



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INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

AUGUST 3, 2020




(U) Evaluation of U.S. Air Force Air Refueling Support to the U.S. Strategic Command's Nuclear Deterrence Mission

Classified By: Randolph R. Stone
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20430601

INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE

Released by the DoD OIG FOIA Office
under FOIA request DODOIG-2020-001201
on 6/2/2023

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Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of U.S. Air Force Air Refueling Support to the U.S. Strategic Command's Nuclear Deterrence Mission

August 3, 2020

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the U.S. Air Force has mission capable aircraft and aircrew to meet the U.S. Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) Operation Global Citadel Operations Order (OPORD) air refueling requirements.

STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(U) Background

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

(U) The Air Force has 396 KC-135s in the fleet. The KC-135 fleet is operated and maintained by active-duty Air Force, the Air Force Reserve Command, and the National Guard Bureau. Air Force data shows that the Service has retired active duty, National Guard, and

Background (cont'd)

(U) Reserve KC-135s at a rate of about 9 a year. The size of the Air Force tanker fleet has been reduced from a total of 543 aircraft in 2003 to 396 at the time of this evaluation. The Air Force projects that, with continued retirements, the total number of KC-135s in the fleet in FY 2024 will be 365.

(U) The Air Force is acquiring the KC-46 tanker, but this aircraft has not reached initial operational capability and
STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(U) Finding

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

Additionally, we determined that:

- (S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]



Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of U.S. Air Force Air Refueling Support to the U.S. Strategic Command's Nuclear Deterrence Mission

(U) Findings (cont'd)

- (S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a);
TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d);
USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

- (S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); TRANSCOM (b)(1)
1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

- (S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); TRANSCOM (b)(1)
1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

- (S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a); TRANSCOM (b)(1)
1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force:

- (U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]
- (U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(U) We recommend that the Commander of the Air Force Mobility Command:

- (U) Schedule threat-level electromagnetic pulse protection tests for the KC-135 Block 45 and implement protection efforts.¹
- (U) Test the KC-46 for survivability against an electromagnetic pulse in accordance with the 20 decibel design margin required in MIL-STD-3023.

(U) We recommend that the Commander of Air Mobility Command, in coordination with the Commander of the Air Force Reserve and the Director of the National Guard Bureau, develop plans to:

¹ (U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]



Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of U.S. Air Force Air Refueling Support to the U.S. Strategic Command's Nuclear Deterrence Mission

(U) Recommendations (cont'd)

- ~~(S)~~ Ensure that air refueling wings have facilities that meet Air Force Manual 32-1084 and Air Mobility Command Instruction 13-520 requirements.
- ~~(S)~~ STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g);
TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d);
USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)

(U) We recommend that the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Manpower, Personnel, and Services, in conjunction with the Commander of the Air Force Reserve and the Director of the National Guard Bureau, determine the anticipated future manning levels for aircrew, security forces, and maintenance crews, and develop recruiting and retention efforts to ensure that the U.S. Strategic Command nuclear mission can be performed.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics responded on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force.

(U) The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force did not address the recommendation regarding STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e), therefore, this recommendation is unresolved.

(U) The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary agreed with the recommendation to STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e). Comments from the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force addressed the specifics of this recommendation. Therefore, this recommendation is resolved, but will remain open.

(U) The USTRANSCOM Chief of Staff responded on behalf of the USTRANSCOM Commander and the Commander of the Air Mobility Command. The Chief of Staff did not agree with the recommendations to test the KC-46 for survivability against EMP and stated that Air Force Material Command system program offices are the lead managers for both aircraft and should be tasked with these recommendations.

(U) As a result of USTRANSCOM management comments, we redirected Recommendations 2.a and 2.b to the Commander of the Air Force Material Command, who has authority to implement these recommendations. These recommendations are unresolved.

(U) The Chief of Staff of U.S. Transportation Command partially concurred with the recommendations regarding facilities, however, the Chief of Staff did not provide specific details on what actions would be taken or when the actions would be taken. Therefore, the recommendations are unresolved.

(U) The Commander of the Air Force Reserve Command did not agree or disagree with our recommendations regarding facilities, and manning, recruitment, and retentions, however, the Commander's comments addressed the specifics of both recommendations. Therefore, both recommendations are resolved and open.

~~(S)~~ The Commander of the Air Force Reserve Command did not agree with our recommendation regarding STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)



Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of U.S. Air Force Air Refueling Support to the U.S. Strategic Command's Nuclear Deterrence Mission

~~(S)~~ STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Director of the Air National Guard did not provide specific details on what actions would be taken or when the actions would be taken. Therefore, the recommendations are unresolved.

(U) The Deputy Director of the Air National Guard agreed with our recommendation to ensure that Air Refueling Wings facilities meet requirements. Comments from the Deputy addressed our recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but will remain open.

(U) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Manpower, Personnel, and Services agreed with our recommendation regarding manning. Comments from the Deputy Chief of Staff addressed the specifics of this recommendation; therefore, this recommendation is resolved, but will remain open.

(U) The Deputy Director of the Air National Guard agreed with our recommendations regarding STRATCOM, USAF (b) (1.1.7(e)) and manning levels. However, the Deputy

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.

(U) Recommendations Table

(U) Management	(U) Recommendations Unresolved	(U) Recommendations Resolved	(U) Recommendations Closed
(U) Secretary of the Air Force	1.a,	1.b	
(U) Chief of the Air Force Reserve	3.b	3.a, 4	
(U) Director of the National Guard Bureau	3.b, 4	3.a	
(U) Commander of Air Force Mobility Command	3.a, 3.b		
(U) Commander of Air Force Material Command	2.a., 2.b		
(U) Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Manpower, Personnel, and Services		4	

(U) Please provide management comments by September 3, 2020.

(U) NOTE: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations:

- **(U) UNRESOLVED** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) RESOLVED** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) CLOSED** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.

~~SECRET~~

August 3, 2020



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE RESERVE
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of Air Refueling Support to the U.S. Strategic Command's
Nuclear Deterrence Mission (Project No. D2019-DISPA1-0152.000)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) This report contains recommendations that are unresolved because the Secretary of the Air Force, Air Mobility Command, the Air Force Reserve Command, and the National Guard Bureau did not agree with, or did not fully address, the recommendations presented in this report. Therefore, as described in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, the recommendations remain open. We will track these recommendations until an agreement is reached on the actions to be taken to address the recommendations, and adequate documentation has been submitted showing that the agreed-upon action has been completed.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Your response should be sent to DoD OIG (b)(6) and DoD OIG (b)(6). Please direct questions to DoD OIG (b)(6), at DoD OIG (b)(6) or DoD OIG (b)(6).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Randolph R. Stone", is located above the typed name.

Randolph R. Stone
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Space, Intelligence, Engineering and Oversight

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the U.S. Air Force has mission capable aircraft and aircrew to meet the U.S. Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) Operation Global Citadel Operations Order (OPORD) air refueling requirements.

STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Background

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.
(g)
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[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.
(g)
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[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

² (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)

(U) Composition of the U.S. Air Force Air Refueling Fleet

(U) The Air Force tanker fleet of 455 tankers is comprised of three aircraft types: KC-135, KC-10, and KC-46. STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) The Air Force has 396 KC-135s in the fleet. Air Mobility Command Fleet Programming Data shows the Air Force has retired KC-135s at a rate of about 9 tankers a year, from a total fleet of 543 in 2003 to a fleet of 396 as of November 2019. The Air Force projects that, with continued retirements, the total number of KC-135s in the fleet in FY 2024 will be 365.

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)

(U) The Air Force is acquiring the KC-46 tanker, but this aircraft has not reached initial operational capability STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

³ (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) U.S. Transportation Command Responsibilities for USSTRATCOM's Air Refueling Mission

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

- (S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
- (S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
- (S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)

⁴ (S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
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(U) DoD Planning Guidance

(U) The 2018 National Defense Strategy directs the DoD to shift its planning constructs from regional conflicts, which were the basis of DoD planning constructs for the last 25 years, to deterring or defeating a great-power aggressor. Deterring or defeating great-power aggression is a fundamentally different challenge than the regional conflicts that were the basis of U.S. military planning constructs for the past 25 years. According to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, “[f]ighting two simultaneous wars against rogue states no longer represents the most pressing challenge to American security and prosperity.” Therefore, the 2018 National Defense Strategy called for “Simultaneity Guidance” to deter in three theaters and win any war.

(U) Specifically, the guidance directs that, during conflicts, a fully mobilized Joint Force must be shaped, sized, postured, and readied to simultaneously:

1. (U) defeat aggression against the United States, its national interests, allies, or key partners by a great-power adversary;
2. (U) deter nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attack;
3. (U) defend the homeland;
4. (U) deter opportunistic aggression in a second theater; and
5. (U) disrupt imminent terrorist or non-strategic weapons of mass destruction threats to the homeland.

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
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• (S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
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(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
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(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
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(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d);
USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

(U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

⁶ (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

⁷ (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
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(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

- (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
- (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
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(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d) [Redacted]
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(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g) [Redacted]
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(U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
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(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g) [Redacted]
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(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g) [Redacted]
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[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

⁸ (U) GAO Report No. 03-923T, "Military Aircraft," September 2003.

⁹ (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Air Force Instruction 31-203 defines mission capable as an aircraft's ability to perform at least one of its assigned peacetime or wartime missions. The instruction identifies multiple sub-sets of mission capable, such as full mission capable, partial mission capable, and non-mission capable. There are additional sub-sets to non-mission capable that identify the specific cause for the aircraft being non-mission capable. The instruction defines aircraft availability as an enterprise-level metric which provides a repeatable, logical, defensible method to calculate an availability standard for aircraft. The formula merges aircraft availability with operational requirements to provide leaders the fleet visibility necessary to make enterprise-wide decisions.

(U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
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[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
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(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

(U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
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
- (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
- (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
- (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
- (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
- (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

¹⁰ (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]

Table 3: (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)



(U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

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(U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

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(U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

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(U/~~FOUO~~) STRATCOM, TRANSCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(U/~~FOUO~~) STRATCOM, TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
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(U/~~FOUO~~) STRATCOM, TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)
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(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4 (g)
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(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4 (g)
[Redacted]

¹¹ (U) Department Of Defense Interface Standard: High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Protection for Military Aircraft Mil-Std-3023, November 21, 2011.
¹² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6811.01c, "Nuclear Command and Control Systems Technical Performance Criteria," February 7, 2014.
¹³ Department Of Defense Interface Standard: High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Protection for Military Aircraft Mil-Std-3023, November 21, 2011.


(U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

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(U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[Redacted]

Figure 1: (U) High-Altitude EMP Detonation



(U) Source: Congressional Commission to Assess the Threat of Electromagnetic Pulse to the United States.

(U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)

[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)

[Redacted]

¹⁴ (U) CJCSI 6811.01, "Nuclear Command and Control System Technical Performance Criteria," February 7, 2014.
(U) DoD Directive S-5210.81, "United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety and Security," April 24, 2017.

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
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[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

¹⁵ (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

¹⁶ (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]

(U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[Redacted]

¹⁷ (U) Air Force Manual 32-1084, "Facility Requirements," February 26, 2016.

¹⁸ (S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d)
[Redacted]

(U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
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[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g) [Redacted]
(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

- (U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
- (U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
- (U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
- (U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]

(U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)

[REDACTED]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)

[REDACTED]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)

[REDACTED]

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.

(g)
[Redacted]

(U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[Redacted]

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force:

- a. (U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]
- b. (U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(U) Office of the Secretary of the Air Force Comments

(U) The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics responded on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary stated that office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in coordination with the Air Force Lifecycle Management Center, will STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[Redacted]

(U) The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary also stated that the Air Force has STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Our Response

(U) The Secretary of the Air Force did not address Recommendation 1.a to STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

Therefore, this recommendation is unresolved. We request the Secretary of the Air Force provide comments on Recommendation 1.a in response to the final report.

(U) The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force addressed the specifics of Recommendation 1.b. Therefore, this recommendation is resolved, but will remain open. We will close this recommendation when we verify the corrective action plan is completed to STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the Commander of the Air Force Material Command:

- a. (U) Schedule threat-level electromagnetic pulse protection tests for the KC-135 Block 45 and implement protection efforts.**
- b. (U) Test the KC-46 for survivability against an electromagnetic pulse in accordance with the 20 decibel design margin required in Military Standard 3023.**

(U) Commander of the Air Mobility Command Comments

(U) The Chief of Staff of U.S. Transportation Command responded on behalf of the Commander, Air Mobility Command. The Chief of Staff did not agree with the recommendations to schedule threat-level EMP protections tests for the KC-135 and test the KC-46 for survivability against EMP in accordance with the required 20 decibel design margin. The Chief of Staff stated that Air Force Material Command system program offices are the lead managers for both aircraft and should be tasked with these recommendations.

(U) Redirected Recommendations

(U) As a result of U.S. Transportation Command management comments, we redirected Recommendations 2.a and 2.b to the Commander of the Air Force Material Command, who has authority to implement these recommendations. These recommendations are currently unresolved. We request that the Commander of the Air Force Material Command provide comments to Recommendations 2.a and 2.b in response to the final report.

(U) Recommendation 3

(U) We recommend that the Commander of Air Mobility Command, in conjunction with the Chief of the Air Force Reserve and the Director of the National Guard Bureau:

a. (U) develop plans to ensure that Air Refueling Wing facilities meet Air Mobility Command Instruction 13-520 and Air Force Manual 32-1084 requirements.

b. (U) STRATCOM, TRANSCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U) Commander of the Air Mobility Command Comments

(U) The Chief of Staff of U.S. Transportation Command, responding on behalf of the Commander of Air Mobility Command, partially agreed with recommendation 3.a to develop plans to ensure that air refueling wings have facilities that meet Air Mobility Command Instruction 13-520 and Air Force Manual 32-1084 requirements. The Chief of Staff stated that Air Mobility Command has established policy on alert facilities, but the Air Force Reserve Command and the National Guard Bureau should be tasked to comply with Air Mobility Command guidance.

(S) The Chief of Staff also partially concurred with recommendation 3.b to [REDACTED] STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g) [REDACTED]. The Chief of Staff stated that Headquarters, Air Force should have the lead role for this recommendation, and Air Mobility Command and other organizations should coordinate efforts to support Headquarters Air Force as needed.

(U) Our Response

(U) The Chief of Staff's comments partially addressed the specifics of recommendation 3.a to develop plans to ensure that air refueling wings have facilities that meet Air Mobility Command Instruction 13-520 and Air Force Manual 32-1084 requirements. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We agree that Air Mobility Command has established policies on alert facility mission requirements. However, we request the Commander of Air Mobility Command describe specific actions on how it will work, in conjunction with the Air Force Reserve Command and the National Guard Bureau, to develop plans to ensure requirements are met.

(S) The Chief of Staff of USTRANSCOM comments did not address the specifics of recommendation 3.b. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. [REDACTED]
STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Commander of the Air Force Reserve Command Comments

(U) The Commander of the Air Force Reserve Command did not agree or disagree with Recommendation 3.a to develop plans to ensure that air refueling wing facilities meet Air Force and Air Mobility Command requirements. STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) The Commander of the Air Force Reserve Command did not agree with Recommendation 3.b to STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) Although the Commander of the Air Force Reserve Command did not agree or disagree with our recommendation, STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED] Therefore, Recommendation 3.a is resolved, but will remain open. We will consider this recommendation closed when the Air Force Reserve Command STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(S) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); TRANSCOM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Director of the National Guard Bureau Comments

(U) The Deputy Director of the Air National Guard agreed with our recommendation to work in conjunction with the Commander of Air Mobility Command and the Commander of the Air Force Reserve to ensure that Air Refueling Wings' facilities meet AMCI 13-520 and AFMAN 32-1084 requirements. STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U) The Deputy Director of the Air National Guard agreed to work in conjunction with the Commander of Air Mobility Command and Commander of the Air Force Reserve Command to STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) The Deputy Director of the Air National Guard addressed the specifics of Recommendation 3.a. Therefore, we consider the Air National Guard portion of this recommendation resolved, but will remain open. We will close this recommendation when the Air National Guard provides a detailed plan, to include estimated completion dates, STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U) For Recommendation 3.b, the Deputy Director of the Air National Guard agreed to work in conjunction with the Commander of Air Mobility Command and Commander of the Air Force Reserve Command to STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendation 4

(U) We recommend that the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Manpower, Personnel, and Services, in conjunction with the Chief of the Air Force Reserve and the Director of the National Guard Bureau, determine the anticipated future manning levels for aircrew, security forces, and maintenance crews, and develop recruiting and retention efforts to ensure that the U.S. Strategic Command nuclear mission can be performed.

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Personnel and Services Comments

(U) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Manpower, Personnel, and Services agreed with the recommendation. The Deputy Chief of Staff stated that he will coordinate with the Commander of the Air Force Reserve and the Director of the National Guard Bureau to correct issues identified in this report, and will develop and implement a corrective action plan to address future manning levels for KC-135 aircrew, security forces, and maintenance crews, and develop recruiting and retention efforts to ensure that the U.S. Strategic Command nuclear mission can be performed.

(U) Our Response

(U) The Deputy Chief of Staff addressed the specifics of this recommendation. Therefore, we consider this recommendation resolved, but will remain open. We will close this recommendation when we verify that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Manpower, Personnel, and Services' corrective action plan meets the intent of our recommendation.

(U) Commander of the Air Force Reserve Command Comments

(U) The Commander of the Air Force Reserve Command did not agree or disagree with our recommendation to determine the anticipated future manning levels for aircrew, security forces, and maintenance crews, and develop recruiting and retention efforts to ensure that the U.S. Strategic Command nuclear mission can be performed. [REDACTED]

STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Please refer to the appendices for the full narrative of Air Force Reserve Command initiatives to meet this recommendation.

(U) The Commander of the Air Force Reserve Command added that [REDACTED]
STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) Even though the Commander of the Air Force Reserve Command did not agree or disagree with our recommendation, the Commander provided details of recently implemented initiatives that address the specifics of our recommendation. Therefore, we consider the Air Force Reserve Command portion of this recommendation to be resolved, but will remain open. We will close the Air Force Reserve Command's portion of this recommendation when the command provides information that [REDACTED]
STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]

(U) Director of the National Guard Bureau Comments

(U) The Deputy Director of the Air National Guard agreed with our recommendation to work in conjunction with the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Manpower, Personnel, and Services; and the Commander of the Air Force Reserve Command to determine the anticipated future manning levels for aircrew, security forces, and maintenance crews, and develop recruiting and retention efforts to ensure that the USSTRATCOM nuclear mission can be performed. The Deputy Director of the Air National Guard stated that STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) The Deputy Director of the Air National Guard agreed with our recommendation to work in conjunction with the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Manpower, Personnel, and Services; and the Commander of the Air Force Reserve Command to determine the anticipated future manning levels for aircrew, security forces, and

(U) maintenance crews, and develop recruiting and retention efforts to ensure that the USSTRATCOM nuclear mission can be performed. However, the Deputy Director did not address what actions will be taken or when the actions will be taken. Therefore, this recommendation is unresolved. We request the Deputy Director of the Air National Guard describe specific actions he will take to determine the anticipated future manning levels for aircrew, security forces, and maintenance crews, and develop recruiting and retention efforts to ensure that the USSTRATCOM nuclear mission can be performed.

(U) Appendix

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from May 2019 through November 2019 in accordance with “Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations” published in January 2012. These standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation’s objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation’s objective.

(U) Interviews and Site Visits

(U) We visited and interviewed representatives from the following headquarters and commands.

- (U) Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Pentagon, Virginia
- (U) The National Guard Bureau, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland
- (U) U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska
- (U) U.S. Transportation Command and Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois

• (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]

(U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

• (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

• (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

• (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

• (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]

• (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]

(U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Documentation and Analysis

(U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted] Aircraft availability rate is defined as an enterprise level-metric which provides a repeatable, logical, defensible method to calculate an Air Force enterprise Aircraft Availability Standard for each Mission Design Series. Mission capability rate is defined as a system's ability to perform at least one of its assigned peacetime or wartime missions.

(U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) We reviewed the following policies to determine departmental and service requirements applicable to our objective.

- (U) The Unified Command Plan, April 6, 2011
- (U) The 2018 National Defense Strategy, January 19, 2018
- (U) Department Of Defense Interface Standard: High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Protection For Military Aircraft Mil-Std-3023, November 21, 2011
- (U) Chairman Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff Instruction 6811.01C, "Nuclear Command And Control Systems Technical Performance Criteria," February 7, 2014
- (U) USSTRATCOM Operation Global Citadel Operations Order, February 8, 2019
- (U) Air Force Instruction 11-2KC-135, "Aircrew Training," January 3, 2017
- (U) Air Force Manual 32-1084, "Facility Requirements," February 26, 2016
- (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

- (U) STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued 2 reports discussing the KC-46 program. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>.

(U) GAO

(U) Report No. 18-353, "KC-46 Tanker Modernization," April 18, 2018

(U) The report stated that, while the acquisition cost estimates for the program remained the same, deliveries of the aircraft would slip to May 2019, 21 months later than originally anticipated, if risks were not mitigated. Some of the risks identified include updating test aircraft to the correct configuration, completing flight tests at a pace almost double its monthly average, and fixing a critical deficiency to keep the refueling boom from contacting receiver aircraft outside the refueling receptacle. The report recommended that the DoD implement a prior recommendation to document lessons learned.

(U) Report No. 19-480, "KC-46 Tanker Modernization," June 12, 2019

(U) This report stated that the Air Force accepted the first KC-46 in January 2019, and Boeing remained nearly 3 years behind schedule. The report also stated that the Air Force accepted aircraft that did not fully meet contract specifications and that had critical deficiencies, including deficiencies that affect the refueling boom. The report stated that the Air Force would withhold a 20 percent payment on each aircraft until Boeing fixes the deficiencies. The report recommends that the DoD disseminate insights in the report about the contracting and sustainment planning experiences for consideration by acquisition programs.

(U) Management Comments

(U) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

18 May 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: SAF/AQ
1060 Air Force Pentagon Suite 4E967
Washington DC 20330-1060

SUBJECT: (U) Air Force Response to DoD Office of Inspector General Draft Report, "Evaluation of U.S. Air Force Air Refueling Support to the U.S. Strategic Command's Nuclear Deterrence Mission" (Project No. D2019-DISPA1-0152.000)

- (U) This is the SAF/AQ response to the DoDIG Draft Report, Evaluation of U.S. Air Force Air Refueling Support to the U.S. Strategic Command's Nuclear Deterrence Mission" (Project No. D2019-DISPA1-0152.000). The SAF/AQ concurs with the report as written without comment.
- (U) SAF/AQ in coordination with the Air Force Lifecycle Management Center will correct issues identified in this report, and develop and implement a corrective action plan outlined in the following recommendation:

RECOMMENDATION 1b.: (U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

AIR FORCE REPSONSE: (U) STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

- (U) The SAF/AQ point of contact is

COSTELLO.DARL [REDACTED]
ENE.J [REDACTED]
DARLENE J. COSTELLO
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)

(U) Commander of U.S. Transportation Command



UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
508 SCOTT DRIVE
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225-5357

16 April 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: TCCS

SUBJECT: (U) DODIG Draft Report, Evaluation of Aerial Refueling Support to the USSTRATCOM (Project Number - D2019-DISPA1-0152.000)

1. (U) The United States Transportation Command staff and Air Mobility Command staff have reviewed the subject report and provide the attached responses to the recommendations found in this report.
2. (U) The point of contact in this matter is [REDACTED]

KOTULICH DEBORAH
AHLOUISE [REDACTED]

DEBORAH L. KOTULICH
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

Attachment:

1. (U) USTRANSCOM Response to DODIG Draft Report

(U) Commander of U.S. Transportation Command (cont'd)

**USTRANSCOM Response to DoDIG Draft Report
Evaluation of Aerial Refueling Support to the USSTRATCOM Nuclear Deterrence Mission
(Project Number - D2019-DISPA1-0152.000)**

(U) Recommendation 2.a: DoDIG recommends that the Commander of Air Mobility Command schedule threat-level electromagnetic pulse protection tests for the KC-135 Block 45 and implement protection efforts.

(U) Management Response: Non-Concur. Air Force Material Command (AFMC) KC-135 Systems Programs Office (SPO), as the lead manager of the KC-135 platform, should be tasked with this recommendation.

(U) Recommendation 2.b: DoDIG recommends that the Commander Air Mobility Command test the KC-46 for survivability against an electromagnetic pulse in accordance with the 20 decibel design margin required in MIL-STD-3023.

(U) Management Response: Non-Concur. Same as recommendation 2.a.

(U) Recommendation 3.a: DoDIG recommends that the Commander Air Mobility Command, in conjunction with Chief of the Air Force Reserve and the Director of the National Guard Bureau, develop plans to ensure that Air Refueling Wings facilities meet Air Mobility Command Instructions 13-520 and AFMAN 32-1084 requirements.

(U) Management Response: Partially Concur. Air Mobility Command has established policies on alert facilities based on mission requirements. Air Force Reserve Command and the National Guard should be tasked to comply with current guidance in place.

(U) Recommendation 3.b: STRATCOM, TRANSCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Management Response: Partially Concur. Headquarters, Air Force should have the lead role and Air Mobility Command and Global Strike Command, as the USSTRATCOM AFFOR, should coordinate efforts to support Headquarters Air Force as needed.

(U) Commander of the Air Force Reserve Command



~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE RESERVE COMMAND

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: AFRC/CC
555 Robins Pkwy Suite 250
Robins AFB GA 31098-2005

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of Air Refueling Support to the U.S. Strategic Command's Nuclear Deterrence Mission (Project No. D2019-DISPA1-0152.000)

1. (U) Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report on the subject evaluation. My staff has reviewed, and we submit the following comments:

a. (U) Recommendation 3a: "...the Commander of Air Mobility Command, in conjunction with the Chief of the Air Force Reserve and the Director of the National Guard Bureau, develop plans to ensure that Air Refueling Wing facilities meet Air Mobility Command Instruction 13-520 and AFMAN 32-1084 requirements."

STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

b. (U) Recommendation 3b.

STRATCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); ITRANS COM (b)(1) 1.4(b)(c)(d); USAF (b)(1) 1.4.(g)

~~SECRET~~

**(U) Commander of the Air Force Reserve
Command (cont'd)**

~~SECRET~~

c. (U) Recommendation 4. "...the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Manpower, Personnel, and Services, in conjunction with the Chief of the Air Force Reserve and the Director of the National Guard Bureau, determine the anticipated future manning levels for aircrew, security forces, and maintenance crews, and develop recruiting and retention efforts to ensure that the U.S. Strategic Command nuclear mission can be performed.

STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)




~~SECRET~~

**(U) Commander of the Air Force Reserve
Command (cont'd)**

~~SECRET~~

USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)



STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)



~~SECRET~~

**(U) Commander of the Air Force Reserve
Command (cont'd)**

~~SECRET~~

2. (U) In addition to the above comments, request the DoD IG change references to "Chief of Air Force Reserve" to "Commander, Air Force Reserve Command." In my role as Chief, of Air Force Reserve (CAFR), I serve as an advisor to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force (SECAF and CSAF) on Air Force Reserve affairs. As Commander, Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) for which I am dual-hatted, I am responsible to organize, train and equip Air Force Reserve forces to support combatant commanders. It is in this role that I will direct and prioritize AFRC efforts toward addressing the recommendations identified in this report.

3. (U) The AFRC point of contact is [REDACTED]

SCOBEE, RICHARD W. [REDACTED]
RICHARD W. SCOBEE
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

cc:
4 AF/CC

~~SECRET~~

(U) Commander of the Air National Guard



UNCLASSIFIED
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
1000 AIR FORCE PENTAGON, ROOM 4E126
WASHINGTON, DC 20330-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: NGB/CF

SUBJECT: Air National Guard Response to DoD Office of Inspector General Draft Report, "(U) Evaluation of U.S. Air Force Air Refueling Support to the U.S. Strategic Commands Nuclear Deterrence Mission" (Project No. D2019-DISPA1-0152.000)

(U) The Office of the Director, Air National Guard, has reviewed the DoD IG Draft Report, "(U) Evaluation of U.S. Air Force Air Refueling Support of the U.S. Strategic Commands Nuclear Deterrence Mission" (Project No. D2019-DISPA1-0152.000). Included are responses to recommendations report for items 3.a, 3.b, and 4.

a. (U) **RECOMMENDATION 3a:** DoD IG recommends that the Commander of Air Mobility Command, in conjunction with the Chief of the Air Force Reserve Command and the Director, Air National Guard, develop plans to ensure that Air Refueling Wings facilities meet AMCI 13-520 and AFMAN 32-1084 requirements.

STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

STRATCOM, TRANSCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

c. (U) **RECOMMENDATION 4:** DoD IG recommends that the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Manpower, Personnel, and Services, in conjunction with the Chief of the Air Force Reserve and the Director, Air National Guard, determine the anticipated future manning levels for aircrew, security forces, and maintenance crews, and develop recruiting and retention efforts to ensure that the USSTRATCOM nuclear mission can be performed.

(U) Commander of the Air National Guard (cont'd)

STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

d. (U) **NGB RECOMMENDATION 1:** Change all references of "Director of the National Guard Bureau" to "Director, Air National Guard." The title "Director of the National Guard Bureau" is incorrect.

(U) The point of contact for this memorandum is

PIERCE.KIRK.STE
WART

KIRK S. PIERCE
Maj Gen, USAF
Deputy Director, Air National Guard

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Manpower, Personnel, and Services



UNCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: HQ USAF/A1
1040 Air Force Pentagon Suite 4E175
Washington, DC 20330

SUBJECT: Air Force Response to DoD Office of Inspector General Draft Report, "Evaluation of U.S. Air Force Air Refueling Support to the U.S. Strategic Command's Nuclear Deterrence Mission" (Project No. D2019-DISPA1-0152.000)

1. (U) This is the AF/A1 response to the DoDIG Draft Report, "Evaluation of U.S. Air Force Air Refueling Support to the U.S. Strategic Command's Nuclear Deterrence Mission" (Project No. D2019-DISPA1-0152.000). The A1 concurs with the report as written and offers the comments below.

2. (U) The AF/A1 in coordination with the Chief of the Air Force Reserve and the Director of the National Guard Bureau will correct issues identified in this report, and develop and implement a corrective action plan outlined in the following recommendations:

RECOMMENDATION 4: (U) The DODIG recommends that the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Manpower, Personnel, and Services, in conjunction with the Chief of the Air Force Reserve and the Director of the National Guard Bureau, determine the anticipated future manning levels for aircrew, security forces, and maintenance crews, and develop recruiting and retention efforts to ensure that the U.S. Strategic Command nuclear mission can be performed.

STRATCOM, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

3. (U) The AF/A1 point of contact is

DEFILIPPI.GWEND
OLYN.RUTH
GWENDOLYN R. DeFILIPPI, SES, DAF
Asst DCS, Manpower, Personnel & Services

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(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMCI	Air Mobility Command Instruction
EMP	Electromagnetic Pulse
MCRS	Mobility Capabilities And Requirements Study
Mil-Std	Military Standard
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OPORD	Operations Order
USSTRATCOM	U.S. Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command

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
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