




INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

AUGUST 10, 2018



(U) Evaluation of Intelligence Support to Protect U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe



Classified By: 1144068226/DoD OIG-ISPA
Derived From: Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Weapon Classification Policy Guide

Declassify On: Exempt (FRD)

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

Unauthorized disclosure subject to administrative and criminal sanctions.

Handle as Restricted Data in foreign dissemination.
Section 144k Atomic Energy Act, 1954

INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE

Released by the DoD OIG FOIA Office
under FOIA request DODOIG-2019-000478

on 7/14/2023





Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of Intelligence Support to Protect U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe

August 10, 2018

(U) Objective

(U) We evaluated whether the level of DoD intelligence support to U.S. Commanders of nuclear-capable units in Europe was adequate to protect U.S. nuclear weapons.

DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(U) This evaluation did not address the physical security of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe or weapons storage vaults. We did not discover any evidence that the systems for security were not working adequately to protect nuclear weapons.

(U) Background

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

~~(S//PRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

Background (cont'd)

OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Findings

~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

- ~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
- ~~(S//PRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DIA (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
- ~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]



Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of Intelligence Support to Protect U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe

(U) Findings (cont'd)

(U) We also found that Air Force Manual 31-108 assigns specific Headquarters Air Force (HAF) responsibilities to staff sections, including Logistics, (U) Engineering, and Force Protection (A4); Security Forces (A4S); and the Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Office (A10). However, AFMAN 31-108 does not assign nuclear weapon security responsibilities to HAF A2 or AFOSI; nor does it assign related responsibilities to the Air Force Inspector General, to whom AFOSI reports.

~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Recommendations

(U) Among other recommendations in this report:

- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

- (U) We recommend that the Air Force Chief of Staff update Air Force Manual 31-108 and related issuances to clearly define responsibility leads for intelligence and counterintelligence support, require units to submit their priority intelligence requirements for collection and analysis, and

(U) Recommendations (cont'd)

(U) ensure that units simultaneously discuss threats with both intelligence and counterintelligence personnel.

- (U) We also recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters) revise DoD Directive 5210.41 to establish requirements for the Defense Intelligence Agency to produce both a secret and a secret releasable to NATO version of the Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]



Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of Intelligence Support to Protect U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe

(U) Comments (cont'd)

(S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); DIA (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO) OSDJS (b)(3); DIA (b)(3)

[Redacted]

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of all recommendations.

(U) Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force	A.1.c, A.1.d, A.1.e C.1.a	A.1.a, A.1.b B.1 (Now B.4 with USAFE for action) C.1.b	None
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters)	None	D.1	None
U.S. European Command	None	A.2.c	A.2.a, A.2.b, A.2.d, A.2.e
U.S. Air Forces in Europe	A.2.a through A.2.e, A.3.a through A.3.c, B.2.a through B.2.c, and B.4 (new recommendation for final report)	B.3.a, C.2, and D.1	None

(U) Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management has agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

August 10, 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(NUCLEAR MATTERS)
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Intelligence Support to Protect U.S. Nuclear Weapons
in Europe (Report No. DODIG-2018-144) (U)

(U) We are providing this final report for your information and use. We conducted this evaluation in accordance with Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations.

(U) We considered management comments from the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters); Commander, U.S. European Command; and Director of Intelligence, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, in the draft of this report when preparing the final report.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly.

- (U) Comments from the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, agreed with some recommendations, but did not address the specifics of Recommendations A.1.d, A.1.e, and C.1.a. We request that the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff provide additional comments to the final report. Comments provided to the final report must be marked and portion-marked, as appropriate, per the security classification guide.
- (U) Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters) addressed all specifics of Recommendation D.1. We do not require additional comments.
- (U) Comments from the Deputy Director of Intelligence, U.S. European Command, addressed all specifics of Recommendations A.2 and C.2. We do not require additional comments.

- (U) Comments from the Deputy Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, did not fully address the specifics of Recommendations A.2.a through A.2.e, A.3.a through A.3.c, and B.2.a through B.2.c. The Deputy Commander's lines of effort are partially responsive, but did not address the specifics of the recommendation. We request that the Deputy Director provide additional comments to the final report within the timeframes identified in the recommendations. Comments provided to the final report must be marked and portion-marked, as appropriate, per the security classification guide. Additionally, Recommendation B.4 was redirected to USAFE for response. We request that the Deputy Director provide additional comments to the final report. Comments provided to the final report must be marked and portion-marked, as appropriate, per the security classification guide.

(U) Please send a PDF file containing your comments to your points of contact in the DoD OIG over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature.

~~(S//FRD)~~ Although certain portions of this report on its own are unclassified, by compilation and due to the subject matter, it is prudent to treat all the information within this report as SECRET//FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA//NOFORN prior to any declassification or Freedom of Information Act requests.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Please direct questions to myself at ~~DoD OIG (b)(6)~~ or the project manager at ~~DoD OIG (b)(6)~~.



Michael J. Roark
Acting Deputy Inspector General for
Intelligence and Special
Program Assessments

(U) Contents

Introduction	1
(U) Objective.....	1
(U) Background.....	1
(U) Responsibilities for Nuclear Munitions in Europe.....	1
(U) Criteria	3
(U) Evaluating the Threat to Nuclear Weapons.....	7
(U) Summary of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Support.....	10
(U) Finding A	11
(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]	11
(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]	12
(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]	15
(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [REDACTED]	18
(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [REDACTED]	22
(U) Conclusion	34
(U) Management Comments on Finding A and Our Response.....	35
(U) Recommendations, Management Comments and Our Response	37
(U) Finding B	44
(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [REDACTED]	44
(U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3) [REDACTED]	44
(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]	47
(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]	49

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) 50

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e) 52

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e); DIA (b)(3) 54

(U) Conclusion 56

(U) Management Comments to Finding B and Our Response..... 57

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments and Our Response 60

(U) Finding C..... 63

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e) 63

(U) Process to Tailor the Threat Capabilities Assessment to the Local Environment..... 63

(U) Conclusion 68

(U) Management Comments to Finding C and Our Response..... 68

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response 70

(U) Finding D..... 73

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e) 73

(U) Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment 73

(U) Conclusion 76

(U) Management Comments to Finding D and Response 76

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response 77

(U) Appendix A 78

(U) Scope and Methodology..... 78

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data..... 79

(U) Prior Coverage 79

(U) Appendix B 80
(U) Examples of Threats 80
~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) 80
~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) 85
(U) Management Comments 89
(U) Headquarters Air Force A4 Comments 89
(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters) Comments 92
(U) U.S. European Command Comments 94
(U) U.S. Air Forces in Europe Comments 96
(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations 99

Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) We determined whether the level of DoD intelligence support was adequate to protect U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.¹ DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

See Appendix A for our scope, methodology, and prior coverage.

(U) Background

(U) In 1953, the United States and its European host-nation partners decided to position nuclear weapons inside Europe to counterbalance Soviet conventional weapons superiority over North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members in Europe.³ The United States would use nuclear weapons in Europe if conventional weapons could not stop advancing Soviet forces. Select nations agreed to host U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and its host nation partners have maintained the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe because of their contribution to the defense of the entire NATO alliance.

(U) Responsibilities for Nuclear Munitions in Europe

(U) Nuclear Weapon Storage Facilities and Security

(S//FRD) OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

¹ (U) For this evaluation, “adequacy” is defined as whether or not the U.S. military commanders stationed in Europe are receiving timely and relevant intelligence reports on adversary actions that allow these commanders to deter, detect, deny, delay, and defend an adversary’s attempt to access a U.S. nuclear weapon.


² (U) Joint Publication 2-0, “Joint Intelligence,” October 22, 2013, defines “relevant” as information pertaining to “the planning and execution of the operation at hand, and [that aids] the commander in the accomplishment of the mission. It must contribute to the commander’s understanding of the adversary and other significant aspects of the [operational environment], but not burden the commander with intelligence that is of minimal or no importance to the current mission.”

³ (U) We refer to the countries that host nuclear weapons as host nation partners.

⁴ (S//FRD) OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)


~~(S//FRD)~~ Figure 1. OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




~~(S//FRD)~~ Figure 2. OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(U) Source: Air base security personnel.

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)


~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



⁵ ~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD)~~ Figure 3. OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Source: Documents obtained from U.S. Air Forces in Europe.

(U) Criteria

(U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)
[Redacted]

⁶ (U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)
[Redacted]

⁷ (U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(U) DoD Nuclear Weapon Security Policy

~~(S//REL to USA, NATO)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4 (a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL to USA, NATO)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4 (a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL to USA, NATO)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4 (a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL to USA, NATO)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4 (a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Joint Staff Publications

(U) Joint Publication (JP) 2-0 distinguishes between intelligence and counterintelligence. JP 2-0 defines intelligence as “the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations.”

⁸ (U) Joint Publication 1-02 defines “operations security” as a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly action attendant to military operations and other activities. For example, a unit may identify information that must be protected, determine what could be observed or exposed, and develop ways to protect critical information and events from adversary intelligence collection.

(U) JP 2-0 identifies seven disciplines that contribute to intelligence production and analysis; for example, human intelligence, open-source intelligence, and counterintelligence.⁹ According to JP 2-0, fusion of the seven disciplines relies on collection and analysis efforts that optimize the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of different intelligence disciplines. Specifically, JP 2-0 states that fusion is:

(U) [A] deliberate and consistent process of collecting and examining information from all available sources and intelligence disciplines to derive as complete an assessment as possible of detected activity. It draws on the complementary strengths of all intelligence disciplines, and relies on [all-source analysis].

(U) JP 2-0 describes the discipline of counterintelligence as

(U) Five functions (collection, analysis and production, investigations, operations, and functional services) conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. [Counterintelligence] is both offensive (adversary penetration and deception) and defensive (protection of vital US. National security related information from being obtained or manipulated by an adversary's intelligence organizations, activities, and operations). ...[Counterintelligence] works closely with intelligence, security, infrastructure protection, and law enforcement to ensure an integrated approach to US [interests].

(U) According to JP 2-0, "the commander drives the intelligence synchronization effort by determining the friendly [course of action], [priority intelligence requirements (PIR)], and points in time and space (decision points) where critical events and activity would necessitate a command decision." According to JP 2-0, the commander's staff takes PIRs and develops information requirements that are:

(U) A series of more specific questions [and] items of information that must be collected and processed to develop the intelligence required by the commander. [Developing information requirements] leads to the generation of requests for information (RFIs). If the required information is already available, a production requirement may be initiated, and if the required information is not available, a collection requirement is initiated.

⁹ (U) JP 2-0 defines intelligence disciplines as "well-defined areas that involve specific categories, collections, and analysis with emphasis on technical or human resources capabilities."

(U) JP 2-01 prescribes how the RFI process supports the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) process:

(U) Customers communicate requirements to their supporting intelligence office ... which articulates the customers' needs as an RFI. RFIs state questions the customer wants answered or contain other specific intelligence needs, such as countries and topics required. ... RFIs also specify the various levels of detail required as well as the periodicity of production and updates.¹⁰

(U) The RFI process influences the products that units receive. For additional information on CCIR development, see Finding A.

(U) U.S. Air Force Issuances

(U) Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 31-108 sets forth Air Force guidance that implements Office of the Secretary of Defense nuclear security guidance and prescribes mandatory procedures for the security of nuclear weapons.¹¹ AFMAN 31-108 implements the DoD Nuclear Weapon Security Policy and outlines Air Force responsibilities to achieve nuclear weapon security standards.

(U) Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-245 identifies antiterrorism officers (ATOs) as the principal military or civilian advisers charged with managing the respective antiterrorism programs for the commander or DoD civilian exercising equivalent authority.¹² ATOs coordinate with security forces, counterintelligence professionals (such as the Air Force Office of Special Investigations), intelligence professionals, and other support organizations to provide an effective antiterrorism understanding for their commanders.

(U) NATO's Allied Command Operations Directive

(U) OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

¹⁰ (U) JP 2-01, "Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations," July 5, 2017.

¹¹ (U) AFMAN 31-108, "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual: The Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Manual," Volume I, June 15, 2017.

¹² (U) AFI 10-245, "Antiterrorism," June 25, 2015.

¹³ (NATO Confidential (NC)) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4 (a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [REDACTED]

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Evaluating the Threat to Nuclear Weapons

(U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3) [Redacted]

(U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

According to DoD Instruction (DoDI) O-2000.16, DoD Component heads are required to ensure that commanders of military installations designate a commissioned officer, noncommissioned officer, or civilian employee to serve as an ATO to support mission requirements and coordinate available resources.¹⁴ ATOs are required to complete training courses approved by the Military Department. DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) DoDI O-2000.16 also requires DoD Component heads to ensure that commanders of DoD installations establish (at least quarterly) a threat working group (TWG) tasked with fusing all available threat information and assessing current and emerging threats to DoD personnel. The instruction requires that TWGs be chaired by the respective installation commanders and led by either the commander's designee or the installation's ATO.

(U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3) [Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4 (a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

¹⁴ (U) DoD Instruction O-2000.16, Volume 1, "DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation: DoD AT Standards," May 5, 2017.

¹⁵ ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4 (a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) OSDJS (b)(3) [Redacted]

(NATO Unclassified [NU]) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e), (b)(3) [Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) OSDJS (b)(3) [Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) OSDJS (b)(3) [Redacted]

(U) Headquarters, USAFE also has force protection analysts within the security forces branch (USAFE/A4S). USAFE/A4S distributes unclassified and secret antiterrorism awareness e-mails containing general European threat information.¹⁸

¹⁶ (U//~~FOUO~~) OSDJS (b)(3) [Redacted]

¹⁷ (U//~~FOUO~~) OSDJS (b)(3) [Redacted]

¹⁸ (U) USAFE/A4S analysts send these e-mails to all USAFE ATOs. The e-mails contain compiled products and assessments from national intelligence agencies such as the National Counterterrorism Center, the JAC, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and other Service force protection and intelligence agencies.

(U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3) [Redacted]

(U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3) [Redacted]

(S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4 (a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f), 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [Redacted]

(S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [Redacted]

¹⁹ (U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3) [Redacted]

²⁰ (U) AFOSI Manual 71-144, Volume 9, "Special Investigations: Analysis and Production," November 3, 2016.

(U) Summary of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Support

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//FRD)~~ Table 1. OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Source: DoD OIG analysis of USAFE data.

(U) Finding A

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

- (U) The “Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Manual” (AFMAN 31-108) did not define intelligence and counterintelligence support responsibilities for nuclear weapon security;
- (U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)
[REDACTED]
- (U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[REDACTED]
 - (U//~~FOUO~~) OSDJS (b)(3)
[REDACTED]
 - (U//~~FOUO~~) OSDJS (b)(3)
[REDACTED]
 - (U//~~FOUO~~) OSDJS (b)(3)
[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[Redacted]

(U) According to DoDM S-5210.41, "supporting military intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement units will assist nuclear sites by providing spot reports of potential or actual threats or incidents that may affect the security of a site and investigating incidents or suspected security violations reported by nuclear units."

(S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) The Difference Between Intelligence and Counterintelligence

(U) According to JP 2-0, counterintelligence is different from intelligence because counterintelligence is a single-source discipline that feeds into fused, all-source intelligence.²¹ According to JP 2-0, fusion means “exploit all sources of information and intelligence.” JP 2-0 further states:


(U) All-source, fused intelligence results in a finished intelligence product that provides the most accurate and complete picture possible of what is known about an activity. While the level of detail in single-source reports may be sufficient to meet narrowly defined customer needs, fused reports are essential to gain an in-depth understanding. Because the adversary will engage in deception efforts, analysts should guard against placing unquestioned trust in a single-source intelligence report.

(U) Figure 4 portrays the disciplines that, according to JP 2-01, can contribute to fused, all-source intelligence.

²¹ (U) See the definitions of intelligence and counterintelligence in the Background section. JP 2-0 defines intelligence disciplines as “well-defined areas that involve specific categories, collections, and analysis with emphasis on technical or human resources capabilities.”

(U) Figure 4. Disciplines That Inform Intelligence

(UNCLASSIFIED)



Source: Joint Publication 2-01.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

(U) Threat information that is collected by AFOSI primarily comes from liaison sources (human intelligence) and is not, by itself, all-source intelligence. Instead, threat information is an input that should be fused with other intelligence to create all-source intelligence.²² Intelligence organizations should be conducting this analysis. This fusion can mitigate over-reliance on single-source information and reduce the chances of deception.

(U) The January 5, 2012, version of JP 2-01 defined deception as “the manipulation of information by a foreign government, group, or individual to get intelligence analysts to reach an erroneous conclusion.” Deception can occur by sources deliberately misleading agents, especially when intelligence organizations are not actively contributing to analysis. This previous version of JP 2-01 further warned that deception “often works because it gives busy analysts what they are seeking – seemingly reliable information on which to base a conclusion.” The current version of JP 2-01 states:

(U) Rigid dependence on a single source of information or operational methodology may result in mission failure or become an operational vulnerability, especially if that source becomes unavailable or if the enemy becomes aware of the use of that single source and takes denial and deception countermeasures.

²² (U) According to DoD Directive 5240.01, “DoD Intelligence Activities,” August 27, 2014, all-source intelligence involves the integration, evaluation, and interpretation of information from all available data sources and types, to include human intelligence, signals intelligence, geospatial intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, and open source intelligence.

(U) JP 2-0 states that to “minimize the effects of enemy deception, and provide the ... most accurate intelligence possible, analysis of information from a variety of collection sources is required so information from one source can be verified or confirmed by others.”²³

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Undefined and Unclear Roles and Responsibilities

(U) AFMAN 31-108 implements DoDM S-5210.41 and provides Service-specific guidance.²⁴ The Headquarters Air Force (HAF) Directorate of Security Forces (A4S) is the proponent for this issuance.²⁵ AFMAN 31-108 assigns specific HAF responsibilities to staff sections including Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection (A4); A4S; and the Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Office (A10). However, AFMAN 31-108 does not assign nuclear weapon security responsibilities to HAF A2 or AFOSI, nor does it assign related responsibilities to the Air Force Inspector General, to whom AFOSI reports.²⁶

²³ (U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

²⁴ (U) AFMAN 31-108, Volume 1, “Nuclear Weapon Security Manual: The Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Manual,” June 15, 2017.

²⁵ (U) According to HAF Mission Directive 1-39, “Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics Engineering and Force Protection,” April 1, 2015, A4S is the Air Force’s “focal point for all doctrine, policy, standards and operational issues involving nuclear and non-nuclear security.”

²⁶ (U) According to Air Force Mission Directive 39, AFOSI is a field operating agency under the administrative guidance and oversight of the Air Force Inspector General.

(U//~~DCNF~~) OSDJS (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(U//~~DCNF~~) OSDJS (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(U//~~DCNF~~) OSDJS (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(U//~~DCNF~~) OSDJS (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) According to a HAF A4 Nuclear Security (A4SN) lieutenant colonel responsible for updating Air Force nuclear weapon security issuances, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-101 defines roles and responsibilities for units, intelligence organizations, and AFOSI.²⁷ Yet, based on interviews with ATOs and our own review of this issuance, we found that AFI 31-101 does not offer clear guidance to units that store nuclear weapons because it states:

(U//~~FOUO~~) OSDJS (b)(3)

~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

- ~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
- ~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
- ~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

²⁷ (U) AFI 31-101 "Integrated Defense (ID)," July 5, 2017.

Finding A

~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

²⁸ (U) We discuss this incident in Appendix B.

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

(U) We determined from analysis of published AFOSI reporting and interviews with unit personnel that AFOSI covering agents were a valuable resource for units that store nuclear weapons. However, this support should come with complementary contributions from intelligence. AFOSI agents did not have full access to, or awareness of, all of the all-source intelligence available. By relying solely on threat information provided by AFOSI without complementary intelligence collection and analysis, commanders may base decisions on single-source information.

(U) According to JP 2-0, "to minimize the effects of enemy deception, and provide the ... most accurate intelligence possible, analysis of information from a variety of collection sources is required so information from one source can be verified and confirmed by others." This fusion can overcome any weaknesses of individual disciplines that provide information.

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

²⁹ (U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) While AFOSI agents leveraged AFOSI analysts when writing reports and conducting source validation, there was neither a dedicated analytical effort (normally performed by intelligence analysts) to combine information nor an attempt to collect information gaps that liaison contacts could not fulfill. Based on interviews with AFOSI personnel located at USAFE and AFOSI headquarters, Marine Base Quantico, AFOSI analysts primarily focused on supporting Region 5 counterintelligence investigations and

³⁰ ~~(S//FRD)~~ We further discuss this incident in Appendix B (Examples of Threats).

³¹ (U) Region 5 is the headquarters for all AFOSI detachments in USAFE.

(U) operations. AFOSI analysts did not request additional intelligence collection, such as signals intelligence, that an intelligence analyst might request to improve overall understanding of the situation.

(S//FRD//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) On September 25, 2017, the USAFE A2 provided us with USAFE Instruction 13-210, which assigns responsibilities to the USAFE A2 to support the USAFE nuclear enterprise. These responsibilities include:

- (U//FOUO) OSDJS (b)(3)

³² (U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

- (U//~~FOUO~~) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e), (b)(3)
[Redacted]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e), (b)(3)
[Redacted]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e), (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e), (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d), USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(U) Support Requirements for Vault Openings

(U//~~FOUO~~) OSDJS (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(U) Whenever there is [an] indication of an increased threat in an area where nuclear weapons are located, Commanders will take additional security measures appropriate to the threat [level] to ensure adequate protection and [will] coordinate these additional measures with applicable headquarters and commands. ... Facilities containing nuclear weapons must be opened only when necessary for operations [such as] required maintenance, inventory, weapon movement, inspections, and, in some instances, training.

(S//~~FRD~~) OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

³³ (U) Air Force Instruction 14-119, "Intelligence Support to Force Protection," March 31, 2016.

³⁴ (U) DoD Manual S-5210.41, Volume 1, "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual: The DoD Nuclear Weapon Security Program," October 25, 2016.

~~(NATO UNCLASSIFIED - NU)~~ According to ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e)~~ :

~~(NF)~~ ~~OSDJS (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)~~
[Redacted]

(U) According to the DoD Antiterrorism Standards, TWGs “fuse all available threat information and assess current and emerging threats to DoD personnel, resources and activities, including large-scale or high-visibility events, and in-transit movements.”³⁶ DoDI 2000.16, Volume 1, defines a TWG as “a group of cross-functional subject matter experts charged with reviewing threat assessments, intelligence, and information to develop possible courses of action to mitigate or counter those threats.” DoDI 2000.16 further states that TWG membership includes:

(U) The commander or a designated representative; the ATO; intelligence, investigative, LE [law enforcement], and security representatives; medical representatives; specialists in [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)] consequence management, and [CBRN and high-yield explosive] incidence preparedness, if available; and appropriate representation from installation tenants; and local, State, federal, tribal, and host nation authorities, as required.

~~(S)~~ ~~OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)~~
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ ~~OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)~~
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ ~~OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)~~
[Redacted]

³⁵ (U) ~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e)~~

³⁶ (U) DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 1, “DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation: DoD AT Standards,” Incorporating Change 1, May 5, 2017.

Finding A

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1)
1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1)
6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a),
(b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

Finding A

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

~~(S//REL to USA, NATO)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)
(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//REL to USA, NATO)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM
(b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

³⁷ (U) We discuss the localized threat capabilities assessment in Finding C.

(U) According to JP 5-0, PIRs are intelligence requirements, stated as a priority for intelligence support, which the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or other aspects of the operational environment.³⁸ Commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) are elements of information the commander identifies as being critical to timely decision making."³⁹ CCIRs consist of PIRs and friendly force information requirements.

(U) According to JP 2-0, staffs take PIRs and then develop information requirements that are:

(U) A series of more specific questions [and] items of information that must be collected and processed to develop the intelligence required by the commander. [Developing information requirements] leads to the generation of requests for information (RFIs). If the required information is already available, a production requirement may be initiated, and if the required information is not available, a collection requirement is initiated.

(U) According to AFI 10-245, commanders are required to ensure that intelligence elements and AFOSI, in coordination with the TWG, develop PIRs for integration into the CCIRs to focus collection and analysis efforts in support of installations and units.

(U) JP 2-01 prescribes how the RFI process supports the CCIR process:

(U) Customers communicate requirements to their supporting intelligence office... which articulates the customers' needs as an RFI. RFIs state questions the customer wants answered or contain other specific intelligence needs, such as countries and topics required. ... RFIs also specify the various level of detail required as well as the periodicity of production and updates.⁴⁰

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]


³⁸ (U) JP 1-02, "DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," August 2017.

³⁹ (U) JP 5-0, "Joint Planning," June 16, 2017.

⁴⁰ (U) JP 2-01, "Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations," July 5, 2017.

(U) Figure 5. Relationship Between Intelligence Requirements and Information Requirements.

(UNCLASSIFIED)



(U) Source: JP 2-0.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

⁴¹ ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

Finding A

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1)
1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

- (S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
- (S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
- (S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(S//FRD//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

⁴² (S//FRD//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

⁴³ (S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Conclusion

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

⁴⁴ ~~(S//FRS//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Management Comments on Finding A and Our Response

(U) United States Air Forces in Europe

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d), USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

- (S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

- (S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

- (S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments and Our Response

(U) Recommendation A.1

(U) We recommend that the Headquarters Air Force Director of Security Forces, with coordination from Headquarters Air Force Director of Intelligence and Inspector General, update Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 31-108, "The Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Manual," June 15, 2017, and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-101, "Integrated Defense," July 5, 2017, to:

- a. (U) Assign the Headquarters Air Force Director of Intelligence as the lead to ensure intelligence support for all Air Force units that store nuclear weapons and designate specific support responsibilities for this lead and for major command intelligence organizations.

(U) Air Force Chief of Staff Comments

(U) The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, responding for the Chief of Staff, agreed with the recommendation stating that AFI 31-101, "Integrated Defense," already captures roles and responsibilities for Air-Force-A2, AFOSI, Major Command A2s, tenant units, and supported components and-geographically separated units/dispersed sites. The A4S will add language in AFMAN 31-108 directing units to AFI 31-101 for intelligence support in defense of assets. This effort was expected to be completed by June 1, 2018.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff addressed the recommendation. Although originally projected to be completed on June 1, 2018, the completion date was later extended until July 30, 2018; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the policy changes have been implemented.

b. (U) Designate specific responsibilities for the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.

(U) Air Force Chief of Staff Comments

(U) The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, responding for the Chief of Staff, agreed with the recommendation stating that the designation of specific responsibilities will also be referenced in AFMAN 31-108.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff sufficiently addressed the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the policy changes have been implemented.

c. (U) Assign responsibilities for commanders of units that store nuclear weapons to levy separate requirements on both the Air Force Office of Special Investigations and intelligence organizations.

(U) Air Force Chief of Staff Comments

(U) The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, responding for the Chief of Staff, disagreed with the recommendation, stating that the U.S. European Command's Supplement to DoDM 5210.41/~~OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.7(e)~~ already makes the distinction in section 5-9 (Intelligence Support).

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff partially addressed the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. ~~DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)~~

We request that the Chief of Staff revise AFMAN 31-108 with a reference to ~~OSD (b)(1) 1.7(e)~~, and provide additional comments in response to the final report.

- d. **(U) Create control measures to ensure that nuclear units' priority intelligence requirements, collection requirements, and intelligence requests for information are submitted, tracked, and processed through major commands' directors of intelligence.**

(U) Air Force Chief of Staff Comments

(U) The Air Force Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, responding for the Air Force Chief of Staff, disagreed with the recommendation, stating that it is beyond the AF/A4S to dictate how Major Command A2s create control measures to ensure that nuclear units submit priority intelligence and collection requirements and to determine how those requirements are subsequently tracked and processed.

(U) Our Response

(U//~~FOUO~~) OSDJS (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

- e. **(U) Require units that store nuclear weapons to simultaneously discuss threats with intelligence organizations and Air Force Office of Special Investigations agents prior to vault operations to fuse intelligence and consider all available information. Consider using the intelligence fusion cell model for an in-person or secure conference call discussion prior to meetings with the host nation.**

(U) Air Force Chief of Staff Comments

(U) The Air Force Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, responding for the Air Force Chief of Staff, disagreed with the recommendation, stating that AFI 31-101 distinguishes between intelligence and AFOSI. Both have roles and responsibilities, as well as membership in threat working groups and fusion cells. Major commands and units currently have the ability to conduct pre-operations meetings of intelligence fusion cells or working groups, either virtually or face to face.

(U) Our Response

(U) Although the Air Force Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff disagreed with our recommendations, his comments addressed the intent of the recommendation.

DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

Therefore, we revised this recommendation clarify that the AF/A4S should coordinate with the AF/A2 and Air Force Inspector General in the development of an oversight means to ensure that the fusion of information is taking place prior to the movement of assets. This recommendation is considered unresolved and will remain open. We request the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection provide comments on this revised recommendation.

(U) Recommendation A.2

(U) We recommend that the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) Director of Intelligence:

- a. **(U) Train, with coordination from the Chief of Security Forces, Chief of Nuclear Operations Division, and Air Force Office of Special Investigations Region 5, leaders from units that store nuclear weapons, including squadron commanders and antiterrorism officers, on available intelligence and counterintelligence support.**
- b. **(U) Designate a dedicated intelligence support element at the major command level that provides tailored support to all USAFE units that store nuclear weapons.**
- c. **(U) Improve interaction between nuclear units and intelligence organizations, including those at wings. Consider establishing forums (conference, secure video teleconference, or webpage) for analysts and agents to share concerns, observations, and lessons learned with other nuclear units.**
- d. **(U) Improve submission and processing of nuclear units' nominations for collection and analysis requirements in support of priority intelligence requirements.**
 1. **(U) Assist nuclear units in developing their priority intelligence requirements. Annually review nuclear units' priority intelligence requirements and validate the status of requested collection.**
 2. **(U) Solicit units' intelligence needs and assist in developing requests for information, production requests, and collection requests that increase all-source analysis of the threat (to overcome deception).**

e. (S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) U.S. Air Forces in Europe Commander Comments

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) Our Response

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) U.S. European Command Comments

(U) DOE (b)(3)

[Redacted]

(S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Recommendation A.3

(U) We recommend that the U.S. Air Forces in Europe Chief of Nuclear Operations Division, with coordination from the Director of Intelligence and the Chief of Security Forces, revise USAFE Instruction 13-210, "USAFE Nuclear Enterprise," December 24, 2014, to:

- a. (S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
- b. (S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
- c. (S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) USAFE Commander Comments

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) Finding B

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

- (U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

- (U) Units that stored nuclear weapons did not formally request tailored products; and

- (U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1)
1.4(a)(f)(g)


[REDACTED]

(U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(U) According to Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, intelligence should be disseminated in such a manner that it is readily accessible by the user. Dissemination occurs using either the “push” or “pull” method, as shown in Figure 6.

(U) Figure 6. Dissemination of Intelligence
(UNCLASSIFIED)



(U) Source: JP 2-01.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

(U) The push concept allows higher echelons to disseminate intelligence to satisfy existing lower echelon requirements or to relay other relevant information. The intelligence that is pushed is sometimes based on the specific unit's intelligence requirements. If organizations push relevant intelligence quickly, it can save units' time. For example, an intelligence organization might e-mail threat reporting on a terrorist group to units near that group. By pushing this information to the units near the threat, those units do not have to be actively searching for the report. Another example of push dissemination is a covering agent calling an ATO with urgent threat information.

(U) The pull concept requires consumers to find and access products created by intelligence organizations at all levels from databases, intelligence files, or other repositories. One example is a user performing a web-based search on a classified network to find relevant intelligence products and reports. The timeliness can depend on how frequently units are searching in the right place.

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(U) We verified through our visits to USAFE units that stored nuclear weapons that the units received some relevant intelligence products automatically. However, many of the most relevant products the units received were produced annually or even less frequently. These are the "Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment" (NSTCA),

(U) produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Department of Energy (DoE); the local threat assessment (LTA) for the unit's installation, prepared by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI); and the "Theatre Nuclear Threat Assessment" from the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Joint Theatre Surety Management Group.⁴⁵ These periodic products are required by DoD, Air Force, or USEUCOM issuances.

(S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

⁴⁵ (S) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

⁴⁶ (U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

⁴⁷ (U//FOUO) OSDJS (b)(3)

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM
(b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1)
1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1)
1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

⁴⁸ (U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

(U) AFI 14-119 requires wing-level intelligence components to:

- (U) provide relevant intelligence to subordinate units, including geographically separated units and units without intelligence capability;
- (U) establish and document procedures for providing intelligence products and services to force protection customers;
- (U) periodically publish and disseminate an accession list to force protection customers incorporating all new, incoming force protection and terrorism reference materials; and
- (U) actively solicit force protection customer feedback to improve intelligence support processes, products, and services.

(U) JP 2-0 states that evaluation and feedback must occur continuously throughout the intelligence process and as an assessment of the intelligence process as a whole. JP 2-0 also requires consultation with intelligence consumers to determine if intelligence requirements are being satisfied.

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1)
1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1)
1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1)
1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM
(b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1)
1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1)
1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI
(b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

⁴⁹ (U) This course was formerly named the Force Protection Intelligence Course, and is now two weeks long. It is the same course that designated intelligence analysts and officers attend to become certified to provide intelligence support to force protection. Other students who attend are security force personnel who have been assigned to serve as the intelligence officer for their security force squadron, with duties very similar to those of ATOs at geographically separated units.

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

⁵⁰ (U) We further discuss this incident in Appendix B (Examples of Threats).

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S//FRD//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

⁵¹ (U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3) [Redacted]

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e); DIA (b)(3)
[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

[Redacted] This situation also illustrated why units remain dependent on AFOSI, as covering agents were more accessible and responsive to these units.

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

[Redacted] In July 2017, the senior intelligence officer drafted a standard RFI form and stated that an e-mail distribution list had been created so that subordinate units could send completed RFI forms by classified e-mail. Although this is a positive development, the senior intelligence officer's initiative needs to be fully integrated into unit procedures, sustained, and used by unit leaders.

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

⁵² ~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

- ~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
- ~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
- ~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1)
1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
- ~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
- ~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

- ~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
- ~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
- ~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
- ~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

⁵³ (U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)
[Redacted]

⁵⁴ (U) Units subordinate to USAFE send RFIs to the USAFE A2 level to be entered into COLISEUM.

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e) [Redacted]
[Redacted] The senior intelligence officer described the road show as visits to units by wing intelligence analysts. These visits could provide an opportunity to train ATO personnel and gather units' intelligence needs. However, we were unable to verify that they had occurred.

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Conclusion

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) Management Comments to Finding B and Our Response

(U) U.S. Air Forces in Europe

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

- ~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

- ~~(S//PRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) U.S. Air Forces in Europe Inspector General

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Additionally, the USAFE noted in response to Recommendation B.3.A that it is outside the policy and authority for USAFE IG to inspect OSI [AFOSI] units and that OSI units are inspected by OSI IG. USAFE recommended adding language that states: "(U) HQ USAF OSI/IG should consider developing similar measures to assess AF OSI support."

(U) Our Response

(U) We acknowledge the USAFE IG's proactive response in inserting recommended inspection items into the USAFE Supplement to 90-201 and including the USAFE A2 in the IG inspection team.

(U) We also acknowledge that it is outside the USAFE IG's authority to inspect AFOSI; therefore, we agreed to revise Recommendation B.3.a to clarify the intent of the recommendation. Therefore, we revised the recommendation to the USAFE IG to develop and implement controls to periodically check and assess how units that store nuclear weapons request, use, and provide feedback on intelligence and counterintelligence support, including for any products releasable to host nation.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments and Our Response

(U) Recommendation B.1

(U) We recommend that the Headquarters Air Force Director of Security Forces send antiterrorism officers for geographically separated units that store nuclear weapons to the Intelligence Support to Force Protection Course at Joint Base McGuire–Dix–Lakehurst, New Jersey.

(U) Air Force Chief of Staff Comments

(U) The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, responding for the Chief of Staff, disagreed with the recommendation stating that major commands have the ability to send ATOs to the course as they see fit. The Directorate of Security Forces (A4S) will not levy that prescriptive measure.

(U) Our Response

(U) As a result of management comments, we redirected Recommendation B.1 to the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) Director of Security Forces and renumbered it as Recommendation B.4.

(U) Recommendation B.2

(U) We recommend that the USAFE Director of Intelligence assist wings with geographically separated units that store nuclear weapons in leveraging local and theater intelligence and support in accordance with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-119:

- a. **(U) Establish and deliver a minimum standard of training for unit antiterrorism officers to obtain intelligence, including access to theater and wing intelligence websites and databases, subscription to specific products, and training to use systems to search for intelligence. Consider staff assistance visits or a conference to provide sustainment training.**
- b. **(U) Provide and annually update a list of relevant websites for antiterrorism officers to use.**

- c. (U) Assist with methods to improve use of intelligence.
 - 1. (U) Ensure that an effective request for information system is fully implemented, explained, and sustained so units that store nuclear weapons know what they can request and how to request relevant intelligence support tailored to their needs, including products that are releasable to host nation partners.
 - 2. (U) Ensure that the wing's intelligence flight implements an effective system to solicit, collect, and respond to feedback on products to improve support to subordinate units that store nuclear weapons.

(U) USAFE Commander Comments

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d), USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Recommendation B.3

(U) We recommend that the USAFE Inspector General, with assistance from the USAFE Chief of Security Forces and Director of Intelligence:

- a. (U) Develop and implement controls to periodically assess how units that store nuclear weapons request, use, and provide feedback on intelligence and counterintelligence support, including for any products releasable to host nation.**
- b. (U) Provide the DoD Office of Inspector General a summary of actions taken in response to this recommendation within 6 months of the publication date of this report.**

(U) USAFE Commander Comments

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Recommendation B.4

(U) We recommend that the USAFE Director of Security Forces send antiterrorism officers for geographically separated units that store nuclear weapons to the Intelligence Support to Force Protection Course at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, or similar training program.

(U) Management Comments Required

(U) The recommendation was redirected based on input from the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, regarding the command that could effect the implementation. It has been renumbered from B.1 to B.4. This recommendation is considered unresolved and open. We request that the USAFE Commander provide comments 30 days after receipt of the final report.

(U) Finding C

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Process to Tailor the Threat Capabilities Assessment to the Local Environment

(U) The DoD Nuclear Weapon Security Program manual, DoDM S-5210.41, states that the NSTCA provides a baseline assessment of adversary capabilities for units to use in developing a nuclear weapon security plan. The NSTCA should explain various methods by which an adversary could attack a nuclear weapon environment or attempt to gain unauthorized access to a weapon; however, the NSTCA does not address local variables, such as terrain, infrastructure, or weather. The adversary capabilities, tactics, and courses of action assessed in the NSTCA are used to develop and tailor the localized TCA.

(U) DoD Guidance on Localizing the Threat Capabilities Assessment

~~(S//REL to USA, NATO)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) According to DoDM S-5210.41, for units outside the continental United States, the Threat Assessment Core Group, which tailors the NSTCA, must involve host nation counterparts. Threat Assessment Core Group membership should include at least one member with experience in intelligence warning, indications, and threat analysis. In addition, one member should have experience in cyber security.

(U) DoDM S-5210.41 requires the Military Departments to develop threat assessment review and approval procedures as part of the localization of the NSTCA. The manual states that, at a minimum, the flag officer is responsible for approving deviations to security criteria and conducting threat assessment reviews.

(U) Threat Assessment Process Used by Units in USAFE

~~(U)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e), (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(U) The 2013 version of the "Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Manual," which implements DoDM S-5210.41, provides Air Force guidance on localizing the TCA, including directing USAFE units to use the "Theatre Nuclear Threat Assessment" and to publish threat assessments as a separate annex to integrated and security defense

⁵⁵ ~~(U)~~ OSD/JS (b)(1) 1.4 (a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) plans.⁵⁶ The Air Force manual also states that after unit commander (as applicable) approval, the completed assessment should be routed through command channels for review by the commander of the major command. An appendix on the format of the localized TCA also provides guidance on approvals:

~~(S//PRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//PRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

⁵⁶ (U) AFMAN 31-108.

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) Supervision and Review of the LNSTCAs

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) The 2013 version of the “Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Manual” recognized that some units that store nuclear weapons did not have resident expertise to use when localizing their TCA. The 2013 manual also described how Air Force units should route local TCAs for approval. However, this language was removed in the 2017 version, as

⁵⁷ ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

⁵⁸ ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) shown in Table 2. In our exit conference with Headquarters Air Force, a commander who updated A4 Nuclear Surety issuances told us that the language was removed because Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-101 already contained such language. However, AFI 31-101 does not address nuclear weapon security.

(U) Table 2. Comparison of 2013 and 2017 Versions of Air Force Manual 31-108

(UNCLASSIFIED) AFMAN 31-108, Vol 1 (March 7, 2013)	AFMAN 31-108, Vol 1 (June 15, 2017)
If localizing the threat assessment requires a particular needed skill set that is not locally available, then the Installation Defense Working Group (IDWG) will exercise its reach back capability to obtain the needed skill set.	Removed.
After [unit] commander (as applicable) approval, route the completed assessment through command channels for MAJCOM commander review.	Removed.
Before commander approval the IDC [Integrated Defense Council] or [unit] IDWG will review the threat, vulnerability, and risk assessments to validate linkages to the [integrated defense plan]. MAJCOMs [USAFE] will review and validate unit threat, vulnerability, and risk assessments against their respective security plans to ensure the [nuclear weapon security standards] can be met.	Removed. (UNCLASSIFIED)

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) Conclusion

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) Management Comments to Finding C and Our Response

(U) U.S. Air Forces in Europe

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

- ~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

- ~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

- ~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation C.1

(U) We recommend that the Air Force Director of Security Forces:

- a. **(U) Evaluate U.S. Air Forces in Europe’s approach to reviewing localized threat capabilities assessments to ensure that they meet the requirements of the DoD “Nuclear Weapon Security Manual.”**

(U) Air Force Chief of Staff Comments

(U) The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, responding for the Air Force Chief of Staff, disagreed with the recommendation stating that USAFE is already compelled to comply with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-101, which regulates annual reviews of threat assessments.

(U) Our Response

(U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

However, we recommended that the Air Force Director of Security Forces review USAFE's oversight process of the lower level units' localized threat capabilities assessments based on the lower level units' lack of intelligence and cyber expertise. We were not recommending the Air Force Director of Security Forces to review the lower level units' process for writing localized threat capabilities assessments. Therefore, this recommendation is unresolved and remains open. We request that the Air Force Director of Security Forces provide additional comments on how the command plans to review USAFE's oversight process of the lower level units' localized threat capabilities assessments.

- b. (U) Revise Air Force Manual 31-108, "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual," June 15, 2017, to improve responsibilities and guidance on how units support, develop, and review the localized threat capabilities assessments, and how intelligence gaps identified in the localized threat capabilities assessment process are addressed.**

(U) Air Force Chief of Staff Comments

(U) The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, responding for the Air Force Chief of Staff, agreed with the recommendation stating that AFI 31-101 regulates the development, review, and analysis of threat assessment in order to identify current, evolving, and forecasted integrated defense challenges/gaps to determine integrated defense reaction. A4S will assign language to AFMAN 31-108 directing units to AFI 31-101.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff addressed all aspects of the recommendation. This recommendation is resolved, but remains open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the update to Air Force Manual 31-108 accurately reflects the changes to the USAFE Supplement to 90-201.

- c. (U) Provide the DoD Office of Inspector General a summary of actions taken on this finding within 3 months of the publication of this report, including the dates of completion or anticipated dates of completion. Send courtesy copy to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters).**

(U) Recommendation C.2

(U) We recommend that the U.S. Air Forces in Europe Inspector General, in coordination with the USAFE Chief of Security Forces, improve inspection and review procedures to ensure that units that store nuclear weapons use required expertise outlined by DoD Manual S-5210.41, Volume 1, "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual: The DoD Nuclear Weapon Security Program," October 25, 2016, when developing the localized threat capabilities assessment.

(U) Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe Comments

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) U.S. European Command Comments

(U) DOE (b)(3)
[Redacted]

(U) Finding D

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

⁵⁹ (S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

(U) Versions of the NSTCA at the Secret Classification Level and Their Use

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[REDACTED]

~~(U//DCNF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e), (b)(3); DIA (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

⁶⁰ (U) DIA (b)(3)

⁶¹ (U) DIA (b)(3)

⁶² (U) DoD Manual S-5210.41, Volume 1, "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual: The DoD Nuclear Weapon Security Program," October 25, 2016, page 25, paragraph 4.3.b.

⁶³ (U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DIA (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.7(e)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//FRB)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) Conclusion

~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(1)
1.4(c), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) Management Comments to Finding D and Response

(U) U.S. Air Forces in Europe

(U) Although not required to comment, the USAFE Deputy Commander, responding for the Commander, provided the following comments on the finding. The Deputy Commander's response to Finding D stated that DIA (b)(3)

USAFE A2 will engage with DIA to establish this as a formal requirement.

(U) Our Response

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation D.1

(U) We recommend that the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters) revise DoD Directive 5210.41 to establish requirements for the Defense Intelligence Agency to:

- **(U) produce a Secret version of the “Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment,” and**
- **(U) produce a Secret version of the “Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment” that is releasable to North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners.**

(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters) Comments

(U) The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense agreed with the recommendation and offered that language being added to the DoD Manual S-5240-41 will be reviewed at least annually and updated as necessary and tailored to incorporate existing and emerging threats to U.S. nuclear weapons. DIA (b)(3)

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary addressed all specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the new policy includes the addition of the requirement for DIA (b)(3). We expect receipt no later than October 1, 2018.

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from December 2016 through December 2017 in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objectives.

(U) The scope of this evaluation did not cover the physical security of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe or weapons storage vaults. We did not discover any evidence that the systems for security were not working adequately to protect nuclear weapons. However, we present findings and recommendations to improve the intelligence and counterintelligence support that commanders need to inform decisions.

(U) We interviewed representatives from the offices of the:

- (U) Joint Staff,
- (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
- (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and
- (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters).

(U) We interviewed subject matter experts from the:

- (U) Defense Intelligence Agency,
- (U) U.S. Transportation Command,
- (U) U.S. European Command,
- (U) U.S. Air Forces in Europe,
- (U) Joint Intelligence Operations Center Europe Analytical Center,
- (U) Air Force Office of Special Investigations,
- (U) Air Force A2 (Intelligence), and
- (U) Air Force A10 (Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration).

(U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, the DoD Office of Inspector General issued one report related to intelligence support for the protection of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Two additional reports, from 2008 and 2010, offered information that was applicable to this evaluation. These reports are classified. To obtain a copy, submit a Freedom of Information Act request with the report number to foiarequests@dodig.mil.

(U) DoD OIG

(U) Report No. DODIG-2016-125, "Evaluation of DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance" (September 19, 2016)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Report No. 10-INTEL-13, "Sustaining the WS3 Security Storage System" (September 30, 2010)

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Report No. 08-INTEL-03, "Review of Threat Assessment Guidance Regarding Nuclear Weapons Located Outside the Continental United States" (March 20, 2008)

~~(S)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) Appendix B

(U) Examples of Threats

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
 USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

- (S//FRD//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
- (S//FRD//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//FRD//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(S//FRD) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
 AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S//FRD//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

⁶⁵ (U) Discussed in Finding A and its recommendations.

⁶⁶ (U) Discussed in Finding B and its recommendations.

⁶⁷ (U) OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) Details of the May 2017 Incident

(S//FRD//NF) OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//NF) OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//NF) OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

⁶⁸ (U) OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

⁶⁹ (S//NF) OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

⁷⁰ (S//NF) OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

⁷¹ (S//NF) OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

⁷² (U) OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); DIA (b)(3)

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); DIA (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

⁷³ (U) OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)

⁷⁴ (U) OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DIA (b)(3)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Unit Concerns

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

⁷⁵ ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

⁷⁶ (U) OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)
[Redacted]

⁷⁷ (U) DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)
[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

(U) Implications for Intelligence and Counterintelligence Support

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
[Redacted]

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a),
(b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a),
(b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//REL NATO)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1)
6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//REL NATO)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3);
USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

⁷⁸ (U) Discussed in Finding A and its recommendations.

⁷⁹ (U) Discussed in Finding C and its recommendations.

⁸⁰ (U) ~~OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)~~

⁸¹ ~~(NATO RESTRICTED)~~ OSDJS, DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)
- ~~(S//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) Unit Concerns

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//FRD)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~(S//FRD//NF)~~ OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) 6.2(a), (b)(3); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(U) Incursions by Protesters

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) Implications for Intelligence and Counterintelligence Support

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(S//NF) OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)

[Redacted]

(U) Management Comments

(U) Headquarters Air Force A4 Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

19 Apr 18

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: HQ USAF/A4
1030 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1030

SUBJECT: Response to DoDIG Draft Evaluation of Intelligence Support to Protect U.S.
Nuclear Weapons in Europe (Project No. D2017-DISPA2-0065.000, 21 Feb 18)

Thank you for the opportunity to provide a response to D2017-DISPA2-0065.000. Our management comments in response to the recommendations include the following:

(U) *Recommendation A.1.* We recommend that Headquarters Air Force Director of Security Forces, with coordination from Headquarters Air Force Director of Intelligence and Inspector General, update AFMAN 31-108, "The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Manual," June 15, 2017, and AFI 31-101 "Integrated Defense," July 5, 2017, to:

a. (U) Assign the Headquarters Air Force Director of Intelligence as lead to ensure intelligence support for all Air Force units that store nuclear weapons and designate specific support responsibilities for this lead and for Major Command intelligence organizations.

COMMENT: (U) AF/A4 concurs with comment. (U) AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, the cornerstone policy for defending installations, already captures roles and responsibilities for AF/A2 (1.6.1), AFOSI (1.6.5), MAJCOM/A2s (1.6.9), tenant units and supported components (1.6.14), and GSUs/dispersed sites (1.6.13). A4S will add language in AFMAN 31-108 directing units to AFI 31-101 for guidance on intelligence support in defense of assets. ECD: 1 Jun 2018.

b. (U) Designate specific responsibilities for Air Force Office of Special Investigations.

COMMENT: (U) AF/A4 concurs with comment. As articulated in our response to Recommendation A.1.a., these responsibilities are already outlined in AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, and will be referenced in AFMAN 31-108.

c. (U) Assign responsibilities for commanders of units that store nuclear weapons to levy separate requirements on both Air Force Office of Special Investigations and intelligence organizations.

COMMENT: (U) AF/A4 non-concurs. (U) EUCOM's supplement to DoDM 5210.41, ^{OSD (b)(1)} _{1.7(e)} already articulates those responsibilities. (5-9 Intelligence Support).

d. (U) Create control measures to ensure that nuclear units' priority intelligence requirements, collection requirements, and intelligence requests for information are submitted, tracked, and processed through Major Commands' Directors of Intelligence.

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Headquarters Air Force A4 Comments (cont'd)

2

COMMENT: (U) AF/A4 non-concurs. AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense, captures roles and responsibilities for AF/A2 (1.6.1), AFOSI (1.6.5), MAJCOM/A2s (1.6.9); it is beyond the role and responsibility of AF/A4S to dictate how MAJCOM/A2s create control measures to ensure nuclear units submit priority intelligence and collection requirements and to determine how those requirements are subsequently tracked and processed.

e. (U) Require units that store nuclear weapons to simultaneously discuss threats with both intelligence organizations and Air Force Office of Special Investigations agents prior to vault operations to fuse intelligence and consider all available information. Consider using the intelligence fusion cell model for an in-person or secure conference call discussion prior to meetings with host nation.

COMMENT: (U) AF/A4 non-concurs. AFI 31-101 already addresses responsibilities of both intelligence organizations and AFOSI to provide appropriate ground intelligence to threat working groups and fusion cells. MAJCOMs and subordinate units already have the responsibility to conduct pre-operational planning and conduct meetings of intel-fusion cells or threat working groups, virtual or face-to-face, as they deem appropriate.

(U) Recommendation B.1. We recommend that the Headquarters Air Force Director of Security Forces send Antiterrorism Officers for geographically separated units that store nuclear weapons, to the Intelligence Support to Force Protection Course at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey.

COMMENT: (U) AF/A4 non-concurs. Within a base defense squadron, primary responsibility for intelligence support to force protection resides with the SFS/S2 and commanders may already send those personnel to this course as allocations are available. AF/A4S will not levy an additive training requirement on installation ATOs when each MAJCOM may already send their respective personnel to this course as they deem appropriate.

(U) Recommendation C.1. We recommend that the Air Force Director of Security Forces:

a. (U) Evaluate U.S. Air Forces in Europe's approach to reviewing localized Threat Capabilities Assessments to ensure they are meeting DoD Nuclear Weapons Security Manual requirements.

COMMENT: (U) AF/A4 non-concurs. It's beyond the role, responsibility, and capability of the AF/A4S to assess U.S. Air Forces in Europe's approach to Threat Capabilities Assessments. While we can assess whether they are conducting the assessment or not, the approach would be developed locally between intelligence and AFOSI personnel and evaluated through U.S. Air Force's in Europe's Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit and Nuclear Surety Inspection process.

b. (U) Revise Air Force Manual 31-108, "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual," June 15, 2017, to improve responsibilities and guidance on how units support, develop, and review the localized Threat Capabilities Assessments, and how intelligence gaps identified in the localized Threat Capabilities Assessment process are addressed.

COMMENT: (U) AF/A4 concurs. AFI 31-101 regulates the development, review, and analysis of threat assessments in order to identify current, evolving and forecasted integrated defense

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Headquarters Air Force A4 Comments (cont'd)

challenges/gaps determine integrated defense reaction. A4S will add language to AFMAN 31-108 directing units to refer to AFI 31-101 for guidance.

3

In summary, the Air Force appreciates the efforts of the DoD IG to improve intelligence support to force protection. Please direct questions to my point of contact, [REDACTED] Chief, Nuclear Systems Security Branch, [REDACTED]

BRIDGES.TIMOTHY.K Digitally signed by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DN: cn=TIMOTHY.K, o=[REDACTED]

Date: 2018.04.19 17:57:29 -0400

TIMOTHY K. BRIDGES, SES
Asst DCS/Logistics, Engineering &
Force Protection

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters) Comments



NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

~~SECRET//FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA//NOFORN~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3050 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3050


MAR 20 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE AND
SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Response to Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Report "Evaluation of
Intelligence Support to Protect U. S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe," (Project No.
D2017-DISPA2-0065.000) (U)

(U) As requested, we are providing a response to subject document (TAB A). You
requested a security classification review of this report to verify that we have marked
information properly and responded to your report recommendation.

DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)




(U) We portion-marked each paragraph in the report consistent with the information
contained in each paragraph. We recommend the addition of a statement similar to the following
statement, placed prominently within the cover memo:

(U) ~~(S//FRD)~~ Although certain portions of this report on its own are
unclassified, by compilation and due to the subject matter, it is prudent to
treat all the information within this report as SECRET//FORMERLY
RESTRICTED DATA//NOFORN prior to any declassification or
Freedom of Information Act requests."

(U) Additionally, you recommended "the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear Matters revise DoD Directive 5210.41 to establish requirements for the
Defense Intelligence Agency." Our language for DoD Manual S-5210-41, currently ready to
enter formal DoD coordination, is:

DOE (b)(3); DIA (b)(3)



UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachments


~~SECRET//FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA//NOFORN~~

(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters) Comments (cont'd)

~~SECRET//FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA//NOFORN~~

DOE (b)(3)

(U) Thank you for the opportunity to comment and provide feedback. If you have any questions, please contact me at ~~DoD OIG (b)(6)~~ or ~~_____~~.



Peter Panta
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Nuclear Matters)

Attachment:
As stated

~~SECRET//FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA//NOFORN~~

(U) U.S. European Command Comments

DOE (b)(3)



(U) U.S. European Command Comments (cont'd)

OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



(U) U.S. Air Forces in Europe Comments



CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCES AFRICA

27 Mar 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS

FROM: DEPUTY COMMANDER, USAFE-AFACRICA

SUBJECT: USAFE Non-Concur on DoD Inspector General (IG) Report: Evaluations of
Intelligence Support to Protect US Nuclear Weapons in Europe

OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1)
1.4(a)(f)(g)

2. (U) BACKGROUND INFORMATION:


OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1)
1.4(a)(f)(g)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) U.S. Air Forces Europe in Comments (cont'd)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c), (b)(3); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)




~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) U.S. Air Forces Europe in Comments (cont'd)


~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

OSDJS (b)(1) 1.4(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f); DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3); AFOSI (b)(1) 1.4(c)(d); DIA (b)(1) 1.4(c); USEUCOM (b)(1) 1.4(a)(f)(g)



e. (U) Ref IG report B.3.A, it is outside the policy authority for USAFE/IG to inspect OSI units. OSI units are inspected by OSI/IG. Recommend adding language that states: "(U) HQ USAF OSI/IG should consider developing similar measures to assess AF OSI support."

4. My POC for this response is the USAFE-AFAFRICA/A2, [REDACTED]


TIMOTHY G. FAY
Major General, USAF
Deputy Commander

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

AB	Air Base
ABW	Air Base Wing
ACO	Allied Command Operations
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirement (lowercase in text)
DASD(NIM)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters)
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOE	Department of Energy
FRD	Formerly Restricted Data
DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)	
HAF	Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)	
JAC	Joint Intelligence Operations Center Europe Analytic Center
JP	Joint Publication
DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)	
LNSTCA	Local (or Localized) Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment
LTA	Local (or Localized) Threat Assessment (lowercase in text)
DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)	
DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)	
DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)	
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOFORN	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NSTCA	Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirement (lowercase in text)
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces in Europe
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
DOE (b)(1) 6.2(a), (b)(3)	
UDCNI	Unclassified DoD Controlled Nuclear Information

Whistleblower Protection U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman's role is to educate agency employees about prohibitions on retaliation and employees' rights and remedies available for reprisal. The DoD Hotline Director is the designated ombudsman. For more information, please visit the Whistleblower webpage at www.dodig.mil/Components/Administrative-Investigations/DoD-Hotline/.

For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

Congressional Liaison

703.604.8324

Media Contact

public.affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

For Report Notifications


www.dodig.mil/Mailing-Lists/

Twitter

www.twitter.com/DoD_IG

DoD Hotline

www.dodig.mil/hotline



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE | OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22350-1500
www.dodig.mil
Defense Hotline 1.800.424.9098