

**PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE:
DISCERNING FACT FROM FICTION**

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FOREWORD

Partnership for Peace was truly a concept born into intense controversy. Even before it was formally adopted at NATO's January 1994 Summit in Brussels, there was no shortage of pundits lining up to critique it and predict its failure. Subsequent events have shown "PfP" to be far from a "failure." Currently, a total of 21 nations have signed Partnership Agreements with NATO, to include Russia.

This success notwithstanding, serious challenges remain to be overcome before Central and Eastern European security concerns and NATO expansion can be reconciled. The authors of this study, therefore, analyze and assess PfP from the perspective of the political realities which govern NATO. They counter the critics of PfP with an analysis of its exact provisions. Moreover, by drawing on the Alliance's historical record regarding expansion, they argue that PfP is the best and most realistic means available to resolve the prickly issue of NATO enlargement. The authors do not ignore existing and potential shortcomings in PfP and specify where conceptual, as well as practical, problems will require the Alliance's immediate action.

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Introduction.

The January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels could arguably be called one of the most important, if not momentous, meetings in the Alliance's history.¹ Labeled privately by some only a few months prior to its convening as "a summit without a theme," the subsequent meeting proved the pessimists incorrect and once again reinforced NATO's relevance.² The Alliance endorsed a common approach toward future political and military integration of its former adversaries to the East ("Partnership for Peace"-PfP, in NATO parlance). This includes a framework for conducting future military operations between NATO and the militaries of partnership countries. Moreover, the Alliance accomplished these far reaching agreements while maintaining consensus that NATO will continue to function as a collective defense, vice collective security, organization. Hence, far from being moribund, the Alliance demonstrated its contemporary vitality by adopting a policy which could well expand its membership at some future date, as well as providing a practical means to assist in that process.

As is usually the case whenever national leaders confront important issues, these efforts have been subjected to widespread and vigorous criticisms. Some detractors complained that the Alliance's initiatives were too strongly influenced by the Clinton administration's anxiety over Russian, and Boris Yeltsin's, rather than Central and East European concerns.³ Others faulted NATO's refusal to extend immediate security guarantees and membership offers to reforming states in the east.⁴ The lack of a stated timetable for membership of partnership countries also troubled some former officials and commentators.⁵ Conversely, others feared expansion would dilute NATO and transform it from a collective defense body into a collective security organization.⁶ Outside the Alliance, summit results did not fulfill the expectations of many Eastern European leaders, who still find their individual and collective security concerns far from resolved.⁷

These arguments are not altogether without merit. If nothing else, the Alliance can be accused of having disappointed many states to its east as regards the prospect for future membership. However, it is still too early to pass definitive judgment on the success or failure of the PfP initiative. Moreover, these criticisms fail to place the program in its proper context. The purpose of the essay, therefore, is to assess PfP comprehensively. This paper provides a broader understanding of the workings of NATO and the immensely difficult challenges it faces in conducting cooperative relations with former adversaries in Eastern and Central Europe.

Partnership for Peace.

Before assessing PfP, it is instructive to examine its

actual provisions. The NATO Heads of State and Government formally announced the initiative at the January Summit in the form of the "Partnership for Peace: Invitation," and an accompanying annex "Framework Document," dated January 10, 1994.⁸ The immediate objective of this cooperation program is to identify where and how the Alliance could assist in transforming the respective military establishments of partners (e.g., training, exercises, planning, doctrine) into forces better capable of operating alongside those of the Alliance.⁹ The Invitation lists the general direction of the program and its intended goals. Interestingly, participation is open not only to members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), but to all Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) members (i.e., to the neutral and nonaligned states of Europe). The Framework document elaborates specific technicalities associated with PfP membership. In general, subscribing states agree to:

- facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting;
- ensure democratic control over their armed forces;
- maintain the capability, subject to constitutional limitations, to contribute to military operations under the authority of the UN and/or CSCE;
- develop cooperative military relations with NATO, i.e., joint planning, training and exercises with the aim of strengthening the ability to participate in peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations and possibly other missions; and,
- produce military forces better able to operate with those of NATO's members.¹⁰

Subscribing states begin the detailed procedure of engaging in the PfP process by identifying, in conjunction with Alliance partners,¹¹ the steps they intend to take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership, as well as specific military or other assets to be employed. Subsequently, NATO and the partner jointly develop a proposed program of exercises and activities, tailored specifically for each partner. To coordinate, support, and implement their cooperation program, subscribing states can establish (at their own expense) liaison offices at NATO Headquarters, as well as second liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell located "at Mons," which will be responsible for creating and implementing the complementary Combined/Joint Task Force (C/JTF) program.¹²

Countering the Critics: PfP in Perspective.

The onus is firmly on NATO to overcome bureaucratic inertia, establish internal and external terms of reference, and ensure that PfP evolves in a manner that will enable NATO to meet its objectives. That said, critics must first remember that the Alliance is made up of 16 sovereign states. Finding consensus on any major issue inevitably results in compromise. Second,

maintaining unanimity on an issue of such import as expanded membership on a large scale is a significant undertaking that will require considerable time for national positions to evolve to the point where consensus can be reached within the Alliance. Third, observers must recognize that before that consensus can be achieved, current NATO members must gain legislative approval as required by their individual democratic practices. Criticisms of PfP must be viewed in light of these constraints.

Deference toward Russia. Given residual Russian power, potential instability within Russia, and the importance that the United States and its allies place on maintaining cordial and stable relations with Moscow, it is only logical that Russia would loom large in Alliance decision making concerning membership expansion.¹³ Clearly, deference to Russian sensitivities helped shape PfP.¹⁴ But this is little more than a recognition of the political and security realities of post-Cold War Europe and does not diminish the value of PfP. The key point is not whether Russia will influence NATO expansion, but whether Russian concerns can be accommodated without giving Moscow *droit de regard* (right of inspection)¹⁵ over the integration of new members or NATO policies. This obviously requires the Alliance to maintain a delicate balance among the complex and competing security demands of *all* nations in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, despite its compromise nature, (as will be argued in greater detail below) the provisions of PfP must, by necessity, walk a fine line between understanding Russian concerns and alienating Central and Eastern European nations, and accommodating Central and East Europeans at the risk of isolating Russia.¹⁶

Indifference toward Central and Eastern Europe Security. The Alliance has been criticized for not immediately offering security guarantees to certain Central and Eastern European states.¹⁷ Left unanswered, however, are a number of critical questions. First, to whom shall the Alliance offer such guarantees? Does the Alliance truly want to offer guarantees to the Baltic States, the Transcaucasian Republics, or the new nations of Central Asia, all of which are geographically separated from the Alliance? Second, how does NATO offer membership to some and not others without drawing a new dividing line across Europe?¹⁸ Those offered membership will be convinced that they are among the first tier nations, and conversely, those not immediately offered membership may feel alienated and resentful. Thus, NATO runs the risk of creating the perception of "neo-containment" if certain nations, particularly Russia, are not among those initially offered membership.¹⁹ Finally, what "guarantees" should be offered?

Indeed, criticism of the Alliance's "failure" to offer immediate membership displays a singular lack of understanding of the Alliance and how it operates. Joining NATO is neither a simple nor quickly effected task. The historical record shows that admission to NATO usually follows a long and complicated process of negotiations first among NATO members to reach consensus on expansion and then between the Alliance and candidate state. This historical experience will undoubtedly

shape its current approach to enlarging membership. Indeed, the two historical examples of expansion after 1951 provide pertinent guidelines of how, and how not, to proceed.

Spain's accession to the NATO in 1982 and the subsequent negotiations that clarified Spain's military role in the Alliance offer an example of why membership details need to be worked out well prior to the commencement of formal negotiations. Spain acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty in May 1982, but without a clear delineation of its role within NATO's integrated military structure. Initial negotiations on Spain's military role took place until October 1982, when the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) won control of the government. Elected, at least partially, on an anti-NATO platform, negotiations stalled for over 3 years while the new government struggled to define its policies toward the Alliance.²⁰

After a national referendum (March 1986) endorsed Spanish membership in NATO, the Gonzalez government articulated the "General Principles of the Spanish Participation in NATO."²¹ Negotiations on military cooperation resumed, but not until November 1988 did NATO's Military Committee (MC) approve "The Guidelines to develop Coordination Agreements between the MNCs [Major NATO Commands] and the Spanish Military Authorities" that would be used to develop six coordination agreements governing Spanish military participation. NATO's Defence Planning Committee endorsed the last two of the coordination agreements in October 1992, 10 years after Spain joined the Alliance.²²

The result of this decade-long endeavor is that Madrid is effectively responsible for the defense of Spain, its air defense and maritime approaches.²³ This is not to argue that the Alliance gained nothing in return. Certainly, NATO membership more securely anchored Spain into the Western European system, and the Alliance gained greater strategic depth in the event of a Soviet conventional assault on Western Europe; acquired a strategic rear area for the reception, storage, and staging of supplies, equipment, and forces; and obtained a base of naval operations to choke off Soviet maritime access.²⁴ However, when conducting a cost-benefit analysis, especially considering the lengthy negotiations required to achieve such minimal results, one might conclude that Spain is a "security consumer," and that the Alliance would prefer to avoid similar results with partnership countries.

The case of the Federal Republic of Germany provides a example of how better to extend NATO membership, particularly to a former adversary. Many may not be aware of or recall the extensive and sometimes bitter debates that took place within NATO which eventually led to the decision to arm the Federal Republic and make it a member of the Alliance.²⁵ While painful and at times divisive, these debates served the key purpose of establishing consensus about the future course of the Alliance. As a result of these consultations, the United States committed, in peacetime, forces for the defense of Europe; the United Kingdom likewise made a "Continental Commitment," and, less positively, the first concrete proposal to create a European defense identity, the European Army, was defeated.²⁶

Perhaps more importantly for this discussion, these debates and subsequent agreements set the conditions for German membership in NATO. These stipulations were quite detailed: they limited the size of German ground, air, and naval forces; prohibited the Federal Republic from manufacturing atomic, chemical, or biological weapons; precluded West German production of long-range missiles, guided-missiles, or naval influence mines; limited the size of naval vessels; prohibited German possession of strategic bombers; and imposed limits on heavy artillery, tanks, or armored personnel carriers, to name a few of the provisos.²⁷ These stringent limitations and the amount of detail reflect European fears of a Germany rearmed less than a decade after the end of World War II. Certainly, the degree of anxiety posed by most former Cold War adversaries will not approach the levels of 1950-55, and that level of rigorous detail may not be required. But, the German example offers insights that would help guide the incorporation of new members from Central and Eastern Europe.

Finally, the German example reveals the efficacy of arriving first at *internal* consensus within the Alliance for expanded membership, which those who advocate an immediate expansion to the east fail to recognize as an essential element of membership enlargement. The rationale for this precondition is simple politics. It makes no sense for the Alliance's heads of government and state to initiate serious negotiations for membership with candidates if there is internal political opposition within the Alliance or within an individual member state.²⁸ Offering membership before internal consensus can be achieved (either within a specific country or within the Alliance, as a whole) could result in stalling an unwanted membership or having to withdraw a membership offer already tendered—a condition fraught with considerable risk.²⁹

While it is true that there is strong support among *some* political leaders in *some* of the NATO countries for expanded membership, it is by no means widespread. An excellent example of this phenomenon can be found in the Federal Republic of Germany. Federal Minister of Defense Volker R  he has argued strenuously for NATO to extend membership to Poland.³⁰ Whether the *Bundestag* would ratify a treaty containing Polish membership in NATO is questionable.³¹ Polish membership in NATO effectively means a German military commitment to defend Polish territory against a potentially nuclear-armed Belarus or Ukraine. Given the record of historical and recent difficulties between Poles and Germans,³² it is difficult to see how consensus on Poland's immediate inclusion into the Alliance could be found in the Federal Republic, let alone within the rest of the Alliance. Thus, while R  he may be absolutely correct to argue this point, and indeed in subsequent years his admonishment of NATO could be seen as farsighted statesmanship, considerable obstacles must be overcome before Poland, other Visegrad states (which include Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia), or a Soviet successor state, can be admitted into NATO.

Recognizing that full membership may not be appropriate at this moment, other commentators, to include former U.S. defense

official Richard Perle and a RAND Corporation study group, have urged NATO to offer some form of "associate" membership to assuage the security anxieties of Central and East European nations.³³ None of these pundits, however, have adequately delineated exactly what constitutes less than full membership in a *collective defense* treaty organization: either a state *has* reciprocal security obligations or it *does not*.³⁴ Furthermore, the stipulation within the PfP invitation that "NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security,"³⁵ sounds essentially like the very "associate membership" status with which many of these states and critics find fault.³⁶

Nor may it be in the best interests of NATO or the states of Central and Eastern Europe to enter into some form of associate status. Such arrangements could arguably have negative repercussions, to include stifling reform efforts in these countries, encouraging extremists to press for the radical resolution of ethnic problems or providing a false sense of security.

Failure to Offer Membership Criteria or Timetables. Despite complaints to the contrary, NATO membership criteria are available. That is, they are clearly spelled out in the 1949 Washington Treaty.³⁷ Additionally, the PfP Invitation document sets out more detailed guidance on steps states can take to meet these criteria.³⁸ Nor, given the practical problems associated with preparing for membership, is the criticism of failure to provide a timetable a valid one. Each potential member possesses unique circumstances that influence its ability to prepare for the *responsibilities*, as well as privileges, of NATO membership. To design one timetable that would meet the singular conditions of each country is not a reasonable demand. Indeed, a key strength of PfP is that its self-paced nature allows individual states to set the tempo for fulfilling membership criteria.

Given the Alliance's history, it is specious to argue that PfP states can only be considered for membership in the Alliance once they attain Western levels of military sophistication and possess model democratic institutions.³⁹ But, in light of the fact that geopolitical exigencies of the Cold War no longer exist, states should not expect NATO to waive strict adherence to democratic standards as it sometimes did in the past. Moreover, few would argue that most potential partnership states need to reform themselves and that the lure of NATO membership provides a strong incentive for them to make the hard, but necessary decisions to institute fundamental changes in their countries. This may be of little condolence to current applicants, particularly the Visegrad states, but it is a political reality that they must recognize.

Partnership for Peace: Its Shortcomings.

Conceptual Imperfections. Despite the detailed provisions outlined in the PfP invitation, several significant conceptual shortcomings in the program require resolution. First, just as

NATO has attempted to forestall the "renationalization" of its members' defense policies, it has likewise urged its PfP partners not to renationalize their own defense structures. However, the slow approach toward expansion eastward and the failure rapidly to integrate Central and European states into the NATO *collective* security system could leave some of these countries little choice other than to nationalize their defense structures to a greater degree than they or NATO desire. Clearly, PfP must focus on preventing such an eventuality. Consequently, this may require earlier and greater transparency in NATO planning and programming procedures than initially envisaged. More importantly, NATO may have to accelerate integrated planning in some cases to ensure that certain partner states integrate their security programs more quickly than some in NATO originally anticipated.

Second, as pointed out in a report by the North Atlantic Assembly, NATO must also consider how to combine PfP efforts with practical cooperation.⁴⁰ For instance, how can elements of collective defense (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty) be integrated with aspects of collective security (Article 4) within PfP missions?⁴¹ Efforts toward this end could become extremely important in the future, especially in preparing the Alliance and its partners to defuse regional crises before they become violent. Resolution of this conceptual gap between Article 4 and Article 5 will require the Alliance to make difficult decisions about its future purpose and its relationship with the east, if NATO will be prepared to address these complex challenges before they lead to intractable crises.

Third, it will be some time before the current weaknesses of partner states will not constitute a potential problem for the Alliance. At present, immediate external threats are not the primary challenge to regional stability in Central and Eastern Europe. Instead, weak economies; lack of familiarity with democratic and market principles and practices; and ethnic, nationalist, religious, and cultural tensions contribute to instability throughout the region. Given the extent of these difficulties and the serious obstacles facing reform efforts in some states, considerable time may be required to overcome these challenges. More importantly for the purposes of this essay, PfP cannot resolve these weaknesses.⁴² The Alliance must recognize that military modernization and an integrated European security system may be meaningless unless economic restructuring to market economies and creation of democratic political institutions are successful. Thus, the security aspect must be blended into a holistic approach with other international institutions (i.e., the European Union) to overcome the inherent weaknesses in many Central and Eastern European states.

Finally, the concept of "pay to play" in PfP may need to be reviewed.⁴³ Because "pay to play" forces states to demonstrate their seriousness toward internal reform and their desire to join NATO, it comprises an essential element of these programs. However conceptually sound this principle may be, the fact remains that even the more economically developed of these countries (i.e., the Visegrad states) are finding it difficult to squeeze already scarce resources to finance these efforts.⁴⁴

Moreover, given the immediacy of manifesting NATO's sincerity about achieving tangible cooperative results, "pay to play" may need to be revisited or implemented in a "creative" manner. Acceptance of the need to resolve this problem leads to a number of difficult questions. First, who should receive financial assistance, what are the priorities (thereby creating a multitiered hierarchy of "partners," with its inherent problems), and how much should be expended? Second, given that discretionary funding is all but nonexistent in NATO, from where will the funds come? Third, how does the Alliance avoid placing Central and Eastern European partners in direct competition with NATO states along the Southern Tier for already scarce development resources? Finally, what constraints should the Alliance place on the expenditure of such funds?

One possible solution to these conundra is for NATO states, on a bi- or multilateral *but coordinated basis*, to provide financial assistance. This money could be in the form of grants or loans, but preferably in the form of matching funds that would continue the process of self-selection, since partner states would still be required to provide up front funding of their programs. At the same time, such a procedure would avoid the perception of favoritism. Regardless of the method adopted, NATO officials need to keep in mind that rigid adherence to "pay to play" could severely obstruct the ability to achieve the program's overall goals.

Practical Obstacles. Additionally, several practical hurdles *within* the Alliance need to be resolved. For example, the implementation of PfP has not been spared traditional intra-Alliance disputes. NATO has a long history of tension between NATO Headquarters and its principal Major NATO Command, SHAPE. This condition stems from the normal tension between political and military bodies, but is exacerbated within the Alliance because of long-term French apprehension that the powers and prerogatives of SACEUR, especially, lack sufficient political control and oversight.⁴⁵ Nor have the strains between Brussels and Mons been limited to traditional "political-military" issues, but have included such fundamental questions of whether "military" decisions are to be made by the Major NATO Commanders (SHAPE by the SACEUR or ACLANT by SACLANT) or by the Military Committee in Brussels.⁴⁶

Although they may seem unimportant, a number of "minor" bureaucratic issues also need to be resolved to ensure that the spirit of PfP is not smothered by red tape. For instance, the invitation to Partnership states to establish liaison offices at NATO Headquarters and second liaison officers to the Coordination Cell at "Mons" have apparently been delayed while NATO authorities ascertain how "pay to play" is to work. Alliance and Belgian officials must also determine the exact status of personnel from partnership states residing in Belgium (e.g., do these personnel acquire diplomatic status? Do they fall under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement or are other provisions required? What is their tax status?). While these issues may appear small, they can delay implementation of PfP and C/JTF. Such delays, especially over what many Central and East European states

consider trivial issues relative to the stated importance of PfP, send the wrong signals to Partnership states, particularly to the program's detractors in the East. Considerable political oversight at the highest level may be needed to force the bureaucratic pace of events.⁴⁷

PfP's Attractions.

Its conceptual and implementation shortcomings notwithstanding, PfP potentially can result in significant benefits to NATO's partner states, as well as to the Alliance itself. Despite the fact that states in Central and Eastern Europe did not receive the security guarantees that they desperately crave, they did receive as much "security" as they could logically expect under the prevailing political conditions. And, because nations deal individually and directly with NATO under PfP, discussions under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty could be conducted at 16 plus 1, as opposed to being limited to the larger NACC or CSCE consultative fora. This ability to consult unilaterally with the Alliance, in itself, underscores NATO's concern for the security of the specific partner. Moreover, as partners develop a deeper relationship with NATO through their individual programs, they will become ever more entwined with Alliance affairs. Indeed, a perhaps unintended-but critical-eventuality of PfP may be that partner states will progressively become bound so close to NATO that the Alliance will be committed *de facto* to the security of the partner.

From the perspective of partner states, PfP offers specific criteria that they must fulfill if they aspire to membership in the Alliance. More importantly, through the development of individualized programs, PfP offers the mutual cooperation and support that will facilitate achieving these goals. These criteria apply not only in the security field, but will also contribute to the integration of the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe into the European economic system.

Another advantage of PfP is that it allows nations to proceed at their own pace. While this may seem trivial, it is, in fact, one of the strengths of the program. It clearly makes little sense to treat Visegrad states similar to, for instance, former-Soviet republics in Central Asia. PfP offers a measured program that will help ensure that these financially-weak nations do not exceed their fiscal limitations as they strive to adapt their security architectures and militaries to western models.

Through the joint development of programs between NATO and individual partner states, PfP offers a way to prevent a complete nationalization of defense structures within Central and Eastern Europe. Those states committed to NATO membership will take the steps necessary to develop their military and security organizations to conform with the NATO model, which, it should be recalled, has been highly successful in precluding the renationalization of defense within Western Europe. Partnership programs also offer the opportunity to move subscribing states to cooperative defense measures that will, over time, prepare them for the responsibilities inherent in the NATO system of

collective defense.

Lastly, from the perspective of partner states, PfP provides an important coordination mechanism for the reform of Central and East European militaries. Although cooperation programs will be designed individually, PfP allows the Alliance to coordinate these separate efforts. This offers a twofold advantage. One, it allows NATO to "deconflict" the various country programs and ensure that the Alliance can coherently support individual programs in the most efficient and efficacious manner. Two, this mechanism can be used to foster cooperation between states that might otherwise be unwilling to move in conjunction with one or another of their neighbors with whom they may not have always enjoyed close relationships.

For NATO, PfP has strong practical advantages and attractions. By offering an invitation to all CSCE members, no nation in Europe is excluded from the process, unless it chooses to be. Thus, NATO avoids being forced into the position of determining *who* among all of Europe will be the *first* offered membership. Nor can the Alliance be accused of favoritism or of drawing a new discriminatory curtain across Europe by fostering a policy of "neo-containment." The decision whether to join falls clearly on the shoulders of the individual states, not on the Alliance.⁴⁸ This provision applies particularly to the former Soviet republics, especially Russia. Despite the volume of Russian complaints and criticisms about the development of PfP, even they cannot escape the logic of the self-selection process and have finally acknowledged that they will participate in the program.⁴⁹

The potential prospect for the traditionally neutral and nonaligned in Europe to participate in PfP and, perhaps, join NATO could also further European stability. PfP holds the prospect to integrate into NATO the developed neutral states of Sweden, Finland, Austria, and possibly even Switzerland. Indeed, as a right of passage for their membership in NATO and participation in PfP, the Alliance should insist that these states themselves participate fully in assisting reforming states to the East. Not only are these countries currently financially capable of such action, many of them already have special bilateral relationships with eastern states (e.g., Austria with Hungary, Finland with Estonia, etc.) which NATO should exploit.

PfP also takes positive steps to reassure Central and East European states about their security concerns and offers guidelines for subscribing states to follow in their pursuit of NATO membership. From a practical perspective, achieving these goals will take time; time that NATO needs. The Alliance can use this breathing space to consider how these states (many of which are former adversaries who have not yet rid themselves of the last vestiges of the Communist regimes) can be fully incorporated into NATO's integrated collective defense, to include access to sensitive NATO information.⁵⁰ NATO also needs time to ponder the repercussions of extending membership invitations, continue internal debates over the many issues surrounding enlargement, and arrive at consensus on when and how to offer membership to states that have demonstrated a clear commitment to democratic

principles, human rights, and market economies, and have achieved their PfP objectives.⁵¹

PfP, therefore, offers NATO a needed interval to ascertain how it can bridge the gap between the existing and proven system of collective defense and an as yet to emerge collective security system for Europe. This is no easy task and, as recent events throughout Europe and the rest of the world amply illustrate, it is not going to get any easier. Careful thought will have to be devoted to this issue to ensure that the most successful collective defense organization in history is not accidentally dismantled or degraded.

Conclusion.

When considering the many political pressures for expansion and the conceptual and practical shortcomings of PfP, the Alliance faces considerable obstacles as it implements its new policy of cooperation with its former adversaries in the east. But, NATO can ill-afford to delay this process. Recognizing that crisis management in the future will be more difficult in a Europe without blocs, the Alliance must begin to address membership and cooperation before events lead to intractable crises. This will require the Alliance to prepare for expansion and not rely simply on rhetoric.

While PfP does not provide a definitive checklist or timetable for membership, it does offer prospective members clear signposts to achieving possible Alliance membership and the means of acquiring assistance to get to that point. However, potential applicants must keep in mind that PfP is a guide to, and not guarantee of, membership. Prospective members will have to demonstrate not only their need to join the Alliance, but also their commitment to Alliance principles and their determination to take the many practical steps necessary to prepare for the responsibilities, as well as the privileges of membership. Clearly, if there is to be any hope of finding consensus within the Alliance to expand membership, prospective members will have to offer something tangible and positive to the Alliance. Given the fact that the mere act of considering expansion eastward constitutes a calculated risk, prospective members will have to make a compelling case, with political and military assets, for inclusion.

The Alliance cannot take a "go slow" attitude toward expansion. The Alliance has a strong interest in ensuring that reforms in Central and Eastern Europe succeed and that responsible nations are fully integrated into existing European and transatlantic political and security organizations. Thus, the onus cannot simply be placed on the reforming states to "bring" themselves up to Western standards. NATO *must* stand ready to help those countries that show a willingness to help themselves. Ineffectual implementation of PfP would not only send the wrong message to reformers and extremists in the east, but also could lead to missed opportunities.

Since immediate extension of membership is not politically feasible, PfP gives the Alliance the necessary time to find

consensus on this difficult problem. This focus on breathing space is not meant to demean the many positive aspects of PfP. It merely recognizes that the Alliance, as well as prospective members, still requires time to digest some of the more important consequences of the end of the Cold War. As recent world events have graphically illustrated, there is a continued need and support for a strong dynamic NATO. It is important, therefore, that the Alliance proceed carefully on the question of enlargement to ensure that we do not get it wrong and contribute to the Alliance's destruction. Conversely, if the question of enlargement is not seriously considered by the membership of NATO and PfP is not successfully implemented, then the Alliance may sow the seeds of its own eventual irrelevance.

ENDNOTES

ENDNOTE TXT = 1. See, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, January 10-11, 1994, Press Communique M-1 (94) 3, Brussels, NATO Press Service, January 11, 1994.

ENDNOTE TXT = 2. For an excellent assessment of the lead up to, and aftermath of the Summit see, Stanley Sloan, "Transatlantic Relations in the Wake of the Brussels Summit," *NATO Review*, Volume 42, No. 2, April 1994, pp. 27-31.

ENDNOTE TXT = 3. "We are now witnessing a policy that places our anxieties about threats of a Russian leader ahead of our commitment to the alliance and to the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe." See Robert Zoellick's op-ed piece in, *The Washington Post*, January 5, 1994.

ENDNOTE TXT = 4. See Paul A. Goble's op-ed piece in, *The Wall Street Journal*, January 26, 1994.

ENDNOTE TXT = 5. "Consider, for example, James Baker, who demands clear criteria and a timetable for those countries that want to join NATO. As secretary of state, the smooth Mr. Baker would never have tied his policy to such a rigid framework." All of these quick-to-the-press criticisms are eloquently refuted by Michael Rühle in, *The International Herald Tribune* (Paris), February 9, 1994.

ENDNOTE TXT = 6. North Atlantic Assembly, International Secretariat, "NATO Enlargement and Partnership for Peace," A: 13 GEN (94) 5, Brussels, February 1994, p. 2; and, Brooks Tigner, "Analysts: Expansion Could Strain NATO," *Defense News*, January 10-16, 1994, p. 8.

ENDNOTE TXT = 7. This is particularly true of the Visegrad countries (i.e., Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary). See, for example *The Washington Post*, January 8, 1994, p. A1; *Army Times*, January 17, 1994, p. 9; and Kossuth Radio Network (Budapest), February 8, 1994, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*-WEU-94-027, February 9, 1994, p. 11.

ENDNOTE TXT = 8. NATO Press Communique M-1 (94)2, January 10, 1994.

ENDNOTE TXT = 9. *Ibid.*

ENDNOTE TXT = 10. *Ibid.*

ENDNOTE TXT = 11. To coordinate implementation of the Invitation, the North Atlantic Council established a Political-Military Steering Committee in January 1994.

ENDNOTE TXT = 12. For a good description of the envisaged workings of PfP see, International Secretariat, *NATO Enlargement and Partnership for Peace*, Information Document AL GEN (94) 5, Brussels, North Atlantic Assembly, February 1994, pp. 6-8.

ENDNOTE TXT = 13. For background on the U.S. administration's position concerning PfP see, *The New York Times*, January 2, 1994.

ENDNOTE TXT = 14. See, for example, Paul Lewis, "U.S. Offers Joint Military Games as Step to Poland's NATO Ties," *The New York Times*, January 8, 1994, p. A1; and David Ottaway, "War Games in Poland Proposed," *The Washington Post*, January 8, 1994, p. A1.

Russian views continue to influence the evolution of PfP. See for example, Craig R. Whitney "NATO Bends to Russia to Allow It a Broader Relationship," *The New York Times*, May 19, 1994, p. A3.

ENDNOTE TXT = 15. Note that the word choice was used by Sergio Balanzino, Deputy Secretary General of NATO at the June meeting of the North Atlantic Council. See, *The New York Times*, June 10, 1994.

ENDNOTE TXT = 16. Note that Central and Eastern European officials have recognized the need to balance their security concerns and the need to maintain cordial relations with Moscow. See Lech Walesa's comments in, *The New York Times*, January 11, 1994.

ENDNOTE TXT = 17. See, for instance, Gary L. Gelpel's piece in, *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 12, 1994, p. 23; *Berlingske Tidende* (Copenhagen), January 31, 1994, in FBIS-WEU-94-022, p. 33; or the arguments outlined in "The Enlargement of the Alliance," Draft Special Report, AL 79, DSC/NE(94)1, Brussels, North Atlantic Assembly, May 1994.

ENDNOTE TXT = 18. As Jeffry Simon has argued in the case of Central and Eastern states, unless extended to all of the Visegrad states at the same time, NATO actions could actually create instability in the region by encouraging divisions. See, Jeffry Simon, "NATO's New Strategic Task: Stabilizing the East," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1994, forthcoming.

ENDNOTE TXT = 19. As argued by then-Ambassador Strobe Talbott in, *The Washington Post*, February 8, 1994.

ENDNOTE TXT = 20. For concise discussions of the internal and foreign policy aspects of Spanish accession and the evolution of Spanish policy toward NATO, see, Emilio A. Rodriguez, "Atlanticism and Europeanism: NATO and Trends in Spanish Foreign Policy," in Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., *Spain's Entry Into NATO: Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988, pp. 55-71; and Antonio Marquina, "Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy Since Democratization," in Kenneth Maxwell, ed. *Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991, pp. 19-62.

ENDNOTE TXT = 21. The nine principles can be found in Marquina, "Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy Since Democratization," pp. 47-48.

ENDNOTE TXT = 22. Lieutenant General Miquel Iniguez Del Moral, "The Spanish Army's Contribution to Europe's Allied Defence,"

NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol. 35, No. 1, February-March 1990, p. 63; and "Endorsement of Spain/MNC Coordination Agreements," *NATO Review*, Vol. 40, No. 5, October 1992, p. 32, respectively.

ENDNOTE TXT = 23. Elements of the Spanish requirements can be found in Moral, "The Spanish Army's Contribution to Europe's Allied Defence," pp. 64-66; Lieutenant General D. Ramon Fernandez Sequeiros, "The Spanish Air Force in the Alliance," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 68-70; and, Admiral Carlos Vila Miranda, "Security Through Coordination-The Spanish Navy's Contribution to the Alliance," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Vol. 37, No. 1/92, pp. 59-62. Note that the Spanish Rapid Action Force is committed to the ACE Rapid Reaction Force. Also, Spain has acted recently to support Alliance activities outside of traditional Spanish defense concerns, for example, Spanish participation in enforcing the NATO "no-fly" zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

ENDNOTE TXT = 24. Glenn Snyder, "Spain in NATO: The Reluctant Partner," in Gil and Tulchin, eds., *Spain's Entry Into NATO*, pp. 141-142.

ENDNOTE TXT = 25. For a discussion of these debates see, for example, Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO's Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain*, Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985, pp. 7-12 and 19-31; and John A. Reed, Jr., *Germany and NATO*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987, pp. 30-46. For a discussion of the debates within Germany over rearmament, NATO membership, and creation of the *Bundeswehr*, see Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988; and Reed, *Germany and NATO*, pp. 47-75.

ENDNOTE TXT = 26. Reed, *Germany and NATO*, pp. 33, 44, and Sloan, *NATO's Future*, pp. 25-27, respectively.

ENDNOTE TXT = 27. These conditions are contained in Protocol No. II on Forces of Western European Union and Protocol No. III On the Control of Armaments, The Brussels Treaty, a copy of which can be found in Reed, *NATO and Germany*, Appendix A, pp. 207-228.

ENDNOTE TXT = 28. This takes on added import when one recalls that accession protocols need to be ratified by parliaments within the constitutional requirements of each member state before accession of a new member can occur. Nor is it readily apparent that ratification would be rapidly forthcoming. For German reluctance, see, *Deutsche Presse-Agentur* (Hamburg), January 10, 1994 in, *FBIS-WEU-94-006-A*, January 10, 1994, pp. 1-2. As David D. Newsom points out, there is no guarantee that Congress would sanction an eastward extension of the U.S. security umbrella. See, "NATO Membership: Handle with Care," *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 26, 1994, p. 23.

ENDNOTE TXT = 29. One need only recall the first Danish referendum on the Treaty on European Union, where a narrow defeat almost derailed the Maastricht Treaty, lead to a flurry of activity that nearly brought down the Major government in Britain and turned a referendum on Maastricht into public vote of confidence on the Mitterrand government that resulted in the Socialists losing control of the French Parliament. For an assessment of these developments in the European Union see,

Douglas T. Stuart, *Can Europe Survive Maastricht?* Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 4, 1994.

ENDNOTE TXT = 30. Federal Minister of Defense R  he first began making this argument in his Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture before the International Institute for Strategic Studies. See, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era, *Survival*, Volume 35, No. 2, Summer 1993, pp. 129-137.

ENDNOTE TXT = 31. Indeed, SPD Chairman Rudolf Scharping has gone on record opposing a policy of expanding NATO too quickly. See, *Deutsche Presse-Agentur* (Hamburg), January 10, 1994 in, *FBIS-WEU-094-006-A*, January 10, 1994, pp. 1-2. Nor is Germany the sole example. As David D. Newsom points out, there is no guarantee that Congress would sanction an eastward extension of the U.S. security umbrella. See, "NATO Membership: Handle with Care," p. 23.

ENDNOTE TXT = 32. Leaving aside the question of historical conflicts between Germans and Poles, even the more recent problem surrounding the implementation of the 1970 Warsaw Treaty between the Federal Republic and Poland manifests continued obstacles to cordial relations. See, Horst Teltschik, "The Federal Republic and Poland: A Difficult Partnership in the Heart of Europe," *Aussenpolitik*, Volume 41, No. 1, 1990, pp. 3-14.

ENDNOTE TXT = 33. "An offer of interim associate membership sufficient to calm understandable anxieties in Eastern Europe would have been appropriate." See, *The New York Times*, January 1994; and Ronald Asmus *et. al.*, "Building a New NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4, September-October 1993.

ENDNOTE TXT = 34. For an excellent explanation of the differences between collective defense and collective security, particularly as regards Europe see, Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe," *Survival*, Volume 34, No. 1 Spring 1992, pp. 36-50.

ENDNOTE TXT = 35. NATO Press Communique M-1 (94)3, January 11, 1994, p. 6.

ENDNOTE TXT = 36. This is particularly true of the Visegrad countries. See, for example, *The Washington Post*, January 8, 1994; *Army Times*, January 17, 1994, p.9; and *Kossuth Radio Network* (Budapest), February 8, 1994, in *FBIS-WEU-94-027*, February 9, 1994, p. 11.

ENDNOTE TXT = 37. See Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty which can be found in *NATO: Facts and Figures*, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989, pp. 376-378.

ENDNOTE TXT = 38. See Annex to NATO Press Communique M-1 (94)2, Partnership for Peace: Invitation, January 10, 1994.

ENDNOTE TXT = 39. As a recent North Atlantic Assembly report argued, however, these requirements are not immutable: "To suggest that certain military 'standards' and 'norms' need to be met before a political decision is made to expand membership is to rewrite the history of NATO itself..." Nonetheless, political exigencies governing and affecting the Alliance will, in the final analysis, dictate who joins NATO and when. See, International Secretariat, "The Enlargement of the Alliance," Draft Special Report, AL 79, DSC/NE (94) 1, Brussels, North Atlantic Assembly, May 1994, p. 4.

ENDNOTE TXT = 40. See, *Ibid.*, p. 8.

ENDNOTE TXT = 41. Provisions of the respective articles can be found in *NATO: Facts and Figures*, pp. 376-377.

ENDNOTE TXT = 42. See, for example, the concerns expressed by Belgian diplomats in "Nation Reported 'Reticent' on NATO Growth," in *FBIS-WEU-94-005*, January 7, 1994, p. 7.

ENDNOTE TXT = 43. See, "Partnership for Peace: Framework Document," point 5.

ENDNOTE TXT = 44. Notwithstanding the principle of pay to play, one authoritative source holds that the Alliance will need to fund between \$15 to \$40 million of the program. Bruce George, "After the NATO Summit," NAA, AL 88, PC (94) 2 (Draft), May 1994, pp. 8-9. Nor is it necessarily in the long-term interests of either the states or NATO for these few resources to be used to fund military establishments.

ENDNOTE TXT = 45. It is interesting to note that not only do the old guard classe politique, so well represented in the Quai d'Orsay, hold that NATO military structures lack sufficient political oversight, but also some of those in France who argue the case that Paris needs to effect a rapprochement with the Alliance. See, for example, the essay authored by a French national working in the NATO International Staff using the non de plume G. Trangis ("Neither Splendid Isolation, nor Reintegration") in, *Le Monde* (Paris), July 14, 1993.

ENDNOTE TXT = 46. For an excellent study of this problem see, Douglas Bland, *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of Structure and Strategy*, New York: Praeger, 1990.

ENDNOTE TXT = 47. NATO authorities are apparently aware of these difficulties and are taking interim measures to ensure that PfP is not hindered by bureaucratic obstacles. See, NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1(94)46, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, June 9, 1994, paragraph 6.

ENDNOTE TXT = 48. Perhaps the most important characteristics of PfP are the provisions for self-selection and self-differentiation contained in the concept. In the words of a recent North Atlantic Assembly report on PfP, the "...concept has elegantly side-stepped the issue [of enlargement] and put in place mechanisms which will facilitate a process of 'self-differentiation' over time for certain interested Central and East European countries." "The Enlargement of the Alliance," NAA Report, AL 79, DSC/NE (94)1, May 1994, p. 4.

ENDNOTE TXT = 49. For background on Russia's "policy" toward PfP see, *The Washington Post*, March 18, 1994; April 1, 1994; May 26, 1994; and, June 9, 1994.

ENDNOTE TXT = 50. The issue of security is not an inconsequential consideration from the perspective of NATO officials. See, *Defense News* (Washington), February 7-13, 1994, p. 1.

ENDNOTE TXT = 51. For a brief, but cogent discussion of the importance of consensus, see Lothar Ruehl, "European Security and NATO's Eastward Expansion," *Aussenpolitik*, No. 2, 1994, pp. 117-119.

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