques*

### (U) Recommendations (cont'd)

(S//NF) USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

### (U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence's Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Sensitive Activities Director, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, did not agree or disagree with the specifics of our recommendation, but did agree with the finding that there are "inconsistencies in OUSD(I)'s oversight of the implementation of DoD policy regarding combatant command intelligence interrogation approaches and techniques." Although the Director did not specifically concur, we consider the OUSD(I)'s actions to update its inspection standard operating procedures and update its independent oversight reporting process to be responsive to the intent of our recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is considered resolved, but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the OUSD(I) has documented their intelligence interrogation inspection processes and documented their procedures for reporting OUSD(I)'s oversight of combatant command intelligence interrogation operations independent of OUSD(I)'s partnership with DoD SIOO.

(U) The U.S. Central Command's CCJ2-X Chief, responding for the Commander of U.S. Central Command, did not agree or disagree with our recommendations. However, the USCENTCOM CCJ2-X Chief's response stated that USCENTCOM initiated an internal revision of USCENTCOM Regulation 381-21 to incorporate our recommendations,

### (U) Management Comments and Our Recommendations (cont'd)

with the final completion anticipated by the end of calendar year 2019. Although the USCENTCOM CCJ2-X Chief's response did not specifically agree or disagree, we consider the U.S. Central Command's actions to update its intelligence interrogation policy to be responsive to the intent of our recommendations. Therefore, the recommendations are considered resolved, but will remain open. We will close the recommendations once we verify that the updated Central Command Regulation 381-21 fully addresses the U.S. Central Command's current operating procedures for maintaining and overseeing intelligence interrogation-related records, and how U.S. Central Command's CCJ2-X personnel will access the data repositories that maintain USCENTCOM's intelligence interrogation-related records.

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

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## (U) Results in Brief

*(U) Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation  
Approaches and Techniques*

### *(U) Management Commends and Our Recommendations (cont'd)*

USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U) Please see the recommendations table on the next page  
for the status of each recommendation.

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***(U) Recommendations Table***

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence	None	1	None
Commander, United States Central Command	None	2.a, 2.b	None
Commander, United States Special Operations Command	None	3	None

(U) Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations.

- (U) **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendations or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendations.
- (U) **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- (U) **Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.





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INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22304-1500

April 15, 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of Intelligence Interrogations Requiring Special Approval  
(Report No. DODIG-2019-077)

(U) We are providing this report for information and use. We conducted this evaluation in accordance with Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation.

(U) We considered comments from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the U.S. Central Command, and the U.S. Special Operations Command on the draft of this report when preparing the final report. Those comments conformed to the requirements of DoD Instruction 7650.03; therefore we do not require additional comments.

(U) If you have any questions or would like to meet to discuss the evaluation, please contact me at DoD OIG (b)(6) [DSN DoD OIG (b)(6)]. We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the evaluation.

Michael J. Roark  
Deputy Inspector General for Evaluations

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## (U) Introduction

### (U) Objective

(U) We determined whether the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence's (OUSD[I]), the U.S. Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM), the U.S. Central Command's (USCENTCOM), and the U.S. Special Operation Command's (USSOCOM) oversight of intelligence interrogation approaches and techniques adhered to applicable DoD policies and regulations.<sup>1</sup> We did not focus on the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) role because the DIA's responsibility for intelligence interrogations was providing oversight of counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT) training, not overseeing the performance of combatant command intelligence interrogations.

### (U) Background

#### (U) Intelligence Interrogation Process

(U) DoD Directive (DoDD) 3115.09 addresses intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning.<sup>2</sup> An intelligence interrogation is "the systematic process of using interrogation approaches to question a captured or detained person to obtain reliable information to satisfy foreign intelligence collection requirements." A detainee debriefing is "the process of using direct questions to elicit intelligence information from a cooperative detainee to satisfy intelligence requirements." Tactical questioning is "the field-expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value of a captured or detained person at or near the point of capture and before the individual is placed in a detention facility. Tactical questioning is generally performed by members of patrols, but can be done by any appropriately trained DoD personnel. Tactical questioning is limited to direct questioning."<sup>3</sup> This evaluation focused solely on intelligence interrogations performed by Service-trained and certified intelligence interrogators who are familiar with the intelligence interrogation process.

<sup>1</sup> (U) We focused the scope of this evaluation on assessing intelligence interrogation oversight at U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command based on their respective areas of operation.

<sup>2</sup> (U) DoD Directive 3115.09, "DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning," October 11, 2012, Incorporating Change 2, Effective April 27, 2018.

<sup>3</sup> (U) According to FM 2-22.3, direct questions are basic questions normally beginning with an interrogative (who, what, where, when, how, or why) and requiring a narrative answer. They are brief, precise, and simply worded to avoid confusion.



(S//NF) OSD/JS and USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Once the interrogator reviews the detainee's background, the interrogator prepares an intelligence interrogation plan. The interrogation plan is a report prepared by the HUMINT collector to organize his plan to approach and question a detainee. The DoD's military and civilian interrogators must use only the approaches and the technique identified in FM 2-22.3.<sup>5</sup> The interrogators submit the intelligence interrogation plan to the unit's senior interrogator for review and approval. The senior interrogator reviews the interrogation plan for applicability to intelligence requirements and the interrogator's methodology to achieve rapport with the detainee. Depending on the location, the role of senior interrogator is determined either by rank or intelligence interrogation experience.

(U) Additionally, behavioral science consultants, if available, who, in accordance with DoDD 3115.09, "are authorized to make psychological assessments of the character, personality, social interactions, and other behavioral characteristics of interrogation subjects and to advise authorized personnel performing lawful interrogations regarding such assessments." DoDD 3115.09 further states that "behavioral science consultants may not be used to determine detainee phobias for the purpose of exploitation during the interrogation process." The interrogator may consider the consultant's assessment while implementing the five phases of every intelligence interrogation—planning and preparing for the interrogation, employing an approach, questioning the source, ending the conversation (termination), and reporting.

(U) Following the intelligence interrogation, the interrogator completes operational and source administrative reporting, which responds to intelligence requirements and includes the rationale for the interrogator's approach, its level of success, a description of the detainee's information, and the detainee's demeanor following the discussion. The interrogator may collaborate with an analyst to identify further intelligence

<sup>4</sup> (U) Army Field Manual 2-22.3, "Human Intelligence Collector Operations," September 2006.

<sup>5</sup> (U) FM 2-22.3. See Appendix B of this report for a complete listing and descriptions of the approved approaches and the technique.



requirements, intelligence gaps, and amplifying information the detainee may be able to answer. Finally, the interrogator generates and submits an intelligence information report via the HUMINT Online Tasking and Reporting database for intelligence community consumption.

### ***(U) Intelligence Interrogation Oversight***

(U) Oversight of intelligence interrogation ensures that DoD Components comply with law and policy and that interrogators treat detainees humanely. According to the Government Accountability Office's "Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government," internal controls are a process implemented by an entity's oversight body, management, and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance that the objectives of an entity will be achieved.<sup>6</sup> These objectives and related risks can be broadly classified into one or more of the following three categories:

- (U) Operations: Effectiveness and efficiency of operations.
- (U) Reporting: Reliability of reporting for internal and external use.
- (U) Compliance: Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

### ***(U) Policies Governing Intelligence Interrogations***

(U) DoDD 3115.09 and FM 2-22.3 are the guiding policies for intelligence interrogation performance and oversight.

#### ***(U) DoD Directive 3115.09***

(U) DoDD 3115.09 requires that DoD military, civilian, and contractor personnel conduct intelligence interrogations of individuals in U.S. or foreign custody in accordance with applicable law, the requirements in this Directive, and implementing plans, policies, orders, directives, and doctrine developed by the DoD Components and approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]).<sup>7</sup> Additionally, all intelligence interrogations must be "conducted humanely in accordance with applicable law and policy." Further, only DoD interrogators who are trained and certified in accordance with DoDD 3115.09 may conduct DoD intelligence interrogations.

#### ***(U) Army Field Manual 2-22.3***

(U) According to FM 2.22-3, "In accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the only intelligence interrogation approaches and techniques that are authorized for

<sup>6</sup> (U) U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government," September 2014 (GAO-14-704G).

<sup>7</sup> (U) DoDD 3115.09.

use with any detainee, regardless of status or characterization, are those authorized and listed in this Field Manual." There are 18 intelligence interrogation approaches and 1 intelligence interrogation technique authorized by FM 2-22.3. Two of the approaches and the technique require additional prior approval. "This manual applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. This manual also applies to DoD civilian employees and contractors with responsibility to engage in HUMINT collection activities. It is also intended for commanders and staffs of joint and combined commands, and Service Component Commands. Although this is Army doctrine, adaptations will have to be made by other Military departments, based on each of their organizations and specific doctrine."

### ***(U) Roles and Responsibilities***

(U) DoDD 3115.09 establishes roles and responsibilities for intelligence interrogations and OUSD(I) and combatant command interrogation oversight.

#### *(U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence*

(U) DoDD 3115.09 assigns OUSD(I) primary staff responsibility for DoD intelligence interrogations and serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding DoD intelligence interrogation policy. In addition, DoDD 3115.09 mandates OUSD(I) responsibility for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of DoD intelligence interrogation policy. OUSD(I) is also responsible for reviewing, approving, and ensuring coordination of all DoD Component intelligence interrogation policies, directives, and doctrine.

#### *(U) Combatant Commands*

(U) DoDD 3115.09 requires that Combatant Commanders ensure all intelligence interrogation plans, policies, orders, directives, training, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures issued by subordinate commands and components are consistent with DoDD 3115.09 and USD(I)-approved policies, and that the combatant commands periodically review and evaluate those issuances. In addition, DoDD 3115.09 requires that Combatant Commanders ensure personnel, including DoD contractor personnel, who are involved in intelligence interrogations are trained and certified.



## (U) Finding

### (U) OUSD(I) and Combatant Command Intelligence Interrogation Oversight Procedures Require Improvement

(U) The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD[I]) developed and coordinated DoD policy, and reviewed, approved, and ensured coordination of all DoD Component intelligence interrogation policies, directives, and doctrine. However, we found inconsistencies in OUSD(I)'s oversight of the implementation of DoD policy regarding combatant command intelligence interrogation approaches and techniques. For example, the methodology for a December 2013 OUSD(I) assessment stated that a survey was used to collect interrogation data from the combatant commands, but the data were not verified by OUSD(I) personnel due to funding limitations. In addition, the methodology for an October 2017 OUSD(I) assessment of combatant command intelligence-related policies and records did not include an assessment of the combatant command's intelligence interrogation program. The inconsistencies in OUSD(I)'s integration implementation oversight occurred because OUSD(I) officials focused on intelligence interrogation policy reviews rather than developing procedures for, and conducting policy implementation oversight of, intelligence interrogations. As a result, OUSD(I) cannot ensure that the combatant commands' intelligence interrogation programs are employing interrogation approaches and techniques consistent with the applicable policies and regulations.

(U) Of the three combatant commands we reviewed, only USSOUTHCOM's intelligence interrogation policies and oversight procedures met the requirements of DoDD 3115.09. For example, USSOUTHCOM annually performs announced and unannounced compliance inspections of intelligence interrogation procedures at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.

(S) However, we found that USCENTCOM's CI/HUMINT Operations Division (CCJ2-X) did not maintain all intelligence interrogation records or have access to the central data repository or the systems and databases that maintain USCENTCOM intelligence interrogation-related records. OSD/JS and USCENTCOM (b)(1)

1.4(c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c); USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As a result, USCENTCOM CCJ2-X could not conduct independent oversight of USCENTCOM intelligence interrogation-related records (such as the interrogators' operational and source administrative reports) without direct access to the central data repository or the systems and databases that maintain USCENTCOM intelligence interrogation-related records. Independent oversight provides reasonable assurance that operations, reporting, and compliance are achieved.

~~(S//NF)~~ USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition, according to USSOCOM officials they were waiting for OUSD(I) to publish the revised DoDD 3115.09 before updating USSOCOM policy. As a result, if USSOCOM restarts its intelligence interrogation program, USSOCOM could perform intelligence interrogations that are not authorized or were not approved by the appropriate individuals within the chain of command because the USSOCOM policy lacked current DoDD 3115.09 oversight and records management requirements.



## **(U) OUSD(I) Did Not Consistently Oversee the Implementation of Intelligence Interrogation Policy as Required by DoD Directive 3115.09**

(U) DoDD 3115.09 directs the USD(I) to develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of DoD intelligence interrogation policy. However, OUSD(I) officials have not been consistent in their oversight of the implementation of intelligence interrogations and they do not have oversight procedures to assess the implementation of DoD Component intelligence interrogations.

### ***(U) OUSD(I) Officials Focused on the Review, Approval, and Coordination of DoD Component Policies Rather Than Overseeing Interrogation Policy Implementation***

(U) During the joint DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Office (SIOO)—OUSD(I) review process, OUSD(I) officials focused on the review, approval, and coordination of DoD Component policies instead of focusing on the implementation of DoD policy. Since 2006, OUSD(I) conducted intelligence interrogation policy reviews. According to OUSD(I) officials, OUSD(I) began revising their policy review procedures in July 2018, to expedite future combatant command reviews.<sup>8</sup> According to the draft procedures for this review process, OUSD(I) will review each DoD Component's intelligence interrogation policy to ensure that it accurately articulates DoDD 3115.09 policy in the following areas:

- (U) Treatment of detainees during the interrogation process;
- (U) Interrogation, debriefing, and tactical questioning;
- (U) Support to interrogation operations; and
- (U) Oversight.

(U) The draft procedures state that OUSD(I) will send any substantive or critical comments to the DoD Component Head for adjudication. Upon receipt of the revised DoD Component Head policy, the OUSD(I) will review the policy to address all substantive and critical OUSD(I) comments. OUSD(I) will then forward the DoD Component Head policy to the Office of the General Counsel (Intelligence) for legal review. Upon completion of the legal review, OUSD(I) will send substantive or critical comments back to the DoD Component Head for adjudication. After receiving final Component Head comments, the OUSD(I) staff will send the package to the USD(I) for final approval. A memorandum signed by the USD(I) approving, approving with

<sup>8</sup> (U) As of November 2018, these updated procedures have not been codified.

changes, or disapproving the policy will then be sent to the DoD Component Head. As of July 2018, OUSD(I) officials used this methodology to review two combatant commands' interrogation policies.

(U) In addition, OUSD(I) officials informed us that they oversee implementation of DoD policy regarding intelligence interrogations by: (1) Reviewing and approving DoD Component policies, directives, and doctrine related to intelligence interrogations; (2) Conducting in person HUMINT assessments of the Services and Combatant Command operations; (3) Maintaining contact and dialogue with the Services and Combatant Commands regarding intelligence interrogation; (4) Hosting monthly meetings with representatives of the DoD Components to discuss current trends and issues relating to intelligence interrogations; and (5) Attending various HUMINT working groups, planning groups, and other meetings in order to provide the opportunity for the DoD Components to address issues.

(U) However, we found inconsistencies in OUSD(I)'s in person HUMINT assessments. Specifically, OUSD(I) does not have a documented procedure or process on how to conduct the in person HUMINT assessment. OUSD(I) provided us three independent assessments of DoD Component's interrogation programs and three assessments that were accomplished as part of a joint review with the Senior Intelligence Oversight Office.<sup>9</sup> These assessments varied in how they were conducted and what was reviewed and reported on.

(U) For example, OUSD(I)'s September 2013 HUMINT Policy Assessment of USCENTCOM was very thorough in its reporting of USCENTCOM's compliance with policy and policy implementation. However, OUSD(I)'s December 2013 DoD Interrogation Program Review, which included USCENTCOM, was only conducted via a survey as funding limitations precluded site visits and independent research to verify accuracy of the component's comments and perceptions. Finally, OUSD(I)'s October 2017 oversight review of USCENTCOM, in conjunction with the Senior Intelligence Oversight Office, had no mention of USCENTCOM's intelligence interrogation program.

### ***(U) OUSD(I) Cannot Ensure That Interrogations are Conducted According to Policy***

(U) As a result, OUSD(I) cannot ensure that the combatant commands' intelligence interrogation programs are employing interrogation approaches and techniques consistent with the applicable policies and regulations. OUSD(I) has documented procedures for intelligence interrogation policy reviews; however, these procedures do not cover independent verification of DoD Component intelligence interrogation

<sup>9</sup> (U) We only requested and reviewed assessments for USCENTCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USSOCOM.



implementation. This OUSD(I) implementation oversight is essential to ensure that the Components comply with, and account for, the humane treatment of detainees.<sup>10</sup>

(U) Without proper oversight, errors within the intelligence interrogation process could occur or go undetected. These process errors could damage the United States' and the Military Services' international reputation. For example, the DoD learned a valuable lesson in 2004 from the investigation of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The Abu Ghraib prison investigation identified two categories of abuse: (1) intentional violent or sexual abuse, and (2) abusive actions taken based on misinterpretation or confusion regarding the law and policy. The investigation also identified that while senior-level officials did not commit the abuse at Abu Ghraib, they did bear the responsibility for the lack of oversight at the facility. Additionally, the report states that establishing a clear chain of military intelligence command and associated responsibilities would have enhanced intelligence collection. Therefore, the development of formal, periodic OUSD(I) intelligence interrogation oversight procedures is essential to the DoD's ability to detect non-compliance and avoid repeating prior mistakes.

### **(U) Combatant Command Oversight of Intelligence Interrogations Is Inconsistent**

(U) During our review, we focused on the USSOUTHCOM, USCENTCOM, and USSOCOM intelligence interrogation programs. Of the three combatant commands, only USSOUTHCOM's intelligence interrogation program met the requirements of DoDD 3115.09. Both USCENTCOM's intelligence interrogation policy and USSOCOM's intelligence interrogation policy should be updated.

### **(U) USSOUTHCOM's Oversight of Its Intelligence Interrogation Program Meets the Requirements of DoD and USSOUTHCOM Policies**

(U) USSOUTHCOM's oversight of its intelligence interrogation policies and oversight procedures met the requirements of DoDD 3115.09 and USSOUTHCOM Regulation 380-1, which implements DoDD 3115.09.<sup>11</sup> Specifically, USSOUTHCOM's intelligence directorate ensured that intelligence interrogation techniques and procedures used by its subordinate command (Joint Task Force-Guantanamo [JTF-GTMO]) at Naval Base

<sup>10</sup> (U) According to DoDD 3115.09, no person in DoD custody or physical control, detained in a DoD facility, or otherwise interrogated, debriefed, or questioned by DoD military personnel, civilian employees, or DoD contractor personnel shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

<sup>11</sup> (U) U.S. Southern Command Regulation 380-1, "Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning," March 14, 2012.

Guantanamo Bay were consistent with DoD and USSOUTHCOM policies. For example, USSOUTHCOM's intelligence directorate personnel provided us detailed information regarding JTF-GTMO's intelligence interrogations, including the number of intelligence interrogations completed and a list of all approaches approved for use during those interrogations. Additionally, USSOUTHCOM's intelligence personnel had access to JTF-GTMO's web-based multi-source intelligence database, the Joint Detainee Information Management System, which they created to maintain and preserve interrogation records in accordance with DoDD 3115.09.

(U) Further, USSOUTHCOM's intelligence directorate personnel informed us that they perform annual announced and unannounced compliance inspections of intelligence interrogation procedures at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, as required by DoDD 2310.01E.<sup>12</sup> DoDD 2310.01E requires that the Combatant Commanders conduct periodic unannounced and announced inspections of detention facilities to provide continued oversight of detainee operations. USSOUTHCOM's inspection team consisted of its Branch Chief for Detention Operations, the Staff Judge Advocate, the Intelligence Director, the Surgeon General, and the U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal for General Detention Operations. Inspection focus areas include intelligence interrogations, standard operating procedures, interrogation planning and recording, and Behavioral Science Consultant Team involvement. In addition, USSOUTHCOM Regulation 380-1, Enclosure 3 contains the USSOUTHCOM Theater Semi-Annual Checklist.

(U) USSOUTHCOM publishes reports with findings and recommendations at the end of each inspection. We requested that USSOUTHCOM provide us with the two most recent reports within the scope of this project.<sup>13</sup> The USSOUTHCOM reports had the following findings and recommendations:

(U) Compliance Inspection of JTF-GTMO (January 2015) had no derogatory remarks related to USSOUTHCOM interrogation operations.

(U) Compliance Inspection of JTF-GTMO (August 2016) had no derogatory remarks related to USSOUTHCOM interrogation operations.

~~(S//NF)~~ USSOUTHCOM's oversight of its intelligence interrogation program contributed information that answered intelligence community requirements. Specifically, the Joint

<sup>12</sup> (U) DoD Directive 2310.01E, "DoD Detainee Program," August 19, 2014, Incorporating Change 1, Effective May 24, 2017.

<sup>13</sup> (U) The two USSOUTHCOM reports we received are 1) Compliance Inspection of Joint Task Force Guantanamo, January 2015, dated February 25, 2015, and 2) Compliance Inspection of Joint Task Force-Guantanamo, August 2016, dated November 2, 2016.



Detainee Information Management System (JDIMS), which was used to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence information from persons detained at JTF-GTMO, provided USSOUTHCOM officials with the capability to link interrogations to intelligence community priority intelligence requirements. JDIMS access includes DoD and non-DoD components and allows intelligence information sharing both internally and externally. The JDIMS reports enabled the USSOUTHCOM J2X to demonstrate the impact of the JTF-GTMO interrogator's efforts.

### (U) USCENTCOM Headquarters Did Not Maintain All Interrogation Records

(U) USCENTCOM did not maintain all intelligence interrogation records at the headquarters level. According to DoDD 3115.09, DoD Component Heads, to include commanders of the combatant commands, shall create, maintain, preserve, and dispose of records (video, audio, and written) related to interrogation or debriefing of detainees for foreign intelligence collection purposes in accordance with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5015.02.<sup>14</sup> DoDI 5015.02 requires the generation and maintenance of operational records as a result of campaigns and contingency operations in the combatant command area(s) of operation. DoDI 5015.02 defines operational records as records generated as a result of operational-level actions such as fragmentary orders, situation reports, and military intelligence summaries. In addition, CCR 381-21 governs USCENTCOM's intelligence interrogation program. According to CCR 381-21, the CCJ2-X stores all USCENTCOM intelligence interrogations records in [REDACTED] USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]

(U) However, the USCENTCOM CCJ2-X did not follow CCR 381-21. According to the CCJ2-X, CCR 381-21 currently includes a self-imposed requirement to maintain intelligence interrogation records. The CCJ2-X further stated that DoDD 3115.09 does not specifically require that component commanders maintain intelligence interrogation-related records locally, nor that the records be stored in the [REDACTED] USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED].

(S//NF) [REDACTED] USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), (c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

<sup>14</sup> (U) DoD Instruction 5015.02, "DoD Records Management Program," August 17, 2017, Incorporating Change 1, Effective April 27, 2018.

USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), (c), (g); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(U) In addition, according to USCENTCOM CCJ2-X officials, the lack of a central repository and direct access to the information has not impeded them from meeting their oversight responsibilities. According to DoDD 3115.09, Commanders of the Combatant Commands shall "plan, execute, and oversee Combatant Command intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning in accordance with this Directive." According to CCR 381-21, the CCJ2-X Chief "manages and oversees interrogation, detainee debriefing, and [tactical questioning] activities and reporting conducted under USCENTCOM authority." In addition, the CCJ2-X Chief "conducts annual compliance inspections of all USCENTCOM Components executing interrogation, detainee debriefing, and [tactical questioning] activities."

(S//NF) USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), (c)

(U) Direct access to the data repository(ies) would allow USCENTCOM CCJ2-X personnel to perform routine independent oversight of components performing interrogations

<sup>15</sup> (S//NF) USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), (c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

(S//NF) USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), (c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)



and meet the requirements of DoDD 3115.09 and CCR 381-21. The information contained in the data repositories includes, but is not limited, to the interrogators operational and source administrative reports that would allow an independent reviewer to verify the interrogator's methodology for questioning a detainee, the approving official's comments, and any connections between the detainee's responses and the intelligence community information requirements.

(U) Without direct access to the central data repository or the systems and databases that maintain intelligence interrogation-related records (such as the interrogator's operational and source administrative reports), USCENTCOM CCJ2-X cannot conduct independent oversight of USCENTCOM intelligence interrogation-related records. Independent oversight provides reasonable assurance that operations [intelligence interrogations], reporting, and compliance with DoD and USCENTCOM interrogation policies are achieved.

### (U) USSOCOM Intelligence Interrogation Policy Does Not Reflect USSOCOM's Intelligence Interrogation Program

(U) USSOCOM's intelligence interrogation policy is out of date, and does not accurately reflect USSOCOM's intelligence interrogation program. Specifically, USSOCOM's intelligence interrogation policy was last updated in 2008, and there is no mention of USSOCOM's information network used to store operational records and data. DoDD 3115.09 requires Combatant Commanders to periodically review and evaluate all intelligence interrogation policies, directives, and procedures.

(U) USSOCOM's intelligence interrogation policy, USSOCOM Directive 381-3, was last updated in 2008 and contains information that is outdated or obsolete.<sup>16</sup> For example, the purpose of the USSOCOM directive is to implement DoD policy on questioning captured or detained personnel for intelligence purposes in accordance with the May 2008 version of DoDD 3115.09. The current version of DoDD 3115.09 is dated October 2012 and incorporates changes that were effective April 2018. The following three references in USSOCOM Directive 381-3 are obsolete:

- (U) DoDD 2310.01E, "The Department of Defense Detainee Program," September 5, 2006. (The current version is dated August 19, 2014, and incorporates changes effective May 24, 2017.)

<sup>16</sup> (U) USSOCOM Directive 381-3, "Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning," June 16, 2008.

- (U) DoDD 2311.01E, "DoD Law of War Program," May 9, 2006. (The current version incorporates changes effective November 15, 2010.)
- (U) DoD Instruction 5240.4, "Reporting of Counterintelligence and Criminal Violations," September 22, 1992. (DoDI 5240.4 was replaced by DoDI 5240.04 in February 2, 2009. The current version is dated April 1, 2016, and incorporates changes effective April 26, 2018.)

(S//NF) USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

***(U) USSOCOM Officials Did Not Update USSOCOM Directive 381-3 Because USSOCOM Personnel Do Not Conduct Intelligence Interrogations Under USSOCOM Authority***

(S//NF) USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]



USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), (c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

~~(S//NF)~~ USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

## (U) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

### *(U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence*

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence's Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Sensitive Activities Director, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, agreed with the finding that there are "inconsistencies in OUSD(I)'s oversight of the implementation of DoD policy regarding combatant command intelligence interrogation approaches and techniques" and that there is room for improvement in the office's administrative procedures. The office has already refined its intelligence interrogation questionnaire and inspection process, most recently used during a March 2019 oversight inspection of U.S. Africa Command.

(U) In addition, the HUMINT and Sensitive Activities Director acknowledged the administrative inconsistencies identified in our report regarding intelligence interrogation oversight reporting. According to the HUMINT and Sensitive Activities Director, these administrative inconsistencies were due to a shift from OUSD(I) only assessments to ones that OUSD(I) coordinated with the DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Official (SIOO). As a result, many of OUSD(I)'s observations and assessments of intelligence interrogation operations did not meet the threshold for inclusion in the DoD SIOO reports. According to the HUMINT and Sensitive Activities Director, each OUSD(I) inspection is done in accordance with OUSD(I)'s standard operating procedure, which the office is updating to ensure that it contains the most efficient and effective procedures.

### *(U) Our Response*

(U) We acknowledge OUSD(I)'s comments on the reporting constraints associated with OUSD(I)'s partnership with the DoD SIOO for combatant command intelligence and intelligence-related oversight. However, OUSD(I) did not provide evidence throughout this evaluation to demonstrate the objective, scope, methodology, and results of its

intelligence interrogation oversight assessments that were subsequently left out of the DoD SIOO reports. We also acknowledge that OUSD(I)'s HUMINT Division developed procedures for the conduct of HUMINT assessments, which includes the implementation of DoD policy regarding intelligence interrogations. However, OUSD(I) did not provide evidence of how those assessments are performed or the method of determining which assessed areas met or did not meet the assessment requirements. Further, we acknowledge that OUSD(I) is in the process of issuing guidance for the Defense Intelligence Agency to develop an intelligence interrogation-related records repository. However, as this repository initiative is in its infancy, we cannot accept the concept as factual evidence.

*(U) U.S. Central Command*

(U) The USCENTCOM CCJ2-X Chief agreed with our finding and recommendation, but noted that DoDD 3115.09 does not mandate that DoD Components maintain intelligence interrogation-related records at the DoD Component level, nor does it require a centralized database for storage of or access to intelligence interrogation-related records.

*(U) Our Response*

(U) U.S. Central Command Regulation (CCR) 381-21 is derived from DoDD 3115.09, and is, therefore, a more restrictive policy. DoDD 3115.09 does require DoD Components to maintain and preserve records "...related to the interrogation or debriefing of detainees for foreign intelligence collection purposes...". While DoDD 3115.09 may not specify that the records be maintained at the geographic combatant command-level, CCR 381-21 required all USCENTCOM records related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning to be stored in the USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED], which we determined was not being upheld. Therefore, USCENTCOM did not satisfy the original DoDD 3115.09 mandate requirements.

*(U) U.S. Special Operations Command*

(S//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

*(U) Our Response*

~~(S//NF)~~ USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

**(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

**(U) Recommendation 1**

**(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develop formal combatant command intelligence interrogation oversight procedures and develop a schedule for conducting intelligence interrogation policy implementation oversight.**

*(U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Comments*

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence's Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Sensitive Activities Director, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence stated that OUSD(I) is updating its inspection standard operating procedures and is working to document OUSD(I)'s oversight of intelligence interrogation operations independent of the DoD SIOO's final reports.

*(U) Our Response*

(U) Comments from the OUSD(I)'s HUMINT and Sensitive Activities Director did not agree or disagree with the specifics of our recommendation. Although the Director did not specifically concur, we consider the OUSD(I)'s actions to update its inspection standard operating procedures and update its independent oversight reporting process to be responsive to the intent of our recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but will remain open, and no further comments are required. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the OUSD(I) has documented their intelligence interrogation inspection processes and documented their procedures for reporting OUSD(I)'s oversight of combatant command intelligence interrogation operations independent of OUSD(I)'s partnership with DoD SIOO.

***(U) Recommendation 2***

**(U) We recommend that the Commander of U.S. Central Command review and update Central Command Regulation 381-21 to:**

- a. (U) Reflect U.S. Central Command's current operating procedures for maintaining and overseeing U.S. Central Command's intelligence interrogation-related records.**

*(U) U.S. Central Command Comments*

(U) The U.S. Central Command's Counterintelligence and HUMINT Operations Division (CCJ2-X) Chief, responding for the Commander of U.S. Central Command, did not agree or disagree with the recommendation. However, the CCJ2-X Chief's response stated that USCENTCOM initiated an internal revision of USCENTCOM Regulation 381-21 to incorporate recommended DoD OIG changes, with the final completion anticipated by the end of calendar year 2019.

*(U) Our Response*

(U) Comments from U.S. Central Command's CCJ2-X Chief did not directly agree or disagree with our recommendation; however, the CCJ2-X Chief's response addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the updated Central Command Regulation 381-21 fully addresses U.S. Central Command's current operating procedures for maintaining and overseeing intelligence interrogation-related records.

- b. (U) Require Headquarters, U.S. Central Command personnel to have access to all of the data repositories that maintain U.S. Central Command's intelligence interrogation-related records.**



*(U) U.S. Central Command Comments*

~~(S//NF)~~ The U.S. Central Command's CCJ2-X Chief, responding for the Commander of U.S. Central Command, did not agree or disagree with the recommendation. However, the CCJ2-X Chief's response stated that USCENTCOM has requested [REDACTED] USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [REDACTED] accounts to have immediate access to subordinate element documentation. Additionally, USCENTCOM requested a data management process from the subordinate elements that will allow for physical storage of all records locally. USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [REDACTED] for intelligence interrogation reporting.

*(U) Our Response*

(U) Comments from U.S. Central Command's CCJ2-X Chief did not agree or disagree with our recommendation; however, the CCJ2-X Chief's response addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that Central Command Regulation 381-21 fully addresses how USCENTCOM CCJ2-X personnel will access the data repositories that maintain USCENTCOM's intelligence interrogation-related records.

**(U) Recommendation 3**

~~(S//NF)~~ USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED].

*(U) United States Special Operations Command Comments*

~~(S//NF)~~ USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

*(U) Our Response*

~~(S//NF)~~ Comments from U.S. Special Operations Command's J2X Chief did not directly agree or disagree with our recommendation; however, the CCJ2-X Chief's response addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that USSOCOM Directive 381-3 fully addresses the U.S. Special Operations Command's intelligence interrogation program [REDACTED]

USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



## (U) Appendix A

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### (U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from May 2018 through February 2019 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) This project evaluated the DoD's and combatant commands' oversight of intelligence interrogations using as a guide DoDD 3115.09 and FM 2-22.3. The scope of this evaluation was limited to an assessment of intelligence interrogation oversight at USSOUTHCOM, USCENTCOM, and USSOCOM based on their respective areas of operation. This project's scope did not include an assessment of detainee questioning performed by untrained or uncertified soldiers at point of capture, law enforcement interrogations, or the quality of the intelligence resulting from intelligence interrogations. The project scope also did not include an assessment of intelligence interrogation policies and procedures at U.S. Africa Command or U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and did not include an assessment of the High-value Detainee Interrogation Group's interrogation policies and procedures.

(U) We did not focus on DIA because DIA's responsibility was providing oversight of CI and HUMINT training, including intelligence interrogations, for the Defense CI/HUMINT Enterprise. The DIA is not an intelligence interrogation oversight body. Therefore, this report does not assess the DIA's intelligence interrogation-related capabilities.

(U) We performed site visits and interviewed personnel at the following locations:

(U) USCENTCOM, MacDill AFB, Florida

(U) USSOUTHCOM, Doral, Florida

(U) USSOCOM, MacDill AFB, Florida

(U) OUSD(I), Washington, D.C.

(U) DIA, Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, D.C.

tactics, techniques, and procedures issued by subor(U) U.S. Army's 35M10 and Joint Interrogation Certification Course, Fort Huachuca, Arizona

(U) U.S. Marine Corps Marine Air Ground Task Force Joint Interrogation Course, Naval Air Station Oceana Dam Neck, Virginia

(U) We reviewed applicable guidance, DoD directives, and instructions. Specifically, we reviewed DoDD 3115.09, USSOUTHCOM Regulation 380-1, USCENTCOM 381-21, and USSOCOM Directive 381-3.

(U) We conducted a formal data call where we requested from each of the three combatant commands that we visited the following:

- (U) Copies of existing policies implementing DoD intelligence interrogation policies and regulations, including intelligence interrogation directives, manuals, and policies for requesting, authorizing, and performing intelligence interrogations.
- (U) Supporting documentation on how the command ensures that all intelligence interrogation and detainee debriefing plans, policies, orders, directives, training, doctrine, and dinat commands and components are consistent with DoDD 3115.09.
- (U) Supporting documentation on how the command ensures that personnel, including DoD contractor personnel, assigned to the command who are involved in intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning are appropriately trained and certified consistent with the standards established pursuant to Enclosure 2, subparagraph 2.d(2) of DoDD 3115.09 and Enclosure 4, section 1 of DoDD 3115.09.
- (U) Supporting documentation on how the command ensures that non-DoD intelligence interrogations are conducted in accordance with Enclosures 3 and 6 of DoDD 3115.09.
- (U) Copies of the commands' coordinated engagement with the Secretaries of the Military Departments to establish procedures for the prompt reporting of reportable incidents, committed by non-DoD U.S. personnel or by coalition, allied, host nation, or any other persons, in accordance with Enclosure 3 of DoDD 3115.09.
- (U) From fiscal year (FY) 2012 through FY2017, supporting documentation for the total number of intelligence interrogations requested and performed by the



commands' interrogators including the number of times the commands' interrogators used each of the intelligence interrogation methods described in FM 2-22.3.

- (U) Copies of the commands' semiannual summary reports (or reporting input) on intelligence interrogations, as well as intelligence interrogation metrics for the FY12 to FY17 period, including but not limited to intelligence interrogation plans and intelligence interrogation summaries.

(U) We interviewed senior intelligence leaders and administrators, and current and former senior intelligence interrogators at two of the three combatant commands that we visited and at each Service intelligence interrogation training facility. We also interviewed OUSD(I)'s HUMINT and Sensitive Activities Directorate, Director for Defense Intelligence (Intelligence and Security) personnel both before and after our site visits to the combatant commands.

### (U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

### (U) Use of Technical Assistance

(U) We did not require technical assistance to perform this evaluation.

### (U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, there were no reports discussing the DoD's or the combatant commands' oversight of intelligence interrogations.

## **(U) Appendix B**

### **(U) Intelligence Interrogation Strategies Authorized by Army Field Manual 2-22.3**

(U) According to FM 2.22-3, "In accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the only interrogation approaches and techniques that are authorized for use with any detainee, regardless of status or characterization, are those authorized and listed in this Field Manual." There are 18 intelligence interrogation approaches and 1 intelligence interrogation technique. Two of the approaches and the technique require additional approval before use.<sup>17</sup>

#### **(U) Intelligence Interrogation Approaches**

1. (U) Direct Approach: In using the direct approach, the human intelligence (HUMINT) collector asks direct questions. The initial questions may be administrative or non-pertinent, but the HUMINT collector quickly begins asking pertinent questions. The HUMINT collector will continue to use direct questions as long as the source is answering the questions in a truthful manner. When the source refuses to answer, avoids answering, or falsely answers a pertinent question, the HUMINT collector will begin an alternate approach strategy.
2. (U) Incentive Approach: The incentive approach is trading something that the source wants for information. The thing that you give up may be a material reward, an emotional reward, or the removal of a real or perceived negative stimulus. The exchange of the incentive may be blatant or subtle.
3. (U) Emotional Love Approach: In using the emotional love approach, the HUMINT collector focuses on the anxiety felt by the source about the circumstances in which he finds himself, his isolation from those he loves, and his feelings of helplessness. If the HUMINT collector can show the source what the source himself can do to alter or improve his situation or the situation of the object of his emotion, the approach has a chance of success.
4. (U) Emotional Hate Approach: The emotional hate approach focuses on any genuine hate, or possibly a desire for revenge, the source may feel. The HUMINT collector must

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<sup>17</sup> (U) Two approaches, Mutt and Jeff and False Flag, require approval by the first O-6 in the interrogator's chain of command. The restricted interrogation technique of "Separation" requires Combatant Commander approval for use, and each interrogation plan using "Separation" requires the approval of the first General Officer or Flag Officer in the interrogator's chain of command.



clearly identify the object of the source's hate and, if necessary, build on those feelings so the emotion overrides the source's rational side.

5. (U) Emotional Fear-Up Approach: In the fear-up approach, the HUMINT collector identifies a preexisting fear or creates a fear within the source. He then links the elimination or reduction of the fear to cooperation on the part of the source. The HUMINT collector must be extremely careful that he does not threaten or coerce a source. The HUMINT collector should also be extremely careful that he does not create so much fear that the source becomes unresponsive.

6. (U) Emotional Fear-Down Approach: In the fear-down approach, the HUMINT collector mitigates existing fear in exchange for cooperation on the part of the source. The HUMINT collector, through verbal and physical actions, calms the source. Psychologically, the source then views the HUMINT collector as the protector or the one who is providing the calm and wishes to help the HUMINT collector in gratitude and in order to maintain the HUMINT collector as the protector.

7. (U) Emotional Pride and Ego-Up Approach: In this technique, the source is flattered into providing certain information in order to gain credit and build his ego. The HUMINT collector must take care to use a flattering, somewhat in-awe tone of voice, and speak highly of the source throughout this approach while remaining believable. This should produce positive feelings on the source's part as he receives desired recognition. The source will eventually reveal pertinent information to solicit more favorable comments from the HUMINT collector.

8. (U) Emotional Pride and Ego-Down Approach: The HUMINT collector accuses the source of weakness or implies he is unable to do a certain thing. This type of source is also prone to excuses and rationalizations, often shifting the blame to others. The objective is for the HUMINT collector to use the source's sense of pride by attacking his loyalty, intelligence, abilities, leadership qualities, slovenly appearance, or any other perceived weakness. This will usually goad the source into becoming defensive, and he will try to convince the HUMINT collector he is wrong. In his attempt to redeem his pride and explain his actions, the source may provide pertinent information.

9. (U) Emotional Futility: The futility approach is effective when the HUMINT collector can play on doubts that already exist in the source's mind. Making the situation appear hopeless allows the source to rationalize his actions, especially if that action is cooperating with the HUMINT collector. When employing this technique, the HUMINT collector must not only have factual information, but also be aware of and exploit the source's psychological, moral, and sociological weaknesses.

10. (U) We Know All: In the "we know all" approach technique, the HUMINT collector subtly convinces the source that his questioning of the source is perfunctory because any information that the source has is already known. The HUMINT collector may even complete a source's answer, as if he is bored and just "going through the motions." When the source begins to give accurate and complete information, the HUMINT collector interjects pertinent questions.

11. (U) File and Dossier: The file and dossier approach is a variation of the "we know all" approach. The HUMINT collector prepares a dossier containing all available information concerning the source or his organization. The information is carefully arranged within a file to give the illusion that it contains more data than is actually there. The success of this technique is largely dependent on the naiveté of the source, volume of data on the subject, and skill of the HUMINT collector in convincing the source that the dossier is more complete than it actually is. There is also the risk that a less naïve source will refuse to cooperate, claiming that, if the collector already knows everything, there is no need for him to talk.

12. (U) Establish Your Identity: In using this approach, the HUMINT collector insists that the detained source has been correctly identified as an infamous individual wanted by higher authorities on serious charges, and he is not the person he purports to be. In an effort to clear himself of this allegation, the source makes a genuine and detailed effort to establish or substantiate his true identity. In so doing, he may provide the HUMINT collector with information and leads for further development.

13. (U) Repetition: The repetition approach is used to induce cooperation from a hostile source. In one variation of this approach, the HUMINT collector listens carefully to a source's answer to a question, and then repeats the question and answer several times. He does this with each succeeding question until the source becomes so thoroughly bored with the procedure, he answers questions fully and candidly to satisfy the HUMINT collector and gain relief from the monotony of this method.

14. (U) Rapid Fire: This approach may be used by one, two, or more HUMINT collectors to question the source. The HUMINT collectors ask a series of questions in such a manner that the source does not have time to answer a question completely before the next one is asked. This confuses the source, and he will tend to contradict himself as he has little time to formulate his answers. The HUMINT collectors then confront the source with the inconsistencies causing further contradictions. In many instances, the source will begin to talk freely in an attempt to explain himself and deny the HUMINT collector's claims of inconsistencies. In this attempt, the source is likely to reveal more than he intends, thus creating additional leads for further exploitation.



15. (U) Silent: The silent approach may be successful when used with either a nervous or confident source. When employing this technique, the HUMINT collector says nothing to the source, but looks him squarely in the eye, preferably with a slight smile on his face. It is important not to look away from the source but force him to break eye contact first. The source may become nervous, begin to shift in his chair, cross and re-cross his legs, and look away. He may ask questions, but the HUMINT collector should not answer until he is ready to break the silence.

16. (U) Change of Scenery: The change of scenery approach may be used in any type of military source operation to remove the source from an intimidating atmosphere such as an "interrogation" room type of setting and to place him in a setting where he feels more comfortable speaking.

17. (U) Mutt and Jeff: The goal of this technique is to make the source identify with one of the interrogators and thereby establish rapport and cooperation. Use of this technique requires two experienced HUMINT collectors who are convincing actors. The two HUMINT collectors will display opposing personalities and attitudes toward the source.

18. (U) False Flag: The goal of this technique is to convince the detainee that individuals from a country other than the United States are interrogating him, and trick the detainee into cooperating with U.S. forces.

### ***(U) Intelligence Interrogation Technique***

1. (U) Separation: The purpose of separation is to deny the detainee the opportunity to communicate with other detainees in order to keep him from learning counter-resistance techniques or gathering new information to support a cover story, decreasing the detainee's resistance to interrogation.

## (U) Management Comments

### (U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Comments



INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
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21 MAR 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS

SUBJECT: (U) Response to the Department of Defense Inspector General's Draft Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques" (Project No. D2018 DISPA2-01564.000)


(U) OUSD(I) concurs with the Department of Defense Inspector General's (DoD IG) finding that there are "...inconsistencies in OUSD(I)'s oversight of the implementation of DoD policy regarding combatant command intelligence interrogation approaches and techniques." OUSD(I) recognizes there is always room for improvement of our administrative procedures and the office has already refined the intelligence interrogation questionnaire and inspection process used during a March 2019 oversight inspection of U.S. Africa Command to implement some of your draft recommendations.

(U) The report also identified administrative inconsistencies in intelligence interrogation oversight reporting, which was due to a shift from an OUSD(I) only assessment to one where OUSD(I) coordinates with the DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Official (DoD SIOO). As a result, many of OUSD(I)'s observations and assessments of intelligence interrogation operations did not meet the threshold for inclusion in the DoD SIOO final report. For example, our intelligence interrogation observations were omitted from the DoD SIOO October 2017 U.S. Central Command inspection report, which was referenced in the DoD IG report.

(U) OUSD(I) conducts in person inspections of two combatant command intelligence interrogation programs every year; each combatant command is inspected every four years. Each inspection is done in accordance with OUSD(I)'s standard operating procedure that we are updating to ensure we have the most efficient and effective procedures. We are working to document OUSD(I)'s oversight of intelligence interrogation operations independent of DoD SIOO's final report.

(U) OUSD(I) would like to note there have been no observations or reports of intelligence personnel committing human rights violations during the scope of this evaluation.

(U) OUSD(I) has provided additional comments on the draft DoD IG report in the attached SD Form 818 for your information. My point of contact is [REDACTED]

  
Frank Sanders  
Director, HUMINT & Sensitive Activities

Attachment:  
As stated

Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: 21 March 2045

  
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UNCLASSIFIED when TABS A and B removed



## (U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Cont'd)

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"

#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
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## HOW TO USE THE SD FORM 818

GENERAL GUIDANCE:

- To sort the table by page number, hover your mouse over the top of the first cell in the column until a downward arrow appears; click to select the entire column. Under Table Tools, select layout, and then click Sort and "OK." To add new rows, copy and paste a blank row to keep consistent formatting. To add automatic numbering to column 1, select the entire column and then click on the Numbering button under Paragraph on the Home ribbon.

IF YOU ARE THE COORDINATING OSD COMPONENT:

- Use this form to provide critical and substantive comments to the OSD Component that created the issuance. Complete the header and footer, columns 2-6, and the last two entries in column 7:

**COLUMN 1** Order comments by the pages/paragraphs that they apply to in columns 4 and 5.

**COLUMN 2** Enter the classification of the comment. If any material is classified, follow DoDM 5200.01 guidance for marking the document. If all comments are unclassified, mark the header and footer and ignore the column.

**COLUMNS 3, 4, AND 5** Enter the appropriate information for each comment.

**COLUMN 6** Enter comment type (C, S, or A).

**(C) CRITICAL:** When a Component has one or more critical comments, that Component's coordination is an automatic nonconcur. The justification for critical comments MUST identify violations of law or contradictions of Executive Branch or DoD policy; unnecessary risks to safety, life, limb, or DoD material; waste or abuse of DoD appropriations; or imposition of an unreasonable burden on a Component's resources.

**(S) SUBSTANTIVE:** Make a substantive comment if a part of the issuance seems unnecessary, incorrect, misleading, confusing, or inconsistent with other sections, or if you disagree with the proposed responsibilities, requirements, or procedures. One substantive comment is usually not sufficient justification for a nonconcur on an issuance. Multiple substantive comments may be grounds for a nonconcur.

**(A) ADMINISTRATIVE:** An administrative comment concerns nonsubstantive aspects of an issuance, such as dates of reference, organizational symbols, format, and grammar.

**COLUMN 7** Place only one comment per row. Enter your comment, recommended changes, and justification in the first two areas provided. If any material is classified, follow DoDM 5200.01 guidance for marking the document. YOU MUST PROVIDE CONVINCING SUPPORT FOR CRITICAL COMMENTS IN THE JUSTIFICATION.

- Review the comments, resolve any conflicting views, and confirm that the completed matrix accurately represents your Component's position. Upload the form to the DoD Directives Program Portal in Microsoft Word format (.docx), with the signed SD Form 106 or coordination memorandum.

IF YOU ARE THE ORIGINATING OSD COMPONENT:

- Consolidate comments from all coordinators and adjudicate them. Do not include coordinator's administrative comments in the consolidated SD 818. Leave columns 4 and 5 blank for general comments that apply to the whole document. Sort comments by the pages/paragraphs to which they apply using the General Guidance sort feature (e.g., all comments from all coordinators that apply to page 1, paragraph 1.a, should be together; all comments that apply to page 1, paragraph 1.b, should be next). Set classification header, footer, and columns 1 and 2 as appropriate. Complete last entry in column 7, and column 8:

**COLUMN 7** If you rejected or partially accepted a comment, enter your justification in the originator justification area. If any material is classified, follow DoDM 5200.01 guidance for marking the document. Leave blank if you accepted it. Include any related communications with the coordinating Component. You MUST provide convincing support for rejecting critical comments.

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
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Column 8 Enter whether you accepted (A), rejected (R), or partially accepted (P) the comment. Your justification in column 7 must be consistent with this entry.

1	U	OUSDI, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	Cover page & page i	N/A	S	<p>Coordinator Comment: (U) Evaluation of the Oversight of DoD's Intelligence Interrogation <u>Approaches and Techniques</u> Programs and Policies</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: BLUF: Recommend delete language lined through, add language underlined as current title does not accurately represent what information is presented in the DoD IG report.</p> <p>Current title indicates a review of the interrogation techniques and approaches utilized by DoD, but the report does not provide information on this subject. The report is based on a review of policy and programs related to oversight by OUSDI and the CCMDs.</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	Choose an item.
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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"

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2	U	OUSDI, [REDACTED]	i	Finding, para 2	S	<p>Coordinator Comment: Recommend delete language lined through.</p> <p>(U) However, we also found inconsistencies in OUSDI's oversight of the implementation of DoD policy regarding combatant command intelligence interrogation approaches and techniques. For example, the methodology for a December 2013 OUSDI assessment stated that a survey was used to collect interrogation data from the combatant commands, but the data was not verified by OUSDI personnel due to funding limitations. In addition, the methodology for an October 2017 OUSDI assessment of combatant command intelligence related policies and records did not include an assessment of the combatant command's intelligence interrogation program.</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: DLUF: Recommend deletion of above paragraph as inconsistencies mentioned in the DoD IG report are due to inconsistencies in the reporting of information collected by the DoD SIOO and OUSDI not inconsistencies in inspection procedures.</p> <p>The example of the December 2013 assessment does not provide evidence of an inconsistency in oversight implementation it states a fiscal restraint that denied OUSDI personnel the ability to travel and collect the information in person, requiring the use of a survey to collect the data.</p> <p>The last sentence in the paragraph does not provide evidence of inconsistency in the methodology of OUSDI's assessment as CENTCOM's intelligence interrogation program was inspected. When OUSDI conducted unilateral HUMINT assessments (intelligence interrogation is a form of HUMINT activity), if an evaluation indicated there was no issue with a specific area reviewed there was a statement that the subject was reviewed and no issues were noted. In 2017, OUSDI was directed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to combine the HUMINT assessment with the DoD SIOO inspection. The Oct 2017 referred to in the recommended deleted paragraph was for CENTCOM and was a joint DoD SIOO and OUSDI inspection. DoD SIOO is</p>	Choose an item.

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(U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Cont'd)

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
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1						<p>responsible for producing the report for these joint inspections, and as the led DoD SIOO procedures are only to report three areas: Findings, Observations, and Best Practices. If an area has no issues that meet one of those three categories then the subject is not put in the report. In October 2017, USCENTCOM intelligence interrogation program was inspected but as there were not findings, observations, best practices, or policy/support issues noted DoD SIOO did not mention it in the DoD SIOO report.</p> <p>DoD SIOO policy on reporting defines: Findings as aspects of intelligence activities that deviate from law or policy. Observations as suggestions to improve the effectiveness of intelligence activities that are otherwise compliant with law and policy. Best practices are innovative processes that exceed requirements and should be considered for adoption by other DoD components. Policy/support issues are OSD-level areas for improvement identified during the inspection.</p> <p>If there are no other examples to support the assumption in the first sentence in this paragraph then IAW with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," which is stated on page iv of the DoD IG report, was used for conducting this evaluation the statement needs to be deleted throughout the report.</p> <p>The "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," states on page 12 "Evidence supporting inspection findings, conclusions, and recommendations should be sufficient, competent, and relevant and should lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations."</p> <p>A change in reporting format does not provide evidence of inconsistencies in oversight methodology, but inconsistencies in reporting methodology.</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	

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(U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Cont'd)

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
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3	U	OUSDI(1), [REDACTED]	i	Finding para 3	S	<p><b>Coordinator Comment:</b> Recommend deletion of lined through and add underlined language. (1) The inconsistencies in OUSDI(1)'s integration implementation oversight occurred because OUSDI(1) officials focused on intelligence interrogation policy reviews rather than developing procedures for and conducting policy implementation oversight of intelligence interrogations. As a result, OUSDI(1) cannot ensure that the combatant commands' intelligence interrogations programs are employing interrogation approaches and techniques consistent with the applicable policies and regulations. OUSDI(1) should update their 2012 procedures for conducting assessments of combatant command's intelligence interrogation oversight programs to ensure combatant commands are appropriately conducting oversight of their component's employment of the interrogation approaches and techniques.</p> <p><b>Coordinator Justification:</b> BLUF: Delete language lined through and add underlined language. Since Oct 2012 (see attached), OUSDI(1) has had procedures in place for the conduct of assessments to review the CCMD's oversight of HUMINT activities. The oversight of the employment of interrogation approaches and techniques are the responsibility of the CCMD as outlined in DoDD 3115.09 and JP 1.</p> <p>OUSDI(1) oversees the implementation of DoD policy regarding intelligence interrogations by: (1) Reviewing and approving DoD Component operational plans, policies, directives, and doctrine relating to intelligence interrogation; (2) Conducting in person HUMINT assessments; (3) Maintaining consistent dialogue with the CCMDs; (4) Hosting a monthly meeting with representatives from the DoD Components on intelligence interrogations; (5) Participating in the development of the critical task list for intelligence interrogations and attend the DoD's intelligence interrogation courses technical review boards to ensure these critical tasks are incorporated into interrogation training; and (6) Attending various</p>	Choose an item.

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						<p>HUMINT working groups to provide DoD components the opportunity to address interrogation issues with OUSD(I).</p> <p>OUSD(I) HUMINT Division developed procedures for the conduct of HUMINT assessments in Oct 2012. Each OUSD(I) HUMINT Division team member is provided these procedures prior to the conduct of an assessment and these procedures have been used in every assessment/inspection since 2012. In August 2018, OUSD(I) HUMINT Division began a review of the assessment process to update the procedures.</p> <p>OUSD(I) is responsible for overseeing the implementation of DoD policy regarding intelligence interrogations the CCMDs are responsible for overseeing the employment of the techniques and approaches.</p> <p>IAW DoDD 3115.09, Enclosure 2, page 12, the Commanders of the Combatant Commands shall "b. Ensure that all intelligence interrogation and detainee debriefing plans, policies, orders, directives, training, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures issued by subordinate commands and components are consistent with this Directive and USD(I)-approved policies, and that they are periodically reviewed and evaluated." So the responsibility of ensuring the employing of interrogation approaches and techniques is consistent with the applicable policies and regulations is a CCMD responsibility and not a responsibility of the USD(I).</p> <p>Joint Publication - 1, "Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States" Chapter II, paragraph 1.b(4) states "CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces and are responsible to the President and SecDef for the preparedness of their commands and performance of assigned missions.</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
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4	U	OUSDI, [REDACTED]	ii	Finding (cont'd) para 1	S	<p>Coordinator Comment: Recommend adding underlined language. OSD/JS and USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c) [REDACTED] previously recognized the requirement for a DoD repository for intelligence interrogation records and is in the process of issuing guidance requiring DIA to develop a repository.</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: BLUF: Recommend add underlined language. Report should identify where OUSD(I) has already determined a requirement and has initiated corrective action.</p> <p>OUSD(I) has already determined the need for a DoD repository for intelligence interrogation records. As such, this was identified as a new responsibility for DIA as the Defense HUMINT Manager in the Draft DoDD 3115.09 revision provided to the DoD IG. Recommend added language to demonstrate that DoD is already developing a way to improve the capability to store intelligence interrogation records.</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	Choose an item.
5	U	OUSDI, [REDACTED]	ii	Finding (cont'd) para 3	S	<p>Coordinator Comment: No change recommended to paragraph. As a result, if USSOCOM restarts its intelligence interrogation program, USSOCOM could perform intelligence interrogations that are not authorized or were not approved by the appropriate individuals within the chain of command because the USSOCOM policy lacked current DoDD 3115.09 oversight and records management requirements.</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: BLUF: OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]</p>	Choose an item.

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						OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e)	
						Originator Justification for Resolution:	
6	U	OUSDI, [REDACTED]	ii	Recommendations para 1	S	<p>Coordinator Comment: Recommend delete language lined through, add underlined language. (U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence <u>continue the practice of developing intelligence interrogation assessment questionnaires that are customized to the operations conducted by the combatant command. This practice provides a more realistic approach to the oversight of the combatant command's activities, develop formal combatant command intelligence interrogation oversight procedures and develop a schedule for conducting intelligence interrogation policy implementation oversight.</u></p> <p>Coordinator Justification: BLUF: Recommend delete language lined through, add underlined language. The development of one single questionnaire does not ensure the same level of effectiveness of the assessments/inspections. The development of a unique questionnaire for</p>	Choose an item.

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						<p>each inspection requires the inspector to review all laws, policies, and plans to ensure the appropriate areas are inspected and the right questions are asked. In 2017, OUSD(I) was directed to combine the OUSD(I) assessment with the DoD SIOO inspections schedule, but OUSD(I) has continued to utilize the assessment procedures developed in 2012 during the DoD SIOO inspections.</p> <p>OUSD(I) HUMINT Division developed procedures for the conduct of HUMINT assessments in Oct 2012. Each OUSD(I) HUMINT Division team member is provided these procedures prior to the conduct of an assessment and these procedures have been used in every assessment/inspection since 2012. In August 2018, OUSD(I) HUMINT Division began a review of the assessment process and to update the procedures.</p> <p>For each OUSD(I) HUMINT assessment or assistance to a DoD SIOO inspection a HUMINT questionnaire is developed that is appropriate to the organization being inspected. OUSD(I) has maintained this practice so that questionnaires are accurate and up to date with current policy and operations. Developing a single one-stop check list for use at all organizations would then require an organization to respond to questions about activities the organization does not conduct and possibly lead to confusion to what requirements and policies apply to the organization.</p> <p>In reference to the schedule, OUSD(I) already has a schedule of inspections of the various organizations based on support to the DoD SIOO. If the intent of the paragraph was for OUSD(I) to have a separate and distinct inspection for intelligence interrogation this must be made clear and would likely cause a burden to limited resources and personnel to complete this separate function from the DoD SIOO inspection.</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	

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7	<del>CONF</del>	OSD(I), [REDACTED]	2	1	S	<p>Coordinator Comment: Recommend deleting language lined through.</p> <p>(CONF) [REDACTED]</p> <p>OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: BLUF: Deleted language lined through. The deleted language does not provide any support to the report's findings and is not relevant to the subject of the report.</p> <p>OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	Choose an item.
8	U	OSD(I), [REDACTED]	3	1	A	<p>Coordinator Comment: Recommend delete language lined through, add underlined language. Specifically, the interrogator will produce an</p>	Choose an item.

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(U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Cont'd)

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
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						<p><del>intelligence interrogation reports</del> intelligence information report to report information in response to collection requirements.</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: BLUF: Delete language lined through and add underlined language. Correct report for reporting information collected during a HUMINT activity is an intelligence information report.</p> <p>HUMINT collectors submit information in response to collection requirements in the form of an intelligence information report, which is sent to the intelligence community. Intelligence interrogation reports are for interrogation community usage and are not disseminated to the intelligence community.</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	
9	U	OUSDI(1), [REDACTED]	4	1	S	<p>Coordinator Comment: Recommend delete language lined through, add underlined language. This manual applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard-Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. This manual also applies to DoD civilian employees and contractors with responsibility to engage in HUMINT collection activities. It is also intended for commanders and staffs of joint and combined commands, and Service Component Commands. Although this is Army doctrine, adaptations will have to be made by other Military departments, based on each of their organizations and specific doctrine. DoDD 3115.09, states that "No person in the custody or effective control of the DoD, detained in a DoD facility, or otherwise interrogated by DoD military personnel, civilian employees, or DoD contractor personnel will be subject to any interrogation treatment or technique that is not authorized by and listed in [FM 2-22.5]."</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: BLUF: Delete language lined through and add underlined language. Paragraph should indicate that DoD</p>	Choose an item.

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						personnel are only authorized to utilize the techniques and approaches listed in the FM. As written the reader might assume the FM only applies to Army personnel.  The deleted statement only applies to Army personnel. the added language from DoDD 3115.09, Enclosure 4, paragraph 2 makes the FM apply to all personnel conducting interrogations of personnel in DoD custody.  Originator Justification for Resolution:	
10	U	OUSDI(1), [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	5	1	S	<b>Coordinator Comment:</b> Recommend delete language lined through, add underlined language. However, we also found inconsistencies in OUSDI's oversight of the implementation of DoD policy regarding combatant command intelligence interrogation approaches and techniques. For example, the methodology for a December 2013 OUSDI assessment stated that a survey was used to collect interrogation data from the combatant commands, but the data was not verified by OUSDI personnel due to funding limitations. Meanwhile, the methodology for an October 2017 OUSDI assessment of combatant command intelligence-related policies and records did not include an assessment of the combatant command's intelligence interrogation program. The inconsistencies in OUSDI's integration implementation oversight occurred because OUSDI officials focused on intelligence interrogation policy reviews rather than developing procedures for and conducting policy implementation oversight of intelligence interrogations. As a result, OUSDI cannot ensure that the combatant commands' intelligence interrogation programs are employing interrogation approaches and techniques consistent with the applicable policies and regulations. The inconsistencies in OUSDI's integration implementation oversight occurred because OUSDI officials focused on intelligence interrogation policy reviews rather than developing procedures for and conducting policy implementation oversight of intelligence interrogations. As a result, OUSDI cannot ensure that the combatant commands' intelligence interrogation programs are employing interrogation	Choose an item.

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						<p>approaches and techniques consistent with the applicable policies and regulations. OUSDI conducts a review of all HUMINT activities during both the DoD SIOO inspections and separate OUSDI HUMINT assessments, but inconsistencies in reporting methodology makes it appear that areas might not have been inspected since they are not mentioned in the DoD SIOO report. OUSDI should develop a method to record all areas that are reviewed during an assessment to ensure that there is no appearance that an HUMINT activity was not reviewed. When OUSDI updates their 2012 HUMINT assessment procedures guidance should be added that addresses the need to list all inspected areas, whether or not if there were any findings.</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: BLUE: Recommendation delete language lined through, add language underlined. Inconsistencies mentioned in the DoD IG report are due to inconsistencies in the reporting of information collected by the DoD SIOO and OUSDI not inconsistencies in inspection procedures.</p> <p>The example of the December 2013 assessment does not provide evidence of an inconsistency in oversight implementation it states a fiscal restraint that denied OUSDI personnel the ability to travel and collect the information in person, requiring the use of a survey to collect the data.</p> <p>The last sentence in the paragraph does not provide evidence of inconsistency in the methodology of OUSDI's assessment as CENTCOM's intelligence interrogation program was inspected. When OUSDI conducted unilateral HUMINT assessments (Intelligence interrogation is a form of HUMINT activity), if an evaluation indicated there was no issue with a specific area reviewed there was a statement that the subject was reviewed and no issues were noted. In 2017, OUSDI was directed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to</p>	

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
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						<p>combine the HUMINT assessment with the DoD SIOO inspection. The Oct 2017 referred to in the recommended deleted paragraph was for CENTCOM and was a joint DoD SIOO and OUSD(I) inspection. DoD SIOO is responsible for producing the report for these joint inspections, and as the led DoD SIOO procedures are only to report three areas: Findings, Observations, and Best Practices. If an area has no issues that meet one of those three categories then the subject is not put in the report. In October 2017, USCENTCOM intelligence interrogation program was inspected but as there were not findings, observations, best practices, or policy/support issues noted DoD SIOO did not mention it in the DoD SIOO report.</p> <p>DoD SIOO policy on reporting defines: Findings as aspects of intelligence activities that deviate from law or policy. Observations as suggestions to improve the effectiveness of intelligence activities that are otherwise compliant with law and policy. Best practices are innovative processes that exceed requirements and should be considered for adoption by other DoD components. Policy/support issues are OSD-level areas for improvement identified during the inspection.</p> <p>If there are no other examples to support the assumption in the first sentence in this paragraph then IAW with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," which is stated on page iv of the DoD IG report, was used for conducting this evaluation the statement needs to be deleted throughout the report.</p> <p>The "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," states on page 12 "Evidence supporting inspection findings, conclusions, and recommendations should be sufficient, competent, and relevant and should lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations."</p>	

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(U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Cont'd)

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
						A change in reporting format does not provide evidence of inconsistencies in oversight methodology, but inconsistencies in reporting methodology.	
						Originator Justification for Resolution:	
11	C	OSD(I), [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	5	3	S	Coordinator Comment: Recommend delete language lined through, add underlined language. <del>However</del> , we found that USCENCOM's CHUMINT Operations Division (CCJ2-X) did not maintain all intelligence interrogation records or have access to the central data repository or the systems and databases that maintain USCENCOM intelligence interrogation-related records. OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c); USCENCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), (c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. As a result, USCENCOM CCJ2-X could not conduct independent oversight of USCENCOM intelligence interrogation-related records (such as the interrogator's operational and source administrative reports) without direct access to the central data repository or the systems and databases that maintain USCENCOM intelligence interrogation-related records. Independent oversight provides reasonable assurance that operations, reporting, and compliance are achieved. OSD(I) previously recognized the requirement for a DoD repository for intelligence interrogation records and is in the process of issuing guidance requiring DIA to develop a repository when DoDD 3115.09 is revised.	Choose an item.

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
12	<del>SNF</del>	OSD(I), [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	6	2	S	<p>Coordinator Justification: BLUF: Delete language lined through and add underlined language. Believe the correct line of communication is between USCENCOM and <sup>USCENTCOM (b)(1)</sup> as this is what is stated on page 12, paragraph 2 of this report. Report should identify where OSD(I) has already determined a requirement and has initiated corrective action.</p> <p>OSD(I) has already determined the need for a DoD repository for intelligence interrogation records. As such, this was identified as a new responsibility for DIA as the Defense HUMINT Manager in the Draft DoDD 3115.09 revision provided to the DoD IG. Recommend added language to demonstrate that DoD is already developing a way to improve the capability to store intelligence interrogation records.</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	
						<p>Coordinator Comment: No change recommended to paragraph. As a result, if USSOCOM restarts its intelligence interrogation program, USSOCOM could perform intelligence interrogations that are not authorized or were not approved by the appropriate individuals within the chain of command because the USSOCOM policy lacked current Do DD 3115.09 oversight and records management requirements.</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: BLUF: <sup>OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)</sup></p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>	Choose an item.

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(U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Cont'd)

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
						OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c)	
						Originator Justification for Resolution:	
13	U		7	2	S	<p>Coordinator Comment: Recommend delete language lined through, add underlined language. (U) During the joint Service Intelligence Oversight Office (JSIOO) review process, (U) officials focused on the review, approval, and coordination of DoD component policies instead of focusing on the implementation of DoD policy.</p> <p>(U) Since 2006, OUSD(I) conducted intelligence interrogation policy reviews. According to OUSD(I) officials, OUSD(I) began revising their policy review procedures in July 2018, to expedite future combatant command reviews. According to the draft procedures for this review process, OUSD(I) will review each DoD Component's intelligence interrogation policy to ensure that it accurately articulates DoDD 3115.09 policy in the following areas:</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: BLUF: Delete language lined through, add underlined language. The original opening sentence of this paragraph indicates there is confusion regarding how OUSD(I) supports a DoD SIOO inspection. Recommended language provides clarity regarding how OUSD(I) supports a DoD SIOO inspection. Recommend this be stated in two separate paragraphs as this is two distinct and separate subjects of conversation. The first paragraph provides information on how OUSD(I) reviews CCMD's policies as this follows along logically with the next paragraphs in the section. Recommend the paragraph</p>	Choose an item.

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(U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Cont'd)

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
#	CLASS	COMPONENT (ND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL)	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
						<p>with information on OUSD(I) support to DoD SIOO inspections be placed in this section after the second paragraph on page 8 of the DoD IG report (Example content for this paragraph is in comment #14).</p> <p>Highlighted statement does not make sense or add to the information provided in the remainder of the paragraph. Believe the opening sentence was supposed to refer to the joint inspections with the DoD SIOO, if this is the true intent of the sentence where is the evidence to support this assumption. During interviews with the DoD IG the entire process of interviewing organization's interrogation personnel was explained. OUSD(I) personnel explained that the individual interrogators at an organization are interviewed and asked questions about the process of conducting interrogations, approval for those actions, and the reporting process for informing the command of violations of law and policy in accordance with DoDD 3115.09.</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	
14	U	OUSD(I), [REDACTED]	8	2	S	<p>Coordinator Comment: Recommend delete language lined through, add underlined language. (U) OUSD(I) conducts the following to support the oversight of in addition OUSD(I) officials informed us that they oversee the implementation of DoD CMO policy regarding intelligence interrogations by: (1) Reviewing and approving DoD Component operational plans, policies, directives, and doctrine related to intelligence interrogations; (2) Conducting in person HUMINT assessments of the Services and Combatant Command operations; (3) Maintaining contact and dialogue with the Services and Combatant Commands regarding intelligence interrogation; (4) Hosting monthly meetings with representatives of the DoD Components to discuss current trends and issues relating to intelligence interrogations; and (5) Attending various HUMINT working groups, planning groups, and other meetings in order to provide the opportunity for the DoD Components to address issues.</p>	Choose an item.

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
15	U	OUSD(I) [REDACTED]	8	3	S	Coordinator Justification: BLUF: Delete language lined through, add underlined language. Current opening sentence for the paragraph does not accurately reflect that the five steps are utilized to support OUSD(I)'s oversight of intelligence interrogation.	Choose an item.
						Originator Justification for Resolution:  Coordinator Comment: Recommend delete language lined through, add underlined language. (U) During the joint inspections/assessments with the DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Office (OSIO) review process, OUSD(I) officials conduct a review of CCMD policies, procedures, and operational plans, and conduct personnel interviews of CCMD HUMINT personnel. The personnel interviews of CCMD HUMINT personnel allows OUSD(I) to collect information on how the CCMD's policies, procedures and operational plans are implemented and how any violations are reported.  (U) However, we found inconsistencies in OUSD(I)'s in-person HUMINT assessments. Specifically, OUSD(I) does not have a documented procedure or process on how to conduct the in-person HUMINT assessment from the results of these inspections/assessments are reported. When these HUMINT assessments were conducted unilaterally by OUSD(I) personnel each inspected area was mentioned in the final report, to include areas where no findings were observed. Since 2017 when OUSD(I) was directed to combine the HUMINT assessment with the DoD SIRO inspection, this practice has not continued. DoD SIRO policy is to only report areas where either a finding, observation, or best practice was noted. Stating that an area had "no findings" does not meet DoD SIRO criteria for being mentioned in these categories. OUSD(I) provided us three independent assessments of DoD Component's interrogation programs and three assessments that were accomplished as part of a joint review with the Senior Intelligence Oversight Office. These assessments varied in how they were conducted and what was reviewed and reported on.	

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
16	U	OUSD(I), [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	8	4	S	<p>Coordinator Justification: BLUF: Delete language lined through, add underlined language. The information in the deleted sentence is inaccurate. All the assessments were conducted in the same manner, it was the reporting of those assessments which were not consistent.</p> <p>The referred Oct 2017 report is a DoD SIOO inspection report and DoD SIOO procedures are only to report four areas: Findings, Observations, Best Practices, and Policy/Support Issues. If an area has no issues that meet one of those three categories then the subject is not put in the report.</p> <p>DoD SIOO policy on reporting defines: Findings as aspects of intelligence activities that deviate from law or policy. Observations as suggestions to improve the effectiveness of intelligence activities that are otherwise compliant with law and policy. Best practices are innovative processes that exceed requirements and should be considered for adoption by other DoD components. Policy/support issues are OSD-level areas for improvement identified during the inspection.</p> <p>In previous OUSD(I) HUMINT assessments there was a statement that would say no findings for each area inspected. DoD SIOO does not format their reports this way.</p> <p>A change in reporting format does not provide evidence of inconsistencies in oversight methodology, but inconsistencies in reporting format.</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	Choose an item.
						<p>Coordinator Comment: Recommend delete language lined through, add underlined language. (U) For example, OUSD(I)'s September 2013 HUMINT Policy Assessment of USCENTCOM was very thorough in its reporting of USCENTCOM's compliance with policy and policy implementation. However, OUSD(I)'s December 2013 (U)</p>	

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P

						<p>Interrogation Program Review, which included USCENICOM, was only conducted via a survey as funding limitations precluded site visits and independent research to verify accuracy of the component's comments and perceptions. Finally however, OUSD(I)'s October 2017 oversight review of USCENICOM, in conjunction with the DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Office, had no mention of USCENICOM's intelligence interrogation program. During both the September 2013 and October 2017 visits, OUSD(I) personnel did conduct reviews of USCENICOM's interrogation program the change in what office writes the final report resulted in an appearance that the program was not reviewed. Finally, OUSD(I)'s October 2017 oversight review of USCENICOM, in conjunction with the Senior Intelligence Oversight Office, had no mention of USCENICOM's intelligence interrogation program.</p> <p>Since the reporting for these reviews were inconsistent, the OUSD(I) should update development periodic intelligence interrogation oversight procedures for the DoD Components' implementation of OUSD(I)-approved intelligence interrogation policies (that reflects a method to historically record all areas inspected). (Recommendation 1)</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: BLUF: Delete language lined through, add underlined language. Inconsistencies mentioned in the DoD IG report are due to inconsistencies in the reporting of information collected by the DoD SIOO and OUSD(I) not inconsistencies in inspection procedures. OUSD(I) recognizes the need to have historical data that provides evidence that all sections were inspected and reviewed.</p> <p>The referenced Dec 2013 was a DoD-wide review of the interrogation program. The purpose of the review was to "...document the status of the interrogation program, inform decision-making during the downsizing phase (after the war in Iraq and Afghanistan), and plan for program sustainment during peacetime." The report was not intended to be an in-depth review of the CCMD interrogation programs, but an overarching review of the entire</p>	
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## (U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Cont'd)

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
						<p>program. As such, this report being listed as an inconsistency is incorrect as the purpose of the review was different in focus than the HUMINT assessments and DoD SIOO inspections of CENTCOM.</p> <p>The referred Oct 2017 report is a DoD SIOO inspection report and DoD SIOO procedures are only to report three areas: Findings, Observations, Best Practices, or Policy/Support Issues. If an area has no issues that meet one of those four categories then the subject is not put in the report.</p> <p>DoD SIOO policy on reporting defines: Findings as aspects of intelligence activities that deviate from law or policy. Observations as suggestions to improve the effectiveness of intelligence activities that are otherwise compliant with law and policy. Best practices are innovative processes that exceed requirements and should be considered for adoption by other DoD components. Policy/support issues are OSD-level areas for improvement identified during the inspection.</p> <p>In previous OUSDI HUMINT assessments there was a statement that would say no findings for each area inspected. DoD SIOO does not format their reports this way.</p> <p>A change in reporting format does not provide evidence of inconsistencies in oversight methodology, but inconsistencies in reporting format.</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	
17	U	OUSDI, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	8	5	S	<p>Coordinator Comment: Recommend deletion of paragraph. (U) As a result, OUSDI cannot ensure that the constituent commands' intelligence interrogation programs are employing interrogation approaches and techniques consistent with the applicable policies and regulations.</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: BLUF: Recommend deletion of above paragraph as inconsistencies mentioned in the DoD IG report are due to</p>	Choose an item.

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## (U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Cont'd)

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
						<p>inconsistencies in the reporting of information collected by the DoD SIOO and OUSD(I) not inconsistencies in inspection procedures.</p> <p>The example of the December 2013 assessment does not provide evidence of an inconsistency in oversight implementation it states a fiscal restraint that denied OUSD(I) personnel the ability to travel and collect the information in person, requiring the use of a survey to collect the data.</p> <p>The last sentence in the paragraph does not provide evidence of inconsistency in the methodology of OUSD(I)'s assessment as CENTCOM's intelligence interrogation program was inspected. When OUSD(I) conducted unilateral HUMINT assessments (Intelligence interrogation is a form of HUMINT activity), if an evaluation indicated there was no issue with a specific area reviewed there was a statement that the subject was reviewed and no issues were noted. In 2017, OUSD(I) was directed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to combine the HUMINT assessment with the DoD SIOO inspection. The Oct 2017 referred to in the recommended deleted paragraph was for CENTCOM and was a joint DoD SIOO and OUSD(I) inspection. DoD SIOO is responsible for producing the report for these joint inspections, and as the led DoD SIOO procedures are only to report four areas: Findings, Observations, Best Practices, or Policy/Support Issues. If an area has no issues that meet one of those three categories then the subject is not put in the report. In October 2017, USCENTCOM intelligence interrogation program was inspected but as there were not findings, observations, best practices, or policy/support issues noted DoD SIOO did not mention it in the DoD SIOO report.</p> <p>DoD SIOO policy on reporting defines: Findings as aspects of intelligence activities that deviate from law or policy. Observations as suggestions to improve the effectiveness of intelligence activities that are otherwise compliant with law and policy. Best practices are innovative processes that</p>	

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## (U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Cont'd)

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
						<p>exceed requirements and should be considered for adoption by other DoD components. Policy/support issues are OSD-level areas for improvement identified during the inspection.</p> <p>If there are no other examples to support the assumption in the first sentence in this paragraph then IAW with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," which is stated on page iv of the DoD IG report, was used for conducting this evaluation the statement needs to be deleted throughout the report.</p> <p>The "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," states on page 12 "Evidence supporting inspection findings, conclusions, and recommendations should be sufficient, competent, and relevant and should lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations."</p> <p>A change in reporting format does not provide evidence of inconsistencies in oversight methodology, but inconsistencies in reporting methodology.</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	
18	C	OSD(I) [REDACTED]	9	2	S	<p>Coordinator Comment: Recommend delete language lined through, add underlined language. (U) Without proper oversight, errors within the intelligence interrogation process could occur or go undetected. These process errors could damage the United States' and the Military Services' international reputation. For example, the DoD learned a valuable lesson in 2004 from the investigation of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The Abu Ghraib prison investigation identified two categories of abuse: (1) intentional violent or sexual abuse, and (2) abusive actions taken based on misinterpretation or confusion regarding the law and policy. The investigation also identified that while senior-level officials did not commit the abuse at Abu Ghraib, they did bear the responsibility for the lack of oversight at the facility. Additionally, the report states that establishing a</p>	Choose an item.

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
						<p><del>clear chain of military intelligence command and associated responsibilities would have enhanced intelligence collection. Therefore, OUSD(I) should update oversight procedures for the DoD Components' implementation of intelligence interrogation policies that reflects a method to historically record all areas inspected the development of formal, periodic OUSD(I) intelligence interrogation oversight procedures is essential to the DoD's ability to detect non-compliance and avoid repeating prior mistakes.</del></p> <p>Coordinator Justification: BLUF: Delete language lined through, add underlined language. The deleted text refers to the Abu Ghraib case which was a detention related issue. Using this as example in this report is not accurate, since this report relates to the oversight of intelligence interrogations. OUSD(I) recognizes the need to have historical data that provides evidence that all sections were inspected and reviewed.</p> <p>The deleted text refers to the Abu Ghraib case which was a detention related issue as there was no evidence of abuse of Abu Ghraib detainees during DoD intelligence interrogations. Using this as example in the DoD IG report is not accurate, since the DoD IG report relates to the oversight of intelligence interrogations. The DoD IG report also does not provide any evidence as required by the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation" that states, "Evidence should be sufficient to support the inspection findings. In determining the sufficiency of evidence, inspectors should ensure that enough evidence exists to persuade a knowledgeable person of the validity of the findings." There is no evidence that supports that there are unlawful or inhumane DoD intelligence interrogations being conducted. OUSD(I) is unaware of any reporting of DoD intelligence interrogators committing detainee abuse, which is required to be reported to the USD(I) IAW DoDD 3115.09.</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	

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(U) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Cont'd)

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COMMENTS MATRIX: Draft DoD IG Report, "Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques"							
#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
19	U	OUSDI [REDACTED]	All	All	S	<p>Coordinator Comment: Change section headings as appropriate to match content of the paragraphs.</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: BLUF: Acceptance of OUSDI comments and changes to the DoD IG report will require that section headings be corrected to reflect information in supporting paragraphs.</p> <p>Some of the OUSDI comments and changes, if accepted, will significantly change the DoD IG report, so section headings will need to be changed to accurately reflect their content.</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	Choose an item.

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**(U) United States Central Command Comments**

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UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND  
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD  
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

20 March 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL  
FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS

THROUGH: U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: USCENTCOM Response to Final Draft of DODIG D2018-DISPA2-  
0154.000 RFI "Evaluation of Intelligence Interrogations Requiring Special  
Approval

- Reference(s): (a) (U) DoD Directive 3115.09, DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee  
Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning, Incorporating Change 1, 15  
November 2013 (U)  
(b) (U) U.S. Central Command Regulation 381-21, Intelligence  
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning, 21  
June 2018 (U)  
(c) (U) DODIG D2018-DISPA2-0154.000 Final Draft "Evaluation of  
Intelligence Interrogations Requiring Special Approval (S/NF)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DoD  
OIG) response to recommendations found in the DoD OIG Final Draft and provide  
classification review for the document before public release.

2. (U) USCENTCOM J2-X (CCJ2-X) provides the following responses to the DoD OIG  
recommendations:

*(U) DODOIG Recommendation: U.S. Central Command should review and update  
Central Command regulation 381-21 to:*

*a. (U) Reflect U.S. Central Command's current operating procedures for  
maintaining and overseeing U.S. Central Command's intelligence interrogation-  
related records.*

*(U) Response: USCENTCOM initiated an internal revision of CCR 381-21 to  
incorporate recommended DODOIG changes with final completion anticipated by the  
end of CY19.*

*b. (U) Require Headquarters, U.S. Central Command personnel to have access  
to all of the data repositories that maintain U.S. Central Command's intelligence  
interrogation-related records.*

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(U) United States Central Command (Cont'd)

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(U) Response: In the short term, USCENTCOM has coordinated for <sup>USCENTCOM</sup> ~~and~~ accounts to have immediate access to subordinate element documentation as well as well as initiated coordination for a data management process that will allow for physical storage of all records locally. <sup>USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)</sup> ~~for intelligence interrogation reporting.~~

3. (U) USCENTCOM looks forward to sustained coordination with DoD OIG to continuously improve the command's intelligence interrogation program, policies, and procedures. Please see the attached CRM for the classification review and additional CENTCOM input.

4. (U) POC for this memorandum is ~~or ISI~~

<sup>USCENTCOM (b)(3), (b)(6)</sup>

Attachment(s):

Enclosure 1: Comment Resolution Matrix (9)

Enclosure 2: FY17-FY19 Intelligence Interrogations Inspection Checklists (7)

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## (U) United States Central Command (Cont'd)

### USCENTCOM J2-X Comment Resolution Matrix

#### USCENTCOM J2-X COMMENT RESOLUTION MATRIX

Technical Note: Administrative Comments are not sufficient justification to cause a Non-Consent response.

##### Column 1 - ITEM

Numeric order of comments

##### Column 2 - #

Used to track comments by source. Manually enter numbers from the first comment to the last comment.

##### Column 3 - SOURCE

J1 - J1  
J2 - J2  
J3 - J3  
J4 - J4  
J5 - J5  
J6 - J6  
J7 - J7  
J8 - J8  
USA - US Army  
USN - US Navy  
USMC - US Marine Corps  
USAF - US Air Force  
USCG - US Coast Guard  
EUCOM - US European Command  
JFRCOM - US Joint Forces Command  
PACOM - US Pacific Command  
SOFOM - US Special Operations Command  
SOUTHCOM - US Southern Command  
STRATCOM - US Strategic Command  
TRANSOM - US Transportation Command  
CENTCOM - US Central Command  
DTRA - Defense Threat Reduction Agency  
DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency  
DLA - Defense Logistics Agency  
NSA - National Security Agency  
DISA - Defense Information Systems Agency

##### Column 4 - TYPE

C - Critical

H-C - Critical: Comments identify violations of the law or contraventions of Executive Branch policy or of policy established in DOD directives. In addition, unnecessary risks to safety, life, limb, or DOD material, waste or abuse of appropriations, or disposition of an irreparable burden on a government's resources. Critical Comments shall always result in a non-consent response.

M - Major: Comments identify blatant incorrect material that may cause non-occurrence with publication.

S - Substantive

A - Administrative

S - Substantive: Comments identify potentially unnecessary, incorrect, misleading, obsolete, or inconsistent content with other policies, or when a proposed change with the proposed responsibilities, requirements, or processes. Substantive Comments may or may not be sufficient justification to cause a Non-Consent response.

A - Administrative: Comments identify document type, sequence, and usage, punctuation, spelling errors and omissions or inconsistencies when appropriate and

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(U) United States Central Command (Cont'd)

USCENTCOM D-X Comment Resolution Matrix

Column 5 - PAGE

Page number.

Column 6 - PARA

Paragraph number that pertains to the comment expressed.

Column 7 - LINE

Line number on the designated page that pertains to the comment. For figures where there is no line number, use "F" with the figure number expressed.

Column 8 - COMMENT

Comment text in line-in-line-out format.

Column 9 - RATIONALE

Provide concise objective explanation of the rationale for the comment.

Column 10 - DECISION

A - Accept

R - Reject (Rationale required for rejection)

M - Accept with modification. (Rationale required for modification)

NOTE: This column is for DASD/FR use only. No rationale required for accepted items. Rationale for rejection is placed in the rationale comment box and highlighted for clarity. For modifications, the complete modified language will be placed (and annotated) as the bottom entry for that item in the "Comments" column and the rationale for the modification placed in the rationale comment box and highlighted for clarity.



(U) United States Central Command (Cont'd)

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (EC SA)
1		CC25NH	C	4	1	<p>With regard to the date combined commands were reviewed, we determined that U.S. Southern Command's intelligence integration policies and oversight procedures met the requirements of DoDD 3115.09. <i>However, we found that U.S. Southern Command's intelligence integration policies and oversight procedures did not meet the requirements of DoDD 3115.09. We found that U.S. Southern Command's intelligence integration policies and oversight procedures did not meet the requirements of DoDD 3115.09. We found that U.S. Southern Command's intelligence integration policies and oversight procedures did not meet the requirements of DoDD 3115.09.</i></p> <p>OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(c); USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), (c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)</p>	<p>Recommend removal of this section as it contradicts DoDD 3115.09. DoDD 3115.09 does not mandate that DoD Components maintain intelligence integration at the DoD Component level unless it does a require a centralized database for storage or access.</p> <p>USCENTCOM Components are an extension of USCENTCOM and through these properties USCENTCOM is maintaining and has access to all intelligence information related records. There is USCENTCOM meets DoDD 3115.09 standards.</p> <p>USCENTCOM recognizes the possible benefits of a local, centralized database and is in the information gathering phase and will work with other DoD entities to explore potential future courses of action.</p> <p>USCENTCOM is presently reviewing CCR 391-21 for future rewrite considerations.</p>	
2		CC25NH	C	4	2	<p><i>USCENTCOM is not required to maintain a centralized database for storage or access of intelligence information related records. USCENTCOM is not required to maintain a centralized database for storage or access of intelligence information related records. USCENTCOM is not required to maintain a centralized database for storage or access of intelligence information related records. USCENTCOM is not required to maintain a centralized database for storage or access of intelligence information related records.</i></p>	<p>Recommend removal of this section as USCENTCOM is compliant with DoDD 3115.09. There is no DoD-level requirement to maintain a centralized database for intelligence information records.</p> <p>USCENTCOM Components submit records to USCENTCOM upon request.</p>	

(U) United States Central Command (Cont'd)

ITEM	#	SECRET	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (CSA)
							USCENTCOM collects routine meetings with component elements conducting intelligence interrogations and receives regular updates on intelligence interrogation activities.	
3.		CCS-NH	C	II	1	OSD/JS and USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)	Re: removal removing this section.  This is not a factual statement nor does it reflect an accurate representation of USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)	
1		CCS-NH	C	II	3	(f) <del>1.4(c) is a factual statement and is not a representation of USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c).</del> Behavioral Science Consultants, if available, who, in accordance with DoDD 3115.09, "are authorized to make psychological assessments of the character, personality, social interactions, and other behavioral characteristics of interrogation subjects and to advise authorized personnel performing limited interrogations."	Paraphrasing and sharing the ending of DoDD 3115.09 regarding BSC, leaves ambiguity. It misrepresents the lawful and intended use of BSC, and the interaction between BSC and intelligence personnel.	









ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (FD8/A)
						<div style="background-color: black; color: red; padding: 2px;">           (b)(1) 1.7(e)            USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)         </div> <div style="background-color: black; color: white; padding: 2px;">           OSD/JS and USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c)         </div> <div style="background-color: black; height: 300px; width: 100%;"></div>		
8		CCJ2-XH	S	21	2	<div style="background-color: black; color: white; padding: 2px;">           (b)(1) 1.4(a),            (c), (g); USSOCOM (b)(1)            1.4(a)         </div> <div style="background-color: black; height: 300px; width: 100%;"></div>	USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), (c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)	

(U) United States Central Command (Cont'd)

ITEM	#	SOURCE	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (ECSS)
9.		CC25-XH	S	21	1	USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), (c)	USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), (c)	
10.		CC25-XH	S	22	1	USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), (c)	USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a), (c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)	
11.		CC25-XH	S	22	2	it. Direct access to the data repository user would allow USCENTCOM/CC25-X personnel to perform routine tasks that are outside of components performance	Routine	

Page 8 of 10



## (U) United States Central Command (Cont'd)

ITEM #	SRCT	TYPE	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT	RATIONALE	DECISION (EC 5.4)
					interceptions and meet the requirements of DoDD J115-09 and OLC 351-21. The information contained in the data repositories includes but is not limited to the intercepts, operational and source administrative reports that would allow an independent reviewer to verify the accuracy and integrity of the information. The approving official's comments and any corrections, however the information repository and the intelligence community information requirements. The review USCENTCOM must update OLC 351-21 to reflect USCENTCOM's current operating procedures for maintaining and ensuring intelligence intercept-related records and require that USCENTCOM personnel to have access to all of the data repository and maintain (304201) intelligence intercept-related records. Recommendations:	overight does not necessitate any particular form of records management in order to be production efficient. As such, DoDD J115-09 is written specifically to reflect this. USCENTCOM conducts annual on-site compliance inspections.	
12	COMINT	S	22	3	(U) Without direct access to the central data repository or the systems and databases that maintain intelligence intercept-related records (such as the intercepts' operational and source administrative reports), USCENTCOM CCMX cannot conduct independent oversight of USCENTCOM intelligence intercept-related records. Independent oversight provides reasonable assurance that operations (intelligence interceptations), reporting, and compliance with DoD and USCENTCOM intercept policies are achieved.	USCENTCOM maintains a daily, consistent, well-established working relationship with its components conducting intelligence interceptations. Aside from the impractical prospect of monitoring each and every interception-related activity in person at the component level, CCMX oversight is predominantly accomplished through the review of relevant documentation. This documentation is readily available to CCMX personnel. The physical storage location of the data has no bearing on USCENTCOM's ability to effectively oversee intelligence interceptations.	
13							

(U) United States Central Command (Cont'd)

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Page 10 of 10



## (U) United States Special Operations Command Comments



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UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND  
7701 TAMPA POINT BLVD.  
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5323

J2X

14 March 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR  
INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS - INTELLIGENCE  
CAPABILITIES, 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA, 22350-1500

SUBJECT: (U) United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Response to the DoD  
Inspector General's Draft Report, Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation  
Approaches and Techniques (Project No. D2018-DISPA2-0154.000)

1. (U) REFERENCES:

- a. (U) Inspector General, Department of Defense Draft Report, Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques, 1 March 2019 (S//NF)
- b. (U) Department of Defense Memorandum, Evaluation of Intelligence Interrogations Requiring Special Approval (Project No. D2018-DISPA2-0154.000), 6 June 2018 (U//FOUO)
- c. (U) DoD Directive 3115.09, DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning, 11 October 2012, as amended (U)
- d. (U) USSOCOM Directive 381-3, DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning, 16 June 2008 (U)
- e. (U) USSOCOM J2X Memorandum, United States Special Operations (USSOCOM) Response to Evaluation of Intelligence Interrogations Requiring Special Approval (Project No. D2018-DISPA2-0154.000), 7 June 2018 (S//NF)

2. (U) The following is provided in response to the DoDIG's request for USSOCOM comment on recommendation 3, reference (a):

a. (U//NF) USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

b. (U//NF) USCENCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

[REDACTED]

Classified by: [REDACTED] HOC, J2X  
Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: 50X1-HUM

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(U) United States Special Operations Command  
Comments (cont'd)

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SOJ2

SUBJECT: (U) United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Response to the DoD Inspector General's Draft Report, Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques (Project No. D2018-DISPA2-0154.000)

USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)

3. (U//FOUO) USSOCOM also requests DoDIG favorably adjudicate the comments and concerns outlined in the comments resolution matrix in Enclosure 1 to this memorandum. This will ensure command relationships are accurately reflected and applicable security classification guides are reflected.

4. (U) My points of contact for this matter are [REDACTED], Chief, USSOCOM J2X HUMINT Branch, [REDACTED], or [REDACTED], Dep Chief, USSOCOM J2X HUMINT Branch, [REDACTED]

USSOCOM (b)(3), (b)(6)

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**STANDARDIZED COMMENT MATRIX PRIMER**

The matrix below is a Word document table to be used as a template for submitting comments on draft documents. Except as noted below, an entry is required in each of the columns. To facilitate consolidating matrices from various sources, do not adjust the column widths.

**Column 1 - TYPE**  
C - Critical (Contentious issue that will cause non-concurrence with publication)  
M - Major (Incorrect material that may cause non-concurrence with publication)  
S - Substantive (Factually incorrect material)  
A - Administrative (grammar, punctuation, style, etc.)

**Column 2 - PARA**  
Paragraph number that pertains to the comment

**Column 3 - LINE**  
Line number of the paragraph

**Column 4 - COMMENT**  
Provide comments using line-in-line-out format to facilitate adjudication of comments. Copy and insert complete sentences into the matrix. This makes it unnecessary to refer back to the publication to understand the rationale for the change. Do not use Tools, Track Changes mode to edit the comments in the matrix. Include deleted material in the comment in the strike through mode. Add material in the comment with underlining. Do not combine separate comments into one long comment in the matrix, (i.e. 5 comments rolled up into one)

**Column 5 - RATIONALE**  
Concise explanation of the rationale for the comment

**Column 6 - ORGANIZATION, POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL**  
Provide organization title (e.g., AFSOC, SOCPAC, SOFATL, J2, J3, etc.) plus name and contact information of person providing the comment

**Column 7 - DECISION (TO BE COMPLETED BY DOCUMENT OPR)**  
This column is for USSOCOM to Accept ("A"), Reject ("R"), or Accept with Modification ("M") the comment

(U) United States Special Operations Command  
Comments (cont'd)

Document Title: Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques

TYPE	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT	RATIONALE	ORGANIZATION, POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	DECISION (A/R/N)
C	ii	3 (bottom left through top right)	USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(e), USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(e)	USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(e)  USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(e) USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(e) USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(e)		
S	ii	4 (on top right)	Recommend modification and classification change: (U) USSOCOM officials also stated that they were waiting for USD(I) to publish the revised DoDD 3115.09 before updating USSOCOM policy. For example, if USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(e) could be updated to reflect the current policy, the current policy would be updated to reflect the current policy. The current policy would be updated to reflect the current policy. The current policy would be updated to reflect the current policy. Recommend the following be added to the	(U//FOUO) Recommend deleting the bottom portion of the paragraph. This paragraph is based on the incorrect speculation that USSOCOM would restart its intelligence interrogation program without the appropriate policy in place. Adding the recommended verbiage would sufficiently reflect what USSOCOM should do in the event it wants to conduct interrogations in the future.		



(U) United States Special Operations Command  
Comments (cont'd)

Document Title: Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques

TYPE	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT	RATIONALE	ORGANIZATION, POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	DECISION (A/R/D)
			recommendations paragraph. Prior to restarting any interrogation program, USSOCOM must update their policy to be in compliance with the existing DoDD 3115.09.			
S	iii	1 (top left)	USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)	(U// <del>FOUO</del> ) Per USSOCOM's 7 June 2018 memorandum to the DoDIG, as USSOCOM Component or personnel conduct intelligence interrogations under CDR, USSOCOM authority. Therefore, USSOCOM does not have an intelligence interrogation program. Adding the recommended verbiage would sufficiently reflect what USSOCOM should do in the event it wants to conduct interrogations in the future		
				USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)		
				USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)		
S	6	2	USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)	USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)		

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(U) United States Special Operations Command  
Comments (cont'd)

Document Title: Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques

TYPE	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT	RATIONALE	ORGANIZATION, POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	DECISION (A/R/D)
			USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)	USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)  USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)  (U//FOUO) Recommend deleting the bottom portion of the paragraph. This portion is based on the incorrect speculation that USSOCOM would restart its intelligence interrogation program without the appropriate policy in place. Adding the recommended verbiage would sufficiently reflect what USSOCOM should do in the event it wants to conduct interrogations in the future		
S	13	4	(U) USSOCOM's intelligence interrogation policy is out of date, and does not properly reflect USSOCOM's intelligence interrogation program. Specifically, USSOCOM's intelligence interrogation policy was last updated in 2008.  USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) is a reference to the Department of Defense (DoD) 3115.06 requires Combatant Commanders to periodically review and evaluate all intelligence interrogation policies, directives,	USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)		



(U) United States Special Operations Command  
Comments (cont'd)

Document Title: Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques

TYPE	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT	RATIONALE	ORGANIZATION, POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	DECISION (A/R/N)
			and procedures.	USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)		
S	14	5	USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)	USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)		
				USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)		
				USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)		
C	14 & 15	7	USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)	USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)		
				USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)		

(U) United States Special Operations Command  
Comments (cont'd)

TYPE	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT	RATIONALE	ORGANIZATION, POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	DECISION (A/R/N)
			USCENTCOM (b)(1) 1.4(c); USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)	USSSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)		
C	15	2	USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a) USCENTCOM and USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)			



(U) United States Special Operations Command  
Comments (cont'd)

Document Title: Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques

TYPE	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT	RATIONALE	ORGANIZATION, POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	DECISION (AUSD)
S	15	3	USSOCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)	2018. (U//FOUO) Recommend deleting the paragraph as it is based on the incorrect speculation that USSOCOM would restart its intelligence interrogation program without the appropriate policy in place.	[REDACTED]	

## (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

**CCJ2-X** Combatant Command Intelligence Directorate element

**CCR** U.S. Central Command Regulation

**CI** Counterintelligence

**DIA** Defense Intelligence Agency

**DoDD** DoD Directive

**DoDI** DoD Instruction

**USCENTCOM** (b)(1) 1.7(e)

**FM** Army Field Manual

**HUMINT** Human Intelligence

**JDIMS** Joint Detainee Information Management System

**USCENTCOM and USSOCOM** (b)(1) 1.7(e)

**USCENTCOM and USSOCOM** (b)(1) 1.7(e)

**JTF-GTMO** Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay

**OSD(I)** Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

**TF** Task Force

**USCENTCOM** U.S. Central Command

**OSD(I)** Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

**USSOCOM** U.S. Special Operations Command

**USSOUTHCOM** U.S. Southern Command



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

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