

# SOLLIMS SAMPLER

Targeting Peace & Stability Operations Lessons & Best Practices

## Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve”

Volume 5

Issue 2



# PKSOI



U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

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## FOREWORD

Welcome to the April 2014 edition of the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) Lessons Learned “Sampler” – **Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve.”**

The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an [Introduction](#) that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “[Quick Look](#)” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related [Lesson Report](#), and (4) links to [additional reports and other references](#) that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to **Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve”** available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission / function – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, policy-makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective.


You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access / download attachments.

If you have not registered on SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account

in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the Stability Operations-related products referenced in the report.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products that we provide for the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our website at [ <http://pksoi.army.mil> ] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [ <https://sollims.pksoi.org> ] to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!



### **OPERATION SERVAL – A MULTINATIONAL EFFORT**

- Military forces from France, Mali, and AFISMA (African-led International Support Mission to Mali)
- Support provided by Allies: U.S., UK, Spain, Canada, Italy, Sweden, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark
- Training provided by EUTM-M (European Training Mission in Mali)
- Training provided by United Nations Mine Action Service

## INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the April 2014 edition of the SOLLIMS Sampler. The focus for this edition is on **Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve.”**

*It is no longer easy to identify those who wish to do us harm. The enemy is pervasive, adaptive and cunning. They cannot defeat us if we work together.*

*Maj. Gen. Robert Catalanotti, U.S. Army,  
[UNIPATH, volume 1 – Partnerships and Peacekeeping](#)*

“Spoilers” can be especially problematic for both the host nation government and for those engaged in peace/stability operations. “Spoilers” – paramilitaries, warlords, and extremists – typically perceive the host nation government and any peace/stability operations as being contradictory to their own interests. “Spoilers” are often linked to international terrorism, crime, narcotics, human trafficking, and illicit trade of arms and ammunition. In many cases, spoilers are also sponsored by, or harbored by, other nations/states.

“Spoilers” typically strive to maintain their illicit or parallel power structures. As they endeavor to retain power/control, they often attempt to undermine the host nation government through violence and intimidation.

What can be done about “spoilers”? [Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction](#) (section 6.5.10) provides the following recommendations:

- Anticipate obstructionists and understand their motivations.
- Create a plan for managing the spoilers.
- Maintain the primacy of the peace process.
- Adopt an assertive position with regard to peace agreement enforcement.

For situations where other nations/states are sponsoring the “spoilers,” the [Decade of War, Volume I, Enduring Lessons](#) (section/lesson 10) offers these recommendations:

- Improve targeting of threat finance and other support.
- Expose sponsor/proxy relationships and promote fissures.
- Build and/or strengthen external partnerships.
- Combine the direct and indirect approaches.

This SOLLIMS Sampler covers a variety of recent cases whereby “challenges and spoilers” posed continuing threats to peace/stability. Although no two cases are alike, this Sampler reveals key lessons and insights for dealing with threats / spoilers – especially the importance of “unity and resolve.” These lessons and insights are summarized in the [Conclusion](#) paragraph.

# Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve”

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## "QUICK LOOK"

Click on [\[Read More ...\]](#) to go to full lesson.

- Military Intelligence, soldier preparation, and logistical support were keys to success for Operation SERVAL – the French military intervention in Mali, conducted in cooperation with the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The UN's Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) provided critical support to the Congolese national army (known by its French acronym FARDC) – effectively neutralizing the M23 rebel group, which had thwarted peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the past 18 months. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has achieved notable success in Somalia after 5+ years operating in the country.... [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Operation Unified Protector demonstrated that NATO can be an effective organization for preventing humanitarian catastrophe – when there is a call for such intervention within its area of interest. Operation Unified Protector also demonstrated the importance of integrating multinational partners into such an operation – whether NATO-led or otherwise. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The “light footprint” of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), combined with a U.S. “whole-of-government” approach, has been an optimal formula for bringing stability to the southern Philippines. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Although the military aspects of the “surge” in Iraq contributed to the improved security and stability situation for Iraq in the 2007-2008 timeframe, the most important and most effective element of the “surge” was the political signal sent by President Bush in Jan 2007 – whereby he strongly conveyed that the United States was decisively committed to Iraq for years to come. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The engagement of potentially disruptive, sub-national elements, as demonstrated in Afghanistan and Somalia, are cases that illustrate the perils and possibilities for engaging “spoiler groups.” [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Coordination mechanisms are imperative when a “Blue” force (UN peacekeeping force) and a “Green” force (foreign national force or regional organization force) are operating in tandem. [\[Read More ...\]](#)

4 April 2014

**SUBJECT: Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve”**

**1. GENERAL**

Overcoming “challenges and spoilers” within conflict-affected nations is a demanding endeavor. Stability operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and multiple nations of Africa have shown that bringing lasting peace/stability to troubled nations – plagued by warlords, extremists, and paramilitaries – is never easy. These have proven to be highly complex operations requiring an extensive understanding of the environment, an extensive understanding of the “challenges and spoilers” within the environment, and an extensive understanding of their connections to 3<sup>rd</sup> party nations/states/actors.

This report examines several recent complex operations – including Operation Serval in Mali, Operation Unified Protector in Libya, the African Union’s operations in Somalia, international operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and U.S.-Philippines partnered operations in the southern Philippines. Among other insights, this report brings to light the imperative of “unity and resolve” among partners – for gaining the upper hand over spoilers and their networks, and for bringing lasting peace/stability to nations in need.

**2. LESSONS**

**a. TOPIC. Operation SERVAL Success Factors (French Intervention in Mali) ([1322](#))**

**Observation**.

Military Intelligence, soldier preparation, and logistical support were keys to success for Operation SERVAL – the French military intervention in Mali, conducted in cooperation with the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA).

**Discussion**.

On 11 January 2013, France initiated Operation SERVAL to defeat insurgent forces [Tuareg rebel forces and Islamic armed groups (Ansar ed-Din, AQIM, MUJAO, and Signed-in-Blood Battalion)] who had seized a number of towns and

cities along the Niger River and who threatened to advance on the capital of Bamako. French forces stationed in Chad, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal deployed to Bamako in early January, forming the initial battle group. On 11 January, French aviation assets launched the initial attacks against columns of enemy vehicles to set the conditions for the battle group's advance. Combining ground movements, airborne operations, and air assaults, French forces (with AFISMA support) proceeded to seize the towns of Timbuktu and Gao (see [French Army Update March 2013](#)) in three weeks time, with subsequent advances on Kidal. By March, French and AFISMA forces were clearing terrorist sanctuaries in the Ifoghas Mountains.

**Intelligence.** In early January, various French and allied intelligence collectors – including satellites, naval maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), human intelligence, and signals intelligence assets – were focused on the threat groups that had de-stabilized a large portion of Mali. The cooperation/intelligence sharing between France and its allies in this regard proved vital for identifying/developing targets for the initial air strikes that paved the way for future ground/airborne/air assault operations. The concerted intelligence effort also helped to pinpoint enemy defensive positions in the Ifoghas Mountains to support subsequent French/AFISMA clearing operations.

**Soldier Preparation.** Many of the French personnel sent to Mali benefited from previous deployment experience in Africa, Afghanistan, the Middle East, or the Balkans. Moreover, the French Army had purposefully instilled in its soldiers an expeditionary mentality and an attitude of "make-do with what you have" – referred to as "*système D*" (from "*débrouille*," meaning "resourcefulness"). Additionally, the French Combined Arms Center issued deploying soldiers (1) a provisional doctrinal manual on desert warfare and (2) a lessons learned booklet about the Tuareg rebellion in the Sahel, titled "[LES RÉBELLIONS TOUARÈGUES AU SAHEL](#)."

**Logistics.** At the beginning of Operation SERVAL, allied contributions helped to overcome France's significant shortfall in transport aircraft – needed to bring essential equipment and supplies into the theater of operations. Then, given the huge distances between units on the ground, as well as the fast pace of operations, French Army logisticians had to work around-the-clock to monitor and manage all classes of supplies, and to coordinate appropriate assets for timely re-supply deliveries. Strategic mobility proved essential, with aviation assets and wheeled vehicles particularly suited to the task. Additionally, adhering to lessons learned from Afghanistan, France ensured the provision medical equipment (such as individual kits and forward-deployed lifesaving modules) and the integration of doctors and medics into every company formation – facilitating timely, efficient treatment of wounded personnel.



## **Recommendation.**

1. Maximize intelligence cooperation/sharing during multinational operations.
2. Prepare soldiers for the rigors of "expeditionary" operations by instilling in them an appropriate mindset, providing them with the latest doctrine, and making them aware of relevant lessons learned.
3. When operations/conditions are "expeditionary," plan ahead for sufficient numbers of logisticians, logistics management tools, and transportation assets to adequately meet the demands of re-supplying units over great distances with limited roadways. Pay particular attention to ensuring that remotely operating units are resourced with sufficient amounts of medical personnel, equipment/kits, and supplies.

## **Implications.**

If planners do not adequately think through the demands of "expeditionary" operations – to include the key requirements of (1) gaining/sharing intelligence, (2) preparing soldiers for the rigors they will face (weather, environment, threat groups, etc.), and (3) managing logistics/re-supply over great distances – then deployed units may suffer from undue delays/setbacks during the course of operations.

## **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the article "[Early Lessons From France's Operation Serval in Mali](#)," by Maj. Gen. Olivier Tramond and Lt. Col. Philippe Seigneur, Army magazine, June 2013.

## **Comments.**

Related references:

1. "[French Army Update March 2013](#)," French Armed Forces, 21 March 2013.
2. "[French Update May 2013](#)," French Armed Forces, 17 May 2013.
3. "[French Update Sept-Oct 2013](#)," French Armed Forces, 24 October 2013.
4. "[Operation Serval: Air Power Lessons from the French Intervention in Mali, 2013](#)," Air Power Development Centre - Australia, May 2013.
5. "[Operation Serval: French Intervention in Mali. Airpower & Joint Lessons for the ADF](#)," David Carr and Nathan Rickard, Air Operations Division, DSTO, 26 June 2013.

6. "[Lessons learned OP SERVAL in Mali](#)," LTC Sebastian Chenebeau, French Army, 4 December 2013.
7. "[LES RÉBELLIONS TOUARÈGUES AU SAHEL](#)" [Lessons Learned booklet about the Tuareg rebellion in the Sahel], French Army Combined Arms Center, January 2013.
8. "[Mali Community of Practice \(CoP\)](#)," SOLLIMS.



## **b. TOPIC. UN Force Intervention Brigade against the M23 ( [1307](#) )**

### **Observation.**

The UN's Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) provided critical support to the Congolese national army (known by its French acronym FARDC) – effectively neutralizing the M23 rebel group, which had thwarted peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) over the past 18 months.

### **Discussion.**

The *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC) and the UN's FIB attacked and defeated the M23 during a 4-day period, 25-28 October 2013. Keys to success included initiative, surprise, unity of effort, leadership, and discipline.

During the FARDC's offensive operation against the M23, the UN's FIB played an important supporting role. FIB units were organized into three task forces. Each of the FIB task forces supported a FARDC task force from the 8th Military Region. After a spate of minor clashes/engagements between the FARDC and M23, the FARDC 8th Military Region Commander decided to take the initiative against well fortified M23 positions along the major roadway from Kanyamahoro to Rutshuru – launching a 3-pronged attack to divide and conquer M23 elements. In support of the attack, the three FIB task forces established blocking positions to prevent M23 forces from maneuvering along the roadway or linking up with one another.

The FARDC offensive against M23 forces near Kanyamahoro (the southern front of the offensive) totally took the M23 forces by surprise. M23 positions swiftly fell to the rocket fire, Mi-24 attack helicopters, and FARDC ground force attacks. FARDC forces advanced on two other fronts (central and northern), driving the M23 forces out of their positions and into a small area in the Virunga mountains near the borders with Rwanda and Uganda. UN FIB blocking forces played a

crucial role in allowing FARDC forces to focus firepower on three primary objectives, confident that M23 elements would be prevented/blocked from maneuvering along the major roadway. Indeed, FIB infantry forces successfully engaged M23 elements in the south and the north, with particularly heavy fighting in the north near Rutshuru and Kiwanja.

The victorious FARDC forces that dislodged and defeated the M23 were a vast improvement over the disorganized, demoralized, and poorly trained forces that were swept aside just 11 months earlier when M23 forces captured Goma in November 2012. Most of the credit for the overhaul goes to the new commander of the FARDC 8th Military Region, Major General Bahuma Ambamba. MG Ambamba orchestrated a comprehensive effort to totally transform his forces – cracking down on discipline, improving training especially for combined operations, significantly raising morale, and earning an excellent reputation among his soldiers. With regard to soldier discipline, there have been no reports of atrocities committed by 8th Military Region soldiers in recent operations (August through October), whereas such acts/crimes had been common during earlier FARDC operations.

The new commanders of the UN's FIB and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) (the overall UN mission in the DRC) also played critical roles in the campaign against the M23, as they took a proactive stance and full advantage of UNSC Resolution 2098 – which allows the use of offensive combat force to neutralize and disarm Congolese rebels and foreign armed groups. The FIB Commander, Brigadier General James Mwakibolwa, demonstrated exceptional leadership skill in utilizing the UN's air assets, artillery, and mortars to act as force multipliers supporting FARDC in its August engagement with the M23, and in positioning these and infantry assets during the October offensive. The MONUSCO Force Commander, Lieutenant General Carlos dos Santos Cruz, continuously provided strong backing for the campaign – giving the FIB Commander the necessary space/freedom to conduct offensive operations. This unity of effort among the MONUSCO Force Commander, the FIB Commander, and the FARDC 8th Military Region Commander was vital to overall success.

Although the FARDC and the UN's FIB teamed extremely well in the October offensive, a number of deficiencies were identified. Foremost among them was communication problems – owing to incompatible and ineffective UN radio equipment. Two other shortfalls were lack of aerial surveillance and shortage of attack aviation assets. Overall, however, the FARDC-FIB partnership and success against the M23 demonstrated that a UN Force Intervention Brigade was able to provide invaluable support for the host nation security force (and the UN Mission) in an environment where a large rebel group posed a [major threat to the civilian population and peacekeeping efforts](#).

## **Recommendation.**

1. The UN should continue the practice of deploying a Force Intervention Brigade on missions where sizable rebel groups/irregular militaries pose a major threat to the civilian population and to UN peacekeeping contingents.
2. To the greatest extent possible, host nation security forces should be in the lead with regard to offensive/combat actions against rebel groups/irregular militaries – with the Force Intervention Brigade in a supporting role when needed, pending approval by the UN Force Commander. This is not to say that the Force Intervention Brigade should not be able to take independent action, as necessary, to protect UN elements and/or civilians when necessary.
3. The UN should adequately equip future peacekeeping forces, to include provision/allocation of sufficient communication, aerial surveillance, and aviation assets, as determined by mission analysis.

## **Implications.**

If the UN does not deploy a Force Intervention Brigade on future missions where sizable rebel groups/irregular militaries pose a major threat to security, then the civilian population (as well as the UN peacekeeping contingent) may become vulnerable to attacks – and, if civilian casualties begin to mount while the UN contingent does little/nothing to protect them, then the credibility of the UN mission will suffer.

## **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the article, "[Pincer Movements, Choppers and Teamwork: How the M23 was Pushed Back](#)," by Darren Olivier, ThinkAfricaPress, 6 Nov 2013.

## **Comments.**

Related references:

1. [United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo \(MONUSCO\)](#) – UN website.
2. "[Ban 'strongly condemns' killing of UN peacekeeper in eastern DR Congo](#)," UN News Centre, 27 October 2013.
3. "[Blue Helmet Blues: UN Force in the Congo, Take Two](#)," Lewis Brooks, ThinkAfricaPress, 18 October 2013.

4. "Intervention Brigade: End Game in the Congo? UN Peacekeeping Task Enters a New Phase," Lansana Gberie, [Africa Renewal](#), August 2013.
5. "[The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo](#)," Major General Patrick Cammaert (Ret.) and Fiona Blyth, International Peace Institute (IPI), July 2013.
6. "[Strategic Lesson Number 19: "Blue" and "Green" Forces Operating in Tandem](#)," David Mosinski and Dan French, PKSOI, 18 June 2013.
7. "["Intervention Brigade' Authorized as Security Council Grants Mandate Renewal for United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo](#)," UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013), UNSC release 10964, 28 March 2013.
8. "[The M23 and the Crisis in Goma, the Democratic Republic of the Congo](#)," Derek Duncan, Global Ministries Associate for Global Advocacy and Education, 18 January 2013.
9. "[Keys to Success for the African Union Mission in Somalia](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 896, David Mosinski, PKSOI, 2 November 2012.
10. "[Eastern Congo: Why Stabilisation Failed](#)," International Crisis Group, 4 October 2012.



**c. TOPIC. Keys to Success for the African Union Mission in Somalia ( [896](#) )**

**Observation.**

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has achieved notable success in Somalia after 5+ years operating in that country – owing especially to the composition of the force, its training & discipline on reducing civilian casualties, the willingness to accept relatively high numbers of friendly/AMISOM casualties, and excellent incentives/pay for AMISOM soldiers/policemen.

**Discussion.**

AMISOM has been the most ambitious intervention in Somalia since the failed U.S. operation of 1993 (the Battle of Mogadishu / "Black Hawk Down"). When AMISOM's initial force of Ugandan soldiers deployed to Somalia more than a decade later, in March 2007, Somalis had long been living in perpetual chaos – without any semblance of formal governance. Communities & neighborhoods across Somalia were dominated by warlords, gangs, and the militant group al-

Shabab. Nearly all of Mogadishu, the capital city, had fallen into the hands of al-Shabab.

AMISOM's success in bringing stability to this chaotic environment has been nothing short of impressive. By and large, AMISOM has cleared Mogadishu of the presence of al-Shabab – accomplished in summer 2011. AMISOM has also pushed al-Shabab out of its last urban stronghold, the port city of Kismayo – accomplished in September 2012. In mid-October 2012, al-Shabab still maintains control of wide areas of south-central Somalia; however, these are rural areas, and the amount of territory under al-Shabab influence has been steadily reduced.

Many ingredients have gone into making AMISOM an effective stabilization force: U.S. funding, equipment, and training; [European Union Naval Force escorts of AMISOM vessels](#); United Nations logistical support, food, and housing; [an international mandate](#); and, specific training on how to avoid civilian casualties and how to respond when they occur. Another contributing factor has been the composition of AMISOM: Because the soldiers/policemen of AMISOM are "black Africans" – Ugandans, Burundians, and Kenyans - the people of Somalia have been generally receptive of their presence and motives from the outset of operations.

Two of the most important factors behind AMISOM's success, however, have been: (1) a high tolerance for friendly/AMISOM casualties and (2) outstanding incentives/salaries. The pay for AMISOM soldiers has been about \$1,028 per month – funded by the European Union. This salary is more than 10-20 times the income that a soldier/policeman would otherwise earn in Uganda & Burundi – a driving factor for initial and continued service in AMISOM.

With regard to friendly/AMISOM casualties, AMISOM and its participating governments refuse to release death tolls. However, certain Western officials have reported that approximately 500 Ugandans and Burundians have been killed to date, along with an unknown number of Kenyans. This clearly points to a high tolerance for casualties on the part of AMISOM – whose peak troop level is only 17,000 – as well as a high degree of staying power / commitment by AMISOM and its contributing nations.

### **Recommendation.**

1. When feasible, tailor the composition of the stability force to soldiers/nations that would be culturally "acceptable" to the people of the host nation (as opposed to soldiers/nations perceived as having no commonality).
2. Provide soldiers/stability forces with specific training on how to avoid civilian casualties and how to respond when they occur.

3. If possible, provide incentives/salaries for stability force soldiers/policemen at a significantly higher rate than they receive in their home country – especially if their stability duties are expected to be hazardous.

4. If possible, gain commitments from participating governments/nations to sustain manpower contributions to the stability force over a number of years – even if casualty rates become high.

### **Implications.**

If intervening soldiers/stability forces are not culturally "acceptable" to the people of the host nation from the very outset (due to lack of commonality), then those soldiers face the immediate challenge of breaking through a barrier of perception as "foreign" and "not to be trusted." Moreover, if intervening soldiers/stability forces are not conscientious, trained, and disciplined on reducing host nation/civilian casualties (CIVCAS) throughout operations, any CIVCAS incidents will only further strain relations and adversely affect the mission.

### **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the article "[Africa, West combine to rout militants in Somalia](#)," by Jason Straziuso, TheWorldPost, 17 October 2012.

### **Comments.**

- A related article is "[UPDF AMISOM success is due to ideology and discipline - President](#)," The State House of Uganda Media Centre, 7 April 2012.

- A related speech is "[Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at UN Security Council Debate on Somalia, October 16, 2012.](#)" Source is the U.S. Mission to the UN.

- A related publication is the AMISOM Review, available at: <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-magazine/>

- Additional information about AMISOM can be found at: <http://amisom-au.org>

- A related lesson stressing the need for peacekeepers to prioritize civilian protection and also discussing situations involving use of force against militant groups is "[Challenges, Strategies, and Necessities for Civilian Protection in Africa](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 697, 15 March 2011.

- A related report is "[Protecting Civilians While Fighting a War in Somalia – Drawing Lessons from Afghanistan](#)," by Alexander William Beadle, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) Policy Brief 10-2012.



#### **d. TOPIC. Preventing Humanitarian Catastrophe: NATO in Libya ( [765](#) )**

##### **Observation.**

Operation Unified Protector demonstrated that NATO can be an effective organization for preventing a humanitarian catastrophe – when there is a call for such intervention within its area of interest. Operation Unified Protector also demonstrated the importance of integrating multinational partners into such an operation – whether NATO-led or otherwise.

##### **Discussion.**

NATO's Operation Unified Protector prevented an imminent humanitarian catastrophe when Qaddafi's forces threatened to overrun Benghazi in March 2011. This intervention gave rebel forces time and space to better organize themselves and subsequently drive Qaddafi from power. It also gave the Libyan populace the opportunity to take control of its own destiny.

At the start of this crisis, when European leaders considered their options for intervening (for preventing the infliction of mass casualties in Benghazi), they came to the conclusion that the only viable option with the requisite speed and resources was NATO. The European Union was not a credible possibility. An ad hoc coalition, led by either France or the UK, was not viable; this option was not acceptable to several NATO nations willing to participate militarily. Although there was significant debate and dissension about making this a NATO operation, its members did agree to commit after ten days of discussion – to enforce an arms embargo by sea, to establish a no-fly zone, and to adopt a civilian protection mission.

Partners were critical to NATO's success. The most emphatic voices in favor of NATO leading this effort in Libya were actually not NATO members, but were instead Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Sweden. These three nations wanted to join a NATO-led operation. They already had some knowledge of what it would take to participate in a NATO operation. They had previously participated in NATO exercises. Four non-NATO nations – Qatar, the UAE, Morocco, and Jordan – ultimately agreed to participate with the NATO political structure on oversight of the operation. Their participation can be seen as a dividend of NATO's outreach programs to North Africa and the Middle East – the "Mediterranean Dialogue" and "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative." Notably, although these partners were brought into the operation, NATO did not conduct a "war by committee" – i.e., it did not fall into the trap of being too slow or indecisive through excessive deliberation/compromise.



Several nations with relatively small military contingents soon turned out to be large contributors. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and Norway all contributed significantly to this operation. At one point, Nordic allies were conducting 25% of all the strike sorties – pulling far more weight than what was expected of them.

NATO did not rely solely on military means to execute Operation Unified Protector. Rather, NATO took a "comprehensive approach" throughout the operation. It took deliberate measures to employ and synchronize diplomatic, information, intelligence, military, and economic capabilities. Early on, NATO secured a UN Security Council resolution authorizing its campaign to prevent mass casualties. Then, NATO rapidly moved to sanction regime change, helped train and arm the rebel forces, worked to cut off Qaddafi's access to capital, facilitated defections from the Qaddafi camp, and campaigned to boost international recognition of the Transitional National Council.

On the negative side, NATO wrestled with a number of significant issues and strains. During deliberations leading up to intervention, certain NATO members spoke out against conducting this operation. Others attempted to limit France's role as overall lead nation for NATO in this campaign. Others would not contribute military forces. The U.S. played a major combat role in the early phase of the operation, but then executed a military "hand off" of sorts to the rest of NATO two weeks into the operation. The U.S. did continue to provide special forces, intelligence, and other vital "key enablers," however, after the "hand off."

All in all, however, Operation Unified Protector was a success for NATO. NATO prevented a humanitarian catastrophe. NATO provided the vital firepower and support that allowed rebel forces to topple the Qaddafi regime. NATO backed change for Libya for a more secure, participatory, and prosperous future.

### **Recommendation.**

1. Consider NATO (and international coalitions) in the future for prevention of humanitarian catastrophe – if/when imminent – within its area of interest.
2. Incorporate other nations (from outside NATO/the coalition) on operations to prevent humanitarian catastrophe. The benefits from political legitimacy and burden-sharing will generally outweigh the cost of compromise.
3. Incorporate other nations (from outside NATO/the coalition) into peacetime exercises for humanitarian catastrophe prevention, so that lessons can be learned from operating together.
4. Use a comprehensive approach when engaged in the prevention of humanitarian catastrophe.

## **Implications.**

If NATO/another international coalition were to intervene in the future on a given humanitarian catastrophe prevention operation without adding/incorporating other additional willing partners, then NATO/the international coalition would lose an opportunity to strengthen the political legitimacy of intervention as well as lose additional resources/burden-sharing support.

## **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the article "[Learning from Libya: The Right Lessons for NATO](#)," by Damon M. Wilson, Atlantic Council Issue Brief, 1 September 2011.

## **Comments.**

- A related lesson which discusses challenges, strategies, and necessities for protection of civilians in Africa is "[Challenges, Strategies, and Necessities for Civilian Protection in Africa](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 697, 15 March 2011.
- A related article which assesses the UN Security Council's approach to human protection with regard to crises in Libya and the Ivory Coast is "The New Politics of Protection? Cote d'Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect," by Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, International Affairs, volume 87, number 4, July 2011. This article can be found on the Chatham House site: <http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/ia/archive/view/176837>
- A related publication on mass atrocity response, which provides numerous additional insights toward the enhancement of civilian protection efforts and a discussion of military response options, is the [MARO Handbook](#), "Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook," Harvard Kennedy School and PKSOI, 2010, available in the SOLLIMS Knowledge Library.
- Information on NATO's "Mediterranean Dialogue" is available at: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_52927.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52927.htm)
- Information on NATO's "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative" is available at: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_52956.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52956.htm)



## **e. TOPIC. Light Footprint and Whole-of-Government Approach – The Southern Philippines ( [911](#) )**

### **Observation.**

The "light footprint" of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), combined with a U.S. "whole-of-government" approach, has been an optimal formula for bringing stability to the southern Philippines. The Philippine government's own "whole-of- nation" philosophy has played a tremendous role toward achieving success in this counter-terrorism campaign.

### **Discussion.**

In 2002, the United States and the Philippine government agreed to partner against terrorist/insurgent threats growing in strength in the Philippines – specifically Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Various insurgent training camps began appearing in the southern Philippines in the late 1980s and soon became problematic for the Philippine government. These camps were viewed as safe havens by al-Qaeda's leadership – which sent an influx of Al-Qaeda operatives to this region beginning with Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law. Other notorious figures followed, including Ramzi Yousef, the architect of the World Trade Center bombing, and Khalid Sheik Mohammad, cited by the [9/11 Commission Report](#) as "the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks." As Al-Qaeda increased its presence and influence in the southern Philippines, JI and ASG embarked on a series of deadly bombings and kidnappings across the region. To combat this growing threat, the United States stood up JSOTF-P in July 2002, assigning it the mission of supporting partner force operations against terrorist threats, and the Philippine government signed a Military Logistics and Support Agreement (MLSA), allowing the United States to use the Philippines as a supply base for military operations throughout the region.

Significant success has since been achieved. The 5 April 2012 report from the Congressional Research Service, "[The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests](#)," states that Joint military activities have significantly diminished Abu Sayyaf's strength and presence, reducing its size from approximately 1,000 members to less than 400, nearly all key ASG leaders have been killed or captured, and the group's religious mission and appeal have waned. JI leadership casualties are also cited.

Over the past several years, JSOTF-P's mission in support of its Philippine partners has remained constant; however, its activities have been refined, modified, and adapted to meet the needs, capabilities, and political support/enthusiasm of the Philippine government and its security forces. Prominent among political activities has been the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP)-Bayanihan, instituted by the Philippine government in early 2011, which

deliberately focused all counterinsurgency efforts under a single national internal-security strategy. Key to the IPSP-Bayanihan was the "whole of nation" philosophy espoused by President Benigno Aquino, as he introduced the security strategy: "The problems confronting our nation are multi-faceted and complex... a military solution is not enough to completely solve them. Efforts to achieve genuine peace and security must therefore be supported by all."

Through implementation of IPSP-Bayanihan, Philippine military components, police elements, and local officials now routinely meet in Sulu, Basilan, and Zamboanga provinces to discuss activities and share information. Philippine government agency personnel now team with security forces on the F3EAD model (find, fix, finish, exploit, assess, disseminate), participate in joint training exercises, and conduct joint operations with Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP) forces. Joint operations against suspected terrorists and criminals are deliberately announced/explained to local communities as legitimate, legal, and necessary to rid the countryside of lawlessness and banditry. This message has resonated well with the Philippine populace.

While the Philippine government has harnessed multiple government resources and worked to inform/include local communities, JSOTF-P has focused its support by way of a "light footprint" and a "whole-of-government" approach. At the request of the Philippines government, JSOTF-P has collocated small detachments with its Philippine partners on approximately a dozen Philippine military bases and police camps. In most instances, JSOTF-P has provided operational detachments at military brigade level and police battalion level; however, one detachment supports an infantry division headquarters and another works with the AFP Special Operations Command.

U.S. Army Military Information Support (MIST) teams and Civil Affairs (CA) teams have been integrated with Philippine partners predominantly at tactical levels. The MIST teams have focused their efforts on radio messaging, atmospheric analysis (to gain insights on the thoughts and concerns of the people, particularly about the government and its security forces), and measures of effectiveness, while the CA teams have concentrated on building a self-sustaining Philippine CA capacity. As a result of these efforts, the AFP now has its own CA capability that has proven capable of planning, resourcing, and conducting civic-action programs and engaging local communities, and both the AFP and PNP now possess the capacity to design, produce, and distribute their own informational products.

At the operational and national levels, select JSOTF-P personnel meet on a weekly basis with senior AFP and PNP commanders. What began as routine engagements with PNP commanders soon led to the creation of a weekly PNP National Operations Center meeting at the Manila headquarters, where JSOTF-P members join Philippine counterparts in weekly discussions on appropriate

security topics. Weekly engagements with AFP senior officers are likewise conducted by JSOTF-P leaders, focusing on the fusion of operational requirements with intelligence.

The "whole-of-government" approach has been continuously emphasized on the U.S. side. JSOTF-P personnel meet on a weekly basis with representatives from the U.S. Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury, and JSOTF-P and FBI personnel are collocated in Manila. At three locations in the southern Philippines, JSOTF-P personnel are collocated with members of the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), which focuses on training local law enforcement officials. This program and the relationship between JSOTF-P and ICITAP have been extremely productive – evidenced by the successful training of over 1,600 local police officers in the province of Sulu alone in 2011.

The "whole-of-government" approach is also embodied in the U.S. Embassy's Mindanao Working Group (MWG). The MWG consists of representatives from across the U.S. Mission and JSOTF-P. It has effectively coordinated, monitored, and assessed U.S. engagements in the southern Philippines over the past several years – achieving U.S. goals and objectives and helping to build Philippine capacity. The MWG has also assisted in linking elements of the Philippine government and the private sector with local communities in the southern Philippines – supporting the intent of the 2011 Internal Peace and Security Plan-Bayanihan: "Efforts to achieve peace and security must be supported by all."

Overall, the "light footprint" and the integration of U.S. Government teammates with Philippine partners (from the strategic through tactical levels) have been an optimal combination for success – bringing peace and stability to the southern Philippines and denying sanctuary to terrorist threats. Ownership/responsibility by the Philippine government and its "whole-of-nation" philosophy have been critical to success as well.

### **Recommendation.**

1. In regions where the U.S. and host nation governments have agreed to work together to counter transnational terrorist/insurgent threats, the U.S. should consider application of the JSOTF-P formula of a "light footprint" and a "whole-of-government" approach.
2. Where the U.S. and the host nation government have agreed to cooperate against threats to stability (such as terrorists/insurgents), the U.S. should emphasize host nation ownership/responsibility in protecting its own population – focusing support to the host nation on advice, assistance, training, equipping, and capacity-building.

3. Where the U.S. and the host nation government have agreed to cooperate against threats to stability (such as terrorists/insurgents), the U.S. should also encourage the host nation government to adopt a "whole-of-nation" philosophy – maximizing government agency involvement and reaching out to communities to build consensus against those (terrorist/insurgent) threats.

### **Implications.**

If the host nation government does not fully commit to ownership/responsibility for protecting its people (from terrorist/insurgent threats), does not harness its own government agencies, does not strive to inform and include local communities, and does not partner for focused external support, then terrorist/insurgent threats may perpetuate over the years and destabilize entire regions – as happened in the southern Philippines from the late 1980s onward ... until the commencement of partnered operations with JSOTF-P and the implementation of IPSP-Bayanihan.

### **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the article, "[JSOTF-P Uses Whole-Of-Nation Approach to Bring Stability to The Philippines](#)," by Colonel Fran Beaudette, Special Warfare magazine, July-September 2012.

### **Comments.**

- A related article, which cites the "indirect approach" and "interagency teaming" in the Philippines as lessons for the United States, is "[Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines: Civilian Harm and the Indirect Approach](#)," by Geoffrey Lambert, Larry Lewis, and Sarah Sewall," PRISM, volume 3, number 4, 21 September 2012.
- A related report, which summarizes the success of joint military activities in the Philippines, is "[The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests](#)," by Thomas Lum, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 5 April 2012.
- A related news article, which highlights AFRICOM's advocacy of the light footprint approach, is "[AFRICOM Will Maintain 'Light Footprint' in Africa](#)," by Donna Miles, U.S. Department of Defense News, 12 June 2012.
- Another related article, which provides an example of AFRICOM's use of the light footprint approach through the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) Africa, is "Spartans of Senegal," by Mark Seavey, The American Legion Magazine, 1 December 2012. This article is available at: <http://www.legion.org/magazine/212985/spartans-senegal>



## f. **TOPIC.** Political and Military Components of the Surge in Iraq ( [808](#) )

### **Observation.**

Although the military aspects of the "surge" in Iraq contributed to the improved security and stability situation for Iraq in the 2007-2008 timeframe, the most important and most effective element of the "surge" was the political signal sent by President Bush in January 2007 – whereby he strongly conveyed that the United States was decisively committed to Iraq for years to come.

### **Discussion.**

Many analysts have argued that the violence in Iraq diminished in the 2007-2008 timeframe due primarily to the following three factors: (1) the arrival of nearly 30,000 additional U.S. troops (beyond the 130,000 on the ground in Iraq in 2006); (2) the adoption of "counterinsurgency" as both a tactic and a strategy for forces in Iraq; and, (3) the dynamic leadership of General David Petraeus, as well as that of Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno.

To a much larger degree, however, the violence diminished in Iraq, and stability was attained, owing to these factors instead:

- U.S. goals and local/Iraqi interests became aligned in late 2006.
- The U.S. built the capacity of the Iraqi military forces to a sufficient level in 2006-2007, under one institutional authority, whereby Iraqi military forces could competently execute national security missions.
- The U.S. sent a strong political signal to the Iraqi's in January 2007, and General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker effectively worked as "one team" to meet the intent of that political signal and provided the requisite steering and oversight of U.S. operations along those lines.

**U.S. goals and local/Iraqi interests.** U.S. goals and local/Iraqi interests were not in line prior to 2006 because of an ongoing sectarian war between the Sunni and the Shi'a factions, complicated somewhat by Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) which was executing a terrorist campaign against U.S. interests, the Iraqi government, and the Shi'a faction (supporting the Sunni faction in the process). However, at some point in 2006, the Sunni's came to realize that they had essentially lost the civil war against the Shi'a faction. In late 2006, the Sunni's therefore began to initiate conflict against AQI (which was becoming more and more difficult to partner with because of AQI's insistence on strict Shari 'a law and AQI's

opposition to traditional Sunni leadership) for the real purpose of gaining an ally with the Americans – who had been working hard to find and destroy any/all elements of AQI and to rid Iraq of its destabilizing presence. Sunni leaders believed that by aiding the U.S. cause and now allying themselves with the Americans, they would be able to preserve Sunni survival and have some degree of representation/power in the future Iraq (which was sure to be a "Shi'a-dominated" Iraq). Hence, the fundamental political interests of all major parties were thus finally aligned in late 2006. The U.S., Shi'a, and Sunni could now all work toward achieving a stable, democratic Iraq (with the Iraqi government certain to be led/run by the Shi'a majority). This was highly desirable by the Shi'a political leaders – particularly Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki – who sought to consolidate power. This was now also palatable to the Sunni leaders as well, settling for any degree of power/voice in the future Iraqi government.

**The capacity of the Iraqi military forces.** In late 2006, the nucleus of a viable Iraqi Army was established – formed around the Iraqi 6th and 9th Army Divisions. Whereas heretofore the Iraqi military forces had been operating under the control of U.S. forces, General George Casey in late 2006 decided to create a central command above those two divisions and other Iraqi units in the greater Baghdad area, and to place that command under the control of the Iraqi government. Once established this new command – the "Baghdad Operational Command" – was established, its leadership partnered closely with Brigadier General John C. Campbell and a number of U.S. brigade commanders – rapidly learning to enforce discipline, plan operations, maneuver forces, and effectively establish and enforce security. Primacy was given to developing and training the Iraqi military forces within this command, although police units were also included. The improved security situation established by the Baghdad Operational Command (primarily through its 6th and 9th Army Divisions) allowed Iraqi citizens to re-establish commerce and mobility across Baghdad and beyond, and more importantly it indirectly conferred legitimacy upon the Iraqi government.

**A strong political signal to the Iraqi's.** In January 2007, President Bush sent a strong political signal that the United States was committed to the people and government of Iraq in spite of recent security and stability challenges. President Bush's address to the nation (10 January 2007) clearly conveyed that the U.S. would help the Iraqi's carry out their campaign to put down sectarian violence, that the U.S. would be providing more than 20,000 additional U.S. troops for this effort, that the U.S. would help the Iraqi government take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces, and that the U.S. would use its full diplomatic resources to rally support for Iraq from nations throughout the Middle East. This strong political promise of support from the White House reassured Iraqi officials that they would be supported by the U.S. as they worked to build governance and stability over the next couple years.

**U.S. senior leaders operating as "one team."** Whereas U.S. civil-military cooperation (between the Department of Defense, State Department, and other



U.S. Agencies) had not been effectively established or practiced during Operating Iraqi Freedom over the course of previous years, the senior military officer and the senior State Department officer on the ground in 2007 – General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker – possessed the keen ability and the willingness to closely and continuously partner on U.S. operations – bringing exceptional "unity of effort" and oversight for implementing the President's guidance. This leadership team ensured that military and civilian contributions were well placed, synchronized, and closely tracked – to meet the overall aim of an American (and Iraqi) political solution – a stable, capable, and legitimate Iraqi government.

### **Recommendation.**

The author of the article "Countering the New Orthodoxy: Reinterpreting Counterinsurgency in Iraq" (see **Event Description** below) offers the following recommendations:

1. Ensure that U.S. goals are aligned with local interests in future stability operations. The endstate visualized by the Host Nation leadership should be fully understood by, and agreeable to, the intervening power/U.S. To achieve this understanding/agreement, U.S. policymakers must correctly assess the motivations of the Host Nation's political leaders and how closely those motivations map onto U.S. national interests.
2. Until and unless the U.S. develops the institutional capacity to develop police forces (and a justice system) on a large scale, the U.S. military should place priority on developing the Host Nation military forces first, and its police forces later. The U.S. (with DoD in the lead) should build the capacity of the Host Nation military to the point where it is capable of providing a secure environment for its citizens and capable of sustaining same. With regard to police forces, the State Department or Allies having gendarme-like forces should take responsibility for Host Nation police training/capacity-building, as well as for justice sector reform – with the full understanding that this effort will likely lag development of the Host Nation military by years.
3. Provide clear political guidance on what the U.S. is committing to do for the Host Nation, and assign senior leaders known for working well with other Agency leaders to lead the U.S. effort and to execute the national guidance. Solid political guidance and proper oversight (with "unity of effort") are absolutely essential for success.
4. With regard to Afghanistan, a strong political signal of support from the U.S. President should be sent to the people and the government of Afghanistan – as opposed to focusing predominantly on the military components of the "surge" in Afghanistan.

## **Implications.**

For future stability operations, if the U.S. President does not provide clear political guidance on what the U.S. is committing to do for the Host Nation, and if DoD and the State Department do not assign the "right" kind of senior leaders (who can work well with other Agencies) to lead the effort and execute the President's guidance, then management and execution of U.S. efforts will likely prove difficult and bog down – impeding progress toward stability and transition.

## **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the article "[Countering the New Orthodoxy: Reinterpreting the Counterinsurgency in Iraq](#)," by Douglas A. Ollivant, June 2011. This article was published by the New America Foundation: [www.Newamerica.net](http://www.Newamerica.net)

## **Comments.**

- President Bush's message of commitment to Iraq – announcing the surge of U.S. troops and U.S. resolve to partner with the Iraqi government – is seen in the "[President's Address to the Nation](#)," 10 January 2007.

- The "strong political signal of support" identified as a recommendation for the U.S. President to send to the Afghan government (recommendation #4 above) has now been sent, one could argue, through the "[Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan](#)" signed by President Obama, 1 May 2012.

- An article which discusses the military component of the "surge" in Afghanistan is "[Surging Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan](#)," by Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, with Derek S. Reveron, Military Review, November-December 2011.

- A report which highlights the lack of U.S. police capacity (for peacekeeping and stability operations) and which recommends that the U.S. should instead help to increase the police capacity of the United Nations (for such operations) is "U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping: From Aspiration to Implementation," by Citizens for Global Solutions Education Fund, 12 October 2011. This report is available at: <http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/U.S.-Engagement-in-International-Peacekeeping.pdf>



## **g. TOPIC. Engaging Spoiler Groups in Nations Beset by Violence ( [1330](#) )**

### **Observation.**

The engagement of potentially disruptive, sub-national elements, as demonstrated in Afghanistan and Somalia, are cases that illustrate the perils and possibilities for engaging "spoiler groups." They also illustrate the importance of engaging 3rd party states/nations that provide support to the "spoiler groups," with the goal/imperative of ending such support.

### **Discussion.**

#### **AFGHANISTAN.**

Over the years, the Karzai government has pursued a strategy of inducement and coercion towards "spoiler groups."

The results of this policy when dealing with "warlords" have been mixed. At one end of the spectrum are warlord-governors such as Northern Tajik commander Atta Noor. Noor, anchored with a well-financed and well-armed base of power in the city of Mazar-I-Sharif, was tapped by Karzai to be the governor of Balkh Province. Relative autonomy from Kabul allowed Noor to implement an administrative framework that, while lacking transparency and true government oversight, has nonetheless contributed to stability and relative economic growth in the province. Although Noor has exercised his considerable economic power (fueled by trade passing through Balkh's border with neighboring Uzbekistan) to further self-interests, he has nonetheless simultaneously supported the aims of the state/nation.

In contrast, another of President Karzai's warlord-governor appointees, Gul Agha Sherzai, fared much worse, ultimately resigning from his post in October 2013. While governing Nangarhar province, Sherzai used his state/provincial financial resources to cement his power and employed coercion against those who opposed him. However, a massive five-day protest against Sherzai erupted within the province in 2013 – with protestors accusing him of illegal land grabs, corrupt practices, embezzlement of development funds, and failure to protect Afghan territory from elements operating out of neighboring Pakistan. In this case, the Afghan central government suffered by its association with a warlord-governor who continued to exhibit corrupt, greedy tendencies, and who failed to protect the interests of the people or the nation.

Besides engaging "warlords," the Karzai government has also taken engagement-oriented steps with regard to the Afghan Taliban and its Pakistani variant. The Karzai government has periodically attempted to bring these groups – minus their most extreme elements (e.g., Al Qaeda and the Haqqani network) – into the peace building process. President Karzai even traveled to

Pakistan to meet with imprisoned Afghan Taliban second-in-command Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in November 2013. Karzai's goal has been focused on providing an avenue for these groups to have a seat at the table for peace negotiations and ultimately to enter the state-building process.

Aligning the goals of the Afghan state and the agendas of the Taliban “spoiler groups” has been extremely difficult. The Karzai government attempted to give the Taliban a voice in the peace building process through the [Afghan High Peace Council](#). During the Doha peace negotiations, the Afghan High Peace Council allowed the Taliban to open an office in Doha (Qatar). However, the manner by which the Taliban opened that office – raising the Taliban flag and banner bearing the name of the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” – conveyed the message that the Taliban still sought to portray itself as the legitimate, alternative government of Afghanistan – challenging the legitimacy of Afghanistan's existing central government. Karzai and others immediately pressed for the office to be shut down. The Taliban then closed its office and claimed they had been deceived.

Al Qaeda and the Haqqani network continue to operate – with considerable support and safe havens provided by Pakistan – as a destabilizing factor to Afghanistan.

## **SOMALIA.**

Similar to Afghanistan, the Somali government has attempted over the years to align its own incentives with those of its opponents.

The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was the most organized and effective opponent of Somalia’s Transitional National Government (TNG) when it was established in 2004. Although the ICU was eventually defeated (by Ethiopian forces) and withdrew to Eretria, it eventually morphed into the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) and continued to threaten Somali stability. The fledgling Somali government faced the question of whether or not it should engage the ARS in the peace building process, and whether or not it could identify/align any incentives for ARS cooperation. The TNG eventually adopted a policy of inducement to bring ARS members into the peace building process. However, the ARS fractured along moderate and hard-line views. As a result, the Somali government gained ARS moderates as allies and accommodated them into the state system, but then it had to deal with the hard-line factions operating from the periphery.

Members of the ARS who sought to spoil the peace process from the outside coalesced into the fighting force known as Al Shabab. Linked with Al Qaeda, Al Shabab remains committed to revolutionary warfare and government overthrow. In allying with the transnational Salafi movement (extremist Sunnis who believe themselves the only correct interpreters of the Koran, consider moderate

Muslims to be infidels, and seek to convert other Muslims with the aim of their fundamentalist version of Islam dominating the world), Al Shabab leaders have signaled their adherence to a political objective that makes engagement exceptionally difficult. Such engagement is even more difficult due to the rise to prominence of Ahmed Abdi Godane within Al Shabab – an extreme hard-line figure with strong ties to Al Qaeda.

Nonetheless, the Somali government has sought to induce members of the Salafi movement into the peace building process. Most notable of these was the integration of Sheikh Ahmed Madobe (one of the founding members of Al Shabab and a former warlord) – appointed 15 May 2013 as the governor of the Juba region. Essentially, the Somali government brought Madobe, as well as the fighters he controls, into the peace building process in a region where he and his men can serve as a counterweight – representing the Somali government – against Al Shabab.

Over the past several years, the Somali government, in conjunction with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), has also used military action against entrenched Al Shabab elements – with considerable success. After defeating Al Shabab elements in Mogadishu, AMISOM drove Al Shabab out of its last urban stronghold, Kismayo, in September 2012. Small spoiler groups, backed by Al Qaeda, still remain in rural areas of south-central Somalia. The Somali government, with the support of its allies, continues to employ a coercive strategy of military action against these groups.

### **Recommendation.**

In the article upon which this lesson is based (see **Event Description** below), the author points out that no single set of policy prescriptions is universally applicable for conflict-affected nations. However, he offers four recommendations based upon themes drawn from his case studies:

1. The government (of a conflict-affected nation) should attempt to integrate "spoiler groups" whenever possible by identifying, aligning, and offering incentives for cooperation.
2. If "spoiler groups" splinter into various factions, the government should develop additional incentives targeted/tailored for the various factions, particularly those seen as moderate.
3. If incentive efforts fail and a given "spoiler group" continues in opposition/violence, the government (and its allies) should engage any 3rd party states/nations providing support to that "spoiler group," for the purpose of ending such support. [**NOTE:** When "safe havens" are provided by a 3rd party state/nation, this form of support needs to be addressed by the affected government and its allies with urgency and resolve.]

4. If the affected government (on its own, or with support from allies) takes military action against the "spoiler group," that military action should be done in conjunction with policies aimed at inducing the "spoiler group" to become a participant in the peace building process.

[As an example, this was NATO's formula for success for dealing with the Serbian "spoilers" during the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict in 1995. Military action and diplomatic/policy initiatives were simultaneously utilized (August-November 1995) to bring the Serbian "spoilers" into the peace building process.]

### **Implication.**

If the government (of a conflict-affected nation) does not work to integrate "spoiler groups" into its governmental structures (when feasible), and if the government and its allies do not heavily engage 3rd party states/nations to get them to stop supporting "spoiler groups," then instability will persist.

### **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the article "[The Perils and Possibilities of Engaging Non-State Armed Actors in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding](#)," by Andrew Watkins, Small Wars Journal (<http://smallwarsjournal.com>), 7 March 2014. The article is made available by [Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0 license](#) per [Terms of Use](#).

### **Comments.**

Related references:

1. "[From Stalemate to Settlement: Lessons for Afghanistan from Historical Insurgencies That Have Been Resolved Through Negotiations](#)," Colin P. Clarke and Christopher Paul, RAND Corporation, 5 February 2014.
2. "[Is Pakistan Putting Its Reputation as an Al Qaeda Safe-Haven at Risk? Perhaps](#)," Dan Murphy, Christian Science Monitor, 13 November 2013.
3. "[U.S. Reaching Limit of Patience with Pakistan on Safe Havens](#)," Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service, U.S. Department of Defense News, 7 June 2012.
4. "[War on the Brink of Failure: 7 Obstacles Stand in the Way of Success in Afghanistan](#)," LTC Daniel L. Davis, Armed Forces Journal, October 2010.
5. "[Political Strategy and Peace Settlement Absent from Afghanistan](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 704, David Mosinski, 17 March 2011.

6. "[Keys to Success for the African Union Mission in Somalia](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 896, David Mosinski, 2 November 2012.

7. "[Security and Governance for Fragile States in Africa - Engaging Islamists](#)," SOLLIMS Lesson 676, David Mosinski, 25 October 2010.



#### **h. TOPIC. “Blue” and “Green” Forces Operating in Tandem ( [1193](#) )**

##### **Observation.**

Coordination mechanisms are imperative when a “Blue” Force (UN peacekeeping force) and a “Green” Force (foreign national force or regional organization force) are operating in tandem. Various operations have shown that if/when these two forces are not aligned under one command, their operations must be planned, coordinated, and synchronized through other means.

##### **Discussion.**

The following operations are illustrative of “Blue” and “Green” forces operating in tandem.

**Darfur/Sudan.** The African Union-UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) involved “Blue” and “Green” elements operating together as a hybrid force, beginning 31 July 2007. UNAMID was set up to be a 26,000-strong peacekeeping force – deployed and commanded jointly by the UN and the African Union (AU) and assigned the mission to protect civilians and support the peace process. However, UNAMID proved powerless to provide security and protect civilians during its early years, 2007-2010. This hybrid force was frequently targeted by rebels/militias – particularly the Janjaweed – and its operations were also severely restricted by the Government of Sudan. UNAMID’s greatest deficiencies were limited mobility (due to lack of aircraft), poor logistics capacity, and weak command and control. Its peak strength reached only 18,969 – kept low because the Government of Sudan repeatedly rejected offers from certain countries to contribute troops to UNAMID. At the outset of UNAMID’s formation [essentially a transition of forces from the African Union’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS) into UNAMID], no mission analysis was conducted, no courses of action were developed/analyzed, no task organization was conducted, and no training was provided for the new missions/tasks. The UN and AU should have planned, organized, and prepared UNAMID personnel according to the mission/tasks, threats, terrain, troops available, time, and host nation factors. Likewise, the UN and AU failed to establish an efficient operations center, had no means to gather information or develop threat

assessments, lacked capacity and will to establish/enforce “humanitarian corridors” to facilitate delivery of aid to camps/settlements, and did not prioritize areas for civilian protection – all to the detriment of the mission.

**Sierra Leone.** The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was deployed in July 1998 to support the return of the democratically-elected government of Sierra Leone. Its tasks included: monitoring the security situation, monitoring disarmament and demobilization of former combatants, and monitoring respect for international humanitarian law. The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), had already been operating in Sierra Leone, and it was newly tasked to establish security in the country by flushing out the remnants of the [AFRC/RUF](#) rebel groups and to conduct disarmament and demobilization. In December 1998, the rebel alliance launched an offensive to retake Freetown and in January 1999 overran most of the city. This led to the evacuation of most UNOMSIL personnel to Conakry, Guinea. Later in January, ECOMOG troops retook the capital and facilitated the return of the civilian government, while the rebels re-positioned into the surrounding countryside. Throughout 1998-1999, cooperation between UNOMSIL and ECOMOG was hampered by lack of standing coordination and liaison mechanisms, which were never put into place. In October 1999, UNOMSIL was succeeded by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which was mandated to assist in implementing the newly established Lome Peace Agreement and its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) plan. Several ECOMOG units were “re-hatted” under the new UN force (UNAMSIL); however, they did not receive any training on UNAMSIL’s mandate or tasks, nor did they receive training on UN Rules of Engagement (ROE). UNAMSIL was formed with no information-gathering or intelligence capabilities, and, resultantly, was taken by surprise by another rebel offensive in May 2000. Fortunately, decisive action was taken to counter the rebels’ gains. In July 2000, India’s contingent launched Operation Khukri to break an RUF siege of Kailahun, where 222 UN troops were essentially held hostage. Then, in August 2000, British forces likewise quickly intervened in response to another hostage situation involving 11 soldiers – defeating a rebel faction called the West Side Boys. By taking decisive action with overwhelming force, this response had the psychological effect of signaling to other rebel groups that the British forces possessed superior firepower and were ready and willing to use it. Sierra Leone's 10-year conflict soon came to an end.

**Haiti.** On 14 January 2000, two days after Haiti’s devastating earthquake, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTCOM) established Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-Haiti) to conduct humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief operations in conjunction with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). From the outset, JTF-Haiti’s leaders and planners worked alongside various counterparts from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), focusing on creating a safe and secure environment. Staffs came together and ensured that both organizations’ priorities and workloads were closely aligned.



JTF-Haiti's "Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center" proved to be the key node for facilitating this coordination, as well as collaboration between JTF-Haiti, the UN, and partners. This JTF-Haiti coordination center closely tracked and synchronized the efforts of JTF-Haiti, MINUSTAH forces, the UN humanitarian community, USAID, and a large number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It was manned by 30 military personnel, including one general officer. This center, and the bulk of JTF-Haiti, operated on unclassified information systems and used commercially available programs/tools to build a humanitarian assistance Common Operating Picture (COP) – allowing current situational awareness for all partners/participants. Additionally, JTF-Haiti and MINUSTAH provided liaison officers across other levels of their organizations – facilitating extensive coordination and unity of effort. JTF-Haiti also worked closely with the UN's "Coordinating Support Committee" in Haiti (involving host nation ministers and humanitarian agencies) and helped to streamline coordination procedures – whereby requirements could be raised, validated, and quickly passed to the appropriate organizations. In the first few weeks of relief operations, the greatest challenges raised by the Haitian government involved managing, protecting, and providing aid and services for the vast number (over two million) internally displaced persons (IDPs) – especially for those who settled in areas that were prone to flooding. To address this complex problem, JTF-Haiti and USAID worked closely with the UN and the Haitian government to develop and execute a comprehensive IDP strategy.

### **Recommendation.**

**1. Mission/Command.** When a "Blue" Force and "Green" Force are deployed to the same area, an effective liaison mechanism needs to be created – to ensure coordination across all levels and synchronization of priorities and actions. The creation of a Joint Operations Center (comprised of military and civilian staff from both organizations) is recommended, as well as the exchange of liaison officers across their organizations. Leaders should decide upon roles, responsibilities, authorities, priorities, and division of labor between the "Blue" Force and the "Green" Force.

**2. Planning.** Recommend the UN refrain from any hasty establishment of peacekeeping forces (such as the way it quickly established UNAMID out of AMIS, and UNAMSIL out of ECOMOG). The UN should instead plan and tailor forces according to the mission, threat groups, terrain considerations, troops available, time, and host nation factors. It should conduct integrated planning with any regional organization (or nation) providing a "Green" Force to work in tandem with the "Blue" Force. They should plan together for the management of IDPs.

**3. Structure/Restructure.** Placing units from a "Green" Force (regional force) under a "Blue" Force should not be undertaken unless leaders deem this necessary. Significant problems are likely to arise when units serving under a

regional command structure with a different mandate and rules are “re-hatted” and need to adjust/conform to the UN’s mandate, rules, and standards.

**4. Training.** Mission-specific pre-deployment training should include the following topics: mandate/mission, background to the conflict, current security environment, ROE, Standard Operating Procedures, Code of Conduct, personal behavior, cultural training, crowd control techniques, Protection of Civilians, route/convoy security, and integrated planning/operations.

**5. Intelligence/Information.** A military information cell should be established within the “Blue” Force headquarters (in the Joint Operations Center) – to serve as the focal point for receiving information/reports on threats and for conducting analysis. The Joint Operations Center should build the COP to enable common situational awareness. “Blue” and “Green” forces should utilize an information-sharing system such as [SOLLIMS](#) for collaboration.

**6. Use of Force.** A “Green” Force in support of a UN peacekeeping mandate has proven to be an effective deterrent to “spoilers” of the peace – particularly if/when the UN mission itself lacks such a deterrent capability. The “Green” Force assigned this role must be credible and capable of robust enforcement action. It needs to plan/act in close cooperation with the “Blue” Force.

**7. Humanitarian Assistance.** The UN should continue the practice of establishing a Coordination Support Committee (host nation government, UN, and humanitarian agency leaders) and should include “Green” Force participation at committee meetings. “Humanitarian corridors” should be established and enforced – covering the main routes that humanitarian relief agencies use for delivery of aid to major sites/camps/settlements, as well as covering the primary routes that IDPs traverse. These corridors/routes need to be cleared of interference from threat groups.

### **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the following references:

1. [“Darfur: An Experiment in African Peacekeeping,”](#) by Michael Fleshman, Africa Renewal, December 2010.
2. [“Humanitarian and Social Welfare: UN Challenges in Darfur,”](#) SOLLIMS Lesson 679, 25 October 2010.
3. [“Neglecting Darfur,”](#) by Omer Ismail and Laura Jones, Enough, 13 September 2010.
4. [“UNAMID Background,”](#) [UNAMID – African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur.](#)

5. [“Challenges, Strategies, and Necessities for Civilian Protection in Africa,”](#) SOLLIMS Lesson 697, 15 March 2011.
6. [“Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa,”](#) by Paul D. Williams, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, September 2010.
7. [“Sierra Leone – UNOMSIL – Background,”](#) [UNOMSIL](#), July 1998 - October 1999.
8. [“Sierra Leone – UNAMISL – Background,”](#) [UNAMSIL](#), October 1999 - December 2005.
9. [“Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone,”](#) Peace-keeping Best Practices Unit, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, September 2003.
10. [“‘Whole of International Community’ for Foreign Disaster Relief,”](#) SOLLIMS Lesson 700, 7 April 2011.
11. [“Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force-Haiti Observations,”](#) by LTG P.K. (Ken) Keen and LTCs Matthew G. Elledge, Charles W. Nolan, and Jennifer L. Kimmey (U.S. Army) in Military Review, November-December 2010.
12. [“MINUSTAH Background,”](#) [MINUSTAH – United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti](#)
13. [“Strategic Lesson 7: Planning for an Internally Displaced Persons \(IDP\) Program,”](#) by Dan French, PKSOI, 2 May 2012.
14. [“Haiti Earthquake Response – Information Collection, Sharing, and Management,”](#) SOLLIMS Lesson 681, 25 October 2010.

### **Comments.**

This lesson may be of interest to:

- Department of the Army – Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7
- Department of Defense – Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3, J-5, J-7
- USAFRICOM – Deputy Chief of Staff, J-3, J-5, J-7
- United Nations – Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)



### **3. CONCLUSION**

Recent peace, stability, and humanitarian operations – across Africa and the Middle East, as well as in the Philippines – illustrate the imperatives of “unity and resolve” when confronting “challenges and spoilers” within conflict-affected nations. Key lessons in this regard include:

- The U.S./Coalition and host nation should utilize a comprehensive approach in planning operations. Integrated planning does not mean “organizations preparing their plans independently and then coordinating their plans with partners”; it means “planning together.”
- The host nation government should consider adopting its own “whole-of-nation” philosophy – maximizing government agency involvement and reaching out to communities to build consensus against “spoiler groups.”
- The host nation government should attempt to integrate “spoiler groups” into the peace process whenever possible – by identifying, aligning, and offering incentives for cooperation.
- The U.S./Coalition should emphasize host nation ownership in protecting its own population – with the U.S./Coalition focusing support to the host nation on advice, assistance, training, equipping, and capacity-building.
- The U.S./Coalition and host nation should maximize intelligence cooperation and information / assessment sharing during stability operations – especially for improving awareness of “spoiler groups.”
- To the greatest extent possible, the host nation’s security forces should be in the lead with regard to any offensive / combat operations against “spoiler groups.”
- U.S./Coalition political leaders should continuously send strong political signals of support to the people and the government of the host nation.
- The host nation government (and its allies) should engage any 3<sup>rd</sup> party states/nations providing support to “spoiler groups” for the purpose of ending such support – especially when that support includes safe havens.
- The U.S./Coalition, as well as the United Nations (for/during international peacekeeping operations), should seek long-term commitments upfront from troop contributing countries for sustainment of their manpower contributions for peace/stability operations – covering a duration of years.
- The United Nations should continue the practice of deploying a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) on peacekeeping operations where sizable rebel groups/irregular militaries pose a major threat to the civilian population and to UN peacekeeping contingents.

- When “Blue” Forces (e.g., UN AMISOM in Mali) and “Green” Forces (e.g., French forces in Mali) are operating in tandem:
  - Establish one Joint Operations Center with staffs from both forces.
  - Exchange liaison officers across organizations.
  - Come to agreement upon roles, responsibilities, authorities, priorities, and division of labor between the “Blue” Force and the “Green” Force.
  - Ensure integrated planning among the “Blue” Force and the “Green” Force.
  - Build and share a Common Operating Picture.
  - Continue the practice of establishing a Coordination Support Committee (consisting of host nation government, UN, and humanitarian agency leaders); include “Green” Force participation at committee meetings.
  - Establish a military information cell (in the Joint Operations Center) – to serve as the focal point for receiving information/ reports on threats and for conducting analysis.
  - Develop a common strategy and detailed plan for IDP management.
  - Include the following topics in pre-deployment training: mandate/mission, background to the conflict, current security environment, Rules of Engagement, Standard Operating Procedures, Code of Conduct, personal behavior, cultural training, crowd control techniques, Protection of Civilians, route/convoy security, and integrated planning/operations.

Through wider dissemination of the aforementioned lessons and their inclusion in strategic and operational planning, significant impacts can be made against “spoiler groups” during the course of future peacekeeping and stability operations.

#### **4. COMMAND POC**

Lessons selected by: Mr. David Mosinski, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst.


PKSOI reviewer: Mr. Dan French, Chief, Lessons Learned Branch.

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## RELATED DOCUMENTS, REFERENCES, AND LINKS

- [“UNIPATH, volume 1 – Partnerships and Peacekeeping,”](#) U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), 1 March 2014
- [“Countering the al-Shabaab Insurgency in Somalia: Lessons for U.S. Special Operations Forces,”](#) Graham Turbiville, Josh Meservey, and James Frost, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Report 14-1, February 2014
- [“Mali Community of Practice \(CoP\)”](#) in SOLLIMS
- [“Peace Operations in Africa: Lessons Learned Since 2000,”](#) Paul D. Williams, Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), July 2013
- [“Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from an ISAF Perspective,”](#) Robert Beljan, Small Wars Journal (SWJ), 30 May 2013
- [“From Spoilers to Statebuilders: Constructive Approaches to Engagement with Non-State Armed Groups in Fragile States,”](#) Sukanya Podder, OECD Development Co-operation Working Paper 5/2012, October 2012
- [“Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations,”](#) Joint and Coalition Analysis (JCOA), Joint Staff J7, 15 June 2012
- [“Foreign Fighter Interdiction: Stability Operations as Countermeasures,”](#) Major M. Daniel Kolva, U.S. Forces-Iraq, PKSOI perspective, 1 April 2011
- [“The Comprehensive Approach: An Iraq Case Study,”](#) Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA), 16 February 2010
- [“Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,”](#) United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and PKSOI, October 2009
- [“Lessons Learned in Peacekeeping Operations,”](#) the Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, 26 October 2006.

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# SOLLIMS SAMPLER

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