



INSPECTOR GENERAL

Department of Defense

July 28, 2017

Report No. DODIG-2017-106

(U) Evaluation of the Air Force and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident

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(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of Air Force and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident

July 28, 2017

(U) Objective

(U) Our objective was to determine whether Air Force and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams are organized, trained, and equipped to respond to a nuclear weapon accident or incident.

(U) Methodology

(U) The criteria against which capabilities were reviewed are detailed below.

(U) Organize. Is there adequate manpower at EOD Custodial Units to meet DoD and Service mission requirements? Are EOD Custodial Units properly aligned within the Services?

(U) Train. Have DoD and the Services identified tasks necessary to train EOD units to respond to a nuclear weapon accident or incident? Have DoD and the Services established conditions, standards, and performance measures to articulate and evaluate these tasks? Is there an inspection process to validate that the training meets DoD and Service mission requirements?

(U) Equip. Do the Services ensure EOD technicians have the tools and equipment necessary to meet DoD mission requirements to respond to a nuclear weapon accident or incident?

(U) Background

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a), USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(U) Overarching requirements for an EOD response to a nuclear weapon accident or incident include:

- (U) DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)
- (U) Air Force Instruction 32-3001, "Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Program," November 20, 2014, directs Air Force EOD to provide an immediate response to nuclear weapon accidents or incidents.
- (U) Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 8027.1H, "Naval Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program and Mission Support," August 7, 2014, directs the Navy to plan for and employ EOD to respond to nuclear weapons accidents or incidents.



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of Air Force and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident

(U) Findings

(S) Organization of EOD teams. Air Force and Navy EOD teams were organized to meet mission requirements identified in DoD Manual 3150.08, "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)," August 22, 2013.

OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g) & 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f), (b)(3); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(S) Training of EOD teams.

DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(S) Equipping of EOD teams.

DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(U) Findings (cont'd)

(S) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation A. OSD, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e), (b)(3)

(U) The Director, Expeditionary Warfare, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, did not respond to the recommendation. We request that the Director provide comments on the final report.

(U) Recommendation B.1. OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) The Secretary of the Navy did not respond to the recommendations in the report. We request that the Secretary provide comments on the final report.



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of Air Force and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident

(U) Recommendations (cont'd)

(U) The Director of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force, responded on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force. The Director agreed with our recommendation and stated that OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U) Comments from the Director of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force, addressed the specifics of the recommendation, therefore the recommendation is resolved. OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) The Director, Joint Staff, disagreed with our recommendation. OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) The Director's comments did not address the specifics of our recommendation; therefore the recommendation is unresolved.

OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendation B.2. We recommend that the Joint Staff Director of Operations:

(U) a. Develop a plan of action to ensure Service explosive ordnance disposal Custodial units and their base or installation commander

OSD, DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U) b. Incorporate Custodial EOD Unit roles and responsibilities in

OSD, DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of Air Force and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident

(U) Recommendations (cont'd)

(S//NF//FRD) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA,
USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(U) Redirected Recommendation B.2a. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. European Command, develop a plan of action to ensure Service explosive ordnance disposal Custodial units and their base or installation commander within U.S. European Command

OSD, DTRA
(b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) We request the Commander, U.S. European Command provide comments to this recommendation within 30-days receipt of this final report.

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF
(b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(U) Recommendation B.3. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics revise DoD Manual 3150.08, "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)," August 22, 2013, to align Custodial Explosive Ordnance Disposal guidance with Presidential Directives.

(U) The Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, responded on behalf of the Under Secretary of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense agreed with our recommendation and stated that DoDM 3150.08 is part of a series of guidance pertaining to U.S. nuclear accident and incident response and will be updated once the preceding documents have been updated. The Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense added (U) that the U.S. nuclear response community will determine if DoDM 3150.08 should expand to reflect U.S. nuclear weapon response procedures during an incident.

(U) The comments from the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, addressed all specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved. We will close the recommendation once we verify DoD guidance on Custodial EOD is aligned with Presidential directives.

(U) Recommendation B.4. OSD, DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1)
1.4(a)(f)

We will close this recommendation once we receive and analyze the updated instruction to



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of Air Force and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident

(U) Recommendations (cont'd)

(S//NF) ensure it addresses our recommendation.

(U) Recommendation B.5. We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force revise Air Force Instruction 32-3001, "Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program," November 14, 2014, Incorporating Change 2, May 13, 2016, to align Custodial Explosive Ordnance Disposal guidance with Presidential Directives.

(U) The Director of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force, responded on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force. The Director did not agree with our recommendation. The Director stated that the IG did not distinguish between a nuclear weapon accident and incident. We agree with the Director that USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(S) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(U) The Air Force Deputy Inspector General and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, disagreed with the Director of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force. The Air Force Deputy Inspector General and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, agreed with our

(U) recommendations. The Deputy Chief of Staff added that his office stands ready to support the Secretary of the Air Force Inspector General and the Director of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force, in revising policy to ensure the requirements of the three recommendations are clearly codified in policy.

(U) Recommendation B.6. We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff, identify explosive ordnance disposal response to a nuclear weapon incident as a Special Interest Item for Nuclear Weapon Technical Inspections.

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(U) Though the Director, Joint Staff, did not agree with our recommendation, the recommendation is resolved.

The Air Force and Navy inspecting Custodial EOD DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED], coupled with the Joint Staff's commitment to evaluate alignment of directives, meets the intent of our recommendation. We will close this recommendation once we receive and analyze future Nuclear Weapon Technical Inspection reports to ensure our recommendation is addressed.



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of Air Force and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident

(U) Recommendations (cont'd)

(U) **Recommendation C.** We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, [REDACTED]

DoD OIG, DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) The Secretary of the Navy did not respond to the recommendations in the report. We request that the Secretary provide comments on the final report.

(U) The Director of Civil Engineers, responded on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force. The Director agreed in principle with our recommendation to comply with Presidential Directives USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) The Director did not address the specifics of our recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. Our recommendation is for the Services to coordinate with the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. Both offices work with the Departments of Justice and Energy on interagency EOD responses. We request the Director reconsider and describe the specific actions the Air Force will take to implement the recommendation.

(U) The Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, agreed with our recommendation. The Acting Director stated that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency is prepared to assist the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Navy to DTRA, USAF (b)(1) [REDACTED]
1.7(e) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Acting Director stated that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency will promote the Services' capability development efforts through the Explosives Ordnance Disposal Steering Group. Additionally, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency will reintroduce the topic at the next Nuclear Weapon Accident Incident Response Sub-committee meeting, projected for September 2017.

(U) The comments from the Acting Director addressed the specifics of our recommendation; therefore this recommendation is resolved. [REDACTED]

DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendations Table

(U) Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	B.1	B.4	
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics		B.3	
Secretary of the Air Force	B.5, C	B.1	
Secretary of the Navy	B.1, C		
Director, Joint Staff	B.1	B.6	
Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency		C	
Joint Chiefs of Staff Director of Operations		B.2b	
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction	C		
Director, Expeditionary Warfare, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	A		
Commander, U.S. European Command	B.2a		

(U)

(U) Please provide management comments by August 29, 2017.

(U) NOTE: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
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July 28, 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of Air Force and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident
(Report No. DODIG 2017-106)

(U) We are providing this report for your review and comment. This evaluation determined whether Air Force and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams are organized, trained, and equipped to respond to a nuclear weapon accident or incident. We conducted this evaluation in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation.

(U) We considered management comments on a draft copy of this report when preparing this final report. We request additional information from the Director, Joint Staff; Secretary of the Air Force; Secretary of the Navy; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction; and the Director, Expeditionary Warfare, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations regarding the actions and timeframe expected to address Recommendations. Additionally, we request comments on the redirected recommendation, Recommendation B.2a, from the Commander, U.S. European Command.

(U) Any additional comments you provide must conform to DoD Instruction 7650.03 and clearly describe the issues, the actions planned or taken to resolve our recommendations along with the projected completion date. Please send any comments or when reporting the completion of a recommendation to [DoD_OIG\(b\)\(6\)@dodig.smil.mil](mailto:DoD_OIG(b)(6)@dodig.smil.mil) in the form of a PDF by August 29, 2017. Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. Please send any classified correspondence via the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at [DoD_OIG\(b\)\(6\)@dodig.mil](mailto:DoD_OIG(b)(6)@dodig.mil) or [DoD_OIG\(b\)\(6\)@dodig.mil](mailto:DoD_OIG(b)(6)@dodig.mil).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Anthony C. Thomas", is written over a circular stamp.

Anthony C. Thomas
Deputy Inspector General for
Intelligence and Special Program Assessments

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) Our objective was to determine whether Air Force and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams were organized, trained, and equipped to respond to a nuclear weapon accident or incident.

(U) Background

(U) OSD, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) The operational threat environment in which EOD technicians are assigned is complex, varied, and technically challenging. Over the last 15 years, adversarial forces have identified the improvised explosive device as the asymmetric weapon of choice to counter U. S. military superiority, which requires an increasingly adaptive and flexible approach to conducting EOD operations. Improvised explosive devices constitute one of the gravest threats to U.S. forces and EOD technicians in the global war on terrorism. Because of this threat, EOD efforts are mostly dedicated to new tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter improvised explosive devices. Focusing on a single EOD mission creates a risk that there could be less emphasis placed on other EOD missions, such as organizing, training, and equipping for an EOD response to a nuclear weapon accident or incident.

(U) General Accountability Office (GAO) Report No. GAO-13-365, "EOD: DOD Needs Better Resource Planning and Joint Guidance to Manage the Capability," April 2013, concluded that meeting the demands for EOD forces in combat operations has negatively affected EOD units' personnel and ability to train for other missions. The GAO found that each of the Services met the combatant commanders' high demand for EOD personnel by deploying units and assuming risks as other EOD missions and training activities were left unfulfilled. For example, Service officials acknowledged to

(U) the GAO that the Services assumed some risks in some mission areas such as countering sea mines, clearing unexploded ordnance on training ranges, and providing defense support to civil authorities. The GAO report did not specify whether the Services assumed risk in the EOD mission to support the nuclear enterprise.

(U) We surveyed 14 departments, agencies, and organizations to identify other oversight reports that would help us determine if the Services assumed risk in the EOD mission to support the DoD nuclear enterprise. With the exception of GAO-13-365, we found no other independent or oversight report on EOD published in the last ten years.¹

(U) Terms and Definitions

(U) As used in this report, the following terms and definitions apply.

(U) DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(S) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

¹ (U) Department of Justice, Department of State, Joint Staff, U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System Support Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, GAO, Secretary of the Air Force Office of the Inspector General, Air Force Audit Agency, Department of the Navy Office of the Inspector General, Headquarters Air Force A10, DoD Office of the Inspector General-Audit, DoD Office of the Inspector General-Investigations, DoD Office of the Inspector General-Policy and Oversight, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

² (U) Title is classified SECRET.

(U) Nuclear weapon accident. DoD Instruction 3150.10, "DoD Response to U.S. Nuclear Weapon Incidents," July 2, 2010, defines a nuclear weapon accident as an unexpected event due to accidental circumstances involving U.S. nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components that results in:

- (U) Errors committed in the assembly, testing, loading, or transportation of equipment, or the malfunctioning of equipment and materiel that could lead to an unintentional operation of all or part of the weapon arming or firing sequence, or that could lead to a substantial change in yield or increased dud probability;
- (U) Accidental or unauthorized launching, firing, or use by U.S. forces, or U.S.-supported allied forces, of a nuclear-capable weapon system that could create the risk of an outbreak of war;
- (U) Loss or destruction of a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon component, including jettisoning;
- (U) An increase in the possibility of, or actual occurrence of, an explosion, a nuclear detonation, or radioactive contamination;
- (U) Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon component;
- (U) Public hazard, actual or implied; and
- (U) Any act of God, unfavorable environment, or condition resulting in damage to the weapon, facility, or component.

(U) Nuclear weapon incident. Presidential Policy Directive-35, "United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and Security," December 8, 2015, defines a nuclear weapon incident as an intentional act attempting damage, theft, unauthorized use, unauthorized movement, or loss of control of a U.S. nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon component involving suspected criminal or terrorist activity.

(U) Recapture. Presidential Policy Directive-35 defines recapture as actions taken to regain control of a U.S. nuclear weapon within the boundaries of the storage or operational site, facility, convoy element, or military installation where a hostile force has gained control of the weapon.

(U) Recovery. Presidential Policy Directive-35 defines recovery as actions taken to locate and regain control of a U.S. nuclear weapon outside the boundaries of the storage or operational site, facility, convoy element, or military installation from where control has been lost, removed, or seized by a hostile force.

(U) Render Safe. CJCS Instruction 3261.01C defines render safe as the portion of EOD procedures involving the application of special methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components of unexploded explosive ordnance to prevent an unacceptable detonation.

(U) Department of Defense Guidance to Organize, Train, and Equip EOD Forces for the Nuclear Mission

(U) DoD Directive 5100.01, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components," December 21, 2010, directs the Air Force and Navy to develop concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; and organize, train, equip, and provide forces to conduct nuclear operations in support of strategic deterrence, to include providing and maintaining nuclear surety and capabilities.

(U) DoD Manual 3150.08, "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)," August 22, 2013, requires all four Services to have EOD teams with the capability to fulfill the initial response requirements of nuclear weapons verification, damage assessment, and electrical render safe procedures. However, to ensure response by the most qualified and knowledgeable personnel, DoD Manual 3150.08 requires follow-on render safe and disposal procedures on Service-unique nuclear weapon systems to be performed by EOD personnel of that Service, in conjunction with the Department of Energy Accident Response Group. The Air Force and Navy are the only Services that operate nuclear weapon storage sites. Therefore, we limited the scope of this evaluation to the Air Force and Navy.

(U) DoD Manual 3150.08 assigns mission requirements for EOD teams responding to a nuclear weapon accident or incident. The manual states that as the primary element responsible for weapon recovery, the EOD team will conduct weapon damage assessments, initiate systematic searches to reestablish accountability of weapons and components, protect classified components from view, and stabilize the site from nuclear and conventional explosive hazards. Safe paths for movement around the

(U) accident site and point(s) for entrance and exit will be clearly marked and briefed to personnel. During the weapons recovery phase, weapons recovery operations are a combined effort of EOD, the Department of Energy Accident Response Group, and FBI bomb technicians when the possibility of a hostile act exists.

(U) DoD Manual 3150.08 also establishes that for EOD teams to be qualified to perform required procedures on nuclear weapons, the teams must receive EOD nuclear weapon training, either in initial training at Naval School EOD and some other recurring or advanced training to supplement their basic knowledge.

(U) DoD Directive 5160.62, "Single Manager Responsibility for Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training (EODT&T)," June 3, 2011, states that the DoD EODT&T Program be designed to improve the effectiveness and economy of EOD activity throughout the DoD by eliminating duplications and overlapping of EOD technology development and training efforts and ensure the attainment of state-of-the-art DoD emergency and wartime EOD capabilities. The DoD directs the Secretaries of the Military Departments to provide:

- (U) (a) an integrated logistics support plan for development of EOD training, curriculum materials, and training aids; and
- (U) (b) sufficient quantities of inert and live explosive ordnance items for EOD procedures, joint validation and test verification, and EOD training.

(U) Air Force Guidance to Organize, Train, and Equip EOD Forces for the Nuclear Mission

(U) Air Force Policy Directive 32-30, "Explosive Ordnance Disposal," March 31, 2014, directs EOD to organize, train, and equip for 10 mission areas:

- (U) Aerospace systems/vehicles and conventional munitions,
- (U) Counter-improvised explosive devices,
- (U) Combating weapons of mass destruction,
- (U) Unexploded ordnance recovery operations,
- (U) Operational range clearance,
- (U) Mortuary Services,

- (U) Defense support to civil authorities,
- (U) Irregular warfare,
- (U) Very Important Person protective support, and
- (U) Nuclear weapon response.

(U) Air Force Policy Directive 32-30 directs all Air Force EOD units to provide immediate initial support to nuclear weapon accidents or incidents. The policy also directs all active duty Air Force EOD units to mitigate risk and to provide site stabilization situational awareness. Direct support units,³ certified on specific weapon systems and aerospace platforms, form the core of weapons recovery teams.

USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Navy Guidance to Organize, Train, and Equip EOD Forces for the Nuclear Mission

(U) Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 8027.1H, "Naval Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program and Mission Support," August 7, 2014, directs Navy EOD to maintain a maximum state of readiness to support:

- (U) joint force operational mobility and battlefield maneuver;
- (U) operations ashore or underwater in support of fleet and shore establishments;
- (U) clearance of unexploded ordnance remaining in former combat zones, training areas, and target ranges;
- (U) nuclear weapons incidents;
- (U) defense support of civil authorities;

³ (U) Air Force Policy Directive 32-30 defines Direct Support Units as an Explosive Ordnance Disposal flight that provides a full capability for nuclear support from initial response through recovery actions. Included are EOD flights supporting nuclear capable wings, nuclear weapon storage areas, or consolidated support bases storing these systems.

⁴ (U) Joint Publication 3-15, "Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations," June 17, 2011, defines obstacles as any natural or man-made obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn or block the movement of an opposing force, and to impose additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on the opposing force.

- (U) assistance in the development of allied nation EOD programs;
- (U) diving, underwater object location, recovery, and demolition services; and
- (U) ships and stations in planning and conducting training in areas of firefighting and damage control involving explosives, explosives safety, disaster control, chemical, biological, and radiological monitoring, emergency personnel decontamination, and emergency destruction procedures.

(U) Methodology

(U) The criteria against which capabilities were reviewed are: Organize, Train, and Equip. These criteria are detailed below.

(U) Organize. Is there adequate manpower at EOD Custodial Units to meet DoD and Service mission requirements? Are EOD Custodial Units properly aligned within the Services?

(U) Train. Have DoD and the Services identified tasks necessary to train EOD units to respond to a nuclear weapon accident or incident? Have EOD and the Services established conditions, standards, and performance measures to articulate and evaluate these tasks? Is there an inspection process to validate that the training meets DoD and Service mission requirements?

(U) Equip. Do the Services ensure EOD technicians have the tools and equipment necessary to meet DoD mission requirements to respond to a nuclear weapon accident or incident?

(U) Introduction

(U) Organizations Reviewed

(U) DOE (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

- (S//FRD) OSD, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f), (b)(3); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
- (S//FRD) OSD, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f), (b)(3); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
- (S//FRD) OSD, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f), (b)(3); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
- (S//FRD) OSD, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f), (b)(3); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(U) DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Finding A

(U) Air Force and Navy EOD Teams Are Organized to Meet Mission Requirements for a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident Response

(S) Air Force and Navy EOD teams are organized to meet mission requirements identified in DoD Manual 3150.08 and Service-specific guidance. [REDACTED]

OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a) & 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f), (b)(3); USAF 1.4(a)(f)

(U) Air Force and Navy EOD Teams Are Organized to Meet Mission Requirements Identified in DoD Guidance.

(U) DoD Manual 3150.08 requires that during a response to a nuclear weapon accident or incident, EOD teams must conduct weapon damage assessments, initiate systematic searches to reestablish accountability of weapons and components, protect classified components from view, and stabilize the site from nuclear and conventional explosive hazards.

(U) Air Force Instruction 38-101, "Air Force Organization," March 16, 2011, directs Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces to organize in flights within the Civil Engineering Squadron. The Civil Engineering Squadron Commander reports through the Mission Support Group Commander to the Wing Commander. Air Force Instruction 38-101 and Air Force Visual Aid 38-104, "Headquarters Department of the Air Force," April 18, 2016, aligns Civil Engineering under the Headquarters Air Force A4, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection.

(U) We asked 15 EOD technicians, and a representative from Air Force Global Strike Command, if Air Force Custodial EOD units are organized with an appropriate chain-of-command within the Civil Engineering career field. Eleven of fifteen EOD technicians and the Air Force Global Strike Command representative agreed that while there are disadvantages to being aligned within Civil Engineering, there are no better alternatives.

(U) We analyzed what we considered the most feasible alternative, which was to restructure EOD organizations as a field operating agency with regional divisions. A field operating agency is a subdivision of the Air Force that is directly subordinate to a Headquarters Air Force functional manager. Field operating agencies perform specialized missions that are larger in scope than a single Air Force Major Command.

(U) To determine if a reorganization from the current structure to a field operating agency would provide any benefits or efficiencies, we reviewed relevant documentation, including Air Force policy and guidance related to reorganization,⁵ Government Accountability Office analysis of DoD reorganization,⁶ and the Air Force Material Command Reorganization Final Analysis.⁷ We identified two major challenges to reorganizing as a field operating agency. First, the annual Defense Appropriations Act usually contains a provision prohibiting expenditure of funds for establishment of such organizations unless the Secretary of the Air Force certifies to Congress that the establishment results in personnel or financial savings to the Air Force.⁸ Second, horizontal integration and collaboration among Custodial EOD units and Air Force bases in different chains of command may complicate communication. Through our analysis we did not identify any benefits or efficiencies to be obtained from reorganizing EOD as a field operating agency that would justify the challenges of such a reorganization.

(U) Representatives from the Headquarters Air Force A4 stated that the EOD career field is manned at 89 percent. This headquarters staff, along with one of the EOD Custodial units we visited, stated that this is an increase from the past and they anticipate the manpower to continue to improve.

⁵ (U) Air Force Instruction 38-101, "Air Force Organization," 31 January 2017; Air Force Instruction 84-105, "Organizational Lineage, Honors, and Heraldry," 19 March 2013.

⁶ (U) General Accountability Office Report No. GAO-13-366, "Air Force Electronics System Center," April 25 2013.

⁷ (U) RAND Corporation, MG-1219-AF, 2012.

⁸ (U) Air Force Instruction 38-101, "Air Force Organization," 31 January 2017

(U) Findings

(S//FRD) OSD, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f), (b)(3); USAF
1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) OSD, DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) OSD, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e), (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) OSD, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) OSD, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e), (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) We did not evaluate the work of the Navy Manpower Analysis Center. However, through interviews with senior Navy personnel and visits to ^{DTRA (b) (1) 1.7(e)} EOD detachments, we determined that the Navy failed to follow-up on written direction from the Commander, Fleet Forces Command, to initiate priority 1 manning for ^{DTRA (b) (1) 1.7(e)} EOD detachments. Designating the detachments for Priority 1 manning is necessary for ^{DTRA (b) (1) 1.7(e)} Navy EOD Detachments to meet the recommended requirement for ^{OSD, DOE (b) (1) 6.2(a), (b) (3); DTRA (b) (3)}.

(U) Conclusion

(U) As a result of our interviews, site observations, and a review of Presidential, DoD, and Service requirements, we determined that the Air Force and Navy EOD teams are organized to meet mission requirements for a nuclear weapon accident or incident response. Specifically, Air Force and Navy Custodial EOD units are organized with an appropriate chain-of-command and the manpower to conduct weapon damage assessments, initiate systematic searches to reestablish accountability of weapons and components, protect classified components from view, and stabilize the site. ^{OSD (b) (1) 1.7(e) & 6.2(a), (b) (3); DOE (b) (1) 6.2(a), (b) (3); DTRA (b) (3)}

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation A

(U) ^{OSD, DOE (b) (1) 6.2(a), (b) (3); DTRA (b) (1) 1.7(e), (b) (3)}

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Director, Expeditionary Warfare, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Comments

(U) The Director, Expeditionary Warfare, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, did not respond to the recommendations in the report. We request that the Director provide comments on the final report.

(U) Finding B

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
[Redacted]

(S) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
[Redacted]

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
[Redacted]

(S) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
[Redacted]

(S) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
[Redacted]

(U) Findings:

(S) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(S) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(S) DoD OIG, OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

⁹ (U) Title is classified SECRET.

(U) DoD Manual 3150.08, "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)," August 22, 2013, states that the EOD element will conduct weapon damage assessments. It also states that weapons recovery operations are a combined effort of EOD, the Department of Energy Accident Response Group, and FBI bomb technicians when the possibility of a hostile act exists. DoD OIG, OSD, DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Air Force Instruction 32-3001, "Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program," November 14, 2014, Incorporating Change 2, May 13, 2016, states that Custodial EOD units are trained to perform all necessary EOD actions from weapon stabilization to weapon recovery, and EOD personnel train on EOD nuclear procedures including, as a minimum, render safe procedures, continuation procedures, and component recovery tasks. USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

¹⁰ (U) CJCSM 3213.02C, "The Joint Staff Focal Point Program," February 1, 2009, CH 1, September 1, 2010, current as of May 23, 2011, defines the Focal Point Program as a CJCS-directed system that applies Alternate Compensatory Control Measures to the handling of operationally sensitive information necessary to support the warfighter.

¹¹ (S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(U) Findings

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
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[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Findings


(U) OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e)



(U) The Air Force Did Not Inspect EOD Team's Capability to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Incident Exercise, Even Though Required

(U) CJCS Instruction 3263.05B, "Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections," November 17, 2014, states that the military importance and political sensitivity of operations with nuclear weapons dictates that all units and personnel maintain the highest possible standards of performance. DoD Directive 3150.02, "DoD Nuclear Weapon Surety Program," April 24, 2013, requires DoD to conduct Nuclear Weapon Technical Inspections of all DoD nuclear-capable units. A Nuclear-Capable Unit is defined as a unit or an activity assigned responsibilities for employing, assembling, maintaining, transporting, or storing nuclear weapons, their associated components, and ancillary equipment.

(U) CJCS Instruction 3263.05B defines Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections as the Service inspection of a nuclear-capable unit, conducted to examine nuclear weapons technical assembly, maintenance, storage functions, logistics movement, handling, safety, and security directly associated with these functions. USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)



(U) CJCS Instruction 3263.05B identifies four types of nuclear weapons technical inspections. The Navy conducts Navy Technical Proficiency Inspections and Nuclear Weapons Acceptance Inspections. The Air Force conducts Nuclear Surety Inspections and Initial Nuclear Surety Inspections. These inspections are detailed in applicable Service standards.

(U) CJCS Instruction 3263.05B identifies 10 major graded areas that Services must inspect at a minimum.¹² Services can add major graded areas in their applicable Service standards or broaden the scope of their inspections to address combatant command and Service requirements. Additionally, CJCS Instruction 3263.05B allows for the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and other DoD components to request Special Interest Items to be evaluated during Nuclear Weapon Technical Inspections.

(U) CJCS Instruction 3263.05B requires security to be a major graded area during Nuclear Weapon Technical Inspections. To provide a realistic assessment of the unit, CJCS Instruction 3263.05B requires exercises at each nuclear-capable unit, using all facets of the unit's ability to meet the nuclear weapon security standard in accordance with DoD Manual 5210.41-M V-1, "Nuclear Security Manual," August 11, 2016. This manual requires USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Air Force Stopped Requiring Inspections of Nuclear Weapon Incident Response in 2015

(U) The Air Force Inspection Agency fields a nuclear inspection team. Air Force Inspection Agency mission documentation states that the nuclear inspection team provides oversight of Major Command-conducted Nuclear Surety Inspections to provide the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Air Force an independent perspective of the safety, security, and reliability of units and nuclear weapons. Agency representatives said that the team does not have a manpower requirement for an EOD technician, and there has never been an EOD technician on their staff. Accordingly, the Air Force Inspection Agency relied on major command inspection teams for EOD expertise during nuclear surety inspections. We found, through our interviews with Air Force EOD teams and Major Command representatives, that the major command

¹² (U) Management and Administration; Technical Operations; Tools, Test, Tie down and Handling Equipment; Condition of the Active/Inactive Stockpile and Retired Weapons; Storage and Maintenance Facilities; Security; Safety; Supply Support; Personnel Reliability Program; and Logistic Movements.

(U) inspection teams did not always have an EOD technician with nuclear experience assigned. We believe this adversely impacted both organizations' ability to independently assess and report EOD's ability to respond to a nuclear weapon accident or incident.

(U) Until 2015, the Air Force included EOD as a major graded area during Nuclear Surety Inspections. The Air Force Inspector General's Nuclear Surety Inspection Team Process Review Group meeting minutes, dated January 12, 2015, recorded the Air Force's position to remove EOD as a major graded area during nuclear surety inspections. During our evaluation, multiple interviews revealed that the Air Force's decision was based on two factors. First, the Air Force Inspector General directed the Nuclear Surety Inspection Team Process Review Group to reduce the number of major graded areas. Representatives from the Air Force Inspector General's staff stated this direction was to better align the Air Force with the minimum standards required in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3263.05B, "Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections," November 17, 2014. Second, our interviews revealed that the EOD major graded area was chosen because of EOD's history of passing Nuclear Surety Inspections.

(U) Air Force Instruction 90-201, "The Air Force Inspection System," incorporating Change 1, February 11, 2016, reflects the decision to remove EOD as a major graded area. This instruction now separates EOD tasks under two separate inspections, Nuclear Surety Inspections and Unit Effectiveness Inspections.

(U) Nuclear Surety Inspections. The Air Force no longer requires an EOD response to a nuclear weapon accident or incident to be evaluated during nuclear surety inspections. DoD OIG, OSD, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]. We reviewed two recent Air Force Global Strike Command Nuclear Surety Inspection Reports¹³ provided by the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force Inspector General. Both reports show that Air Force Global Strike Command inspected the respective Custodial EOD units on nuclear weapon accident tasks. Neither inspection reported the results of EOD integration into nuclear weapon recapture and recovery planning as required by Air Force Instruction 90-201,

¹³ (S) OSD, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(3); USAF 1.4(a)(f)

(U) "The Air Force Inspection System," incorporating Change 1, February 11, 2016. Additionally, neither report documents whether exercises, augmented by EOD, were conducted as required by CJCS Instruction 3263.05B in accordance with DoD Manual 5210.41-M V-1, "Nuclear Security Manual," August 11, 2016.

(U) Unit Effectiveness Inspections. Air Force Unit Effectiveness Inspections, as described in Air Force Instruction 90-201, inspect four major graded areas of managing resources, leading people, improving the unit, and executing the mission. Attachment three to the instruction gives the inspectors the flexibility to choose two of three operations that would evaluate aspects of EOD capabilities: (1) aircraft accident operations, (2) weapons of mass destruction response operations, and (3) improvised explosive device operations. Weapons of mass destruction response operations include U.S. nuclear weapons; foreign nuclear weapons; chemical, biological, and radiological weapons; and certain high explosive weapons. Without a Service requirement to inspect an EOD response to a nuclear weapon incident, there is no guarantee this area will be inspected. CJCS Instruction 3263.05B, "Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections," November 17, 2014, states that the military importance and political sensitivity of operations with nuclear weapons dictates that all units and personnel maintain the highest possible standards of performance. Given the potentially catastrophic consequences that could be triggered by a nuclear weapon functioning before, during, or after EOD operations, we believe an EOD response to nuclear weapons incidents should be inspected during Nuclear Surety Inspections.

(U) We found through our interviews with Air Force EOD teams, Major Command representatives, and Air Staff personnel that two unforeseen consequences occurred when the Air Force removed EOD as a major graded area during nuclear surety inspections. All 15 of the Air Force EOD technicians we interviewed stated that because EOD was no longer a major graded area, the EOD flights were not included in installation-level exercises, which focus on the major graded areas of nuclear surety inspections. Similarly, EOD technicians do not believe they are receiving adequate training time in nuclear weapon storage areas because they are not a major graded area. EOD technicians stated that nuclear maintenance teams and other teams which are inspected during Nuclear Surety Inspections have a higher priority for access to weapon storage areas. EOD technicians stated that a lower access priority, coupled

(U) Findings

(U) with required maintenance within nuclear weapon storage areas, reduces the amount of EOD training time. We did not evaluate what is or is not adequate training time in the weapon storage area, but we concluded through our interviews that removing EOD as a major graded area has resulted in training challenges for Custodial EOD units.

(U) Conclusion

(S) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(U) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

(U) Director, U.S. Navy Strategic Systems Program Comments

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); NAVY (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)(h); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(U) Finding

(U) Director, Joint Staff Comments

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(U) Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, Comments

(U) The Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Air Force disagreed that the Air Force did not inspect an EOD response to a nuclear weapon incident exercise during Nuclear Weapon Technical Inspections. However, there was no documentation of these exercises in the inspection reports we reviewed. Further, the answers we received during our interviews with Air Force EOD technicians and Air Force Global Strike Command representatives were different from those given by the Deputy Inspector General.

(U) The Deputy Inspector General stated that on January 26, 2017, the Air Force issued updated guidance for EOD Custodial Units. The update added the requirement for inspections to validate certification of the EOD Custodial Unit's ability to conduct passive diagnostics and provide comprehensive technical assessment of any supported weapons system and aerospace platform, involved in a nuclear weapon accident and incident. We reviewed the updated guidance. When implemented, the Air Force will meet the CJCS Instruction 3263.05B requirement to conduct exercises at each nuclear-capable unit, using all facets of the unit's ability to meet the nuclear weapon security standard in accordance with DoD Manual 5210.41-M V-1, "Nuclear Security Manual."

(U) Findings

(U//~~FOUO~~) USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) The Air Force also disagreed that Air Force Instruction 90-201, "The Air Force Inspection System," April 21, 2015, Incorporating Change 1, February 11, 2016, requires that EOD integration into nuclear weapon recapture and recovery planning processes be evaluated. We refer the Air Force to Air Force Instruction 90-201, page 88, paragraph 6.9.6.4. for the requirement. This requirement states the Air Force will:

(U) DoD OIG, OSD, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) The Air Force Inspection Agency disagreed with our determination that Custodial EOD flights were not included in installation exercises. An Air Force Inspection Agency official stated that inspection reports located in the classified Inspector General Evaluation Management System have shown forces participated in semi-annual recapture and recovery exercises. The Air Force Inspection Agency did not provide any reports to support this statement. Further, this information contradicts multiple interviews with EOD technicians during our fieldwork.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) As a result of management comments, we redirected Recommendation B.2a, below, to the Commander, U.S. European Command, which has the authority to implement the recommendation.

(U) Recommendation B.1

(U) OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) The Secretary of the Navy, Comments

(U) The Secretary of the Navy did not respond to the recommendations in the report. We request that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense provide comments on the final report.

(U) The Director of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force, Comments

(U) The Director of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force, responded on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force. The Director agreed with our recommendation to OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e)

. The Director stated that OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, Comments

(U) The Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, also agreed with our recommendation. The Deputy Inspector General stated that once the requirement is established in policy and subsequently communicated by functional subject matter experts through the Air Force Inspection System through Air Force Instruction 90-201, "Air Force Inspection System," February 11, 2016, Wing and Major Command level inspectors will inspect then report to concerned stakeholders.

(U) Findings

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Comments

(U) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, also agreed with our recommendation. The Deputy Chief of Staff added his office stands ready to support the Secretary of the Air Force Inspector General and the Director, of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force, in revising policy to ensure the requirements of this recommendation are clearly codified in policy.

(U) Our Response to the Air Force Comments

(U) Comments from the U.S. Air Force addressed the specifics of the recommendation, therefore the recommendation is resolved. OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U) Director, Joint Staff Comments

~~(S//NF)~~ The Director, Joint Staff did not agree with this recommendation. [REDACTED]

OSD 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ The Director's comments did not address the specifics of our recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. [REDACTED]

DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(U) Findings

(U) Recommendation B.2

(U) We recommend that the Joint Staff Director of Operations:

(U) a. Develop a plan of action to ensure Service explosive ordnance disposal

Custodial units and their base or installation commander OSD, DTRA (b)(1)
1.7(e)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) b. Incorporate Custodial EOD Unit roles and responsibilities in OSD, DTRA
(b)(1), 1.7(e)

[REDACTED].

(U) Director, Joint Staff Comments

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(S//NF//FRD) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) ~~FOUO~~

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(U) Redirected Recommendation B.2a

(U) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. European Command, develop a plan of action to ensure Service explosive ordnance disposal Custodial units and their base or installation commander within U.S. European Command

OSD, DTRA (b)(1)
1.7(e)

(U) We request the Commander, U.S. European Command provide comments to this recommendation within 30-days receipt of this final report.

(U) Recommendation B.3

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics revise DoD Manual 3150.08, "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)," August 22, 2013, to align Custodial Explosive Ordnance Disposal guidance with Presidential Directives.

(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Comments

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics agreed with our recommendation. The Under Secretary stated that DoD Manual 3150.08 is part of a series of U.S. nuclear weapon incident/accident response guidance documents, and preceding documents in this series are being updated. The Under Secretary added that once these preceding documents have been updated, DoD Manual 3150.08 will be updated. The Under Secretary stated that during the rewrite process, the U.S. nuclear response community will determine if DoD Manual 3150.08 should expand to reflect U.S. Nuclear weapon response procedures during an incident.

(U) Our Response

(U) The comments from the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, addressed all specifics of the recommendation; therefore; the recommendation is resolved. We will close the recommendation once we verify DoD guidance on EOD Custodial explosive ordnance disposal is aligned with Presidential Directives.

(U) Recommendation B.4

(U) OSD, DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U) Director, Joint Staff Comments

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) OSD, DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

We will close this recommendation when we receive and analyze the updated instruction to ensure it addresses our recommendation.

(U) Recommendation B.5

(U) We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force revise Air Force Instruction 32-3001, "Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program," November 14, 2014, Incorporating Change 2, May 13, 2016, to align Custodial Explosive Ordnance Disposal guidance with Presidential Directives.

(U) The Director of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force, Comments

(U) The Director of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force, responded on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force. The Director did not agree with our recommendation to revise Air Force instructions to align Custodial EOD guidance with Presidential Directives. The Director stated that the IG did not distinguish between a nuclear weapon accident and nuclear weapon incident and added that USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U) Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, Comments

(U) The Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, agreed with our recommendation. The Deputy Inspector General stated that once the requirement is established in policy and subsequently communicated by functional subject matter experts through the Air Force Inspection System through Air Force Instruction 90-201, "Air Force Inspection System," February 11, 2016, Wing and Major Command level inspectors will effectively inspect then report to concerned stakeholders.

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Comments

(U) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, agreed with our recommendation, adding his office stands ready to support the Secretary of the Air Force Inspector General and the Director of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force, in revising policy to ensure the requirements of this recommendation, is clearly codified in policy.

(U) Our Response to the Air Force Comments

(U) DoD OIG, OSD, DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U) Findings

(U) Recommendation B.6

(U) We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff, identify explosive ordnance disposal response to a nuclear weapon incident as a Special Interest Item for Nuclear Weapon Technical Inspections.

(U) Director, Joint Staff Comments

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) Though the Director, Joint Staff did not agree with the specifics of our recommendation, the recommendation is resolved. The Air Force and Navy inspecting Custodial EOD DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED], coupled with the Joint Staff's commitment to evaluate alignment of directives, meet the intent of our recommendation. We will close this recommendation once we review future Nuclear Weapon Technical Inspections reports to ensure our recommendation is addressed.

(U) Finding C

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(U) Requirements for Secure Communication

(S) DoD OIG, OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(U) Findings

(U) Air Force Policy Directive 32-30, "Explosive Ordnance Disposal," June 21, 2013, requires USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(U) The Navy does not have existing Service requirements for secure communication. However, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command gave us a draft letter of requirements for secure data, voice, and video capabilities. The Navy does not have an estimate for when the letter will be signed.

(U) EOD Lacks Secure Communication Equipment

(S) DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

[REDACTED]

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Conclusion

(S) OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

(U) Federal Bureau of Investigation Comments

(U) The Federal Bureau of Investigation stated they appreciate and recognize the implications of some portions of the draft on the joint DoD-Federal Bureau of Investigation-Department of Energy mission set. The Federal Bureau of Investigation stated their review did not reveal any issues that they wish to raise as technical or formal comments.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation C

(U) We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, DoD OIG, DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Comments

(U) The Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, concurred with our findings and recommendations. The Acting Director stated that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency is prepared to assist the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Navy to DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

The Acting Director stated that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency will:

(U) Promote the Services' capability development efforts through the Explosives Ordnance Disposal Steering Group. The agenda for the Explosives Ordnance Disposal Steering Group meeting on May 8, 2017, included the topic of secure communications.

(U) Reintroduce the topic at the next Nuclear Weapon Accident Incident Response Subcommittee meeting, currently projected for September 2017.

(U) Our Response

(U) The comments from the Acting Director addressed the specifics of our recommendation; therefore this recommendation is resolved.

USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Secretary of the Navy Comments

(U) The Secretary of the Navy did not respond to the recommendations in the report. We request that the Director provide comments on the final report.

(U) The Director of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force, Comments

(U) The Director of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force, responded on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force. The Director agreed in principle with our recommendation to comply with Presidential Directives USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, Comments

(U) The Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, responding on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, agreed with our recommendation. The Deputy Inspector General stated that once the requirement is established in policy and subsequently communicated by functional subject matter experts through the Air Force Inspection System through Air Force Instruction 90-201, "Air Force Inspection System," February 11, 2016, Wing and Major Command level inspectors will effectively inspect then report to concerned stakeholders.

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Comments

(U) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, also responded on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force. The Deputy Chief of Staff agreed with this recommendation. The Deputy Chief of Staff added his office stands ready to support the Secretary of the Air Force Inspector General and the Director, of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force, in revising policy to ensure the requirements of this recommendation is clearly codified in policy.

(U) Our Response to the Air Force Comments

(U) Comments from the Air Force partially addressed the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. DoD OIG, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

Air Force Policy Directive 32-30, "Explosive Ordnance Disposal," June 21, 2013. We agree with the Director of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force, that a whole of government approach is necessary to USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e). Our recommendation is for the Services to coordinate with the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. Both offices work with the Departments of Justice and Energy on interagency EOD responses.

(U) Findings

(U) Therefore, we request that the Air Force describe the specific actions that the Air Force will take to work with the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, to ~~DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

(U) The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction did not respond to the recommendations in the report. We request that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense provide comments on the final report.

(U) J53, U.S. Special Operations Command Comments

~~(S//NF)~~ ~~OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) We did not analyze this course of action during our evaluation and therefore cannot determine the feasibility. However, the rationale of leveraging existing equipment for the stated reasons warrants attention from the stake holder implementing this recommendation. We appreciate the insight from the U.S. Special Operations Command J53.

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from January 2016 through October 2016 in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation. These standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objective.

(U) DOE (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- (S//FRD) OSD, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f), (b)(3); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
- (S//FRD) OSD, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f), (b)(3); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
- (S//FRD) OSD, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f), (b)(3); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)
- (S//FRD) OSD, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f), (b)(3); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

(U) We reviewed Presidential directives; Departmental directives, instructions, and manuals; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions, Joint publications, and combatant command Concept of Operations plans. We also collected and reviewed Service directives and instructions, and we reviewed installation-level developed training checklists.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) Computer-processed data was limited to official emails and electronic publications which we determined to be sufficiently reliable.

(U) Appendix B

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) GAO



(U) Report No. GAO 13-365, "EOD: DOD Needs Better Resource Planning and Joint Guidance to Manage the Capability," April 2013.

Meeting the demands for EOD forces in combat operations has negatively affected EOD units' personnel and ability to train for other missions. The GAO found that each of the Services met the combatant commanders' high demand for EOD personnel by deploying units and assuming risks as other EOD missions and training activities were left unfulfilled.

(U) Management Comments

(U) Management Comments

(U) Director, U.S. Navy Strategic Systems Programs

	<p style="text-align: center;">SECRET DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY DIRECTOR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS 1250 18TH STREET SE, SUITE 3600 WASHINGTON NAVY YARD, DC 20374-5127</p>	<p>8120 Ser 31/S050417007/001 10 May 17</p>
<p>From: Director, Strategic Systems Programs To: DoD Inspector General</p>		
<p>Subj: EVALUATION OF AIR FORCE AND NAVY EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND TO A NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT, PROJECT NO D2016-DISPAL-055,000 (U)</p>		
<p>Ref: (a) DoD Manual 5210.41, V-1 (b) CJCSI 3261.01 (c) OPNAVINST 5040.6J</p>		
<p>1. (U) Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) does not concur with Finding B on Page 16, "(U) The Air Force and the Navy did not inspect Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team's Capability to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Incident Exercise, Even Though Required.", after reviewing the draft report.</p>		
<p>b. NAVY (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)(h); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)</p> <div style="background-color: black; width: 100%; height: 100px;"></div>		
<p>b. OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); NAVY (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)(h); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)</p> <div style="background-color: black; width: 100%; height: 100px;"></div>		
<p>2. (U) Request the subject report be revised to accurately reflect the information above, specifically identifying that the Navy does meet the requirements to inspect the EOD response to a nuclear weapon incident.</p>		
<p>3. (U) My Point of Contact is [REDACTED]</p>		
<div style="text-align: center;"> T. J. BENEDICT</div>		
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"><p>DECLASSIFICATION STATEMENT Classified by: 1.TG/William Mayville, USA; DI-3 Reason: 1.5(a), (d), & (f) Declassify on: 20480107</p></div>		
<p>SECRET</p>		

(U) Management Comments

(U) Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs



NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DODD DEFENSE PROGRAMS
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3045

WY 26 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL

SUBJECT: Response to Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Report "Evaluation of
Air Force and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities to Respond to a
Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident." (Project No. D2016-DISPA1-055.000)

As requested, I am providing a response to one recommendation contained in the subject
report.

Recommendation B.3:

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
revise DoD Manual (DoDM) 3150.08, "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures
(NARP)," August 22, 2013, to align Custodial Explosive Ordnance Disposal guidance with
Presidential Directives.

Response: CONCUR. DoDM 3150.08 is part of a series of guidance pertaining to U.S. nuclear
weapon incident/accident response and will be updated once the preceding documents have been
appropriately updated. In its current form, DoDM 3150.08 accurately reflects Custodial
Explosive Ordnance Disposal guidance as it pertains to accidents. During the rewrite process,
the U.S. nuclear response community will determine if DoDM 3150.08 should expand to reflect
U.S. nuclear weapon response procedures during an incident.

Arthur T. Hopkins
Acting

(U) Management Comments

(U) Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency



DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
8725 JOHN J. KINGMAN ROAD, STOP 6201
FORT BELVOIR, VA 22060-6201

MAY 03 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of Air Force and Navy Explosives Ordnance Disposal Capabilities to
Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident (Project No: D2016-DISPA1-
055,000)

Reference: (U) DoD Office of Inspector General draft Report, "Evaluation of Air Force and
Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon
Accident or Incident," April 11, 2017

(U) The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has reviewed the referenced draft
report and concurs with its findings and recommendations.

DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

DTRA is prepared to assist the respective Services' efforts in the following forums:

- (U) DTRA will promote the Services' capability development efforts through the Explosives Ordnance Disposal Steering Group (EODSG). The agenda for the next EODSG meeting, scheduled for May 8, 2017, includes this topic.
- (U) DTRA will reintroduce the topic at the next Nuclear Weapon Accident Incident Response Subcommittee meeting, currently projected for September 2017.

(U) In response to your request for a security review of the draft report, DTRA concurs with the classification and Formerly Restricted Data caveat as currently written.

(U) My point of contact is


Shari Durand
Acting Director

(U) Director, Joint Staff



~~SECRET//FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA//NOFORN~~

THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

DISM 0079-17
25 May 2017

Reply Zip Code:
20318-0300

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
(ATTN: [REDACTED])

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of Air Force and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities to
Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident (D2016-DISPA1-055.000)

1. (S) Thank you for the opportunity to review the subject draft report. [REDACTED]
OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

2. (U) Attachment A provides Joint Staff responses to the recommendations within the subject document. Attachment B provides additional comments. In conjunction with reviewing and providing feedback to the subject report, the classification of the content was reviewed and deemed appropriately classified as "SECRET//FRD." In the future, it would be valuable to include Action Officer-level comments into the draft report before it gets to final coordination.

3. (U) The Joint Staff point of contact is [REDACTED]

William C. MaWilly, Jr.
WILLIAM C. MAWILLY, JR.
LTG, USA
Director, Joint Staff

Attachments:
As stated

Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: N/A, FRD Exempt

~~SECRET//FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA//NOFORN~~

(U) Director, Joint Staff (cont'd)

~~SECRET//FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA//NOFORN~~

17 May 2017 ATTACHMENT A
INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: (U) Evaluation of Air Force and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident (D2016-DISPA1-055.000)

(U) As requested, the following are Joint Staff responses to the recommendations within the document as written:

1. (U) Recommendation B.1 -- OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e)

~~SECRET~~ JS Response:

DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.4(a); OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a), (b)(3); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

2. (U) Recommendation B.2 -- Joint Staff Director of Operations:

- a. Develop a plan of action to ensure Service EOD custodial units and their base or installation commander OSD, DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

~~SECRET~~ JS Response:

OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

- b. Incorporate custodial EOD unit roles and responsibilities in OSD, DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

Attachment A

~~SECRET//FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA//NOFORN~~

(U) Director, Joint Staff (cont'd)

~~SECRET//FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~ JS Response:

OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

3. (U) Recommendation B.4 -- OSD, DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

~~SECRET~~ JS Response:

DoD OIG, OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

4. (U) Recommendation B.6 -- Director, Joint Staff identify EOD response to a nuclear weapon incident as a Special Interest Item for Nuclear Weapon Technical Inspections.


~~SECRET~~ JS Response:

OSD (b)(1) 1.4(a); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)

Attachment A


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(U) Director, Joint Staff (cont'd)



OSD, DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)


(U) Director, Joint Staff (cont'd)



DoD OIG (b)(1) 1.7(e); OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e) & 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e), (b)(3)


(U) Management Comments

(U) Director, Joint Staff (cont'd)



OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e) & 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)


(U) Director, Joint Staff (cont'd)



OSD, DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Management Comments


(U) Director, Joint Staff (cont'd)



DoD OIG, DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e); OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e) & 6.2(a), (b)(3)


(U) Management Comments:

(U) Director, Joint Staff (cont'd)




OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Director, Joint Staff (cont'd)



OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e) & 6.2(a), (b)(3); DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)


(U) Director, Joint Staff (cont'd)



DoD OIG, OSD, DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Management Comments


(U) Director, Joint Staff (cont'd)



DoD OIG, OSD, DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Management Comments

(U) Director, Joint Staff (cont'd)



DoD OIG, OSD, DTRA (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Air Force



Office of the Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



MAY 12 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR DOD/IG

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Air Force and Navy EOD Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident, (Project No. D2016-DISPA1-055.000)

REFERENCES: (a) DoD OIG Draft Report, 11 April 2017, *Evaluation of Air Force and Navy EOD Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident*
(b) AFI 90-201, 11 February 2016, *Air Force Inspection System*

Thank you for the opportunity to review and provide comments on three specific recommendations highlighted in your report at reference (a). Also for your consideration we have attached to this memo a consolidated comment matrix communicating areas of critical concern.

We agree with all three recommendations B.1, B.5 and C. Once the requirements of these three recommendations are clearly established in policy and subsequently communicated by functional subject matter experts through the AF Inspection System via reference (b), Wing and MAJCOM-level inspectors will effectively inspect then report to concerned stakeholders.

Finally, EOD inspection concerns raised within this report which fell outside of the report's formal recommendations will be addressed between AF/A4, AF/A10, AFGSC, USAFE, and SAF/IG using established functional and inspection policy.

We stand ready to support your staff's efforts to address any concerns related to the recommendations or attached comments. [REDACTED]

SAMI D. SAID
Major General
Deputy Inspector General

Attachment:
Comment Matrix, SD Form 818

cc:
AF/A10
AF/A4
SAF/IM
AFGSC/IG
USAFE/IG

BREAKING BARRIERS...SINCE 1947

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

DECLASSIFIED AUTHORITY: E.O. 13526, 02-28-2007
DATE OF REVIEW: 09-11-2013 BY: SP-6 BTJ/bjs

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UNCLASSIFIED ~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
SELECT A CLASSIFICATION

COMMENTS MATRIX FOR Project No. D2016-DISPAL-055.000 Review

COMMENTS MATRIX FOR Project No. D2016-DISPA1-055.000 Review						
U	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION
U		AFGSC/IGIS [REDACTED]	ii, 12, 17	2, 2, 1	C	<p>Coordinator Comment: Contrary to Finding B, EOD units are inspected for nuclear weapon responses for incidents/accidents per USAF directives. [This comment and rationale applies to all areas stating the units are not inspected]</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: Per AFI 90-201, para 6.10.2.3, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]</p> <p>AFI 32-3001, para 9.4.2.6, states custodial EOD units will conduct Nuclear Weapon Response - Broken Arrow annually, which is inspected through the Commander's Inspection Program.</p> <p>During Nuclear Surety Inspections, the AFGSC/IG EOD Inspector inspects three task evals: USAF (b)(1) 1.7(d) Broken Arrow, and bay operations/raids; and conducts tech operations. Additionally, the inspector evaluates the Quality Assurance program, PRP, technical orders, response grades, training records and documentation and nuclear related equipment.</p> <p>[AFIA] Additional EOD NSI inspection requirements were added to AFI 90-201 as part of a guidance memorandum in 26 Jan 17 to validate certification of EOD Direct Support Units ability to USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>

SD FORM 818, MAY 14

ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE AND SHOULD NOT BE USED

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
SELECT A CLASSIFICATION

(U) Management Comments

(U) Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Air Force (cont'd)

~~This document contains UNCLASSIFIED information only, and is not to be released to the public.~~
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

SELECT A CLASSIFICATION

COMMENTS MATRIX FOR Project No. D2016-DISPAL-055,000 Review							
#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
2	U	AFGSC/IGIS [REDACTED]	17	1	C	<p>Coordinator Comment: USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	
3	U	AFGSC/IGIS [REDACTED]	18	3	C	<p>Coordinator Comment: We found no instances in AFI 90-201 and CJCSI 3263.05C that require EOD integration into nuclear weapon recapture and recovery planning processes.</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: EOD integration into planning processes should be driven by the IDP and should be situation dependent.</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	
4	U	AFIA/CV [REDACTED]	19	2	C	<p>Coordinator Comment: Disagree with Reference: "EOD flights were not included in installation-level exercises."</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: Horizontal and vertical inspection reports located in IGEMS-C have shown agencies forces participating as directed IAW DoDM S-5210.41 Vol. 2, para 4.7 (b): "each installation...will conduct</p>	

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(U) Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Air Force (cont'd)

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COMMENTS MATRIX FOR Project No. D2016-DISPAL-055,000 Review

#	CLASS	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL	PAGE	PARA	COMMENT TYPE	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	A/R/P
						semi-annual recapture and recovery exercises....participation of all agencies and forces." IGs need to continue to work closely and strengthen relationships with units to observe/validate EOD efforts while also ensuring unit commanders have the freedom to balance unit training and evaluation requirements.	
5	U	AFIA, CV [REDACTED]	21		S	<p>Coordinator Comment: Disagree with Recommendation B.6</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: A Special Interest Item (SII) to identify explosive ordnance disposal response to a nuclear weapon accident should be carefully considered against the current list of SIIs being conducted by the Service while also examining the urgency of the need and the impact to IGs' unit.</p> <p>[SAF/IG] Additionally, policy interpretation at very high levels within the EOD enterprise must be resolved to include clear training requirements/standards of performance, etc. before an SII could even be considered useful.</p>	
6	U	USAF, MSgt [REDACTED]	20	B.2.b; B.3	S	<p>Coordinator Comment: The terms "accident" and "incident" need to be more clearly defined to ensure ALL agencies involved in a nuclear weapon accident/incident share a common operating language. Additionally, roles and responsibilities not only need to be incorporated into guidance, but should be clearly defined to reduce the amount of policy interpretation that currently exists.</p> <p>Coordinator Justification: The lack of clear definitions of what constitutes an accident and incident creates ambiguity as to the roles and responsibility of custodial EOD units during an accident/incident response.</p> <p>Originator Justification for Resolution:</p>	

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(U) Director of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



MEMORANDUM FOR DOD IG

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Air Force and Navy EOD Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident. (Project No. D2016-DISPA1-055.000)

REFERENCES: (a) DoD OIG Draft Report, 11 April 2017, *Evaluation of Air Force and Navy EOD Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident*

AF/A4C appreciates the opportunity to review and provide comments on the three recommendations captured in your report at reference (a) as noted below.

(U) Recommendation B.1 OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Management Response: We concur with recommendation to OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Recommendation B.5: We recommend the Secretary of the Air Force revise Air Force Instruction 32-3001, "Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program," November 14, 2014, Incorporating Change 2, May 13, 2016, to align Custodial Explosive Ordnance Disposal guidance with Presidential Directives.

(U) Management Response: We non-concur with this recommendation. We feel the IG in making their recommendation did not distinguish between an incident involving a nuclear weapon and an accident involving a nuclear weapon.

DoD OIG, OSD, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Recommendation C: We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

DoD OIG, DTRA, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) Management Response: We agree in principle, but believe the recommendation for USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

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(U) Management Comments

(U) Director of Civil Engineers, U.S. Air Force (cont'd)

We will work through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's EOD steering group and the joint staff to develop joint mission-essential tasks lists for EOD response to a nuclear weapon incident.

We stand ready to support your staff's efforts to address any concerns related to the recommendations. My point of contact for this matter is [REDACTED]

DoD OIG (b)(6) [REDACTED]

TIMOTHY S. GREEN, Maj Gen, USAF
Director of Civil Engineers
DCS Logistics, Engineering & Force Protection

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(U) Management Comments

(U) Associate Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration



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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



May 24, 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR DODIG

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Air Force and Navy EOD Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident. (Project No. D2016-DISPA1-055,000)

REFERENCES: (a) DoD OIG Draft Report, 11 April 2017, *Evaluation of Air Force and Navy EOD Capabilities to Respond to a Nuclear Weapon Accident or Incident*

AF/A10 appreciates the opportunity to review and provide comment(s) on the three recommendations captured in your report at reference (a). We have also noted some critical comments submitted by SAI/IG, which highlights areas of concern with EOD's role in recapture and recovery planning processes and inspection of EOD units.

Acknowledging the noted policy issues captured during this evaluation, AF/A10 concurs with all three recommendations (B.1, B.5 and C) that were tasked to review. We are ready to support SAI/IG and AF/A4 in revising policy to ensure the requirements of these three recommendations are clearly codified in policy and subsequently communicated by functional subject matter experts through the AF Inspection System via reference.

My point of contact for this matter is [REDACTED] AF/A10C Capabilities [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DoD OIG (b)(6)@mail.mil.

BILLY W. MULLINS, SES, USAF
Associate DCS, Strat Deterrence & Nuc Integration

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(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GAO	General Accountability Office
OPNAV	Chief of Naval Operations

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