

SOLLIMS SAMPLER

Targeting Peace & Stability Operations Lessons & Best Practices

“Stabilization and Transition”

Volume 7, Issue 3

August 2016



PKSOI



U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

Approved for Public Release,
Distribution Unlimited



U.S. ARMY



**STRENGTH
and
WISDOM**

FOREWORD

Welcome to the August 2016 edition of the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) Lessons Learned “Sampler” – **Stabilization and Transition**.

The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an [Introduction](#) that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “[Quick Look](#)” that provides a short description/preview of the lessons included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the Stability Operations (SO)-related [Lessons Learned](#) – organized by sector, and (4) links to [additional references and resources](#) that are either related to the Sampler’s lessons or that address current, real-world, Defense Stabilization and Transition-related challenges.

This lessons learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to **Stabilization and Transition** available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission/function – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, the Joint community, policy-makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description
- Lesson Author
- **(NEW)** Critical Analysis from PKSOI Subject Matter Expert (by stabilization sector)

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section within a lesson. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective. This month and issue we will have our PKSOI Stability sector experts provide some analysis and thoughts on the submitted articles. This edition will provide a sample of what our sector experts think about the selected topics. This is a new addition to the SOLLIMS format and based on availability we will continue with this initiative moving forward.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access/download attachments.

If you have not registered in SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our website at [<http://pksoi.army.mil>] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [<https://sollims.pksoi.org>] to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!



Abuju, Nigeria (6 June 2016). COL Raymond D “Boz” Bossert Jr., Chief of Stability operations for PKSOI from Douglasville, Georgia, and Lieutenant General BT Ndiomu (center left), Chief of Training and Operations for the Nigerian Military, interact with the Nigerian Military crisis action team for Stabilization operations in the Northern operational area focused on Boko Harem and the Nigerian Delta region focused on insurgents. This group was part of a 5-day Country engagement by AFRICOM and PKSOI to the Nigerian Military Engineer School, National Defense College and the Ministry of Defense to lecture and prepare and review the National Strategic plan Nigeria is producing in collaboration with their civilian ministries to address the Stability phase of operations they are entering upon direction of their President. (photo by LT CDR Audu Idu, Nigerian Defence College)

INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the August 2016 special edition of the SOLLIMS Sampler, ***Stabilization and Transition***. I am COL Raymond ‘Boz’ Bossert – the Division Chief for Stability Operations at PKSOI (717-245-4380). In an effort to provide some Subject Matter Expert analysis on the lessons submitted for this issue, I have directed our stabilization sector experts to provide some critical analysis and comments on the submissions. This is an effort to provide some expert feedback to the authors and the community on what your area/subject experts – who deal with everything from policy through implementation and assessments – have to say about a particular lesson. We will endeavor to make this a recurring event to broaden our database of lessons and connect the policy, doctrine, and assessments that our experts work on to the actual submissions for the betterment of the community. I hope this will be of value and start a dialogue between the experts, the community, and the field moving forward.

In this edition, we cover the following stabilization areas/subjects: Governance, Security, Economic Stabilization, Infrastructure, Rule of Law, FHA / HADR, and Interagency derived from the current internally accepted stabilization sectors and US Department of Defense Policy and Doctrine. These sectors “apply to every actor and activity across all end states.” These activities are outcome-focused; they serve as overarching themes that should guide all actions/efforts toward desired stability outcomes. The five sectors and two specific callouts are:

- **Security.** A safe and secure environment is the basis for all stabilization efforts. The key elements of this sector consist of: understanding the local context, fostering ownership, balancing formal and informal systems, effective transitions from international to host nation actors, management of “spoilers,” reform of the security sector, and protection of human rights.
- **Governance.** Under the basic premise that everything is political, this sector requires: using a “conflict lens,” fostering and sustaining a political process, inclusivity of warring parties and marginalized groups, effective strategic communications, and a collaborative and synchronized approach.
- **Economic Stabilization/Infrastructure.** The derivation of this sector is as follows: establishing a bargain between citizens and the government, articulating a clear mandate and authorities, matching resources to goals and promoting inclusivity, capacity-building, State building, and establishment of a viable institutional base that an economy can thrive on.
- **Social Well Being.** The main elements of this sector involve getting all actors to work together through: a shared understanding of the situation, a shared strategic goal, integration, cooperation and coherence, civil-military cooperation, and recognition of humanitarian space.
- **Rule of Law.** This sector, an imperative for other efforts moving forward, rests heavily on the following factors: management of “spoilers,” reform of the security sector, protection of human rights, delivering a timely peace

dividend, adept leadership, accountability and transparency, management of expectations and communication, building constituencies for peace, and ensuring international community engagement.

- **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.** This sector focuses on the following complex issues: unity of effort, building host nation capacity to manage the emergency and support long-term development, immediate and effective response planning, and collaborative assessments.
- **Interagency.** This sector is based on: comprehensive regional diplomacy and shared assessments of the situation, a shared regional vision, and cooperation with neighboring countries, international entities, and regional structures.

This Sampler of lessons is meant to be used by actors across the range of peace and stability operations – whether contributing to a peacekeeping mission, partnering with other nations on stability operations, or engaging in peacebuilding efforts. Along with the various lessons – which are categorized under the seven subject areas – this Sampler’s [CONCLUSION](#) offers final thoughts and recommendations, and its [Related Documents, References, and Links](#) provides the reader with additional reference material.



COL Raymond “Boz” Bossert, Division Chief of Stability Operations at PKSOI and Major General AO Shodunke, the Commandant of the Nigerian Army Military Engineer School, in Makuda, Nigeria. A recent visit in June 2016 was to help identify the way the U.S. executes stabilization operations and how we train our force to plan, prepare, and execute those missions. (photo by Nigerian Public Affairs officer)

"QUICK LOOK" (Preview of the Lessons)

Click on [\[Read More ...\]](#) to go to full lesson.

- Strengthening horizontal accountability in a post-war context typically involves interventions and external support in the following areas: constitution-making, watchdog institutions, transitional justice, local governance, and security sector reform. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The Department of Defense is in the process of implementing a military capability to provide governance support. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Establishing a safe and secure environment involves much more than initial policing actions. The reduction of violence in the given operating environment over time requires a range of other actions and appropriate resourcing. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Recent U.S. operations in Iraq and continuing operations in Afghanistan highlight the importance of building effective host nation security forces in post-conflict stabilization efforts. In both situations, the U.S. and its coalition partners failed to focus initial efforts on building strong and capable security forces. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- As Peace and Stability Operations continue to grow in importance and dominate defense policy, activity and the interests of the major leading nations, the concept of "strategic intelligence" existing only to support national level policy makers "within the beltway" no longer reflects the role... [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Interagency reconstruction operations in the Rusafa Political District of Iraq during the 2003-2010 time period produced many tangible benefits for the district's residents; however, these operations suffered from various planning, management, and information-sharing problems – impeding the effective and efficient use of U.S. Government resources. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Developing a sustainable economy is one of the key end states within the USIP/ PKSOI strategic framework for stabilization and reconstruction. One of the key questions that may arise when considering solutions to economic development issues involves whether it is better to address the problem from the national to local level or from the local to national level (i.e., a top-down or bottom-up approach). [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- USAID's implementation of Community-Led Total Sanitation in Afghanistan over the 2009-2012 timeframe, combined with education/training programs and a comprehensive approach, achieved notable success – more so than various other USG-led programs – offering a useful framework for future stability operations. [\[Read More ...\]](#)

- During post-conflict stability operations, it is imperative to rapidly restore the population's access to basic water and sanitation services. ...in post-conflict Kosovo, the tremendous success that was achieved through a 3-year management contract in the Gjakove-Rahovec area suggests that contracting a professional company to do the work can be a very promising approach for meeting post-conflict water service requirements and sustainability. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Nations emerging from conflict typically face significant challenges in justice and rule of law. In such cases, it is important to identify the impediments to rule of law reform, take actions to address them, and lay the foundation for security sector reform (SSR). [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The effectiveness of rule of law projects/initiatives depends heavily on how well they are nested within the host nation's rule of law objectives and goals. Rule of law operations can be successful, as noted in northern Iraq 2008-2010, through gaining an understanding of the needs of host nation partners (judges, security chiefs, police chiefs, etc.) and their communities, and then responding to those needs. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- U.S. Southern Command had to overcome numerous functional organization and manning gaps that hindered the staff's ability to provide an effective and sustained response in support of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations to the Government of Haiti. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- During a humanitarian disaster, there is often a shortage of relief resources, yet a plethora of civilian and military agencies ready to assist the host nation. ...One effective way to improve such civ-mil coordination and strategic effectiveness during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) is to engage stakeholders in dialogue before such incidents occur, utilizing the Operational Contract Support (OCS) concept known as the Joint Contracting Support Board (JCSB). [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- At U.S. Embassy Kabul, a small interagency (IA) team of planners, assessors, and action officers in the Political-Military Affairs (Pol-Mil) section has helped orient civ-mil relations toward the main goal of building capacity for the Afghan government and its society. This IA team – the Civ-Mil Plans and Assessments Sub-Section (CMPASS)... [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- There are many challenges for the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) or the Joint Force Command (JFC) commanders when operating in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) environment; however, there are also many opportunities. ...there are some integration methods that the GCC and JFC commanders can use to ensure better cooperation in the future. [\[Read More ...\]](#)

TABLE OF CONTENTS	
1. <u>GOVERNANCE</u>	Page 8
1.a. <u>Governance Interventions in Post-War Situations</u>	Page 8
1.b. <u>Governance Unity of Effort</u>	Page 13
2. <u>SECURITY</u>	Page 15
2.a. <u>Establishing a Safe and Secure Environment</u>	Page 15
2.b. <u>The Criticality of Security Force Institution Building</u>	Page 18
2.c. <u>Defining, or Re-Defining the Role of Strategic Intelligence During Stability Operations</u>	Page 21
3. <u>ECONOMIC STABILIZATION / DEVELOPMENT</u>	Page 26
3.a. <u>Interagency Rebuilding Efforts in Rusafa, Iraq</u>	Page 26
3.b. <u>Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches to Economic Development</u>	Page 30
4. <u>INFRASTRUCTURE / RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES</u>	Page 33
4.a. <u>Addressing the Basic Sanitation Needs of the Host Nation during Stability Operations</u>	Page 33
4.b. <u>Providing Water in Post-Conflict Kosovo</u>	Page 37
5. <u>RULE OF LAW</u>	Page 41
5.a. <u>Justice and Rule of Law</u>	Page 41
5.b. <u>By, With, and Through in Rule of Law Operations – Iraq</u>	Page 43
6. <u>FHA / HADR</u>	Page 46
6.a. <u>Unintended Consequences of Organizational Design – USSOUTHCOM and its Earthquake Response to Haiti</u>	Page 46
6.b. <u>Civ-Mil Coordination in Disaster Relief through Operational Contract Support</u>	Page 51
7. <u>INTERAGENCY / WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT</u>	Page 55
7.a. <u>Embassy Planning in Afghanistan and Beyond</u>	Page 55
7.b. <u>Challenges to a Geographic Command</u>	Page 58
8. <u>CONCLUSION</u>	Page 62
<u>ANNEX A: Related Documents, References, and Links</u>	Page 64
<u>ANNEX B: Previously Published SOLLIMS Samplers</u>	Page 66

SECTION 1: GOVERNANCE

1.a. TOPIC. Governance Interventions in Post-War Situations (Lesson # [504](#))

Observation.

Strengthening horizontal accountability in a post-war context typically involves interventions and external support in the following areas: constitution-making, watchdog institutions, transitional justice, local governance, and security sector reform.

In the report upon which this lesson is based (see “Event Description” paragraph below), the author uses the term 'post-war' instead of 'post-conflict.' He explains that 'post-conflict' is a misleading term, not only because conflict is an inherent element in all societies, but because violence often continues in societies after a peace settlement has been accepted.

Discussion.

Democratic accountability is a prerequisite for good governance and a functioning democratic system. To secure that political leaders ‘play by the rules’ – act in accordance with their mandate and do not violate citizens’ rights – is a concern in all societies aiming to secure a democratic form of government. Accountability is divided into two categories:

(i) **Horizontal accountability** refers to the classical tripartite division of state power between the three branches of government as well as the range of other public entities (often called special agencies of restraint or ‘watchdogs’) created to check for abuse by or inefficiencies of the state. Strengthening horizontal accountability in a post-war context typically involves interventions and external support in the following areas: constitution-making, watchdog institutions, transitional justice, local governance, and security sector reform.

- The report uses South Africa as a model for *constitution-making* for divided societies. The process took almost seven years and faced threats of renewed violence. However, the slow and cumbersome process associated with constitution-making was at the heart of its success. Divergent examples of constitution-making which involved a rapid process include Rwanda, Afghanistan, and East Timor. Other research suggests that parliamentary democracy is preferable to presidentialism because the latter tends to foster zero-sum competition, deadlock, and personalist, state-level leadership.

- The concept of '*watchdog institutions*' appeared with the emergence of the 'new democracies' in former socialist states and one-party states in the south. The watchdogs were intended to complement other institutions of restraint on the

'state.' Some of the types of watchdogs include 'Rights watchdogs,' 'Reform watchdogs,' and 'Audit watchdogs.' Corruption is typically prevalent in societies where there is limited accountability of public institutions. The potential for corruption is considerable in states where control of the state is contested or accountability institutions are weak.

- A common view is that a decentralized approach is important in post-war situations where central government structures are weak or remain contested. In that situation, local structures are important in providing goods and services and to promote local democratic processes. However, some experts warn that local governance cannot succeed in the long-term without a national state structure. Examples given were Somalia and Bosnia. Somalia's local and regional governance did not succeed because power continued to be wielded by warlords and other non-state leaders. Bosnia's new government approach was overly decentralized and had the same weaknesses as the former government system.

- The concept of security sector reform (SSR) emerged in the late 1990s. The sector was broadly defined and included institutions of police and justice, defense (private and public military organizations), and civilian control and oversight. Examples of externally assisted SSR include Central and South Eastern European countries – including the Balkans. The most successful SSR cases are South Africa and some Latin America countries. In these cases, the SSR process was more internally driven which underlines the importance of participation to create legitimacy in the process.

(ii) **Vertical accountability** denotes the chain of institutions and processes that link the elected ruler to its electorate and the citizenry. It includes citizens acting through the electoral process or indirectly via civic organizations and the media. Vertical accountability is influenced by a variety of factors, many of which are not directly governance related. However, vital interventions in post-war contexts focus on the election system, building a civil society and supporting grassroots initiatives.

- The objectives of post-war elections are typically to: 1) move the conflict from the military battleground to the political arena; 2) transfer power or legitimize the power of a government that can start rebuilding the country; and, 3) initiate and consolidate the democratization process. There is increasing awareness that ill-timed, badly designed or poorly run elections can undermine both peace and democratization in post-war situations. Considerations for elections include the degree of continuing conflict in society, security conditions, and freedom of movement. Political contests require some minimal prerequisites such as freedom of expression, freedom of movement, and organization and existence of political parties that can field candidates and mount election campaigns. The electoral system has a big impact on representation and governance. The critical factor is the electoral formula which determines how votes are translated into seats. In post-war situations, as in emerging democracies generally, political

parties are critical insofar as they structure the competition between societal groups and interests. Some observers argue that in situations where one party is dominant, 'democracy promoters' must encourage the development of alternative political parties, financing included. Helping civil society and financing proliferation of NGOs is not enough, 'political party development must be a top agenda item.'

- Many donors support human rights organizations that build rights awareness on grassroots levels (e.g. the Honduran-based CeSHRA program in Central America). These are often anchored in a national human rights commission, or human rights monitoring linked to larger peace commissions (as in Nicaragua). Support for development of human rights organizations in Cambodia on both local and national level has, for instance, been considered a major success and achievement. National, institutional support is necessary to establish the principle of no impunity through firm prosecution of violations. In the case of refugees returning to conflictual post-war situations, both national and international support is required to establish a reasonable absence of fear. Fear of reprisals was a main reason why Hutu refugees were reluctant to return to Rwanda after the genocide. In Bosnia, it took concerted efforts by the international community – including provision of incentives to both refugees and local authorities – to encourage returns to areas that had been 'cleansed.'

- Several projects in war-torn societies have been designed to empower victimized and traumatized communities. For example projects of this kind have been established to assist the indigenous people in Guatemala, who suffered enormously from systematic violence perpetrated by the 'security' forces during the war. One project, for instance, sought to strengthen the Mayan people's capacity to articulate their interests in policy discussions. The theory that personal contact reduces hostility has informed numerous projects. The assumption is that participation in common projects and structured interaction among previously divided communities will help restore positive social relations. Cooperative projects of this kind have been particularly common in the post-war Balkans. Evaluations of cross-ethnic contact groups of youth and NGOs suggest they have been effective but – as in the case of grass-roots human rights initiatives – vulnerable to renewed conflict on the national level. South Africa pioneered the use of grass-roots peace committees. These committees were designed to foster tolerance and prevent violence at the local level.

(iii) **External Agents.** Although not part of this discussion, a third form of accountability can be added, namely the accountability imposed by external agents such as donors, financial institutions, etc.

Recommendation.

According to the report, people must recognize that governance is a process, not a product. This calls for a long-term perspective and a recognition that social

engineering has distinct limits. External actors in particular need to be conscious of the dilemmas of ownership and assistance that operate in post-war situations. While working in a policy framework that emphasizes the principles of democracy – which entails local self-determination and ownership – aid actors have their own interests and procedures that may well conflict with local needs and interests. The imbalance in capacity and resources nevertheless gives the aid actors a dominant voice in the formulation of goals and policies, often leaving conflicts to be ‘solved’ on the ground through local non-compliance or resistance, or producing dysfunctional social consequences. The dilemma is inherent in all aid activities, but is accentuated by the sharp imbalance in resources and administrative capacity that typically exist in a post-war situation.

The other main conclusions/recommendations of this report are:

- Aid actors need to adjust policies to local types of post-war situations. A one-size policy does not fit all cases.
- Promoting human rights is a confidence-building measure, and as such is essential to establishing a foundation for post-war, democratic governance.
- Accountability measures are necessary to secure democratic governance, but there are many forms and structures of accountability.
- Decentralization has obvious advantages in post-war situations where the central state is weak or remains contested, but must be balanced by a national structure aid coordination based in host government institutions can be an effective and sustainable approach.
- Approaching security issues through non-conventional entry points can encourage critical reforms in a difficult sector.

Implications.

The recommendations lay out a slow methodical process towards achieving good, effective governance. However, affected countries, aid donors, and international groups should not hold tight to a plan but recognize that events and situations usually change which will cause unplanned reactions or changes. All parties must be flexible but hold true to the long-term goal(s). External actors must, at some point, cede or slowly transition responsibilities to the host nation otherwise risk the issue of ownership of the process. All affected parties should use those practices and traits from successful governance interventions but need to be ready to modify or perhaps terminate those things that are not working or become obstacles to peace-building.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the report “[Governance Interventions in Post-War Situations: Lessons Learned](#),” May 2005, by Vibeke Wang, Astri Suhrke, and

Elling N. Tjonneland, of the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway. The report addresses governance issues in post-war situations.

Lesson Author: Mr. Jaime Apo.

Critical Analysis from PKSOI Governance SME (717-245-3559):

The author is correct to highlight the article's key assertion that governance is a process and not a product. The process of governance is not set in stone, but must adapt to changing circumstances and events. However, the details in the article deserve further scrutiny.

Additionally, while the article acknowledges the development of governance as a process, the article places too much emphasis on a sequential implementation (first security, then economic, then political reform, or some variation of that depending on how the conflict concludes), with the article recommending 10-year increments. However, as the *Guiding Principles* points out, there is a strong interdependence between the functions of governance; they cannot be implemented in a linear fashion. Security, Rule of Law, Economic, Governance and Basic Human Services all depend on one another to establish a system of good governance. Thinking in linear terms, while simplifying the problem, risks successful governance institution building.

The article places more emphasis on democracy as a necessary institution for accountability. While political moderation, accountability, civic participation and empowerment are all necessary conditions to achieve stable governance, they do not necessarily fit into the western democratic model of parliamentary or presidential systems.

Most notably, the article misplaces the primary risk of not rapidly transitioning authority to the host nation. The risk of intervention forces' owning the process *is* a problem. However, absent timely transfer of responsibility to the host nation, legitimacy will erode. The mere fact that the host nation's institutions are not given authority will degrade ongoing efforts to develop a system of governance.

Finally, local context is critical. The fact that an intervention was successful in supporting governance institutions in one case does not automatically determine that the practice will be successful in another. The reference publication highlights in the introduction "guiding principles"; they remain a guide for success and not a formula.

There are many valid points in the article. However the lessons are not universal. Careful and critical analysis of the assertions can improve the lessons drawn. Pointing out discrepancies along with the credible assertions improves the take-aways from the study.

1.b. TOPIC. Governance Unity of Effort
(Lesson # [1582](#))

Observation.

The Department of Defense (DoD) is in the process of implementing a military capability to provide governance support. The initial plans call for military governance specialists who can operate at the national and regional levels of government. As the capability continues to evolve, the DoD organizations responsible for implementation should consider developing a local military governance capability to ensure unity of effort and interoperability within the whole-of-government and international organizations.

Discussion.

Recognizing a capability gap in the ability to provide military governance support, the Department of Defense is in the process of establishing military governance specialists within the United States Army Reserve Civil Affairs Corps. The initial implementation plan establishes military governance specialists capable of providing support at the national and regional levels of government. Historical experiences with military governance support demonstrate the utility in having governance capabilities that are able to synchronize efforts from the national through the local levels of government. The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program is an excellent example of not only national through local level governance support, but civil-military unity of effort.

Within the United States Government, the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development have roles with support to governance capacity building. With the implementation of a Department of Defense governance capability, it is important to ensure that the groups and organizations within each department and agency are capable of operating in a complementary capacity to ensure unit of effort through a whole-of-government approach. Additionally, international organizations such as the United Nations, through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), execute governance capacity building functions on an international basis. Future U.S. governance efforts should ensure not only interoperability within the whole-of-government, but also within an international organizational construct as well.

Recommendation.

There are two recommendations concerning possible implementation of a local military governance specialist capability. The first recommendation is to develop a whole-of-government approach within the United States Government and the

second involves potential integration with international organizations such as the United Nations.

1. Within the whole-of-government approach, the Department of Defense, along with the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development, should collaborate to establish a common operating framework for employing governance specialists. Establish scalable response options and organizational/team constructs that are able to respond to governance issues.

2. In conjunction with synchronizing the whole-of-government approach, the second recommendation is to review international governance standards with organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme to ensure interoperability with international/UN response capabilities.

Implications.

By not implementing a local governance capability, the DoD risks continuing past practices of not having capabilities to achieve unity of effort from national through local levels of government.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on a PKSOI-facilitated visit to the Department of Defense, Department of State, and United States Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C., 24-25 March 2015. The purpose was to gain a better understanding of DoD, DoS and USAID Peacekeeping and Stability Operations capabilities. Key attendees were: OSD-P, OSD P&R, DoS POL/MIL, USAID (OFDA, OTI, DCHA/DRG), PKSOI faculty, and USAWC students. Additional information for military governance specialists is from the Stability Operations Joint DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendation.

Lesson Author: COL Michael Magliocco.

Critical Analysis from PKSOI Governance SME (717-245-3559):

The author highlights an important gap in the U.S. Government's capability and capacity to respond to crisis, which continues to plague the international community. However, the author needs to be careful with definitions. U.S. military doctrine recognizes three definitions relating to governance:

- Military Government: Complete control of all governmental functions by military authorities; examples of this have not been seen since post WWII Germany and Japan.
- Transitional Military Authority: A temporary military government installed until security conditions allow return to civil authority
- Military Support to Governance: Military capabilities are applied in support of developing governance functions, be they providing security, helping to

develop infrastructure that enables the provision of essential services and economic development, or security sector reform whereby local security forces are developed and trained to be accountable to civil authority. This is the most common military role in governance today.

As the author highlights, Governance unity of effort requires collaboration with the Department of State and USAID. The Department of Defense is not in the lead in this endeavor; it remains in support as the definition implies, i.e., military support to governance. Interagency collaboration remains critical from the outset for success. The proper use of terms is essential, to ensure all parties are clear on what mission the DoD is conducting in a given scenario.

SECTION 2: SECURITY

2.a. TOPIC. Establishing a Safe and Secure Environment (Lesson # [1152](#))

Observation.

Establishing a safe and secure environment involves much more than initial policing actions. The reduction of violence in the given operating environment over time requires a range of other actions and appropriate resourcing.

Discussion.

Establishing a safe and secure environment:

On the surface, most members of the military will likely look at establishing a safe and secure environment as simply providing a policing function with an aim at keeping violence at a minimum. In actuality, it seems that providing a lasting secure environment entails much more. Once basic security is established in a peacekeeping situation, the stabilizing force or team must start building the basic foundations of society based upon a thorough needs assessment of the operating environment. In the Sierra Leone case study, 2.6 million homeless individuals is a staggering number that represents a significant source of potential violence and criminality based on individuals simply trying to fulfill their basic needs. With a population this large, one challenge is attempting to keep them at peace with each other while the basic needs of shelter, water and food are addressed by the peacekeeping force. If too many of the limited resources are put into law enforcement and security, then the effort to provide for basic needs will move too slowly, causing the security situation to potentially get out of hand due to a restless and suffering population. Yet, if the law enforcement function is under-resourced in order to speed up the humanitarian effort, then the

likelihood of opportunistic criminality will spike dramatically in a “survival of the fittest” environment.

Options for reducing violence:

One “ground level” challenge is attempting to reduce violence in an operating environment. As a military police company commander in Iraq in 2003, my company was charged with supply route patrols. One of our tasks was to enforce the weapons ban placed on the Iraqi population. While we confiscated many AK-47s and other weapons, the Iraqi populace that we were now charged with protecting frequently reminded us that we were removing from them their basic ability to protect themselves in their homes. Opportunistic crime was still rampant at this point in the war. While we were carrying out orders to remove weapons from the battlefield, we may have also been creating a situation where many Iraqi civilians could no longer defend themselves against the many criminal elements still roaming the country. This likely created a significant anti-American sentiment that would continue to challenge the coalition in the coming years of the war. The point is that if the peacekeeping forces are not available on the ground to provide the security the population requires, then creative approaches that include utilizing indigenous police and military forces in a partnering approach must be considered. This was a big problem in Iraq, however, because the previous indigenous forces were all disbanded, leaving U.S. forces, like my company, having to start from scratch training Iraqi police units – using individuals with no experience and little capability to provide for their own security.

In addition to providing for basic security, other means for reducing violence must include ensuring an equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance resources such as food, water, medical support, power generation, and shelter requirements. This encourages a sense of fairness throughout the population. This was also an issue in southern Iraq in 2003 (where I was initially located), because the population in southern Iraq was watching hundreds of convoys passing through their region on their way to Baghdad while the southern population was left with far less in support and assistance. This was a significant issue – the “Baghdad first” approach that was taken.

Recommendation.

Some suggestions for post-hostility security, reducing violence, and stabilizing a society:

1. Think through the long term ramifications of completely disbanding established security force capability (e.g., De-Baathification in Iraq) before taking such a radical step. Are rank and file officers really part of the displaced regime? Can they be "salvaged" and re-trained under a new rule of law philosophy?

2. Plan thoroughly for "Phase IV" operations and plan accordingly for suitable and sufficient resources capable of securing the entire population and holding terrain until such time that a logical and responsible transition to a new government can take place.

3. If there is neither the will nor the resources to execute a successful Phase IV campaign, then strongly recommend modification to the desired end-state and objectives of the "Hostilities" phase of the campaign. It seems that as a general rule of thumb, if the desired end-state is something that resembles regime change, then you need to plan for a fully resourced, comprehensive "Post-Hostilities" phase that includes a COIN capability should the situation develop into an insurgency.

Implications.

Remembering lessons learned from an under-resourced post-conflict campaign during OIF, the following implications are possible:

- Significant challenges re-establishing rule of law institutions.
- Fueling support for an insurgency due to an inability to provide for the basic security needs of the indigenous population.
- Related challenges to establishing economic and political institutions necessary to address the basic needs of the society.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on personal experience as a company commander in theater during Operation Iraqi Freedom I and II and insights gained during the PKSOI Elective Course PS2219 taken at the United States Army War College.

Lesson Author: COL Timothy Connelly.

Critical Analysis from PKSOI Security Sector SME (717-245-4304):

COL Connelly identifies a key misapplication of the DDR programs (Disarm, Demobilize, and Reintegration of former combatants into society) in Iraq. Foremost, DDR should not disarm the populace because it injures the inalienable right of self-defence. This created a security vacuum which criminal and militant groups exploited. The predictable inability to establish professional police forces quickly exacerbated this condition. Second, the wholesale dismissal of the Iraqi army vitiated the chance to process soldiers through the DDR programs in a constructive manner. Accordingly, dismissed without honor and cast out without hope for the future, a vast portion of former soldiers and policemen engaged in insurgent and criminal enterprises. Lastly, the blanket and immediate application

of De-Baathification of Iraqi society was based on a flawed understanding of de-Nazification of German society. While de-Nazification was official policy in accordance with JCS 1067 for occupied Germany, the Allied military government deemed it unworkable as a blanket policy (except for the upper tier Nazi officials) and relegated the issue to the German authorities. Knowledge of this history should have guided U.S. policy in Iraq.

2.b. TOPIC. The Criticality of Security Force Institution Building (Lesson # 1707)

Observation.

Recent U.S. operations in Iraq and continuing operations in Afghanistan highlight the importance of building effective host nation security forces in post-conflict stabilization efforts. In both situations, the U.S. and its coalition partners failed to focus initial efforts on building strong and capable security forces. When efforts did eventually shift to host nation security forces capable of accepting responsibility for sovereign security, much of this effort was focused on tactical capability, rather than ministerial effectiveness. However, as the recent collapse of Iraqi Security Forces against invasion by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in June 2014 demonstrated, institutional shortfalls such as lack of professionalism, poor training, and inability to provide effective logistics can rapidly degrade previous advances in tactical effectiveness. Building effective security force institutions requires commitment of significant time and effort and is in many ways more challenging than building tactical effectiveness. Despite being a difficult task, developing ministerial / institutional effectiveness is an absolutely critical requirement for post-conflict stabilization and should be a major concern from the very beginning for future efforts in building partner security forces.

Discussion.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the majority of security operations were performed by Coalition forces, while the development of small host nation security forces was a relatively secondary effort. Eventually, as withdrawal timelines were developed, the Coalition rapidly increased efforts to develop effective host nation forces and this became first a significant and then the number one Coalition priority. Despite the Coalition realization that strong and capable host nation security forces would be required for effective transition, the majority of effort was focused initially on building tactical capability so that host nation forces could serve as adjuncts for Coalition security efforts. Even the composition of forces favored “tooth” rather than tail. We realized that Iraqi and Afghan forces would eventually have to sustain themselves, but a focus on near-term security priorities rather than long-term capacity building led to development of combat formations heavily enabled by Coalition sustainment efforts.

As the tactical security situations in each theater began to improve under the weight of Coalition troop surges and major expansions of host nation combat forces, effort was shifted to the development of logistics and overall security ministry effectiveness. In both situations, however, Coalition forces found that developing the myriad logistics functions required to sustain an effective fighting force was extremely challenging due to extensive corruption, overly centralized management, and low education levels. Additionally, the ministries of Defense and Interior in both Afghanistan and Iraq were riven by sectarian and ethnic rivalries, extreme corruption, as well as a lack of competence in the bureaucratic skills required to run large organizations.

However, though the U.S. and Coalition partners were eventually able to focus large numbers of competent advisory teams to develop tactical competencies at the brigade level and below, applying this same comprehensive “blanket” approach to the operational and ministerial level was much more difficult. Ministerial and senior staff advisory positions require senior field grade/civilian equivalent and above personnel specifically trained in both the requirements of advising at this level as well as the culture of the host nation. Personnel have to be prepared to address and overcome challenges such as corruption and sectarianism and must be competent in the skill set required to improve the capacities of [often senior] personnel in host nation bureaucracies. While tactical level tasks could be allocated relatively easily to specific units or Coalition nations, the closer to the “top of the pyramid” at the institutional level, the more difficult this became. Advising at this level requires a unity of effort among interagency and Coalition partners that was difficult to achieve and sustain in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Competing viewpoints, interagency rivalries, and often a hesitancy or inability to provide adequate numbers of trained and competent advisors hamstrung the Coalition.

Recommendation.

Security institution building and the development of ministerial/organizational effectiveness in partner security forces needs to be a critical aspect of all future U.S. COIN and stabilization operations right from the start. Overcoming challenges such as corruption and sectarianism and developing an effective bureaucracy that works for the particular needs of the host nation is a complicated and long process. It requires the extensive commitment of senior military and civilian personnel and a unity of effort and purpose across the interagency and Coalition effort. While this is a difficult effort, it is not impossible. Though Coalition efforts to accomplish ministerial efforts were late in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the relevant experience is now present and lessons learned are readily available. It is critical that we collect these lessons learned and properly organize ourselves for the future so that we do not repeat these mistakes and fail to address this critical requirement from the outset of our next post-conflict stabilization endeavor.

Implications.

Reforming and developing institutional capacity at the ministry and organizational level is a long and painstaking process. It requires the integration of our western doctrine with an understanding of the particular culture, history, and dynamics of the particular host nation. These solutions cannot be rapidly instituted and need long-running partner advisory efforts to accomplish. Failing to implement reforms at the institutional level will maintain many of the root causes (corruption, sectarianism, etc.) which led to instability in the first place and doom any improvements at the tactical or operational level to eventual failure. Without addressing the structural deficiencies systemic to the overall organization, these shortcomings will slowly eat away at any gains that were previously made. The tactical/operational level may be simpler and attractive to our militaries, but the more difficult institutional issues must still be tackled if we hope to achieve lasting transformation.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the personal experience of the author over five years as an intelligence leader at USCENTCOM, MNF-I, and ISAF tasked with assessing challenges to the development of effective capacity in the Iraqi Security Forces and Afghan National Security Forces. It was further refined by coursework, research, and interviews examining Security Sector Reform during a year of study at the U.S. Army War College.

Lesson Author: COL Jerad Harper.

Critical Analysis from PKSOI Security Sector SME (717-245-4304):

COL Harper makes several insightful points. Regarding Afghanistan, some points require further edification. No counterinsurgency strategy existed before 2009, at least in the sense that a strategy was considered. In its place, the coalition attempted to implement security sector reform, but most of this reform was haphazard or not implemented effectively. While the coalition did provide MOD ministerial advisors as early as 2003, these were ad hoc assignments from the pool of available officers at headquarters. Some advisors performed well, others failed completely; however, none was trained for the assignment. In 2010, OSD began the MODA (MOD/MOI advisor) program, which was designed to provide better trained ministerial advisors in a consistent manner. The MODA program continues today and is expanding to other countries as a result of its effectiveness. Regarding the uneven training of the Afghan security forces: While the coalition began training the Afghan National Army (ANA) in 2003, with a gradual expansion of a balanced force, the coalition abandoned this training effort in 2009 due to the “surge.” Abandoning the earlier design of training combat support and combat service support battalions commensurate with maneuver battalions, the coalition focused on churning out infantry battalions and accepted responsibility for the maintenance and supply of the ANA. Disturbingly,

the ANA contributed only token forces to the surge, compelling the coalition to shoulder the burden of the fight. Worse, the coalition expanded the ANA (over 180,000) far above the Afghan's ability to maintain and supply without coalition subsidies. In aggregate, this has severely undermined the transition of responsibility to the Afghan government.

The training of the Afghan National Police did not really begin until 2006, but establishment of local police units did not begin until 2009 (except for the ill-conceived auxiliary police program from 2006 to 2008). While the Afghan police have vastly improved of late, a security vacuum existed at the local communities for years. In fact, the coalition was unaware of the growth of insurgent forces in RC South until mid-2006 because no police were available to alert the authorities of a growing problem. The strategic lesson here is that stabilization efforts in a post-conflict period must focus immediate attention to the establishment of police forces from the local to the national level. Coalition authorities should devote relatively fewer resources to an army as long as coalition forces are available for national defense.

2.c. TOPIC. Defining, or Re-Defining the Role of Strategic Intelligence during Stability Operations ([Lesson # 753](#))

Observation

As Peace and Stability Operations (P/SO) continue to grow in importance and dominate defense policy, activity and the interests of the major leading nations, the concept of "strategic intelligence" existing only to support national level policy makers "within the beltway" no longer reflects the role of strategic intelligence in peace and stability operations. For the United States, "within the beltway" refers to the key political centers that are found primarily in the national capital – Washington, D.C.; for other nations a similar 'national capital' region can be implicated for this observation.

Discussion

In reviewing the terminology, readers need to understand the existing differentiation between Tactical – Operational – and Strategic intelligence.

- **Tactical:** most Army/military intelligence operations take place at the tactical level; training programs and doctrine are written for or support operations at the Corps level and below; intelligence efforts focus on gaining information about the Threat – a specified, identifiable enemy; direct, kinetic operations.
- **Operational:** supports Corps level and up to Service Component Command / Joint Task Force / Geographical Component Command level

requirements; informs development of “campaigns”; looks beyond a Threat consisting of just land forces, just military forces and capabilities; starts incorporating PMESII factors – and other socio-cultural/political, regional factors – as part of the Threat structure / organization / capabilities.

- **Strategic:** supporting national level policy-maker decisions (for USA, “inside the beltway”); high end political, intelligence - includes economical, geo-political assessments leading to one nation’s / nation-state’s policy towards another nation / nation-state.

NOTE: Experience over last 10-12 years has shown continual blurring of lines between Tactical-Operation-Strategic (T-O-S) operations and intelligence requirements.

MG Flynn’s recent article [see **Comments** below] uses the terms “red” vs. “white” intelligence.

- “red” intelligence > focus is on the enemy, the Threat; forces, units, capabilities; kinetic actions/capabilities (“meanies” and bad guys) and predominantly military-related factors
- “white” intelligence > focus is on socio-political factors; non-traditional bad guys; generally non-kinetic in nature; when kinetic factors are involved, effects may be within realm of WMD – weapons of mass destruction; terrorist/ terrorism issues, policy and concerns.

With the resurgence of P/SO as a primary/priority focus for the Common Operational Environment, there has been a blurring of lines also between T-O-S operations. Although the impact of “white” intelligence has much greater probability to result in “disaster” situations, our militaries, still continue to over-emphasize the need for “red” intelligence and, therefore, the commitment of precious national resources. Consider, the “how to” for “white” intelligence is not currently built into either Doctrine or Force Structure. Given an analyst assigned to be an “occupation intelligence analyst,” there is no methodology for transitioning intelligence products from MCO (major combat operations) to P/SO. By using the Joint Tactical Collection and Analysis list we have shown some proficiency at the Strategic/macro level; looking at major political players; looking at the macro level. Again, no training plans/doctrine in place that addresses an intelligence distillation process that takes Strategic Intelligence down to the Tactical Intelligence level – produces useable, tactical level products.

Growing realization that strategic level intelligence is not just for use “within the beltway” – it has a much broader audience and use – e.g., Corps, MND, all the way down to BCT. These products that address “white” issues provide a launch point from which Stability Operations planning and execution can be based.

Another issue or area that needs some focus is the need to work outside the classified arena. There is a tremendous amount of information out there that is available in “open source” media – current news/press, academic study and research – that is much better than the military components products. In particular, academic products are generally more long term in perspective and provide much broader coverage; can get to the background information that exists “below the surface”; that helps make situations more understandable.

The Flynn article encourages embracing “open source” as a “primary source” of intelligence. Unfortunately, the level of use of social media is restricted by “literacy” – i.e. social media – radio, newspapers, etc. are in the native language; the quality of the technology is also questionable especially as to reliable, on demand availability in remote areas – the Internet is NOT ubiquitous!! Consider another impact of “valley-ism” – the presence of unique dialects leads you to ask, “What is really being said?” “What is really being heard?”

At the village level, the village shaman provides the oral history of his village; within his valley. Information exists within the shaman and is shared at ‘Friday sermons’ or other opportunities for the shaman to present information orally. The shaman may or might not ‘embellish’ this history; especially information about anything or anyone that may enhance or provide prestige to the village or a key village personality.

In Afghanistan the challenge is huge; goes beyond provincial/regional information requirements; need to ‘get dirty’ and go down to village level; address tribal, clan, even family level concerns. No formal model exists to help. Given that no formal model exists, the term “valleyism” perhaps provides a model – the political, economic, and cultural drivers applied within this model (“valley-ism”) provide insights as to what we need to understand to be able to operate effectively and successfully.

Recommendation

Sustain:

- Development and distribution of strategic intelligence products – products that address “white” issues; realization that these products are not just for use “within the beltway.”
- Working outside the classified arena; there is much good “open source” / unclassified information – often much better than .military products; consider current press, private sector and academia – longer term focus, broader coverage, disciplined research and analysis products.
- Sharing information, “intel” within and among ‘established’ coalition nations – e.g. the ABCA nations (America, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand); NATO. This becomes more problematic with ad hoc or “plug-and-play” coalitions – often lacking current MOA for info sharing.

- Sharing with or within the UN also presents unusual/unique challenges – the United Nations in general does not like term “intelligence”; rather to use “information” – e.g., UN forces conduct Information Operations vs. Intelligence Operations.
- Language and cultural awareness training – consider, for the future of P/SO in general, learning a “Big 8” – English, French, German, Russian, Arabic, Spanish, Chinese and Japanese – from a regional wish list; will have to assume risk for sub-dialects; invest in long-term language training, up to 48 weeks or more (recall the CORDS language/culture effort/prep for Viet Nam crisis).
- Establish country-based intelligence centers within CONUS – e.g., Joint Intelligence Center – Iraq/JIC-Iraq; individuals assigned for 3-5 years – e.g., assigned to Anbar Political Analysis Team as Intelligence Analyst; in and out of host nation for rotations of 6-8 months in duration; CONUS-based element provides reach back support for deployed individuals.
- Continue to develop a sense of national level identity; awareness of national level political structure, national level issues and how to get “village” issues recognized within this system.

Implications

Within the JICs, develop individuals with great depth of knowledge of the country (language, culture, etc.); spanning more of the regional issues/concerns; focus less on politics or national level policies, but deeper understanding of the “real” issues by focusing on regional, district, village level concerns – e.g., water rights on a river that not only forms the international boundary between two nations, but also exists as the only source of water for drinking (humans, animals); irrigation (crops/livelihood); bathing/hygiene for the village, district, province.

Need to stop using the “pick-up team” approach – institutionalize the Stability Operations Information Center (SOIC) and/or the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) concepts – employ a home-based element in U.S.; deploy forward elements within the country in question.

Due to nature of the culture, much “political narrative” originates or is disseminated from the “pulpit”; this is often the only source of strategic/national level information for the general populace – although it may be “provincial” in content at best.

Some additional thoughts on language training:

- P/SO tend to be long-term in nature; language training should be considered a long-term commitment.

- Language proficiency allows you to use “impromptu” intel/information – i.e., conversation overheard in the market square, at local sports gathering; individuals as “street smart” linguists.
- “Interpretation” vs. “translation” – is the assigned Interpreter getting you and the local the “truth” – what you want to know; what you need the local to understand.

Comments

The comments here reflect the personal opinions and observations of COL Laughrey and should not be interpreted as any official position of the U.S. Army, the Intelligence Corps, or any other USG agency involved with P/SO.

Additional pertinent info is contained in the article "Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan," by MG Michael T. Flynn (USA), Captain Matt Pottinger (USMC), and Paul D. Batchelor (DIA), Center for a new American Security, 4 January 2010. This article can be found at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/37166462_Governance_Interventions_in_Post-War_Situations_Lessons_Learned ; other related information in – [SOLLIMS Lesson #680](#) (Afghan Stability & Reconstruction Portal).

Recommended Reading: Dawisha, Adeed, “[Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation](#),” Princeton University Press, 2009.

Event Description

Extracted from notes taken during live interview with COL Laughrey by Mr. French, Chief, Lessons Learned Branch, PKSOI, on 18 May 2011.

Lesson Author: Mr. Dan French.

Critical Analysis from PKSOI Security and Intel SME (717-245-3165):

The author makes a number of sound recommendations that have still not been implemented. While the need for deep linguistic and cultural knowledge has been proven, the current force structure still does not allow this level of time in place. Commanders constantly laud the value of civil affairs officers with language and cultural awareness skills, but the budget for such personnel is constantly cut. As a result, a competent French speaker may be pulled to assist in a Spanish-speaking area, simply because the military recognizes “language skill.”

Since the establishment of Human Terrain Teams in the mid-2000s, military intelligence has become more cognizant of the need to understand not only threats, which are the focus of the majority of basic military analytic exercises (i.e., JIPOE and PMESII), but also potential assets or opportunities. The Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICoE) and other MI partners are currently

developing new intelligence preparation of the battlespace methods to recognize this shortfall and to more effectively incorporate key cultural and social factors into descriptive and forecasting products at all levels (T, O and S).

The UN's concern about "intelligence vs. information" is well founded, but as the value of open source information is more commonly recognized, intelligence structures in and among partner nations must emphasize its use as it smooths sharing capability. Sources aside, a consistent shortfall is in the poor training of analysts in the U.S. and its national and multinational partners. The last decade and a half of war has turned military analysis into an immense industry with a tactical single-target focus, creating a dearth of capability at the strategic level to identify critical future threats.

While the internet, per se, may still not be ubiquitous, even in rural areas of the United States, cell phone signals are connecting those at the furthest reaches of the Earth as telephone applications make information sharing so simple it is nearly impossible to sort the wheat from the chaff.

Also lost in the "intelligence vs. information" debacle is the need for more effective traditional information campaigns to ensure that the message of the benefits of stability operations reaches the people they are intended to support and are not so poorly managed that they undermine the mission itself at all three levels.

SECTION 3: ECONOMIC STABILIZATION / DEVELOPMENT

3.a. TOPIC. Interagency Rebuilding Efforts in Rusafa, Iraq (Lesson # [1049](#))

Observation

Interagency reconstruction operations in the Rusafa Political District of Iraq during the 2003-2010 time period produced many tangible benefits for the district's residents; however, these operations suffered from various planning, management, and information-sharing problems – impeding the effective and efficient use of U.S. Government resources.

Discussion

The Rusafa Political District is one of 11 urban political districts of Baghdad. This district contains 10 Government of Iraq ministries, including the Ministry of Defense, and two major universities. With a population of 435,000, Rusafa is about the size of Atlanta, Georgia. Rusafa has several large markets, including the sprawling Shorja Market (Baghdad's largest market), as well as numerous parks and monuments, areas of light industry, warehouses, slums, ethnic

ghettos, dozens of Sunni and Shia mosques, and several Christian churches. Shia Muslims comprise the majority in 40 of the 44 neighborhoods of Rusafa, while Sunni Muslims comprise the majority in the other four neighborhoods.

Four different U.S. Government agencies funded or managed reconstruction projects in Rusafa during the 2003-2010 timeframe: the U.S. Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of State (DoS). The types of projects they conducted and their size, scope, and duration all varied across agencies, across time, and across programs. Also, many of the projects were substantially modified as U.S. priorities evolved.

According to USACE officials, the Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS) was supposed to be the database of record for Iraq reconstruction activities. However, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) found this system to be severely incomplete. SIGIR's research identified 1,303 reconstruction projects in Rusafa, valued at about \$148 million (\$115 million in construction projects, and \$33 million in non-construction projects). The total number of projects (1,303) was judged by SIGIR to be lower than reality, as many other projects were reported by U.S. personnel, but were never entered into IRMS. Furthermore, several project details in the IRMS database were found to be suspect, particularly project completion dates.

Reconstruction projects in Rusafa covered the following sectors:

- Security and Law Enforcement
- Justice, Public Safety, Infrastructure, and Civil Society
- Electricity
- Roads, Bridges, and Construction
- Education, Refugees, Human Rights, and Governance
- Healthcare
- Private Sector Development
- Water Resources and Sanitation
- Oil Infrastructure

Although certain projects were never completed and certain other projects were not sustained following their transfer to Iraqi authorities, the \$115 million in construction projects did result in a number of significant benefits for the citizens of Rusafa and for the Government of Iraq. Those benefits included: a police and fire infrastructure system; the renovation of four government ministries; improvements to the Baghdad Post Office; a new water treatment plant; and, the repair of sports fields, a major city park, municipal gardens, and dozens of schools. The \$33 million in non-construction projects also yielded notable benefits for Rusafa's residents, such as: grants that helped start or expand businesses, projects that enabled market areas to be maintained/cleaned, and security measures (such as guard forces and fortifications) that improved the

level of security/safety at numerous shopping areas. The Government of Iraq and local/district government offices additionally benefited from the receipt of computers, equipment, and furniture.

Perceptions of ineffective projects varied. By and large, the following types of projects were viewed as not having produced significant effects/benefits:

- School construction – Numerous schools were built, but teachers were unavailable to staff them.
- School refurbishments – Many of these projects failed to gain Iraqi buy-in; they were often rejected by the Iraqi Ministry of Education for poor quality of work or due to political reasons.
- Trash pick-up – These projects and contracts frequently resulted in corruption and wasted resources.

Overall, the Rusafa reconstruction effort suffered from the same "stove-piping" that U.S. officials faced while implementing reconstruction activities across the rest of the country – i.e., a lack of coordination / information-sharing between U.S. Government agencies. Poor coordination between agencies – especially during the early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom – led to the duplication of effort and a waste of resources. USAID was repeatedly noted as starting projects that mirrored ones already implemented by the Army. The Army's use of micro-grants, in turn, often conflicted with USAID's micro-loan programs. On a positive note, one effort that proved to be exceptional for improving coordination and reducing duplication of effort was the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) initiative.

Besides "stove-piping," other significant impediments to successful reconstruct-reconstruction activities in Rusafa were the following: the failure to establish quantifiable metrics to evaluate success, lack of continuity caused by personnel rotations, lack of capacity within agencies/units to monitor multiple projects, pressures to spend as much as possible as fast as possible on reconstruction projects, heavy administrative requirements with regard to use of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), poor security conditions that impeded oversight, and lack of coordination with Iraqi officials on project selection and sustainment planning.

Recommendation.

1. Agencies performing reconstruction and stabilization missions should properly identify local needs, secure local government support, ensure continuity of execution, and administer meaningful oversight.
2. Agencies should establish effective information management systems in support of reconstruction and stabilization operations – capturing data on all reconstruction projects and facilitating information-sharing.

3. The U.S. Government should continue use of the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) initiative during future reconstruction and stabilization operations.
4. Avoid using the "speed of spending" as a metric for progress during future reconstruction and stabilization operations.
5. The Department of Defense should judiciously relax the regulations governing the use of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) for small-scale, rapid-response projects.
6. Ensure that the host nation/local community is involved in project selection and sustainment planning.
7. Stabilization and reconstruction projects should only be undertaken if a unit or agency has the capacity to monitor and measure them.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on "[Interagency Rebuilding Efforts in Iraq: A Case Study of the Rusafa Political District](#)," SIGIR Special Report Number 3, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 26 February 2013.

Other References.

- SOLLIMS Lesson #1036, "[Final Report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction](#)." Lesson provides an overall assessment of the reconstruction program in Iraq, along with seven overarching recommendations.
- SOLLIMS Lesson #685, "[The Balancing Act of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and the Need to Involve Local Groups](#)." Lesson discusses cases of local community involvement in reconstruction efforts in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Lesson Author: Mr. David Mosinski.

Critical Analysis from PKSOI Sustainable Economy sector SME (717-245-3289):

The outstanding entry above appropriately highlights the guiding principles that should be implemented to increase the effectiveness and cross-sector collaborative impact of reconstruction projects in a post-conflict or fragile state. One area mentioned that is particularly worthy of further examination is the ePRT concept. Excellent sources on ePRTs include:

- [John K. Naland, Lessons from Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, US Institute of Peace Special Report 290, October 2011](#)
- [GAO Report, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, GAO-08-905RSU \(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008\).](#)

For those interested in learning more about and contributing to the development of approaches to enhance interagency collaboration, PKSOI invites readers to participate in the newly established Interagency Peace and Stability Operations Leader Development Program and related Community of Interest discussions. To gain access to this Program and related Blackboard site, please contact Prof. Rick Coplen at PKSOI: richard.c.coplen2.civ@mail.mil

3.b. TOPIC. Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches to Economic Development (Lesson # [1763](#))

Observations.

Developing a sustainable economy is one of the key end states within the United States Institute of Peace/U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (USIP/PKSOI) strategic framework for stabilization and reconstruction. One of the key questions that may arise when considering solutions to economic development issues involves whether it is better to address the problem from the national to local level or from the local to national level (i.e., a top-down or bottom-up approach). Unfortunately, there is no clear-cut answer to this question. So, how do you address economic development issues in a post-conflict environment to achieve a sustainable economy, and is a top-down or bottom-up approach better suited to achieve the end state?

Discussion.

To begin the process of determining the optimal method for economic development, conducting an accurate assessment of the overall economic health of the country is essential. Identifying the root cause or causes underlying the lack of economic development will assist with developing appropriate solutions. Are the institutions involved with the country's economy state-based or free market? Are they centrally controlled, privatized, or a combination of both? What are the formal and informal economic systems in place, and what systems evolved as a result of the conflict? Who are the key stakeholders (government, private, international, regional, etc.)? These questions, and many more, will assist those involved with the economic development recovery efforts to determine the optimal method for assistance.

Once the root causes are known and conditions are such that economic development recovery efforts can commence (i.e., a peace treaty that is agreed to by all parties is in effect), economic development recovery efforts can commence. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Post-Conflict Economic Growth Program Emphases model is a good framework to assist with determining top-down or bottom-up approaches for economic recovery. The framework includes four key areas, which are: (1) to provide humanitarian assistance and expanded physical security; (2) to provide jobs, policy, and local reforms; (3) to reconstruct infrastructure and provide public health services; and, (4) to build institutional capacity. These four key areas represent a fundamental shift from past economic development practices. Past practices tended to focus on a sequential method, which involved addressing basic human needs first, then addressing economic development at a later point. The USAID model demonstrates the utility of addressing four inter-related areas simultaneously vs. sequentially, in which economic development efforts should begin immediately.

Two examples, one from Iraq and one from the Swat Valley in Pakistan, demonstrate challenges and considerations associated with developing top-down and bottom-up approaches to economic development. In Iraq, the centralized structure of the various ministries led the Coalition Provisional Authority to develop a top-down approach to economic development. While in theory it was logical to adopt this approach, the practical application proved to be troublesome. The purging of Ba'ath party officials, lack of understanding of organizational processes, synchronization with other ministries, and the needs of the people throughout the country led to significant delays in the delivery of basic services. As an example, due to the severely degraded conditions of Iraq's electrical infrastructure, the power grid proved insufficient to support economic development initiatives in the short term. Additionally, from the bottom up, local economic development initiatives (such as attempting to privatize certain industries) met with resistance from those continuing to operate using the centralized ministry approach.

In the Swat Valley, Pakistan, the Swat Relief Initiative (SRI) was created in an effort to deliver aid to the people of the Swat Valley in Pakistan. Since its founding, SRI has evolved from serving as an aid organization to one that builds local capacity through sustainable initiative programs. The organization's current programs build local capacity through five specific areas: social mobilization, health, education, economic development, and sustainable environment. The program's scope of assistance is interesting from the standpoint that it focuses on specific local initiatives and does not focus on the broader region. In other words, it represents a bottom-up, targeted approach instead of a wide-ranging top-down approach to capacity building. Given the geography, levels of program funding, and cultural considerations, the bottom-up approach is appropriate for this area.

Recommendation.

Top-down and bottom-up economic development approaches have their relative advantages and disadvantages based upon the conditions under which they are enacted. The answer to the question of which approach to use depends upon an accurate assessment and thorough understanding of the root causes of economic development problems and whether or not sufficient conditions exist for development to proceed. The USAID Post-Conflict Economic Growth Program Emphases model can serve as the foundation for implementing top-down, bottom-up, or an appropriate combination of the two methods based upon the desired end state. Most importantly, the economic development initiatives should spawn from the host nation itself, with assistance and advice from outside agencies and organizations as appropriate. Outside agencies and organizations should collaborate to maximize their capabilities to assist the host nation.

Implications.

Both top-down and bottom-up approaches can be more effective if they successfully facilitate consensus amongst the many governmental and non-governmental organizations operating in the host country. While collaborative efforts among a variety of stakeholders with differing goals and objectives may prove problematic from a U.S. perspective, the host nation, assuming it has the capacity to do so, should serve as the initiator and coordinator for the economic development efforts. Assuming that the host nation government has the capacity to serve as the overall coordinator for economic development initiatives, having all stakeholders utilize a common framework to assess the problem and implementing economic development initiatives that at least do not contradict one another would be ideal. Ultimately, it is the host nation government which must serve as the honest broker, as the host nation government and its people are the ones to sustain, and benefit from, the top-down, bottom-up, or combined approach to economic development.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on readings and discussions of economic development approaches in U.S. Army War College elective course PS2208, Economic and

Infrastructure Development.

Lesson Author: COL Michael Magliocco.

Critical Analysis from PKSOI Sustainable Economy sector SME (717-245-3289):

The excellent entry above raises viable questions and offers useful examples examining the effectiveness of solution strategies pursued in Iraq and Pakistan.

Particularly useful is the observation that economic stabilization and infrastructure development activities can and should be simultaneous, vice sequential.

One area warranting further discussion is the author's assertion in the final sentence of a "combined approach to economic development." A strong case can be made that post-conflict or fragile states should facilitate economic stabilization and infrastructure development by pursuing a top-down AND bottom-up strategy simultaneously. For example, top-down national level policy tools include monetary and fiscal policies designed to enhance macroeconomic stabilization and promote a sustainable market economy. National level policy tools focused on improving macroeconomic stabilization, especially inflation reduction and currency stability, can include control of interest rates, money supply, bank reserve requirements, and exchange rate policy.

National level policy tools focused on promoting a sustainable market economy include fiscal policy tools such as government spending and taxation policy. For example, the national government can spend money to rebuild public infrastructure (roads, bridges, ports, telecommunications and electrical networks, etc.) and human capital development systems (schools, vocational training centers, healthcare facilities, etc.). Additionally, the host nation government should also dedicate significant resources to providing the security needed to support sustainable economic development.

Meanwhile, bottom-up solution strategies conducted in parallel with the top-down national strategies are also advisable. The author provides an excellent example of the human capacity building techniques of the Swat Relief Initiative (SRI) in Pakistan. Additional insights from the SRI can be accessed at <http://swatreliefinitiative.org>.

SECTION 4: INFRASTRUCTURE / RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES

4.a. TOPIC. Addressing the Basic Sanitation Needs of the Host Nation during Stability Operations (Lesson # 1308)

Observations.

USAID's implementation of Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) in Afghanistan over the 2009-2012 timeframe, combined with education/training programs and a comprehensive approach, achieved notable success – more so than various other USG-led programs – offering a useful framework for future stability operations.

Discussion.

USAID, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the State Department have all been involved in sanitation projects in Afghanistan – some in conjunction with each other, and most in conjunction with the Afghan government and communities. However, many of these sanitation projects failed to achieve meaningful results – particularly those that were initiated by military units on short deployment cycles, because projects often focused on short-term gains, rather than long-term results/sustainability.

Many of these short-term projects were funded by the DoD-run [Commander's Emergency Response Program \(CERP\)](#). During the 2006-2011 timeframe, CERP funded over 1,350 water, sanitation and hygiene projects in Afghanistan. In 2010-11 alone, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and local commanders using CERP implemented 187 water, sanitation, and hygiene projects, spending over \$12.5 million. Despite such investment, 75% of the Afghan population was still drinking contaminated water on a daily basis, and many Afghans were still practicing open defecation. Rural Afghans particularly were ignorant of the fact that sanitation-related diseases – from unclean water, open defecation, and the lack of hand-washing and basic sanitation practices – were the primary cause of Afghanistan's high child mortality rate.

USAID was able to achieve notable success, however, through combined programs that ran from late 2009 through 2012. USAID's [Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation \(SWSS\) program](#) had at first focused heavily on "hardware" approaches (technological solutions) and suffered from a lack of coordination with the DoD and State Department, which were working similar efforts/projects. Progress was gradually made through a greater emphasis on "software" approaches – aimed at changing the attitudes of local communities/inhabitants toward sanitation and better hygiene – and greater cooperation with DoD and State Department stakeholders. USAID incorporated [Community-Led Total Sanitation \(CLTS\)](#), established family health advocacy groups, and expanded hygiene education programs and training/instruction on the maintenance of water pumps and latrines. Through involving various NGOs and community workers, USAID was able to "trigger" (i.e., introduce) CLTS into 1,031 communities across six Afghan provinces – resulting in 611 communities no longer practicing open defecation, improvements to 42,129 latrine facilities, and an estimated 574,091 beneficiaries of hygiene education programs.

Generally speaking, USAID does not have the capability, however, to operate alone in unsecure and hostile environments, meaning that the military is often first involved in helping host nation communities address sanitation problems/issues – as was the case in Afghanistan for several years. However, the military should not be expected to provide an advanced level of sanitation technology/service, due to its focus on security and other missions. When the military is involved in initial provision of basic sanitation services, the initial steps of CLTS

could be helpful: increase sanitation awareness among locals, and facilitate the establishment of basic sanitation infrastructure. The following Sudanese Refugee case study [one of 25 case studies offered in reference 1, under “Other References” paragraph below] discusses a situation in which a low-tech CLTS approach was used (by an NGO) to improve basic sanitation infrastructure for a local population group/refugee community:

Sudanese Refugee Case Study. This case study involved the construction of household pit latrines at the Farchana camp for Sudanese refugees in Chad. Secours Catholique Développement (SECADEV), a Chadian NGO, needed a long-term solution for fecal management that would be sustainable and applicable to the unique conditions found in the camp. The Farchana camp, home to 5,560 refugee families, is located in the deserts of eastern Chad. This environment, coupled with the unknown future timeframe for the camp’s existence, presented significant challenges that had to be overcome. SECADEV, following the recommendation of another NGO, created single family pit latrines that consisted of two pits. Only one of the pits is used at a time. When the first pit is full, it is covered to minimize the contact with raw sewage, while allowing for limited treatment to take place. This system, without emptying the pits, is expected to be functional for four to six years. If the pits are periodically emptied, the system has the potential to last for an even greater duration. At an estimated cost of €495 (\$670), it represents a small-scale sanitation project that can be executed by military units.

Recommendation.

1. For host nation communities with basic sanitation requirements/issues during stability operations, USAID should continue utilizing Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS), family health advocacy groups, hygiene education courses, and training programs on the maintenance of water pumps/latrines. USAID should also continue to emphasize a comprehensive approach to sanitation projects – integrating the efforts of other USG stakeholders and NGO partners, working hand-in-hand with the host nation government and communities.
2. The CLTS approach for basic sanitation should be considered for use by U.S. military units during stability operations in cases/areas where USAID is not yet involved. Raising sanitation awareness among local inhabitants and helping them establish basic sanitation infrastructure will help set the stage for greater development efforts. As the security situation improves, USAID can further team with the host nation and work more advanced efforts/projects. U.S military leaders and field sanitation teams should receive pre-deployment training/ education on the CLTS approach.

Implications.

If USAID and DoD do not make use of the CLTS approach during future stability operations, then meaningful, long-term results in sanitation will be difficult to achieve. Significant resources could be wasted, and lives lost through sanitation-related disease. Training, education, and community involvement will be key to making progress/gaining success.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the article "Providing Basic Sanitation," by Adam Brady, Andrew Pfluger, and Jeffrey Starke, Small Wars Journal, 12 November 2013. This article is available at: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/providing-basic-sanitation>. It is made available per the Creative Commons License: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0>

Other References.

1. "Household pit latrines with urine diversion - Farchana refugee camp," by Julie Patinet, in [Sustainable Sanitation Alliance, Compilation of 25 case studies on sustainable Case study of sustainable sanitation projects from Africa](#), Sustainable Sanitation Alliance, September 2012.
2. Afghan Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation (ASWSS), USAID: <http://www.usaid.gov/node/51411>
3. Water Sanitation and Hygiene: Community-Led Total Sanitation and Hygiene Education Project; Funded by USAID, Bakhtar Development Network (BDN): http://www.bdn.org.af/?page_id=44
4. IRC [International Water and Sanitation Center] – Community-Led Total Sanitation: <http://www.ircwash.org/tags/community-led-total-sanitation>
5. Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), Center for Nation Construction and Capacity Development, United States Military Academy: <http://www.usma.edu/cnrcd/sitepages/CERP.aspx>

Lesson Author: Mr. David Mosinski.

Critical Analysis from PKSOI Infrastructure SME (717-245-4090):

Comments: This lesson is acceptable, suitable, and feasible according to DoD doctrine, unit training, and current practices.

- This Lesson Learned topic points out a useful and simple framework to help mitigate unsanitary practices and conditions that are found in many indigenous populations during the conduct of Stability Operations.

- The lesson describes some observed USAID best practices, that also happen to be DoD doctrine and techniques for basic Field Sanitation and Waste Management.
- In preparation and training for potential deployments, deployable military units routinely instruct their unit personnel on this Field Sanitation doctrine. Unit commanders and leaders enforce and supervise unit compliance. Therefore, the units should already be proficient and prepared to conduct this training and instruction, as well as to construct or help supervise the construction on the described rudimentary Field Sanitation and Waste Management facilities.
- The former U.S. Army Field Manual 21-10 *FIELD HYGIENE AND SANITATION*, now listed as TC 4-02.3 (May 2015), with the same name, lists similar best practices for hand-washing and use of sanitary techniques at pages 2-3 and 2-4 for keeping personnel healthy in “field” or deployed conditions (similar to many third world country in-situ environments).
- The U.S. Army Technical Manual 3-34.56 *WASTE MANAGEMENT FOR DEPLOYED FORCES* (July 2013) depicts a similar latrine style method of managing fecal matter at page 4-20.

4.b. TOPIC. Providing Water in Post-Conflict Kosovo (Lesson # [696](#))

Observations.

During post-conflict stability operations, it is imperative to rapidly restore the population's access to basic water and sanitation services. Although donors are often forthcoming with generous reconstruction packages for such basic services, local institutions are usually ill equipped to receive, handle, and manage those efforts. The traditional course of action involving monetary and technical assistance for restoring water services has generally proven to be a marginal fix. However, in post-conflict Kosovo, the tremendous success that was achieved through a 3-year management contract in the Gjakove-Rahovec area suggests that contracting a professional company to do the work can be a very promising approach for meeting post-conflict water service requirements and sustainability. To effectively address conflict, a whole-of-government approach is critical. However, achieving unified action between U.S. Government agencies can be challenging.

Discussion.

The conflict in Kosovo in the late 1990s left municipal water services in a critical situation. One of the most severely damaged areas included the towns of Gjakove and Rahovec, along with their 56 surrounding villages – a total population of about 200,000. The water infrastructure for this area was in bad shape, and most employees who had managed/maintained the various water facilities had departed. At the end of the year 2000, water supply interruptions were continuous, water leakages were countless, and water quality was poor. Water losses were twice as high in 2000 compared to pre-conflict. Most water meters had been broken or stolen.

Rather than use the traditional course of action for post-conflict water reconstruction, involving money and technical assistance/experts, to restore basic services through emergency repairs, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) took a different approach. The primary logic was that short-term, outside technical experts have no stake in the ultimate success or failure of the Host Nation's water reconstruction program. Additionally, UNMIK recognized that something much greater had to be done in the problematic context of Kosovo. Here a whole new water utility had to be built, including organizing a new public utility company staff, implementing proper operating procedures, and establishing a customer database. Also, the political environment in Kosovo was uncertain, and governance was weak. In light of these conditions, UNMIK decided that contracting a professional company to restore water services, for a significant duration, was the optimum way ahead.

UNMIK therefore developed a performance-based contract, in which the hired professional company would take full control of water operations, maintenance, billing, and collections for the Gjakove-Rahovec area. The contract had two primary objectives: (1) improve services for the customers, and (2) establish a viable Kosovar public utility capable of operating on its own by the end of the contract period. The Kosovar public utility company, in this case, was Hidrodrini Radoniqi (HSR).

In December 2001, UNMIK awarded the contract to a German utility company – Gelsenwasser AG. The contract was for 3 years, with a total cost of \$US 2.1 Million. Besides the awarded contract amount, the hired professional company would also manage/control a supplementary emergency repair investment fund, which had been established through a World Bank grant. With this fund, the professional company could select, contract, and supervise emergent civil works projects.

In 3 years' time, tremendous improvements were made in the provision of water for the Gjakove-Rahovec area, as well as in the operational and financial performance of the HSR/public utility company. Full chlorination of distributed water was achieved in the first few months, and a reliable supply of potable water

was also re-established. The customer database was fully re-built in 2 years. Metered water coverage increased from 10 to 90 percent by the end of the 3rd year. The water utility progressed from an operating loss of about \$250,000 in 2001 to an operating profit of more than \$100,000 in 2004. The staff of the HSR/public utility company received extensive training and gained competency. Management/use of the emergency work fund by the professional company proved to be a good move by UNMIK, as emergent repair and improvement projects were able to be accomplished by Gelsenwasser AG with speed and flexibility.

At the end of the contract, in December 2004, transition from Gelsenwasser AG to HSR was flawless. Since that time, HSR has been successfully operating as a purely public utility. HSR has sustained all of the infrastructure, operational, and financial improvements achieved by Gelsenwasser AG. Metered water coverage has further improved to 94 percent. HSR has become the only Kosovar water utility company to achieve a potability compliance rate of more than 99 percent.

Overall, UNMIK's performance-based management contract proved to be a tremendous success. Also, the associated water service program proved to be sustainable. Of note, the dollar cost of the contract equated to about \$US 3.50 per inhabitant per year.

Recommendation.

1. Recommend that contracting a professional company to reconstruct and operate the water utility in post-conflict environments should be considered as a viable, if not optimal, solution. The contract should be performance-based, with established performance objectives. The contract should be for a significant duration (e.g., 3 years) in order to make a long-term impact. Further, the contracted company should be responsible for mentoring the existing public utility company, ensuring that a successful transition take place toward the end of the contract period. Through these measures, the contacted company would have a firm stake in the ultimate success of the program.
2. Recommend that the professional company be given control/responsibility of an emergency work fund, assuming that such a fund can be provided by the World Bank or another donor. Allocating these additional emergency funds upfront to the professional company, Gelsenwasser AG, afforded it the resources, speed, and flexibility needed to conduct necessary emergent major repairs and improvements, above and beyond what had been projected.
3. Recommend that realistic targets and expectations be set for water service restoration. Comprehensive repairs of the damaged water infrastructure and complete re-establishment of the customer database and associated meters may take years to complete. In this regard, a professional company assigned with this complex mission (overseen by contract managers) – as opposed to an ad

hoc team of outside experts – would be best postured to survey the situation, establish priorities, set realistic expectations, track progress, and partner with, train, and mentor the Host Nation's utility company to do the same.

Implications.

If a professional company is not used to reconstruct/operate/sustain the water utility for a post-conflict region, and if this task is assigned instead to a team of technical experts for a short duration, then the long-term outcome will probably not be as good as the recommended alternative. In the case of the Gjakove-Rahovec area of Kosovo, the infrastructure, operational, and financial improvements made by the professional company and then sustained by the public utility company proved to be far superior than the other/more traditional efforts in the rest of the country.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "Improving Water Services in a Post-conflict Situation," by Philippe Marin, Josses Mugabi, and Manuel Marino, in GRID LINES, a publication of the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, Note No. 52, March 2010. Article at: <http://www.ppiaf.org/ppiaf/allpublications>

Lesson Author: Mr. David Mosinski.

Critical Analysis from PKSOI Infrastructure SME (717-245-4090):

Comments:

- This lesson advocates for three recommendations:
 - o Potentially “optimal” solution of contracting with a, presumably, expert private contractor to conduct and complete water utilities and water service restoration tasks that involve improving and then handing over a “complex”, holistic systems campaign to government control.
 - o Providing an emergency work fund (or control thereof) to the same expert private contractor.
 - o Developing realistic targets and expectations for long term potable water service restoration.

- This lesson is feasible in terms of creating and overseeing a performance-based contract for the repair, maintenance, job training, and project hand-over of a potable water distribution system.
 - o DoD has a plethora of doctrine on the development and supervision of performance-based service contracts, as well as numerous deployable units that specialize in contracting oversight.

- The main feasibility problem is the assumption that enough “expert” contractors are extant to truly competitively bid on any potable water problem in any area.
- Potentially more difficult is the provision of what could be construed as an open, un-purposed, non-specific “emergency” fund. In order to successfully allocate such a fund, the monies would have to be justified by a specific range of purposes or activities and pass legal and FARs contracting review.
- The last recommendation is also problematic in some cases, due to the urgency of need within some populations and with respect to the Military unit’s/Host Nation government’s potential security goals. Long lead time objectives sometimes do not fit well with a restive population that demands immediate fixes to prevent further or deeper violence (there is a concomitant belief in some third world areas that the U.S. – especially the U.S. Military – can literally do anything; therefore if an urgently needed service is not being immediately provided, then that is because the U.S. just doesn’t want to do it).

SECTION 5: RULE OF LAW

5.a. TOPIC. Justice and Rule of Law (Lesson # [1162](#))

Observations.

Nations emerging from conflict typically face significant challenges in justice and rule of law. In such cases, it is important to identify the impediments to rule of law reform, take actions to address them, and lay the foundation for security sector reform (SSR).

Discussion.

In general, the rule of law refers to the "authority and influence of law in society," especially as a constraint upon behavior, including behavior of government officials. The ancient philosopher Aristotle was familiar with the concept and wrote "Law should govern." Rule of law has been referred to as a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, and entities – public and private – including the State itself, are accountable to the laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. More often than not, a country's laws are a mirror image of the country's constitution.

As a country comes out of conflict/upheaval, the institutions of governance are usually in disarray, likely with a flawed or weak constitution, failed institutions of governance, and poor leadership. In such cases, one of the priority areas of the United Nations' Mission in country would be to support realization of a constitution and the implementation of security measures that bring about some semblance of peace and stability. Governance and rule of law reforms can and should be designed to ensure that Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts enable effective, legitimate, and accountable state security forces, and to ensure that these forces operate under the control of a legitimate state authority.

The major impediments to justice / rule of law reform in most countries that have been affected by conflict – like Bosnia, Afghanistan, and South Sudan – include the following: lack of enthusiasm for justice reform, informal/traditional justice systems that are unique to particular areas/cultures/religions (often referred to as “non-state justice systems”), and different governments within the host nation having minimal interactions with one another and not trusting each other, particularly in a federally fragmented country, and especially during transition periods. Another major challenge is how the intervening parties coordinate other agencies like international and host nation non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also working to support reform, but who may not be willing to associate with the military. Also, the military personnel implementing rule of law policies and reforms are sometimes viewed as suspect or detrimental by some host nation groups. Yet another significant challenge is how to measure achievements, especially in the case of winning hearts and minds to facilitate reforms.

In Afghanistan, rule of law reform efforts faced a number of additional challenges. First, the people making reform decisions usually were in the capital/Kabul, while those implementing the reforms/programs were out in villages and towns, and there were oftentimes disconnects between decision-makers and implementers. Second, promoting gender rights was a difficulty due to existing traditional and customary laws. Third, rule of law efforts in Afghanistan could often not adequately deal with violators of justice who held influence in society. On many occasions they were protected from prosecution. Finally, lack of prosecutors and judges in districts to undertake judicial business had a major impact on justice / rule of law, due to an overwhelming number of cases being handled by just a few available judges – as the majority had moved out during earlier conflict to other countries.

Recommendation.

1. The United Nations' Mission in a post-conflict country should endeavor to support realization of a constitution and the implementation of rule of law and security sector reforms.
2. The many impediments to rule of law reform may be mitigated and turned into opportunities by creating rule of law working groups with the aim of identifying

areas for rule of law enhancements, coming up with plans for rule of law reforms, and bringing parties together to discuss and develop enthusiasm for justice, particularly at the local level. Enhancements should encourage freedom of movement, ensure human rights and gender rights, establish appropriate courts whereby all cases can be dealt with, promote an effective system for record-keeping, and address reforms of the penitentiary system in tandem with police reforms – to ensure enforcement of the law and security of the citizens.

Implications.

If recommendations are followed, a functional judicial system can be established – one that is independent and efficient, with adequate numbers of judges and support staff, and able to mete out justice in a timely manner – creating an enabling environment for justice and rule of law.

Event Description.

This lesson was developed for U.S. Army War College elective course PS2229 – Security Sector Reform – and is based on readings, classroom discussion, and mission experience.

Lesson Author: COL Godfrey Buluma, Kenya Defense Forces.

Critical Analysis from PKSOI Rule of Law SME (717-245-3659):

Comments. Efforts in Afghanistan emphasized that doing too much too soon may mean that most efforts fail. Traditions and customs must be respected while supporting human rights. This will require a longer-term and more measured response, but one in which we have better chances of long-term and lasting change that ideally prevents or mitigates violent conflict.

5.b. TOPIC. By, With, and Through in Rule of Law Operations – Iraq ([Lesson # 711](#))

Observations.

The effectiveness of rule of law projects/initiatives depends heavily on how well they are nested within the host nation's rule of law objectives and goals. Rule of law operations can be successful, as noted in northern Iraq 2008-2010, through gaining an understanding of the needs of host nation partners (judges, security chiefs, police chiefs, etc.) and their communities, and then responding to those needs. Supporting the host nation's goals and priorities, and gaining "buy-in", can be critical to effecting and legitimizing legal reforms, as well as to enhancing the host nation's rule of law capacity.

Discussion.

Working "by, with, and through" host nation partners can provide rule of law practitioners with the means to make steady, relevant, and legitimate progress on legal reform efforts. Two compelling examples of working "by, with, and through" host nation partners in rule of law operations – one positive, one negative – are the "conference and committee" initiatives undertaken by Multi-National Division-North (MND-N) and by one of its subordinate Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in northern Iraq during the 2008-2010 timeframe.

The positive example of "by, with, and through" is an MND-N wide conference initiative (ultimately a series of conferences) that was planned and implemented to bring judges from across northern Iraq together to discuss key issues they were facing. The genesis of the MND-N wide conference(s) was actually a request by the Salah ad Din Province's chief judge to hold a conference of only the judges of that province – to discuss certain issues facing the provincial judiciary. This was worked through an MND-N unit within that province. The conference took place, incorporating the gambit of judges and prosecutors of that province. Numerous objectives were addressed and improvements soon effected province-wide, significantly improving rule of law operations. MND-N was quick to take advantage of this provincial initiative - deciding to implement a much broader conference – that would bring together judges from all provinces of northern Iraq. A key takeaway of that first MND-N conference for northern Iraq was that the Iraqi judges were given an entire day (the initial day of that conference) to discuss issues that they wanted to discuss – without any coalition input or questions. That allowed the Iraqis to: (1) take the lead and drive further conference conversations/agendas in directions that they desired, and (2) gain internal Iraqi consensus on their issues/initiatives. The Iraqi judges developed a prioritized list of the issues facing the judiciary throughout northern Iraq. These prioritized issues were further discussed during the course of that first conference, were later taken to the Higher Juridical Council of Iraq (the national body with oversight of all courts in Iraq) for action, and were also addressed/monitored at follow-on MND-N / Iraqi conferences. All in all, MND-N was able to guide and track the various rule of law issues/initiatives. Contributing factors were the partners' "buy-in" to the original conference, affording them the opportunity to gain consensus, and continuous partnering between MND-N legal advisors and northern Iraq partners.

The negative example of "by, with, and through" was the failure of a certain BCT (under MND-N) to garner host nation support on the Provincial Justice Committee (PJC) initiative within Diyala Province. Issues of detainee overcrowding and slow processing of criminal cases seemed to be of major concern to police, judiciary, and corrections agencies throughout that province. The PJC initiative – a forum/construct for bringing together key actors in the criminal justice process – had been successfully utilized by other BCTs in other provinces. However, when the BCT operating in Diyala Province scheduled a

first PJC meeting, the Iraqi Security Forces (including the Provincial Chief of Police) failed to attend it. Two months later, a second PJC meeting was held, and again the Chief of Police and heads of security forces failed to show up. The Provincial Chief Judge then took the position that he also would not attend in the future unless the police and security chiefs participate. At the third PJC meeting, only members of the Diyala Judiciary showed up. Over the course of months, no progress was made with regard to detainee overcrowding or criminal case processing/streamlining. The inability of the BCT to gain "buy-in" of certain key actors – "buy-in" to attend the PJC meetings – meant no communication, consensus, or progress on the province's legal concerns. Convincing the police and security chiefs that reform could be driven "by" them, "with" their cooperation/consensus and that of the relevant Iraqi criminal justice actors, and "through" partnering/mentoring was not accomplished.

Recommendation.

1. Rule of law practitioners should work "by, with, and through" their host nation partners. Enabling the host nation partners to improve, and refine their own rule of law processes and procedures – "by" having them formulate the issues/initiatives, working "with" them on those issues/initiatives, and "through" mentoring opportunities and venues – can help to build consensus and to expand rule of law effectiveness and legitimacy.
2. Rule of law practitioners should conduct periodic assessments to ensure that the collective "we" of working together on projects/initiatives truly includes host nation counterparts and their desires and priorities.

Implications.

Failure to work "by, with, and through" host nation rule of law actors in developing rule of law projects/initiatives can threaten the effectiveness and success of legal reform and can result in wasted resources or even a de-legitimization of the host nation rule of law processes.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "[The Rule of Law at Dawn: A Judge Advocate's Perspective on Rule of Law Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2008 to 2010](#)," by Geoff Guska, Small Wars Journal, 10 February 2011.

Lesson Author: Mr. David Mosinski.

Critical Analysis from PKSOI Rule of Law SME (717-245-3659):

Comments. Host nation actors must be the driving force for success. It is less "buy in" and more "determine their own priorities." Intervening forces are often overwhelming to those fragile areas in which they find themselves. The host

nation simply does not have the capacity to absorb all the goodness coming its way. It is better to build the relationships first and then allow activities to flow from the relationship, rather than build activities and try to encourage people to “buy in.” We must realize that just because we can do something does not mean we should do it. Long term success will not occur through imposed solutions. Engagement and relationships with host nation actors are fundamental to success.

SECTION 6: FHA / HADR

6.a. TOPIC. Unintended Consequences of Organizational Design – USSOUTHCOM and its Earthquake Response to Haiti (Lesson # [2421](#))

Observations.

U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) had to overcome numerous functional organization and manning gaps that hindered the staff’s ability to provide an effective and sustained response in support of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) operations to the Government of Haiti. The decision to transform USSOUTHCOM’s headquarters and the need to institute an “in-stride” fix ultimately affected the headquarters’ ability to respond to the disaster, assign and organize Joint Task Force–Haiti, and ultimately the build-up of its component parts.

Discussion.

- **Organized for Function versus Combat.** In 2008, the USSOUTHCOM made the decision to transition and realign its staff into one that functionally aligned its directorates and implement a new concept referred to as the “enterprise model.” This new concept fully integrated USSOUTHCOM’s efforts with the interagency (IA) and non-governmental organization (NGOs), as well as multinational partners and private organizations to achieve their stated national and theater objectives. However, implementing the enterprise model came at the expense of deviating from the traditional J-Code structure that the remainder of the Army followed. Of particular note, the USSOUTHCOM Functional Plan for HADR operations originally tasked traditional “J-Codes” with specific responsibilities for execution; however, the plan had not been updated or codified to reflect the headquarters’ new organizational design.

On January 8, 2010, General Fraser, Commander, USSOUTHCOM, noted during a meeting to discuss the headquarters’ organization that the command had lost some of its planning discipline and capacity across several of the staff functions; specifically across the planning horizons: Watch, COPS (current

operations), FUOPS (future operations), FUPLANS (future plans). Indeed, throughout USSOUTHCOM, the traditional primary and special staff organizations and functions were not manned with sufficient depth to respond in a timely manner and provide the sustained operations that would unfold less than one week later in Haiti when a 7.0 magnitude earthquake centered under the capital city of Port au Prince decapitated the country's government and many of the organizations already there assisting them.

Additionally, there was no standing concept of operations (CONOP) or operations plan (OPLAN) with an associated time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) built for a HADR event that the staff could use to begin force flow planning. Five days into the crisis, General Fraser recognized this disconnect with how USSOUTHCOM was organized and directed the staff to conduct an "in-stride" reorganization back into the more traditional "J-Code" structure.

As a result, this decision, while disruptive and painful, helped reestablish traditional staff functions and responsibilities and reform the basis from which the command could request personnel fillers. This change, along with much needed external augmentation especially from USNORTHCOM's Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), gave USSOUTHCOM critically needed breadth, especially for planning, and depth to conduct 24 hour operations. The more traditional structure facilitated faster integration of, and immediate contribution by, external augmentees.

- Organizing JTF-Haiti. USSOUTHCOM's pre-existing staff organization made the already difficult task of forming a Joint Task Force (JTF) all that more challenging. Within days of the earthquake, USSOUTHCOM was faced with the potential for significant security issues that could cause a mass exodus of Haitians towards Cuba or the United States. Faced with this likely scenario, USSOUTHCOM made the decision to assign its only organization certified in executing this particular task to U.S. Army South (ARSOUTH). Therefore, with ARSOUTH now designated as JTF-Migrant Operations in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, USSOUTHCOM had to find an alternate headquarters for the JTF. As a result, USSOUTHCOM decided to build the JTF around its own Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ).

Unfortunately, only 22 of its original 56 personnel had been integrated into the USSOUTHCOM staff to make up for personnel shortfalls. Thus, as lead elements of the SJFHQ began to arrive, the 22 member staff brought with them an understanding of the country and the broader USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), but they were too few to provide a viable staff for sustained operations. Within 72 hours after the earthquake, an immediate "plug" of personnel from the XVIII Airborne Corps Assault Command Post (ACP) helped provide a well-honed staff around which the JTF could mature. Unfortunately, the ACP personnel were not joint and they too required the addition of a host of augmentees from the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC). The JECC

provided key enabling capabilities that helped round out critical joint planning capabilities, including current operations, future operations, and logistics. Additionally, the JECC package included personnel from U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) and the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE).

With the personnel situation improving, JTF-Haiti faced another complicated issue that delayed it from being fully operational – providing communications. When the JCSE arrived it brought with them a Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) suite, which provided access to approximately 200 workstations, as well as other “workarounds.” However, it was quickly revealed that the DJC2 was incompatible with the XVIII Airborne Corps ACP's Executive Communications set. While DJC2 provided transmission capability for Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPR), Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR), and Microsoft Exchange, it was incompatible with the ACP's tools, including Defense Connect Online, MIRC, NX Light, and PureEdge. As a result of these issues, DJC2 would not be fully operational until January 21, 2010.

- Identifying the Gaps and Seams. Although the headquarters was officially established by verbal order (VOCO) on January 14, 2010, it would take weeks to identify and assemble the numerous component parts of JTF-Haiti. With no assigned forces and no CONPLAN, the USSOUTHCOM and JTF staffs both had to build their forces in-stride. Unfortunately, the lack of a fully operational joint logistics C2 element within the global response force (GRF) required planning on a short notice by a USSOUTHCOM staff with little force deployment planning capacity, adding to an already challenging force flow situation. Many of the enabling capabilities (to include engineering, civil affairs, psychological operations, public affairs, and medical) were not in a contingency status. All of the potential component elements of the JTF were in various states of readiness, scattered widely across the United States on Active Duty or in the Reserves, and with different mobilization timelines. Additionally, some were located at or near “force projection platforms” while others had to move long distances to reach an aerial port or a sea port of embarkation.

Consequently, General Officer phone calls were utilized to request specific forces. The initial “push” of forces and supplies was rapid, but ad-hoc and executed outside of formal planning, sourcing, and tracking procedures. At one point JTF-Haiti was tracking 16 pages of verbal orders regarding force flow. Supporting commands and units leaned forward in their efforts to alert, prepare, and make initial movement in support of the Haitian mission. As a result, some units were forced to deploy with suboptimal force packaging and/or movement planning.

Additionally, supporting commands did not adequately communicate between each other as to what forces were being moved on verbal orders in support of the Haitian mission. This translated into an ad-hoc sequencing of units and equip-

ment into the AOR since there was no TPFDD used for many of the deploying units. The initial lack of a requisite audit trail, due to the over reliance on verbal orders, deprived supporting and supported commands of synchronized force flow planning and tracking, creating a rapid infusion of manpower and supplies. Two weeks after the earthquake, JTF-Haiti still did not have processes in place to match relief needs with arriving supplies. Until JTF-Haiti stood up a force flow working group composed of J3 and J4 personnel who met daily to coordinate the arrival and distribution of supplies, develop more accurate requirements, and provide assessments to the JTF Commander, the JTF planners did not know what they had, where it was, and what was coming in. The rapid deployment of forces and early entry capabilities based on verbal orders were critical to the overall mission's success, but ultimately they added to the chaos of force and capability management flow problems that the command had to address and deal with all the while trying to stabilize the situation and save lives.

Recommendation.

1. Review and amend the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to address shortfalls in HADR response plans and responsibilities.
2. Develop a deployable “advise and assist” team with senior mentors and lessons learned reach-back capability to support COCOM and JTF Commanders and their staffs during the initial stages of crisis action planning and to ensure their staff sections are organized, trained, and equipped to respond to HADR operations .
3. COCOMs should review HADR plans every 12-18 months as well as the role of the Reserve Component Forces as part of a no-notice contingency and the composition of the Global Response Force to include all enablers (CA, PSYOP, C2, Logistics, Engineer, etc.).
4. Codify as a “Best Practice” for future use the “force flow working group” to match relief needs with arriving supplies.
5. Review the SJTFHQ manning requirements and relationships across all COCOMs.
6. Review the JTF HQs Joint Manning Documents ensuring that the headquarters are built joint and trained joint.

Implications.

Clearly, there was no indication that USSOUTHCOM intended to create the conditions that followed from changing their organizational design. In fact, one can see why a Combatant Command (COCOM), with no forces assigned and manned 85 percent strength, would feel the need to change their organizational

design in order to fully integrate its interagency partners with its mission in pursuit of its Theater objectives. However, the issues that resulted from this change and the “trickle-down” effect it caused, as seen in its response to the disaster in Haiti, should have been foreseen.

In the years prior to the Haitian response, there are no indications that anyone took the time to review USSOUTHCOM’s Functional Plan for HADR operations against the “J-Code” system tasked with specific responsibilities for execution. The transfer of these responsibilities to the “enterprise” directorates was never tested or codified. As a result, the new model failed in its ability, at the strategic (COCOM) level, to provide the necessary traditional primary and special staff functions critical to crisis action planning, receiving augmentation support, and providing an immediate response to the Government of Haiti. Consequently, USSOUTHCOM had no choice but to conduct an “in-stride” reorganization to replace these critical functions all the while trying to stabilize the situation in the aftermath of a devastating earthquake and save lives in Haiti.

Furthermore, USSOUTHCOM erred in its decision to build a JTF, at the operational level, with the XVIII Airborne Corps ACP at its center rather than using the fully operational ARSOUTH JTF. One can certainly understand the issues related to mass migrant operations. However, using a headquarters command post that is neither joint nor assign the proper communications equipment simply because they were available was a huge mistake in terms of organizational planning and design. The decision to use the XVIII Airborne Corps ACP in this manner only served to further delay operations until the early insertion of joint enablers from SOUTHCOM’s SJTF, USAF, USN, JECC, JPASE, JCSE, and other liaison officers that could arrive in Theater and begin to provide key planning and external communications capacity as well as facilitating information sharing and coordination.

Prior to this, the initial “push” of forces and supplies via verbal orders was extremely rapid but also ad-hoc in nature and largely executed outside of formal planning, sourcing, and tracking procedures, which caused an early loss of in-transit visibility and efficiency in delivery. Only when the key joint enablers arrived was JTF-Haiti able correct this issue and form the force flow working group to begin the process of matching relief needs with arriving supplies.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the article “USSOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force-Haiti...Some Challenges and Considerations in forming a Joint Task Force,” by COL John Ryan, Mr. Russ Goehring, and Mr. Robert Huslander, and the article “Imposing Order on Chaos: Establishing JTF Headquarters,” by Dr. Mark D. Mandeles, published in the [Joint Center for Operational Analysis Journal, Volume XII, Issue 2, Summer 2010](#).

Lesson Author: Mr. Donald Myers.

Critical Analysis from PKSOI FHA/HADR SME (717-245-4250):

Comments. Recommendations 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this article are fully in line with our current doctrine. JP 3-29, page xi, specifically states, “that Geographical Combatant commands (GCCs) develop and maintain commanders’ estimates, base plans, concept plans, or operation plans for FHA. In response to a disaster, the supported GCC structures the force necessary to conduct and sustain the FHA operation, typically forming a joint task force.” These recommendations are fully feasible and acceptable. It is critical that every COCOM reviews/exercises its FHA Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Operations Plans (OPLANs) every 12-18 months, to include incorporating Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) and Reserve Component Forces as part of the contingency. During reviews/exercises, the organizations can validate their staff roles and responsibilities and address any seams/gaps within their organizations. GCCs should capture lessons learned from their FHA operations and exercises in order to improve future FHA activities. These lessons learned will also provide valuable insight for commanders and staff in developing/refining CONOPS and OPLANs with associated time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) for a FHA event that the staff could use to begin force flow planning.

**6.b. TOPIC. Civ-Mil Coordination in Disaster Relief through Operational Contract Support
(Lesson # [2406](#))**

Observations.

During a humanitarian disaster, there is often a shortage of relief resources, yet a plethora of civilian and military agencies ready to assist the host nation. Without careful coordination among these supporting agencies, adequate resources may not reach survivors. One effective way to improve such civ-mil coordination and strategic effectiveness during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) is to engage stakeholders in dialogue before such incidents occur, utilizing the Operational Contract Support (OCS) concept known as the Joint Contracting Support Board (JCSB).

Discussion.

OCS is the U.S. military’s process for both procuring services and goods from commercial sources as well as planning and coordinating with contractors. It emphasizes taking into account the broader implications and stakeholders when planning action. A JCSB is an OCS meeting initially held prior to any civ-mil collaborative operations to gather different agencies together in order to understand their limitations and capabilities as well as to clarify contracting

requirements. Doctrinally, the JCBS gives the military flexibility to decide when to meet and who to invite; as such, it is a great venue for integrating civilian agencies.

In cases of U.S. involvement in HA/DR, civilian organizations and agencies are normally in charge of disaster response efforts. When such emergencies occur within the U.S., the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead agent; when such events occur in foreign countries, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes the lead. While responding to international disasters, USAID must coordinate with other civilian agencies, including the United Nations Organization for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Although they do not regularly take the lead, military stakeholders are also often highly involved in HA/DR, due to the strong levels of logistical support that they can provide. Such military actors may include units charged with acquiring goods/services, including associated senior contracting officials and representatives from the Defense Logistics Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).

When these various civ-mil agencies meet via JCSB to plan for HA/DR, they prepare to overcome both communication and resource challenges. These civil and military organizations have very different organizational limitations/capabilities, structures, and assumptions about how other civ/mil organizations operate. Being upfront about these differences can improve communication lines and relationships between the organizations, which will facilitate more informed requests for direct and indirect support during a disaster. Furthermore, civilian and military organizations have different approaches to situational analysis; information-sharing via JCSB events allows all HA/DR organizations to take a more strategic perspective about implications and unintended consequences of actions for other nations, reducing effort duplication. This can in turn encourage actions that support the local economy and reduce resource competition.

For example, during the recent 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, both the host nation/area infrastructure and U.S. military bases experienced damage. Due to realizing that generators would be in high demand for the affected population, the U.S. military requested support from the U.S. mainland to obtain generators so that civilian communities in immediate need from the host nation could receive generators first. This operational decision had strategic consequences in the disaster response and served to strengthen positive relationships with Japanese authorities. Air Force Duty Operations Division Chief, Major Chris Hearl, puts it this way: “Military professionals responding to a HA/DR event often think tactically; how do we solve the problem in front of us? OCS teaches us to think more operationally, even strategically. How do we best solve the problem in front of us, without causing unintended consequences for our partners and allies?”

Recommendation.

1. As part of the HA/DR Operation Contract Support (OCS) process, regularly hold a Joint Contracting Support Board (JCSB) in the joint operating area (JOA), inviting civilian stakeholders (including ICRC and UNOCHA, but especially USAID) and military personnel to participate in these meetings, in order to:

- Increase civ-mil coordination for more effective disaster response
- Build relationships with affected stakeholders prior to an emergency incident
- Share unclassified information more transparently about the operating environment and organizational limitations to mitigate competition for resources and infrastructure strain

2. Conduct a continuing and thorough analysis of the “operational environment” in order to identify ongoing 2nd/3rd order implications of actions on host nation politics and economic stability. In this way, incorporate operational and strategic thinking into HA/DR tactical decisions.

- For example, the supporting nation may consider acquiring certain supplies from local businesses instead of bringing those supplies in through the supporting nation’s internal relief resources, thereby better supporting the local economy.

Implications.

If civil and military organizations do not meet together prior to emergencies to share information and discuss support concepts, then they may grossly misunderstand each other’s organizational limitations/capabilities; if civ-mil agencies do not understand other agencies’ organizational limitations/capabilities, civ-mil coordination in an emergency will be inefficient, decreasing the supporting nation’s ability to assist the host nation.

If strategic thought is not utilized in analyzing the operating environment, then resources may be acquired in ways that either harm the local economy or delay support to people in the disaster area who are in immediate need.

Event Description.

This lesson learned is based on the article, “Operational Contract Support: Mitigating Challenges Faced with Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Relief Missions,” by Major Chris Hearl, Deputy Operations Division Chief, Air Force Installation Contracting Agency – Operating Location Pacific, found in the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance’s [LIAISON magazine, Volume VII, Fall 2015](#), pp. 36-39.

Additional Comments from the Lesson Author.

The recommendations and implications in this article reflect theories of change found in USAID's "Theories of Change and Indicator Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation" manual (June 2010):

Building Bridges: "If key actors from belligerent groups are given the opportunity to interact, then they will better understand and appreciate one another, be better able to work with one another, and prefer to resolve conflicts peacefully."

Although different civilian and military agencies coordinating in HA/DR are not "belligerent groups," they operate under very different assumptions and structures; interacting and working together in JCSB settings will lead to increased understanding and ability to collaborate during actual emergencies.

Lesson Author: Ms. Katrina Gehman.

Critical Analysis from PKSOFI FHA/HADR SME (717-245-4250):

The recommendations of this article are supported by JP 3-29, page IV-3: "developing the contracting support plans and conducting the associated contractor integration planning crosses most joint force and Service component primary and special staff lanes." Using contracting support in response to FHA, even though feasible might not be acceptable based on urgency of need and available resources, USAID OFDA will identify the acceptable type of support in order to provide a prompt relief of human suffering. Additionally, JP3-29, page II-12, states, "mechanisms for implementing emergency responses to disasters should consider the private sector is done through USAID OFDA, which maintains communication with UN agencies and other international organizations and private sector donors to ensure the USG complements rather than duplicates existing assistance programs." The synchronization of relief efforts including contract support and unity of effort during a FHA operation is critical in relieving human suffering.

SECTION 7: INTERAGENCY / WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT

7.a. TOPIC. Embassy Planning in Afghanistan and Beyond (Lesson # [873](#))

Observations.

At U.S. Embassy Kabul, a small interagency (IA) team of planners, assessors, and action officers in the Political-Military Affairs (Pol-Mil) section has helped orient civ-mil relations toward the main goal of building capacity for the Afghan

government and its society. This IA team – the Civ-Mil Plans and Assessments Sub-Section (CMPASS) – helps guide the complex civ-mil activities in Afghanistan – mainly by ensuring that the distinct perspectives and approaches of civilian agencies and military forces are closely coordinated – to mutually reinforce one another.

Discussion.

In 2009, the U.S. Embassy Kabul established CMPASS as a new Civ-Mil Plans office (J5) alongside the existing Pol-Mil Operations office (J3) and placed them both under one J3/J5 Director (Mr. Philip Kosnett). The CMPASS team was originally composed of five persons, but grew to seven personnel by mid-2011: four State Department planning officers from the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, two additional State Department planners, and one U.S. Army field grade officer. The mission assigned to CMPASS was: to coordinate civ-mil actions among the Embassy, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), and Afghan partners, and to provide planning and assessment support throughout the U.S. Mission.

To accomplish its mission, to help set and disseminate theater guidance, and to maximize the alignment of U.S., Afghan, and coalition activities, CMPASS works off of the Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan (outlined in the attached briefing). CMPASS routinely teams with the Embassy's Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) office, whose primary responsibility is to coordinate civ-mil actions between Kabul and the field. Additionally, CMPASS frequently collaborates with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), notably its Stabilization Unit in Kabul and with its military liaisons from both Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command and the former ISAF Joint Command (IJC). Through working/collaborating with these offices, CMPASS is able to help prioritize strategic and operational objectives, synchronize civ-mil activities across time and space, agree upon ways to measure progress, and build flexibility and room for adaptation into civ-mil efforts.

CMPASS helps operationalize civ-mil integration first and foremost through its participation in the National Level Working Groups (NLWGs), which are civ-mil problem-solving teams structured around subject areas that address governance, elections, rule of law, anti-corruption, population security, reintegration, agriculture, infrastructure, borders, economic development, counter-narcotics, illicit finance, gender policy, and information initiatives. CMPASS serves as the Embassy's coordinating body for these working groups, and it helped to prepare agenda items and read-ahead packets for meetings between the Chief of Mission and ISAF Commander. CMPASS members also help to identify cross-cutting issues that require special consideration and additional coordination to achieve desired effects.

CMPASS has also served as the Embassy lead for preparing assessments that help define and measure progress in Afghanistan. In conjunction with State and USAID officials in Washington, CMPASS prepares quarterly assessments for the National Security Council, which the national security staff uses to evaluate the impact of its strategy and to prepare briefings for Congress. In this effort, CMPASS worked closely with the Afghan Assessments Group at ISAF Headquarters and with the assessments group at ISAF Joint Command (IJC). CMPASS' assessments addressed topics such as Afghan ministerial budget execution, anti-corruption and counter-narcotics measures, and progress on sub-national governance, private investment, and international donor coordination.

Some of the most important synchronization exercises for CMPASS have been intense interagency reviews of U.S. civ-mil efforts in Afghanistan called "Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drills." These civ-mil ROC drills were co-hosted by U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, U.S. Central Command, and the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. These sessions routinely included senior participants from the Embassy, USAID, ISAF, the Afghan ministries, the Afghan Supreme Court, and ambassadors and senior officials the European Union, the United Nations, and 11 other embassies. In preparing for and executing these senior-level events, CMPASS organized and facilitated the interagency coordination within the Embassy. As a result of these ROC drills, civ-mil planning and resource requirements have been better synchronized – between U.S., international, and host nation partners – along various lines of effort, including security, governance, agriculture, justice, economic development, anti-corruption, counter-narcotics, and border issues.

Recommendation.

1. Within any given U.S. embassy, establish and empower a planning team (like CMPASS) to focus on ensuring that the yearly State Department and USAID mission strategic plan informs the activities of the mission. This planning team could help facilitate periodic assessments with the ambassador to measure progress on the goals in the strategic plan and propose courses of action to address gaps or deficiencies. This planning team could also help organize periodic civ-mil ROC drills.
2. For civ-mil planning and training events, when numbers of U.S. Government Agency civilian personnel may be limited, the Agencies should coordinate with the military to identify the key times during the planning cycle that require critical civilian expertise, and then participate at those junctures with the right people.
3. Those involved in the complex business of planning stability operations should come to recognize the critical importance of building personal relationships. Planning is likely to improve when civilians and service members take time to get to know one another, understand the constraints the others are working under, and learn what is motivating them to work on the plan/operation.

Implications.

If an embassy does not establish and empower a planning team (like CMPASS) to focus the activities of the mission on its yearly strategic plan, then execution of mission activities might prove to be disjointed or incomplete, and periodic assessments on progress toward goals might be absent or lacking.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the article "Navigating Civil-Military Relations in Kabul," by Maria J. Stephan, in [InterAgency Journal 3-1](#) (Winter 2012), published by the Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation.

Other References.

A related document which outlined the Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan is: "[Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan: Master Brief](#)," United States Government, February 2011.

Lesson Author: Mr. David Mosinski.

Critical Analysis from PKSOI Interagency SME (717) 245-3331:

The CMPASS office was the U.S. Government's main conduit for support to district offices of the Afghan government set up in areas that had been cleared and held by Coalition forces beginning in 2009. The office's key stabilization task – essentially standing up a locally responsive Afghan government presence – was viewed as essential to a successful counter-insurgency strategy. This strategy sought to put an Afghan government face on the Coalition's planned transition from clear-and-hold military operations to Afghan-led build-and-transfer civil activities. These civil activities aimed to persuade local populations that their government was able to stay the course in creating a more stable, prosperous Afghanistan.

The effort largely failed for three reasons. First, the Afghan government was unable to stand up its district offices with qualified personnel that were committed to the communities to which they were assigned. These personnel were either unconnected with the communities or too fearful of their personal safety to remain over time. Second, U.S. and Coalition financial support was largely implemented through foreign contractor companies who diverted substantial amounts of aid to pay foreign salaries and security. Finally, local communities, particularly in the restive south and east of Afghanistan, did not feel secure enough to support or work with Coalition-sponsored projects and Afghan district offices.

In short, the CMPASS experiment – while set up with noble and well-intentioned purposes – failed to take hold because insurgent groups, criminal gangs and

local war lords frustrated COMPASS. Afghan officials and Coalition contractors were prevented from establishing long-term relationships with villagers. In addition, U.S. and Coalition donors tended to throw too much money at local projects beginning in 2009-2010 that was often wasted because projects were unsustainable. At present, Afghanistan remains even more mired in corruption and opium-based criminal activity as ever in its history.

The main conclusion of the COMPASS experiment is that security is essential to undertake an effective reconstruction program. Without security, such efforts become more expensive, difficult, and problematic. In addition, the COMPASS experiment did not take into consideration the cultural reality of Afghanistan. Afghan district officers were increasingly seen by Afghan villagers, particularly in poorer areas, as inserting or imposing a centralized National government upon them that did not understand their needs and was diverting much of the aid to their personal pockets. In other words, the rapid stand-up of district offices was an exercise in futility, further divorcing skeptical villagers from their national government.

7.b. TOPIC. Challenges to a Geographic Combatant Command (Lesson # [1072](#))

Observations.

There are many challenges for the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) or the Joint Force Command (JFC) commanders when operating in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) environment; however, there are also many opportunities. Operations conducted in Iraq, Afghanistan and Bosnia/Kosovo all showcase how our military has to operate in a JIIM environment. During each operation, the U.S. used the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, as well as incorporated the Department of State (DOS) and worked with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other countries' forces to accomplish the mission. However, in each case there have been many lessons learned; there are some integration methods that the GCC and JFC commanders can use to ensure better cooperation in the future.

This lesson will first look at the challenges of operating in a JIIM environment. There are too many challenges to discuss them all; for the purpose of this paper we will look at two that seem to consistently cause issues. Those are culture and interests of the different organizations in JIIM. Each aspect of JIIM all have their own culture in both planning and conducting the operation; we will look at culture in each of the elements. Next under challenges, this paper will explore the interests of each element under JIIM as each entity would have its own mission set, rules of engagement and its own government to answer to.

Next this lesson will discuss what the GCC or JFC commanders can do during phase zero to ensure they get the best results they can get, given the environment they have to operate within. Understanding the challenges will help frame how to properly plan for, use and synchronize efforts to ensure mission success. Phase zero is just one aspect; this lesson will further look at the later phases of an operation and how the GCC or JFC commanders can further the mission by using all entities of JIIM, and how they can minimize the effects of the differences in culture and interests.

Finally, this lesson will recommend a possible change in law. Throughout the planning for Iraq and Afghanistan as well as phase zero planning for areas such as Southeast Asia (SEA), having a synchronized plan of action between the military and DOS is critical. There have been many instances in past and current operations where having a synchronized plan and a give and take approach would be helpful for current and future operations. A law enacted by Congress, much like the Goldwater Nichols Act, may have to be put in place to ensure future mission success.

Discussion

One of the first challenges is the different cultures throughout the JIIM environment. USAID and the State Department have a different culture when it comes to how they operate and plan. Both agencies have a collaborative, less structured, most everyone has a say, non-hierarchical, political and diplomatic planning process. This process focuses on larger ideas and concepts, but leaves much to be desired when there is a requirement for details and timeliness is of the essence. This type of planning process causes friction in military planning circles. The military planning culture is very structured with a clear chain of command, individuals with decision authority and individuals that work; it focuses on details, and time is extremely important. In a JIIM planning environment, the friction that these cultural differences creates causes disparity, prevents synchronization of efforts and will possibly cause a mission to be less successful than it could have been.

When dealing with multinational cultural differences, culture can play a huge part. In World War II, during Operation Husky, the British planning culture was collaborative, where all commanders had a say in the plan, and the plans almost required a vote to be approved. The U.S. planning culture was much like it is today, "here is the plan..., execute." The differences in planning culture caused multiple problems during the execution and subsequent missions of Operation Husky.

Another possible challenge in the JIIM environment is the particular goals or interests of those involved. During Operation Enduring Freedom, other multinational militaries that were working for U.S. forces were focused on reconstruction, government and other Political, Military, Economic, Social,

Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) activities. However, U.S. forces wanted more counterinsurgency operations. The other militaries have very specific rules of engagement due to their political constraints; this caused distrust between the other militaries and U.S. forces, both in planning and execution.

Understanding culture and interests is essential when planning in a JIIM environment. U.S. forces must not only understand culture and interests, but determine which parts of the culture and interests either inhibit or enable the process. When planners can link the cultural similarities as well as understand where and how interests meet, they can more easily work toward a common goal. In most situations, it may require some give and take on all parties involved, and each must negotiate to achieve the desired end state.

An example of this would be the use a multinational military unit. Understanding that their governments are not willing to accept significant casualties and have focused them on building infrastructure, the JFC could mission them to execute base security and focus them on building schools and economic centers, thus freeing U.S. forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

Once the staff has a solid understanding of culture and interests, it must fully incorporate all JIIM partners in the planning process. Promote a culture within the GCC staff of acceptance of the different cultures, and coach them to understand the different interests.

Use the State Department and USAID as examples of promoting cooperation; this will establish a forum for interagency collaboration on the GCC campaign and contingency plans. Next, create a country team that is made up of senior representatives from each of the agencies. Finally, develop a planning group that incorporates all parties in a forum committed to sustained collaboration to continue strengthening and expanding comprehensive planning efforts.

After planning, execution in phase zero continues; include all JIIM partners in assessment working groups. This will enable all interested parties to collaborate on changing conditions, share information and make adjustments if necessary. Executing assessment working groups would prevent miscommunication to outside parties, show a unified front, and prevent fracturing of the plan, thus increasing the chances of success.

Throughout all operations, the enemy has a vote and the environment can, and will change, thus forcing an adjustment or change in plans. During later phases of an operation, the relationships and coordination built during planning and phase zero will, for good or bad, continue. This is where the establishment of an assessment working group in phase zero will pay dividends. It is imperative to include all partners. Thus when adjustments or changes must occur, all interested parties have a say in the process, and they are synchronized and nested to ensure the best outcome.

Because of the challenges in planning and execution of recent operations, this paper poses a recommendation to create a law, much like the Goldwater Nichols Act that forced our military to fight jointly. *Operation Eagle Claw: Desert One* was an Army Special Forces mission to rescue American hostages in Iran. Major flaws in planning and executing a mission that required Army, Navy and Air Force caused Congress to pass the Goldwater Nichols Act, thus forcing the U.S. military forces to conduct joint headquarters, planning, training and cooperation. Though painful at first, the Goldwater Nichols Act is a major reason the U.S. military has enjoyed success in the recent past.

Department of State and a GCC could have a significant difference in views on how to accomplish a mission. Due to these differences and neither organization being “required” to plan and execute together, there needs to be a forcing function to ensure cooperation in the future. Congress needs to create a law; much like the Goldwater Nichols Act, that dictates planning and cooperation. Additionally there needs to be a body designated as the “decision maker” if neither can come to a resolution of their differences.

Recommendation.

1. Congress should create a law; much like the Goldwater Nichols Act, that dictates planning and cooperation between the Department of State and the military/GCC. Additionally, there needs to be a body designated as the “decision maker” if neither can come to a resolution of their differences.
2. Establishment of an assessment working group in phase zero will pay dividends. It is imperative to include all JIIM partners.

Event Description.

This lesson has been developed for U.S. Army War College PKSOI Elective Course PS2206 - International Development.

Lesson Author: COL David Sanders.

Critical Analysis from PKSOI Interagency SME 9171) 245-3331:

This paper makes an admirable contribution to the growing dialogue about how to organize Defense, State, and USAID into a coherent decision-making body working towards mutually supporting, unified efforts in conflict-affected countries. The JIIM construct is useful to help USG officials come together and suggests ways in which these officials can reach decisions. It appears the author supports the Ambassador as the main decision-maker in host-nation situations where security is not problematic. In those cases where conflict has taken hold, the Combatant Commander appears to take the place of the Ambassador in making on-the-ground decisions mainly because he has more financial resources and personnel to implement programs. The author is right to call for a new

Goldwater-Nichols Act that enshrines these decision-making bodies as organizational ways forward in stabilizing conflict-affected societies.

However, even with organizationally clear decision-making bodies on the ground in conflict-affected societies, the issue of transition remains difficult. That is, when does the military commander turn over key tasks to the Ambassador and host-nation authorities? Should decision-making bodies approve projects that may serve short-term counter-insurgency purposes but seem to be unsustainable over the longer term because of their costs and poor connection to local economic realities? How does a decision-making body avoid wasteful, inefficient, and duplicative activities? Finally, under what circumstances might these decision-making bodies be subject to excessive oversight by White House, National Security Council and federal agency representatives, thereby preventing them from being more flexible and agile on the ground? Additional work must be done to ensure JIIM efforts are effective.

8. CONCLUSION

The Stabilization and Transition guidelines mentioned throughout this lesson report are essential and all equally imperative for successful peace and stability operations. Rather than offer specific by-sector commentary, we hope the ability to see the subject matter experts' input to the posted discussions were of most value. These individuals and their teams are deeply involved in everything from policy through doctrine to implementation in their specific sectors and thus are able to provide some critical analysis of the authors' submitted lessons. The timing of this issue could not be more appropriate. The DoD is initiating a holistic review of US Military and Government stabilization efforts, and PKSOI and our contributing authors will play a large part in that. Everything from naming conventions, stability topics, policy, doctrinal changes and current initiatives that need to be adapted to the dynamic landscape that our troops and international organizations are dealing with, will be assessed. This program review will take no more than 12 months, conducted by internal and external parties, and thus, by next summer, we should have some findings to present to the community.

Through wider dissemination of the afore-mentioned comments and the program review of Stabilization efforts and actions, their consideration in the planning and execution of peace & stability operations will make significant impacts during the course of future peace and stability operations. This coupled with dynamic and outside the box thinking, with leadership emphasis on the five stabilization sectors and two callout crosscutting principles, will help make success out of most missions and great strides in the others.

We appreciate any chance to engage our community of interest, so please feel free to reach out to your sector experts. We have included some contact

information per sector/lesson to facilitate correspondence as required to continue the dialogue for the betterment of the community!

PKSOI Points of Contact

PKSOI reviewer: COL Raymond ‘Boz’ Bossert, Chief, Stability Operations Div.
 Contact info: Email: raymond.d.bossert.mil@mail.mil
 Phone: (717) 245-4380

Publication editor: Mr. David Mosinski, Lessons Learned Senior Analyst.
 Contact info: Email: david.a.mosinski.mil@mail.mil
 Phone: (717) 245-4229

U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)	
Director	COL Greg Dewitt
Deputy Director	COL Geoffrey Mangelsdorf
Assistant Director	Mr. Bill Flavin
Chief, Peacekeeping Division	COL Melinda Mate
Chief, Proponency Division	COL Sam Russell
Chief, Stability Operations Division	COL Raymond ‘Boz’ Bossert
Governance SME	Mr. Tony Lieto
Security Sector SME	Dr. Ray Millen
Security and Intel SME	Ms. Diane Chido
Sustainable Economy Sector SME	Mr. Rick Coplen
Infrastructure SME	COL James ‘Brooks’ Schultze
Rule of Law SME	Dr. Karen Finkenbinder
FHA / HADR SME	COL Iraj Gharagouzloo
Interagency SME	Dr. Mike Spangler
Lessons Learned Branch Chief	Mr. Dan French
Lessons Learned Senior Analyst	Mr. David Mosinski
Lessons Learned Analyst	Ms. Katrina Gehman

Disclaimer: All content in this document to include any publications provided through digital attachment is considered unclassified, for open access. This compendium contains no restriction on sharing / distribution within the public domain. Existing research and publishing norms and formats should be used when citing “Sampler” content and any publications provided.

Annex A

Related Documents, References, and Links [Ensure you are logged in to SOLLIMS to access these items.]

Guides/Handbooks

- [“Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations,”](#) SOLLIMS Sampler, PKSOI, July 2015
- [“Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief \(Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below\),”](#) Headquarters, US Southern Command, 13 July 2011
- [“Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,”](#) USIP and PKSOI, 2009
- [“Rapid Reconnaissance Handbook for Humanitarian/Disaster Response,”](#) Operations Multinational Interoperability Working Group, 7 November 2012
- [“The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response,”](#) Sphere Project, 2011
- [“Unity of Effort Framework Solution Guide,”](#) Joint Staff J7, 2 October 2013
- [“USACE Overseas Contingency Operations Playbook,”](#) USACE, October 2015

Studies/Reports/Compendiums

- [“Civil Power in Irregular Conflict,”](#) CNA, PKSOI, and AUSA, 12 January 2010
- [“Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster-Relief Operations: Lessons Learned and Best Practices,”](#) Captain Cathal O’Connor, US Navy, 5 December 2011
- [“Quick Impact Projects used by Military Organizations to Build Trust and Confidence amongst the Local Population,”](#) Brent C. Bankus, POTI, 28 June 2016
- [“Stability Operations in the Western Hemisphere,”](#) CALL Newsletter 11-15, February 2011
- [“Strategic Lessons in Peacekeeping & Stability Operations, Volume 1,”](#) PKSOI, July 2012
- [“Strategic Lessons in Peacekeeping & Stability Operations, Volume 2,”](#) PKSOI, August 2013

- [“The U.S. Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005,”](#) by Lawrence A. Yates, Combat Studies Institute, 2006
- [“USAID & DOD: Analysis and Recommendations to Enhance Development-Military Cooperation,”](#) Ben Kauffeld, 4 September 2014

Presentations

- [“PACOM Disaster Response Lessons Trends 1991-2013,”](#) CFE-DMHA, 12 March 2014

US Military Doctrine

- [“ADP 3-07 Stability,”](#) Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQ DA), August 2012
- [“ADRP 3-07 Stability,”](#) with change 1, HQ DA, February 2013
- [“ATP 3-07.5 Stability Techniques,”](#) HQ DA, August 2012
- [“ATP 3-07.31 Peace Ops,”](#) HQ DA, April 2015
- [“FM 3-07 Stability,”](#) HQ DA, June 2014
- [“JP 3-07 Stability Operations,”](#) Joint Staff, 29 September 2011
- [“JP 3-07.3 Peace Operations,”](#) Joint Staff, 1 August 2012
- [“JP 3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance,”](#) Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 January 2014
- [“Multi-Service Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance,”](#) Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 2013

Websites

- [Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance \(CFE-DMHA\)](#)
- [U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute](#)
- [USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance](#)
- [U.S. Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization](#)

Annex B Previously Published SOLLIMS Samplers (available in [SOLLIMS library](#))

Investing in Training for, and during, Peace and Stability Operations
(Jun 2016)

Building Stable Governance (Mar 2016)

Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping (Feb 2016)

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: Concepts, Principles and Applications
(Dec 2015)

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance [Foreign Disaster Relief] (Sep 2015)

Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations (Jul 2015)

Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Students (May 2015)

Security Sector Reform (Feb 2015)

Reconstruction and Development (Nov 2014)

Women, Peace and Security (Aug 2014)

Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students (Jul 2014)

Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve” (Apr 2014)

Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces (Jan 2014)

Key Enablers for Peacekeeping & Stability Operations (Oct 2013)

Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students (Aug 2013)

Multinational Operations (Jul 2013)

Leadership in Stability Operations: Understanding / Engaging the People
(Apr 2013)

Protection of Civilians (Jan 2013)

Medical Assistance / Health Services (Oct 2012)

Reconciliation (Jul 2012)

Civ-Mil Cooperation (Apr 2012)

Building Capacity (Jan 2012)

Ministerial Advising (Oct 2011)

Fighting Corruption (Apr 2011)

Economic Stabilization (Jan 2011)

Transition to Local Governance (Oct 2010)

Rule of Law and Legitimacy (Jul 2010)

Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping (Jun 2010)

SOLLIMS SAMPLER

<https://sollims.pksoi.org>



U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute



Contact Info:

PKSOI

ATTN: Lessons Learned Division Chief

22 Ashburn Drive

Carlisle, PA 17013

or Email

usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.sollims@mail.mil

