

# SOLLIMS SAMPLER

Targeting Peace & Stability Operations Lessons & Best Practices

## Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces

Volume 5

Issue 1



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## FOREWORD

Welcome to the January 2014 edition of the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) Lessons Learned “Sampler” – **Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces**.

The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an [Introduction](#) that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “[Quick Look](#)” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related [Lesson Report](#), and (4) links to [additional reports and other references](#) that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to **Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces** available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission / function – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, policy-makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access / download attachments.

If you have not registered on SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account



in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the Stability Operations-related products referenced in the report.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products that we provide for the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our website at [ <http://pksoi.army.mil> ] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [ <https://sollims.pksoi.org> ] to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!

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**Kunar Province, Afghanistan. Afghan Border Police (ABP) and U.S. Army Soldiers from ABP Zone 1, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, hike from their landing zone to Observation Point 12 along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, 21 January 2013.**

(Photo by U.S. Army Sergeant Jon Heinrich, TF 1-101 Public Affairs)

## INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the January 2014 edition of the SOLLIMS Sampler! The focus for this edition is **Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces**.

*The successful recovery of the host nation from a prolonged conflict, as well as the success of U.S. stability operations in that nation, ultimately depends most of all on establishing effective community-based police.*

*(U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap, Dennis E. Keller, August 2010)*

A safe and secure environment is one in which the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without the fear of persistent or large-scale violence. Such an environment is characterized by absence of conflict; the protection of citizens, communities, government officials, infrastructure, and cultural/historical sites; the freedom for people and goods to move about the country and across borders without fear of harm; and, an adequate level of “public order.”

“Public order” is the condition whereby laws are enforced equitably; the lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals are protected; criminal and politically motivated violence has been reduced to a minimum; and, criminal elements – from looters and rioters to leaders of organized crime networks – are pursued, arrested, and detained.

Without question, police forces are critical enablers for both “public order” and the establishment of a safe and secure environment.

While U.S./coalition or international actors may be called upon to do the bulk of this security work in the initial phases of peacekeeping or stability operations, it is essential to involve host nation (HN) resources whenever possible and appropriate. This is important for two reasons: (1) to begin to build HN security capacity and (2) to promote HN government legitimacy through internal/HN structures, systems, and programs.

The success of building HN police/security capacity depends heavily on taking into consideration the host nation’s history, culture, legal framework, and norms. It also depends on “shaping” the HN security apparatus and its culture – through incorporation of certain normative standards such as: responsiveness to the local community, accountability to the rule of law, and defense of human rights.

This Sampler looks at the involvement of external (U.S./coalition/international) police forces – as well as the involvement and development of HN police forces – during several recent peacekeeping and stability operations. Key thoughts and recommendations are captured in the [Conclusion](#) paragraph.

# Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces

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## "QUICK LOOK"

Click on [\[Read More ...\]](#) to go to full lesson.

- Military Police units are generally better [than other conventional forces] at performing stability policing operations due to their training and professional development process... [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- In stability operations, the establishment of an effective police force is critical to the successful transition from the United States' (and/or allied nations') provision of security services to the Host Nation (HN) taking responsibility and authority for its own security. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Village Stability Operations (VSO) in Afghanistan address the need to build a credible and honest Afghan Local Police (ALP) element within villages – particularly in remote areas. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The "light footprint" of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), combined with a U.S. "whole-of-government" approach, has been an optimal formula for bringing stability to the southern Philippines. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- In 1999 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1272 granting authority used for several UN missions over the next decade, each seeking to aid the East Timor state into independence from Indonesia. Despite conditions appearing ideal for transition and the development of security sector reform, the process instead broke down... [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) actions launched in Liberia at its "golden hour" (mid-2003 to 2005) were absolutely critical for post-conflict recovery and for establishing a viable foundation for further stabilization work. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Notwithstanding the excellent systems in place by which the U.S. already contributes to international post-conflict preparedness, such as the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), additional benefits could be gained from establishment of a gendarmerie within the U.S. Army. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- After a conflict, the justice and reconciliation process can contribute to stability and encourage dialogue and integration of the former combatants into society; however, appropriate resources to work this process are often not available. This process is difficult to realize in African environments... [\[Read More ...\]](#)

6 January 2014

## **SUBJECT: Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces**

### **1. GENERAL**

A safe and secure environment requires, as a minimum, the physical security of civilians, public figures/forums, critical infrastructure, government facilities, and cultural/historical sites. Protecting people/events/facilities, establishing law and order, and maintaining law and order are vital functions for keeping the peace/stabilization process moving forward and for allowing expansion of service deliveries and market activities. Police forces are essential players for handling these functions.

This report provides several lessons from the SOLLIMS database – covering Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Timor-Leste, and Liberia – which accentuate the importance of police forces and building HN police/security capacity as an integral component of peacekeeping and stability operations.

### **2. LESSONS**

#### **a. TOPIC. Stability Policing as a Viable Component of Stability Operations ( [755](#) )**

##### **Observation.**

Military Police units are generally better [than other conventional forces] at performing stability policing operations due to their training and professional development process – especially in the area of responding to very complex situations characteristic of stability operations, with the goal being to de-escalate the situation / apply minimal force as preferable to engaging the “threat” with deadly fires. By staying neutral in the application of the “law,” remaining emotionally sound and impartial in the eyes of the populace (very important traits when conducting security policing operations), and whenever possible, engaging/involving the Host Nation in all aspects of their own security, the Stability Policing Unit (SPU) can gain the trust and confidence of the populace and begin to help stabilize the overall post-conflict, post-crisis situation.

##### **Discussion.**

The “traditional” Military Police (MP) missions/functions are:

- enable / conduct maneuver and mobility operations
- conduct area security
- maintain law and order
- conduct internment and resettlement
- conduct military police intelligence operations

(Police intelligence operations are considered ongoing simultaneously throughout all of the missions).

The five “traditional” MP functions/missions above are likewise carried out in/during “expeditionary” or stability policing operations (SPO); just that, during security policing operations, there is additional focus on building the capacity of the Host Nation security/police forces, establishing public order, and enabling the transition toward normalcy for the Host Nation. In general, Military Police units are more proficient than other General Purpose Forces (GPF) in performing SPO due to the level of proficiency and the specialized training they get as a normal part of their professional development. In particular, most GPF lack training and experience in deterring conflict / the de-escalation or deterrence of violence and associated Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP).

When directed to conduct stability policing operations, a particular area that poses significant challenges for MP leaders at all levels is the development of “engagement” skills – i.e., working directly with civilian leadership, from provincial/village elders all the way up to ministerial levels (“key leader engagements”). Although challenging, many soldiers have been surprised at how well they can do this – bordering on and even including conducting negotiations. U.S. professional military education and training environments for MP units and leaders are beginning to address this and provide better preparation for future deployments.

Looking more specifically at Afghanistan, the issue of corruption and how it is understood by the indigenous population and how it effects SPO needs to be better understood. In particular, corruption can often be the cause of poor investigative techniques and failure to convict – which greatly weaken the overall legal system. However, the level of acceptable corruption must be viewed from the perspective of the people; what would be / may be labeled “corruption” in a Western, Judeo-Christian based system of laws may be not only acceptable behavior based on local mores, but also even expected by the people and the indigenous leadership. The hard-and-fast application of what is considered “corruption” in Western legal systems would be counter-productive in Afghanistan – especially in outlying provinces and villages.

UN forces – “blue hats” – are often seen as being more acceptable for conducting SPO. Whereas U.S. or other outside nations have short term rotations of leaders and soldiers, UN forces generally have longer staying power, longer terms of



involvement. UN forces are also seen as being more impartial / neutral in their application of law and order; they maintain an apolitical profile and administer interim, expeditionary law and order consistently across all elements, factions, sects, and hierarchy of the nation-state within which they operate.

### **Recommendation.**

1. Leaders at all levels need to develop “engagement skills” – while maintaining their warfighting skills.
2. Security strategy and the legal/criminal justice systems must work hand-in-hand to achieve peace and good order, and ensure the populace is protected from harm.
3. Experience has shown that the most effective composition for stability police forces is a combination of Host Nation and UN elements.
4. Look to countries that have an existing “national police force” for a model to emulate – e.g., Italy/Carabinieri.
5. Maintaining consistency and impartiality are critical for successful stability policing operations; those who must enforce the “law” must be seen as true neutrals in the process.
6. Need to re-prioritize efforts from the perspective of the Host Nation vice U.S./Western/European principles of law and order.
7. Rules of Engagement (ROE), based on a deeper understanding of the local culture, followed with impartiality, and combined with a comprehensive risk assessment, will ultimately lead to a “best effort” for the development of a stability policing strategy and the actual conduct of stability policing operations.

### **Implications.**

- A “Whole-of-Government” approach needs to be adopted when developing a stability policing strategy. The SPU must be able to regularly communicate with other police / criminal justice organizations as well as NGOs/IOs in their area of operations (AO) and work towards a mutually agreeable concept and strategy for law enforcement activities. This lends credibility to actions that are taken under the auspices of maintaining law and order that may lead to civilian casualties or the defacing of national artifacts of high religious or cultural value. The populace will still be upset with loss of life or property, but will most likely not take aggressive action against the SPU.
- Trying to impose “our” priorities that are out of synch or inconsistent with the populace’s needs and priorities will only lead to frustration on all parts and may

even generate additional hostilities and lawlessness as the people express their dissatisfaction with ongoing SPO. Although re-prioritization may lead to conflicts with the individual's personal code of ethics, stability police elements and their leadership must be prepared to adjust to abide by "local laws" and principles, while still staying within the limits of UCMJ and internationally recognized standards.

- Containing the amount of unnecessary or excessive civilian casualties and defacing of cultural artifacts, buildings, and other sacred sites will basically take care of itself when ROE are enforced and followed consistently by all elements of an SPU – both non-indigenous and Host Nation forces.

### **Event Description.**

Extracted from notes taken during live interview with COL Patricia Ryan by Mr. Dan French, Chief, Lessons Learned Branch, PKSOI, on 25 May 2011. Colonel Patricia Ryan served as the Chief, Police Reform, PKSOI, from October 2010 to December 2011. Her previous assignments included: Chief of Staff, ARNG at the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence and Fort Leonard Wood; Director of Military Support, Rhode Island National Guard; and, RFI OCONUS OIC, Kuwait. Her commands included Recruiting and Retention battalion command and Military Police company command. She served in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Guatemala, and Honduras. A copy of the interview (MP3 format) is available on request.

### **Comments.**

- Earning and keeping the trust and confidence of the populace – while being a challenge for SPO – is likewise an absolute imperative.

- The most significant aspect of a successful SPO "campaign" is the need to "focus on the population." When the population feels safe and secure and feels that law and order is being applied impartially across society, they will support the SPU and begin to accept responsibility for their own stability policing requirements.

The comments above reflect the personal opinions and observations of COL Ryan; they should not be interpreted as any official position of PKSOI, the U.S. Army, or any other USG organization or agency involved with peacekeeping and stability operations.



## **b. TOPIC. Transition to Host Nation Security – Building Effective Local Police Forces ( [682](#) )**

### **Observation.**

In stability operations, the establishment of an effective police force is critical to the successful transition from the United States' (and/or allied nations') provision of security services to the Host Nation (HN) taking responsibility and authority for its own security. However, the U.S. Government (USG) currently lacks the institutional capacity to deliver the resources needed to establish, train, and advise HN civilian police forces in stability operations in a timely manner. This capacity gap has been filled by contractors and by the U.S. military in recent operations, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); however, for such operations, the strategy/vision, resources available/employed, techniques utilized, and focus have all been inadequate.

### **Discussion.**

Currently, the USG lacks an on-hand capacity to make an immediate and coordinated civilian police training effort, when needed, during the initial phase of a stability operation. This capacity gap has not always existed. During the 1954-1974 timeframe, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and its successor, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), had comprehensive programs in place and provided the technical advice, training, and equipment for foreign civil police organizations as needed. However, in 1974, congressional legislation (Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act) put an end to USAID's involvement in foreign police training. Today, there is no one agency fully in charge of building a standing capacity in the U.S. for police trainers/advisors for potential deployment for stability contingencies. Instead, what happens is that a multiplicity of agencies get involved in the development, bidding, and awarding of contracts for police trainers when the requirement arises. It takes considerable time to put those contracts into place, and additional time for the contracted trainers to be identified, prepared, and deployed to the area of operation – leaving the U.S. military as virtually the only viable option to work with HN police forces.

Recent U.S. military doctrine recognized the importance of police forces in counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations. [Field Manual \(FM\) 3-24 Counterinsurgency](#), states that the primary frontline COIN force is often the police – not the military. [FM 3-07 Stability Operations](#) [the precursor to [Army Doctrine Publication \(ADP\) 3-07 Stability](#)] cited the importance of civilian police forces, stating that community-oriented police services, under civilian control, are essential to success. It further stated that the military needs to include the tasks of "train and advise host-nation police forces" and "establish police academies" among its essential stability tasks. The U.S. military fulfilled such tasks and roles during both OIF and OEF, as did large numbers of contracted personnel.

In fact, OIF became the largest law enforcement and police training effort overseas since the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. During OIF, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) established the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) to reconstruct Iraq's security sector. CENTCOM created the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) to train and equip Iraqi police and other civilian security forces. DynCorp International was contracted to provide 690 International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) for police assessment, training, and mentoring functions. Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) was contracted to provide 192 International Police Trainers (IPTs).

However, contracted police trainers were often not willing or able to operate in non-permissive areas in OIF, because of restrictions or clauses in their contracts. Training of HN police personnel was usually confined to the capital city or to secure areas – leaving unsecured, more remote areas of the country without desperately needed police trainers and mentors. Additionally, there was no mechanism in place to keep select/top trainers on station for a longer timeframe, which would have served to maintain institutional knowledge and some semblance of longer-term capacity.

Because there is no one USG agency with a definitive lead role for foreign police assistance, and because the resultant convoluted approach equates to contracting police training teams for short periods of time (usually year-to-year), there has been no coherent USG or strategic vision for developing police trainers or executing policing missions. In the absence of such a vision, in OIF and OEF, the contracted training teams did not distinguish between "stability policing" and "community-based policing" needs. By definition, "stability policing" takes place immediately/upfront in stability operations – to deal with high-end threats such as organized criminal groups, insurgent/terrorist cells, organized looting, and large riots. A normative practice is that the military force, complemented by "stability police," reestablishes local security in those instances. In OIF and OEF, that complement of HN local police forces was not always present, or when it did exist, it was incompetent, corrupt, or ethnically motivated.

"Community-based policing," on the other hand, is the police work of finding out what law enforcement problems exist within the local communities and helping the communities solve them. The focus of "community-based policing," when it had been conducted, was the cultivation of a close relationship with the local community and a proactive approach to crime prevention and security needs. In Afghanistan, this was largely absent during the early years of OEF. A surge in local criminal activity in 2005, combined with the Afghan government's and police force's inability to address the problem, became a major contributor to local discontent with the government.

In OIF and OEF, U.S. police assistance efforts have primarily focused on establishing a centralized police academy, where new or recycled police officers received training on the basic skills of police work. Although these academies



included instruction on respect for human rights, acceptable and humane interrogation techniques, the rights of individuals under HN laws, and proper police behavior, some police officers relapsed into their former organizational culture, values, or attitudes after a few months on the job. A sustained effort to shape the local police's organizational culture often did not occur. However, in the 2009-2010 timeframe of OEF, when the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) made a concerted effort to embed advisors with Afghan police and security forces, where they physically worked together over an extended timeframe, the shaping of police organizational culture was effected. The embedded advisor, who went beyond short periods of teaching and coaching and instead gained understanding, respect, and trust of host unit counterparts through daily interaction/cooperation, could better shape the unit's organizational culture.

Additionally, U.S. police assistance efforts have sometimes focused the local police on supplementing HN military forces – as opposed to keeping the local police oriented on protecting their communities from crime and criminal group violence. In some cases, that failure to keep local police forces oriented on public safety and routine law enforcement for their villages and surrounding areas left a security vacuum – which was then filled by insurgent or criminal groups.

### **Recommendation.**

The author of the PKSOI paper upon which this lesson is based (see Event Description on page 13) recommends that:

1. Because the USG lacks capacity to deliver/deploy civilian police trainers in the early phase of stability operations, the U.S. military must be prepared to assess, advise, and train HN police forces until such time as civilian police trainers/mentors do arrive.
2. The U.S. military – upon assuming the roles of assessing/advising/training HN police forces – should distinguish between "stability policing" and "community-based policing," and should transition from the former to the latter at the appropriate point. U.S. military trainers/advisors, whether part of an Advise and Assist Brigade or deploying independently, should be provided instruction on both "stability policing" and "community-based policing," as well as how and when to transition to the latter. U.S. military trainers/advisors should be trained, in advance, on "community-based policing" tasks – such as arrest procedures, criminal investigations, working within local legal frameworks, crime prevention, and community relations.
3. The U.S. military – when conducting "community-based policing" efforts – should not fail to recognize the importance of "shaping the police organizational culture." Shaping a police organizational culture into one that is legal, ethical,

responsible, and responsive will help preclude attitudes from falling back on bad habits or corruption. Many variables beyond U.S. military control – ethnic/tribal tensions and influences, fractured political leadership, incongruent societal values – will undoubtedly present major challenges. In spite of those factors, when training local police personnel, emphasis should be placed on normative standards of behavior. Standards should include responsiveness to the local community, accountability to the rule of law, and defense of human rights.

4. The U.S. military should embed advisors with local police units. Embedded advisors can gain the requisite cultural knowledge, access, and rapport to mold police organizational culture into a desirable end-state.

### **Implications.**

- If the U.S. military does not assume the role of developing effective host nation police forces – through training, advising, and shaping – then a security vacuum may emerge, which insurgents/terrorists/criminal groups can take advantage of, adversely affecting stability and governance efforts. Similarly, if incompetent/corrupt/abusive local police personnel are present and continue their practices without intervention/training, such perpetuance can cause local populations to turn against the government. Successful transition to HN responsibility/authority for security and other essential services will not be realized.

- If the U.S. military were to assume the role of developing effective host nation police forces (which is the far better option than doing nothing or relying upon late-arriving, restriction-bound, non-long-term contract personnel), it can be implied that fulfillment of this role will take time, patience, and perseverance.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the PKSOI paper "[U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap](#)," by Colonel (Ret) Dennis E. Keller, August 2010.



### **c. TOPIC. Village Stability Operations: Leveraging Elders and Building Local Police ( [768](#) )**

### **Observation.**

Village Stability Operations (VSO) in Afghanistan address the need to build a credible and honest Afghan Local Police (ALP) element within villages –

particularly in remote areas. In executing their missions, VSO teams have found that it often pays great dividends to work closely with village elders.

### **Discussion.**

In the fall of 2009, Coalition Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) initiated a pilot program to bring stability to a network of villages in remote areas of Afghanistan – in the south, west, and east. This program came to be known as VSO. Under the VSO program, small, well-trained detachments of soldiers live and operate within certain villages – after the invitation to do so by village leaders. These detachments then work to establish stability by addressing security, development, and governance issues in conjunction with the local populace. The detachments attempt to connect the villagers back to their district and provincial government. They also work to develop an effective local security force or ALP force for each given village – often building from an existing traditional local protective force.

In practice, the local “shura”/council nominates members for the ALP, and those individuals are then vetted by coalition forces. Those individuals then receive three weeks of training which focus on the Afghan constitution and ethics, as well as security-specific training. Ideally, with additional mentoring and partnering, they are ultimately capable of standing up against, and driving out, Taliban influences, and they help set conditions for political and economic improvement.

Detachments involved in VSO have found that close cooperation with village elders is critical to achieving success.

In one village, detachment members convinced the village elders to agree to allow younger men to join the ALP. The detachment also worked with a neutral businessman who was able to broker various agreements with influential men to recruit relatives for employment in the ALP. The overall result was not just sufficient numbers of police recruits, but also fairly even tribal representation among this force.

In another village, the embedded detachment initially experienced significant difficulties in trying to convince the village elders to nominate personnel for the local police force. The detachment, however, remained patient and continued to engage village shura councils and elders. Eventually, the village elders realized the value of the police for their community and they nominated recruits/ participants. The elders also took on an active role in overseeing the work of the ALP.

In another region, a detachment recognized the need to overcome tribal power struggles which were not conducive to establishing a local police force. The detachment first found a way to separate the elders of rival tribes – precluding further confrontations / power struggles between them. The detachment then

established itself as an honest broker to help them work through their grievances separately, and then jointly.

In another region where rival tribes were not cooperating and had divided themselves by geographic areas, the special forces detachment planned and held shura councils in neutral locations, such as at a district center or firebase. This tact encouraged/convincing elders to come together at a neutral site to work out their tribal disputes and to establish an effective local police force.

In a western region, VSO teams planning to conduct a show of force in conjunction with the ALP against Taliban elements were able to gain valuable assistance from village elders. Village elders escorted the partner forces to the selected locations/buildings. The elders also agreed to knock on doors to announce their support of the force and to de-escalate tensions as needed.

Finally, in Khakrez in Kandahar province, the embedded VSO team conducted multiple key leader engagements, met with shura councils, and trained local security force personnel to defend themselves, as well as trained them on how to contact the Afghan National Security Forces or coalition forces for assistance, if threatened. The VSO team leveraged relationships with village elders to establish this local security force and to provide oversight. Within a few months, Khakrez saw a significant reduction in insurgent attacks, as well as a return to normalcy for the local populace.

### **Recommendation.**

1. Continue VSO efforts to develop and train Afghan Local Police – in order to promote stability in remote areas and counter Taliban intimidation.
2. Work closely with village elders on ALP/security efforts. Their participation is vital for establishing a credible and representative force, and for monitoring and sustaining it over time.

### **Implications.**

If VSO teams ignore village elders in the process of developing the ALP, it would undermine the legitimacy of the village elders, would reduce the credibility of the ALP, and could contribute to greater instability and Taliban inroads.

### **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the article "[The Nuts and Bolts of Village Stability Operations](#)," by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Stephen N. Rust, originally published in the Jul-Sep 2011 edition of Special Warfare.



## Comments.

A related article which discusses the origins of the VSO program and the success in the district of Khakrez in Kandahar province is "[Taking a Stand: Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police](#)," by Lt. Col. Basil Catanzaro and Maj. Kirk Windmueller, originally published in the Jul-Sep 2011 edition of Special Warfare.



### **d. TOPIC. Light Footprint and Whole-of-Government Approach – The Southern Philippines ( [911](#) )**

#### Observation.

The "light footprint" of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), combined with a U.S. "whole-of-government" approach, has been an optimal formula for bringing stability to the southern Philippines. The Philippine government's own "whole-of-nation" philosophy has played a tremendous role toward achieving success in this counter-terrorism campaign.

#### Discussion.

In 2002, the United States and the Philippine government agreed to partner against terrorist/insurgent threats growing in strength in the Philippines – specifically Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Various insurgent training camps began appearing in the southern Philippines in the late 1980s and soon became problematic for the Philippine government. These camps were viewed as safe havens by al-Qaeda's leadership – which sent an influx of Al-Qaeda operatives beginning with Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law. Other notorious figures followed, including Ramzi Yousef, the architect of the World Trade Center bombing, and Khalid Sheik Mohammad, cited by the [9/11 Commission Report](#) as "the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks." As Al-Qaeda increased its presence and influence in the southern Philippines, JI and the ASG embarked on a series of deadly bombings and kidnappings across the region. To combat this growing threat, the United States stood up JSOTF-P in July 2002, assigning it the mission of supporting partner force operations against terrorist threats, and the Philippine government signed a Military Logistics and Support Agreement (MLSA), allowing the United States to use the Philippines as a supply base for military operations throughout the region.

Significant success has since been achieved. The 5 April 2012 report from the Congressional Research Service, "[The Republic of the Philippines and U.S.](#)

[Interests](#)," states that Joint military activities have significantly diminished Abu Sayyaf's strength and presence, reducing its size from approximately 1,000 members to less than 400, nearly all key ASG leaders have been killed or captured, and the group's religious mission and appeal have waned. JI leadership casualties are also cited.

Over the past several years, JSOFT-P's mission in support of its Philippine partners has remained constant. However, its activities have been refined, modified, and adapted to meet the needs, capabilities, and political support/enthusiasm of the Philippine government and its security forces. Prominent among political activities has been the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP)-Bayanihan, instituted by the Philippine government in early 2011, which deliberately focused all counterinsurgency efforts under a single national internal-security strategy. Key to IPSP-Bayanihan was the "whole of nation" philosophy espoused by President Benigno Aquino, as he introduced the security strategy: "...the problems confronting our nation are multi-faceted and complex... a military solution is not enough to completely solve them. Efforts to achieve genuine peace and security must therefore be supported by all."

Through implementation of IPSP-Bayanihan, Philippine military components, police elements, and local officials routinely meet in Sulu, Basilan, and Zamboanga provinces to discuss activities and share information. Philippine government agency personnel team with security forces on the F3EAD model (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Assess, Disseminate), participate in joint training exercises, and conduct joint operations with Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP) forces. Joint operations against suspected terrorists and criminals are deliberately announced/explained to local communities as legitimate, legal, and necessary to rid the countryside of lawlessness and banditry. This message has resonated well with the Philippine populace.

While the Philippine government has harnessed multiple government resources and worked to inform/include local communities, JSOTF-P has focused its support by way of a "light footprint" and a "whole-of-government" approach. At the request of the Philippine government, JSOTF-P has collocated small detachments with its Philippine partners on approximately a dozen Philippine military bases and police camps. In most instances, JSOTF-P has provided operational detachments at military brigade level and police battalion level, however, one detachment supports an infantry division headquarters and another works with the AFP Special Operations Command.

U.S. Army Military Information Support (MIST) teams and Civil Affairs (CA) teams have been integrated with Philippine partners predominantly at tactical levels. The MIST teams have focused their efforts on radio messaging, atmospheric analysis (to gain insights on the thoughts and concerns of the people, particularly about the government and its security forces), and measures of effectiveness,

while the CA teams have concentrated on building a self-sustaining Philippine CA capacity. As a result of these efforts, the AFP now has its own CA capability that has proven capable of planning, resourcing, and conducting civic-action programs and engaging local communities, and both the AFP and PNP now possess the capacity to design, produce, and distribute their own informational products.

At the operational and national levels, select JSOTF-P personnel meet on a weekly basis with senior AFP and PNP commanders. What began as routine engagements with PNP commanders soon led to the creation of a weekly PNP National Operations Center meeting at the Manila headquarters, where JSOTF-P members join Philippine counterparts in weekly discussions on appropriate security topics. Weekly engagements with AFP senior officers are likewise conducted by JSOTF-P leaders, focusing on the fusion of operational requirements with intelligence.

The "whole-of-government" approach has been continuously emphasized on the U.S. side. JSOTF-P personnel meet on a weekly basis with representatives from the U.S. Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury, and JSOTF-P and FBI personnel are collocated in Manila. At three locations in the southern Philippines, JSOTF-P personnel are collocated with members of the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), which focuses on training local law enforcement officials. This program and the relationship between JSOTF-P and ICITAP have been extremely productive – evidenced by the successful training of over 1,600 local police officers in the province of Sulu alone in 2011.

The "whole-of-government" approach is also embodied in the U.S. Embassy's Mindanao Working Group (MWG). The MWG consists of representatives from across the U.S. Mission and JSOTF-P. It has effectively coordinated, monitored, and assessed U.S. engagements in the southern Philippines over the past several years – achieving U.S. goals and objectives and helping to build Philippine capacity. The MWG has also assisted in linking elements of the Philippine government and the private sector with local communities in the southern Philippines – supporting the intent of the 2011 Internal Peace and Security Plan-Bayanihan: "Efforts to achieve peace and security must be supported by all."

Overall, the "light footprint" and the integration of U.S. Government teammates with Philippine partners (from the strategic through tactical levels) have been an optimal combination for success – bringing peace and stability to the southern Philippines and denying sanctuary to terrorist threats. Ownership/responsibility by the Philippine government and its "whole-of-nation" philosophy have been critical to success as well.

## **Recommendation.**

1. In regions where the U.S. and host nation governments have agreed to work together to counter transnational terrorist/insurgent threats, the U.S. should consider application of the JSOTF-P formula of a "light footprint" and a "whole-of-government" approach.
2. Where the U.S. and the host nation government have agreed to cooperate against threats to stability (such as terrorists/insurgents), the U.S. should emphasize host nation ownership/responsibility in protecting its own population – focusing support to the host nation on advice, assistance, training, equipping, and capacity-building.
3. Where the U.S. and the host nation government have agreed to cooperate against threats to stability (such as terrorists/insurgents), the U.S. should encourage the host nation government to adopt a "whole-of-nation" philosophy – maximizing government agency involvement and reaching out to communities to build consensus against those (terrorist/insurgent) threats.

## **Implications.**

If the host nation government does not fully commit to ownership/responsibility for protecting its people (from terrorist/insurgent threats), does not harness its own government agencies, does not strive to inform and include local communities, and does not partner for focused external support, then terrorist/insurgent threats may perpetuate over the years and destabilize entire regions – as happened in the southern Philippines from the late 1980s onward ... until the commencement of partnered operations with JSOTF-P and the implementation of IPSP-Bayanihan.

## **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the article, "[JSOTF-P Uses Whole-Of-Nation Approach to Bring Stability to The Philippines](#)," by Colonel Fran Beaudette, Special Warfare magazine, July-September 2012.

## **Comments.**

A related article, which cites the "indirect approach" and "interagency teaming" in the Philippines as lessons for the United States, is "[Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines: Civilian Harm and the Indirect Approach](#)," by Geoffrey Lambert, Larry Lewis, and Sarah Sewall," PRISM, volume 3, number 4, 21 September 2012.



A related report, which summarizes the success of joint military activities in the Philippines, is "[The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests](#)," by Thomas Lum, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 5 April 2012.

A related news article, which highlights AFRICOM's advocacy of the light footprint approach, is "[AFRICOM Will Maintain 'Light Footprint' in Africa](#)," by Donna Miles, U.S. Department of Defense News, 12 June 2012.

Another related article, which provides an example of AFRICOM's use of the light footprint approach through the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) Africa, is "[Spartans of Senegal](#)," by Mark Seavey, The American Legion Magazine, 1 December 2012.



#### **e. TOPIC. Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste ( [854](#) )**

##### **Observation**

In 1999 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1272 granting authority used for several UN missions over the next decade, each seeking to aid the East Timor state into independence from Indonesia. Despite conditions appearing ideal for transition and the development of security sector reform, the process instead broke down, resulting in a humanitarian crisis requiring additional international assistance. The primary causes of this failure apply broadly to similar efforts and should be considered in the planning of future operations. Even now, the population is faced with many armed groups, as well as continued ripples stemming from the mishandling of the initial transition to independence.

##### **Discussion**

##### **Police**

Initial efforts focused on establishing sustainable police forces with the intent to increase professionalization over time. This meant that recruiting focused on numbers of recruits rather than the qualification of those recruits. In many cases, this resulted in recruits who were unfit for duty either because of personal temperament or associations. This recruiting practice led to a poorly trained force that was not trusted by the people.

Police indiscretions from the previous regime, combined with new indiscretions caused by poor recruiting standards, limited community trust of the police. This shortfall in trust was exacerbated by a lack of community involvement in the prioritization of police training and focus of enforcement. Prioritization issues

stemmed from overzealous timelines from the international community. The timelines were not driven by ground truth, but instead by the expectations of the international community. The Timorese excelled in areas in which they were familiar (mainly community policing and structured reporting relationships), while dramatically failed in others (human rights and chain-of-command decisions) that were imposed from the outside, or culturally foreign.

Police force local units that were established in advance of UN intervention were more successful at gaining the trust of the population and introducing new norms in the rule of law. Of course, some trade-offs were required at the local level; security forces sometimes failed to abide by human rights and democratic standards for the sake of ensuring stability.

## **Military**

The military, in contrast, drew its initial force from the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL). UN officials chose this approach because the FALINTIL was already known to the people and had much of the initial training required. This approach made for an effective base for the military to build upon. However, because of the demographics, this approach skewed the culture of the military outside of the public norm. The military's priorities and its culture were not consistent with those of the country as a whole. The effects were compounded because, due to its higher readiness and funding, the military performed many traditional police functions while the police were still being generated/formed.

## **Roles and Functions**

Independence meant a rapid drain of experienced Indonesians not party to the new state. This left many civilian offices vacant and gutted the fledgling administration's ability to offer basic services. This meant that the international community was left to fill in these holes in the interim – often with poor coordination. The resulting hodgepodge of structures created by different international cultures resulted in inconsistent policies across different areas – even in the face of some standard operating procedures offered by the central government.

Although the host nation was well prepared for policing functions in which they had experience and training, the same could not be said for other activities, such as planning, forensics, and management.

Because the military had a higher level of training, the international community regularly used it for handling social and political threats, such as internal law enforcement and security issues that the police were deemed under-trained or under-resourced to accomplish, causing confusion of roles and responsibilities. This also caused the police to feel 2<sup>nd</sup> class next to the army, which fueled

societal and political divides since the majority of the army came from one political group. This infighting caused the people of Timor-Leste to lose trust in both services, as they came to see both groups as untrustworthy and political. In 2006, this tension boiled over into armed conflict. This conflict required additional UN intervention to bring a semblance of stability back to the country. The UN continues to work to fully establish the rule of law.

### **Recommendation.**

The rift between the police and army, as well as the overall failure of the mission, had several distinct causes. While the end effect of addressing these issues is difficult to determine, the wide consensus is that the situation would be much improved with the following recommendations:

1. Include the community when determining police priorities for an area.
2. Give consideration to mixing groups and classes when forming new government organizations – in order to minimize tensions within and between the new government organizations.
3. Create the transition schedule based upon when the host nation is prepared to handle specific tasks, rather than based upon international priorities. Set up host nation partners for success, even if the required timeline isn't preferred. Some international priorities (such as corruption or human rights) may have to temporarily take a back seat in order to plan for the long-term.
4. Allow senior officials, who know their culture, to have a larger say in dictating priorities for new organizations.
5. Be clear about the roles and functions of each service, and don't borrow a more established service to fill the role of a newer service without careful planning and great need. It would be preferable to support the culture of the organizations and accept a less favorable short-term result in exchange for long-term viability and respect between government agencies. It is also oftentimes preferable to use international assistance to fill short-term gaps because this approach causes less damage to the organizational culture in most cases.
6. Coordinate all participating international players to ensure consistency of training and culture throughout the government.
7. Create substantial oversight to support a policy of hiring and promoting the most qualified applicants in a corruption-free environment. Shortcuts that fill the rolls with unqualified persons will be detrimental in the long-run.
8. Because of the small staffs and limited power of offices of security cooperation, it is often most effective to engage governments at a high level in

order to form a solid policy base from which to base more tactical development. In particular, there is an opportunity to line up international and host nation goals at a high level to ensure that the culture and priorities of both parties are included in the plan.

9. UN and international mentors can better leverage ministry level officials to work through political matters, rather than try to inexpertly navigate the local culture. The process might be slower, but it will tend to be more accurate and sustainable long-term. It will also help provide good experience to the newly created ministries, as well as build public support for the institutions the international community is trying to transition power to.

### **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the publication "[Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste: Missed Opportunities and Hard Lessons in Empowering the Host-Nation](#)," by Nicholas J. Armstrong, Jacqueline Chura-Beaver, and Isaac Kfir, PKSOI, 10 May 2012.



### **f. TOPIC. Lessons from Liberia in Security Sector Reform ( [703](#) )**

#### **Observation.**

Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) actions launched in Liberia at its "golden hour" (mid-2003 to 2005) were absolutely critical for post-conflict recovery and for establishing a viable foundation for further stabilization work. Although every peace building context presents its own set of unique and complex challenges, certain key areas of action addressed within the Liberian security sector may also be applicable to wider peace building efforts, particularly for nations recovering from an abrupt end to a civil war. Key areas of action successfully implemented in Liberia revolved around consolidating the state's monopoly of force, maintaining the momentum of peace building, integrating SSR with DDR, operationalizing "human security," and mobilizing "networks for peace."

#### **Discussion.**

Upon the conclusion of its 14-year civil war, in August 2003, Liberia faced an incredibly difficult situation with regard to post-conflict peace building. From a pre-war population of three million, more than 250,000 people had been killed, and another one million people were displaced or missing. Pillaging, looting, abductions, torture, rape, and other human rights abuses had occurred on a

massive scale throughout the conflict period. Most Liberians had lived in constant fear of the military and police forces, not to mention the numerous warring factions. Liberia's infrastructure had been totally destroyed, with no functioning electrical grids, no public running water, no sewage, and no other public utilities. Throughout the capital of Monrovia, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) lived in slums consisting of tin shacks and garbage. After 14 years of violence, chaos, and fear, a pause for peace came about when President Charles Taylor accepted an offer of asylum from Nigeria.

Seeing a "golden hour" for peace building upon the exile of President Taylor, the United Nations, the United States, and certain key leaders/practitioners (including the authors of the article "[Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in Liberia](#)") immediately focused their engagement on Security Sector Reform.

An initial priority was to consolidate the state's monopoly of force to uphold the rule of law. Probably the most critical action taken in this regard was the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR) program, which was implemented by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in a quick, if not hasty, manner on 7 December 2003. Launching the DDRR program quickly, and involving many of the ex-combatants in transitional labor, kept these ex-combatants focused on material gains and employment – rather than on renewing violence. Simple monetary compensation for the arms/ammunition surrendered was a key factor for gaining their cooperation. Another motive for these combatants to show up at a DDRR site was temporary amnesty. Blanket or general amnesty was never issued in Liberia; however, temporary amnesty proved to be vital to the success of the DDRR program. A conscious decision was made – in the interest of disarming and demobilizing armed groups – to postpone the implementation of transitional justice in favor of temporary amnesty, and this approach paid large dividends.

The DDRR program succeeded in disarming and demobilizing 101,449 combatants, and it collected 61,918 weapons and 6,486,136 units of ammunition. Throughout execution of the DDRR program, UNMIL disposed of the collected ordinance, and it worked to seal off Liberia's borders from outside interference. An early threat to the DDRR program surfaced during a 10-day period in December 2003. Significant riots broke out at one of the DDRR sites (Camp Schefflin), posing a major threat to the UNMIL contingent there. Consequently, UNMIL put a halt to the DDRR program. However, within four months, once additional UN peacekeepers were on the ground, UNMIL re-energized the program and resumed execution in full force. That persistence gave a reassuring message to the Liberian government, and to all Liberians, that disarmament, demobilization, and peace building were moving forward and that momentum would be maintained. The pace of disarmament and demobilization picked up quickly.



Similarly, persistence in "maintaining momentum" kept the crucial 2005 Liberian general elections on schedule. In opposition, many senior statesmen, interim government officials, and potential candidates had pushed hard for holding party conventions and for rewriting the constitution in advance of any elections. However, their motives may have been self-serving – to prolong their time in office/exposure, or even to have an opportunity to divert resources (funds from the February 2004 donor conference) for their personal gains rather than for the good of Liberia. Fortunately, the UN, U.S., and certain key leaders in Liberia stood firm on keeping the October and November 2005 elections on schedule. The elections resulted in the first female head of state for Africa (Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson), but more importantly resulted in a new, legitimate government recognized by the vast majority of all Liberians – to establish and uphold the rule of law.

To consolidate a monopoly of force for this new government to uphold the rule of law, the UN, U.S., and the authors of this article took the approach of integrating DDR and SSR in the transformation of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The UN worked the "disarmament" piece – as it systematically disarmed the legacy national military force. The United States simultaneously worked the "demobilization and reintegration" pieces, while at the same time restructuring and reforming the forces. The entire DDR/SSR program included recruiting, vetting, training, equipping, fielding, sustaining, and mentoring the new force. The program also involved constructing new military bases across the country, establishing a professional defense ministry, drafting a national defense strategy, and redesigning the force structure. The point of intersection between DDR and SSR was "reintegration" – the process of reincorporating as many "appropriate" ex-combatants into the new military as possible. For the select few who were able to pass the vetting process, "reintegration" not only gave them quick employment in the new military, but also served to build trust (between former enemies) and let them become an integral part of the greater Liberian peace building effort. Due to the downsizing of the new military, however, other avenues for reintegration for most ex-combatants (economic avenues, such as public works programs) had to be pursued.

Likewise, the UN and U.S. integrated DDR and SSR in the transformation of the Liberian National Police (LNP). The highly corrupt, brutal police force that had operated during the Taylor years was, unfortunately, still largely intact after the civil war. Its officers posed a significant threat to the state and to peace. In response to this threat, the United States initially put a much higher priority and much greater attention on reforming the LNP than on reforming the AFL. The U.S. and UNMIL demobilized (purged) all unqualified policemen, vetted/reintegrated a small number of personnel, conducted extensive recruiting/vetting/training of new police forces, established a new police academy, and developed an emergency infrastructure. UNMIL took on the major role of training the LNP, worked with various international partners to build new police stations and

barracks, and equipped the force with vehicles and logistics. Also, efforts were made to increase female representation in the force.

A unique approach taken by recovery leaders and new governmental leaders was the effort to operationalize "human security." The primary focus here was to ensure that the population could gain "freedom from fear" of the military. A number of steps were taken to ensure the new AFL would not appear threatening to the people. First, as stated earlier, a vetting process was used to screen all of the candidates for the AFL. Second, the AFL's force structure was overhauled: its size was made deliberately small, it contained no special units (to preclude any loyalties to a specific person, vice the state), and it was ethnically balanced – with all tribes equally represented. Third, non-traditional training was highly emphasized, covering the following subjects: discipline, moral judgment, respect for the laws of war, Liberian history, the Liberian constitution, civics, and literacy. Also, Liberians were taught to be the trainers of the AFL, so that they could take stock in professionalizing their own military.

Finally, besides the many SSR and DDR actions to consolidate the state's monopoly of force, another key short-term action was to mobilize "networks for peace" – for the purpose of counterbalancing "networks for war." Conflict-recovery leaders were extremely proactive in promoting the actions of peace-minded groups and in establishing multilateral, national, and nongovernmental webs of people and organizations who wanted a warless Liberia. As nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) trickled back into the country, and as evacuated embassy staff personnel returned, these groups/people were significantly helped by the UN, by the embassies, and by recovery leaders to enhance reintegration and reestablishment of social/support networks. Finally, Liberian women's peace groups were considerably assisted in networking aspects, and they grew to be active informal groups for promoting local, community-based security systems.

### **Recommendation.**

In the immediate aftermath of civil war, when a "golden hour" or "window of opportunity" is presented to lay a foundation for peace building and to impact and include the (former) warring factions, leaders/practitioners should immediately address the following areas of the security sector:

1. Consolidate the state's monopoly of force to uphold the rule of law.
2. Maintain momentum of reform and peace.
3. Integrate DDR and SSR in the transformation of military and police forces.
4. Operationalize "human security."
5. Mobilize "networks for peace" to counterbalance the "networks for war."

## **Implications.**

If a post-conflict state does not gain a monopoly of force through prompt reform of its security sector, then it will lack the means to uphold the rule of law and may face renewed competition from insurgents, militias, organized crime, and revolutionary movements – which can challenge the state's legitimacy, threaten citizens/communities, and potentially push the state back into wide-scale conflict.

## **Event Description.**

This observation is based on the article "[Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in Liberia](#)," by John Blaney, Jacques Paul Klein, and Sean McFate, a policy analysis brief from the Stanley Foundation, June 2010.

## **Comments.**

A related document, which discusses security sector reform in Liberia and the importance of incorporating non-state security actors and community-based approaches, is "[Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building](#)," by Sarah Meharg and Aleisha Arnusch, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2010.



## **g. TOPIC. A U.S. Gendarmerie ( [1103](#) )**

### **Observation.**

Notwithstanding the excellent systems in place by which the U.S. already contributes to international post-conflict preparedness, such as the [U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative \(GPOI\)](#), additional benefits could be gained from the establishment of a gendarmerie within the U.S. Army.

### **Discussion.**

Recent discussion about post-conflict development – during U.S. Army War College PKSOI Elective Course PS2206 “International Development” – really drove home the importance of security in the post-conflict environment. Post-conflict security was discussed in our class session under the broad category of “level of effort.” It was widely agreed to be one of the most important factors in achieving lasting peace and follow-on development success following conflict. Without appropriate “level of effort” in security, backsliding is highly likely. Other factors discussed were the host nation’s prior democratic experience, level of economic development, and social homogeneity. Of these four factors, “level of

effort" in security is the only one over which an assisting nation (such as the U.S.) has direct control. This is a very simple observation, but speaks volumes about the imperative for nations who provide post-conflict security assistance to get it right.

From my observation at the U.S. Army War College, I get the impression from discussions with my classmates that Army Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels, as the future strategic leaders of U.S. Land Power, are ready to embrace a larger role for the U.S. Army as professional peacekeepers. By this, I mean they seem ready and willing to have a more capable Army that can do peacekeeping-type operations. I think they can envision a time in which some portion of the Army is designated as, and functions regularly as, a gendarmerie. Such a designation does not mean these personnel would have to necessarily serve in a domestic role (which would cause [Posse Comitatus](#) problems) to remain proficient. There seems to be enough international work to keep them well-trained.

A U.S. gendarmerie might offer the U.S. at least two benefits. (1) A gendarmerie would be able to focus more [than traditional military forces] on law enforcement and policing competencies, which will make it a more effective trainer and advisor of international peacekeeping and police forces. David Bayley and Robert Perito, in Chapter 3 of their book "[The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime](#)" (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010), make a persuasive case for why police are more effective at controlling violence among a population than a military force. In a post-conflict scenario in which the U.S. will have to play a direct role, a U.S. gendarmerie might be more effective at quickly assuring and empowering civil police authorities than would traditional military forces. (2) Secondary benefits might arise from the fact that a U.S. gendarmerie would simply look more like the international forces it trains. It would appear smaller, and would, notionally, wear differently styled uniforms. This is a lesson the U.S. government has already learned in employing the U.S. Coast Guard in partner capacity building missions. The Coast Guard looks and acts like other nations' navies. This fact enhances the relationship between trainer and trainee because, among other reasons, it serves to minimize the apparent power differential – a curse the U.S. always carries.

### **Recommendation.**

The U.S. Army should pay serious consideration to forming a separate gendarmerie force. Notwithstanding the excellent systems in place by which the U.S. already contributes to international post-conflict preparedness, such as GPOI, the Army should consider the benefits of having its own gendarmerie.

### **Implication.**

Budget constraints would currently make it difficult, of course, for the Army to propose such a plan to the Department of Defense (DoD) and Congress. Doing

so would force serious decisions about the future of the U.S. Army. However, the Army should consider this proposal/issue.

### **Event Description.**

This lesson is based on discussions during the U.S. Army War College PKSOI Elective Course PS2206 “International Development,” specifically the lesson centered on post-conflict stability.

### **Member Perspective. (Comments from another SOLLIMS member)**

“I really appreciate the analysis about a U.S. gendarmerie force. As an officer from Benin’s gendarmerie, I can confirm that the creation of a U.S. gendarmerie will increase U.S. Army capability and capacity in Peace and Stabilization Operations under UN mandate. Its organization, hierarchy, and professional training, through military operations, security intervention and law enforcement are key issues that involve/provide flexibility and interoperability on post-conflict stabilization.

A gendarme, by definition is the soldier of the law. A U.S. gendarme – well trained, equipped and supported – will be more useful for the future of peacekeeping operations. Respect of law, public safety and order, and military police work are essential tasks for a gendarmerie in post-conflict stabilization operations. Professional training prepares the gendarme to work easily both for military and civilian authority.

The challenges in peace and stabilization operations are the lack of coordination and integration between military planners, nongovernmental organizations, and civil society authorities. From my perspective, a U.S. gendarmerie force, with the U.S. Army experience and leadership in the world, will offer a wide variety of flexibility to operate with more efficiency and effectiveness in peacekeeping operations in the world. For example, if a U.S. gendarmerie were created/utilized in Iraq or Afghanistan, the concept and doctrine of engagement of such a gendarmerie force in post-conflict and stabilization would help to maintain/sustain the presence of the U.S. throughout successful peace and stabilization operations.

Overall, it is a good perspective for U.S. Army to think about the creation of a gendarmerie for peace and stabilization operations. This initiative will help the U.S. Army to change the mentality and perception of populations about the warrior picture of U.S. military in the world. A gendarme is more close to the population that he protects, secures and prevents from danger with regard to the respect of law.

In Benin, the gendarmerie as a military force is part of the Ministry of Defense, but with its missions of public security, order, and law enforcement, it works for civilian authorities through the Ministry of Homeland Security and the Ministry of Justice. In some rural areas and difficult environments, the gendarmerie is the representative of the state and acts with regard to the respect of law.”





## **h. TOPIC. The Need to Create a U.S. Gendarmerie for Peace and Stability Operations ( [1174](#) )**

### **Observation.**

After a conflict, the justice and reconciliation process can contribute to stability and encourage dialogue and reintegration of the former combatants into society; however, appropriate resources to work this process are often not available. This process is difficult to realize in African environments where parts of the population are illiterate. How can they understand and respect the rule of law, if the law is disconnected from their environment? How can they respect the rule of law, when we know that the vulnerable people – especially women and children – have been displaced from their own property (from the urban to rural areas) and need security and food/basic necessities to survive? How can they respect the rule of law, when the military is not trained, equipped, and specialized to respect of the rule of law? Do you think that many military or police forces have this capability in African environments?

### **Discussion.**

Critical and creative thinking allows one to understand that the military must be trained, equipped, and specialized in rule of law and its enforcement in order to assist the civilians in the rural areas in Africa. Civilian organizations do not have the capability to execute rule of law processes in a post-conflict operation without a military/formed police unit at the operational and tactical levels. In a well organized and credible state, a system of proper human/governance behavior and relative stability can help to transform the post-conflict period to a rule of law system, where the state has the monopoly of force and the individuals respect human rights. To attain such an environment/system, the peace/stability operation focuses on five main pillars: Security, Justice and Reconciliation, Humanitarian Assistance / Social Well-being, Governance and Participation, and Economic Development. Each pillar requires coordination between civilian and military actors, to include the State/Government, Defense/Security, Justice, and Development agencies, and, importantly, each pillar requires appropriate resources/assets.

The U.S. Government (USG) would gain more in its assistance to countries in Africa if the U.S. military were to develop a kind of military Formed Police Unit (FPU) or “gendarmerie” for peace/stability operations. This asset would not only be critical for executing rule of law programs, but could also help to achieve unity of effort with interagency and unity of command – through ties to the various ministries and agencies. It is also not a myth but rather a cultural military

challenge for the U.S. military with regard to perceptions of gaining victory or conflict termination. Throughout any peace/stability operation period, working with/within civilian interagency planning and coordination processes requires patience and time, which may not be easy for the U.S. military. It is clear that stability and development in a host nation are long processes; however, these conditions are often incompatible with the U.S. military mindset and culture – geared toward quick and rapid results. A military FPU seems more appropriate for such long-term work needed in these conditions.

### **Recommendation.**

From my perspectives, for future peace/stability operations, the U.S. military needs to emphasize support of the rule of law (RoL); Security Sector Reform (SSR); and, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) for peace/stability operations in Africa. Today, it is difficult to achieve successful results due to the military's cultural challenges. However, the creation of a kind of military FPU, as a U.S. "gendarmierie," would certainly open opportunities to develop flexibility to work within the complex civilian and military environment, execute critical programs (RoL, SSR, and DDR) over long timeframes, and apply U.S. funding/resources more efficiently with better chances for success in Africa.

### **Implication.**

Without a flexible military force like a U.S. gendarmerie, the strategy, concept, planning, and resourcing processes may not be optimized for peace and stability operations (PSO), and attaining PSO goals may prove difficult for the U.S.

### **Event Description.**

This lesson was derived from seminar discussions during lessons 1-10 of U.S. Army War College PKSOI Elective Course PS2219 "Concepts and Principles."

### **Member Perspective. (Comments from another SOLLIMS member)**

"A U.S. gendarmerie dedicated for SSR missions certainly has benefits. In terms of organizational culture, training, and equipment, a gendarme force would bridge the capabilities gap – more robust than regular police and forestalling the need to use military force except in extreme cases. Gendarmes would also obviate legal restrictions with the use of the military for training police. Determining the authority for such a force would need to be settled – probably Department of State (DoS)."



### **3. CONCLUSION**

Creating and maintaining a safe and secure environment is fundamental to success on peacekeeping and stability operations. Recent experiences, as shown in this Sampler (in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Timor-Leste, and Liberia), have demonstrated the important role that police forces play in this critical endeavor.

Key lessons on the use of police forces and building HN police/security capacity include:

- Security strategy and the legal/criminal justice systems must work hand-in-hand to achieve peace and good order.
- Maintaining consistency and impartiality are critical; those who enforce the law must be seen as true neutrals in the process.
- When the U.S. military assumes the role of assessing/advising/training HN police forces, it should distinguish between “stability policing” and “community-based policing,” and should transition from the former to the latter at the appropriate point.
- When conducting “community-based policing,” it is not only important to understand HN principles/systems/perspectives, but also to ensure that normative standards of police behavior are established and enforced, to include:
  - responsiveness to the local community
  - accountability to the rule of law
  - defense of human rights
- Embedding advisors with local police units can facilitate greater cultural understanding, access, and rapport with locals.
- Community/village elders can play a vital role when working to establish a credible, representative local police force for their communities.
- The HN central government should be encouraged to adopt a “whole-of-nation” philosophy – whereby HN government agencies “team” with lower level government officials and community leaders to find commonality and build consensus against threats to peace/stability.
- Community leaders should help determine priorities for law enforcement activities in their areas, as well as for the training of local police personnel.
- At all levels, it is essential to establish and closely monitor a policy whereby the most qualified applicants are hired (and promoted) for police/security positions.
- When transforming an existing police force with a history of problems, consideration should be given to:

- demobilizing (purging) all unqualified police personnel
- vetting/reintegrating small numbers of qualified/proven personnel
- conducting extensive recruiting/vetting/training of new police personnel
- establishing and/or revamping police academies, as necessary
- The engagement of police forces in community “peace building” programs and networks can serve to build an environment of safety and security. Such involvement helps demonstrate that the police are indeed interested in community issues, opens communication channels, and builds trust among community members.

Other recommendations for consideration:

- The U.S. Government should develop and assess options for creation of a U.S. gendarmerie for use in stability operations.
- The UN – through its Police Contributing Countries (PCC) – should endeavor to increase capacity for deploying police personnel/units, due to growing demands. The UN should also endeavor to ensure commonality of training/standards.

Through wider dissemination of the aforementioned lessons, through their inclusion in planning, training, and education programs, and through on-the-ground emphasis, significant impacts can be made during the course of future peacekeeping and stability operations.

#### **4. COMMAND POC**

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PKSOI reviewer: Mr. Dan French, Chief, Lessons Learned Branch.


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## RELATED DOCUMENTS, REFERENCES, AND LINKS

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- [“Police in UN Peacekeeping: Improving Selection, Recruitment, and Deployment,”](#) William J. Durch and Michelle Ker, International Peace Institute, 8 November 2013
- [“All-Female Formed Police Units,”](#) SOLLIMS Lesson #1257, David Mosinski, PKSOI, 25 September 2013
- [“UN Police Magazine, 11th edition,”](#) United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, July 2013
- [“Social Capital, Policing and the Rule-of-Law: Keys to Stabilization,”](#) Karen Finkenbinder and Paul M. Sangrey, PKSOI, 16 July 2013
- [“Fostering a Police Reform Paradigm,”](#) Karen Finkenbinder, Robert E. Lowe, and Raymond Millen, PKSOI, 18 June 2013
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- [“U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap,”](#) Dennis E. Keller, PKSOI, 20 August 2010
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