SOLLIMS SAMPLER

Targeting Peace & Stability Operations Lessons & Best Practices

Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College Students

Special Edition

August 2013

PKSOI
U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE
STRENGTH and WISDOM

FOREWORD

Welcome to this special edition of the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) Lessons Learned "Sampler" – **Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College Students.**

The general structure of the "Sampler" includes (1) an **Introduction** that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler **"Quick Look"** that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related **Lessons Learned Report**, and (4) links to **additional reports and other references** that are either related to the "focus" topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of "Sampler" – of the observations, insights, and lessons submitted by U.S. Army War College students available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission / function – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, policy-makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description

The "Event Description" section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a "Comments" section. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access / download attachments.

If you have not registered on SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account

in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report.

   We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the "Sampler" as a reference for you and your unit/organization. By using the "Perspectives" text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.

   At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our website at [**http://pksoi.army.mil**] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [**https://sollims.pksoi.org**] to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!

Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan – Afghan electrical power technicians receive on-the-job training from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Soldiers that will enable them to safely sink the power poles and replace 110 kV lines throughout Kandahar and Helmand provinces in southern Afghanistan.

(Photo by Karla Marshall, Afghan Engineer District-South, 26 June 2012)

INTRODUCTION

Welcome to this special edition of the SOLLIMS Sampler: **Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College Students**.

In Academic Year 2013, U.S. Army War College students in PKSOI elective courses were given the opportunity to enter a Lesson Learned (gained from operational experience) into the SOLLIMS database. Over 80 Lessons Learned were captured, covering topics such as Governance, Security Sector Reform, Economic Stabilization, and Comprehensive Approach. The vast majority have Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) applications.

The overriding theme of their Lessons Learned is essentially: **"Building upon the Past to Gain Economies and Success in the Future,"** as indicated below:

- Lesson 1 (in this publication) discusses USSOUTHCOM Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief exercises and suggests building upon them through greater inclusion of Army Echelon Above Brigade (EAB) units and synchronization with USAID.

- Lesson 2 discusses Engineer capacity gaps from OIF/OEF experiences and offers ways to overcome them through formal partnering/leveraging between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and USAID.

- Lesson 3 discusses Department of Defense (DoD) and Peace Corps teaming during a mission in Uganda and recommends seeking out such opportunities during future engagements.

- Lesson 4 discusses strategic mistakes made in stability/security planning for OIF and suggests the need to re-think such approaches in the future.

- Lesson 5 discusses Rule of Law (RoL) partnering in Afghanistan and offers ways to improve operations through better resourcing and training.

- Lesson 6 discusses reconstruction best practices from Panjshir Province, Afghanistan and cites synchronization as the key to future operations.

- Lesson 7 discusses the lack of "peace building" efforts during counter-insurgency operations in the Philippines and calls for "peace building" activities to be fully integrated into stability operations in the future.

- Lesson 8 discusses conflict resolution and transformation in Nicaragua and other countries and emphasizes the importance of fully understanding the local context – above all else – when conducting future interventions.

We hope you'll take these students' lessons under consideration during your planning and preparations for future stability operations…. We also hope you'll take the time to further explore SOLLIMS and discover the many other insightful lessons available!

Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College Students	
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"QUICK LOOK"

Click on [Read More ...] to go to full lesson.

- Army Active and Reserve Component **Echelon Above Brigade (EAB) units** are confronted with an increasing training resource gap that could be mitigated by greater participation in Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) Joint exercises. **[Read More ...]**

- There is a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) capacity and **capability gap with respect to technical engineering**. **[Read More ...]**

- In order to gain a more current and accurate local assessment and understanding of the operating environment, **U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) units should identify the other U.S. Government (USG) agencies** working in the local area. **[Read More ...]**

- **Establishing a safe and secure environment** involves much more than initial policing actions. **[Read More ...]**

- The critical stability operations sector of justice and reconciliation, specifically as it applies to **rule of law training to Afghans, was slow to materialize in OEF** and initially ineffective in 2006 under the Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) contract for the Department of State (DoS) Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL). **[Read More ...]**

- The efforts of our **Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)** in Panjshir Province, Afghanistan, were focused on improving the performance of all Afghan government institutions in the province, tying those to the central government, and ensuring the local population continued to see the U.S. Coalition presence in a positive manner. **[Read More ...]**

- In a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment, **peace building is the most challenging part** of the COIN effort. In most cases, COIN efforts in the Philippines were not successful because the government's response failed to fully integrate peace building operations in its overall plan. **[Read More ...]**

- The collapse of a state generates conditions that can be very unfavorable to the development of democracy. If there is to be any chance for success, **understanding the local context** in its historical, cultural, political, and sociological dimensions is especially vital. **[Read More ...]**

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26 August 2013

SUBJECT: Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College Students

1. <u>GENERAL</u>

USAWC students submitted Lessons Learned for the following elective courses during Academic Year 2013:

- Peace/Stability Operations Concepts & Principles
- Security Sector Reform for Commanders
- Challenges in Economic Development
- International Development

Their Lessons Learned covered a range of operations, including: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and operations in Africa, Asia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Central America, and South America.

This report presents 8 of those lessons from the SOLLIMS database – providing a number of insightful recommendations toward improving future peacekeeping and stability operations.

2. <u>LESSONS</u>

a. <u>TOPIC</u>. **Army Echelon Above Brigade Unit Participation in GCC HA/DR Joint Exercises (1124)**

<u>Observation</u>.

Army Active and Reserve Component Echelon Above Brigade (EAB) units are confronted with an increasing training resource gap that could be mitigated by greater participation in Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) Joint exercises, with the benefit of accomplishing national security strategy objectives along development, diplomacy, and defense lines of effort while improving the unit's proficiency in performing its doctrinal mission. The U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) has been conducting annual Humanitarian Assistance (HA) New Horizons (NH) exercises since the late 1990s and Beyond the Horizons (BTH) exercises since 2008. These USSOUTHCOM Humanitarian Assistance training events usually consist of engineer units building medical clinics, schools, community centers, and wells, and concurrently medical units deliver focused

healthcare to under-served population areas within Central America. NH exercises usually last a year with unit rotations, and BTH exercises last around three months. All participants benefit significantly from these activities. The DoD military units sustain or gain training proficiency in their Full Spectrum Operation (FSO) Mission Essential Task List (METL), and the host nation selected population receives free healthcare as well as sustainable small physical infrastructure projects.

Discussion.

The 2013 Army Posture Statement presented to the 113th Congress on 23 April 2013 describes an Army that is "regionally engaged and globally responsive; it is an indispensable partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to Combatant Commanders in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment." This vision implies the ability of the three main national stake-holders to continue to commit to a concept of unified action in shaping our global environment. The Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) can gain efficiencies in better leveraging their respective scarce resources and synchronizing their efforts to generate a more coherent, powerful, and effective national security strategy within the 3D framework [Diplomacy, Development, and Defense].

The U.S. Army possesses a significant force structure in both active and reserve components with a wide range of capabilities to employ across the full spectrum of military operations, to include Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations. The engineer, medical, and logistics capabilities commonly associated with HA/DR missions reside in organizations at Echelon Above Brigade (EAB), with limited opportunities to conduct realistic multi-echelon training in a JIIM environment.

The drawdown from Iraq and Afghanistan will increase the demand for the best training resources available at the two CONUS-based Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and focus mainly on meeting training requirements for brigade combat teams (BCTs), while further reducing training resources for active and reserve component EAB units. Both CTCs can only accommodate ten brigade-level training rotation cycles per year. The shift to a regionally aligned unit concept applies mainly to BCTs, but should be extended to EAB units, specifically, engineer, medical, and logistics organizations.

The training advantages of Joint exercises outside the U.S. are numerous. The mission command and staff planning and coordination challenges that these exercises present prior, during, and after execution cannot be duplicated in a CONUS unit training scenario. The multi-modal nature of the deployment and redeployment, the austere environmental conditions, and the coordination required with the various stakeholders make these exercises invaluable at all levels of the military organization and establish long-lasting relationships within

JIIM partners – with greater utility during actual contingency operations. Additionally, the unit tasks that are trained during these HA exercises are the same unit training tasks required to support most other military operations. Annual GCC training conferences with DoS and USAID stakeholders using a 36-month planning horizon would allow the military to de-conflict employment of unique DoD capabilities among Combatant Commanders, synchronize training dates with DoS diplomatic efforts, and complement USAID development programs. Close GCC and USTRANSCOM staff coordination could also mitigate exercise-generated high transportation costs.

Recommendation.

1. The Army should extend unit regional alignment to EAB engineer, medical, logistics and other units with HA/DR capabilities. This would provide the ability for units to develop and incorporate some extensive regional functional expertise in unit standard operating procedures (SOPs) and common operational picture products, much like forward-stationed formations. EAB units would also develop habitual relationships with all regional JIIM stakeholders.

2. Annual geographical and functional Combatant Command exercise planning conferences and subsequent working groups should articulate a 36-month minimum exercise planning horizon. All units should be nominated or approved to participate NLT 24 months prior to exercise.

3. GCCs should synchronize all HA/DR related Joint exercises with USAID to ensure that the Theater Campaign Plan and the U.S. Mission Strategic Resource Plan remain complementary.

4. Close GCC coordination should de-conflict availability of low density, high demand capabilities between Combatant Commands. GCCs may want to consider the timing and duration of exercises to optimize strategic mobility assets. The sequencing of reserve component units based on annual training periods to provide continuity in the mission over the duration of the exercise is critical, considering that many unique capabilities are solely resident in the reserve component force structure. A cost analysis of prepositioned equipment in support of these exercises should confirm the cost-benefit of using War Reserves.

Implication

The absence of realistic comprehensive training opportunities comparable to CTC training events will rapidly degrade and erode EAB units' FSO METL proficiency in unit tasks associated with rapidly deploying expeditionary capabilities globally in austere environments among many JIIM partners.

Event Description.

This lesson was developed for the PKSOI Elective Course 2206 – International Development.

b. TOPIC. Building Partner Capacity – USACE and USAID (1093)

Observation.

There is a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) capacity and capability gap with respect to technical engineering. However, the U.S. Army has the ability to assist USAID with technical engineering by leveraging U.S. Army Corps of Engineer (USACE) assets to assist as needed.

- USAID and USACE successfully partnered in Iraq and Afghanistan to execute over $50 billion in reconstruction.

- USAID maintains an in-house engineer force of 24 engineers while USACE is currently manned at 35,000.

- The lack of familiarity between USACE and USAID hampered initial reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

- Current fiscal austerity would allow USAID to leverage USACE personnel on a reimbursable basis to assist with engineering development and capacity building.

- Authorities are in place to allow immediate partnering and leveraging of USACE personnel to work with and for USAID.

Discussion.

After 11 years of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States Government (USG) is considering new ways to meet national objectives by increasing the United States' focus on diplomacy and development.

Non-state actors and failing/weak states present challenges in security and stability within different Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). Combatant Commanders will likely have less resources to respond to increasing threats. It is imperative, then, that Combatant Commanders guide their military staffs to develop Theater Security Cooperation Plans in a way that integrates and leverages available Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational

(JIIM) resources and capabilities to coordinate a whole-of-government approach to accomplish national security objectives.

Reduced discretionary spending will cause the USG to seek efficiencies and cost savings. This fiscal environment may stimulate the search for internal and external efficiencies that could facilitate interagency cooperation and the need to leverage capabilities and capacity. USACE has the resources and USAID has the development work to accommodate a partnership that could be symbiotic.

Expanded interagency cooperation is proposed as a way to increase government efficiency. Presidential Policy Directives, cabinet secretaries, and Congressional testimony call for increased interagency cooperation in foreign and domestic operations. Iraq and Afghanistan illuminated interagency problems that consisted of ad hoc models and ill-defined policy. The current administration touts interagency cooperation as essential in every USG activity, and the current political environment invites an opportunity to lead in this endeavor.

Recommendation.

Focused recommendations are provided that meet two criteria: (1) USAID and USACE can implement actions immediately, and (2) the Executive Branch has all necessary authorizations, appropriations, and authorities to execute initial implementation recommendations.

1. Commission a USAID/USACE working group to conduct a study on present and future national security requirements in which USACE could provide engineering and/or technical support to USAID. The working group should evaluate why USAID and USACE have not significantly partnered outside of Iraq and Afghanistan and how both agencies may be able to use each other's expertise in a cooperative manner.

2. Determine project thresholds for USACE partnering and actions that would allow USACE and USAID personnel to, at a minimum: train together, conduct interagency exchanges, share technology and best engineering practices, and conduct table-top exercises.

3. Determine if USACE can provide low-cost or no-cost support to USAID and, if so, for what type of engineering and technical services. Determine authorities and law that must be changed in the future by the legislative branch in order to allow no-cost support to USAID.

4. Continue to study the emerging USACE requirement to support USAID's increased role regarding food security ("Feed the Future") by providing water sector support.

5. Provide a report in 90 days to agency leadership with implementation objectives, an associated timetable to execute agency partnering, and a synchronized communications strategy that emphasizes smart government through efficient and effective ways of government agencies working together.

Implication

Recommendations allow USAID and USACE to work together and familiarize themselves with one another.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on an understanding of USAID and USACE technical engineering capability and capacity.

c. **TOPIC**. **U.S. Department of Defense Interaction with Interagency Partners in the Field (1095)**

Observation.

In order to gain a more current and accurate local assessment and under-standing of the operating environment, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) units should identify the other U.S. Government (USG) agencies working in the local area, specifically those assigned to U.S. Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Discussion.

In April 2011, my Reconnaissance & Surveillance (R&S) Squadron participated in Atlas Drop, an overseas deployment training mission in Uganda, sponsored by U.S. Army Africa (USARAF). In conjunction with a joint contingent of active and reserve units, our mission was to train the Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF) in aerial delivery and resupply planning and execution, to include aerial resupply planning, rigger operations, and pathfinder operations. While conducting our training in the vicinity of the town of Soroti, Uganda, we met a group of Peace Corps Volunteers who were teaching at local schools and orphanages. During several conversations with these Peace Corps Volunteers in a social setting, we exchanged our experiences working with the Ugandans. My Soldiers related some of the challenges they'd experienced while teaching the Ugandan Soldiers. The Volunteers provided some keen insights from their experiences over the past several months that my Soldiers noted and later implemented successfully.

During those conversations, we learned that one of the Volunteers taught sewing at a local orphanage for orphans of the Lord's Resistance Army's (LRA's) activities in the area. When he learned that we were looking for a sustainable solution to supplying the UPDF with locally produced VS-17 panels with which to mark drop zones for the aerial resupply operations, he indicated that the girls at the orphanage could make the VS-17 panels from locally procured, brightly colored cloth – commonly used to make the brightly colored orange, blue, purple, red, or yellow school clothes of the local school children. We then contracted with the orphanage, and they did indeed produce a very colorful – and sustainable – VS-17 panel for the UPDF to use for marking their drop zones.

This chance meeting between two unlikely partners, the U.S. Army and the Peace Corps in the field, resulted in the achievement of the training mission goals, as well as a partnership between the UPDF and a local organization to provide a much needed product. While this is a somewhat uniquely fortuitous event, it indicates the possibilities that exist to gain a better social and cultural understanding of an unfamiliar operating environment.

Recommendation.

1. When deploying to an unfamiliar operating environment, identify other USG or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in the area, and establish a relationship early on.

2. Remain cognizant of the implications of DoD and Other Government Agencies (OGAs) and NGOs sharing cultural information. Don't jeopardize the unique relationships that OGAs and NGOs have with the local populace.

3. Identify key interactive opportunities that exist or could exist. For example, the opportunity to identify a customer-client relationship as illustrated by this example.

Implications

1. Missed opportunity is the most noteworthy outcome of failing to identify any OGAs or NGOs working in the area and not establishing a relationship.

2. Failing to remain cognizant of the implications of DoD and OGAs and NGOs sharing cultural information could jeopardize the unique relationships that OGAs and NGOs have with the local populace, as well as jeopardize interagency cooperation efforts in the future.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on Exercise Atlas Drop 2011: a partner capacity building exercise in Uganda designed to teach aerial resupply planning, rigger operations, and pathfinder operations to the UPDF.

d. **TOPIC.** **Establishing a Safe and Secure Environment** **(1152)**

Observation.

Establishing a safe and secure environment involves much more than initial policing actions. The reduction of violence in the given operating environment over time requires a range of other actions and appropriate resourcing.

Discussion.

Establishing a safe and secure environment:

On the surface, most members of the military will likely look at establishing a safe and secure environment as simply providing a policing function with an aim at keeping violence at a minimum. In actuality, it seems that providing a lasting secure environment entails much more. Once basic security is established in a peacekeeping situation, the stabilizing force or team must start building the basic foundations of society based upon a thorough needs assessment of the operating environment. In the Sierra Leone case study, 2.6 million homeless individuals is a staggering number that represents a significant source of potential violence and criminality based on individuals simply trying to fulfill their basic needs. With a population this large, one challenge is attempting to keep them at peace with each other while the basic needs of shelter, water, and food are addressed by the peacekeeping force. If too many of the limited resources are put into law enforcement and security, then the effort to provide for basic needs will move too slowly, causing the security situation to potentially get out of hand due to a restless and suffering population. Yet, if the law enforcement function is under-resourced in order to speed up the humanitarian effort, then the likelihood of opportunistic criminality will spike dramatically in a "survival of the fittest" environment.

Options for reducing violence:

One "ground level" challenge is attempting to reduce violence in an operating environment. As a military police company commander in Iraq in 2003, my company was charged with supply route patrols. One of our tasks was to

enforce the weapons ban placed on the Iraqi population. While we confiscated many AK-47s and other weapons, the Iraqi populace that we were now charged with protecting frequently reminded us that we were removing from them their basic ability to protect themselves in their homes. Opportunistic crime was still rampant at this point in the war. While we were carrying out orders to remove weapons from the battlefield, we may have also been creating a situation where many Iraqi civilians could no longer defend themselves against the many criminal elements still roaming the country. This likely created a significant anti-American sentiment that would continue to challenge the coalition in the coming years of the war. The point is that if the peacekeeping forces are not available on the ground to provide the security the population requires, then creative approaches that include utilizing indigenous police and military forces in a partnering approach must be considered. This was a big problem in Iraq, however, because the previous indigenous forces were all disbanded, leaving U.S. forces, like my company, having to start from scratch training Iraqi police units – using individuals with no experience and little capability to provide for their own security.

In addition to providing for basic security, other means for reducing violence must include ensuring an equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance resources such as food, water, medical support, power generation, & shelter requirements. This encourages a sense of fairness throughout the population. This was also an issue in southern Iraq in 2003 (where I was initially located), because the population in southern Iraq was watching hundreds of convoys passing through their region on their way to Baghdad, while the southern population was left with far less in support and assistance. This was a significant issue – the "Baghdad first" approach that was taken.

Recommendation.

Some suggestions for post-hostility security, reducing violence, and stabilizing a society:

1. Think through the long term ramifications of completely disbanding established security force capability (e.g., De-Baathification in Iraq) before taking such a radical step. Are rank and file officers really part of the displaced regime? Can they be "salvaged" and re-trained under a new rule of law philosophy?

2. Plan thoroughly for "Phase IV" operations and plan accordingly for suitable and sufficient resources capable of securing the entire population and holding terrain until such time that a logical and responsible transition to a new government can take place.

3. If there is neither the will nor the resources to execute a successful "Phase IV" campaign, then strongly recommend modification to the desired end-state and objectives of the "Hostilities" phase of the campaign. It seems that as a general

rule of thumb, if the desired end-state is something that resembles regime change, then you need to plan for a fully resourced, comprehensive "Post-Hostilities" phase that includes a COIN capability should the situation develop into an insurgency.

Implications.

Remembering lessons learned from an under-resourced post-conflict campaign during OIF, the following implications are possible:

- Significant challenges re-establishing rule of law institutions.

- Fueling support for an insurgency due to an inability to provide for the basic security needs of the indigenous population.

- Related challenges to establishing economic and political institutions necessary to address the basic needs of the society.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on personal experience as a company commander in theater during Operation Iraqi Freedom I and II and insights gained during the PKSOI Elective Course PS2219 taken at the United States Army War College.

e. **TOPIC**. **Rule of Law Training in Afghanistan (975)**

Observation.

The critical stability operations sector of justice and reconciliation, specifically as it applies to rule of law training to Afghans, was slow to materialize in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and initially ineffective in 2006 under the Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) contract for the Department of State (DoS) Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL). Rule of law training and programs are essential to stability operations and must be equally implemented with the other stability operations sectors to ensure the Afghan populace has faith in the judicial system and the central government. Early analysis of judicial customs, processes, institutions, and population concerns are critical information requirements to prepare rule of law training and implementation prior to execution during stability operations.

Discussion.

The JSSP contract in Afghanistan commenced in 2006 as a DoS awarded contract to a U.S. government contractor. The contract awardee, PAE Government Services, conducted trial-and-error analysis of the training curriculum and made improvements over the course of several years. As of 2011, DoS considered JSSP to be their "flagship" rule of law program, and the Afghan rule of law training showed a better understanding of Afghan culture and capacity.

The Afghan judicial structure was notably different from western systems. Defense attorneys were new to the country's legal process and there was no jury system. Equally critical, there were no true police detectives. The Afghan judicial system had prosecutors acting as detectives to collect case evidence from crime scenes with the police simply assisting in an arresting capacity. This allowed for a single entity in the system to collect, hold, and present all evidence in a court of law. With the prosecutors focused on legal practice and not evidence collection, there were many issues with evidence provided in courts as related to collection methods, maintenance (tampering), and thorough collection.

Within the judicial system there was unfamiliarity with the judicial processes and judicial institutions with corresponding personalities. This slowed the judicial process and negatively impacted cases by not having all the legal entities aligned. INL and PAE incorporated working and training with prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, AND police into the program of instruction (POI). This allowed for police and prosecutor coordination and a better understanding of duties and requirements. Additionally, the POI incorporated mentoring at higher levels of the Afghan judicial system, to include the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and policy levels of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Having mentors at the highest levels allowed for better coordination and understanding throughout the judicial system and improved relationships with Afghans throughout system.

The training and mentoring approach used the train-the-trainer concept. INL and PAE conducted the POI with Afghan instructor counterparts. Critical to POI success was the addition of the Critical Thinking course and follow-on mentoring of the students upon course completion at their assignments. JSSP also started "in-house" Afghan training teams by assigning an Afghan prosecutor to develop training for judicial centers, investigative police, and prosecutors on a recurring basis outside of JSSP-led courses. This training is now self-sustaining. JSSP focused on "student-centered" learning vice "teacher-centered" learning. This facilitated learning with student experience-oriented instruction (Adult Learning Theory). The course provided small group facilitation proven best for Afghans.

JSSP training initially started with a 7-month POI in 2007 and was based on standard legal courses from U.S. schools that basically loaded three years of law

school into a very short period. This approach proved to be too much information for the Afghans. Afghans could learn the presented material, but could not apply it. In 2008, INL and PAE changed the format of the POI to 4 weeks of instruction, followed by 4 weeks of mentoring, followed by 3 weeks of instruction, and then ending with a 3-week mentorship. This, too, was found to be too disruptive to the students. With this approach, the students did very well in class, but did not do well on the job. In 2009-2010, INL and PAE created an 8-week POI with more class time on subject matters. The new format used a "hands-on" training approach and infused critical thinking AND legal reasoning. These concepts were not taught in Afghan law schools. With this format, students showed actual application of Afghan law, not simply knowledge of law. The POI also included a mock trial in which judges, investigators, police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys (men and women) work together in critical thinking reviews of the case and crime scene investigation. Students appeared to know and understand the judicial relationships and what they can expect throughout the judicial process.

Measure of effectiveness of the POI outside of throughput metrics and convictions/release rates are provided in these success vignettes:

- Afghanistan enforced a "running away" law that prescribed if an Afghan woman left her house without her husband's permission, she would be punished. JSSP instruction showed that NO such law existed; it was simply a tribal custom. There are now less "running away" cases seen in the judicial process due to the rule of law training and understanding. This is a significant positive move for female rights in Afghanistan as well.

- A prosecutor in Kabul provided a written indictment in a 2010 narcotics case. A JSSP-trained Afghan defense attorney provided an 8-page Law & Evidence based defense statement (rebuttal). This was the first rebuttal for the newly formed Afghan defense attorneys and a substantial move forward in the Afghan judicial process.

- COL Kehestane (Chief of CID in Herat 2011): "We are giving those graduates (JSSP) the toughest cases." He also stated that since Afghan judges started attending JSSP rule of law classes, the Afghan judges are finding more fault in prosecutors' cases. This equates to a refined rule of law and judicial capacity building.

Recommendation.

1. As with all partner nation training, cultural understanding and adult communication style is critical for learning and implementation. Off-the-shelf POIs need to be quickly adapted to partner nation needs, especially in rule of law training. Rule of law training should include mentorship at higher levels – to provide connectivity throughout the legal continuum. In Afghanistan, and many countries, relationships with personnel throughout the Judicial System are often

key to success. To further the rule of law learning experience, JSSP should include more Afghan judges speaking to Afghan law students about what they expect to see in their court room and what they are looking for in a case. JSSP mentors should continue with mentorship post-training, to ensure learning is applied and to identify further training needs. Rule of law training needs to sustain the critical thinking and legal reasoning training in the adult learning format.

2. Due to extensive courtroom work for Afghan lawyers, JSSP instructors should be experienced TRIAL lawyers with significant experience. Overseas contracting may attract lawyers out of law school or those who are not trial lawyers. Rule of law training needs trial lawyers who have actually practiced law in a courtroom in front of a judge – the way the Afghans are expected to perform in their judicial system.

3. Afghan rule of law training needs to include investigators/detectives. This is a new role for Afghans as the prosecutor also performs in the role of police detective. Need a separation of duties. It would be good to have retired police detectives mentor the Afghan detectives vice having JSSP lawyers instruct the course. There needs to be a separate investigation and evidence handling course.

4. JSSP needs to implement a Case Management System (CMS) for the MOJ. This will allow case tracking and closure within the judicial system for accountability and archival.

5. Rule of law training and programs are essential to Afghanistan and other stability operations and must be implemented early and provide for a functioning judicial system. This system affects all the other stability operations systems. Early analysis of judicial customs, processes, institutions, and legal challenges & concerns are critical information requirements to prepare rule of law training and implementation prior to execution during stability operations.

Implications.

1. Rule of law training in the stability operations sector of "justice and reconciliation" is a critical component to successful stability operations.

2. The population will look at the actions of the judicial sector in response to corruption, criminal activity, police misconduct, and other nefarious actions.

3. Success in this rule of law training is required early in stability operations to support the other stability operations sectors.

Event Description.

Author is a National Guard Special Forces officer familiar with military Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions in the Middle East and Africa. From 2009 to 2012, the author served as a program manager and quality assurance manager for PAE Government Services; he observed the JSSP contract for PAE Government Services and met with INL and other stakeholders.

f. TOPIC. Afghan Provincial Reconstruction Team Project Process (1172)

Observation.

The efforts of our Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Panjshir Province, Afghanistan, were focused on improving the performance of all Afghan government institutions within the province, tying those organizations to the central government, and ensuring the local population continued to see the U.S./ Coalition presence in a positive manner.

Discussion.

On our base, we had an Embedded Training Team tasked with coordinating the efforts of the provincial police, Afghan Army, Afghan National Directorate of Security, and coalition military forces. We also had a Security Forces Advisory Team that embedded within the provincial police headquarters and mentored their efforts. Another team consisted of agriculture specialists from the Kentucky National Guard and the U.S. Forest Service. They worked with the provincial director of agriculture, irrigation, and livestock to improve farming within the province. We had a team of engineers working large infrastructure projects such as roads, government buildings, and schools; a team of Civil Affairs officers working smaller projects through the local district governors; and, a team of medical professionals who helped the local clinics throughout the province with advice and training. There were two U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) employees who worked municipal governance and women's issues. Finally, we had a State Department Foreign Service Officer who directly mentored the Provincial Governor and his senior staff.

Everything we did in the province was worked through the Afghan government. Large efforts were worked either at the Provincial Governor's request or with his approval. If the project needed funding, we required him to attempt, in writing, to get the funds from the central government and to request an operating and sustainment budget. If local leaders came to our base requesting large projects, we listened to their requests and then referred them to the Governor's office.

Smaller projects were worked through the provincial line directors, district governors, and the municipal government. The Provincial Governor was informed of all these efforts.

Projects were in a variety forms. Some were large engineering construction efforts: e.g., roads, buildings, bridges. Some projects consisted of only advice and training: e.g., construction classes, medical clinic visits, youth shuras/ councils. Many projects were "self-help" projects: our Provincial Reconstruction Team provided expertise in design and some money for materials, and the local community provided the labor and the balance of the material and funding required.

These "self-help" projects were so successful that we typically had five to ten underway within each district. They gave local leaders the opportunity to engage the district governors, and they allowed both to be seen as directly helping their communities. The nature of the "self-help" projects ensured that the local people had a stake in project success, since they were investing their sweat and treasure. The projects were also a visible reminder to the entire community that the Coalition and the district government were working together to make people's lives better. Typical requests for these projects included drinking water systems, foot bridges, micro-hydro electric generators, school playgrounds, and flood damage repair.

Recommendation.

Provincial reconstruction efforts should always be synchronized with the legitimate Afghan government, and the provincial officials should be tied to the central government in Kabul.

Implications.

Failing to tie the Provincial Reconstruction Team's effort to the Afghan government risks creating a parallel structure. Also, empowering the provincial governments without linking them to the central government risks separating them from the central authority in Kabul.

Event Description.

The events described were continuous from October 2010 to July 2011 and all within the Panjshir Province of Afghanistan..

g. TOPIC. Integrating Peace Building with Peace & Stability Operations (1147)

Observation.

In a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment, peace building is the most challenging part of the COIN effort. In most cases, COIN efforts in the Philippines were not successful because the government's response failed to fully integrate peace building operations in its overall plan for addressing the insurgency problem.

Discussion.

Peace building is one of the vital components of peace and stability operations. Peace building programs sustain the gains of military operations that can lead to achieving the overall objectives of the peace and stability operations. In a counterinsurgency environment, peace building is the most challenging part of the COIN effort. In most cases, COIN efforts in the Philippines were not successful because the government's response failed to fully integrate peace building operations in its overall plan for addressing the insurgency problem.

In the Philippine's COIN operations, the main challenge of the Armed Forces of the Philippines has been how to sustain the gains of the military operations against the insurgents. For more than four decades, the Philippine government has been struggling in combating the communist insurgents. While the Armed Forces of the Philippines have been militarily capable of addressing the armed components of the insurgency problem, the Philippine government has not been economically sufficient in providing the essential services required by the local population. The absence or lack of peace building operations/programs in the countryside made the peasants, poor farmers, and other civilian sectors vulnerable to recruitment by the communist insurgents. The communist insurgents were able to exploit legitimate grievances of the people – such as poverty, injustice, inequality, poor governance, and other social ills of the society – in the furtherance of their cause. Furthermore, former rebels and supporters who joined the mainstream society would later rejoin the insurgents once they saw no improvement in the economic condition of the community.

To consolidate and sustain the gains of the military in its COIN operations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines embarked on developmental activities with support of, and in collaboration with, other government agencies, nongovern-mental organizations, media, local government units, and various stakeholders. Through a multisectoral convergence program, the Armed Forces of the Philippines engaged various stakeholders to generate support and mobilize resources from both the government and civilian sectors – local and foreign – to undertake developmental activities in the countryside. These activities have been intended to address the grievances of the local populace.

One of the activities under the multisectoral convergence program was the mobilization of the Peace and Order Councils (POCs) – to integrate the developmental activities at the local level. The national government established the POCs to be headed by the local government executives – to address peace and order challenges in the locality. The aim has been to get the commitment of the local government units and other stakeholders in prioritizing the delivery of the essential services to the insurgency-affected or depressed areas.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines also undertook development support projects with the private sectors. The main effort in this endeavor has been to forge partnerships with the private sector, thus creating a link between civilian institutions and the people. Through this activity, conflict-affected and depressed areas received numerous donations from well-meaning institutions, such as school buildings, school supplies, books, medicines, farm-to-market roads, potable water systems, electric power systems, and other essential services.

To facilitate awareness of the national security issues, the Armed Forces of the Philippines also undertook multisectoral peace forums. This was done to inform the local government units, media, academia, religious leaders, and the general public about the nature of these issues and about the roles and contributions of various people/groups in addressing the insurgency. The main effort in this program has been to instill in the whole community a shared responsibility in maintaining peace and security across the country.

Indeed, peace building is a vital component of peace and stability operations. It must be integrated into the peace and stability operations in collaboration with multiple stakeholders. Addressing the drivers of the conflict and instilling an unwavering commitment among national and local leaders and their people for the maintenance of peace and security are necessary elements in preserving the gains of the military operations.

Recommendation.

Peace building must be integrated into the peace and stability operations, in collaboration with all stakeholders.

Implication.

The initial gains of peace and stability operations cannot be sustained without addressing the drivers of conflict and involving the people.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the Philippine experience in COIN.

h. TOPIC. Democracy and Governance, Conflict Resolution and Transformation (1082)

Observation.

The collapse of a state generates conditions that can be very unfavorable to the development of democracy. If there is to be any chance for success, understanding the local context in its historical, cultural, political, and sociological dimensions is especially vital.

Discussion.

1. Democracy and Governance. From the readings which we covered, apart from the routine definitions and explanations taught to us time and again, I found the arguments advanced in the other readings especially on Islam to be thought provoking in the sense that justification for their beliefs and style of governance was well articulated. At the same time, whilst Mali was aptly used to justify the emergence and holding of democracy in an African Muslim country considered to be extremely poor, landlocked, with the majority of adults overwhelmingly illiterate and living in absolute poverty, there was no condemnation of the manner in which democracy was instituted in the country and neither was inference made to measures that were being taken to address the causative factors of the coup. Mali today is just one of the failed states, as qualified by scholars who had researched in these fields of study. It was equally opportunistic to use just one country and expect the whole world to base a turn-around on Mali.

2. The above brought me to the question of whether the whole world could become democratic. Academically, I find that it is easy to say yes. However, when cognizance is taken of the way globalization is dictating how states should behave in order to survive, it certainly is not possible that all nations in the world could become democracies. This is even exacerbated by the behavior of the strong economies which are overly more concerned about achieving their national interests, irrespective of the manner and ways employed. As long as their style of governance secures them the national goals, the rest in their relations with the cooperating partners is "political gymnastics." Currently Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, to mention but a few, are opposed to becoming democracies as defined by the U.S./UN, claiming that the manner in which they conduct their national businesses is equally democratic. And this is the more reason why I found the argument advanced by Muslims to be founded on firm ground in the light that the UN charter and U.S. National Security Strategy emphasizes the requirement for respect of other divergent cultures or considered alien from the U.S./UN understanding/perspective.

3. It is equally on record that some countries that became democracies out of convenience, especially to access financial aid, without having well thought out national strategic plans for how to improve the causative factors of a failed state, got carried away with the abuse of the newly acquired democratic powers – mainly to settle political scores – and had leaders equally forced out of power faster than they assumed it. The three military coups that occurred in Africa before the year 1990 in countries that had adopted democratic governance attest to this deduction.

4. <u>Democracy and Islam</u>. Having gone through the readings, I came to a conclusion that a number of governments in Islamic states that came into power through elections, like Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon, and the occupied Palestinian territories, are in their own understanding sending a message that they did not necessarily require following the U.S./UN definition of democratic governance to prove that they could practice it. They want the most to practice democracy that is imbued with Islamic tenets, in the same way the people of the U.S. believe in their rights as enshrined in the constitution, to which some Muslims claim is a source of promiscuity and moral decay perceived to exist in some Western societies. Those individuals look at Sharia [the religious law of Islam] to be their spiritual source of legislation, as they believe that religion should play a large role in their lives, and this is why they adhere to Islamic values at all times.

5. Whilst I respect their commitments to their values and belief in Sharia, I have also been observant to trends in their behaviors in countries where they enjoyed total freedom. This is in respect of their commitment to certain observances like their dress code. This is a challenge that the Muslims are faced with in respect of their desired freedoms as compared to wholesomely embracing democratic governance.

6. When I look at the various factors used to assess a country, I agree with the fact that electoral democracy can exist in countries with significant violations of human rights, massive corruption, and a weak rule of law, as currently this is what Zambia is faced with. The opposition parties are crying for these defects in democratic governance to be sufficiently contained so that, in elections at least, the will of the voters can be reflected in the outcome, and, in particular, unpopular incumbents can be booted from office. They [opposition parties] are calling for an open electoral arena, with substantial freedom for parties and candidates to campaign and solicit votes, and thusly to speak, publish, assemble, organize, and move about the country peacefully for that purpose. They have on a number of occasions requested for neutral and fair administration of the voting and vote counting, with universal suffrage, secrecy of the ballot, reasonable access to the mass media, and use of established legal procedures for resolving electoral disputes. They say this is not yet granted to them. Therefore, it takes a lot for appropriate democratic government to take root.

7. <u>Conflict Resolution and Transformation – Nicaragua Study Case</u>**.** From the onset as I did the reading of the Nicaragua study case, I could discern that reliance on formal democratic mechanisms in the post-conflict state played a pivotal role to settle the long standing differences and challenges that were faced. Other means of settling the differences can provide only limited terminal suspension for a short period of time before recommencing [of disputes]. Truly, in the absence of an effective state, possibilities are that a civil war takes place, enabling a rebel force ultimately to triumph. Situations of this nature facilitate the creation of a vacuum which is gradually or rapidly filled by the rebellious army and political movement to establish control over the state. The end result is that democracy in such cases is known not to take root, as it perpetuates the replacement of one form of autocracy with another. Overly powerful warlords and armies, with either no real central state or only a very weak one, continue to fight, minus the conflict coming to an end, but likely until a country is torn into ill governed zones. These types of situations alluded to above usually see an international actor or coalition of actors step in to constitute temporary authority – politically and militarily. For example, the U.S. under the relatively thin layer of a coalition went into Iraq with an American administration after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

8. One key component/principle for moving into such challenged countries is to ensure that before embarking on any steps to achieve democracy, order must be made to bear, and this must be emphasized to all parties to the conflict. The reason behind having order first is that no viable or meaningful democracy flourishes in a context where violence or the threat of violence is all-encompassing and permeates the political machinations, with fears of groups and individuals. This is all the more reason, as discussed during the presentation on all stability areas and progression of the transformation, it was emphasized that the requirement for security and the rule of law and order must prevail throughout the whole period of conflict resolution and transformation.

9. In the presentation, it was further emphasized that the promotion of democracy in post-conflict situations cannot succeed without the rebuilding of order, and the tasks of democracy-building and of peace implementation are inseparable. Whilst it is possible to implement peace without democracy, as in the case of Zimbabwe, it is not possible to build democracy without peace, since peace is embedded in democracy.

10. <u>My Take Away</u>. It was established that any coalition offering assistance should first and foremost understand the local context in its historical, cultural, political, and sociological dimensions. It is especially vital in the wake of violent conflict or state failure, because the collapse of a state generates conditions that are very unfavorable to the development of democracy. This state of affairs often requires a much more massive and wide-ranging set of international commitments than just democratic assistance.

11. The scope of international intervention is, more often than not, far greater in post-conflict settings – if there is to be any chance for democratic success. Inadequate understanding of the local context – including such vital issues as political leaders and alliances, historical trends and grievances, religious, ethnic and sub-ethnic divisions, the sources of legal and illicit revenue, and the structure and loyalties of private militias – can be crippling. This is time and again alluded to and/or emphasized by American friends returning from their recent rich experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq.

12. It was also found cardinal to establish international legitimacy and active support for the post-conflict intervention in order to raise and sustain the necessary resources and commitment – if there is a shared sense of importance and commitment in the international community. This should preferably be formalized by a United Nations Security Council mandate. Doing so both entices and entangles the powerful states to take a vital interest in the mission challenges as they arise. This course of action does not only ensure the need to distribute and share the burdens, but also cements the legitimacy internally in the host country, so that the intervention is not seen to be the imperial action of another powerful state.

13. The requirement to generate legitimacy and trust within the post-conflict country cannot be over emphasized, as no international reconstruction effort can succeed without some degree of acceptance and cooperation. There will be requirements for local support and positive engagement from the people of the failed state.

14. The above is of primacy because if the local population has no trust in the initial international administration and its intentions, the intervention can become the target of popular wrath, and it will then need to spend most of its military (and administrative) energies defending itself rather than rebuilding the country and its political and social order.

<u>Recommendation</u>.

1. Any coalition offering assistance should first and foremost understand the local context in its historical, cultural, political, and sociological dimensions.

2. Establish international legitimacy and active support for the post-conflict intervention – to raise and sustain the necessary resources and commitment.

3. Generate legitimacy and trust within the post-conflict country.

4. Ensure that the requirements for security, the rule of law, and order prevail during the whole period of conflict resolution and transformation.

Implication.

If the local population has no trust in the international administration and its intentions, the intervention can become a target of popular wrath.

Event Description.

This lesson is based upon analysis of the readings and presentations covered in the Peace/Stability Operations Concepts & Principles course.

Return to "Quick Look"

3. **CONCLUSION**

The Lessons Learned submitted by USAWC students during Academic Year 2013 provide valuable insights toward improving peacekeeping and stability operations in the future. Below is a compilation of the key recommendations from the 8 Lessons Learned in this publication.

- The Army should extend regional alignment to Echelon Above Brigade (EAB) engineer, medical, logistics, and other units with Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) capabilities. This would allow those units to develop and incorporate regional functional expertise into SOPs, as well as develop habitual relationships with regional JIIM stakeholders.

- Global Combatant Commands (GCCs) should synchronize all HA/DR related Joint exercises with USAID to ensure that the Theater Campaign Plan and the U.S. Mission Strategic Resource Plan remain complementary.

- USAID and USACE should establish a working group to determine how USAID-USACE partnering can be improved to leverage each other's capabilities for greater efficiencies on future operations.

- DoD units deploying on stability operations should identify other U.S. Government (USG) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in the area, establish relationships early on, and identify interactive opportunities that exist or could exist – while ensuring not to jeopardize the unique relationships that OGAs & NGOs have with the local populace.

- DoD planners should thoroughly plan for "Phase IV" operations – to map out suitable and sufficient resources capable of securing the host nation population (i.e., providing them a safe and secure environment) and

holding terrain until such time that a logical and responsible transition can take place.

- U.S./coalition leaders should think through the long-term ramifications of completely disbanding an established host nation security force capability (e.g., De-Baathification in Iraq) before taking such a radical step; they should determine if rank and file officers can be "salvaged" and re-trained under a new rule of law philosophy.

- Rule of Law (RoL) training and programs are essential to stability operations; they must be implemented early to provide for a functioning judicial system. Understanding host nation judicial customs, processes, institutions, and legal challenges & concerns are critical information requirements to prepare RoL training and implementation prior to execution during stability operations.

- Reconstruction efforts should focus on improving the performance of local/host nation government institutions, tying those organizations to the central government, and ensuring the local population sees the U.S./coalition presence in a positive manner.

- Peace building must be fully integrated into the peace/stability operation – in collaboration with all stakeholders. Addressing the drivers of the conflict and instilling an unwavering commitment among national & local leaders and their people to help maintain peace & security are necessary elements for preserving the gains of the military/security forces.

- Any coalition offering assistance should:

    o First and foremost understand the local context in its historical, cultural, political, and sociological dimensions.

    o Establish international legitimacy and active support for the post-conflict intervention – to raise and sustain the necessary resources and commitment.

    o Generate legitimacy and trust within the post-conflict society.

    o Ensure that the requirements for security, the rule of law, and order prevail during the whole period of conflict resolution and transformation.

Besides the recommendations above, many other thought-provoking Lessons Learned submitted by USAWC students are readily available in the SOLLIMS database. We hope you'll take some time to discover these Lessons Learned, utilize them in your planning and preparations for future stability operations, and share with us any related insights or perspectives!

4. **COMMAND POC**

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Las Marias, El Salvador – Captain Ernesto Santamaria of the Colombian Army, left, looks on as Colombian, El Salvadoran, and American soldiers work together to build a school in the remote Salvadoran village of Las Marias during Exercise Beyond the Horizon 2013. Colombian engineers deployed to support the mission in both El Salvador and Panama.

(Photo by Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service, 10 June 2013.)

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