

SOLLIMS SAMPLER

Targeting Peace & Stability Operations Lessons & Best Practices

Women, Peace and Security

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U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

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FOREWORD

Welcome to the August 2014 edition of the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) Lessons Learned “Sampler” – **Women, Peace and Security**.

The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an [Introduction](#) that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “[Quick Look](#)” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related [Lessons Learned Report](#), and (4) links to [additional reports and other references](#) that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to **Women, Peace and Security** available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission / function – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, the Joint community, policy-makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section within a lesson. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access / download attachments.

If you have not registered in SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account

in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our website at [<http://pksoi.army.mil>] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [<https://sollims.pksoi.org>] to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!



Kabul, Afghanistan (7 July 2014) – An Afghan National Police (ANP) officer displays her diploma after graduating from the Afghan National Police Academy. Of the 51 graduates, 26 were recognized for completing the 8-week Initial Police Training Course (IPTC), which is overseen by advisors of the Afghan Women’s Police Corps. The IPTC prepares students for their duties as a police officer, which is similar to work done by police academies in the United States. The remaining 25 graduates completed the 4-month Non-Commissioned Officer specialty training course.

(NATO TV photo)

INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the August 2014 edition of the SOLLIMS Sampler! The focus for this edition is **Women, Peace and Security**. In this edition, we endeavor to provide not only thought-provoking lessons, but also a comprehensive list of [related documents, references, and links](#). For background, we draw from the [United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 \(2000\)](#). This resolution:

- *Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective.*
- *Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to fully respect international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls.*
- *Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence.*
- *Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls.*

In December 2011, amplifying the importance of this resolution to the United States, the White House published the [United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security](#). The National Action Plan states:

- *The engagement and protection of women as agents of peace and stability will be central to the United States' efforts to promote security, prevent, respond to, and resolve conflict, and rebuild societies.*
- *The United States' efforts on Women, Peace, and Security will complement and enhance existing initiatives to advance gender equality and women's empowerment, ensure respect for human rights, and address the needs of vulnerable populations in crisis and conflict environments.*
- *The United States will ensure that activities in support of Women, Peace and Security are coordinated among all relevant departments and agencies of the government, integrated into relevant United States foreign policy initiatives, and enhanced by engagement with international partners.*

PKSOI's SOLLIMS database has captured numerous experiences from peace and stability practitioners on the topic of **Women, Peace and Security** – several of which are presented in this Sampler. Key take-aways from these lessons are captured in the [Conclusion](#) paragraph.

Women, Peace and Security

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"QUICK LOOK"

Click on [\[Read More ...\]](#) to go to full lesson.

- Bringing about social/societal changes – especially in regard to women’s rights – has been a daunting proposition in **Afghanistan**, where large segments of the population reside in tribal regions and rural villages . . . [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- **All-female Formed Police Units (FPUs)** serving on UN peacekeeping missions in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have effectively improved security in those post-conflict environments. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- To those that have grown up in developed countries, energy may be thought of purely in terms of access to electricity. For people in developing countries who live at or below the poverty line, however, **access to energy** . . . [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The provision of humanitarian aid can evolve into a situation where locally recruited personnel, entrusted with the responsibility of aid distribution, engage in corrupt and **abusive practices**. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The ability to provide competent and appropriate “**expeditionary medical services**” is perhaps one of the most urgent, and critical capabilities needed when responding to conflict-related crises or natural disasters . . . Special challenges: How to interact with/provide care for women, children; maternal and child health . . . [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Attending to the “**human domain**” is vital to peacekeeping and stability operations. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- In the immediate aftermath of the December 2007 elections in **Kenya**, violent clashes broke out that threatened the very existence of the country. . . . “civil society response” based on previously developed civil society peace building capacity – was absolutely critical to bringing about peace . . . [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Post-conflict reconstruction can be seen as a balancing act for the intervening organizations . . . One grass roots example in **Kosovo** of a civil society organization that successfully promoted reconstruction and free markets was the Kosovo Business Women’s Association (SHE-ERA). [\[Read More ...\]](#)

22 August 2014

SUBJECT: Women, Peace and Security

1. GENERAL

Addressing gender issues while planning and conducting peace and stability operations requires the utmost attention to detail. Time spent on this endeavor, however, is absolutely essential for mission success.

This report includes observations, insights, and lessons from several recent operations – including Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, UN peacekeeping operations in Liberia, UN peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), peacebuilding actions in Kenya, and humanitarian assistance missions in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. Common to all experiences is the imperative of being attuned to gender issues and to the fact that women are a major element of the “human domain” in which peacekeepers and stability practitioners operate. Indisputably, women must be recognized as a vital factor in all peace and stability equations.

2. LESSONS

a. TOPIC. Women’s Rights in Afghanistan: the Village and VSO ([1541](#))

Observation.

Bringing about social/societal changes – especially in regard to women's rights – has been a daunting proposition in Afghanistan, where large segments of the population reside in tribal regions and rural villages, heavily influenced by tribal codes/traditions, tribal leaders/councils, Taliban/insurgent threats, and so on. Inroads have been made by Village Stability Operations (VSO), as described by a VSO team member in eastern Afghanistan; however, lasting or meaningful change seems elusive as the VSO presence draws down.

Discussion.

In a certain case in eastern Afghanistan, a Special Operations Forces (SOF) team conducting VSO made notable headway towards improving women's rights within the village; however, once the team pulled out during the drawdown, the situation quickly changed for the worse.

In this particular village, the SOF team had been successful in training several dozen villagers to be "local police." It was also successful in forming, beyond the security alliance, a friendship (albeit weak) with the village elders. The SOF team often engaged these village elders on women's rights – requesting permission to build a girls' school and to form a women's "shura" (council). However, these requests were repeatedly denied. After many months, the village elders finally granted permission for construction of a girl's school, but only after certain demands of theirs were met. Then, three months later, in a similar *quid pro quo*, the village elders also granted permission for the formation of a women's shura.

After the capture or killing of several Taliban commanders in this area by other U.S. forces, the partnership between the SOF team and the village leaders grew to new heights. An improved level of security (as Taliban attacks diminished) allowed for a local bazaar to begin operating again. Village leaders recruited even more "local police," and the SOF team trained them and charged them with patrolling the bazaar. Village leaders then agreed to allow certain USAID project teams to work in the village, such as a water sanitation team, and to allow a U.S. Army Female Engagement Team (FET) to hold a number of classes for the local women. The FET brought members of various NGOs with them, and they set up classes on midwifery, female hygiene, sewing, and handicrafts. Sewn items and handicraft products were then sold in the local bazaar.

These gradual steps that began to improve the education, rights, and livelihoods of girls/women in this village were quite significant advancements. Earlier, the village leaders' attitudes toward such ideas/advancements were made very clear to the SOF team during one of the shuras, as they complained that "Americans are trying to free Afghan women from their husbands throughout the land, and we will oppose this with force if we must." For the village leaders, such issues were solely matters of Pashtun code (i.e., it is the individual man's decision to allow what his wife and daughter may or may not do); the central government and outsiders have no business in such matters.

Regrettably, once the village leaders learned of the SOF team's projected departure (concurrent with the U.S. military drawdown), things took a turn for the worse. Certain village leaders believed the village would not be able to maintain its autonomy (from the Taliban) without the security support of the SOF team, and they proceeded to cut backdoor deals with the Taliban. Soon thereafter, several other village leaders who had been opposed to collaborating with the Taliban were abducted from their homes at night. Days before the SOF team's departure date, two women were found hanged in the village center. Two weeks after the SOF team departed, the women's shura ceased to exist, and the girl's school was abandoned. Weeks later, the girls' school was burned down.

In the view of one individual on this SOF team, VSO was implemented too late in the Afghanistan conflict, and then certain SOF teams were withdrawn too early from villages where they had made moderate headway.

Recommendation.

1. Issues of gender equality in Afghanistan should be approached with a realistic mindset: Small, pragmatic goals should be set with generous, long-term timelines.

2. Bottom-up approaches should be emphasized in Afghanistan, whereby local and tribal elders are engaged on the issues, and whereby they are encouraged to foster communication with higher levels of government – linking bottom-up approaches with top-down approaches.

Implications.

Unless local/village level leaders are simultaneously (and more heavily) engaged through bottom-up approaches, then national-level programs and top-down approaches on issues dealing with women's rights will see little results in many regions of Afghanistan.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the article "[A Bottom-Up Approach: The Importance of the Village in Afghan Society](#)," by Eric Wilson, in The WVoice, Vol. 2, No. 1, 12 February 2014. The WVoice is a publication of Women's Voices Now (<http://womensvoicesnow.org>).

Comments.

Related references:

- (1) "[Women's Access to Justice in Afghanistan](#)," Erika Gaston and Tim Luccaro, United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report, 17 July 2014.
- (2) "[Engaging Afghan Religious Leaders for Women's Rights](#)," Palwasha L. Kakar, USIP report, 18 June 2014.
- (3) "[It Takes the Villages: Bottom-Up Stability Operations in Afghanistan](#)," LTC Michael Anderson, USAF, National Defense University, National War College, April 2014.
- (4) "[Women and Conflict in Afghanistan](#)," International Crisis Group, 14 October 2013.
- (5) "[Women's Rights, Gender Equality, and Transition: Securing gains, moving forward](#)," Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 3 September 2013. This document is also available at: <http://www.areu.org.af>

(6) "[Expanding Village Stability Operations through SOF-GPF Integration](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 968, 26 February 2013.

(7) "[Empowering Afghan Women: Leveling the Playing Field or Mission Creep?](#)," Farzana Nabi-Amanullah, Ph.D., Regional Command Capital (RC-C) Human Terrain Analysis Team (HTAT) AF-30, 2 March 2012.

(8) "[Village Stability Operations: Leveraging Elders and Building Local Police](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 768, 3 November 2011.

(9) "[Planning Considerations for Military-Political Engagement in Afghanistan](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 669, 23 August 2010.

(10) "Village Stability Operations" document library, under "[Special Reports and Papers](#)," on the SOLLIMS ISAF Portal.



b. TOPIC. All-Female Formed Police Units ([1257](#))

Observation.

All-female Formed Police Units (FPUs) serving on UN peacekeeping missions in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have effectively improved security in those post-conflict environments. Moreover, they have proven to be an excellent asset for community-level peace building, as well as a major source of inspiration for women and girls.

Discussion.

In January 2007, India deployed a contingent of 103 policewomen to the United Nations Mission in Liberia ([UNMIL](#)). They provided the core of the first all-female Formed Police Unit (FPU) to ever serve on a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Initially 22 male staff personnel supported the FPU, but after several months, the organization was turned into an all-female FPU. Since then, there have been successive contingents of all-female FPUs in UNMIL, contributed by India.

The original tasks of the all-female FPU consisted of guarding the president's office, providing security at various public events having high-profile leaders in attendance, carrying out night patrols with members of the Liberian National Police (LNP) in and around the capital (Monrovia), and conducting riot control when needed. With each rotation, the FPU's roles expanded beyond the mandated tasks – to include supporting a wide range of community-focused programs, with particular emphasis on those involving Liberian women and girls.

For example, the all-female FPUs conducted community summer camps, in which they taught self-defense, first aid, and classical Indian dance for Liberian girls.

Several researchers have indicated that the time and energy that female peacekeepers expended on interacting and communicating with the local community had an amazing influence. It was reported that when the all-female FPUs noticed decreasing attendance in various community programs, they made a concerted effort to approach both men and women, seeking to understand the reasons for their absenteeism or their withdrawal from certain activities. This approach resulted in a detailed understanding of the concerns, needs, and prevalent challenges of the community, which in turn facilitated the improvement of community programs, greater participation by community members, and significant strides in peace building to overcome friction and grievances.

Of note, in the areas where all-female FPUs operated, it was reported that sexual abuse and exploitation of women dropped sharply. Reports also showed an increase in the number of girls remaining in, and completing, primary school in those areas. Additionally, an increase in female recruitment in the LNP was ascribed to the all-female FPU, which is said to have inspired women to take on non-traditional roles – such as the security profession.

Overall, the presence of the Indian all-female FPU has led to enhanced physical safety and security in Monrovia and surrounding districts. Support from the Government of Liberia was contributory to the all-female FPU's success, as the Government not only supported the activities of the FPU, but also created awareness of its activities among the local populace. By increasing the FPU's visibility at public events and drawing attention to its presence in the community, security continued to improve.

In November 2011, Bangladesh deployed an all-female FPU to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ([MONUSCO](#)). This first all-female FPU from Bangladesh began its work at a crucial point in time for the DRC, needing to establish security in a tense environment plagued by the violence surrounding the presidential and national legislative elections of 2011. The all-female FPU not only performed its tasks successfully, it also proved instrumental in saving many civilian lives during one period of heavy fighting in Kinshasa. Based on the FPU's success, Bangladesh replaced this unit with another 125-member all-female FPU in February 2013, and Bangladesh has committed to subsequent rotations as well.

The tasks of MONUSCO's all-female FPU have included: crowd control, the protection of the UN staff and facilities, and escorting UN personnel into various areas deemed insecure. In addition to these security tasks, the all-female FPU has worked to support various programs and events within the communities it has served. For instance, the Commander of the second FPU contingent, Shirin

Jahan Akter, arranged to have the FPU participate in the International Women's Day event held in Kinshasa on 8 March 2013, where it provided a demonstration of martial art skills under the theme "Rise up Women, Awaken Your Power." Such activities by the all-female FPU have had a significant positive impact on Congolese society at large, and its women in particular.

Recommendation.

1. The UN should continue the approach of sending all-female FPUs on select peacekeeping operations. This should be done on a case-by-case basis, depending on the UN's assessment of the given host nation environment and the willingness of contributing countries to deploy such units. In certain environments, all-female FPUs may be able to serve as key role models for host nation women and girls.
2. The UN and other organizations/coalitions engaged in peacekeeping operations should consider the benefits of having their deployed police/security forces engage in community peace building programs and activities.

Implications.

If the UN does not pursue the option of deploying all-female FPUs on appropriate missions, then an opportunity to provide role models for women and girls of the host nation by way of a cohesive, professional security organization may be lost. Also, the failure to couple "peacekeeping/stability operations" with "peace building activities" may translate to achieving only short-term security gains – without resolving long-standing grievances, maximizing participation/inclusivity, and potentially achieving long-term stability/peace.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the article "Women in Peacekeeping: The Emergence of the All-Female Uniformed Units in UNMIL and MONUSCO," by Catherine A. Onekalit, in [Conflict Trends](#), July 2013, published by ACCORD. ACCORD's website: <http://www.accord.org.za>.

Comments

Related references:

- (1) "[Female Participation in Formed Police Units: A Report on the Integration of Women in Formed Police Units of Peacekeeping Operations](#)," Charlotte Anderholt, PKSOI Paper, September 2012.
- (2) "[Gender Mainstreaming in Peacekeeping Operations Liberia 2003-2009: Best Practices Report](#)," published by United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), in cooperation with Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and German Development Cooperation, September 2010.

(3) "[Gender-Sensitive Police Reform in Post-Conflict Societies](#)," published by [UN Women](#), 15 October 2012.

(4) "[UN Police Peacekeeping](#)," presented by Damien Carrick, RN Law Report on [abc.net.au](#), 21 July 2009.

(5) "[Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute and Creating Peace through Grassroots Leadership](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 1191, 17 June 2013.



c. **TOPIC**. Access to Energy in Developing Countries ([1462](#))

Observation.

To those that have grown up in developed countries, energy may be thought of purely in terms of access to electricity. For people in developing countries that live at or below the poverty line, access to energy takes many different forms and, depending on the type used, could carry many health risks and deter social and economic growth.

Discussion.

When analyzing access to energy in developing countries, there are a number of similarities across the globe. First, almost all people have access to some form of energy. Second, people in urban areas have greater access to electricity than those in rural areas, and only in Africa has this become a significant issue due to higher birthrates in the urban areas while the electricity supply remained stagnant. Third, in households that do not have access to electricity, women suffer more than men, both socially and in higher health risks. Finally, families at or below the poverty line pay more for energy than those with higher per capita incomes.

Those living in developed countries tend to think of energy primarily as electricity. For those living in the rural areas of certain developing countries, however, the three-stone fire, burning dung or crop residue to cook food, is considered energy. Although this form of energy is relatively cheap, it is paid for by those in poverty through time and labor. Excessive amounts of time are expended daily to gather resources for this energy. Additionally, these rural areas typically maintain very conservative gender-type roles within the household, whereby the women gather the fuel and conduct the food preparation. Where electricity is not available, the women may have to conduct threshing and grinding by hand. In these environments, the amount of time required to gather fuel and prepare food often

prevents women and girls from attending school, bound in their traditional roles/duties within the household.

For those at the poverty line in urban areas of developing countries who must buy their energy, the cost is disproportionately high. The lack of disposable income held by these families means they can't buy in bulk, and buying less costs more. Additionally, the cheaper the fuel, the less efficient it is during use. It is estimated that 80% of the energy expenditures by these families is dedicated to cooking fuel, while 20% goes to lighting.

Regardless whether the family lives in a rural or urban area, many at the poverty line suffer from respiratory diseases due to inefficient stoves, poor ventilation, and use of fuels that require open pit burning – all of which combine to increase the chance of premature death through respiratory disease. Over the next 30 years in Africa, deaths due to HIV and Malaria are expected to decrease, while deaths due to respiratory disease are expected to increase.

Recommendation.

1. The cycle of poverty placed on women must be alleviated. Access to electricity will allow for the education of women, which will result in their ability to make informed parenthood choices. Development efforts should focus on the recruitment of private organizations to donate mini-grid access to remote villages and on using renewable energy sources, clean cooking stoves, and improved ventilation systems. The per capita electricity needs are much lower in remote areas, and renewable energy sources are generally sufficient.

2. In areas closer to major population centers, encourage public and private investment in electricity access and the use of hybrid grids using many forms of electricity. This will provide greater incentive for the public utility companies to invest in the needed infrastructure, but with fewer tariffs passed on to the consumer to pay for the infrastructure. The less costly infrastructure is possible because the grid will not have to be extended over large distances from major population centers, but will instead take advantage of a series of clustered hybrid grids.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on a group presentation during U.S. Army War College course PS 2221 – Emerging Global Challenges and Development Trends.



d. TOPIC. Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-being ([1083](#))

Observation

The provision of humanitarian aid can evolve into a situation where locally recruited personnel, entrusted with the responsibility of aid distribution, engage in corrupt and abusive practices.

Discussion

From Angola, Sierra Leone, and Sudan mission experiences, I came to understand how provision of humanitarian aid can evolve into a situation where locally recruited personnel, entrusted with the responsibility of aid distribution, engage in corrupt and abusive practices against their own nationals – abusing the privilege of distributing aid on behalf of international agencies.

Due to women usually being faced with challenges of looking after children and the sick, they are usually the ones held at ransom, especially through sexual abuse in return for aid provisions. Therefore, appropriate accountability and monitoring mechanisms are required to be put in place as checks and balances on those that handle aid provisions, thereby curbing the abuse.

In the missions, hostilities and ill feelings by the affected persons were usually directed at agencies that provided aid instead of the corrupt personnel or host nation (HN). The affected persons felt that by not placing foolproof systems in place to monitor the whole humanitarian assistance effort, the aid providers facilitated the unpalatable practices.

The lapses in the preparedness to mitigate the effects of crises by a number of countries still leave a lot to be desired. The lack of adequate preparations is mainly attributed to poor governance, as opposed to lack of resources. A lot of misplaced priorities result in needy areas being neglected whilst colossal amounts of money are spent on fringe benefits for those in government. In areas where humanitarian assistance is rendered with a functioning government present, most of the assistance is channeled towards gaining political mileage and corrupt disposal by government officials by favoring tribes/groupings and personnel supporting their governance. Therefore, humanitarian assistance should be with a definitive purpose emphasized to recipient governments or personnel in charge, as discussed in the succeeding paragraph.

As budgeting and preparations are planned, concluded, and set into motion by USAID, which is the lead department for the United States, in unison with cooperating partners rendering humanitarian assistance and with the military, I believe assistance should be aimed at facilitating the under-mentioned:

- Access to and delivery of basic needs services, where the affected population should have equal access to aid and be able to obtain adequate water, food, shelter, and health services, so as to ensure survival and life with dignity.
- Access to and delivery of education, with the affected population having equal and continuous access to quality formal and non-formal education, whose aim should be the provision of the opportunity for advancement and promotion of a peaceful society. This is achievable through a system-wide development and reform that avails equal access to relevant, quality, and conflict-sensitive education.
- Return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons should ensure that all individuals displaced from their homes by violent conflict have the option of a safe, voluntary, and dignified journey to their homes or to new resettlement communities. All affected persons should have recourse for property restitution or compensation, and receive reintegration and rehabilitation support to build their livelihoods and contribute to long-term development.
- Social reconstruction should enable the population to coexist peacefully through intra- and inter-group forms of reconciliation. Mechanisms to help resolve disputes non-violently and address the legacy of past abuses should be activated, especially through development of community institutions that bind society across divisions.

I am in accord with the requirement that humanitarian assistance shall be delivered in a manner and with the sole purpose of fostering responsibility and sustainability in order to mitigate the effects of the crises, in such a way that people quickly readjust to their old ways of living after stability is achieved.

I find the under-mentioned to be fundamental information that has to be stressed to the cooperating partners before crises:

- It is the primary role and responsibility of the state to provide timely assistance and protection to affected persons as provided for in the [Humanitarian Charter](#), once a crisis is experienced. Extenuating cases like the Haiti earthquake or floods in Mozambique can be dealt with appropriately, whilst cases like famine in Zimbabwe and floods in Zambia, where the central government-allotted monies never reached the affected persons should have corrective measures taken when all is addressed.
- The above is said especially in light of the fact that the affected population usually does not have sufficient capacity to respond – particularly in the immediate aftermath / early response to the crisis. Therefore, state or controlling authorities should not engage in discrimination of certain groups of people and/or affected areas.

- It is important that the host government is made to understand that it has the responsibility to determine the capacity and intentions towards all members of the affected population about the scale and type of humanitarian response and what in addition is required.
- The HN government should overcome all forms of exploitation and corruption so that all affected people are afforded access to assistance without discrimination. Aid can negatively affect the wider population and amplify unequal power relations between different groups, including men and women. Valuable aid resources can increase exploitation and abuse and lead to competition, misuse or misappropriation of aid.
- The requirement for timely information to the affected population on how to access aid facilitates sanity in the whole operation. The assurance that people will have access to basic services, security, and respect for human rights gives them a foundation/hope for life with dignity. Therefore, the interplay of personal and contextual factors that heighten risks to this access should be analyzed, and mitigating programmes should be designed to address the risks, as well as target the needs of vulnerable people. Planning and feedback procedures by those dealing with the crisis are very important.

I believe that HN actions taken at the earliest opportunity become very important in the sense that they strengthen local capacity – utilizing local resources to restore services, education, markets and livelihood opportunities to promote early economic recovery and the ability of people to manage risk after external assistance has ended. Therefore, it is time that governments become proactive, rather than reactionary, in managing effects of crises.

The case study we dealt with in the U.S. Army War College elective course PS2206 (International Development) really brings out all the lessons to be learnt from both the positive and negative aspects involved in provision of humanitarian assistance manifested on the ground.

I find that USAID looks at “resilience” as the desired endstate in the provision of humanitarian assistance. I say so because the assistance is not rendered in perpetuity, but by design will have to be discontinued at a certain point. I believe that this is most appropriate when the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth is achieved; this defines “resilience.”

Recommendation.

1. Humanitarian assistance should be undertaken with a definitive purpose, emphasized to recipient governments or personnel in charge.

2. The host nation government should be made to understand that it is responsible to determine the required capacity for crisis response, as well as to disseminate the intentions of humanitarian responders to the affected population.
3. The host nation government should overcome all forms of exploitation and corruption, so that all affected people are afforded access to assistance without discrimination.

Implications.

If systems are not put into place to preclude exploitation and corruption, then hostilities and ill feelings by the affected persons may be directed against the agencies providing the aid.

Event Description.

This lesson is based upon Angola, Sierra Leone, and Sudan mission experiences and also draws from a case study within U.S. Army War College elective course PS2206 – International Development.



e. TOPIC. Medical Services as Part of an Overall Stability Operations Strategy ([758](#))

Observation.

The ability to provide competent and appropriate “expeditionary medical services” is perhaps one of the most urgent and critical capabilities needed when responding to conflict-related crises or natural disasters – when large numbers of people are displaced or injured by violence, earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding, tsunamis, etc. In these situations, the host nation, region, or town can be so devastated by the events that essential services are either overwhelmed or become incapacitated. Where robust and modern medical services never truly existed (in some 3rd world countries) – when medical personnel themselves are also among the casualties, and when medical care facilities are significantly destroyed – then the provision of medical services becomes one of the most critical aspects of any stability operations strategy. Time is of the essence during these Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief operations (HA/DR) – to save lives, alleviate suffering, and prevent additional morbidity or mortality from environmental exposures or infectious diseases. There are significant challenges to both military medical support elements and civilian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in being able to provide critical care to the

indigenous population. For military medical teams and units – e.g., Combat Support Hospitals – their normal mission is to provide force health protection for the "kinetic" force. Because of this, the local populace may see these medical providers as being aligned more with military intelligence activity and the warfighters. However, as recently reiterated by the Department of Defense, medical HA/DR and other stability operations are now just as important as offensive and defensive operations in the core competencies of the military. For the NGOs, many seek to distance themselves from close association with military forces – to include such "vanilla" activities as having medical supplies delivered by military assets, moving with military forces for local security, or regularly conversing with military patrols in their area. Otherwise, groups such as Al Qaeda (AQ), the Taliban, or other opposing forces can use these passive events to show that NGOs are in league with the military and can then become targets for the insurgents. The result – the populace will not trust NGOs nor will they use the available medical services and facilities. For both military and NGO medical providers, another precept of medical stability operations is to work closely with the host nation (HN) so that priorities are identified, medical support activities are properly coordinated, and HN Ministry of Health programs and services are not disparaged or undermined by the short-term stability operation. Another challenge, particularly in Middle Eastern regions, is understanding the culture as it relates to the medical treatment of women, children, and prisoners/detainees – a very touchy subject. Expect/anticipate that, at best, only female medical personnel will be able to talk to, perform triage for, or treat the indigenous female population.

Discussion.

Security of medical care personnel and facilities must always be kept in mind. Terrorists/insurgents often seek soft targets (those that are not as well-armed as combat units). They like to disrupt HA/DR missions or kill medical or NGO providers/personnel. Example: during the initial UN mission in Iraq, a Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device hit the UN headquarters and killed the head of the UN team. Result: the rest of the UN mission packed up and went home. The overall security plan for stability operations personnel and facilities must always include an ongoing evaluation of security risks and the protection of expeditionary medical services and personnel – without being intrusive. Over emphasis on security requirements or responding with excessive military force can leave the impression that medical services are not there as a priority for the people and can even result in the local populace fearing and fleeing from medical elements.

Immediately after a major disaster, essential medical services are vitally needed to save lives and to prevent more suffering. Failure to provide adequate essential medical services not only brings down the overall standard of living and wellness of the population, but can also result in a loss of confidence and

dissatisfaction with the HN government. (Failure/inability to care for their basic needs can result in a decline in governance and order.)

Expeditionary/emergency medical care: Need to have military expeditionary medical support ([EMEDs](#)) forces available 7x24. When responding to a humanitarian crisis – tsunami, flood, etc. – EMEDs forces should deploy within 48-72 hours. They must be nominally self-sufficient for 7-10 days.

When designing a stability operations/expeditionary medical support concept, priority of effort should be determined and coordinated by the HN. Emergency medical services are needed during the early part of a major HA/DR operation, followed by general preventive medicine, public health, hygiene & sanitation, training & education, and building or improving partner capacity.

Special challenges: How to interact with/provide care for women, children; maternal and child health. Mothers are very central characters in many cultures, having control of family, influencing the children/daughters. By training the mothers how to provide basic medical/health care, it results in training of the children and the family.

With regard to providing medical care for detainees/prisoners, it is important to show respect for the Rule of Law and instill professionalism in the detention cadre – for dealing with the most vulnerable, disenfranchised, and often the most reviled segment of the population. Yet some of these detainees may, in the future, become the military, political, or business leaders of the HN. Must be careful to show respect for cultural issues. Don't antagonize the individual, family, community, or local leadership. Ensure application of acceptable humanitarian principles and adherence to Geneva Conventions. This also applies to treatment of combatants and non-combatants in general.

In disaster response situations, there is a tendency for the populace to move away from the disaster site(s) – e.g., flooded areas. Expect massive migrations. Need to be prepared to run/administer refugee communities / internally displaced person (IDP) camps. Expect externally displaced person (EDP) camps in neighboring countries. The people are now located where there are no preventive medical services, no infrastructure, and no professional care givers

Priority of effort: 1) potable water – used for both drinking and cleaning; without this expect a large number of cases of gastrointestinal disorders; 2) disposal of garbage, human waste, and black/brown water [black = sewage/human waste; brown = post-cleaning body and food]; 3) teach good personal hygiene and infection control; and, 4) provide proper and adequate/appropriate shelter, food, and water – e.g., after Hurricane Katrina, relief agencies provided trailers as shelter/homes – but, they were not connected to any sewage system and did not have electrical power or water; might have been better off with communal toilets and tent shower & bath facilities.

Importance of strategic communication (STRATCOMM): letting people know where to go to get medical attention/care; ensuring that people know who is providing services so that AQ/Taliban cannot discredit or claim credit; countering negative STRATCOMM being broadcast by AQ/Taliban. Use social media as part of STRATCOMM operations. Inform the populace on matters of public health, preventive medicine, hygiene, and warnings about epidemics.

Recommendation.

1. When designing a stability operations/expeditionary medical support concept, the priority of effort should be: emergency/essential medical services, general preventive medicine, public health, hygiene & sanitation, training & education, and improving or building partner capacity. Always work and coordinate with the HN Ministry of Health.

2. Understand and disseminate to medical care givers the cultural nuances related to caring for women and children.

3. Teach detention cadres and medical care-givers the professionalism needed to care for prisoners/detainees to ensure respect for the Rule of Law.

4. Use social media to inform the populace of the types of medical care facilities, capabilities, locations, missions, etc. Social media can be useful to help connect patients with medical providers.

5. Respect NGOs and other civilian medical providers' desires to be non-affiliated with warfighters. Any interpretation by the population that the medical service personnel or NGOs are part of the warfighting element can jeopardize the care givers themselves, as well as spread mistrust among the populace.

6. Avoid any activity that creates the perception by the people that the medical services are more a part of "military operations" than a true concern for the health and welfare of the people. Medical services provided by the military or NGOs must be done in close coordination with the HN. Medical services provided by the military or NGOs must not overshadow the HN Ministry of Health because this can ultimately result in a lack of confidence in the government – as well as dependence on a standard of care that might not be sustainable once the expeditionary medical services have departed.

Implications.

Failure to adhere to the concepts and principles outlined in this observation may not only jeopardize the success of medical services in stability operations, but also the success of the overall strategy for the region, province, etc. On the other hand, successful implementation of medical services can be a tremendous positive influence on the populace, enhancing the probability that other stability

operations objectives will be more easily realized and aid in winning the “hearts and minds” of the people.

Event Description.

Extracted from notes taken during live interview with COL Roberto Nang by Mr. Dan French, Chief, Lessons Learned Branch, PKSOI, on 3 June 2011. COL Nang served as Senior Medical Advisor at PKSOI from September 2010 to July 2012. His previous assignments included commanding a medical support and evacuation company in Somalia in 1993, leading a Preventive Medicine team in support of the Nicaraguan Ministry of Health in 1998 following Hurricane Mitch, serving as Division Surgeon for the 1st Cavalry Division 2002-2005 with duty in Iraq, and commanding the 31st Combat Support Hospital 2007-2008 in support of detainee operations in Iraq. Interview is available upon request (MP3 format).

Comments.

Although costly to maintain and train, the ability to quickly deploy expeditionary medical capacity – medical personnel, equipment, and mobile facilities – is vital in this dynamic geo-political world where stability operations are just as important as offensive and defensive operations. The USAF EMEDs program; the light, modular, expeditionary field hospitals of the Army; and, the ship hospitals of the Navy are the right steps in the evolving world of medical stability operations.



f. TOPIC. Attending to the “Human Domain” ([906](#))

Observation.

Attending to the “human domain” is vital to peacekeeping and stability operations. The following quotes are provided to illustrate what is meant by the “human domain” and why it is essential for planning and executing operations:

“We must also remember that conflict is a human endeavor, ultimately won or lost in the human domain. The Army operates in this human domain, which is the most important factor in a complex environment.” (reference 1)

“Simply stated, the lesson of the last decade is that failing to understand the human dimension of conflict is too costly in lives, resources, and political will for the Nation to bear.” (reference 2)

“A nuanced understanding of the environment [in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere] was often hindered by a focus on traditional adversaries and a neglect of information concerning the host-nation population. ...Because the traditional intelligence effort tended to focus on enemy groups and actions, it often neglected ‘white’ information about the population that was necessary for success in population-centric campaigns such as counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Local commanders needed information about ethnic and tribal identities, religion, culture, politics, and economics.” (reference 3)

“Partnerships with host nation actors should be guided by impartiality, inclusiveness, and gender considerations based on a solid understanding of the local context (to include civil society; private sector actors; and, all ethnic, religious, and minority groups.)” (reference 4)

Discussion.

Although the “human domain” is broad in nature – encompassing the full range of host nation populations, their values, their motivations, and their behaviors – recent stability operations highlight the importance of focusing attention on the following specific elements / population groups:

Local leaders/elders. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and peacekeeping and civil-military operations across Africa have shown the importance of engaging local leaders/elders and gaining their buy-in on stability and reconstruction efforts. Particularly effective approaches have been the implementation of an “itihad” (“unity”) strategy in OIF to influence community leaders and build consensus, the use of Village Stability Operations (VSO) in OEF, and Key Leader Engagements (KLEs) with local officials in both operations. (references 5-9)

Women. Recent stability operations have shown that engaging women in peace building efforts can pay significant dividends, even in societies where women have had little or no participation in governance. The deliberate inclusion of women’s groups in Liberia and Kenya and the use and expansion of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) in Afghanistan provide valuable lessons on engaging women/women’s groups and the derived benefits for the mission. (references 10-13)

Youth/young adults. With challenges ranging from disgruntled youths (lacking education and employment) to youths taking up arms (in militias and extremist groups), the need to address sizable youth populations has come to the fore in peacekeeping operations across Africa, as well as in OEF. Effective approaches have included: engaging established youth groups (Kenya), creating new youth groups/youth “shuras” (OEF), and implementing various post-conflict employment programs – e.g., public works programs (Liberia and Uganda). (references 11 and 14-16)

Religious leaders. From the Balkans to Iraq to Afghanistan, religion has often played a role in fueling conflict between groups within the host nation. It has also been used by insurgents as a basis for violence against coalition/ international forces. Engagement with local religious leaders has shown to merit attention, particularly if the coalition/international force is resourced with subject matter experts/chaplains and places command emphasis on using them for this purpose, as per II Marine Expeditionary Brigade and the UK contingent in Helmand Province in OEF. (reference 17)

Civil society groups. Civil society groups have proven to be critical resources both for forging peace in a conflict-affected nation and for post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The work of the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) in Afghanistan and the Riinvest Institute in Kosovo shows that immediate engagement with civil society groups and investments at the local level can lead to host nation capacity for long-term growth and stability. Understanding local culture, societal groups, and how they interact is paramount for this engagement. The Human Terrain System facilitated this understanding for commanders/staffs during OIF and OEF. (references 11 and 18-20.)

Insurgents. OIF, OEF, and peacekeeping & stability operations across Africa have shown the criticality of understanding the mindset of insurgents, as well as how insurgents can sometimes be persuaded to change course. Regionally-tailored Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives (bolstered by command emphasis) were able to gain notable success in both northern Iraq and northern Afghanistan – and perhaps could have been used by host nation authorities as foundations for broader programs. Information operations targeting insurgents/combatants, amnesty provisions (temporary/conditional), and nationally-resourced employment programs were shown to be critical for DDR program success. (references 10 and 21-23)

Recommendation.

1. U.S./coalition forces engaged in future peacekeeping and stability operations should develop a comprehensive strategy upfront to address the “human domain.” **This strategy should target six key population groups –** local leaders/elders, **women,** youth/young adults, religious leaders, civil society groups, and insurgents – and should consider use of the following elements:

- An “itihad” strategy (“unity” strategy)
- Village Stability Operations
- Key Leader Engagements
- Female Engagement Teams
- Youth group engagement programs

- Nationally-supported employment programs
- Chaplain/religious leader engagement programs
- Programs designed to engage, invest in, and mentor civil society groups
- The Human Terrain System
- Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs
- Information operations targeting insurgents/combatants

2. U.S./coalition forces should ensure that formations are sufficiently resourced and trained to operate in the “human domain.”

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the following **REFERENCES:**

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- (3) [“Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations,”](#) Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), 15 June 2012.
- (4) [“Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,”](#) United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and PKSOI, October 2009.
- (5) [“Creating an Epidemic of Unity,”](#) SOLLIMS Lesson 709, 17 March 2011.
- (6) [“Village Stability Operations: Leveraging Elders and Building Local Police,”](#) SOLLIMS Lesson 768, 3 November 2011.
- (7) [“Preventing Conflict: Interagency Village Stability Operations Model,”](#) Matthew Denny, The Simons Center, June 2012.
- (8) [“Influencing the Population: Using Interpreters, Conducting KLEs, and Executing IO in Afghanistan,”](#) CPT Michael G. Cummings, Infantry magazine, May-August 2010.
- (9) [“Rebuilding Schools and Communities in Post-conflict Kenya,”](#) SOLLIMS Lesson 772, 21 November 2011.
- (10) [“Lessons from Liberia in Security Sector Reform,”](#) SOLLIMS Lesson 703, 15 March 2011.
- (11) [“Civil Society Capacity and Action for Peacebuilding – Kenya,”](#) SOLLIMS Lesson 702, 15 March 2011.
- (12) [“Female Engagement Teams: The Case for More Female Civil Affairs Marines,”](#) MSG Julia L. Watson, Marine Corps Gazette, July 2012.

- (13) "[Female Engagement Teams: The Need to Standardize Training and Employment](#)," LTC Janet R. Holliday, Military Review, March-April 2012.
- (14) "[Youth Shura Innovation in Afghanistan](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 771, 21 November 2011.
- (15) "[The Youth Bulge in Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities](#)," Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC), October 2011.
- (16) "[Public Works Programs in Post-Conflict Economic Stabilization](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 690, 15 March 2011.
- (17) "[Religious Leader Engagement in Afghanistan through Military Chaplains](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 770, 7 November 2011.
- (18) "[The Balancing Act of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and the Need to Involve Local Groups](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 685, 10 November 2010.
- (19) "[Engaging Civil Society in Peacekeeping](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 642, 19 May 2010.
- (20) "[Strategic Lesson Number 4: 'Social Mentoring' – Understanding the People, Engaging Local Groups](#)," PKSOI, 28 March 2012.
- (21) "[DDR Initiative in Northern Iraq](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 774, 19 December 2011.
- (22) "[Bottom-up Approach to Reintegration in Northern Afghanistan](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 778, 4 April 2012.
- (23) "[Strategic Lesson Number 6: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration \(DDR\)](#)," PKSOI, 30 April 2012.



g. TOPIC. Civil Society Capacity and Action for Peace Building – Kenya ([702](#))

Observation.

In the immediate aftermath of the December 2007 elections in Kenya, violent clashes broke out that threatened the very existence of the country. Besides the successful formal mediation efforts by the former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, an equally impressive "civil society response" – based on previously developed civil society peace building capacity – was absolutely critical to bringing about peace to this country in chaos. The actions of the Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP) during this crisis of emergent/spiraling violence is a tremendous example of utilizing civil society peace building capacity, mobilizing a larger constituency on short notice, incorporating multi-sector and multi-level actions, and teaming with a parallel formal mediation effort.

Discussion.

Politically instigated ethnic clashes had been a well-known source of violent conflict in Kenya prior to the elections of December 2007. Ruthless politicians/candidates had often utilized youth militia groups to carry out violent attacks on communities they perceived to be in opposition to their political agendas.

In December 2007, national presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Kenya. Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga were the two leading presidential candidates. In the months and weeks leading up to voting day, opinion polls favored Odinga and his party. Early voting results on 27 December indicated that Odinga had built a comfortable lead. However, this lead gradually eroded, and, as election day passed and two more days passed without a presidential winner being declared, tensions and anxiety among Kenyans gave way to many violent clashes and incidents. Finally, on 30 December, the Electoral Commission of Kenya announced that Kibaki had actually won. With this announcement, Kenya exploded into unprecedented and widespread violence/conflict. 1,300 people lost their lives, and more than 500,000 people were displaced.

Within 24 hours of the 30 December announcement, in the midst of the spiraling violence, a new civil society group called Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP) was launched by five prominent Kenyan civil society peace workers and mediators, including two retired general officers. The group's formation was widely announced to the public. Among the CCP's five core leaders was Ms. Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, well known as a founding member of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee. By way of background, Ms. Abdi had worked with a number of women back in the 1993-95 timeframe to address a cycle of violence in the Wajir district of Kenya, where state institutions had miserably failed to provide security. These women took initiative and developed a civil society peace building capacity to address that cycle of violence. They initially engaged the elders of different clans, set up a mediation process, and included formal authorities such as the district commissioner. In 1995, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee was established, which broadened participation in the province to include additional government officials, security personnel, religious leaders, NGO representatives, tribal chiefs, and peace advocates. This civil society committee not only brought peace to the Wajir district, but was also used as a model for all districts throughout northern Kenya.

Notably, the districts of Kenya that had such Wajir-like civil society peace committees in place during the aftermath of the December 2007 elections reported far less violence than the districts without such committees.

The CCP, formed on 31 December 2007, immediately drew upon existing civil society peace building capacity and provided a crucial space/avenue for all people to utilize. The CCP's initial focus was to plead publicly and privately with

political leaders and candidates to dialogue, while simultaneously reaching out to all Kenyans. In its very first media appearance, the CCP appealed to all Kenyans to halt the violence and called for calm, peace, and dialogue throughout the country. The CCP leaders invited anyone and everyone interested in peace to come to their location, the Serena Hotel, to join the group.

An Open Forum was born, then, on 1 January 2008. The Open Forum's daily morning sessions became the meeting place for civil society group leaders, politicians, private sector representatives, various professionals, the media, and people from all walks of life. Working committees were developed in the areas of Humanitarian Response, Media, Community Mobilization, Resource Mobilization, and High Level Dialogue. Committee members harvested ideas and suggestions from the people gathered at the Open Forum, developed discussions on those topics, and then produced focused actions. The High Level Dialogue committee soon interfaced with a parallel, formal mediation effort led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

Besides the working committees, a web of interrelated groups emerged from the Open Forum: the "Concerned Youth for Peace," "Concerned Kenyan Writers," "Concerned Artists and Celebrities for Peace," "Concerned Women," and several others. Each of these groups and their leaders were deliberately linked to other networks/leaders. The resulting interactions encompassed and connected multiple sectors and multiple levels of Kenyan society.

On 9 January 2008, in just 10 days' time, the CCP released a document entitled "Citizens' Agenda for Peace." This document provided a 7-point agenda for ending the crisis. Among its points were the building of trust and confidence between the (competing) political parties, closure to the elections, and the formation of a government of national unity. On 28 February 2008, the formal mediation process led by Mr. Kofi Annan (and involving the African Union's Panel of Eminent Personalities) produced its own "National Peace and Reconciliation Accord" – which bore a striking resemblance to the CCP document released weeks earlier.

Recommendation.

1. Stability operations practitioners should consider building "civil society peace building capacity" in states/provinces prone to conflict. Kenya's Wajir Peace and Development Committee – which included women, government officials, security personnel, clan/tribal leaders, religious leaders, NGO representatives, and peace advocates – can serve as a useful model for some fragile states/provinces.
2. In conditions of emergent/spiraling violence in fragile states, it is important for respected leaders – internal and external – to take prompt action to mobilize peace building efforts. In the case of Kenya, the efforts of Ms. Dekha Abdi and the other four leaders of CCP, and the parallel activities of Mr. Kofi Annan and

the African Union's Panel of Eminent Personalities, were absolutely critical in grabbing the attention of the Kenyan people and in mobilizing multiple sectors of society for peace building.

3. In conditions of emergent/spiraling violence in fragile states, it is likewise essential that a space/avenue be provided to the people to vent their frustrations and to develop alternatives to violence. In the case of Kenya, the CCP afforded that necessary space/avenue for positive civil society actions.

4. In peace building and conflict resolution actions, those leading the actions should employ an inclusive strategy – one of maximum participation/representation and transparency. The CCP's call for anyone and everyone to participate, the daily Open Forum, and the active participation of media in the Open Forum, all serve as an excellent example of an inclusive strategy and the resulting benefits.

5. In peace building and conflict resolution actions, those leading the actions should ensure that participation is extended to multiple levels and multiple sectors of society. In the case of Kenya's Open Forum, the "reach" generated by linking the various committees and groups to one another bridged the lines of party, tribe, ethnicity, religion, age, and gender.

Implications.

1. If civil society capacity for conflict resolution is not developed in fragile states, and if respected leaders do not step up in a crisis to use this capacity and to mobilize society for peace building, then conflict can quickly spiral out of control and turn the state into lawless chaos.

2. The need to get the word out to all countrymen to end rising violence and to join peace building efforts (in times of crisis) implies that mass communication venues/resources are readily available. If they are not, peace building leaders should exhaust all available alternatives in order to maximize information dissemination.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "[Inspiring Citizens' Initiative for Peacebuilding in Kenya](#)," by Paul van Tongeren, New Routes, Volume 15, 4 November 2010.

Comments.

A related article, which also documents the origins of the CCP and its work during the violent aftermath of the December 2007 Kenyan elections, is "[Citizens in Action: Making Peace in the Post-Conflict Election Crisis in Kenya](#)," by George

Wachira, with Thomas Arendshorst and Simon M. Charles, NPI-Africa and GPPAC, January 2010.



h. TOPIC. The Balancing Act of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and the Need to Involve Local Groups ([685](#))

Observation.

Post-conflict reconstruction can be seen as a balancing act for the intervening organizations – on the one hand, expending resources on immediate/near-term requirements such as security, humanitarian relief and physical infrastructure, while on the other hand simultaneously working toward longer-term social, political, and economic development objectives. The primary challenge in this regard is how to provide enough humanitarian relief to offset the daily needs/pressures from conflict recovery, while not compromising the building of key Host Nation institutions that can facilitate peace and stability, provision of essential public services on a sustainable basis, and economic prosperity. In this latter task – the building of institutions for long-term growth – immediate engagement with local civil society groups is imperative. With the right support, local groups can lead rebuilding efforts, become drivers of reform, and improve the well-being of citizens in post-conflict countries.

Discussion.

The Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) (an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) is of the position that the reconstruction process is indeed a balancing act of providing sufficient immediate humanitarian relief for post-conflict society, while also constantly working to attain long-term development objectives. CIPE appears to give primacy to the latter, and it advocates the use of institutional and economic reforms at the grass roots level as the basis for long-term recovery.

On the one hand, addressing the basic nutrition, sanitation and health needs of the population and restoring the physical infrastructure in post-conflict countries is critical upfront; however, the long-term social well-being of the populace must also be kept at the forefront of reconstruction efforts. Success depends on addressing economic issues and establishing an economic foundation and opportunities for employment and self-advancement. In fact, economic issues are generally at the forefront of all concerns held by citizens of post-conflict countries. For example, in 2006 in Afghanistan, according to a survey conducted by the Asia Foundation, the main reason that many respondents believed the

country was moving in the wrong direction were: unemployment, a poor economy, and lack of reconstruction progress. "Unemployment" was named as the greatest problem by Afghan respondents at both the national level and local level. Other major problems identified by participants were "security" and "corruption."

While foreign assistance is an integral component of the reconstruction process and can be a short-term solution to basic needs and services, long-term success depends on state-building and the rebuilding of key social, political, and economic institutions down to the lowest levels possible. It is through institutional reforms – especially at the community level – that a post-conflict country can take ownership of its problems and resolve problems on its own. Such reforms encompass the **inclusion of marginalized groups**; the promotion of independent media; the revision of laws, regulations, and informal rules of cooperation; and, improved involvement and agendas of existing local decision-making groups. In Afghanistan, for instance, the incorporation of local, traditional decision-making institutions and mechanisms – such as “shuras” (village level councils) and “jirgas” (tribal assemblies of elders) – in implementing foreign aid and assistance projects serves the purpose of affording legitimacy to the aid projects and builds a sense of ownership for the reforms.

In Afghanistan, CIPE's approach to reconstruction has also been to target the private sector – shaping it to become a vested participant in the reconstruction process. The idea of involving the private sector was identified early on in the reconstruction process, when CIPE contacted members of the expatriate business community and facilitated their travel back to Afghanistan to meet with other entrepreneurs – those who could most affect the creating of jobs, supplying of goods and services, and improving standards of living. The assembled group of entrepreneurs/businessmen cited concerns such as existing barriers to conducting business within Afghanistan, an ineffective banking system, weak rule of law, exclusion from policymaking, and marginal accountability in government.

As the next step, CIPE facilitated the creation of the Afghanistan International Chamber of Commerce (AICC), Afghanistan's first voluntary national business federation. This federation included over 20 national, regional, and local business associations, and three international affiliates. To address the problems identified by businessmen and to better integrate the private sector in reconstruction activities, AICC launched an initiative called the Procurement Technical Assistance Center (PTAC). PTAC provided assistance on the procurement process to over 50 companies and has distributed more than 85 government tenders to its members, resulting in more than \$2.5 million in contracts for Afghan companies – thereby creating jobs and providing economic opportunities for Afghan citizens. AICC also facilitated over \$20 million in investments through its International Trade and Investment Promotion Office, creating hundreds of further employment opportunities.

Also, to influence long-term development through policy reform, AICC organized more than a dozen large-scale public policy roundtables to help address private sector reform issues. Attended on average by more than 250 government and business leaders, these events energized the business communities in Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad behind public policy issues and positions, leading to a number of policy successes/reforms. These reforms occurred in the areas of Customs, Private Investment Laws, and feedback mechanisms between private sector and government. Much work remains to be done to influence long-term economic development; however, key steps in laying the foundation have been initiated.

Kosovo, another recent post-conflict environment, saw similar, perhaps greater, success in reconstruction. From the outset of the reconstruction process, the Riinvest Institute of Kosovo – a non-profit institute founded in 1995 for the promotion of modern economic development – took the same "balancing act" approach. On the one hand, Riinvest advocated and facilitated the delivery of humanitarian relief to address pressing day-to-day problems of citizens, but it also remained continuously focused on long-term development. To attain those long-term objectives of stability, transition, and growth, Riinvest emphasized institutional reforms to build a private sector capable of bringing Kosovars out of poverty – through job creation, investment, and trade.

When reconstruction efforts first began, Riinvest was the only organization to conduct a detailed study of the Kosovar private sector. Upon completion of this study, it developed policy recommendations aimed at improving the business climate. Riinvest's emphasis on building up the private sector and economic capacity became even more important in light of a decision by reconstruction stakeholders that required Kosovars (citizens) to contribute to reconstruction funds – in order to avoid the aid dependency problem that plagued rebuilding efforts in nearby Bosnia. In this respect, business growth, employment, and income became even more essential for Kosovars.

The recommendations of Dr. Muhamet Mustaf, president of Riinvest, made in the early stages of reconstruction and later throughout the process to public officials and businessmen, turned into highly effective measures to rebuild Kosovo's economic capacity and ensure long-term development. Specifically, he advocated developing, with citizens' input, an economic framework that reflected the needs and the aspirations of Kosovars – and that discouraged corruption and illegal economic activity. Additionally, he encouraged the strengthening of civil society and democratic institutions, the involvement of Kosovars in the reconstruction process, and the continued commitment from the international community to transform Kosovo from an aid-based economy to a self-sufficient economy. Dr. Mustaf's recommendations spurred both the reform agencies and average citizens to identify problems, drive solutions, and build local consensus – resulting in civil society groups and political leaders taking ownership of a sustained reconstruction process.

One grass roots example in Kosovo of a civil society organization that successfully promoted reconstruction and free markets was the Kosovo Business Women's Association (SHE-ERA). This organization was founded through the support of CIPE in 1999 in the aftermath of the Balkans conflict. It targeted a previously marginalized sector, women. It brought people and ideas together and took measures to help women enter the business community. SHE-ERA also diligently worked to promote values conducive to free markets and democracy: fairness, accountability, responsibility, and transparency. Additionally, SHE-ERA worked to foster a spirit of entrepreneurship and social and political healing.

Recommendation.

1. Build participatory political and economic institutions. Governments, businesses, and civil society organizations should focus on building the structures/mechanisms of democratic governance and free markets – to allow public participation in reconstruction reforms, and to create an economic system that encourages entrepreneurship and growth.
2. Engage local civil society groups. Planners and executing agencies in post-conflict recovery should identify ways to utilize the expertise and commitment of local groups. Engagement and capacity-building should consistently be worked hard at the grass roots level – to cultivate a sense of responsibility within local communities, and to ensure that civil society becomes closely involved in helping to identify and address developmental needs.
3. Involve the private sector/entrepreneurs. Planners should conduct a detailed study of the private sector to understand the business climate, to determine shortfalls/impediments, and to develop suggestions to re-look policies, improve the business climate, and stimulate growth. Donors should study pre-existing conditions and analyze how they may affect aid projects, and what can be done to optimize outcomes. Lead agents should consider encouraging the establishment of business federations/associations – such as AICC in Afghanistan and SHE-ERA in Kosovo – in the interest of gaining consensus and promoting coordination with public officials to address economic issues.

Implication.

If local groups and the private sector are not engaged at the outset of the reconstruction process, then a window of opportunity will be missed for gaining broad participation, accountability, and effective/lasting reforms. If a foreign assistance-driven, top-down approach only is emphasized, such an approach may result in continued aid dependence and alienation of the population – who have no sense of ownership of the reconstruction activities. Unemployment, corruption, and economic stagnation are the likely outcomes, and potential for conflict may also increase.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "[Building Democracies and Markets in the Post-Conflict Context](#)," by Aleksandr Shkolnikov and Anna Nadgrodkiewicz, [Center for International Private Enterprise \(CIPE\)](#), ECONOMIC REFORM Issue Paper No. 0806, 29 August 2008.

Comments.

A related article – which similarly advocates economic reform efforts aimed at the grassroots level / local businesses / entrepreneurs – is "[Stabilization Operations Beyond Government: Joint Venture Public-Private Partnerships in Iraq and Afghanistan](#)," by Matthew W. Parin, in PRISM, Vol. 1, No. 4, September 2010.



3. CONCLUSION

Over the course of recent peace and stability operations, planners and practitioners have increasingly recognized the imperative of addressing gender issues – not only for protecting and enabling women, but also for bringing lasting stability to host nations. Below is a compilation of the key recommendations from the lessons in this publication on furthering Women, Peace, and Security:

- Issues of gender equality in Afghanistan should be approached with a realistic mindset: Small, pragmatic goals should be set with generous, long-term timelines. Bottom-up approaches should be emphasized in Afghanistan, whereby local and tribal elders are engaged on the issues, and whereby they are encouraged to foster communication with higher levels of government – linking bottom-up approaches with top-down approaches.
- The UN should continue the approach of sending all-female Formed Police Units (FPUs) on select peacekeeping operations. This should be done on a case-by-case basis, depending on the UN's assessment of the given host nation environment and the willingness of contributing countries to deploy such units. In certain environments, all-female FPUs may be able to serve as key role models for host nation women and girls.
- The cycle of poverty placed on women in many developing countries must be alleviated. Development efforts should focus on the recruitment of private organizations to donate mini-grid access to remote villages and on

using renewable energy sources, clean cooking stoves, and improved ventilation systems.

- In humanitarian assistance/disaster relief situations, women are often faced with the challenges of looking after children and the sick, and they often lack security. Individuals in control of aid provisions have sometimes taken advantage of these vulnerable women. Therefore, it is imperative that appropriate accountability, monitoring and security mechanisms be emplaced to oversee individuals managing aid stockpiles and deliveries, in order to help prevent sexual abuses.
- In humanitarian assistance/disaster relief situations, medical personnel / care-givers need to be educated, prior to deployment, on the cultural nuances related to caring for women and children in the host nation.
- Women need to be engaged in peace building efforts, even in societies where women have had little or no participation in governance. In societies where it is not appropriate for male soldiers to communicate with local women, Female Engagement Teams (FETs) should be used by the military for addressing this major component of the “human domain.”
- In states/nations prone to conflict, stability practitioners should consider building “civil society peace building capacity.” The Wajir Peace and Development Committee of Kenya – which included women, government officials, security personnel, clan/tribal leaders, religious leaders, NGO representatives, and peace advocates – can serve as a useful model for some fragile states/nations.
- Involve women in economic stabilization and development efforts. The Kosovo Business Women’s Association (SHE-ERA) – which helped women enter the business community and worked to promote values conducive to free markets and to foster a spirit of social and political healing – can serve as a model for many post-conflict societies.

Through wider dissemination of such lessons on Women, Peace and Security, and through continuous attention to this major component of the “human domain” (women), significant impacts can be made during the course of future peace and stability operations.

Bottom Line: Factor women and gender issues into all peace and stability operations, include women in peace building activities, and treat women with dignity and respect in countries in which you are operating.

4. COMMAND POC

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
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Kabul, Afghanistan (25 June 2014) – Croatian Brigadier General Gordana Garasic, ISAF Gender Advisor, poses with her Afghan counterparts who serve in the Afghan National Police, Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Defense. The Afghan female delegates met at Headquarters ISAF to encourage information exchanges toward gender integration of their military and police. Brigadier General Garasic is spearheading gender integration efforts to assist the Afghan military and police to raise the number of females serving to 10 percent over the next decade.

(Photo by USAF Capt. Ben Alumbaugh)



Related Documents, References, and Links

[Ensure you are logged in to SOLLIMS to access these items.]

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