

Inspector General

United States
Department of Defense



Report No. 08-INTEL-03
March 20, 2008

DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE

Review of Threat Assessment Guidance Regarding Nuclear Weapons Located Outside the Continental United States

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Department of Defense Inspector General
400 Army Navy Drive (Room 703)
Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Acronyms (U)

CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
JAC	Joint Advisory Committee
MUNSS	Munitions Support Squadron
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
NSTCA	Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment
OATSD(NCB)	Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Chemical and Biological Defense Programs
OCONUS	Outside the Continental United States
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology & Logistics)
USD(I)	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)	OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)
PTNW	Postulated Threat to Nuclear Weapons



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

March 20, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
NUCLEAR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
PROGRAMS

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e), USAF (b)(3)

SUBJECT: Report on Review of Threat Assessment Guidance Regarding Nuclear Weapons
Located Outside the Continental United States (Report No. 08-INTEL-03)

(U) We are providing this report for review and comment. We considered comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report.

(U) DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs agreed that the Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment can be improved. The Assistant to the Secretary proposed alternative actions for all three report recommendations. We do not believe the proposed alternative actions meet the intent of the recommendations, accordingly we ask that the Assistant to the Secretary provide additional comments to Recommendations 1., 2., and 3., indicating concurrence or nonconcurrence and planned corrective actions by May 20, 2008. We also request that the Assistant to the Secretary comment on the material internal control weakness discussed in the report.

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e), USAF (b)(3)

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Questions should be directed to DoD OIG (b)(6) (DSN DoD OIG (b)(6)) or DoD OIG (b)(6) (DSN DoD OIG (b)(6)). See Appendix E for the report distribution. Audit team members are listed on the inside back cover.

Shelton Young

Shelton R. Young
Deputy Inspector General
for Intelligence

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Dissemination, Section 144.b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954.~~

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Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

Report No. 08-INTEL-03
(Project No. D2007-DINT02-0018.00)

March 20, 2008

Review of Threat Assessment Guidance Regarding Nuclear Weapons
Located Outside the Continental United States

Executive Summary (U)

(U) Who Should Read This Report and Why? OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)




(S) Background. OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//FRD) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g), (b)(3)



(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)



(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)




(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




~~(S//NF)~~ Results. OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)



~~(S//NF)~~ Summary of Recommendations. OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



¹ (S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)



² (S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




(S//NF) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//NF) We also recommend the OATSD(NCB) suspend revision of DoD S-5210.41M, "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual" dated November 22, 2004 until the NSTCA is revised to emphasize emerging and projected threat characteristics as well as postulating a minimum adversary force size using the criteria in the above recommendation.

OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




(S) **Management Comments.** OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)



(S) **Audit Response.** OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(U) We request that the Assistant to the Secretary provide additional comments to the final report recommendations indicating concurrence or non concurrence and planned corrective actions by May 20, 2008.

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)




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Background (U)

~~(S)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




~~(S)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



~~(S)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



~~(S//FRD)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)



~~(S//FRD)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g), (b)(3); USAF (b)(3)



~~(S//FRD)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g), (b)(3); USAF (b)(3)



(S//PRD) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g), (b)(3); USAF (b)(3)

(S//PRD) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g), (b)(3); USAF (b)(3)

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)

- (S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

- (S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

- (S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

- (S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)

- (S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)

³ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e), (b)(3); USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)

- (S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)

- (S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)

- (S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)

- (U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e), USAF (b)(3)

(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) Effectively defending against a terrorist or non-state actor threat requires two mutually supporting types of intelligence information. First, in order to effectively plan against current and future terrorist attacks, planners should have the most complete characterization of adversary capabilities available to the Intelligence Community. This strategic assessment of adversary capabilities allows security planners to anticipate required future security capabilities and implement them before an adversary can defeat the security system. Second, an effective system of tactical warning should exist to attempt to defeat a surprise attack. Because tactical warning of an attack is not guaranteed, a nuclear weapon physical security system, leveraging both strategic and local threat assessments must be capable of defeating a surprise attack.

(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//NF) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




Objectives (U)

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)



(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



Review of Internal Control (U)

(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




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(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(c)(f)(g), (b)(3)

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Introduction (U)

(U) It is Departmental policy that all threat statements provide the size of an adversary force to facilitate planning, programming, resource allocation, and management. Departmental and or Joint Publications requiring definition of adversary force size include:

(U) Joint Publication 2-0. Joint Publication 2-0, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations", describes the purpose of intelligence in peacetime is to "project future adversary capabilities."

(U) Joint Publication 2-01.3. Joint Publication 2-01.3, "Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures (JTTP) for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, (JIPB)," dated May 24, 2000, states that enemy course of action development is based on an assessment of the adversary including its composition, disposition and strength, and goes on to state that friendly course of action, development, [defense planning in this case] "take[s] into consideration factors such as relative force ratios, initial force

(U) dispositions and possible schemes of maneuver.” Thus, adequate defense planning requires an assessment of enemy strength or at least relative strength in terms of force ratios.

(U) Joint Publication 3-10. Joint Publication 3-10, “Joint Security Operations in Theater” dated August 1, 2006, states that a commander’s priority intelligence requirements for analysis of the enemy include “organization, size and composition of forces.” Force size and strength of adversarial components is considered a critical part in facilitating timely information that affects success mission accomplishments. The Joint Publication considers force organization, size, and composition of adversaries to be one of six potential priority intelligence requirements. Priority intelligence requirements are intelligence requirements deemed most important to mission accomplishment. Information requirements that are most critical or that would answer a priority intelligence requirements are known as essential elements of information.

(U) Joint Publication 5-0. Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Operation Planning” dated December 26, 2006, describes adversary strengths and weaknesses as a key part of operational design planning. Operational design is the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a joint operation plan and its subsequent execution. According to the Joint Publication the key to operational design essentially involves (1) understanding the strategic guidance; (2) identifying the adversary’s principal strengths and weaknesses, and; (3) developing an operation concept that will achieve strategic and operational objectives.

USAF (b)(3)

(U)

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)

(S//NF) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//NF) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//NF) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//NF) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(U) USAF (b)(3)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



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(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(U) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.7(e)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



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• (S//NF) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//NF) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

- (S//NF) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

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- (S//NF) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

- (S//NF) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//NF) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)

(S//NF//FRD) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g), (b)(3); USAF (b)(3)

USAF (b)(3)

(U)

(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(~~DoD UCN~~) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(3)

- (~~DoD UCN~~) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(3)

~~(DoD UCN)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(3)



~~(DoD UCN)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(3)



~~(DoD UCN)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(3)



~~(DoD UCN)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(3)



~~(S)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



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(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//NF) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

- (S) Recommendation. OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

- (S) Action Taken. OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

- (S) Recommendation. OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

- (S) Action Taken. OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

- (S) Recommendation. OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

- (S) Action Taken. OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

USAF (b)(3)

(U)

(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

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(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

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
(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

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(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

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
(S//PRD) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)

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(S//FRD) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)

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
(S//FRD) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)

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(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)

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(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)

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(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

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(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

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Summary (U)


(S//NF) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

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(S//NF) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(FOUO) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



Management Comments on the Finding and Audit Response (U)

(U) **Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Defense Programs Comments.** The ATSD(NCB) agreed that the NSTCA can be improved. The ATSD(NCB) comments included a matrix with comments on the finding. Agreed to changes were made to the final report. The ATSD(NCB) comments and our response are included in Appendix C.

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e), USAF (b)(3)



Recommendations, Management Comments and Audit Response (U)

(U) We recommend the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs:

1. ~~(DoD UCNT)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(3)



a. ~~(DoD UCNT)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(3)



b. ~~(DoD UCNT)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(3)



c. ~~(DoD UCNT)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(3)



d. ~~(DoD UCNT)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(3)




e. ~~(DoD UCNT)~~ OSD/JS, USAF (b)(3)



2. (U) Suspend revision of DoD S-5210.41M: "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual," dated November 22, 2004 until the NSTCA is revised to emphasize emerging and projected threat characteristics as well as postulating a minimum adversary force size using the criteria in Recommendation 1.

3. (S//PRD) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g), (b)(3); USAF (b)(3)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)



(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(g), (b)(3)



(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




(S) OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




(U) We request that the ATSD(NCB) provide additional comments to the final report recommendations indicating concurrence or non concurrence and planned corrective actions by May 20, 2008.

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology (U)

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)



(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g), (b)(3)



(U) We preformed this audit from February 2007 through February 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

(U) **Use of Computer-Processed Data.** We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

(U) **Government Accountability Office High-Risk Area.** The Government Accountability Office has identified several high-risk areas in DoD. This report provides coverage of the Protection of National Critical Infrastructures high-risk area.

Prior Coverage (U)

(U) No prior audit coverage has been conducted on physical security of nuclear weapons located Outside the Continental United States.


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Appendix B. Consequence of Adversary Success (U)

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)


~~(S)~~ Consequences of Adversary Success. OSD/JS, USAF (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(Figure 1.) Elements of Risk




⁴OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



Appendix C. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs Comments and Audit Response (U)

(U) On December 18, 2007, the ATSD(NCB) provided comments to our draft report along with an attached comment matrix (Appendix G). Some suggested changes were made to the report. The comments and our audit responses are keyed to the item numbers in the matrix.

(U) **ATSD(NCB) Comment (Items 1 and 7):** During the development of the draft audit report the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has updated Joint Publication 3-10.1 "Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense," dated July 23, 1996 and consolidated the publication into Joint Publication 3-10, "Joint Security Operations in Theater" dated August 1, 2006. Joint Publication 5-00.1, "Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, dated January 25, 2002 was consolidated into Joint Publication 5-0, "Joint Operation Planning" dated December 26, 2006.

(U) **Audit Response:** We revised the appropriate sections of the final report to reflect the consolidated of the Joint Publications.

~~(S//NF)~~ **ATSD(NCB) Comment (Items 2 and 3):** OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)


~~(S//NF)~~ **Audit Response:** OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)

~~(S//NF)~~ **ATSD(NCB) Comment (Items 4 and 5):** OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S)~~ **Audit Response:** OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//NF) ATSD(NCB) Comment (Item 6): OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




(S) Audit Response: OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//NF) ATSD(NCB) Comment (Item 8): OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



~~(S//NF)~~ Audit Response: OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



~~(S//NF)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




~~(S//NF)~~ ATSD(NCB) Comment (Items 9 and 10): OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



~~(S)~~ Audit Response: OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)



~~(S)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)




(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)




(S//NF) ATSD(NCB) Comment (Items 11 and 16): OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




(S//NF) Audit Response: OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//FRD) ATSD(NCB) Comment (Item 12): OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)



(S//FRD) Audit Response: OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)



(S//FRD) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a), (b)(3); USAF (b)(3)



(S//NF) ATSD(NCB) Comment (Item 13): OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S) Audit Response: OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//NF) ATSD(NCB) Comment (Item 14): OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(S//NF) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [REDACTED]

(S) Audit Response: OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) ATSD(NCB) Comment (Item 15): OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [REDACTED]

(U) Audit Response: ATSD(NCB) suggested wording was incorporated into the first sentence of the USAF (b)(3) [REDACTED] section of the report.

Appendix D.

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)

Comments and Audit Response

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)

(U) **Audit Response:** Suggested paragraph has been developed and incorporated into the final report on page 12.

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)

(U) **Audit Response:** The redundant information was eliminated.

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)

(S) **Audit Response:** OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)

(S) **Audit Response:** OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

(U) **Audit Response:** OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)

(U) **Audit Response:** We incorporated the suggested wording into the body of the final report; paragraph 2, page 15.

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)

(S) **Audit Response:** OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)

(S) **Audit Response:** OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)

(S) **Audit Response:** OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3)

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [REDACTED]

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3) [REDACTED]

(U) **Audit Response:** We clarified the wording in the final report, page 17.

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3) [REDACTED]

(U) **Audit Response:** OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3) [REDACTED]

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3) [REDACTED]

(U) **Audit Response:** OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3) [REDACTED]

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3) [REDACTED]

(U) **Audit Response:** OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3) [REDACTED]

(S) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3) [REDACTED]

(S) **Audit Response:** We deleted the sentence.

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3) [REDACTED]

(S) **Audit Response:** OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g); USAF (b)(3) [REDACTED]

Appendix E. Report Distribution (U)

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Chemical and Biological Defense Programs
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Defense
Programs (Nuclear Matters)
Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation

Joint Staff

Director, Joint Staff

Department of the Navy

Chief of Naval Operations
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command

Department of the Air Force

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)

Combatant Commands

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)

Other Defense Organizations

Director, U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System Support Staff

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member

Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member (Continued)

House Committee on Armed Services

House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Appendix F. Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs Comments (U)

~~SECRET~~



NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
PROGRAMS

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3050 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3050

DEC 13 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
INTELLIGENCE AUDITS

THROUGH: DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION RESOURCES AND ANALYSIS

SUBJECT: Management Comments on the Draft Report, "Assessment of Threat to Nuclear
Weapons Located Outside the Continental United States (Project No. D2007-
DINT02-0018.00)" (U)

(U) In response to your September 21, 2007, memorandum requesting "review and
comment" on the subject report, we submit the attached comment matrix for consideration.
We have also asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide comments on the draft
report.

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) We appreciate your consideration of these management comments. Our staff
point of contact is OSD/JS (b)(6)

Arthur T. Hopkins
Acting

Attachments:
As stated


Classified by: OSD/JS (b)(6)
Reason: 1.4(g)
Declassify on: November 15, 2017

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Draft DoD IG Report on OCONUS Threat Assessment Review

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
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g), (b)(3)



Draft DoD IG Report on OCONUS Threat Assessment Review

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
OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g), (b)(3)



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Draft DoD IG Report on OCONUS Threat Assessment Review


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Draft DoD IG Report on OCONUS Threat Assessment Review

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g), (b)(3)




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Draft DoD IG Report on OCONUS Threat Assessment Review

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g), (b)(3)




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Draft DoD IG Report on OCONUS Threat Assessment Review

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g), (b)(3)



Appendix G. OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)
Comments (U)

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e); USAF (b)(3)



UNCLASSIFIED

STANDARDIZED COMMENT MATRIX PRIMER

The matrix below is a Word document table to be used as a template for submitting comments on draft publications and draft program directives. Except as noted below, an entry is required in each of the columns. To facilitate consolidating matrices from various sources, do not adjust the column widths. Use the column headings in the document header as a guide to adjust column widths.

Column 1 - ITEM

Numeric order of comments. Accomplish when all comments from all sources are entered and sorted. To number the matrix rows, highlight this column only and then select the numbering ICON on the formatting tool bar.

Column 2 -

Used to track comments by source. Manually enter numbers from the first comment to the last comment. These numbers will stay with the comment and will not change when consolidated with other comments.

Column 3 - SOURCE

J1 - J-1	JFCOM - US Joint Forces Command
J2 - J-2	PACOM - US Pacific Command
J3 - J-3	SOCOM - US Special Operations Command
J4 - J-4	SOUTHCOM - US Southern Command
J5 - J-5	SPACECOM - US Space Command
J6 - J-6	STRATCOM - US Strategic Command
J7 - J-7	TRANSCOM - US Transportation Command
J8 - J-8	DTRA - Defense Threat Reduction Agency
USA - US Army	DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency
USN - US Navy	DLA - Defense Logistics Agency
USMC - US Marine Corps	MDO - Missile Defense Organization
USAF - US Air Force	NSA - National Security Agency
USCG - US Coast Guard	DISA - Defense Information Systems Agency
CENTCOM - US Central Command	NIMA - National Imagery and Mapping Agency
EUCOM - US European Command	LC - Joint Staff Office of Legal Counsel

Column 4 - TYPE

C - Critical (Contentious issue that will cause non-concurrence with publication)
M - Major (Incorrect material that may cause non-concurrence with publication)
S - Substantive (Factually incorrect material)
A - Administrative (grammar, punctuation, style, etc.)

Column 5 - PAGE

Page numbers expressed in decimal form using the following convention: (Page I-2 = 1.02, Page IV-56 = 4.56, etc.) Enables proper sorting.

0 - General Comments

0.xx - Preface, TOC, Executive Summary (Page i = 0.01, Page xi = 0.11)
1.xx - Chapter I
2.xx - Chapter II
3.xx - Chapter III
x.xx - Chapter x, etc.
51.xx - Appendix A
52.xx - Appendix B
51.01.xx - Annex A to Appendix B
53.xx - Appendix C, etc.
99.xx - Glossary

NOTE: For Program Directives enter the page number as a whole number. (1, 2, 3, etc.) PDs are normally sorted by paragraph and line number and the page number helps to find the paragraph.

Column 6 - PARA

Paragraph number that pertains to the comment expressed (i.e. 4a, 6g, etc.)

NOTE: An entry in this column should be used when commenting on draft program directives. An entry is optional for comments on draft joint publications.

Column 7 - LINE

Line number on the designated page that pertains to the comment, expressed in decimal form (i.e., line 1=1, line 4-5 = 4.5, line 45-67 = 45.67, etc.) For figures where there is no line number, use "F" with the figure number expressed in decimal form (i.e. figure II-3 as line number F2.02). For appendices, use the "F" and the appendix letter with the figure number (i.e. appendix D, figure 13 as line number FD.13; appendix C, annex A, figure 7 as line number FCA.07).

Column 8 - COMMENT

Comment text in line-in-line-out format according to ISM 5711.01A, *Joint Staff Correspondence Preparation* (Examples are provided in JP I-01, Annex A to Appendix E). To facilitate adjudication of comments, copy complete sentences into the matrix so that it may not be necessary to refer back to the publication to understand the rationale for the change. Do not use Tools, Track Changes mode to edit the comments in the matrix. Include deleted material in the comment in the strike through mode. Add material in the comment with underlining. Do not combine separate comments into one long comment in the matrix. (i.e. 5 comments rolled up into one).

Column 9 - Remarks

Page 1 of 12

UNCLASSIFIED

Provide additional explanation. Also used to provide Sponsor's response to comment and recommendation.

Column 10 - DECISION

A - Accept

R - Reject

P - Partially Accept with modification

NOTE: This column is for the LA and JSDS use only. No rationale required for accepted items. Rationale for rejection is placed in the rationale comment box and highlighted for clarity. For modifications, the complete modified language will be placed (and annotated) as the bottom entry for that item in the "Comments" column and the rationale for the modification placed in the rationale comment box and highlighted for clarity.

TIPS AND TRICKS OF THE TRADE

Headers and Footers

1. Publication name
2. Classification (Unclassified/Secret/etc.)
3. Column headings
4. Filename (insert from header/footer drop down menu)
5. As of "date" (insert from header/footer drop down menu—manually enter date when finalized for tracking purposes)
6. Page X of Y (insert from header/footer drop down menu—manually enter last page number for Y when finalized—tracks total # of pages and does not default back to actual page #)

Combining Matrices

1. Select all and correct for font and font size (Times New Roman, #10).
2. Copy one entire matrix and paste it a few lines below the last row of another matrix.
3. Adjust column widths as necessary to match one matrix with the other (use the column headings in the document header as a guide).
4. Merge the matrices into one by deleting the lines between the two.

Item (row) numbering (automatic numbering)

1. Highlight column number 1 from top to bottom.
2. Delete the existing number and then renumber by selecting automatic line numbering on the formatting tool bar.

Sorting

1. Select: "Table" on top menu toolbar
2. Select: "Sort."
3. Select: "Sort by, Column 5 (Page column), Number, Ascending."
4. Select: "Then by, Column 7 (Line column), Number, Ascending."
5. Select: "Then by, Column 4 (Type column), Text, Descending."


Executive Summaries

Do not make comments on the executive summary until the FC. Main body text will be copied and pasted into the executive summary reducing the amount of time spent on making the two accurate. The contractor with LA and/or JSDS input will include an executive summary in the FC released for review and comment.

Draft DoD IG Report on OCONUS Threat Assessment Review

~~SECRET//TRD~~

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g), (b)(3); USAF (b)(3)




Page 3 of 12

Draft DoD IG Report on OCONUS Threat Assessment Review

~~SECRET//TRD~~

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g), (b)(3); USAF (b)(3)




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Draft DoD IG Report on OCONUS Threat Assessment Review

~~SECRET//FRD~~

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g), (b)(3), USAF (b)(3)




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Draft DoD IG Report on OCONUS Threat Assessment Review

~~SECRET//FRD~~

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g), (b)(3); USAF (b)(3)




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Draft DoD IG Report on OCONUS Threat Assessment Review

~~SECRET//MR~~

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g), (b)(3); USAF (b)(3)




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Draft DoD IG Report on OCONUS Threat Assessment Review

~~SECRET//MR~~

OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g), (b)(3); USAF (b)(3)




Page 3 of 12

Draft DoD IG Report on OCONUS Threat Assessment Review

~~SECRET//TRB~~


OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g), (b)(3); USAF (b)(3)



Draft DoD IG Report on OCONUS Threat Assessment Review

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OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g), (b)(3); USAF (b)(3)



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OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4(f)(g), (b)(3); USAF (b)(3)



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