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Police Units of Peacekeeping Operations

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September 2012

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FOREWORD

When we co-authored the chapter, “As Time Goes By,” *The Expansion of Women’s Roles in Police Work*, in Quint C. Thurman’s *Controversies in Policing* (2004), we were somewhat optimistic about the integration of women into policing. Both of us entered the world of policing in the early years – Dr. Hale as a young academic in the 1970’s, a protégé of Robert Trojanowicz, Director of the well-respected Michigan State School of Criminal Justice, the first such program in the U.S. Ms. Finkenbinder entered policing as a young military policewoman in the 70’s, later transitioning to municipal police.

By 2004, Dr. Hale was a full professor at Shippensburg University and, Ms. Finkenbinder, a recently departed municipal police patrol sergeant, beginning an academic career. We observed that women were no longer a novelty in policing but there were still plenty of obstacles to their full integration. Ms. Anderholt’s research shows us that some things have not changed very much.

This report looks at the obstacles that continue to impact the integration of women into Formed Police Units (FPUs) of Peacekeeping Operations. FPUs are different from the standard UN police unit because they are recruited from a single-member state as a coherent unit, unlike UNPOL members which are recruited and often deployed as individuals. These units are intended to operate in high-risk environments. Because there is a lack of data about women in FPUs, Ms. Anderholt reaches back to the experiences of gender integration in municipal police departments in the United States and compares them with accounts of FPUs or related UN police units.

Her recommendations are consistent with our previous findings; however, the picture may be more optimistic. Modern U.S. Military combat operations have turned the traditional model on its head. In the last ten years, many military women have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in high-risk operations. They have fought and died alongside their male counterparts in operations that have, heretofore, been the purview of their brothers in arms. Increasingly, women soldiers are thrust into “male” roles and are successful. This has not gone unnoticed in the U.S. military, as it continues to open up “combat” positions to women. This paradigm shift may be the force needed to tear down current barriers to the integration of women in FPU’s. FPU’s are considered to be more “tactical” as they engage in such missions as: riot control, crowd management, public safety, protection of UN personnel, evacuations of personnel in extreme situations, convoy protection, facilities protection, and assist local and UNPOL with high risk operations. Military women, proving themselves in combat operations, may unwittingly be the catalyst toward vaulting policewomen over the current barriers to full integration in FPU’s. Hope springs eternal.

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FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN FORMED POLICE UNITS

A Report on the Integration of Women in Formed Police Units of Peacekeeping Operations

Charlotte Anderholt

Introduction

This report examines the obstacles that continue to hamper the integration of women into Formed Police Units (FPUs) of Peacekeeping Operations in accordance with the principles of United Nations (UN) Resolution 1325. To address this topic the study (1) briefly establishes the emerging importance of police units to peacekeeping operations, (2) outlines the key principles of UN Resolution 1325, (3) discusses the need for diversity, especially gender diversity, in police units, (4) discusses the core obstacles to integrating women into police units, (5) offers accounts of the major UN peacekeeping missions that utilized Formed Police Units (FPUs) or their predecessor organizations, and (6) concludes with summary recommendations for improving the integration of women into FPUs.

It is important to clarify that while there is a literature on women in peacekeeping, there are no systematic studies that address the question of women in FPUs. Because of this lack of data, the report compares the experience of gender integration in municipal police forces in the United States with accounts of FPUs or related UN police units and their experience with gender integration. In addition, the narrow question of women in FPUs cannot be separated from the larger

question of the unique vulnerability of women and girls in conflict environments and the equally unique role women and girls play in peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction of civil society. These themes will be discussed as warranted throughout the study.

Finally, there is only now a clearly emerging sense of the definition and purpose of an FPU. The first FPUs were deployed to Kosovo under the UNMIK mission, and to East Timor (UNTAET) in 1999. FPUs are designed to be rapidly deployable, more heavily armed than regular UN police units (UNPOL, formerly CIVPOL), and more capable of independent operations. In short, FPUs are intended to respond to a wide range of contingencies spanning the spectrum of peace operations, but especially to be able to operate in high-risk environments.

What differentiates an FPU from a standard UNPOL unit is that police in FPUs are recruited from a single-member state, and have trained together to operate as a coherent unit. Whereas UNPOL members are recruited individually and often deployed to UN missions as single members, by mandate FPUs cannot be deployed except as a full 120-140 person unit or in the smallest functional subset as a team of 10-12 officers.¹ As a consequence of the increased operational effectiveness achieved through the particular recruitment and training model of FPUs they have generally been used for three high-risk mission-types.

First, FPUs are considered a specialty force for managing public order. Examples of specific public order missions include riot control, crowd management at public assemblies, and the assurance of general public safety during potentially tense events like elections. Indeed, the core of the FPU mission can be thought of as assisting, "citizens to exercise their fun-

damental rights without any disturbance or unjustified hindrance and to prevent assemblies from threatening or actually harming public safety.”²


The second key FPU mission is the protection of UN personnel. This has included evacuations of personnel in extreme situations (post-election Cote d’Ivoire) and convoy protection (Congo). In addition, VIP and general facilities protection (prisons, warehouses, IDP camps, UN compounds) fall under this mission-rubric.³

Finally, FPUs are designed to assist local and UNPOL police with particularly high-risk operations. Such missions include high-visibility patrols (with local police, UNPOL or military peacekeepers) as in Congo, Haiti and Darfur; high-risk arrests; anti-organized crime work or SWAT and hostage negotiation operations. It is also important to note that FPUs distinguish themselves not just by this mission-set, but because they are able to perform the above while maintaining a strict code of respect for human rights law.⁴

Policing in Peace Operations

It has been said that “peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can do it.”⁵ As the list of FPU missions suggests, however, the literal truth of that axiom is increasingly being called into question. It is an emerging tenet of modern peacekeeping that police forces are essential components of effective missions. Police units, in general, offer peacekeepers the ability “to restore public order in the short term, while building law enforcement agencies that are critical for long-term stability”. In states in crisis, UN police units have been crucial in re-establishing the rule of law

either through assistance to struggling host-nation police agencies or, in cases of the outright collapse of national law-enforcement, by replacing them entirely. Police missions are often politically “more acceptable to host governments and citizens” than military operations composed of foreign forces.⁶ Further, FPU’s are significantly cheaper to deploy than regular military units. FPU’s cost around \$5 million to deploy while a battalion-sized military unit can cost up to \$30 million. Finally, the deployment of FPU’s is a way to communicate to affected populations that the conflict is demilitarizing, while still maintaining a credible force presence for active high-risk operations and local police training missions.⁷



Source: Fearon and Laitin, *International Security* 28.4 (2004)

As an activity traditional peacekeeping often has more in common with police doctrine than war-fighting doctrine. For an increasing number of conflicts

this makes a policing framework a more effective approach to peacekeeping than the traditional military framework. Of the 13 UN peacekeeping operations conducted prior to 1988, eight were traditional cease-fire monitoring missions after the cessation of interstate wars and one, Cyprus, was a functional equivalent. By contrast only four post-Cold War missions have been traditional 'Chapter 6' PKOs.⁸ Since 1990 active UN PKOs per year have jumped significantly in number and complexity. Numbering in the high teens, these PKOs go well beyond cease-fire monitoring to include "transitional administration in which the UN takes over some or all day-to-day government of the country or region in question."⁹ Much of the day-to-day governing is related to the provision of public security and thus involves policing.

The numbers increasingly reflect this trend. At the end of 2011 the authorized end-strength for deployed UN police stood at 17,500.¹⁰ This is an eight-fold increase since 1995, with more than 50 FPU's involved in missions in Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur/Sudan, Liberia, Timor-Leste, and Cote d'Ivoire. This represents nearly 20%¹¹ of total deployed uniformed personnel through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).¹²

Unlike with war-fighting where the goal is the defeat of the enemy, the aim of a police force is to enforce compliance with laws in order to protect the civilian population. Further, international police forces do not seek to coerce belligerents into peace, as would third-party military peacekeeping units.¹³ Rather, police units focus on the safety and needs of the civilians in a conflict.

Indeed, UN peacekeeping operations increasingly combine military and police functions and personnel.

They do this in order to establish or strengthen key political institutions, offer emergency aid, clear landmines, set up and monitor elections, and more. In all these functions, credible and effective police units are essential. Because they are more heavily armed than regular UN police units, FPUs act as a key bridging unit between the military component of a peacekeeping mission and lightly-armed, often institutionally weak local police. In 2007, FPUs helped re-establish government control from gangs in Haiti and even helped evacuate civilians caught in gun battles in the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹⁴

Current UN Missions with FPUs

Mission	Number of FPUs	FPU Officers	Total UN Police Component	FPU as % of Total Component
MINUSTAH (Haiti)	16	2,273	3,578	64%
MONUSCO (Congo)	7	889	1,259	71%
UNAMID (Darfur)	16	2,227	5,121	43%
UNMIL (Liberia)	7	846	1,309	65%
UNMIT (Timor)	4	489	1,364	36%
UNOCI (Ivory Coast)	6	952	1,296	73%

Source: *UN Police Magazine*, January 2011

A 2005 report for the Center on International Cooperation put the case for FPUs in simple terms:

Military reinforcements may be helpful in some situations, but not if the security threat is of a lower order - such as criminal violence by armed gangs. In those circumstances, what may be needed is a judicious mix of military and Formed Police Units (FPUs) with care-

fully calibrated rules of engagement, not overwhelming force.¹⁵

Former Under Secretary-General of the UN, Brian Urquhart, asked about the prospect of a UN rapid reaction force, answered:

Peacekeeping is the equivalent on an international scale of what the civil police are on the national. That's fine, as long as everyone cooperates. In a nation-state, if the police can't manage, they call in the national guard. I think something along the lines of an international guard - like armed police acting on a large scale - has got to be introduced into the world society.¹⁶

Urquhart's choice to use a policing metaphor is telling. Peacekeeping may be a soldier's job because the operating environment is often akin to a war zone. But the actual day-to-day work that takes place within that war zone-like environment is closer to police work than soldiering. The biggest reason this is true is that much of the work is investigative and relationship-building in nature. FPU and UNPOL units are composed of members with specific training and experience in investigative and community-based relationship-building work. Military units generally are not. As a result, police units are able to gain the trust of crime victims better because they are experienced with the skills of law enforcement. Whereas military units deployed in peacekeeping operations are essentially being asked to adapt their skills for secondary uses, police units are using their core skills as intended. Conducting and using interviews (as opposed to interrogations), witness statements, and forensic evidence to set up cases for legal prosecution requires a significantly different set of skills than those typically evinced by soldiers.

Though police and military units often share terms of art like 'operation' or 'patrol' it is essential to remember that such similarity is only surface-deep. The object of most military operations occurs at the culmination of unit tactical action, that is, when the use of maneuver and/or weapons is complete. Military operations are generally not planned or conducted with the preservation of evidence or due process in mind. In contrast, police operations accept significant tactical restraints military units generally do not in order to assure due process and preserve evidence.

A police action, such as an arrest, that involves maneuver and/or weapons is only the middle section of a larger operation that began with evidence gathering and will often conclude with legal prosecution. Competency through all phases of police work is essential to developing trust with local populations on all sides of a conflict. "Terrain, maneuver, and weapons aside," it is this credibility of the police force that "is an essential component in establishing an effective buffer," between sides to a dispute.¹⁷ This realization is why policing has become such a priority within the peacekeeping community in recent years. The following sections address why, in addition to professional competency in non-military operations, police credibility rests on its officers' ability to relate to and interact with the diverse population it serves.

Security Council Resolution 1325

The UN has recognized both the unique vulnerability women face in conflict zones and the unique role they can play in the peace process. Resolution 1325, adopted in 2000,

holds a promise to women across the globe that their rights will be protected and that barriers to their equal participation and full involvement in the maintenance and promotion of sustainable peace will be removed.¹⁸

Specifically, the Resolution calls on Member States to:

- “ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels [...] for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict,”
- “urges the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among [...] civilian police,”
- “expresses its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and [...] to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component”¹⁹
- “requests the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on [...] the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures”²⁰

A 2004 report by the Secretary-General’s Office concluded that, “in no area of peace and security work are gender perspectives systematically incorporated in planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting.” It went on to note:

An outstanding challenge is increasing the numbers of women in high-level decision making positions in peacekeeping operations. In the areas of conflict prevention, peace negotiations and post-conflict

reconstruction, women do not participate fully and more needs to be done to ensure promotion of gender equality is an explicit goal in the pursuit of sustainable peace.²¹

Women in FPUs

Mission	FPU Officers	Women FPU Officers	Women as % of Total FPU Officers
MINUSTAH (Haiti)*	2,273	173	7.61%
MONUSCO (Congo)	889	6	0.67%
UNAMID (Darfur)	2,227	64	2.87%
UNMIL (Liberia)*	846	141	16.67%
UNMIT (Timor)	489	5	1.02%
UNOCI (Ivory Coast)	952	0	0%

Source: *UN Police Magazine*, January 2011

* Denotes PKOs with all-female FPUs

Resolution 1325 calls for a process known as gender-mainstreaming. As defined by the UN, gender-mainstreaming is:

The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all spheres, so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated.²²

Gender mainstreaming is not just about women's rights. Rather, it concerns the critical analysis of how gender considerations affect security, reform, reconstruction and, ultimately, the stability of peace in conflict environments.²³ Gender mainstreaming is a holistic approach that seeks to understand how gender perspectives affect the entire peacekeeping process and to integrate those lessons into the UN's operations. (The specifics of how gender mainstreaming improves peacekeeping will be discussed in the subsequent section.)

The risks of not considering gender perspectives are high. As the UN itself has noted about its own experience, gender-blind peace agreements have only partially secured peace in conflict environments. "[UN] programming based on these agreements [...] cannot be considered inclusive. The risk in not having a gender perspective is that the mission will overlook important issues of inclusive security that will jeopardize agreements and threaten the fragile peace."²⁴ In 2010 the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the state of implementation of Resolution 1325. In its summary the Committee concluded that "women must be fully included in the determination of peace in their communities and societies. Despite increased rhetoric and attention to women in conflict, [UN] implementation of this sound notion is lacking."²⁵

Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, in introducing the 50-year anniversary issue of UNPOL magazine, wrote that he was:

Especially pleased that almost ten percent of today's UN police are female, and that the organization's "top

cop” is a woman: Ms. Ann-Marie Orler. We are working hard to ensure that women make up 20 per cent of UN police by the end of 2014.

He continued with a recognition that in accordance with the goals of Resolution 1325 the goal should be full gender parity, but then conceded that even the lesser 20 percent goal would take a “concerted effort”.²⁶

Achieving the goals of Resolution 1325, however, is largely a matter of the political will of individual Member States contributing to FPU’s or other police units. As will be discussed later, the key to integrating women into FPU’s is first integrating them into Member State police forces. Because the obstacles to integrating women into institutions are generally cultural, doing so requires commitment from the highest-level leadership in contributing nations.²⁷

The following section discusses why the broader issues of gender-mainstreaming, to include the integration of women in police units, are key.

Diversity in Policing

It is an already well-established tenet of modern policing that an effective force must reflect the community in which it serves. As the president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police observed:

We have learned that to be effective, police cannot operate alone; they require the active support and assistance of their communities. Central to maintaining that support is the recognition that law enforcement agencies must reflect the diversity of the communities they serve.²⁸

The most important way any police force can begin to reflect the basic diversity of the community it serves is in its relationship to the women of that community. As Mona Eltahawy argues in her account of gender-based violence in *Foreign Policy*, the most vulnerable group in societies across the world, especially in conflict zones, are women. They are always seen as “the cheapest bargaining chips” on the table among parties to the conflict.²⁹

Recent work has further established what the Secretary-General understands: “that advancing the cause of women, peace and security, must be integral to our peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, not an afterthought.”³⁰ Beside the normative argument for incorporating gender perspectives into peace operations, there are three areas where doing so directly contributes to operational effectiveness:

- Information gathering
- Credibility of the Operation
- Force protection

Information Gathering

It is estimated that among internally displaced persons (IDPs) women, children and the elderly make up 80% of the population.³¹ An example of this skewed demographic make-up is Rwanda, where it is estimated a full 70% of the post-genocide population was made up of women and children. A study of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan concluded that outreach efforts to women in addition to the traditional outreach aimed at men yielded a much more nuanced and accurate picture of the social and political operating environment.³²

The Afghanistan study concluded that even when done inadvertently, the incorporation of aspects of gender mainstreaming resulted in significant improvements in outreach, intelligence, and as a result, force protection. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has utilized female engagement teams (FETs) in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These teams develop relationships with the local female population and essentially conduct police 'presence' patrols designed to increase contact with families.

FETs have been able to reach a greater portion of the full population than their male counterparts who are often prohibited from speaking with women due to local custom. Female FET members, by contrast, face no such restrictions and can talk to both men and women in the local population. In addition, through woman-to-woman interactions FETs found that many Afghan women wielded significant influence over male family members. It is this kind of information gathering that makes female integration into FPU's essential for mission success in conflict environments where half or more of the population is female.

Credibility of the Operation

Including women in police units has broad effects on the perceived credibility of PKOs. For example, the all-female Indian CIVPOL unit deployed to Liberia is viewed as more approachable by the local population than counterpart male units. In the limited global studies conducted, compared to male colleagues women police officers in PKOs have been found to:

- have significantly lower rates of complaints of misconduct
- significantly lower rates of improper use of force
- significantly lower rates of inappropriate use of weapons

These studies have also found women police are less authoritarian in interactions with citizens and lower-ranking officers. In addition, women officers respond more effectively to violence committed against women and are more likely to respond to domestic abuse claims.³³

Most importantly women officers are seen as being able to diffuse potentially violent situations without the use of force more effectively than male counterparts. As another study of UN gender mainstreaming in Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Namibia and South Africa found, “Women’s presence improves access and support for local women; it makes men peacekeepers more reflective and responsible; it broadens the repertoire of skills [...] within the mission, often with the effect of reducing conflict.”³⁴ Taken together the effects of including women in police units is to dramatically improve mission credibility.

Force Protection

Including women in police units also has a direct effect on the protection of forces. Experiences in PRTs and FETs in Afghanistan and elsewhere have shown that mixed-gender units are able to work more effectively with local populations and often avoid unnecessary tension as a result. More directly, the greater access female officers have to ‘women-only’ areas of

the home or public spaces has frequently resulted in the discovery of hidden improvised explosive devices (IEDs) secreted in these areas. Indirectly, gender-conscious and gender-sensitive approaches to women in local populations has often revealed that women are not as restricted in the public realm as previously thought. Women who were approached by PRTs or FETs in this way often self-identified with their public function - government official, police officer, or teacher - and expressed their right and interest in being included in political decision-making. Such an expression of rights and interests in public decision-making is itself a goal of Resolution 1325 and a signal that the security environment is stabilizing.³⁵

As these examples show, the effects of including women in all aspects of a PKO are systemic and self-reinforcing. As women become less fearful of engaging in the public life of their communities the overall risk to personnel is decreased and overall mission effectiveness increased.

The next section of the report offers brief case studies highlighting some of the major deployments of civilian police in PKOs, the development of FPU and the emerging focus on the importance of recruiting women to serve as police officers. In addition it documents the absence of women in many police contingents and points toward the difference their presence might have made.

United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)

The first UN police officers deployed with the the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960-64. Ghanaian police were introduced to the mission in a law-enforcement and training capacity for local Congolese police in a way that presaged developments decades later.³⁶ The ONUC mission is notable for the level of force deployed, and is often considered the UN's first "peace enforcement" mission, though this term was not inaugurated until later.³⁷

Ghana supplied only two police companies out of a total of 2,291 troops that deployed to the capital Leopoldville. These were the only police companies deployed as a part of the mission despite the recognition that law enforcement breakdowns were of prime concern:

The urgent problems facing the country such as [...] the absence of a judiciary or magistracy, [...] the disruption of the security organs including the army and the police [...] are matters engaging the constant attention of the civil operations branch of ONUC.³⁸

Despite possessing the highest literacy rate in Africa, Congo under Belgian colonial rule had never systematically educated its citizens past the age of fourteen. As a result there were only thirteen graduates from the national university in the first five years of its operation. Functionally this meant the country was still dependent on its former colonial master for the "brains and technical ability" needed to run its civil administration, security apparatus, and economy.³⁹ The first appeal received by the United Nations from the Congolese prime minister Patrice Lumumba, emphasized the need to "restore order in the ANC (Ar-

mée Nationale Congolaise),” the newly formed, post-independence, national security force, and “stressed the unreliability of the ANC [...] which was totally unable to restore order in Leopoldville, let alone the rest of the country.”⁴⁰

Ralph Bunche, the UN Secretary General’s representative in the Congo, explained to UN force commander Carl von Horn that UN troops had four tasks:

- “maintaining law and order in the Congo”
- “take the place of unreliable ANC troops, curb their undesirable activities, and eventually try to build them up into a reliable force”
- “establish our own freedom of movement throughout the country”
- “be ready to prevent any unilateral interference from outside”⁴¹

As the mission task list indicates, police functions were to be the initial focus for ONUC. Ghanaian police were tasked with maintaining law and order, and providing training to develop a native Congolese police force. This was an essential first task because in the words of von Horn:

Lack of any training and experience almost invariably prevented [Congolese troops] from exercising any real control in the chaotic areas for which they were responsible. In any case, however much they may have wanted to cooperate with us in restoring law and order, the means were simply not there; the civic administration had broken down, their soldiers were unpaid and could not be trusted, and whatever local police there had once been appeared to have vanished.⁴²

Von Horn noted that the arrival of the Ghanaian police companies was badly needed because few if any of the military units in the mission had experience dealing with riot situations worse than, “than a difference of opinion at a soccer match.” When they arrived the Ghanaian police officers almost immediately put on a demonstration of a riot drill that served as lesson to both the Swedish troops in the ONUC mission and the local inhabitants.⁴³

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

Following Cypriot independence in 1960, a series of constitutional crises led to the outbreak of violence between Greek and Turkish communities on the island in December 1963. The UN mission’s original mandate was to:

Use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.⁴⁴

The first organized police “component,” somewhat in the style of future FPUs, was deployed by the UN to Cyprus in 1964 as part of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). To the present day, peacekeeping troops (military and CIVPOL) remain on the island. The term “civilian police” (CIVPOL) was coined as a result of the first addition of non-military police to a peacekeeping mission. Traditionally, military police were “responsible only for conduct and discipline within the larger military units to which they were attached.”⁴⁵ The new breed of civilian police would have

a more prominent role in peace operations; in Cyprus, they were (and continue to be) tasked primarily with monitoring the “green zone,” the buffer zone of cease-fire that extends across the island, as well as with facilitating relationships between Turkish and Greek Cypriot police forces. CIVPOL also assist in investigations and in the Force’s humanitarian activities⁴⁶ and in regular functions including, “patrolling, liaising with the local police, mediating in disputes between local civilians and monitoring and issuing permits for civilian use of the buffer zone.”⁴⁷

One path-breaking development has been the creation of a Joint Communication Room bringing together Turkish and Greek Cypriot police to cooperate and share intelligence in pursuit of criminals. In the early years of the deployment, civilian police numbered up to nearly 200. In the interim, numbers fell to 24 and currently stand at 68, having been bolstered in response to the reduction of UN military troop levels to less than 1000.⁴⁸

United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)

The UN mission to Namibia in 1989-1990 was authorized in order to monitor the peace process and elections after many years of conflict between Namibia and South Africa. Financial considerations meant fewer peacekeeping troops than planned were deployed. This gap was filled in part by the addition of extra police observers.

Civilian police composed the largest element of the mission’s civilian staff, numbering 1500.⁴⁹ This demonstrated an evolution toward a greater use of civilian toward a great use of civilian police personnel as

peacekeepers in missions where the goals of deployment were primarily political (such as election-monitoring) as opposed to the mainly military goals (such as separation of combatants) under classic Chapter 6 PKOs. Although civilian police in UNTAG were not formally recruited or organized as FPUs, the nature of the mission meant that for a significant period of time before the elections they effectively acted as formed units as a result of having worked as cohesive small groups, "travel[ing] throughout the country with over a hundred mobile teams attending some 2,000 registration points."⁵⁰ When this was not the case, the force of 1500 was divided among 49 police stations distributed across the country. In both cases, police were operating in smaller groups than the average contemporary FPU which typically numbers 110-140 officers.

Although not comprehensive - UN-wide policies on gender integration or gender mainstreaming would not be adopted for another decade - UNTAG stands out as as a remarkably gender-conscious mission while still pointing to important areas where gender balance was lacking. High-level staff "made conscious decisions to increase the number of women in the mission and deliberately recruited women for decision-making positions."⁵¹ UNTAG Director Cedric Thornberry noted that "peacekeeping missions have almost always included women but because they have been concentrated in the service sector, their presence has not been recognized."⁵²

However, while nearly 50% of the non-police civilian staff was composed of women, the same did not hold true for the police and military personnel. The number of women in CIVPOL and military components was extremely low and the UN did not start asking contributing countries to send greater numbers of female police until 1994.⁵³

UNTAG was a significant success story for United Nations peacekeeping. It was a relatively brief mission, lasting just over one year, and came in well under even its reduced budget. In an organization that was just beginning to look beyond relying solely on military structures and formations for peacekeeping, the international civilian police officers deployed to Namibia “adopted an international outlook and joined with United Nations men and women from over a hundred different countries to help create an environment in that war torn land for the holding of free and fair elections.”⁵⁴

The success of UNTAG cannot be attributed directly to the gender balance of its staff, as there are other important factors, such as its clear and limited mandate. But the high percentage of women involved in the mission may well have contributed to the unusual level of support the UN mission received from the parties involved in the conflict. The mission’s success also reflected a step toward a new kind of peacekeeping, where the gender balance among mission staff, though primarily civilian and not military, more accurately reflects the situation on the ground. That is, that women represent approximately 50% of any society.

Unfortunately, the lessons learned in Namibia had not yet been thoroughly integrated when the UN was again called upon to provide civilian police, this time in the former Yugoslavia:

The positive experience of transforming Namibia into an independent state and the intensive role of the UN in this historic mission had no immediate effect on the orientation and the body knowledge of the UN, and thus the apparatus remained for a time that of a peacekeeping orientation with old [military-style] patterns of operation.”⁵⁵

United Nations in the former Yugoslavia

The evolution toward FPU's continued in 1998 with the creation of the Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU) established by NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Civilian police were deployed in numerous missions in this region throughout the 1990s, including the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UN-MIBH) with 2000 police organized as the International Police Task Force (IPTF); the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with over 800 police throughout the former Yugoslavia; the UN Civilian Police Support Group (UNCPSG) with 114 police in Croatia; the re-organization of UNPROFOR into the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) with 26 police; and the UN Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) with nearly 300 police, with UN Peace Forces (UNPF) staff headquarters in Zagreb. Taking lessons from all of these experiences, the UN established Special Police Units (SPUs) as a component of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) from the outset. At its creation in 1999 UNMIK was authorized to deploy up to 4718 police personnel, to include Formed or Special Police Units as well as border police, although it took a number of years to build up to full strength. By 2012, 7 police officers remained.

When first deployed into areas of the former Yugoslavia where local police had been disbanded, had departed, or were not capable of fulfilling necessary duties, UN police units "were responsible for undertaking regular policing duties including restoring and maintaining law and order."⁵⁶ In the absence of direct references to armed peacekeeping missions in the UN Charter, peacekeeping has traditionally been consid-

ered a "Chapter VI 1/2" action, meaning it falls somewhere between "the pacific settlement of disputes" as described in Chapter V and those "dealing with enforcement measures" as described in Chapter VII.⁵⁷ The manner in which civilian police and specifically Formed Police Units were used in the former Yugoslavia represents an evolution toward greater authority for police personnel in peacekeeping, as "UN police officers were armed and had full executive mandates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter" as well as having "FPUs that were deployed to maintain public order and support UN policing activities."⁵⁸

Police were also tasked with performing in a civilian police role and "prepar[ing] the transition to the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) that would eventually take over from CIVPOL."⁵⁹ These changes led to future operations in which police personnel have been given capacity-building mandates, such as in Sudan (UNMIS) and Liberia (UNMIL).

The 2000 Annual Report on UNMIK's policing activities in Kosovo makes no mention of the presence, role, or absence of female police, either within Formed/Special Police Units or within the larger body of individual police personnel. There is limited discussion of the need to recruit women to the Kosovo Police Force, which UNMIK was involved in training. A 2001 report similarly failed to discuss the presence, role, or absence of female police in any capacity, despite depicting women's involvement prominently on the cover. In mid-2003 the Office of Gender Affairs added a "full-fledged gender advisory unit" to the mission, which led to a series of policy and program changes and additions.

In spite of a lack of formal recognition of their presence, women police played an important role in

peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. Lyn Holland, an Oklahoma law enforcement officer, was the first US woman to serve in a policing capacity in a peacekeeping mission. After seeing a television ad recruiting US law enforcement officers to train police in Haiti, she joined the Haitian National Police Initiative via the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP), and was subsequently deployed to Kosovo. There she created a program to assist victims of rape as an act of war, and served as the first and, at the time, only female member of the Kosovo-based law enforcement team.⁶⁰

Holland notes, "when I went to Kosovo, I was one of the few women driving a car."⁶¹ It is crucial that women be integrated into peacekeeping missions because,

the populations that we're serving in UN peacekeeping missions are primarily women [...]. If you don't have a woman[s] perspective in the solutions for the problems in peacekeeping then you're not going to have the totality of the perspectives that you need. And so it's very important. It's also important to have women in peacekeeping missions so that the population can see women serving in equal positions to the men. Many people have never seen women do some of the functions you do.⁶²

Similarly to Holland, Deputy Superintendent Shahzadi Gulfam was the first female Pakistani police officer to serve in a UN mission. She served in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1997 and in Kosovo from 1999-2001. In her capacity as a Recruitment and Selection Officer for the Kosovo Police Service, Gulfam visited schools and colleges in rural areas in order to engage in outreach

to women and specifically to recruit them into police service. Her pitch, in addition to explaining the role of police, emphasized the added impact female officers could have in their communities.⁶³ Gulfam was honored with the International Female Police Peacekeeper Award in 2011, in recognition of her work in the former Yugoslavia as well as subsequently in Timor-Leste.

UNMIK was among the first generation of peacekeeping missions to be outfitted with a formal gender unit, and the Kosovo example is particularly key in showing not only the importance of gender balance and gender mainstreaming within PKOs, but also how those practices can affect the broader society in which missions operate. In Kosovo, the gender unit was instrumental in writing the UNMIK Regulation on Elections for the Parliamentary Assembly of Kosovo. The unit's work allowed women to fill 28% of Assembly of 2001.⁶⁴ Gender advisors have also played a key role in supporting the integration of gender perspectives in the judicial and legal sector by conducting training for judges, lawyers and prosecutors.⁶⁵

United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)

Like the mission in Namibia, ONUSAL is considered a UN peacekeeping success story. Two UN missions (ONUVEN and ONUCA) preceding ONUSAL had focused on election monitoring, facilitation, and ensuring compliance with the Esquipulas II accords between the five Latin American states that were parties to the accords. ONUSAL, authorized by Security Council resolution 693 in May 1991, was charged with human rights monitoring, election monitoring, verifying the military aspects of the accords, and the

formation of the police and security services.⁶⁶ The primary goal of the CIVPOL deployment to El Salvador was "to prevent the [National Police] from acting in an openly politicized and abusive manner during the peace process and to assist in maintaining public safety in former conflict zones."⁶⁷

Though not included in the initial deployment, ONUSAL began staffing 300-400 civilian police in 1992. This CIVPOL component was tasked with assisting in the maintenance of security and public order, the monitoring of the activities of the police, and the establishment of a new National Civilian Police (NCP).⁶⁸ This allowed ONUSAL to function effectively within the original mandate, which was to provide public order during the interim period in which a national police force would be established. With Salvadoran cooperation, their accomplishments included the creation of a new National Academy for Public Security to provide training and continuing education for recruits and officers, the recruitment of nearly 8000 new officers, and the construction of "a police service that inspired confidence and security rather than fear in the general public."⁶⁹

Though the mission was ultimately considered successful, the police element faced its share of challenges. The military resisted police reform that lessened its involvement in internal security and the financial constraints of the structural adjustment program the Salvadoran government was working under meant new police units suffered from a lack of facilities and resources. In addition, there was a severe lack of experience among newly recruited officers and a significant number of former rebels within the police force.⁷⁰

Among the lessons learned in the Salvadoran experience was that in future missions there would almost certainly be a “need to form integrated teams of police and human rights observers, preferably with a legal background, as well as advisors, instructors and political officers.”⁷¹ Though FPU were not used in ONUSAL, it was clear that future missions would need specialized units to teach, advise, verify and observe domestic police agencies in post-conflict environments.⁷²

ONUSAL also did not have a Gender Affairs Unit or a Gender Advisor, as later peacekeeping missions would. The first Gender Specialist wouldn’t be appointed to a mission until 1999.⁷³ Whether women served among the police observers in ONUSAL is unclear, though there were certainly women on the civilian staff of the mission. Demobilization records, however, show that significant percentages of Salvadoran insurgent combatants were female, and that women were actively involved in the struggle on all sides, whether in traditional roles as caretakers and support persons or in arms-bearing roles.⁷⁴ This suggests that there were a number of ways in which a greater integration of women in FPUs could have bolstered the ONUSAL mission.

Further, although El Salvador experienced a lower level of sexual or gender-based violence than many similar conflicts, evidence nonetheless suggests that “women were routinely singled out and tortured in a qualitatively different manner than their male counterparts.”⁷⁵ A study of female prisoners in El Salvador revealed that “women were often singled out and tortured in gender-specific ways, including sodomy, the application of electric shocks to the breasts and genitals, gang rape and forced miscarriage, etc.”⁷⁶ Post-

conflict assessments concluded that sexual violence was committed largely by the state against its citizens, and in rarer cases by the insurgents. Salvadoran state violence took the form of “widespread torture of suspected insurgents and supporters, and as part of a pattern of rape/murder that occurred in massacres and assassinations,” that largely took place inside state-controlled facilities.⁷⁷ The perpetrators were primarily the national police, national guard, and members of the national army.⁷⁸

The presence of female police among police personnel deployed with ONUSAL would have been an invaluable asset in handling the post-trauma social consequences of this sort of pervasive gender-based violence. Not only have studies shown that women are typically better equipped to appropriately work with other women who have experienced this sort of trauma, but the mere presence of female police might have changed the dynamic on the streets between a fearful population and a new police force taking the place of one that had committed such abuses.⁷⁹ As UN Police Chief Ann-Marie Orler has written, “the presence of female police officers provides trust and confidence in the police. Female police officers play an important role as security providers, mediators, investigators and trainers in reconstructing police services around the world. They have a major impact as role models for the populations whom they serve.”⁸⁰

United Nations Mission to Mozambique (ONUMOZ)

The peace operation in Mozambique was established by Security Council resolution 797 in 1992 as a consequence of the signing of a peace accord. The mission’s mandate included verification that the terms of

the accord were being implemented, large-scale humanitarian activities (repatriation of refugees), large-scale demobilization and disarmament programs, and election monitoring.⁸¹ Although the peace accord did not explicitly discuss the need for international police, the Secretary General argued that:

Experience elsewhere suggests that [a specific role for United Nations civilian police] could be desirable in order to inspire confidence that violations of civil liberties, human rights and political freedom will be avoided.⁸²

The Secretary General advised that a police component would be most needed for election monitoring. At its maximum strength, the civilian police component of the mission eventually deployed 1087 police personnel (up to 1144 were authorized). The specific mandate of the police component included the following:

- Monitoring of all police activities in Mozambique
- Monitoring and verifying reorganization and retraining of quick reaction police
- Monitoring the respect of the rights of Mozambican citizens
- In coordination with other mission components, monitoring the election campaign
- Providing technical support to the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL)⁸³

In the short-term, the CIVPOL contingent was highly effective insofar as few human rights abuses were reported in the period during which it was de-

ployed. Elections were held on time, as planned, and were considered largely free of violence, corruption, or tampering.⁸⁴ That said, in the longer term, issues arose that pointed to a need for more in-depth training, mentoring, and monitoring of the national police forces.

The influence of organized crime within the police force, and continuing allegations of human rights abuses were of most concern. Moreover, the most significant shortcoming among CIVPOL personnel was an unevenness of training across the force. Too often, CIVPOL units lacked the language facility in English or Portuguese to communicate with local police, or were unable to drive UN vehicles due to a lack of the proper permits.⁸⁵ The shortcomings among ONUMOZ personnel point to the utility of recruiting a unit of police officers that have already been trained to function together. One report specifically notes as a future recommendation that, “a crisis management team should be established early in the mission to oversee and direct operations of a serious nature.”⁸⁶ In the future, that role would be filled in large part by FPUs.

It is unclear whether or not women served in the police component of the UN mission in Mozambique. For the same reasons as in discussions of previous missions, there can be no doubt that their presence would have been valuable in establishing trust with the communities served, serving as role models for both men and women, and of course, in fulfilling the mandate as required.

United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)

UNTAC represented a departure from many other ongoing missions in the early 1990s in that its broad mandate included the challenging and experimental task of “manag[ing] the transition.”⁸⁷ Unlike peace-keeping missions that focused exclusively on peace enforcement (enforcement, monitoring, and verification of peace agreements) or peacebuilding (broad reconstructive state-building activities), UNTAC was truly a transitional assistance force, intended to stand in the breach while the Cambodian government reorganized itself via internationally monitored elections.

The mission “assumed control of key sectors of the country’s administrative structures--foreign affairs, defence, security, finance and communications--in order to build a stable environment conducive to national elections.”⁸⁸ Given the challenges posed by such a broad mandate, “public security quickly became a major challenge--if not *the* major challenge--facing UNTAC during its period of operation.”⁸⁹

Accordingly, UNTAC had the largest deployment of civilian police to that date, with 3,359 personnel eventually deployed out of a possible 3,500 authorized. Unlike many other missions discussed in this report (UNMIK and ONUSAL, for example), UNTAC’s police were not tasked with peacebuilding activities such as the wholesale reorganizing and recreation of a national police force. Nevertheless, the mandate of the police component was broad:

UN CIVPOL usually does not maintain law and order independently but supervises law enforcement by local police forces. Of policing powers--including:

reporting, investigation, search, seizure, arrest and detention--CIVPOL conventionally is restricted to reporting, as in Namibia, or reporting and investigation, as in Cyprus. However, UNTAC CIVPOL not only had a supervisory function, through reporting on and investigating incidents, but the power of 'control.' [...] This put CIVPOL in a powerful position to challenge abuses of power and direct law and order.⁹⁰

In terms of the evolution of policing within peace-keeping operations, UNTAC represents a new direction and a new recognition of the importance of civilian policing for public security. The UNTAC mission was also the first time CIVPOL was established as its own independently functioning command, rather than being placed under the authority of the military component as in previous operations.⁹¹

The number of UNTAC police personnel meant that there would be approximately one CIVPOL officer for every 15 local civil police.⁹² The first several hundred civilian police to arrive in Cambodia were assigned to work on repatriation in regions where refugees and IDPs were being resettled. Within a few months, nearly 2,000 civilian police were deployed across the country and tasked with supervising the maintenance of law and order and aiding in investigating human rights abuses.

Despite this work-load, the contingent would not reach full strength until six months before elections were planned. By September 1992, UNTAC "includ[ed] a strong police presence extending down to village level." In the preparatory period before elections in late 1992 and early 1992, ceasefire violations increased and the security situation deteriorated, forcing civilian police to focus their efforts on preventing and dealing with direct threats to public order.

In one such example, UNTAC took the unusual step of assuming arrest, detention and prosecution powers unto itself in cases of serious violations. During the electoral campaign, CIVPOL worked in tandem with military observers to monitor political rallies and assist in civil education efforts aimed at increasing the understanding and participation of people in the forthcoming election. The election itself was considered a success, with 90% or more of those eligible going to the polls. In the post-election phase, police personnel were gradually withdrawn, with all having departed by the end of 1993.⁹³

Although UNTAC is considered to have been a successful mission in many areas (e.g. election-monitoring), there were serious shortcomings to its performance. Notably, CIVPOL “did not even attempt to carry out its ‘control’ tasks” within the broad mandate it had been given. One study noted that the particular subcultures within which police operate in their home countries tend to emphasize “underwriting authority, not challenging it,” and that the mission’s police personnel were not well-equipped to operate outside of their familiar environments, where they knew the language and the local laws.⁹⁴

As is often the case, UNTAC’s police began with clearly delineated areas of operation, to include maintaining a presence at the provincial and district levels, and to cooperate with other mission components in the investigation of human rights abuses and provision of election security. But as time passed more complex responsibilities were handed down. These included VIP escort and arrest responsibilities which the CIVPOL component was not prepared to undertake.”⁹⁵

It is clear from an analysis of the shortcomings of civilian police performance in Cambodia that the ad-

dition of FPUs and of female police personnel would have been extremely valuable. FPUs, trained and capable of dealing with a variety of low and high security situations, could have better adapted to the changing policing needs of the mission as time passed. Their cohesive training units would have allowed them to operate efficiently even in unfamiliar environments, and the nature of working with trusted and familiar colleagues would have allowed them to challenge authority where necessary.

Although the UNTAC mission was path-breaking in a number of ways, “its composition [...] reflected a fairly traditional, highly militarized, and male-dominated venture”:⁹⁶

Of the nearly 23,000 international military and civilian personnel, there were no women appointed to director-level posts within the mission, very few women in the military contingents, and little presence of women in high-level posts among international civil servants [...]. There were so few women appointed to UNTAC, in fact, that a UN Division for the Advancement of Women study on women’s involvement in peace-keeping missions registers their presence, in statistical terms, as “zero.”⁹⁷

In the challenging period of transition Cambodia faced between war and peace, female police could have provided essential role models for Cambodian women emerging into a new political and social order in a country where 65% of the population was female, and 35% of households were headed by women.⁹⁸ And in the particular case of Cambodia, as one female UNTAC employee noted,

'more women in either the military or police components of the mission might have dispelled the local impression that the United Nations was an 'army of occupation.'⁹⁹

Cambodian women themselves took note of the fact that the UN preached the importance of women's participation in politics, but had few female members on UNTAC staff. Cambodian women surveyed argued that this "undermined [the] message of women's political participation."¹⁰⁰ Finally, the presence of female police might have led to greater awareness and a quicker, more appropriate response to allegations of frequent and pervasive exploitation of Cambodian prostitutes, as well as rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment by UNTAC staff.¹⁰¹ A Human Rights Watch advocate is one of many who have noted that "the advantages of a strong presence of female peacekeepers in conflict and post-conflict zones include creating a safer space for girls and women who have suffered sexual violence."¹⁰²

United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)'s Female Formed Police Unit

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by Security Council resolution 1509 in 2003 to support the implementation of the cease-fire agreement and the peace process ending the civil war that had begun as early as 1989. The total number of civilian deaths between 1989 and 2003 is estimated at 250,000.¹⁰³ Further, nearly 60% of the country's population of 2.6 million became refugees over the duration of the conflicts.¹⁰⁴ After a series of a tentative

cease-fires, UNMIL has maintained the peace and is mandated to support humanitarian and human rights activities; as well as assist in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military.

As of 2012 the UNMIL mission consists of 9,208 uniformed personnel, including 1,291 police personnel. Out of these there are 7 FPUs comprising 845 armed police officers. Three FPUs operate out of the capital Monrovia with the remainder deployed throughout the country. FPU composition includes two FPU's from India, two FPU's from Jordan, two FPU's from Nepal and one FPU from Nigeria. The FPU mission is to support the Liberia National Police (LNP) by providing rapid crowd control response, escorting VIPs including the President of Liberia, conducting joint patrols with UNPOL and LNP anti-crime units, conducting joint exercises, and providing technical advice and facility security at prisons and other government facilities. In addition, FPUs engage in community outreach programs designed to bolster community confidence in the police and rule of law. Finally, FPUs have taken special care to promote the recruitment of women into the LNP.¹⁰⁵

UNMIL was the first UN mission to field an all-female Formed Police Unit (F-FPU), which deployed from India to Liberia in January 2007. This experimental unit features a reverse of the usual order of things, with 103 women in operational roles and 22 men working in logistics.¹⁰⁶ At the time of the F-FPU's deployment, there were already 82 individually recruited female police working in various capacities in UNMIL. This puts representation of women police at 16.67% within the mission, which is the highest across current UN missions, and compares very favorably

to the mere 2.18% of women among UN military personnel, and 8.2% of women across UN policing as a whole.¹⁰⁷ Among the successes of the F-FPU thus far, a DPKO Gender Affairs associate counts the fact that “the percentage of women in the national police force rose from 13 percent in 2008 to 15 percent in 2009.” Moreover, the female police have successfully been deployed on the front lines as riot control, “as they can reportedly help calm raucous crowds,” and their mere presence has “encourage[d] Liberian women to report instances of sexual violence.”¹⁰⁸

UNMIL may be the UN’s best example thus far of the incorporation of a gender perspective into a peace-keeping mission in a holistic and comprehensive manner. Among other successes, Under Secretary-General Guehenno notes:

We successfully integrated a gender perspective in the DDR process in Liberia, which ensured that the eligibility criteria was revised to include women who played support roles to the combatants, as cooks, porters, sex slaves or spies, and who oftentimes served as part-time combatants. Over 21,000 women were demobilized as a result and many of these women contributed important information on where arms caches were hidden. In Burundi, 231 of the 485 disarmed female ex-combatants have been recruited into the newly restructured police force, as part of their reintegration.”¹⁰⁹

Other successes among the wide variety of tasks assigned to these police include the staffing of a free health clinic by healthcare workers from the F-FPU, where policewoman and doctor Sarla Mahovia quickly realized that women were more likely to bring their reproductive health concerns to her than to a

male physician; encouraging literacy among women; providing skills training to youths, especially girls; providing security for government buildings; providing security and monitoring during elections; and performing nightly mobile and foot patrols alongside Liberian National Police.¹¹⁰

Ellen Margrethe Loj, UNMIL's Special Representative to the Secretary-General, says of the F-FPU: "They have greatly contributed to the healing that is needed by all Liberians recovering from the civil war and have shown that women need not be victims, but healers and protectors in the new Liberia."¹¹¹ At a rotation ceremony in Monrovia, as an F-FPU prepared to depart after 12 months service, Loj noted that, in addition to all their tangible successes in policing, "we are first and foremost in the mission, proud of them being our *best Formed Police Unit*."¹¹²

Likewise, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who attended the ceremony, congratulated the officers:

You have been an inspiration because of your professionalism, because of your commitment, because of just the manner in which you serve. We've been trying to target 20% of our security forces for women--we haven't reached that--but I see that because of you the numbers are increasing. Today we have, more and more, women who are willing to see the police force as a constructive, positive force.¹¹³

Loj concluded: "We hope through their performance, through them walking the streets of Monrovia at night-time, all hours of the day, that they have inspired Liberian women [...] and thereby committed in small measure [...] to [President Sirleaf's] goal, namely gender mainstreaming in all branches of Liberian society."¹¹⁴

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)'s Female Formed Police Unit

MINUSTAH is the successor mission to UNMIH, the peacekeeping force that took over to monitor Haitian elections and ensure a peaceful transfer of power after the U.S.-majority Multi-National Force responded militarily to a coup attempt in 1994. MINUSTAH deployed in 2004 in order to stabilize the political situation and support the transitional government. Its mandate including the following:

- to assist in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police
- to help with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes
- to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti
- to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence
- to assist in organizing, monitoring, and carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections¹¹⁵

Like the Indian F-FPU deployed under UNMIL, the Bangladeshi F-FPU puts 160 female police in operational roles, with 30 male police serving in supporting positions. The support staff will work as “drivers, barbers, clean men, electricians, cooks, plumbers, motor vehicle technicians/mechanics, etc.”¹¹⁶ However, the

tasks set for the Haiti F-FPU differ from those undertaken in Liberia, primarily because Liberia is a post-conflict area whereas the Haiti F-FPU was deployed in May 2010 when the country was dealing primarily with the aftermath of a severe earthquake.

The major focus of MINUSTAH in the period after the earthquake has been on provision of public security, largely by way of working with local police.¹¹⁷ Thus, the Haiti F-FPU has focused on a combination of humanitarian activities, including patrolling in IDP camps and providing health training and primary healthcare, as well as traditional community policing.¹¹⁸ They have also provided “static and mobile security, coordination with other FPU units, and conduct[ed] checkpoint operations.”¹¹⁹ And in one more example of gender awareness creating tangible change for the communities where FPUs function, the gender unit and civilian police are finalizing a pilot project to establish private rooms within police stations where women can confidentially report violent crimes.¹²⁰

Sahely Ferdous, a member of the Bangladeshi F-FPU, believes that the primary challenges facing Haitian girls and women are gender-based violence and discrimination, lack of access to education, economic dependence, and lack of opportunities to participate in government. The problem of sexual violence is particularly pervasive, and is exacerbated when women are forced to live in IDP camps where public security is lacking.

Trained to deal with sexual exploitation and abuse, Ferdous and her colleagues noticed that:

The impact of women as peacekeepers is that it strengthens psychological support for victims, so that they feel more comfortable reporting sexual or physical violence.¹²¹

Her observations are particularly poignant in the face of repeated allegations of sexual exploitation of girls and women by UN peacekeepers in Haiti. The Status of Forces Agreement between MINUSTAH and the Haitian government requires peacekeepers to adhere to the Geneva Conventions, but also establishes broad legal immunity for peacekeeping troops, creating an untenable situation for Haitians who might have the courage to testify to abuse.

Marie St. Cyr, a Haitian human rights advocate, laments:

We still don't have full participation and we certainly don't have full inclusion. Haitian women are still being raped...they are supporting more than half of the households, and yet they are not being heard.¹²²

The job of a female civilian police officer in Haiti requires fortitude and flexibility. As officer Marily Côté, explained, "We are asked to ensure security one day and the day after we play the role of psychologist, this is everyday life in the camps." It is this sort of skill and adaptability, highlighted particularly well by female FPUs, and arising from a combination of effective training and experience working as a team, that will ultimately make the difference for the most vulnerable populations in post-conflict areas.

As Sahely Ferdous notes,

Our women's contingent will have a long term impact on the Haitian people, especially on women and girls.

Most of the women welcome our presence and activities. They see us as a symbol of women's empowerment and feel inspired to be established socially and economically.¹²³

Obstacles to Gender-Balancing in Peacekeeping Operations

Despite the significant benefits of including women in police units, the obstacles to their integration remain high. As discussed earlier there have been no systematic studies on the obstacles to integrating women in FPUs. There are, however, several studies on the integration of women in US domestic police units. This section will highlight the results of one 'study of studies' examining the obstacles to female integration in the US nationwide, across the last 50 years. The obstacles identified in this section, in the absence of other studies directly related to FPUs, are intended to provide a generalizable framework of the obstacles to the integration of women in police units. Because FPUs are recruited from Member State police forces, the obstacles to integration in contributing nations are the first-level obstacles to increasing female participation in FPU or other UN police units.

In the US the proportion of female police officers has increased by some 40% between 1987-1997. In the 15 years since then, however, the percentage of women officers has only increased by 10%. Today the average proportion of female police officers serving in US departments has plateaued at around 11%.¹²⁴

In Canada the rate of female deployment to international police engagements remains near 11% despite considerable gains in the rates of women entering domestic police forces. This is important because Canada

is one of the top Member States for training UN police units. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has been highly proactive in trying to implement the goals of resolution 1325, so the difficulty in increasing the number of women deploying for international police missions, despite these efforts, is of concern.¹²⁵

Further, studies in both countries highlight similar obstacles to the integration of women into domestic police forces or their deployment to international missions. Two major classes of obstacles prevent the integration of women into police units. The first is direct discrimination. This is what women who are interviewed about their experiences in police units mean when they cite a general male-dominated culture. The second main class of obstacles are systemic barriers, usually hiring and recruitment practices, that prevent significant numbers of women from applying for police work because they fail to recognize the extra domestic-care burdens most women bear that men do not. These kinds of barriers represent failures to incorporate the gender-sensitive perspectives called for in resolution 1325.

It should be noted that there are differences in the obstacles women in developed/industrialized nations face compared to women in developing/non-industrialized countries. Typically, though not always, the obstacles in the latter are higher for women than in developed/industrialized nations. If states like the Canada and the US struggle to get female participation rates in their own police forces into even the mid- to high teens, the barriers for even token female participation in most developing states is higher still.

The direct obstacle most frequently cited as a barrier to integrating women into police forces is the physical fitness test. Jurisdictions that apply a univer-

sal standard to applicants based on a male baseline systematically reduce both the number of women who are eligible for hire and the number of women applying for careers in police (because of the likelihood of failure on the test). Tests that emphasize upper-body strength are particularly likely to see high proportions of women fail. The arguments in favor of a universal physical fitness standard, that requirements represent real job requirements, is the same used by militaries that exclude women service members. But as critics have pointed out, the scientific evidence that such standards are in fact necessary job requirements is questionable. Considering the highly varied fitness level of serving male officers over the course of a career and the success of women serving in advanced militaries, the validity of such arguments is weak. Nonetheless, the political effectiveness of the universal standard argument remains a serious obstacle to women.¹²⁶

Another related obstacle is the real or perceived male-dominated culture of police units. In particular the boot-camp nature of most police academies is cited in the US literature as a significant reason many women refrain from applying. The paramilitary style of police training is problematic in two ways. It is seen as both indirectly out of sync with female learning styles and it often perpetuates a group culture that is directly hostile to women.¹²⁷

Finally, conflicts with the unique domestic responsibilities of women, who shoulder a disproportionate share of family care duties, keep many women from applying, gaining promotion, or even sustaining a career. Inflexible hours, lack of part-time or flexible hour structures, and leaves of absence are all major obstacles to integrating women into police forces. The RCMP study on women in peacekeeping also found

that these family care obligations were cited as significant reasons female officers declined opportunities to serve in international police missions. Though interest among women was high, lack of support for domestic responsibilities was the primary reason cited for not accepting deployment opportunities.¹²⁸

One additional finding is particularly important. The perceived obstacles to integration of women was different among female officers and their chiefs. Though significant numbers of both groups agreed (86% of chiefs, 68% of women officers) that the small number of female applicants was the primary reason for the small number of women in uniform, they disagreed strongly about why this was the case. Only 7% of police chiefs agreed that the surveyed police agencies were “not very woman friendly,” compared to 45% of female officers surveyed.

Further, there were striking differences in perceptions about other reasons why potential female applicants failed to apply. Sixty-nine percent of female officers felt women failed to apply because agencies did not proactively recruit women. Only 48% of chiefs agreed with this statement. Likewise, 52% of officers surveyed agreed that women fail to apply because they “don’t think they can get hired.” Only 29% of chiefs agreed. This is important because it points to the fact that differences in how heads of departments view the causes of low female integration is itself an obstacle to increasing the number of women in police units.

Recommendations

Among the conclusions of the groundbreaking study on gender mainstreaming in Afghan PRTs is the idea that even among countries with otherwise excellent track records in supporting the goals of resolution 1325 and gender mainstreaming, serious obstacles to integrating women in FPU and other police units remain. As the study notes, Sweden, despite its strong record of gender mainstreaming work within its PRTs, nonetheless had no female PRT members. The study authors concluded that this was because Sweden had the lowest number of women in its armed forces among the contributing states studied.¹²⁹

This anecdote highlights both the potential for significant advances in incorporating gender-sensitive policies despite low female representation, and the difficulties in advancing the goal of integrating more women into FPUs without challenging the structure of domestic police institutions in Member States. Though some progress is possible even if these two outcomes are separate, there is a natural limit to how meaningful gender mainstreaming can be without an increase in the number of women at all levels of national police units.

Recognizing the inseparability of more equal representation of women in police forces with the normative and operational goals of resolution 1325 is the first step. Other necessary steps revolve around attacking the reality of hostile hiring and educational environments and the failure of police leadership to recognize the direct and indirect barriers women face to full participation.

In conclusion this report recommends three broad approaches to better integrate women into FPUs, CIVPOL or other police forces.

- *Promote policies and practices in Member States that are sensitive to the real and perceived procedural barriers that dissuade women from applying to police units or successfully completing police training.* These efforts should include the promotion of gender-normed fitness tests, proactive recruitment of women, and the development of less military-like training academy cultures. In addition, efforts should be made to develop evidenced-based accounts explaining the reasons women are dissuaded from applying for police jobs. The results of these studies should then be used to sensitize hiring authorities to the real perceptions of police culture and hiring procedures among target female populations.
- *Counter the male-dominated culture of many Member State police agencies.* In the US one method for attacking the problem of overt sexism in hiring and recruiting has been to legislate requirements for a ‘qualified applicant list’ from which police forces must hire. This approach specifies the physical and written exam parameters and degree requirements for an applicant to be legally hireable. The process of recruiting and certifying the applicant pool is thus significantly separated from final hire decision-makers in units where direct discrimination is more likely. In the US such procedures have been used to bracket the selection pool for smaller police and sheriff’s departments where personal discretion in hiring decisions remains high. Similar systems could be adapted for developing states where systemic discrimination at the hir-

ing level is a risk.¹³⁰ In addition, systemic sexual harassment and gender sensitization policies should be implemented throughout Member State police agencies where FPU recruitment is targeted.

- *Policies and procedures should be developed that address the barriers women face when deciding whether to accept deployment to FPU missions.* Such efforts should focus on developing ways to allow women to serve on FPUs while supporting and respecting the family responsibilities many women carry that their male counterparts do not. Policies concerning flexible work arrangements, leaves of absence and part-time employment should be oriented toward promoting women's careers throughout all levels of the force and throughout a woman's career life-cycle. Such policies will tend to become self-sustaining and more effective as greater numbers of women advance to higher levels of authority within police agencies.

As Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno noted during the floor debate over resolution 1325:

A significant proportion of peacekeeping personnel and other staff associated with peacekeeping still do not have a conceptual understanding of what gender mainstreaming entails, nor have they grasped that it is more than just about hiring more women. This may explain in part why we have yet to institutionalize many of our gender mainstreaming strategies. Too often, it is individual commitment, rather than institutionalized mechanisms, that drives our work.¹³¹

Despite significant progress, more than a decade into the integration of women into FPUs and other police units, the process remains more of an *ad hoc* endeavor than an institutionalized one. Integrating women into FPUs is both a moral issue and a question of operational effectiveness. It is a moral issue for the UN and for Member States because the women's equitable participation in the police units as key institutions of their societies is a moral right. It is a moral issue for the international community because the effects of conflict fall disproportionately on women and the children, sick, and elderly they care for. Integrating women into the FPUs that serve these populations is a core way of ensuring that women in conflict zones have a voice in the rebuilding of their societies.

Ensuring that the voices of women are heard and that their concerns and suggestions are incorporated into post-conflict social, economic and political structures is the key to long-term operational success. FPUs are an increasingly important tool in achieving that success and the integration of women into FPUs is one of the best ways to ensure that voices of women around the world are not just heard, but listened to.

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