




Experimentation in Support of DoD's Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept

BY PROFESSOR BERT B. TUSSING

On 23 and 24 September 2008, the Center for Strategic Leadership hosted a “Limited Objective Experiment” (LOE) in support of the validation and refinement of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept (HD-CS JOC). The event was the fourth in a series that envisions a total of 12 such experiments, all designed to help describe how Joint Force Commanders will conduct and support operations in this regime eight to twenty years in the future. Previous LOE’s were hosted and facilitated by the National Defense University and the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security. The last two experiments have been hosted and conducted by CSL at Collins Hall.

Each of the four experiments has had a specific focus surrounding the development of the future JOC. The first LOE, conducted in June 2007, was centered on Unity of Effort in the federal interagency community, addressing particularly the need for a national level plan to integrate and coordinate efforts among those agencies. LOE 2 was conducted in Monterey, California, and focused on the Lines of Effort currently associated with the JOC—Detect, Deter, Prevent, Defeat and Support. That forum was asked to validate whether or not those lines of effort fulfill the foreseen requirements for the Joint Force Commander in homeland defense and civil support. Immediate feedback from that LOE, particularly from representatives outside of DoD, indicated that that was not the case with regard to the Department’s requirement for Civil Support. Accordingly, a separate “excursion” of select representatives from across the interagency was convened in Colorado Springs to take a closer look in determining the line(s) of effort required toward that end.



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The third LOE was directed towards examining risk management methodologies (RMM) appropriate for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. Participants were charged with characterizing an RMM that identifies and prioritizes effects and capabilities, guides current risk mitigation efforts, and evaluates prior risk mitigation activities for the future Joint Force Commander. The LOE was not, however, intended to develop a single, recommended RMM for concept developers, nor to develop specific definitions in a lexicon. Rather, the intent was to describe desired characteristics and elements of an RMM, allowing concept developers maximum flexibility in incorporating other relevant documents and efforts with the experiment results when addressing Risk in future versions of the JOC.

LOE 4’s issue was equally complex: trying to contribute to the discernment of a future path for attaining unity of effort within the military component of the DoD’s Total Force. Acknowledging ahead of time the vital role filled by DoD civilians and contractor support, the organizers nevertheless wanted to focus this experiment specifically on the military’s active component, its reserve component, and, within that reserve component, the National Guard. In


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addressing the same, over forty participants from around the country convened at Collins Hall, including representatives from Northern Command (NORTHCOM); the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM); the Joint Staff; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs; the National Guard and the National Guard Bureau; the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserves; the United States Army Corps of Engineers; the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force Staffs; the Training and Doctrine Command and Forces Command; the Marine Corps Combat Development Center; the Naval Postgraduate School, the National Defense University, the Naval War College and the Army War College; the Center for Strategic and International Studies; the Rand Corporation; and others.

In helping to set the stage for discussions that were to follow, presentations were offered on the purpose of Joint Operating Concepts in general and the HD-CS JOC in particular; the future Joint Operating Environment for which the JOC is designed; the framing construct for the HD-CS JOC experimentation process; and the legal authorities which currently direct our operations in homeland defense and civil support. With those briefs as prelude, the forum was divided into three workgroups under the facilitation of Professors Jim Kievit, Jef Troxell, and Bert Tussing, all of the U.S. Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership.

The workshops were asked to consider how the uniformed component of the future Total Force could improve unity of effort—in terms of effectiveness and efficiencies—in planning, resourcing and executing homeland defense and civil support missions. Towards that end, the participants were asked to consider whether any of the DoD uniformed components possessed characteristics that are better-suited for the planning and execution of future HD-CS missions; to provide insights into what changes to the Total Force are warranted to improve unity of effort for those purposes; and, given the demands and potential demands of civil support, to examine the potential impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the DoD if the Total Force components organize, train and equip for Civil Support missions.

A number of interesting observations and recommendations surrounding “warranted changes” came out of the workshop discussions, representing a wide diversity of opinions. In terms of the active component, one set of recommendations called for returning its focus back to the “core competencies” of fighting and winning our nation's wars, leaving the civil support mission to the reserve components. A completely different strain of thought suggested that the active component should focus more on acquisitions that were of “dual use” and interoperable with civil authorities for response and recovery operations. Building upon that notion, the workshop group suggested that the active component might consider establishing a dedicated civil support force, realizing that this, in turn could well call for an increase in end strength. Another working group called for retaining the current mission focus outlined in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (Conventional Campaigns, Irregular Warfare, and Homeland Defense). Concurrently, however, this group proposed the development of a staff directorate at NORTHCOM that would mirror



the civil structure designed for the National Response Frameworks Emergency Support Function (ESF) for Emergency Management. Across the board, participants held that steps needed to be taken to increase liaison and interaction between the active component and the National Guard.

Specific recommendations were also submitted for warranted changes in the service reserves. All three workshop groups recommended expanding mobilization authorities of the Reserves for civil support operations, not only in response to terrorist attack, but likewise in response to natural disasters or catastrophes. Making the service reserve and the National Guard together, one workshop group floated the notion of consolidating those forces in separate land and air components, with the land force absorbed into the states' National Guard, and the

air component folded into the U.S. Air Force Reserve. Whether or not that consolidation was adopted, the group contended that the entire reserve component be recognized as a standing “operational reserve,” and that current policy be adjusted to reflect that status. By extension, there was a call for functional area reorganization of this operational reserve, optimizing it for both the domestic and OCONUS missions.

As for the National Guard itself, a number of warranted changes were recommended. Significant discussion was invested by one group to aligning/realigning Command and Control (C²) for civil support operations. Several participants called for increased training for “dual status commanders,” allowing for “efficiencies and effectiveness” in preparing for and executing missions with combined Title 10/Title 32 forces. Others called for developing a State “coordinating authority” for regional, multi-state missions such as those currently being executed along the nation’s southwest border, or those that may be required for a catastrophic natural event that transcends states’ borders. One set of participants returned to a frequently heard theme of shifting the National Guard’s focus away from conventional campaigns, in order to prioritize its role in civil support and emergency preparations. And offering a reversed image of the previously cited recommendation for the active component, some participants called for the creation of a National Guard Civil Support command.

In addition to all of these, there were recommendations for warranted changes beyond the components to the Total Force itself. Acknowledging the development of the new CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (and ensuing plans for two other such forces), members of the forum suggested that the force be organized, trained and equipped to be an “all hazard” Civil Support Response Force, with a charter well beyond the constraints implied in containing and mitigating the effects of a weapon of mass destruction event. Participants noted a requirement for strengthening command, control, cooperation and coordination capabilities between the components, the interagency, and state and local government. In light of the same, they recommended that NORTHCOM develop a Common Operational Picture (COP) mechanism that can be integrated into the extant and developing operations and fusion centers in both federal and state jurisdictions. Members of the workshops called for increasing training and exercise opportunities across all elements of the Total Force, and in concert with their civil sector counterparts when available. These proposed exercises could take place either physically, virtually, or constructively, subject to needs and the intent of the players. Multiple workshop groups pointed to an immediate requirement to enhance “asset visibility” between the active and reserve components, in order to identify strengths and weaknesses in preparing for and responding to disaster. And in expanding upon the “Total Force” concept, one workgroup suggested exploring the development of a “home guard” force, building upon the capabilities that currently reside in the various states’ militias, and dedicate those forces as a component of the civil support mission.



Members of the forum pointed to a number of potential benefits to be gained by implementing elements of the recommendations cited above, and others introduced in the course of the LOE. Greater proficiency and tighter focus in civil support missions were to be derived from the recommendations calling for dedicated forces from both the active and reserve components—organized, trained and equipped for the task. Increased familiarity with civil component counterparts would automatically ensue from pursuing training, education and exercise opportunities with the same. In the process, uniformed and civil responders would develop vital relationships that could pay massive dividends in times of actual crises. Response times in crises would be reduced across the Total Force on the strength of a more frequent and directed association between the components in planning and exercising homeland defense and civil support scenarios. Improved asset visibility would also result in more rapid response times, and may provide an opportunity for reduced redundancies in a resource constrained environment. In total, the synergy provided from dedicated units and resources, joint and interagency exercises, and situational awareness born of a common operational picture will result in swifter execution, expedited recovery, and faster reconstitution of committed forces.

At the same time, the participants were equally aware of potential costs commensurate with these proposals. A recurring theme in the conference surrounded concerns over a reduced focus on the expeditionary warfighting mission. Participants also pointed to the inevitability of greater competition for resources across the range of military

operations that would accompany the dedication of organizations and infrastructure for civil support requirements. Some members of the forum believed this competition could extend beyond DoD to encompass other agencies and organizations involved in domestic response. Over time, they held that this could result in a reduced urgency for these other stakeholders to develop their own capabilities towards these ends. In light of the Quadrennial Defense Review's imperative addressing the requirement for our armed forces to build capabilities among our partners—in this case, our interagency and intergovernmental partners in homeland security, homeland defense, and civil support—the continued dependencies accompanying this reduced urgency is antithetical to the Department's concept of national security.

The preceding, of course, is only a sample of the observations and recommendations that came out of the workshops' discussions. The depth and breadth of the exchanges that took place over two days between the subject matter experts gathered in Carlisle can only be represented in an article of this sort. The final analysis report on the LOE, however, will be released in the month of October. That report, along with the reports from the first three LOE's, will be made available for examination through the Center for Strategic Leadership's Issue Papers (accessible at <http://cbnet/orgs/usacsl/IPapers.asp>).

*This and other CSL publications may be found on the USAWC/CSL web site at:
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/IPapers.asp>.*

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DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT JOINT OPERATING CONCEPT
EXPERIMENTATION IN SUPPORT OF DOD'S HOMELAND

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