



VOLUME 2

2015-2016 CIVIL AFFAIRS ISSUE PAPERS:
**CIVIL AFFAIRS: A FORCE FOR ENGAGEMENT
AND CONFLICT PREVENTION**

Edited by
Christopher Holshek
John C. Church, Jr.



PKSOI PAPER

Volume 2

**2015 - 2016 Civil Affairs Issue Papers:
Civil Affairs: A Force for Engagement
and Conflict Prevention**

Presented by the

**Civil Affairs Association
In coordination with the**

**U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability
Operations Institute,
USMC Training Command,
and the
Foreign Area Officer Association**

Edited by

Christopher Holshek and John C. Church, Jr.

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ISBN: 978-0-9861865-6-1

Table of Contents

Forewordv

Civil Affairs Association
President Joseph P. Kirlin III

Executive Summaryix

Panel Discussion: “Civil Affairs in Engagement and
Conflict Prevention – Current Civil-Military Force
Activities and Recommendations on the Way
Ahead”1

Jim Ruf

Issue Papers

1. “Renewed Relevance: CA Develop Human
Networks for Effective Engagement”9

Major Arnel P. David

2. “From Green to Blue: U.S. Army Civil Affairs
and International Police Engagement”25

Captain Rob Kobold

3. “Civil Engagement as a Tool for Conflict
Prevention: A Case Study”41

Captain Tammy Sloulin and
Lieutenant Colonel Steve Lewis

4. "The Role of Civil Affairs in Counter-
Unconventional Warfare"59

Major Shafi Saiduddin

5. "Civil Affairs Forces, U.S. Army Reserve, National
Guard, and the State Partnership Program:
Is there Room for Engagement?"85

*Major David E. Leiva and
Major John Nonnemaker*

*For more information, go to:
<http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/>*

FOREWORD

Last year, the Civil Affairs Association and its partners, launched its first Issue Papers since the early 2000's, but with a different approach. The annual cycle of a thematically linked Symposium, Issue Papers, and Roundtable, provides a platform for the most operationally experienced community of Civil Affairs (CA) practitioners since World War II to have more direct and visible input on the discussion of the future of Civil Affairs – as a national strategic capability – at the command and policy levels, as well as capture their insights and lessons for future posterity and research. The objective of employing this crowdsourcing method is to give young leaders and the upcoming generation, something not previously done in a systemic way, an opportunity to have a voice in the future of a force in which they have arguably the greatest interest.

So far, it has been paying off very well. People in many places are recognizing the great value of this work because in good part they are recognizing the great value of Civil Affairs, regardless of component or branch of service. When I asked Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, among the U.S. Army's most influential leaders in building the force of the future and recognized in Time's list of 100 most influential people in the world in 2014, to be the keynote speaker at the Symposium, he did not hesitate. At the Symposium, the General delivered one of the most cogent and meaningful presentations to an audience of Civil Affairs professionals, for which we are most grateful and thank him for his challenge and keen insight.

This year's discussion was a real breakthrough. But, it left us all with some heavy lifting and critical tasks,

wrapped up in Lt. Gen. McMaster's call for the CA Regiment to "think, learn, analyze, and implement." He provided us a powerful vehicle to think clearly about future conflict and how CA continues to "secure the victory" by helping to prevent as well as end wars. Now it's time to get to work. As a Regiment, we need to answer Lt. Gen. McMaster's challenge and robustly contribute to the Army Warfighting Challenges shaping discussion and analysis of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader development and education, and personnel interim solutions for the future force including CA. The Joint Force would benefit from the Civil Affairs community's input and collaboration on the Army Operating Concept, Engagement functional concept, and Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning and Human Aspect of Military Operations.

At the same time, we must intensify our dialogue with others in the military, government, civilian partners, political leaders, and educate them and public at large about CA. In addition to the Issue Papers and the Association's newsletter, there are the publications of our partners, such as PKSOI's Peace & Stability Operations Journal, NDU's Joint Forces Quarterly and Prism, ROA's The Officer, there are plenty of opportunities to get the word out. We need to seize them.

The implied task, is for the Regiment, individually and collectively, to become conversant with the concepts and operational frameworks and languages of the larger Joint Force, which includes the basics like: the military decision-making process, campaign planning, along with policies, directives, and doctrine on peace, stability, and civil-military operations as well as the operational frameworks of interagency, multinational, and non-governmental partners. Then, the last task is we must take ownership of that advocacy and become better citizens of our own community.

The Civil Affairs Association greatly appreciates the collaboration and assistance of its partners in this endeavor –the National Defense University Center for Complex Operations, U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), Center for the Study of Civil-Military Operations at West Point, Foreign Area Officer Association, Reserve Officers Association, and the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition. Our special heartfelt thanks go out especially to PKSOI in partnering with us in the publication of these Issue Papers.

Finally, profound thanks go to Major General Mike Kuehr, USA (ret) Colonel Christopher Holshek, USA, (ret), Colonel John C. Church, Jr., USMC, and many others who have gone above and beyond the call to organize these events and produce these Issue Papers so vitally important to shaping the future of our force.

“Secure the Victory!”

Joseph P. Kirlin III
Colonel, USA, (ret), Civil Affairs
President
The Civil Affairs Association

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY -
“CIVIL AFFAIRS: A FORCE FOR ENGAGEMENT
AND CONFLICT PREVENTION”**

Christopher Holshek

Civil Affairs (CA) has long been a major national strategic capability that helps transition from war to peace and from military to civilian lead and control after major conflict. Along with the Joint Force in general, CA is tasked to engage partners in Phase 0 (Shape and Influence), to contribute to conflict analysis, including identifying sources of illicit power. CA serves to shape the distribution and use of political and informal power in order to mitigate the drivers of instability. This instability is not limited to threats. It can be disease, contagion, poverty, illiteracy, etc. In conjunction with Military Information Support and Information Operations (MISO) and Information Operations (IO) as well as Foreign Area Officers (FAOs), CA is the only part of the Joint Force specifically suited for Peace & Stability Operations under Joint Stability Operations Doctrine and a “force of choice” under the Army Functional Concept for Engagement.

All these imperatives raise two questions:

- One, how as such does or should CA contribute to conflict prevention, in coordination with MISO/IO and FAOs as well as an array of government, non-government, and private sector civilian partners and regional and multilateral organizations?
- Two, what CA capabilities are required to support engagement in these ways?

To look at CA as “a force for engagement and conflict prevention,” the Civil Affairs Association, in coordination with the National Defense University Center for Complex Operations, U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute, Center for the Study of Civil-Military Operations at West Point, Foreign Area Officer Association, Reserve Officers Association, and the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, conducted its third Civil Affairs Symposium on Friday, November 20th 2015, at Joint Base San Antonio Fort Sam Houston’s Mission Training Complex. In addition to speakers and panel discussions bringing forward key lessons from current and past operations, the final five Civil Affairs Issue Papers with observations and recommendations on the future Civil Affairs force were formally presented by the authors for publication after the Symposium.

Perhaps the most poignant point from the day’s discussion was that the Civil Affairs (CA) community of practice “must help the broader Army think, learn, analyze, and implement solutions to the Army’s Warfighting Challenges (AWFC) that help the Army and the Joint Force consolidate gains and achieve sustainable outcomes in future conflict” concluded Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, Deputy Commanding General of Futures for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the keynote speaker at this year’s Civil Affairs Symposium.

McMaster passionately reminded the 100-plus attendees of the immutability of the nature of war, regardless of phase, as being essentially a human endeavor. He emphasized how war is an extension of politics and, thus, about the consolidation of gains leading to a sustainable and lasting political outcome as much as winning battles. And, he noted war is also a contest of wills and, thus, fundamentally as psycho-

logical as it is physical. He added how war is uncertain and, therefore requires adaptability, endurance, and a willingness to learn. Based on the political, human, and uncertain continuities of conflict, he also clearly laid out the balance of challenges and expectations for CA as a critical part of the Joint Force. He concluded by offering that “Civil Affairs doesn’t need to do everything, but it does need to be involved and able to help everyone else do things better.”

He then challenged the Civil Affairs regiment to help the Army learn by providing input to the Army Warfighting Challenges shaping the discussion and analysis of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader development and education, and personnel interim solutions for the future force – which can be accessed by anyone at TRADOC’s Army Capabilities Integration Center website.

McMaster’s creative but common sense approach set the tone for further discussion at the Symposium and for developing a deeper understanding of the broader role CA supports in engaging partners, shaping and influencing the environment, consolidating gains, and contributing to conflict analysis – before and not just during and after full-scale war.

Building on this thinking, Civil Affairs Association President Col. (ret.) Joe Kirlin explained. “By developing deeper understanding of the strategic context for their work, the Civil Affairs community can provide comprehensive support to commanders at all levels by striving to identify the sources, distribution, and use of political and informal power in order to mitigate the drivers of conflict and instability and not just threats. This helps CA further its longtime role as a major national strategic capability for winning wars to also preventing them.”

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs Anne Witkowsky, who led the luncheon discussion following the presentations of a panel of top command and institutional representatives observed that CA “remains more capable and relevant than it was on 9/11, a key capability in comprehensive, whole-of-government transition management.” Despite recent total force cuts mandated by the Defense Department, including its complete disbanding of the U.S. Navy, Civil Affairs training program, CA is ideally suited for 21st century war and peace.

The CA mission to “secure the victory” in consolidating political as well as military objectives was forged from nearly two centuries of engagement in military government and working with local leaders, interagency, multinational, and non-government and civil society partners. Despite drawdown from Iraq and Afghanistan, demand for CA continues to rise. Marine CA, as Brig. Gen. Austin Renforth, Commanding General, USMC Training Command emphatically noted, has nearly doubled in size, bucking the trend, but remaining true to its unique *Small Wars* history and ethos. More and more military leaders, including geographic combatant commanders who manage U.S. theater security cooperation strategies to engage international threats, have gained an appreciation of the need for CA to be engaged early, often and far forward in the planning phases to help better frame the political-military problem and understand the environment as well as the enemy.

“Peace and stability operations are a core Civil Affairs competency,” Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Director Col. Daniel Pinnell stated. A career artillery officer with extensive time in both civil-military and military information

operations, he received the Association's Colonel Ralph Temple Award at the annual dinner that evening for his contributions to Civil Affairs. Pinnell and many others at the Symposium also admitted that Civil Affairs - among the least understood military capabilities - must do more to be an integral part of all planning and operational activities. This requires aggressive education and training of commanders and staffs on CA missions and capabilities - mainly at the initiative of the CA Regiment itself.

This heightened awareness also requires the effort of policy stakeholders in the CA community to overcome legal, budgetary, and programmatic, and policy impediments to leveraging especially Reserve Component CA, whose background and talents are ideally suited to Phase 0 missions under the Army Engagement Concept. This better understanding includes the use of functional specialists currently being revitalized by the Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG) at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) in Ft. Bragg, North Carolina.

The discussion delved deeper into this year's theme in the five papers chosen from two dozen submitted for publication in the 2015-16 Civil Affairs Issue Papers. Four of the papers were presented at the Symposium, under the moderation of the Issue Papers Committee Chairman, Brigadier General (retired) Bruce Bingham. The authors received audience-ranked cash awards based on their presentations.

The five papers are (in order of award):

- "Renewed Relevance: CA Develop Human Networks for Effective Engagement," by Maj. Arnel P. David, won first place. "Ideally, networks of key relationships translate into a cost-effective capability, bringing increased

responsiveness and understanding in times of crisis.” He further wrote, “Through effective engagement, CA forces work with civilian and military partners to provide commanders and ambassadors an improved understanding of the environment, and in many countries, small teams extend the reach of the U.S. embassy. CA elements can be a cost-effective means for providing this critical context.”

- Second place was a tie between “From Green to Blue: U.S. Army Civil Affairs and International Police Engagement,” by Capt. Rob Kobol, and “Civil Engagement as a Tool for Conflict Prevention: A Case Study,” by Capt. Tammy Sloulin and Lt. Col. Steve Lewis. “Effective, transparent and legitimate police services are more than simply a governmental service; they are critical to stability and are a key conflict prevention tool,” Kobold posited. “Law enforcement governance specialists from USACAPOC Civil Affairs units are positioned to bridge this capability gap ... but the effort to capture applicable police skills developed in a Reservist’s civilian career must be expanded to Reservists outside of USACAPOC, and it must include members of the National Guard.” Continuing with the discussion of the security sector, Sloulin and Lewis offered: “In societies where the elements of security, governance, and development are weak, instability and conflict fester... The presence of security forces perceived as illegitimate can also lead to conflict as people will distrust their actions... Thus, our hypothesis for conflict prevention is therefore based on supporting a partner nation’s efforts to improve security, governance, and development.”

- Third place went to “The Role of Civil Affairs in Counter-Unconventional Warfare,” by Maj. Shafi Saiduddin. Picking up on last year’s Issue Papers and remarks made by Col. Pinnell, Saiduddin proposed the a new identity for CA forces could be: “United States Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct population-centric irregular warfare with an emphasis on FID, UW, COIN, and Stability capabilities,” further offering that CA is “the basic capabilities needed to execute a C-UW strategy already exist within the CA force and within CA and Joint doctrine. However, operationalizing CA in C-UW will require the development of CA-specific C-UW doctrine, better integration with intelligence and MISO capabilities, and clarifying the identity of the Civil Affairs Regiment.”
- Maj. David E. Leiva and Maj. John Nonnemaker co-authored “Civil Affairs Forces, U.S. Army Reserve, National Guard, and State Partnership Program: Is There Room for Engagement?” and finished in fourth place. They argued that it is high time to integrate CA into the National Guard, as the Guard’s renowned Phase 0 State Partnership Program focus areas “align closely with CA tasks: Civil Information Management, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Nation Assistance, Population and Resource Control, and Support to Civil Administration.”

These papers make up the heart of the second volume of 2015-16 Civil Affairs Issue Papers, co-published by the Association and PKSOI and launched at the Civil Affairs Roundtable at the National Defense University's Center for Complex Operations (NDU-CCO) in Washington, DC, on 7-8 April. The Roundtable completes an annual cycle of discussion of a theme chosen by the Civil Affairs community at the end of each Roundtable. Then a call for papers is issued. The intent of the annual cycle of the Symposium, Issue Papers and Roundtable is to provide a platform for the most operationally experienced community of Civil Affairs practitioners since World War II to have more direct and visible input on the discussion of the future of Civil Affairs at the command and policy levels, as well as capture their insights and lessons for future posterity and research.

From especially the final discussion that day, three key tasks immediately emerged for the CA Regiment. First the CA community must answer Lt. Gen. McMaster's challenge and robustly contribute to the Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC). At the same time, it must intensify its dialogue with others in the military, government, civilian partners, political leaders, and educate them and public at large about CA. "We have some strategic communication products that we hang on our website and will continue to update and improve," Col. (ret.) Kirlin pointed out. He continued, "But anyone experienced in CA can come up with their own 'elevator speech' based on the audience and situation. Targets of opportunity are everywhere - we need to engage them."

To embrace this challenge effectively, CA operators must become conversant with the concepts and operational frameworks and languages of the larger

Joint Force – including basics like the military decision-making process and campaign planning, along with policies, directives, and doctrine on peace, stability, and civil-military operations – as well as the operational frameworks of interagency, multinational, and non-governmental partners. This need to be knowledgeable across the spectrum of conflict was the main message coming from the morning panel. “It’s still more effective for Civil Affairs to learn how to better integrate with those they support, enable, and enhance rather than rely on them to learn how to better integrate Civil Affairs,” Pinnell stressed.

The third task is about ownership of that advocacy. “Citizenship in this community is more than just showing up at these events and then going home,” My fellow CA practitioner, Col. John C. Church, Jr., USMCR, currently in command of a Marine CA Group, and I passionately exhorted in our summary at the Symposium. “For especially those of us in Civil Affairs, if you’re not an active member of the Association or any of these other organizations representing your interests, then you’re letting someone else decide the fate of a force you care so much about and invested so much in. You’re on the sidelines and not a player. This event and everything discussed at it has been a call for leadership. The question you must ask yourself is whether you’re up to the task.”

Col. (ret.) Holshek, a Director in the CA Association, is co-organizer of the Symposia and Roundtables and co-edits the Civil Affairs Issue Papers. His new book, Travels with Harley – Journeys in Search of Personal and National Identity, reflects on experiences and insights gained from three decades as a Civil Affairs officer in a multitude of operations, levels and conditions, and environments.

Panel Discussion:
Civil Affairs in Engagement and Conflict Prevention
- Current Civil-Military Force Activities and Recommendations on the Way Ahead

Jim Ruf

Moderator: Jim Ruf, Colonel, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (ret.), Senior Program Officer for Civil-Military Affairs, United States Institute of Peace.

Panelists:

- Major General Daniel Ammerman, Commander, U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) (USACAPOC)
- Brigadier General Austin E. Renforth, Commanding General, Training Command, U.S. Marine Corps
- Colonel Daniel A. Pinnell, Director, U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute
- Colonel Scot N. Storey, Commander, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne)
- Dr. Rosemary Speers, Principal Research Scientist, Center for Naval Analyses

Civil Affairs (CA), along with the rest of the Joint Force, is increasingly being required to engage partners in Phase 0 (Shape and Influence) in order to contribute to conflict analysis and to mitigate the drivers of instability. Together, with Military Information Support Operations, Information Operations, and Foreign Area Officers, CA is considered many as the part of the Joint Force specifically suited for Peace & Stability Operations under Joint Stability Operations Doctrine and is considered a “force of choice” under the U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-5, 24 February 2014).

The CA Symposium, through the Issue Papers and this panel in particular, explored the following two questions across commands and institutions from multiple Service and Component views:

- How does or should CA contribute to conflict prevention, in coordination with other actors sharing the space?
- What CA capabilities are required to support engagement?

The purpose of this session was to (re)view the operational environment and assess where, when, and how CA professionals from all Services and Components can best be leveraged and engaged to provide the greatest return to both the communities of policy and practice. In particular, this discussion was to highlight the geographic combatant and functional commands that leverage and employ CA capabilities. Specifically, this panel was asked to hone in on conflict prevention and ways to best engage during this phase of the operational continuum.

In the wake of the points in LTG McMaster's keynote presentation and after brief introductory remarks, each panelist provided the following points:

- As the primary CA force provider, MG Ammerman focused on the ongoing CA activities that his Reserve Component (RC) force is undertaking. MG Ammerman highlighted RC CA capacities to recognize civilian drivers of conflict for "human terrain" mapping and identifying second and third order effects of U.S. security cooperation and irregular warfare actions. CA's role in engaging with multinational Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and civil society actors was specifically highlighted as a unique capability and value-added for the Joint Force.

- In addition, USACAPOC (A) not only has the only two conventional force Psychological Operations Groups, but also recently has added new Information Operations units. MG Ammerman pointed out that USACAPOC's Theater Information Operations Groups (TIOG) provide about two-fifths of the U.S. Army's information operations capacity.
- Unfortunately, the ability to fully utilize RC CA capacity is limited due to sequestration-squeezed funding and program funding constraints, stemming from Cold War era legal authorities for Reserve call-ups. USACAPOC funding has primarily been reduced to readiness related training funds with very little for operational missions. The limited number of available RC CA annual training days (14-21 days) often results in difficult choices regarding support of Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations with the lack of days for up-front training prior to CTC rotations. This often forces USACAPOC teams at CTCs with little integration time with the supported command prior to jumping into the training missions or even doing a relief in place with another unit during the CTC, which encumbers both force and operational integration and training. Limitations in authorities and budgets for RC CA also inhibit the deployment of Soldiers whose knowledge and skills sets are ideal for Phase 0 engagement missions beyond two weeks, which is not enough time to realize full potential in building and maintaining relationships and networks critical to mitigating drivers of conflict and instability as well as countering related threats.

- These restraints impede professional development in areas that make RC CA a unique capability, especially to the development of functional specialists or for CA planners at the operational and strategic levels. There is a resurgence in USAJFKSWCS/USACAPOC efforts to recruit and train functional specialists within the Civil Affairs Commands. There is also a gap in sufficient CA planners so a senior-level CA planning course proposal is being staffed for feasibility.
- A career infantry officer, Brig. Gen. Renforth focused his remarks both as an employer of CA capabilities and as head of the Marine Training Command (counterpart to the Army's Training and Doctrine Command) and having the responsibility for training and educating the Marine CA force. He noted the Marine Corps had recently doubled its number of Civil Affairs Groups. A true believer in CA capabilities from his own experience and observations as an employer of CA skills and knowledge, he discussed his support in his role as both a battalion and regimental commander. Brig. Gen. Renforth, accompanied by the Director and Deputy Director of the Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School (MCCMOS), harkened to the Corps *Small Wars* ethos and practice. He specifically highlighted the need for CA to clearly articulate their value-added in the language of the mission and how they fit into Marine concepts for the employment of forces and the broader theater campaign plan. He encouraged CA forces to not assume that their role is universally understood or guaranteed; there-

fore, he stressed the implied task that CA operators have to learn at the MOS producing school and later be able to explain – in the unique Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) lexicon – how their capabilities and practices further the success of the overall mission, particularly with respect to political consolidation of military gains, as Lt. Gen. McMaster discussed in his keynote.

- As the commander of the Army’s Active Component CA force that supports Special Operations Forces (SoF), Colonel Storey focused his remarks on his command’s on-going civil-military engagement program and its global implementation. This effort is accomplished mainly through the Civil-Military Support Elements in support of U.S. Country Teams where they require a continuous engagement missions and the conduct of Irregular Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense and Unconventional Warfare in fragile and failing states. He recognized the unique value-added of RC CA to support such missions but discussed the challenges that the Special Operations Command, in particular, had in accessing them.
- Dr. Speers brought a Navy perspective to the discussion, touching briefly on the now defunct Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command (MCAST) and how the Navy can best maintain those much-needed littoral engagement capabilities that Navy CA possessed for the Service going forward. She also pointed out the challenges associated with maintaining CA functionality in the Navy, while not having a set career path for CA, which is a similar issue for the Marine Corps.

- COL Pinnell focused on the challenges of relationships between the supported and supporting CA forces. He laid out his presentation by first explaining how peace and stability operations are a core Civil Affairs competency. However, COL Pinnell also articulated that Civil Affairs is among the least understood military capabilities. As a result, CA must do more to be an integral part of all planning and operational coordination activities within the functional and geographic combatant commands. Although better CA integration in Joint Force Phase 0 missions requires a policy-level effort to overcome legal, budgetary, programmatic, and policy impediments to gaining timely access to CA capabilities, the CA must also look to further professionalize the CA force as well as conduct aggressive education and training of commanders and staffs on how and when to best integrate CA capabilities.

During the question and answer session it became clear that a number of junior officers were interested in hearing from the experienced panel on possible solutions to existing challenges. For example, younger officers wanted seasoned advice on making that good first impression with your supported officer(s). This challenge can be difficult when a relationship does not currently exist. Panelists and participants provided some excellent advice as did other senior officers who had experienced similar circumstances.

One good example was for CA operators to be as conversant in operational doctrine and frameworks such as the Military Decision Making Process as other staff in order to clearly articulate CA value in the context of the current plan. This recommendation and

others should be captured in a guide or in accessible best practices (e.g., a CA version of the online “Company Commander” tool) and made available to junior officers. This is a potential mission for the respective CA commands and schoolhouses jointly. Another item for further exploration could be how to better source CA requirements at the training centers, given current training and readiness constraints.

In summary, the following points are offered for further consideration and action:

- Demand among the commands for CA across the full range of operations is clearly palpable. However, this is encumbered by: how Active CA Component force cuts in particular as well as how the use of the Army force generation model are “stressing” this force; and, how restraints from outdated legal authorities and budgetary mechanisms and overall funding prohibit leveraging the full force.
- Especially with respect to Phase 0, it is essential to bring CA into steady-state Geographical Combatant (GCC) and Functional Commands planning as well as develop Civil-Military Engagement (CME) support plans nested with the GCCs and country teams; and allow CA teams to Conduct CME reconnaissance, build relationships and networks, and conduct human terrain mapping. CA programs at home station, in turn, must be in support of apportioned theater objectives.
- CA forces must better prepare themselves to work in the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment; they must also be much better versed in Army operational doctrines and frameworks, espe-

cially in Irregular Warfare and Peace & Stability Operations.

CA must educate supported commands and forces on how they can best integrate their capabilities for missions across the full range of operations, at all levels of command, and in all environments, as well as provide recommendations on CA programs and operations that can be operationalized within the context of the mission and commander's plan.

Jim Ruf, Colonel, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (ret.), is a member of the U.S. Institute of Peace's Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding team where he serves as a senior program officer for civilian-military affairs.

Renewed Relevance: CA Develop Human Networks for Effective Engagement

by Major Arnel P. David

Reflecting on the lessons of recent conflict, General (ret.) Martin Dempsey emphasized “the science of human relationships.”¹ These relationships move at the “speed of trust” and, as Special Operations Command (SOCOM) claims, “You Can’t Surge Trust.”² All parties need to invest the time, personnel and resources to engage tribal leaders, community influencers, key interlocutors and civil society groups for mission success in modern war. Therefore, relationships are critically important pacing items to commanders. Rapport must be tracked, assessed and managed. This process involves sensing local communities and collecting information to depict a human engagement network.

Civil Affairs (CA) forces are best postured to assume lead in developing this human network concept. This problem set, mapping the human network, is the domain of expertise for CA, which specializes in “low-tech solutions” to “low-tech problems.”³ The CA regiment needs to (1) create a community of interest interweaving academic research on network science and ongoing Army Warfighting Challenges to examine human networks; (2) experiment with network mapping software and best practices to capture relevant data from engagements; and (3) based on these experiments update doctrine and training that supports the new Army Operating Concept (AOC).⁴

While CA teams, along with other maneuver elements, conduct engagements, they are not tracked, as-

sessed and managed in a systematic manner by staffs at multiple echelons much less integrated into planning and operations. CA teams conduct engagements, but the relationships often atrophy once the team transitions. The data tends to be lost or not analyzed in relation to theater or service priorities. Ideally, networks of key relationships translate into a cost-effective capability, bringing increased responsiveness and understanding in times of crisis.

The Importance of Networks in Military Strategy and Civil Affairs

“Subjugating the enemy without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.”

— Sun Tzu

The preceding enduring maxim of ancient strategic thought remains true for present and future conflict. Consequently, many have misconstrued this concept and persistently pursued long-range strike technology aimed to deliver ordnance that breaks an adversary’s desire to fight. The search for a technological panacea and desire to wage war in this fashion seduced key policy makers and influenced a poor allocation of resources.⁵ Researchers, conducting empirical studies, are beginning to reveal that these technological advancements (e.g. mechanization, UAVs, and smart bombs) not only failed to subjugate an enemy, their increased use strengthened the foe’s will to fight and potentially creates more enemies.⁶ Many argue that this technological obsession impeded the military’s ability to understand the social-cultural context of war and this is a “prime area of strategic weakness” for the United States⁷.

A recent RAND study of the last 13 years of war validates this lesson: "...because of the inherently human and uncertain nature of war, technology cannot substitute for sociocultural, political, and historical knowledge and understanding."⁸ Through effective engagement, CA forces work with civilian and military partners to provide commanders and ambassadors an improved understanding of the environment, and in many countries, small teams extend the reach of the US embassy. CA elements can be a cost-effective means for providing this critical context.

Past CA studies advance these strategic sentiments and this paper builds on them with two additional threads. First, CA forces serve as a principle interface between civilian and military organizations often acting as a catalyst for effective action in a critical space known as "gray zones."⁹ Gray zones are defined as a space where there is an increasing incidence of American adversaries pursuing their strategic ends in a matter that remains below the threshold for military intervention. Gray zone conflicts elude U.S. mental models and legal frameworks on the conflict spectrum between peace and war. For the second thread, the forward, limited size, and discreet activities of CA forces best posture them to contend with the puzzling array of complex relationships resident in the environment. For engagements amongst the populace there is an inverse relationship with the size of the element and the effectiveness of the engagements. Small can be beautiful and CA teams have the training and equipment to operate in contested areas where other US elements have limited access.

Creating local alliances and nurturing key relationships provide a more granular understanding of social and cultural challenges.¹⁰ The idea of decisive victory

will not present itself so cleanly in these gray zones and future conflict. The nation will have to “learn to conceptualize its victories in terms of shaping perceptions over time” and influence minor changes to complex adaptive systems.¹¹ Future conflict will not be contained “in either time or space,” rather it will span “the spectrum of human activity” and be protracted in duration.¹² Dr. Allenby warns of an evolving “civilizational conflict” and describes the paradox of U.S. conventional military dominance pushing state and non-state actor competition into asymmetric realms (gray zones) where the U.S. is reluctant to engage.¹³ The creation and use of human engagement networks provide a medium in which CA can help partners engage and take effective action.

To some, these concepts appear to depict a dark future riddled with challenges and problems unsolvable. Russia’s “new generation warfare” and China’s “unrestricted warfare” present new forms of war the U.S. must confront.¹⁴ Our generals will need to lend more credence to these “uncomfortable wars” and address the popular off-set strategy that is quickly becoming the comfortable approach.¹⁵ Nevertheless, these challenges offer new opportunities for the U.S. military to adapt, evolve, and thrive in this new space.

Technological answers alone will not address gray zone challenges and it does not require expensive solutions. Rather, operating in this space demands a continued revision of CA doctrine. Major General (ret.) Robert Scales once developed a concept of “culture-centric warfare” where winning required “creating alliances, leveraging non-military advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions – all tasks that demand exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation.”¹⁶

CA forces already do many of these things and have the requisite language, negotiation and cultural training to compete in this arena. CA's primacy in traversing civil terrain makes this branch most capable in leading the Army in culture-centric warfare and engagement. Creating a human engagement network capability requires a human and humane presence on the ground since there is no substitute for the context needed in interpreting human activity. Mechanization, UAVs, and robots can't build the essential relationships needed for a human engagement network. It will take professional operators of a type for which CA has primacy.

Human networks capture formal and informal relationships and provide the foundation for emergent social behavior. This behavior is often self-organizing. Self-organization, also known as "emergence" in complexity science circles, results from the spontaneous emergence of order at critical points of instability within complex structures.¹⁷ For example, a young person makes a decision whether to join an insurgent organization. This decision is based on a range of local factors from relatives who are members of the cell to local economic conditions. If the U.S. Army understands these connections, it can take preventive action.

A review by Sydney Tarrow of civil war scholarship finds "that it is not quantities but interactions that are the key to the dynamics of violence."¹⁸ These complex interactions of people that take the form of structures, patterns, and properties for self-organization serve as the catalyst for what Jeffrey Goldstein calls "social emergence."¹⁹ Alison Gilcrest's study of "well-connected" communities finds that strong communities emerge "as a result of the interactions within a complex web of overlapping networks."²⁰ These

communities, as social systems, “thrive at the edge of chaos in which people’s sense of community, their social identity, emerges from the unpredictable dynamics of mutual influence and interaction.”²¹ These theories provide a rich intellectual foundation for mapping networks in order to prioritize engagements and achieve desired effects.

Careful examinations of complex social systems illuminates opportunities to intervene and situations to avoid. Mapping human networks and engaging with key influencers is especially important in hybrid warfare and gray zones. In these environments, much as in Counterinsurgency (COIN), the enemy hides among the population. The high value target in these environments is the capability of the enemy to manipulate the population and leverage them for everything from logistics to intelligence and recruitment.

Therefore, building a human engagement network capability allows you to attack the adversary’s source of strength and deny them the civil terrain they need to complete their mission. This is indeed war and we must leverage multiple tools (e.g. Military Information Support Operations (MISO), Information Operations (IO), and other equities) for a synergistic effect to defeat our opponents.

Take the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, where Russian proxy forces target vulnerable groups of people and foster dissent to create access. They hide among the Russian minority population. Yet, all members of the Russian minority likely do not support these proxy groups. If the U.S. Army would have had active CA teams in Eastern Ukraine prior to the crisis and mapped the network, it would have provided engagement options and increased situational awareness for U.S. Joint Forces. The same dynamics apply in the Bal-

tics now. CA teams, with new doctrine and training, need to be engaged in Russian minority communities creating problems for malign Russian influencers.

A human network built on increased connections, relationships, and interactions enable effective engagement. The role, capability, and narrative for Civil Affairs must resonate and prove relevance for the Army and defense establishment. Until CA accepts this notion and extends its capacity to thrive in gray zones, albeit with a human engagement network, the utility of CA forces will continue to be questioned. What current doctrine and CA core tasks are missing is the method and data in which relationships are tracked and examined. The dizzying array of complex relationships within a network require an appreciation for the multiplicity of factors at play in a given environment. At the local level within a conflict, “mainstream politicians build armed wings, states collaborate with militias against common foes, police ignore private counterinsurgent armies, and warlords place their loyalists inside security forces.”²² There are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), multinational corporations, and multiple state agencies intervening in the civil domain. This complex web requires a conceptual vocabulary to intelligently explore this civil space and an understanding of civil society is key, profoundly.

By studying this dimension of the environment, CA professionals among many other elements (e.g. MISO, Foreign Area Officers (FAOs), National Guard State Partnership Program (NG SPP), and others) formulate new ways to analyze complex social systems, determine who and where to engage, and ultimately, create human engagement networks.

CA forces remain engaged around the world and their activities can be improved by the systematization of their engagement networks. To be clear, many networks of relationships exist at multiple levels, but they are not measured or captured in any meaningful way. Sadly, many networks lack resilience and the absence of constant management limit their effectiveness. In an era of declining resources, any activity or engagement should not be wasted. Therefore, all CA forces (active and reserve) must embrace the notion of not only persistent – for example, enduring Civil Military Support Elements (CMSEs) in various countries – but *effective engagement*. All engagements matter and build cumulatively to strengthen the network. A human network built on increased connections, relationships, and interactions enable effective engagement.

Recommendations

The Army needs effective engagement to become a force-wide competency. Civil affairs' experience, specialization, and access to the civil domain accelerate learning opportunities. The planned reduction of CA forces and continued fiscal austerity not only make this effort timely but compulsory as well. Networks form the key of embracing this concept of effective engagement. From a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) perspective, realizing human network engagement requires investments of time and thought in new doctrine and training. With respect to doctrine, we need to create a community of interest to look at what ideas from network science can be leveraged for doctrinal integration.

Many regard social science as the science of the twenty-first century.²³ Social phenomena are among the most difficult scientific problems to solve and Albert-László Barabási finds “the dynamics of many social, technological, and economic phenomena are driven by individual human actions, turning the quantitative understanding of human behavior into a central question for modern science.”²⁴ Leading scholars in network science have recently developed ways to describe interactions in quantitative terms.²⁵ The Network Science Center at West Point is currently experimenting with these concepts.²⁶ A team of sophisticated mathematicians and scientists created network models, assessment techniques, and an algorithm to prioritize strategic actions in ungoverned spaces.²⁷

Fortunately, there are other academic institutions and research firms eager to partner for testing and experimentation. CA needs to develop a community of interest to maintain traction on emerging developments in this network science area. After testing and proof of concept, the interest group should evolve into a program of record and become an advanced course for planners. Building effective human engagement networks will require both training and additional education.

Any undertaking to intervene in an environment constitutes an obligation to cultivate *causal literacy*.²⁸ Causal Literacy is an obligation to study causal claims that academic scholars proffer. Colonel Celestino Perez argues that those “who must attempt to imagine a range of potential outcomes, windows of opportunity, and associated probabilities – should find the contemporary science of conflict and war to be an indispensable aid to competent, and thereby ethical, performance.”²⁹ It is an incredible responsibil-

ity to traverse the civil domain and CA forces must suffuse theory and practice for effective application. The development of an advanced CA planner course provides standardization for building the network combined with an ability to explore cutting-edge academic scholarship.

A network not only builds capacity and capability, it can provide explanations to address causes rather than symptoms and see the forest rather than trees. Similarly, in the medical field, mistaking symptoms as causes is dangerous, yet providing a prescription with the wrong diagnosis can be fatal. Effective partnering, backed by causal literacy, provides a better contextualization of the environment and illuminates cultural dynamics not immediately visible. In addition to academic theory, research has produced open source tools for data collection and visualization.

The military is plagued by expensive software suites and costly contractual obligations (e.g. Distributed Common Ground System -Army (DCGS-A), Palantir, Civil Information Management Data Processing System (CIMDPS)). New digital investments are unlikely in this new era of austerity. However, there are many free and open source solutions available for immediate use to capture sociopolitical data, aid in managing relationships, and capture atmospherics.³⁰ To begin, the software solution does not need to be overly complicated. A wiki-type function is all that is required to get started. Data collection entails capturing the different types of relationships, interactions, and actors present in a particular locality or region. Social scientists have developed powerful visualization tools (multidimensional and 3D) to depict complex social systems. The growing interconnectedness of the world and confluence of human interaction

and increased urbanization change the environment at an accelerating rate.³¹ This speed of change necessitates a higher level of analysis. A visually depicted network with the ability to disaggregate and bracket components of a system provides a vital lens for analyzing the operational environment. Moreover, these observed connections, interactions, and relationships are becoming more measureable and manageable. Currently, CA projects and assessments are captured, indexed, and shared on a database (CIMDPS) but there is no mechanism for tracking relationships.

In volatile areas like Yemen, Pakistan, Lebanon, and many other regions, there is no record or history of the relationships and networks built once forces depart. The current conflict in Yemen is a prime example. How many of the young people joining the ranks of an extremist group might have been identified beforehand if we would have just saved our previous community engagement data and created a method to analyze areas at risk of tipping into extremist activities. Maintaining a current network with key touchpoints provides enduring insight into an environment that might become a future objective.

Taken together, CA can lead the Army in engagement by engendering three recommendations: (1) create a community of interest interweaving academic research on network science and ongoing Army Warfighting Challenges to examine human networks; (2) experiment with network mapping software and best practices to capture relevant data from engagements; and (3) based on these experiments update doctrine and training that supports the new Army Operating Concept (AOC). The community of interest within the regiment must work and contribute to the Army's top two Warfighting challenges: (1) develop situational

understanding, and (2) shape the security environment. Innovation in the CA regiment does not require a material solution but iterative intellectual discussions to modify doctrine in ways that improve engagement for CA and the Army.

Conclusion

In spite of the analytical rigor required to examine these human networks, it is essential for the formulation of strategy to plan effective engagement. This paper began by outlining the significance of relationships. Often taken for granted, CA forces extend the reach of U.S. embassies and military organizations into areas that are contested and not conducive to non-military entities.

In an era of declining resources and competing priorities, it is imperative to build an effective human engagement network of partners to attack collective action problems in these growing gray zones. These networks of capability have the propensity to present multiple dilemmas to our nation's adversaries. Ideally, networks of key relationships translate into a cost-effective capability that brings increased understanding and responsiveness in times of crisis. A review of complex social systems and network science illuminates a realization that building human networks is of supreme importance and within the realm of the possible. Further examination and experimentation of this concept renews relevance and increases the proposition value of Civil Affairs for the military and the nation.

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From Green to Blue: U.S. Army Civil Affairs and International Police Engagement

Captain Rob Kobold

Hard-earned and costly experience in the last few decades has demonstrated that the inability of a government to provide safety and security to its people is a key driver of instability. However, truly free and stable societies are built on foundations which are sturdier than military force alone. Civilian police forces, dedicated to and governed by the Rule of Law, are critical to long term stability and conflict prevention. This fact is not unknown; the U.S. Government and the International Community have invested billions of dollars in just the last decade developing and supporting civilian police forces as part of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction activities. In spite of these sincere efforts, a key aspect of long term support to civilian police development is missing: long term civilian police engagement. Military to military engagement has been a key role of the United States Armed Forces for generations.

The benefits of building lasting relationships with allied military forces are well known: U.S. Forces are able to develop interoperability, mentor foreign forces and, in the best cases, serve as a model for the ethical and moral use of force. The benefits of engaging police professionals from the United States with peers overseas are similar. The challenge lies in developing lasting relationships with civilian police forces in host-nations when the United States has no standing expeditionary force of law enforcement advisors. Law enforcement experts from the Reserve Component in

general and the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) in particular are a unique resource, deployable during all operational phases, working with military and Interagency (IA) partners, and leveraging their connection to domestic civilian police agencies to develop the persistent bonds with supported police services necessary for long-term mentoring and support.

Police Forces: More than Security

The role and function of the security sector is critical in both preventing conflict, and transitioning a society from conflict to recovery and reconstruction. But developing civilian police forces is a complicated task, requiring specialized skills and unique experience. While military personnel have experience in many security roles, the U.S. military does not police civilian populations as a core competency. The lessons learned from more than a decade of contingency operations have demonstrated that security alone is simply not enough to contribute to stability. Populations require “safety, security and justice” for true stability to take root.¹ These principles are predicated on a functioning Rule of Law system, which serves to prevent, investigate and provide lawful punishment for criminal behavior.

When discussing why an effective civilian police force is critical in a free society, it is often useful to highlight the differences between the military and the police. The first difference is one of function; the military is an external security force, trained and equipped to project power beyond the borders of the state. Police forces, on the other hand, are a domestic security force, trained and equipped to guarantee peace, order

and security to the civilian population.² Civilian police are trained and organized to use minimal force and maximum contact with the community in order to achieve a safe and secure environment; militaries are, by their very nature, designed to use overwhelming force and only mission essential contact with civilians in order to achieve an objective.³ These differences dictate the third and most important attribute of civilian policing: legitimacy. Because civilian police are not expected to use overwhelming force against the people they are expected to serve, they require the consent of the population to be the guardians of order. Civilian police maintain order in a democratic society because it is their communal and accepted role, not because of the threat of force.⁴ The importance of police legitimacy is key to the founding of modern policing in the London Metropolitan Police by Sir Robert Peel: civilian police cannot simply demand to be the guardians of order; the community must accept that the police have a duty and responsibility to enforce the law.

A key aspect of stability is to ensure that parties to conflict are separated and that law and order is maintained. While this task may require military force at certain conflict stages, in the long term the maintenance of social order is a core police task.⁵ Additionally, effective and democratic police forces are an important barometer of the effectiveness of a state. The manner in which the police function is important for the citizens of the country in question. Effectiveness, or lack thereof, also matters to those external actors with whom the state has relations. As USAID guidelines for assisting law enforcement agencies in developing countries note, “for the average citizen, civilian police is the most visible symbol of government and an indicator of quality of governance”⁶

This is why support to host nation law enforcement capabilities is an integral part of the institution building process; effective policing creates public confidence in the ability of a state to govern. But the goal of domestic security is not simply the development of effective law enforcement agencies; instead, the goal of an effective police support program is the development of Rule of Law. This requires the development of multiple structures: fair and effective laws, trusted law enforcement agencies, transparent courts and competent custody agents and facilities.⁷ The complexity of these programs, and time it takes to develop the expertise and ethical outlook required for success, demand training and support programs which take a long term view. Effective support to police programs depends on training, mentorship and the modeling of effective behavior; persistent engagement between U.S. policing experts and host nation personnel.

Current U.S. Government International Law Enforcement Development Strategies

In spite of the challenges presented by law enforcement support operations, the United States has a long history of involvement in international police training. The first large scale international law enforcement mission undertaken by U.S. forces was in post-World War II Germany, where the U.S. Constabulary was specifically organized as a force to police German civilians, alongside a training program to develop decentralized civilian police forces in Germany, based upon a British and American model of local policing.⁸

Since the end of the Cold War the number and type of police support operations has expanded. Following the invasion of Panama in 1989, the government com-

pletely rebuilt the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) as a civilian law enforcement agency. This effort led to police support and development operations in Haiti, El Salvador, Liberia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq; as well as numerous smaller training missions. The lead agency for U.S. government support to foreign law enforcement agencies is the Department of State (DoS), with the Department of Justice (DoJ), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of Defense (DoD) providing support. During these missions, three staffing models have emerged for training host nation police forces: using currently serving police officers, using contract law enforcement experts, or employing U.S. military personnel to train and mentor local law enforcement.

The use of currently serving law enforcement officers as international police trainers and mentors is the rarest staffing model in U.S. operations. While some Federal law enforcement officers, such as Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) or Border Patrol Agents can be assigned to overseas postings as part of their employment, the same is not true of State and Local police officers. In Canada and most European countries, there is a national Constabulary which is often the primary agency for managing international police advisory missions.⁹ The lack of a centralized deployment capability for U.S. law enforcement officers has made their use ineffective.

An example of this weakness was the 2015 deployment of several law enforcement trainers from the Reno Police Department to the Ukraine, to support Department of Justice sponsored western style Police Academy. These officers were deployed under the authority of the Mayor and the Police Chief, but were

recalled when the City Manager and the City Council raised concerns about the cost, the loss of local officers, and the liability to the city for injured or killed police officers.¹⁰ This challenge of staffing has been one reason why U.S. assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies has made limited the use of active state and local law enforcement officers.

Due to these staffing issues, most civilian overseas law enforcement trainers and mentors supporting overseas law enforcement support operations are contractors. The use of contractors allows the U.S. Government access to a broad pool of experienced law enforcement officers. But the use of contractors presents its own unique challenges. The first is that the majority of those serving in contracting roles are retired law enforcement officers, as most active officers cannot obtain a long term leave of absence to serve in overseas missions - which may last a year or more. Their status can lead to issues including the lack of physical fitness of some of the officers deployed, as well as others who are not prepared to live and work in austere operating environments. This trend has resulted in an environment where civilian law enforcement contractors are unpredictable and unaccountable, which complicates the process of developing host nation law enforcement capacity.¹¹ The next challenge posed by using contractors is the time it takes to recruit, screen, organize and deploy contractors overseas. During the crisis in Somalia in 1991-1993, a requirement for an effective national police force was identified as a key factor for the long term stability of the country, but due to the lack of a readily deployable police support package, the security situation collapsed before any cohesive training plan could be implemented.¹²

Due to the lack of any alternative, Military Police units have frequently been tasked to train local police forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. While these units do perform law enforcement tasks, they lack experience being the primary police agency for a civilian population.¹³ The challenge for Military Police units does not arise from training technical skills, the “low order skills”, required by police officers i.e. crowd control, weapons handling, and tactical response. Rather, the challenge is the “high order” policing knowledge, the daily interaction a police officer has with the community and the ability to handle complicated and nebulous situations presented by diverse societies, such as dealing with quality of life and homeless issues.

These skills can only be developed with experience.¹⁴ This skill deficit cannot be bridged effectively by training alone, it requires layers of experience - both individual and organizational - to successfully navigate the challenges of democratic policing.¹⁵ It is for this reason that in civilian law enforcement training, the experiential portion of police officer development is acknowledged and codified in the formal Field Training system, where a new officer in the field is trained and assessed by a more experienced officer. But the biggest problem of using military units to train local police forces is that this relationship blurs the line between military and police. In stable, free societies, the military does not play a role in policing civilians. The long term success of law enforcement capacity building would be best served by nurturing and developing the civilian nature of policing as early as possible.

Bridging the Capabilities Gap

The use of experienced civilian police officers (CIVPOL) is the international best practice for assessing, training and mentoring law enforcement agencies in developing and post-conflict societies.¹⁶ The early implementation of a civilian police force serves to define and maintain the difference between police and military. International experience with CIVPOL has demonstrated that an early civilian law enforcement presence is effective in Stability Operations, as the establishment of Rule of Law is a prerequisite for political and economic development.¹⁷ The main challenge to current staffing model is the lack of an ability to build long term police engagement with host nation agencies. Persistent engagement would require long term contact between CIVPOL advisers and the indigenous police agency. This link requires serving law enforcement officers, who can not only deploy to the host nation to provide training and mentorship, but can serve as a host for IA programs which bring foreign police leaders for training and experiential tours in the United States. Current staffing models do not support relationship building in police engagement: the answer to this challenge lies in the capabilities and expertise found in the Reserve Component in general and U.S. Army Civil Affairs in particular.

Civil Affairs has long had specialists who advise in various capacities of civil society, from economic development and education, to public transport and administration. USACAPOC has recently sought to expand this capability with the implementation of the Governance Specialist Program (38G) under the Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG). USACAPOC already has a wealth of law enforcement

experience within its ranks, but this revitalization of the core tasks of Civil Affairs allows specific skill sets to be quantified and recorded.¹⁸ This skillset enables USACAPOC the capability to draw policing specialists with backgrounds specifically tailored to mission needs: general policing, investigations, training, incarceration and administration. Also, law enforcement specialists within USACAPOC will have the opportunity to interact and train with other critical governance specialists; such as prosecutors, defense attorneys and social workers, preparing to advise host nation authorities on a full spectrum of services.

The use of USACAPOC as a key agency for law enforcement advising and training has several advantages. The first is the fact that Civil Affairs soldiers are deployable, and can develop long term engagement to advise and support host nation police agencies. The second is that experienced police leaders within USACAPOC have broad backgrounds in a variety of law enforcement skills. These experiential skillsets are necessary for successful modern law enforcement agencies; skillsets such as community policing, managing diverse populations, and public safety focused problem solving.

Finally, the previous deployment histories and professional military education of Civil Affairs officers also provides them practical experience and training in operating within military task force organizations. Civil Affairs officers with a public safety background have the unique ability to interact as both police and military leaders. The development of a pool of law enforcement specialists within USACAPOC gives combatant commanders a rapidly deployable, task organized force of civilian law enforcement specialists who would be able to integrate into COCOM plan-

ning and implementation.¹⁹ The early introduction of civilian law enforcement expertise into contingency planning shifts the focus of civilian policing capacity building from an operational afterthought to a “Phase 0” planning consideration. This movement makes police capability development a critical conflict prevention tool.

A Way Forward

In order for a cohesive police support program, which can work with broader interagency efforts, to develop within USACAPOC, several substantive changes would need to be implemented. A full strategic gap analysis focused on this issue is beyond the scope of this monograph; however by focusing on changes to current Stability Operations doctrine, the organization of International Police Support Teams in CACOMs, and leveraging the use of personnel, a clear roadmap for how law enforcement expertise from within USACAPOC can be leveraged emerges.

Current Stability Operations (SO) doctrine does not place significant emphasis on the use of military personnel with civilian law enforcement skills in developing, supporting or advising foreign police services. *JP 3-07 Stability Operations* correctly points out that “USG efforts to develop indigenous police forces are led by (DoS), with assistance from DoJ and DoD.”²⁰ While the Department of State will still have the primary role in developing foreign law enforcement capabilities, emphasis should be changed from merely providing support to these programs to playing an active role, specifically through the use of Law Enforcement specialists from USACAPOC. The current SO doctrine recognizes that the establishment of

“Police Primacy” in internal security is a goal, it does not leverage the military resources available to support this, especially Reservists with specialized law enforcement experience.

The organization of law enforcement specialist governance teams within the CACOMs would be the next best step toward leveraging police expertise to support conflict prevention. In order to evolve in this manner, it is critical to build partnerships with IA partners; the DOS, the DOJ and USAID. By building bridges with these organizations, USACAPOC will make its resources and expertise visible and ensure that law enforcement experts from within the command are able to contribute to the valuable missions undertaken by these organizations.²¹ Relationships with IA partners would be especially effective at the CACOM level; regionally oriented police support teams based at each CACOM would be best suited to develop and maintain relations with locally based IA partners, embassy personnel, FAO’s and local host nation law enforcement agencies.

A closer relationship between these agencies and USACAPOC would be symbiotic; DoS, DoJ and USAID have preexisting relationships with international and host nation law enforcement agencies and ongoing support programs, while Civil Affairs Governance Specialists provide key capability and gap analysis expertise. An additional benefit to the active use of Civil Affairs personnel as host nation law enforcement advisers would be the development of personal relationships between these officers and key host nation police leaders. Many of these agencies bring foreign police leaders to the United States for training or modeling purposes; Civil Affairs officers who have developed relationships with police leaders in

their home nations would be prepositioned to serve as hosts and mentors should these leaders be brought to the United States for training. Developing long-term relationships between Civil Affairs law enforcement Governance Specialists and host nation police leaders would prove to be invaluable to the support of long-term stability operations.

The Civil Affairs community has already begun to make structural changes that enhance the ability for USACAPOC to support overseas law enforcement capacity building programs throughout all operational phases. The first is the development of the 38G Military Governance Specialist Program. This program provides commanders and USACAPOC with public safety leaders who possess quantifiable skills in various law enforcement specialties, which ensures that deployable Civil Affairs officers with required skills are available at all operational phases.²² But in order to ensure the greatest impact of this program, the effort to capture applicable police skills developed in a Reservist's civilian career must be expanded to Reservists outside of USACAPOC, and it must include members of the National Guard. The National Guard State Partnership Program (NG SPP) already has National Guard members conducting bilateral training with host nation forces. These relationships could be expanded to partner police officers within the National Guard with police professionals as well.

The development of personal relationships between police officers within USACAPOC, the Reserves and the National Guard with key host nation police leaders would generate many benefits. IA partners (International Narcotics and Law (INL) and International Crime Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)) bring foreign police leaders to the

United States for training or modeling purposes; law enforcement officers who have developed relationships with police leaders in host nations would be prepositioned to serve as hosts and mentors should these leaders be brought to the United States for training. Developing long-term relationships between Civil Affairs law enforcement Governance Specialists and other law enforcement professionals with host nation police leaders would prove to be invaluable to the development of effective policing agencies overseas, contributing immeasurable worth to comprehensive conflict prevention efforts.²³

Effective, transparent and legitimate police services are more than simply a governmental service; they are critical to stability and are a key conflict prevention tool. Conversely, ineffective police forces and the use of military forces for law enforcement are both drivers of instability and public symbols of poor governance. Developing an effective police force is a long term project, one requiring experienced and skilled experts. Law enforcement governance specialists from USACAPOC Civil Affairs units are positioned to bridge this capability gap, by working with both military and civilian based police support operations.

By building lasting ties with law enforcement leaders in partner nations, Civil Affairs personnel will become key agents in shaping police agencies as stable, public service centered institutions. Persistent engagement, and the development of lasting relationships between key police leaders and Civil Affairs law enforcement specialists, can be a key component of developing police agencies in host nations which are capable of supporting stability, and contributing to wider development efforts.

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9. In Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is the managing agency for international police advising (<http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/po-mp/index-eng.htm>). France has the *Gendarmerie* and Germany the *Bundespolizei*, both are Federal law enforcement agencies. Europe has developed a standing law enforcement expeditionary capacity utilizing these national level constabulary forces (<http://www.eurogendfor.org/>).

10. Reno Gazette Journal Editorial Board. 4th March 2015. <http://www.rgj.com/story/opinion/editorials/2015/03/04/wrong-recall-reno-police-ukraine-view/24322369/>

11. Studies of the use of contract personnel within DOS INL have revealed several problems. This program relies mainly on retired law enforcement officers, who are frequently not physically capable of the demands of Stability Operations. Due to staff turn-over and the lack of a doctrine writing headquarters, international law enforcement support programs lack institutional stability. Key personnel from DOS provide oversight and manage contracts, but do little to capture institutional knowledge. A further consideration is additional legal liability.

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20. JP 3-07, *Stability Operations*, p III-46.

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22. Blais, Curtis (Ed.). *Governance Innovation for Security and Development: Recommendations for U.S. Army Civil Affairs 38G Civil Sector Officers*. Technical Report. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. P63-66.

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Civil Engagement as a Tool for Conflict Prevention: A Case Study

**Captain Tammy Sloulin and
Lieutenant Colonel Steve Lewis**

Instability in Central America continues to present a challenge to the security of the United States (U.S.). Poverty, inequality, lack of basic services and education, and the highest murder rates in the world plague Central America.¹ An estimated ninety percent of cocaine destined for the U.S. travels through Central America, managed by transnational criminal organizations (TCO) through their expanding covert networks of corruption, intimidation, and violence.² Violent street gangs have partnered with TCOs, and this has allowed them to morph into criminal insurgencies, displacing state control and establishing parallel governing structures in key locations along illicit trafficking routes.³ This trend is leading to the degradation and displacement of state sovereignty, especially in the “Northern Tier” of Central America.⁴ The spike in the numbers of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) during the summer of 2014,⁵ the sustained mega-high rates of violence, the continued ease with which TCOs smuggle mass quantities of illicit goods into the U.S., and the inability of Northern Tier countries to slow these trends or regain control of ungoverned spaces are key indicators that the sovereignty of the Northern Tier states is threatened.

Many experts agree that the “withering of public authority,” the expansion of transnational illicit networks, and the growth of “alternately governed” areas represents a real threat to the security of the U.S.⁶ Regardless, the Department of Defense has neither the

resources nor the political mandate to conduct large-scale stability operations.⁷ If the current proclivity to violence, transnational criminal activities, and the deterioration of state sovereignty continue, the existing window to prevent a greater catastrophe (which would mandate large-scale troop deployments) may close rapidly. Thus, the United States Government (USG) must develop a sound and executable strategy for relatively cheap small-footprint approaches to prevent conflict before this nexus grows into a calamity that requires large deployments.⁸ This paper will examine the utility of a U.S. Civil Affairs Team (CAT) as one of the better elements of the USG's small-footprint conflict prevention strategy.

In this paper, we will explore the drivers of instability and violence as a way to determine potential opportunities for mitigating these drivers and, thus, prevent the spread of violence. Next, we will examine the operational environment within which this case study occurs in order to better understand the specific drivers of violence at play in Honduras (which the CAT in our case study encountered at the beginning of its mission). Subsequently, using the factors of security, governance, and development, we will explore what a CAT could theoretically do to prevent violence then examine what the team in our case study actually did and whether it was actually effective.

Finally, we will examine the lessons learned from this case study and make recommendations for future missions of these types.

Drivers of Instability and Theory of Prevention

Although many factors may drive conflict, in this paper, we will focus on the drivers outlined in *Joint*

Publication 3-07 Stability Operations. The elements of a stable society are human security (security), economic and infrastructure development (development), and governance and rule of law (governance).⁹ In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the mission, we start with the assumption that lack of security, legitimate governance, and development makes populations vulnerable to internal strife or manipulation by violent non-state actors (VNSA), which leads to conflict.

In societies where the elements of security, governance, and development are weak, instability and conflict fester. Lack of *security* leads to a breakdown in the social order and offers VNSA the freedom to prey on vulnerable populations. The presence of security forces perceived as illegitimate can also lead to conflict as people will distrust their actions. Security forces that are viewed as corrupt or subversive are “major barriers” to state legitimacy and will drastically impede governance and development.¹⁰

Lack of *governance*, in turn, creates a vacuum which is exploited by illicit groups seeking to establish hospitable environments within which they pursue their own activities. Insurgencies seek to establish shadow governments in order to legitimize their attempts to supplant the state, and TCOs and criminal gangs seek to transform state institutions through corruption and intimidation, in a process known as *state capture* or *state reconfiguration*.¹¹

Lack of *development* leaves the people with few legal alternatives, thus, forcing many to choose illegal or violent activities to survive.¹² It's clear that lack of security leads to conflict, lack of governance leads to conflict, and lack of development leads to conflict. Thus, our hypothesis for conflict prevention is therefore based on supporting a partner nation's

(PN's) efforts to improve security, governance, and development.

Case Study Background – Honduras

The Republic of Honduras currently suffers under the confluence of “alarming levels of crime and violence, high levels of poverty and food insecurity, and ineffective governance.”¹³ Additionally, Honduras has become a hub for narco-trafficking criminal organizations, through which cocaine and other illicit goods flow from the Andean Ridge to North America. The tremendous wealth associated with narco-trafficking allows local and transnational criminal organizations to supplant state control of under-governed areas in order to facilitate more effective trafficking.¹⁴ The Department (province/state) of Gracias a Dios (GaD) is the “mouth of the funnel” into which much of the illicit traffic flows.¹⁵ GaD is a remote region of eastern Honduras that is bordered to the north and east by the Caribbean Sea and to the south by Nicaragua. GaD is also physically isolated from the rest of Honduras by the lack of all-weather roads, making the only legitimate connections those by air or sea. However, there are a variety of covert roads and river routes by which illicit goods are smuggled.

Physical isolation is matched by social isolation: the majority Miskito population of GaD successfully resisted Spanish occupation in the eighteenth century and continues to resist the influence of the Government of Honduras (GoH) in the twenty-first century.¹⁶ The Miskito in Honduras also have a strong connection to the Miskito in neighboring Nicaragua, making them even more resistant to Tegucigalpa's influence. As a result of a combination of mistrust, neglect, and

lack of resources, the central government provides very few services to the people of GaD. Lack of a robust government presence, limited economic opportunities, and the region's utility for narco-trafficking have made GaD a region ripe for conflict.

The CAT's Approach

In light of the growing problems of violence, TCO growth, and the potential for greater violence and loss of state sovereignty, the Honduran Military (HNDMIL) Joint Staff developed a plan to defeat the TCOs and criminal gangs and reestablish security and governance in vulnerable areas. This plan—*Operation Morazán*—included the positioning of interagency task forces led by the HNDMIL in under-governed areas. In GaD, the HNDMIL established Task Force Policarpo Paz Garcia (TF Paz). In addition, the GoH granted the U.S. Embassy's Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) permission to deploy a U.S. Army CAT with TF Paz.

A CAT is a four-soldier team designed to work with PN military and civilian organizations in austere environments. The team consists of a team leader, a team sergeant/operations sergeant, a CA NCO/civil information manager, and a medical specialist. Such a team was available as part of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Civil Affairs Engagement Program (CAEP) and sourced from the 81st Civil Affairs Battalion in Fort Hood, Texas. The designated CAT (CAT-HONDO), and it was placed under the operational control of Special Operations Command-South (SOCSOUTH) and the tactical control of SOC-SOUTH's forward command and control element (SOCFWD). CAT-HONDO was supported by a Civil

Military Operations Center (CMOC) co-located with the SOCFWD.

CAT-HONDO did not plan to focus on addressing the grievances and social ills of the people of GaD. The problems were vast, the resources of CAT-HONDO were limited, and the provision of social services by U.S. Forces would undermine the legitimacy of the GoH. Instead, CAT-HONDO's mission was to help TF Paz achieve stability and to disrupt TCOs in GaD by building the GoH's legitimacy, influence, and capacity. In support of this objective, CAT-HONDO developed four lines of effort: First - conducting thorough civil reconnaissance in partnership with TF Paz to better understand the drivers of instability that TCOs leverage to manipulate vulnerable populations; Second - building the capacity of TF Paz to conduct positive civil engagement with the people of GaD; Third - building the capacity of local governments in partnership with TF Paz and the local departmental and municipal governments; and finally - facilitating greater positive interaction and connection between all potential unified action partners (such as the local government, non-governmental organizations, U.S.G agencies, and civil society) in support of security, governance, and development in GaD.

Security

Security is the ability of the people to lead their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence.¹⁷ An essential element of citizen security is the relationship between the security forces (SecFor) and the people whom they are tasked with protecting. A poor relationship fosters mutual mistrust and leads each side to view the other with suspicion. Mistrust

limits information flow, leads the population to see the SecFor as illegitimate, and caU.S.es the SecFor to use force inappropriately. Thus, positive and persistent engagement between the SecFor and the population is essential for security, and when the state fails to provide security, other groups quickly fill the vacuum.

What can a CAT do to improve security? The most effective role a CAT can play in building PN security involves helping the security forces understand the value of civil engagement and then building their capacity to conduct civil engagement. The first step entails building the PN SecFor understanding that civil engagement is not a public relations ploy or a feel-good task best left to the period after the conclusion of a conflict. Rather, it is an essential task in the displacement of the influence of, the disruption of, and the defeat of VNSA.

Populations supply VNSA with safe havens, recruits, information, and resources either because they are intimidated or they see the VNSA as legitimately filling the role of security provider. The PN SecFor must prove to the people that they are their protectors and that the VNSA are the manipulators. They can do this through a sustained effort to positively engage the population. Successful CA teams have built the understanding then the capacity of PN SecFor, which, in turn, have led to the greater legitimacy and influence of the PN on the population and decreased support for the VNSA.

What did CAT-HONDO do to improve security? In GaD, the historic mistrust between the Miskito people and the central government represented a significant challenge for TF Paz. CAT-HONDO worked with TF Paz, assisting with mission analysis and the development of a civil engagement plan in support of Opera-

tion Morazán. Among the key elements of this plan were the security outposts that TF Paz established in remote border and illicit trafficking areas of GaD. CAT-HONDO worked closely with these outposts to conduct civil reconnaissance in order to better understand the civil vulnerabilities that the TCOs used to manipulate and influence the population. Then, CAT-HONDO and the individual outposts would develop small civic action projects to facilitate the outposts' engagement with these small communities. The projects included: small-scale medical outreach programs, school renovations, and donations of school supplies.

This effort improved communication and, at the same time, TF Paz grew to better understand the population, the illicit trafficking routes, and how the TCOs intimidated the local population. Furthermore, the effort enabled TF Paz to better protect the people and expand the influence and legitimacy of the GoH in the eyes of the Miskito population. At the end of their deployment TF Paz informed CAT 8135 that TF Paz had observed a marked decrease in illicit trafficking activities in areas with greater TF Paz presence and engagement. Additionally, local government leaders reported less intimidation by TCOs.

An additional program with which CAT-HONDO assisted TF Paz was the *Guardianes de la Patria* or Guardians of the Homeland Program. The GoH designed this youth mentorship program to address low school attendance, lack of patriotism and national spirit, and lack of positive role models for the youth of GaD. The program provided the HNDMIL with the platform needed to reach out to the community and address many of the issues that contributed to insecurity and instability in the region. The program also allowed the military to routinely leave the base

and interact with the population, increasing trust and confidence between the community and the military. CAT-HONDO connected resources and funding from multiple NGOs which significantly increased the impact of the program.

Governance

Governance is a situation “where the state provides essential services and serves as a responsible steward of state resources; government officials are held accountable through political and legal processes; . . . the population can participate in governance;” and the people can enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state.¹⁸ Governments are deemed effective when they adequately perform the functions of governance within the expectations and norms of the people they govern. When the state is seen as illegitimate, instability and conflict ensue because “citizens tend to withdraw support from governments that cannot or will not provide basic services and some level of economic opportunity.”¹⁹

What can CATs do to improve governance? CATs can facilitate the improvement of the capacity and legitimacy of local governments by various means. One of the most successful is relationship building and the connection of the local government to other government and non-government partners. In many developing countries, the national, provincial, and local government agencies are not synchronized and, in some cases, work toward conflicting objectives. Thus, a CAT can work with the local government to expand its network of support and assist the broader network to better understand the local government’s challenges. This network can include PN government agencies,

USG agencies such as USAID, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Additionally, the CA team can build the capacity of the local government to engage its own constituents in order to better understand and address their needs. Encouraging citizen participation in the local government's activities and programs will build its legitimacy.²⁰ The planning and execution of civic action projects designed to facilitate interaction between the people and their local government is a principal tool that CATs use to increase interaction and participation.

What did CAT-HONDO do to improve governance?
At the beginning of CAT-HONDO's deployment, the Governor of GaD and the Commander of TF Paz did not work together. The Governor of GaD, a native Miskito, did not clearly understand the role or the disposition of the security forces in his department. As for the Commander of TF Paz, a non-Miskito from central Honduras, he did not know the governor and conducted operations using the same methods he had employed in other parts of Honduras. Conflicts arose between the Miskito people and TF Paz as a result of their poor relationship. The team assisted in bridging the gap between the two leaders, and this facilitated greater communication and cooperation between them. A significant success was achieved in August 2014 when CAT-HONDO, with the support of the CMOC, assisted the Governor in organizing a meeting of all six mayors in GaD (It was significant because they represented different political parties and rarely cooperated) and facilitated the attendance of a senior GoH official representing the Vice President's office. It was the first time a senior official of the Hernandez administration had visited GaD. This visit significantly improved the legitimacy of the national government

in the eyes of the Miskito and initiated a strategic dialogue which continues to this day.

Based on the developing cooperation among TF Paz, the Governor, and the mayors, a significant deficiency was identified. It turned out that GoH agencies, such as the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education, were unable to move supplies from Puerto Lempira (the capital of GaD) to schools and clinics in remote villages. CAT-HONDO helped TF Paz develop a plan to deliver these needed supplies as part of their logistical resupplying of their remote security outposts.

Development

Economic development refers to the “ability of the people to pursue the opportunities for livelihoods within a system of economic governance bound by law.”²¹ Put differently, the state must create the environment needed to “unleash the potential of the private sector.”²² Renowned economist, William Easterly, once sagely offered, “Remember, aid cannot achieve the end of poverty. Only homegrown development based on the dynamism of individuals and firms in free markets can do that.”²³ Thus, the state should work to facilitate an environment conducive to development. Some key actions with which the state can facilitate private sector growth are improving the security of the population; expanding and maintaining physical infrastructure; improving human capital through educational, vocational, and health programs; crafting a reliable regulatory framework managed by dependable civil servants; and facilitating positive civil engagement to improve the community’s social capital.

What can a CAT do to improve development? As mentioned previously, support for security and governance can improve the environment and encourage development. The improved legitimacy of the state can facilitate both internal and external investment. There are two additional tasks that a CAT can do to facilitate development. First, the CAT can work with the PN and USG interagency to facilitate information flow and assist in aligning the proper resources to support development. Second, the CAT, working closely with other partners, can assist the local government to plan and execute projects and programs which will improve the development environment and expand the social capital of the community. Programs such as school renovation and medical outreach activities done in partnership with the OSC humanitarian assistance program (HAP) can improve both the human capital and physical infrastructure of a community. Moreover, ensuring broad community consultation and participation in these projects will improve the social capital of the community.

What did CAT-HONDO do to improve development? As noted, the simple act of helping TF Paz to develop positive relationships with the people of GaD built people's confidence in the state and led to some improvement in their willingness to pursue legal economic opportunities. CAT-HONDO and the CMOC collaborated to connect and support a variety of organizations working to improve development in GaD. CAT-HONDO worked with U.S.AID to assist a vocational training program the latter was conducting with a local Catholic NGO. The CMOC and CAT-HONDO linked several municipal governments in GaD to a Honduran university (which had seeds and agricultural resources such as training and land assessments)

in order to increase food production in the region and decrease the need to import food which significantly decreased the financial burden on low income communities. CAT-HONDO and the CMOC also coordinated with the Ministry of Education to improve the local school facilities and availability of teachers.

Effects Achieved and Lessons Learned

After almost a year in GaD, CAT-HONDO was able to observe changes in the three factors that were potential drivers of conflict. TF Paz significantly increased its presence in and access to remote locations and populations throughout GaD, especially along illicit trafficking routes. They now have a much better relationship with the population, and the friendly exchange of information is common. This new information connection has led to a measurable decrease in illicit trafficking and intimidation of local government representatives. The improved coordination between the military and the civil government also enhances the legitimacy of both the military and local government. CAT-HONDO also observed improvements in development situation as people report greater confidence in the state and willingness to invest in their community.

Persistent Presence. Success in this mission was built on the establishment and maintenance of relationships. With a persistent presence, the team gained legitimacy with the population, the military and civil leadership, and the U.S. Country Team. True measurable effects require the trust of partners, and trust is established through persistent presence. Additionally, persistent presence allows the teams to more fully understand the discreet factors within the operational environment that drive instability.

Small Footprint. Although the limitations on the number of U.S. Military personnel (small footprint) were mandated based on financial and political constraints, they proved to be much more of a benefit than a detriment. A small team does not overtly effect the environment the way a large deployment might (creating resentment by the population and skewing the economy as businesses scramble to meet USG logistical requirements and neglect the local population's needs). Moreover, a smaller effort does not put pressure on both the U.S. and PN Military to execute large-scale operations and achieve major effects in the short term at the expense of sustainability or indigenous solutions. Finally, a small, persistent USG footprint is less likely to make the PN military and civil government appear to be illegitimate, in need of foreign assistance, or, worse, the lackeys of a foreign power.

Communication. The utility of language training cannot be overstated. The team's ability to communicate with the population and all PN organizations in Spanish was a significant advantage. Language training must remain a top priority for CATs. The team's ability to articulate its objectives and negotiate with the PN military, disparate PN government institutions, and civil society organizations was key to its success. Many of these groups have different objections and do not trust each other, so it is a testament to the team's abilities at negotiation and mediation that it was able to get these groups to talk to each other and, in many cases, agree on courses of action.

Recommendations and Conclusion

The two areas most in need of attention with respect to the deployment of CATs for such missions

are with respect to doctrine and training. Much of CA doctrine is focused on support for major combat operations. The continued development of doctrine focused on civil engagement in Phase 0 or shaping and influence operations, especially the prevention of conflict, should be pursued – especially with respect to leveraging the persistent presence, small footprint, and communication effects such engagements can have.

Such improvements will also provide the appropriate doctrinal framework for revisions in training. In this case, the CA Team was required to operate for extended periods of time in an austere environment with limited U.S.G support; it needed to be as self-sufficient as possible. Continued emphasis should be placed on training in the areas of secure communications, threat analysis, counter-surveillance, weapons and unarmed combat skills, mobile force protection, negotiations and strategic communications, medical skills, assessments of physical and human infrastructure/networks, network building, and Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) skills.

It is inherently difficult to prove a negative—in this case, to prove that the efforts of a CAT prevented conflict from taking place. However, in this situation, it is clear that the activities of CAT-HONDO during almost twelve months in GaD had an effect on the factors that drive conflict. The combination of a PN with an established plan and forces aligned to support that plan; a supportive U.S. Country Team; clear strategic guidance and resources provided by the geographic combatant command and theatre special operations command; and a properly trained, selected, and equipped team enabled this “small-footprint” team to use Civil Affairs engagement as a tool to prevent conflict.

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The Role of Civil Affairs in Counter-Unconventional Warfare

Major Shafi Saiduddin

Civil Affairs (CA) forces, through their ability to analyze conflicts, identify sources of instability and engage populations, have the potential to mitigate or prevent future conflicts. The real question is how to apply this concept of conflict prevention towards achieving national security objectives. The term “conflict prevention” is not itself a national strategic objective, but clearly conflict prevention can be an important tool in countering adversary unconventional warfare campaigns. The U.S. and its interests currently face a variety of hybrid threats from state and non-state actors. Many of these threats can best be described as long term unconventional warfare (UW) campaigns. UW, particularly in its earliest stages, involves exploiting civil vulnerabilities, such as popular dissatisfaction with political, social, or economic conditions. These grievances provide the initial fuel to feed a UW campaign. CA engagement and conflict prevention activities in Phase Zero, if conceptualized and operationalized properly, can become the first line of defense in countering adversary unconventional warfare campaigns.

The 2015 *National Military Strategy*, emphasizes a continuing era of persistent conflict characterized by hybrid threats. The U.S. military is looking at waging long term campaigns with our goal to deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries, and to disrupt, degrade, and defeat violent extremist organizations (VEOs).¹ The difficulty is that many of these threats exist in the middle ground between peace and war. Rather than

a binary system of “peace versus war” we live in a constant cycle of competition between states, and non-state actors, that spans the diplomatic, economic and military realm.² Most of this competition takes place in what we describe as Phase Zero, the shape and influence phase of military operations. Rather than merely a preparatory phase leading to the use of military force, Phase Zero is the domain where entire UW campaigns can take place which never lead to armed conflict. These campaigns can independently secure specific strategic advantage for the state or non-state actors conducting them.

U.S. high intensity warfare capabilities have few peers. Likewise, U.S. SOF Surgical Strike capabilities are world-class. The difficulty we have as a nation is operating in the realm that George F. Kennan, American diplomat and historian, described as “political warfare”. Kennan described political warfare as: “the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace.” In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures, and “white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.³ The 2013 U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) white paper, “SOF Support to Political Warfare,” describes the concept of political warfare in greater detail as well as outlining ways that Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) can support it. “Political warfare is not a term used in U.S. military joint doctrine yet, however, political warfare’s

military aspects integrate counter-unconventional warfare (C-UW) and unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), Security Sector Assistance (SSA), and Information and Influence Activities (IIA), closely calibrated with and in support of those of other government departments."⁴ Political warfare describes many of the activities conducted by Civil Affairs in Phase Zero, often bridging the gap between statecraft and warfare.

C-UW describes "operations and activities conducted by the U.S. Government and supported by SOF against an adversarial state or non-state sponsor of unconventional warfare." These initiatives can "decrease the sponsor's capacity to employ unconventional warfare to achieve strategic aims." C-UW is focused on "attriting an adversary's ability and will to persist in Hybrid Warfare, or to support elements of a resistance or insurgency."

"C-UW can also include whole-of-government initiatives embracing foreign internal defense (FID) as well as improvements to law enforcement, rule of law (RoL), governance, and citizen inclusion through addressing grievances—thus shoring up the stability and legitimacy of the state and increasing its immunity to adversary UW."⁵ Most of these initiatives fall within the core tasks of CA, making CA integral to the development of a C-UW campaign.

CA forces have the potential to become the first line of defense to adversary UW campaigns in Phase Zero. As Dr. Mark Galeotti Professor of Global Affairs at New York University's School of Professional Studies states in an interview with the *Small Wars Journal*: "Ultimately, hybrid defense is about legitimate and effective governance. On so many levels, this is precisely a war of governance."⁶ Whether CA uses the term

C-UW or “hybrid defense,” the focus of its operations in Phase Zero must be on bolstering the governance of vulnerable partner nations.

Russia’s campaign in the Ukraine illustrates the critical role of governance. The initial stages of the Russian campaign in the Ukraine were based on targeting areas of weak governance by identifying civil vulnerabilities and exploiting them. By the time the campaign transitioned to armed conflict, the groundwork of the campaign had long since been in place and the ability of the Ukrainian government to counter this campaign was extremely limited. Russia has certainly recognized the significance of political warfare. Russian Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov offered, “In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. (...) The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”⁷

CA forces are unique in that they are a military entity with the mandate to engage with and affect the non-military means of achieving strategic goals. However, the application of CA forces to this problem set has been hindered by our conceptualization of how CA forces should be employed. An example of the challenge of conceptualization can be found in our understanding of UW itself. The difficulty with UW is that, as a nation, we do not understand it, though it is being used against us on a regular basis.⁸ The state actors who use UW most effectively have not significantly changed the structure or composition of their armed forces and maintain significant conventional capabilities, however, they have a very broad concept of UW and how to apply it. Adversarial UW takes sev-

eral forms and is part of the doctrine of competitor nation states, Russia, China, and Iran, as well non state actors such as Daesh and Al-Qa'ida. The specifics of each actor's methods are described in greater detail in the ARSOF white paper, however, the commonalities are that all campaigns start in a peacetime environment, are heavily psychological in nature, and involve leveraging the grievances of a population.

UW is defined in U.S. doctrine as "Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area."⁹ US UW doctrine describes the components of UW as the armed component, public component, underground, auxiliary, and mass base. As a military, we tend to focus on the armed component, but from a doctrinal perspective, the initial focus of UW should be on the underground, not the armed component. As noted UW researcher Colonel (ret.) David Maxwell writes: "it is the underground that provides the key to understanding the motivation, objectives, interests, methods, and strategy of the leadership of a revolution, resistance, or insurgency (RRI). It is through the underground that we can not only vet members but also try to determine one of the most important questions of "what comes next?" after the organization achieves success. We really need to assess all the organizations of an RRI and not solely the armed component, which seems to always be the focus of our strategy and activities."¹⁰

Distribution of technology, increased use of the Internet, smartphones and social media have also significantly changed the role of the mass base. Civil vulnerabilities affecting the mass base will have a significant

impact on the development of resistance movements. Evolving Special Warfare doctrine highlights the role of CA in UW such as working with the underground to develop and advise a shadow government, mobilize the mass base, organize non-violent protest and leverage civil vulnerabilities against the targeted government or occupying power.¹¹ CA forces can also delegitimize a government or occupying power through identifying and degrading civil strengths.¹² CA forces are in an ideal position to detect these same techniques when applied against partner nations.

There are now a wide variety of labels to address the concept of political warfare from the military side. We have irregular warfare, hybrid warfare, and asymmetric warfare, not to mention UW. However, as Colonel (ret.) Maxwell notes: "Definitions and doctrine aside, unconventional warfare at its core is about revolution, resistance, and insurgency (RRI) combined with the external support provided to a revolution, resistance, or insurgency by either the U.S. or others (who may or may not have interests aligned with the U.S. and may in fact be opposed to the U.S. and our friends, partners, and allies)." He concludes that the need is not so much for a new definition for UW than to just conceptualize it properly.¹³

There is also a misconception that UW and guerilla warfare are synonymous. Guerilla warfare is a technique that can be part of UW, but it is not essential for UW. UW is psychological in nature; ARSOF UW doctrine notes that entire UW campaigns can be conducted by Psychological Operations without the deployment of SF or CA forces.¹⁴ Another misconception is that UW is "owned" by ARSOF. This perception contributes to a narrow view of UW by Department of Defense (DoD) and the interagency. ARSOF "owns"

parts of UW, yet so do all other elements of national power.¹⁵ The three ARSOF regiments – Civil Affairs, Special Forces, and Military Information Support Operations – all specialize in UW, and when combined in a single command, such as 1st Special Forces Command (Provisional) (Airborne) can provide a scalable, deployable, UW capability. However, SOF do not conduct UW unilaterally without support from, or in support of, other agencies and elements.¹⁶ Successful UW requires the diplomatic, informational, and economic aspects of national power. UW and Counter-UW are whole-of-government efforts that must be engaged by civilian agencies, usually in the lead, and supported by both SOF and conventional forces.

As mentioned previously, neither C-UW or political warfare are part of Joint Force doctrine yet. However, these terms help conceptualize the challenges the U.S. faces. For much of the past decade, the U.S. has framed many threats, particularly those involving non-state actors such as Al-Qa’ida, in terms of Counterterrorism (CT). As a doctrinal term CT is narrow and it has become even more so over the passage of time with its definition shifting to “activities to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks.” “Countering root causes and desired regional end states” has been recently removed from the definition.¹⁷ The U.S. has been successful at executing CT operations tactically, though not as successful in achieving intended long term strategic objectives. While influence capabilities have had a role in CT operations, they have generally been regarded as supporting or collateral capabilities, and have been prioritized and resourced accordingly.

The greatest flaw of U.S. CT strategy is that while it is very successful at targeting adversary leadership and networks, it has great difficulty affecting the ide-

ology that feeds a movement, or the governance conditions that give a movement a place to grow. UW, on the other hand, is a broad concept, and in its reverse form, C-UW has an operational core of UW, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Counter insurgency (COIN), Stability, and CT.¹⁸ From a perspective of new ARSOF doctrine, C-UW allows for the comprehensive integration of Special Warfare and Surgical Strike capabilities as mutually supporting efforts. As the U.S. faces continuing threats from non-state actors, particularly the Islamic State (or *Daesh*), reframing these conflicts in terms of C-UW will allow intensive targeting of the ideological and governance components of an adversary UW campaign.

There is growing interest in the development of a comprehensive C-UW strategy. Section 1097 of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act explains that “the Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of other appropriate departments and agencies of the United States Government, develop a strategy for the Department of Defense to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors.” This directive includes requirements to clarify roles within DoD, analyze authorities and command structure, and make recommendations on new doctrine and capabilities.¹⁹ This new strategy could have key roles for CA in conjunction with Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and Special Forces. This is a timely opportunity for the CA Regiment to examine its capabilities and refine them in order to support this new strategy.

CA already conducts many of the Phase Zero activities required for C-UW. One of the primary ways is through Foreign Internal Defense (FID). FID is de-

defined as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”²⁰ While FID is not the reverse of UW, much of the necessary framework for C-UW Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) exists within FID joint doctrine. Working within existing doctrine, CA can support C-UW through a thorough knowledge of UW and the application of FID.

FID is a subset of Nation Assistance and is clearly within the lane of CA core tasks. Unfortunately, there are misconceptions as to how FID is conducted and who conducts it. By doctrine, FID is Civil Military Operations (CMO) and MISO heavy. The principles of FID include the maximum use of CMO and MISO and a minimum use of physical force. CMO is listed as direct support to FID not involving combat operations.²¹ In practice, however, the concept of FID is focused on training security forces. Simply applying “train and equip” to a problem set is an insufficient solution.²² Training security forces can have limited effect in countering a UW campaign as it typically does not increase the partner nation’s capacity to counter the work that an adversary is doing through the underground and auxiliary and in mobilizing the mass base. By the time the campaign progresses to the armed component it is usually too late. It is more important to wage C-UW in the early phases.

The line of effort that allows CA to conduct C-UW most effectively in the Phase Zero environment is Persistent Engagement, the best example of which is USSOCOM’s Civil Military Engagement program where Civil Military Support Elements (CMSEs) oper-

ate on a permanent basis out of U.S. Embassies. The CMSE supports a Host Nation's Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategy as well as a Global Combatant Command (GCC) Theater Campaign Plan. "CMSEs support cooperative security by merging the GCC, Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), and U.S. Ambassador objectives, which are achieved through Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). CMSEs are able to sift through the myriad of interagency programs and objectives to link those that provide mutual interest and combine resources to achieve synergy."²³

A CMSE, through its interaction with civilian populations and civilian agencies is in the best position to identify civil vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an adversary as well as detecting early UW activities by adversary operators. CMSEs working out of Embassies are natural partners for Defense Attaches and Foreign Area Officers, who often serve as the central point of engagement with the Department of State (DoS) and Intelligence Community. While CME is a program of record through USSOCOM, it is also a part of CA doctrine through ATP 3-57-80. As such, the concepts are applicable to CA forces designated as both conventional and SOF.²⁴ CME is much broader than the military concepts of UW and FID and is actually closer to Kennan's concept of political warfare.

While UW and C-UW function best when part of whole-of-government efforts, experience during the last decade has shown that in practice integrating whole-of-government effects is exceedingly difficult. This way involves aligning the efforts of disparate governmental agencies, often with no common culture and sometimes with competing equities. Additionally, while the military may have a difficult time conceptualizing the concept of political warfare, civilian agen-

cies have an equally difficult time operationalizing it. It is here where Army Special Operations Forces have great value by combining planned, directed effects in support of statecraft and diplomacy. CA, in particular, has the ability to integrate military operations with counterpart civilian agencies and facilitate operationalizing whole-of-government efforts.

A key task for CA is to recognize local concepts of legitimacy when it comes to governance. A repeated mistake in previous US campaigns has been to view legitimacy and governance through a Western model. Simply replicating U.S. structures and procedures has had limited success in Iraq and Afghanistan. Persistent engagement allows a language trained and regionally focused CA operator to fully understand the nuances of civil society and governance in foreign countries. Planning assumptions, often made by an over-reliance on social studies research, are not a substitute for having a qualified observer on the ground. While diplomats do serve in these regions, CA can bridge the gap between diplomatic and military lines of operations by viewing developments on the ground through a UW/ C-UW lens. CA Teams usually have greater freedom of movement and can also provide ground truth by their interactions with host nation military and government officials at lower levels.

While CA already conducts most of the activities necessary for C-UW, however, there is currently no specific C-UW doctrine. In order to operationalize and focus CA efforts, C-UW doctrine for CA is essential. FID and CME are broad activities that support a variety of strategies. CA elements are currently active in many countries. While all of these engagement activities are valuable, Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) in C-UW must be targeted and focused against spe-

cific adversary UW campaigns. Unless CAO is part of a comprehensive C-UW strategy, these efforts will remain scattered and it will be difficult to generate strategic effects against an adversary's UW campaign. Facilitating the process of developing CA C-UW doctrine, new UW Joint Doctrine was released in September 2015 that clears up many of the ambiguities that led to a misperception of UW and adds a more complete description of CAO in UW.

Alongside CA C-UW doctrine, the pathway to the effective use of CA in C-UW is through the development of a Phase Zero "operational art" for CA. The concept of a separate Phase Zero operational art has been gaining traction and is best illustrated in Colonel Brian Petit's book "Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero".²⁵ The key question is how to achieve strategic effects through engagement.

Efforts must be synchronized and Phase Zero campaigns must be developed but current operational art is focused on landpower and maneuver warfare. There is a growing recognition that engagement activities in Phase Zero have unique requirements which will drive the development of a tailored operational art. One of the unique aspects, is that Phase Zero campaigns contain logic that is paradoxical to generally applied principles of the use of military force. Colonel Petit illustrates it as "The Five Paradoxes of Phase Zero." They are:

- Less is better than more,
- Steady and slow is (often) preferred over intrusive and fast,
- A supporting role is better than a lead one,
- The wrong man can do more harm than the right man can do good,

- Conceding military control and precision can create better long term outcomes.²⁶

The Five Paradoxes of Phase Zero can serve as a guide in tailoring both CA operational art and capabilities to the “New Normal.”²⁷

Specific challenges to campaign development in Phase Zero include the requirement to blend political and military effects and the difficulty in operationalizing “indirect” methods of military power. Central to Colonel Petit’s thesis is that operational art in Phase Zero “combines supply chain management principles with network logic; its hybrid is an arranging chain that makes operational artistry possible over vast time, distance, cultural and programmatic spans.”²⁸ What this means is, that the idea of a single commander-like operational artist synchronizing events is not possible in Phase Zero. Different actors, or nodes, will dominate in different cycles.²⁹ For this reason alone, developing coordinated campaign plans is exceptionally difficult. CA will need to develop its own portion of Phase Zero operational art to achieve strategic objectives through persistent engagement. By using the existing doctrinal framework for UW and FID, executing CME, and incorporating CA into early stages of Phase Zero campaign design, we have the initial framework to focus CA capabilities against an adversary UW campaign.

A key step in operationalizing CA in Phase Zero is to clarify the identity or “brand name” of CA. As Colonel (ret.) Dennis Cahill notes in his 2015 CA Issue Paper, the current definition of CA is flawed. CA is defined as “designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations.” In other words, Civil Affairs is essentially defined as forces that con-

duct Civil Affairs Operations. Colonel (ret.) Cahill proposes definition changes that will clarify the definition of Civil Affairs from both historical and grammatical points of view.³⁰ A separate but closely related issue is the “identity” or “brand name” of the CA Regiment, which is similar to, but not synonymous with its definition. It is the lack of a coherent identity that makes the role of CA nebulous to joint force commanders and policy makers and becomes an obstacle in operationalizing CA. For many in the military, CA is associated entirely with Humanitarian Assistance and CERP project management. In C-UW, CA must be viewed an integral military operational capability rather than an ambiguous supporting entity if it is to be used effectively.

While CA core tasks describe the types of operations that CA conducts, they do not describe the identity of CA. However, the term “Irregular Warfare” (IW) does. Irregular warfare is defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).” This broad form of conflict has insurgency, COIN, and UW as the principal activities. Irregular forces are normally active in these conflicts; however, conventional forces may also be heavily involved, particularly in counterinsurgencies.³¹

The ARSOF UW manual further notes that, “IW is about people, not platforms. IW does not depend on military prowess alone. It also relies on the understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores. Although IW is a violent struggle, not all participating irregulars or irregular forces are necessarily armed. People, more so than weaponry, platforms, and advanced technology, will be the key to success in

IW. Successful IW relies on building relationships and partnerships at the local level. It takes patient, persistent, and culturally savvy people within the joint force to execute IW.”³² This more accurately describes what CA does across a broad spectrum of conflict. Describing the identity CA in terms of irregular warfare provides more clarity to the non-CA commander.

A proposed identity for CA forces could be – United States Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct population centric irregular warfare with an emphasis on FID, UW, COIN, and Stability capabilities.

Clarity of identity will also allow greater specialization between CA components. CA forces include Active and Reserve Component forces from both the Army and Marine Corps. Post-2006 attempts to “specialize” CA in the Army have focused on the very general terms of “SOF” and “conventional”. As U.S. ability to wage hybrid warfare relies on an interdependence of SOF and conventional forces, this distinction is rapidly becoming obsolete for CA. A better framework would be to have CA components specialize in certain aspects of irregular warfare, yet still remain capable of executing all core tasks. Orienting CA forces towards particular mission sets such as FID, UW, or Stability, while requiring a single standard for qualification will result in better unity of effort within the regiment. There was a little more specialization in terms of missions pre-2006, through the construct of General Support, FID/UW, and General Purpose battalions. What was lacking back then was commonality and consistency of training.

As the concept of hybrid warfare also includes a significant role for high intensity warfare, there is currently a serious discussion within the Army on how to

retain irregular warfare capabilities within the force. As maneuver forces re-focus on high intensity warfare skills that may have atrophied through years of practicing COIN, identifying CA firmly as the Army's irregular warfare experts, together with the concept of CMO institutionalized within the maneuver force, can provide a reservoir of irregular warfare knowledge that can be used to reconstitute a larger scale COIN capability if needed.

For CA to conduct C-UW requires a fusion with intelligence capabilities and Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Target Audience Analysis (TAA) - first to identify the adversary actions taken in support of their UW campaign and then to develop targeting for employing CA forces. This union will require changes in how to view intelligence. The current model of intelligence is focused on conventional enemy forces and targeting for Surgical Strike. C-UW requires a broader form of "sociocultural intelligence." The intelligence process must be able to detect enemy operators conducting the type of population-centric hybrid warfare that involves governance. This method involves detecting efforts to exploit civil vulnerabilities or degrade civil strengths as well as a deep understanding of the human domain. The corresponding "awareness gap" plagues current target-focused intelligence systems and processes. Civil Information Management (CIM), a core task of CA, provides this needed deeper level of understanding, however, CIM can be stove piped within CA resulting in an incomplete understanding of the situation, as well as duplication of effort between various analytical structures.

Addressing this gap will likely require broadening the CA career field to include an intelligence/CIM focused specialty, similar to that of the Special Forces

intelligence sergeant. This act will require an experienced CA operator who receives advanced training in both CIM and intelligence, to include both analysis and collection. This intel/CIM 38 series position would serve as the link between traditional intelligence processes and CIM. Working both at the tactical level on a CMSE and at planning levels with a task force or embassy, these specialists can help focus the efforts of CA in C-UW and facilitate CA targeting. Along with this, cross training in MISO TAA is critical to aligning influence activities.

With only one Active brigade of CA available to conduct the bulk of Phase Zero C-UW, a commitment to C-UW will require examining the active component/reserve component (AC/RC) mix in CA. Current CA force structure is based on the idea of CA as a force for Stability or large scale COIN. The growth of the CA force over the past decade was driven by the need for more CA forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and current drawdowns have been based on end of COIN operations in Iraq and the scaling back of the Afghanistan mission. While budgetary constraints are very real, actual requirements must be re-evaluated in terms of Phase Zero and C-UW. However, even if a decision were made to increase active duty CA forces, recent experience has shown that this is a challenging process and may not even be feasible in the near term. The interim solution will, by necessity, involve a reliance on the Reserve Component.

While COIN and Stability are part of the operational core of C-UW, the real issue is the capability of Reserve CA to conduct Phase Zero C-UW, specifically UW and FID. Currently, there are significant shortfalls in the Reserve Component training pipeline that could create risk to the C-UW mission. To paraphrase Colonel Petit's Paradoxes of Phase Zero, "the wrong

person can do more harm than the right person can do good.”³³ This reality is an argument for, at the very minimum, requiring selection and assessment for the Reserve Component. A model for integrating Reserve Component CA into the C-UW mission can be found in National Guard Special Forces where all SF personnel attend the same selection and qualification process as their Active Component counterparts. When NG SF transitioned from a correspondence course based curriculum to the full active-duty pipeline, there were concerns that this would impact civilian careers and make recruiting difficult. Paradoxically, making entry into NG SF more difficult may have resulted in a greater number of volunteers.

The Reserve Component can also provide some unique solutions to ongoing problems within the total CA force. While the Reserves are often thought of in terms of civilian skills, one area that is even more important for Phase Zero engagement is language proficiency and cultural knowledge. These are critical to developing networks and is an area that the military and SOF in particular has struggled with for years. Maintaining a force with a minimum level of language qualification, such as a 1/1 score on the Defense Language Proficiency Test is challenging, and a 1/1 score does not provide the level of proficiency needed for true engagement without the use of interpreters.

Reserve Component units often have access to U.S. civilian population centers with large immigrant communities and native speakers in high-demand languages and cultures. Often, members of these communities have a strong desire to serve, but many do not desire full time service. The Reserve Component provides them an opportunity to serve and Army Reserve and National Guard college tuition programs also provide an additional incentive for enlisting.

While immigrants and first-generation Americans who are native speakers in target languages already serve in the Reserve Components, there is no Army-wide program to recruit them into CA, PSYOP or NG SF units. The Active Component has the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program, which allows non-citizens legally present in the U.S. to join the military and provides a streamlined process for citizenship. This program has been used to recruit for critical skills, such as high demand languages. A MAVNI-style program, one that includes native speakers who are already U.S. citizens, and provides incentives for joining the Reserves, could help mitigate the language and cultural knowledge gaps.

The difficulties in operationalizing CA in C-UW, while complex, are far from insurmountable. U.S. CT strategy has had incredible success from an organizational standpoint, with unprecedented integration between DoD and civilian agencies and a nearly seamless integration between intelligence and operations. The difficulty is that CT as a strategy is too narrow to achieve strategic endstates. Without prioritizing governance and ideology, U.S. ability to counter hybrid threats is limited. Following the model of CT organizations, the development of a national level influence and governance capability incorporating CA, with the ability to operate under Title 50 authorities, will increase the ability to conduct C-UW operations in denied areas. A significant step to increase the effectiveness of C-UW would be the development of a Joint Special Warfare Command as proposed by Colonel (ret.) Maxwell.³⁴ This capability would complement existing Surgical Strike units, integrate C-UW capabilities at the national level, and provide a wider range of options for civilian policymakers.

The greatest barrier to operating in the political warfare domain appears to be, interestingly enough, neither in doctrine nor capabilities, but rather how to conceptualize it. According to Frank Hoffman, a professor at the National Defense University. “The critique was, and still is, that America’s view of war is overly simplified,” he said. “We think of things in black-and-white terms.”³⁵ An examination of current U.S. Military doctrine supports UW and C-UW campaigns as well as CA’s role in both of these areas. Section 1097 of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) opens the door to the development of a C-UW strategy, along with the doctrine and capabilities to support it.

The real challenge in executing the new *National Military Strategy* is cultural, both within the nation and the military. Any new conceptual thinking requires cognitive changes, as well as structural. By far the most significant challenge will be in the conceptualization of warfighting in Phase Zero. The military is culturally conditioned to view kinetic operations as decisive and non-kinetic operations as shaping. However, in Phase Zero, denying an adversary the ability to develop a UW campaign through addressing civil vulnerabilities is a decisive operation that supports the *National Military Strategy*, while a surgical strike to remove an adversary’s UW operators may only serve as the shaping operation, buying time for the decisive operation to succeed.

CA is the ideal force to take the lead in a Phase Zero C-UW campaign as the basic capabilities needed to execute a C-UW strategy already exist within the CA force and within CA and Joint doctrine. However, operationalizing CA in C-UW will require the development of CA specific C-UW doctrine, better integration with intelligence and MISO capabili-

ties, and clarifying the identity of the Civil Affairs Regiment.

Recommendations

Recommendations from this effort are therefore:

1. Develop CA specific C-UW doctrine to support the requirements of section 1097 of the 2016 NDAA. Develop CA Phase Zero Operational Art to ensure that CA tactical actions in C-UW achieve strategic effects.
2. Develop influence and governance capabilities to support C-UW under title 50 authorities, ideally as part of a Joint Special Warfare Command.
3. Align and integrate CIM, MISO Target Audience Analysis, and Intelligence capabilities. Develop a holistic concept of “sociocultural intelligence” to provide situational understanding in Phase Zero. Consider adding to the 38 series career field with an 18F type CIM/Intel MOS. Crosstrain CA CIM personnel in MISO Target Audience Analysis.
4. Re-evaluate the current Active Component/Reserve Component balance of CA forces against the requirements of a comprehensive C-UW strategy. Address the Reserve Component gaps in selection and training using an established National Guard Special Forces model. Leverage Reserve Component opportunities to recruit native speakers in target languages and cultures.
5. Define the identity, or ‘brand name,’ of CA in terms of Irregular Warfare in order to provide clarity to Joint Force commanders and operationalize CA capabilities for C-UW.

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**Civil Affairs Forces, U.S. Army Reserve, National
Guard, and the State Partnership Program:
Is there Room for Engagement?**

Major David E. Leiva and Major John Nonnemaker

When the 32nd Military Engagement Team supported the Mississippi National Guard (MSNG) and the Office of Military Cooperation in Uzbekistan with the timely delivery of several Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles as part of a Foreign Military Sales case in December 2014, leaders considered it a major military and diplomatic victory. The altering geo-political landscape in the Central and South Asia region of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) had quickly made the partnership between the MSNG and the Republic of Uzbekistan one of the most important in the State Partnership Program (SPP). The delivery's timeframe had also coincided with the arrival of the new U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Pamela Spratlen, who officially took over December 18.¹ And, then there was the involvement of the military engagement team (MET) made up of the Wisconsin Army National Guard - a rather new Army concept that brings Army National Guard² (ARNG) brigade-level headquarters into theater to engage with U.S. and foreign military leaders in the region, foreign royalty and even members of Congress travelling through the region on state visits. The development of the MET to handle military-to-military activities was proving its value along with the SPP, a venerable 22-year-old exchange that was born from the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Interestingly, this entire episode did not raise an eyebrow anywhere at U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) in what may have traditionally been considered a Civil Affairs (CA) mission. In fact, nowhere in the equation was there room for a CA team, nor was it required or requested. More to the point, there are 70 such partnerships across the globe where small strategic movements and engagements happen daily, which begs the ultimate question: Why aren't the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and its CA force – with all of its capabilities and regional approach – part of the Defense Department's SPP conversation?

A Primer on the State Partnership Program

When the Soviet Union dissolved from 1989-1991, American officials explored options to minimize instability and encourage democratic governments in the former Soviet bloc. The Latvian government first requested assistance in developing a military that resembled the ARNG model of citizen-soldiers. General Colin Powell and General John Shalikashvili, then-the U.S. European Command commanding general, embraced the idea as a means of developing partnerships with non-NATO countries. This effort led to the establishment of the Joint Contact Team Program in 1992. Later that year, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the leader of the Joint Contact Team visited the Balkans. Less than six months later, these leaders directed that the first SPP partnerships be formed.³

The SPP became a program of record of the Defense Department's joint security cooperation program, managed by the National Guard Bureau, and executed by the state National Guard in support of the Geographic Combatant Commanders' (GCCs) se-

curity cooperation objectives. The SPP matches a State or Territory's National Guard (Army and Air) with a partner nation to exchange military skills, experience, and defense knowledge to enhance partner capabilities. Generally, it is viewed as high impact, low-cost with small footprint in partner counties that focus on 12 specific areas:

- (1) Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Response and Mitigation,
- (2) CBRNE Response and Consequence Management,
- (3) Border/Port Security and Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement,
- (4) Installation and Critical Infrastructure Protection,
- (5) Search and Rescue,
- (6) Support to Public Health,
- (7) Counterdrug/Counternarcotic,
- (8) Officer/NCO development,
- (9) Public Affairs,
- (10) Employer Support/Family Support for National Guard Forces,
- (11) Cyber Defense,
- (12) Civil-Military Aviation Integration.⁴

Shaping the Theater

Three years ago, the Louisiana National Guard coordinated a handover of its SPP with Uzbekistan to its Mississippi neighbors. Hindsight has proven that the move has been a stroke of luck and genius. With all of the talk about the "pivot to Asia," the incipient rise of Russia on the global stage with the invasion of Crimea caught most by surprise. As a result, the MSNG be-

came centerpiece of a renewed interest in the region with a potential revival of the Cold War and able to capitalize on its internal resources. The southern state is able to use its very own Camp Shelby Joint Forces Training Center, which has 135,000 acres for training exercises and 100 square miles of restricted airspace for unmanned aerial systems training – all-important facets with the budding relationship on several fronts.

First, the Uzbekistan military purchased 300 MRAPs as part of the Excess Defense Articles, and RQ11 Raven systems through Foreign Military Financing (FMF), a source of financing provided to a partner nation on a grant (non-repayable) or direct loan basis. Second, theater security cooperation (TSC) events concentrated on Officer Professional Development, and that allowed the MSNG to use its Regional Training Institute and accompanying instructors. Lastly, when appropriate, the MSNG could tap into Special Operations because Special Forces units reside within the state. For Ambassador Spratlen, who served previously as the U.S. Ambassador to its neighbor, Kyrgyz Republic, the MRAPs were an integral part of the partnership with the United States. In an interview with local Uzbekistan media, she said, “the 300 MRAPs were important to build on the cooperation that has been established.”⁵

USARCENT, the Army Service Component Command to USCENTCOM, reported it needed to integrate all of the different resources available into a coherent plan in order to meet its objectives. The USARCENT AOR consists of 20 nations in the Levant, Central and South Asia and Arabian Peninsula. Uzbekistan is one of those nations. Currently, USARCENT is resourced, postured, and prepared to improve regional security and stability. Its unique combination of land power

and Army support structure prevents confrontations from becoming conflicts, shapes its AOR through engagements with partners and sets the conditions to win, if necessary. In the years ahead resides a real chance for the United States, together with its partners and allies, to achieve diplomatic and military successes, thereby accelerate diplomatic and military successes, and thereby accelerate much-needed positive momentum in the USARCENT AOR.⁶

As noted in both the 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* and the 2011 *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, security cooperation and building partner capacity are identified as priorities in multiple regions, including the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. In addition, both documents emphasized the need to strengthen and expand the United States' network of international partnerships to enhance security, and the National Military Strategy instructs the GCCs, among others, to collaborate with other agencies to pursue TSC. As such, the SPP acts as a force enabler for the GCCs, and SPP activities are part of the GCCs' TSC plans. SPP activities are to be approved by the GCCs, as well as the U.S. ambassador in their respective partner nations, before they can be executed.⁷

Challenges and Opportunities

A 2012 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report noted the SPP had many benefits, according to SPP coordinators, Bilateral Affairs Officers, and officials from all six Geographic Combatant Commands, as listed in the table below.⁸

Table 1: Key Benefits of the State Partnership Program, as Cited by State Partnership Program Coordinators, Bilateral Affairs Officers, and Officials from Geographic Combatant Commands		
SPP Coordinators	Bilateral Affairs Officers	Officials from combatant commands
Provides experience and training for guardsmen	Events are tied to combat command or country team mission	Events support combatant command mission and objectives
Develops relationship with partner country	Good communication and coordination between stakeholders	National Guard units possess unique skills that are useful for supporting combatant command objectives
Encourages partner countries to co-deploy to Afghanistan	Provides information sharing and support partner country	Encourages partner nation deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan
Improves retention or provides other incentives for guardsmen	Builds relationship with partner country	
Guardsmen benefit from partner country's experiences	Encourages partner countries to co-deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan	

However, the same report noted that stakeholders hindered the program by a lack of clear goals, objectives and measure. The government watchdog concluded that:

- The State Partnership Program does not have agreed-upon goals or metrics to assess progress,
- Complete information about activities and funding is unavailable,
- Data on State Partnership Program activities are incomplete and inconsistent,
- State Partnership Program funding information is incomplete,
- DOD lacks guidance on current State Partnership Program data management,
- Challenges in funding activities and incorporating U.S. and foreign partner civilians require additional guidance and training,

- Stakeholders expressed concerns about funding of activities and civilian involvement identifying a country for a partnership can be difficult.

As far back as 1992, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau identified possible areas of cooperation in military-to-military exchanges that included Civil Affairs and National Guard/Reserve affairs along with a list of specific capabilities that the National Guard could provide such as teams for cooperative humanitarian or civic assistance projects. Since then, there has been no mention of it. The reason is simple: Civil Affairs operators do not exist in the National Guard.⁹

Colonel David O. Smith is the Director of the Joint Staff of the MSNG. He has worked with SPP partnerships with Bolivia (1999) and Uzbekistan (2012) for years. In his annual SPP review, Civil Affairs is a capability he does not bother to bring up as a potential for an exchange simply because there are no CA units in the state's inventory. If one of the two nations requests CA training, it becomes a COCOM tasker to figure out, he says.¹⁰ (The 350th Civil Affairs Command has a unit aligned with Bolivia.) "Right there, to begin with, you have an issue. Right there is a rub because there are no CA units, it is underrepresented, and then there are tribal boundaries with the Army Reserve and Army National Guard," Colonel Smith observed in a conversation with the authors.¹¹

Colonel Anthony Couture, the Senior National Guard Advisor at USARCENT whose staff is a direct liaison to the various National Guard commands, offers building habitual and enduring relationships with key personnel is paramount to any successful partnership. The organizations personnel perform activities and engagements that cannot be replicated in

a training environment, he says. According to Colonel Couture, the countries' personnel develop skills required to manage incidents, be more productive and efficient, as well as increase knowledge on TTPs that have worked in other areas of the world.¹² To his point, the National Guard personnel do not move out of the state with each promotion so they are very likely to keep those relationships.

Colonel Couture told the authors he can envision the Army Reserve's CA structure being an enabler to the SPP. "As the Defense Department reviews the program and develops the (Department of Defense Instruction), I see more engagement from all the Services and Components to include the USAR organizations. The CA is a natural fit into the partnerships focus areas," he said. "The core SPP focus areas align closely with CA tasks: Civil Information Management, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Nation Assistance, Population and Resource Control, and Support to Civil Administration."¹³

Getting into the Process

Restrictive, rebuilding, or non-permissive countries are not conducive to security cooperation efforts. Conversely, fully developed countries will not benefit from a SPP partnership. Once the staffing has been completed by a state, a method can be chosen on how to best achieve the proposing state's end state. There are three solid methods (outside of the traditional application process) for gaining partnership traction utilizing TSC activities; exercises, overseas deployment for training, assisting with Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract support, and support to traditional TSC events. Each of these activities by definition is a

TSC tool of the GCC. Building enduring relationships within a GCC, service component command, and supported country should be the goal while planning for these events.¹⁴

Volunteering to support or host a GCC or service component command exercise can initiate a relationship with a host or partner country. Unilateral exercises are preferred if the supporting state wishes to form a relationship with a single country. Certain countries refuse to host exercises within their borders, yet request specific training from the GCC. Many states have the resources available within the state to adequately host this type of event. The event will include multiple in-process reviews and occasional train-up exercises with senior officials from the country, which can provide a forum to further build the relationship. The state participating in such events can also build interpersonal relationships at the GCC and service component command, which can be leveraged for future exercises. If the exercise becomes an annual or bi-annual exercise, this can begin the process of building a habitual partnership.¹⁵


When a country is acquiring new equipment through FMS, opportunities for the National Guard and others to assist in fulfilling the contract may occur. Areas of opportunity can include logistics support for delivery, training, and maintenance of the new equipment. This support can be appropriated through the terms of the contract.

Countries may occasionally request the GCC or service component commands for advice on training, personnel, or subject matter expertise (on a number of military related topics). Active Component organizations designated by the GCC, service component command or a State Partner, if one has already been ap-

pointed, may take the lead for providing this training and advice. These events usually get awareness from senior Ministry of Defense officials and occasionally governmental officials. Volunteering on an as needed basis can assist in forming key relationships.¹⁶

Prior to 2012, an agreement between the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the GCC established SPP partnerships. DoD Instruction 5111.20 in December 2012, changed that responsibility to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. Today, OSD approval is required along with Secretary of State concurrence. In 2014, Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) became established as the final approval authority for new partnership with the SPP Comprehensive Global Plan, directed by OSD Policy, to establish Defense Department-wide priorities for pursuing new partnerships to manage what countries “ask” to join the program and to address the resources required for potential program expansion.¹⁷

This plan, which remains under development, will be staffed across the GCCs, Joint Staff, OSD, and the Services, to give all stakeholders an opportunity to provide inputs on the plan.



The left side of the graphic depicts the process for requesting a partnership. ¹⁸ New SPP partnerships must be officially requested in writing by a foreign country. Once the U.S. Ambassador or Chief of Mission and the GCC agree and endorse the formation of a new partnership, the request is forwarded to the Chief, National Guard Bureau where his staff conducts selection analysis and makes a recommendation on the best-fit State for the partnership.

The NGB analysis is an in-depth assessment of the partnership based on prioritized criteria for assessing State nominations. Nomination criteria are established in coordination with the GCC desk officer and the Office of Defense Cooperation, as well as Joint Staff, OSD, and State Department Desk Officers. Selection criteria focus on such aspects as force structure, U.S. objectives within the foreign country, key focus areas that align with National Guard capabilities, and the interest and capacity of a State's National Guard to effectively manage a new partnership. The Chief

reviews the staff recommendation and makes a final decision as to which State to recommend to the GCC.

Once the Chief, NGB and the GCC agree on a recommended State, the recommendation is staffed to the Joint Staff and OSD to complete the approval process. This process is depicted on the right side of the graphic. The GCC formally endorses the partner selection and coordinates with the U.S. Embassy for the Ambassador's endorsement. The Ambassador or Chief of Mission then coordinates the recommended State with the requesting Nation who accepts the State partner. Once these approvals are formally documented, partnership activities begin. In the forthcoming update to DoDI 5111.20, the roles and staffing process will be clearly outlined, and most likely the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will be delegated as the approval authority for SPP partnerships and for coordinating State Department Concurrence.¹⁹

The Services really have two touch points where they can provide inputs on what countries join the State Partnership Program and SPP activities. First, at the GCC level, the Service Components have a leading role in security cooperation activities and can provide direct inputs to the GCCs. Second, the Services will have the opportunity to comment on the SPP Comprehensive Global Plan, which will outline DoD-wide priorities for the program and potential new partner countries.

Regionally Aligned Forces

The Army's recent strategic shift from a two-front, "fight and win" Army to the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) "shape and prevent" strategy is problematic because the military industrial complex still focuses on

a force-on-force threat, according to Lieutenant Colonel Jay Morse, a Judge Advocate General who penned an essay on the topic of RAF earlier this year in *Small Wars Journal*.²⁰ He notes RAF is not innovative; rather, it serves an approach that has been implemented in the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community, as well as NGB. A typical Civil Affairs Battalion's area of operation can be as large as an entire continent, which equates to around 200 soldiers conducting meaningful face-to-face engagement. Currently under RAF, the only thing truly regionally aligned with any area is the unit's guidon. The soldiers themselves will continue to rotate throughout the entire force. Morse proposes an individual soldier to have a regionally aligned "home base" after short, professional development tours outside his or her alignment.

Another key concept that Morse brings up is to focus engagements on the regional influencers and as well as the quality of the engagements, not the quantity. By building stable institutions, these same institutions can help stabilize the region. This concept was utilized in the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) AOR with Colombia, which is now producing measures of effectiveness to support that this concept can work. Morse also recommends that RAF cannot simply be the method of deployment rather these deployments should have one question in mind: Why? By having small numbers of American trainers living and working with our partner nations for, even, short periods, troops can deploy with Regionally "Engaged" Forces who bring maturity, experience, education, energy, visibility, viability, venerability, and value to the relationship.²¹

Senior Army leaders have repeatedly emphasized that RAF success depends on "person to person" en-

gements. In a 2014 joint statement to Congress on Army Posture, the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army wrote that the Armed Forces need to “build trust” and “develop relationships:”

These forces shape and set theaters for regional commanders employing unique Total Army characteristics and capabilities to influence the security environment, build trust, develop relationships and gain access through rotational forces, multilateral exercises, military-to-military engagements, coalition training and other opportunities... The Army National Guard, through the State Partnership Program, maintains long-term partnerships worldwide.²²

RAF should build on the SPP’s successes in relationship and capacity building with partner nations at an extremely low price. Additionally, a combination of RAF and SPP with a SOF element would grant the GCC with an endless source of National Guard and Reserve resources that can be leveraged to maximize its effectiveness collectively. More importantly, the National Guard is less likely to see turnover because promotions occur within the state. Meanwhile, the Active Component and USAR personnel will potentially move to other parts of the globe or country as part of their career progression.

It remains to be seen just how that combination will play out as resources dwindle, relevance becomes critical, and “tribal boundaries” become sacred. In its recently released Fiscal Year 2016 SPP Program Management guidance, the National Guard Bureau has already made clear its vision for 2020 and beyond, aiming to be the GCC’s force of choice when conducting TSC engagements.²³ Absent in the document is any mention of the USAR.

The GCC should be able to leverage the long-term relationship that exists between a State and their Partner Country to achieve country objectives. Furthermore, the NG will leverage its interagency experience to support DoD's whole-of-government approach to strengthen alliances and partnerships and provide a stabilizing presence in all regions. By leveraging NG core capabilities, DoD will also contribute to an enhanced climate for mutually beneficial civilian-to-civilian relationships.²⁴

Future Areas of Study

This research paper attempted to consider the State Partnership Program's inclusion of Civil Affairs forces. While ambition may have no bounds, by no means was this critical look an effort designed to be all inclusive. There are definitely areas that merit more nuanced research, analysis and discussion. Those areas for soldier-scholars include a more complete understanding of the Military Engagement Team, and whether it is the most appropriate means of employing a form of CMO. Should United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (US-ACAPOC) play a greater role than the one it is currently playing?

No one has closed the door on Civil Affairs forces augmenting the SPP relationships. In fact, the opposite appears to be the case. But "tribal boundaries" exist even as the era of dwindling resources persist and expectations to continue building partner capacity no longer affords any component, or program, to dismiss opportunities. Consider that with Regionally Aligned Forces, what considerations must be measured to link the SPP with the RAF in terms of Doctrine, Organiza-

tion, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P)?

Every state ARNG has a SPP relationship. Why not start with an informal meeting to see what regionally-aligned Civil Affairs units in the Army Reserve have in common with those states? Are they unknowingly working on the same projects? Better yet, is there room for engagement?

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
**Edited by
Christopher Holshek
and
John C. Church, Jr.**

**Publications Coordinator
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**Composition
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ISBN: 978-0-9861865-6-1