U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center

Historical Services Division

RIDING THE HYDRA: HOW THE ARMY ENTERPRISE WENT TO WAR 2001-2007

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Executive Summary

The history of the U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom is replete with tactical and operational studies, and the shifts in strategy are well documented. The Chief of Staff of the Army's (CSA) official study, *The U.S. Army in the Iraq War*, provides an excellent analysis of the operational level of war. "Riding the Hydra," however, examines the institutional Army, specifically the Army staff, and its efforts to prepare the Army for war.[1]

When President George W. Bush made the decision to launch the war in Iraq, the Army faced a two-front war for the first time since World War II. Though the Army in 2002 was much better trained, equipped, and ready than its predecessor sixty years before, it still showed the effects of declining budgets and lack of strategic focus. The modern, professional Army requires bureaucratic processes in order to coordinate a complex and highly sophisticated system. The defense budgets have declined over the years, but they remain as much as 14 percent of the total federal budget. Managing those funds properly and legally requires a system of firm controls.[2]

Yet those administrative processes, while necessary for proper stewardship of Army resources, can also stifle innovation and development of new capabilities while having a stultifying effect on equipping forces. Those procedures were optimized for a Cold War Army, not a modern expeditionary Army with a rapid deployment mission. With the urgent need to prepare for war in Iraq, the Army's senior leadership began to energize the Army enterprise from the top down, while reacting to requirements from the bottom up. Senior leaders created the Army Strategic Planning Board (ASPB) to react to urgent requirements from commanders preparing to deploy, but it grew into a more proactive role as its processes matured. The ASPB became the vehicle for introducing innovation and accelerating processes through new initiatives such as the Rapid

Equipping Force (REF), the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI), and the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Task Force. The ASPB identified requirements and sought accelerated solutions, but paired with the Setting the Force General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) to match resources to these requirements. These two forums later merged and became the Army Requirements and Resources Board (AR2B), which remains in place.

Accelerating processes and introducing innovation in a system that depends on bureaucracy to function requires energetic individuals empowered to make decisions. That can sometimes be dangerous, as the urgency of war might lead to disregard for necessary safeguards. In the preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army developed a process for rapidly responding to urgent requirements and anticipating future needs, while maintaining the bureaucratic structure necessary for proper function. The methods of requirements determination and resources allocation that the Army developed initially to support combat operations were later codified in the Army Strategic Campaign Plan, which included Army Transformation and the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process in a holistic system.

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I - Identifying Requirements

The President's decision in 2002 to invade Iraq posed several challenges to senior Army leadership. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki selected Lt. Gen. Richard A. "Dick" Cody as the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, in the summer of 2002 to get the Army ready to go to war in Iraq.[3] Shinseki had served four assignments in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (ODCS), G3, and understood how cumbersome Army bureaucracy had become, especially with regard to acquisitions. He charged Cody with accelerating the processes to get the Army ready.[4] Cody's biggest challenge lay in integrating all the various actions necessary to equip and deploy the Army. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) had provided planning guidance for combat operations in Iraq in October 2001, and the Army had already begun the massive buildup of forces in the Kuwaiti desert. While the SECDEF's guidance was necessarily general, it limited the force employed to 250,000.[5]

Cody arrived at the Pentagon in July 2002 and found a daunting task ahead: prepare the Army to deploy to a second combat zone while still committed to combat in Afghanistan and engaged in missions around the world. Those operations consumed a considerable percentage of a force already reduced by the post-Cold War drawdown to an end strength of 480,801.[6] The Army had deployed Special Operations Forces to Afghanistan in October 2001, followed by a task force consisting of units from the 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne Division. In addition to the growing commitment to Afghanistan (then at 8,863), the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) hosted 6,645 Soldiers in Kuwait, 840 Soldiers in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain on Operation Desert Spring, and 860 in the Sinai for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission.[7]

The U.S. remained committed to the Balkans, with significant forces assigned to Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Hungary (2,755) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo and Macedonia (4,955). Task Force Bravo in Honduras consumed 140 Soldiers, while Operation Noble Eagle required nearly 20,000 Soldiers for security in the Continental United States (CONUS). In addition to these troops deployed on operations, 120,250 Soldiers remained forward stationed in Europe and Korea. In total, the Army had some 190,500 Soldiers deployed in 122 countries. By 2004, the number of Soldiers deployed would settle at 272,000, with 15,000 in Afghanistan on Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and 105,000 in Kuwait and Iraq on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).[8]

Shinseki hosted a two-star conference in the summer of 2002 for senior Army leadership and commanders of units projected to deploy under Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1003V. After the conference, Cody met with the commanders set to deploy first: 1st Cavalry Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). Cody had previously served as Director for Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization (DAMO-OD) and had focused on the units' readiness. He went over each unit's current Unit Status Report (USR) and directed the commanders to prepare Operational Needs Statements (ONS) to bring their units up to C-1 for deployment, eliminating "in lieu of" requirements.[9]

Cody determined that, in addition to the myriad tasks needed to prepare the Army to go to war, and the challenges associated with ongoing Army Transformation, he needed to accelerate the acquisitions and fielding processes. He re-energized the Army Strategic Planning Board (ASPB) as the first step in fast-tracking the process from the top.[10] The ASPB had been created originally on September 14, 2001, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The purpose of the board at that time was to begin planning to address the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The Army G3, Lt. Gen. David McKiernan, brought three officers from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) to begin developing what would be called the Army Strategic Campaign Plan. The planning over the next month included a war game at the Army War College. After the plan was completed on October 19, 2001, the ASPB went essentially dormant.[11] Cody re-styled the ASPB as a decision-making body, chaired by the G3 and staffed by representatives from the G1, G8, and the rest of the Army staff. Cody used the board to quickly prioritize resources within the Army in an effort to better support the war and help sustain current and future operations.[12] The initial list of requirements from the deploying commanders became the first set of decisions required at the ASPB and provided a starting point for the ASPB to begin addressing unit problems.[13]

The ASPB process began somewhat hectically, as the board worked to identify urgent initial requirements. Cody set the ASPB focus on three priorities:

1) Soldier equipment and weapons.
2) Vehicle equipment and weapons.
3) Communications equipment, especially Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).[14]

Since OEF had begun, ONS requests had come through the Army Operation Center (AOC) to be distributed to the appropriate Army staff section. Cody directed the AOC to send the ONS to the ASPB in order to address these issues quickly.[15] The ASPB met twice weekly, first in a working session, and then in a decision forum. Cody chaired the decision meeting. Lt. Gen. Benjamin Griffin, DCS-G8 and the Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition Logistics and Technology) (ASA [ALT]) also attended for additional coordination, but it was a G3 decision-making forum and Cody had the authority to make the necessary calls. Cody set the tone for the mission, energizing and empowering the G3 staff. Preparing for war was not "business as usual" and the staff worked seven days per week. Cody personally attended the ASPB meeting every Thursday and made decisions quickly in order to make necessary preparations.[16]

These ONS provided the first requirements for the ASPB.[17] For the ASPB decision brief, each ONS was presented on a "quad" chart: Problem Definition, Size of the Problem, What the Unit Needed, and the proposed Course of Action (COA). Cody would make the decision, then sign the quad chart to affirm the decision and move money as necessary. The Director of the Army Budget Office (ABO) assigned an officer to the ASPB to ensure that the money was legally allocated and to track which funds came from what programs.[18]

In January 2003, Cody sent the ASPB on a staff assistance visit to 1st Cavalry Division, 4th Infantry Division (ID), and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment to check their

preparations for deployment and to identify any additional problems. That trip generated more requirements for the ASPB to address beyond simple equipment shortages, including the following:

- Recommended force structure changes; the 4th ID was the only division without a chemical company.
- Need for Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) permission to start Anthrax prophylaxis.
- Unit lack of visibility of ammunition to be issued in theater.
- Shifting of National Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations for deploying units and the effect on the training cycles.
- Timing of turn-in of life cycle replacement equipment.[19]

This holistic look at unit requirements reflected Cody's desire to use ASPB to break through the Army's "stovepiped" functions and look across the entire Army enterprise. Most actions could not be completed without affecting something else, and perhaps having long-term or wide-ranging effects on the Army.[20] Cody placed emphasis for fielding squarely on the deploying units, ignoring the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) when necessary. In one instance, the 82nd Airborne Division was set to field a piece of equipment. Cody saw that the 30th Infantry Brigade (North Carolina Army National Guard) was preparing to deploy for a rotation to Iraq. He directed that 30th Infantry Brigade receive the equipment before the 82nd. The decision caused howls of protest, but it set the tone for the remainder of the process: deploying units had priority.[21]

The success of the system lay in the decision-making authority granted to Cody. Each week he directed that current year funds be reprogrammed and authorized out-of-DAMPL fielding of critical items to deployed or deploying units. Cody provided a weekly report to the CSA and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) of all decisions made and money moved or obligated, which often ran into the millions of dollars (see Fig. 1).[22]

ODS Bradley – Out of DAMPL Fielding

The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) had the oldest, non-ODS (Operation Desert Storm) Bradleys in the Army, with the worst Operational Readiness (OR) rates. The ASPB identified some 200 ODS Bradleys at Anniston Army Depot, prepared for shipment to the 2nd Infantry Division and to Army Pre-Positioned Stock-4 (APS-4) in Korea. The 2nd Infantry Division was next in line in the DAMPL for fielding, but was not on the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) for Iraq. Cody ordered the Bradleys to be diverted to Fort Carson to replace the 3rd ACR fleet, and called CG, Eighth Army, to explain the rationale, promising to replace them within six months. The issue caused minor friction at the time, but the move demonstrated the value of the ASPB. In the only instance of Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) concern about the process, Shinseki later told Cody that a decision of this magnitude should have been reserved for the CSA, but he supported it.

Figure 1 - ODS Bradley – Out of DAMPL Fielding
Source: Gen. (Ret.) Richard A. Cody, interview by Dr. Michael E. Lynch, November 21, 2017, recording, Senior Officer Oral History Program (SOOHP), U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

The board tracked those requirements by Major/Combatant Commands: CENTCOM, European Command (EUCOM), Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), and Army Component Command, as well as additional support required by Title 10.[23] As the system matured, the requirements were consolidated into two lists: the Combatant Command Support Tasks (CCST) and the Army Combatant Command (ACC) tasks.[24] Further refinements led to CENTCOM/EUCOM Preparatory Tasks, ACC and GSC tasks, CFLCC tasks, Reconstitution Support Tasks (RST), Army Support Tasks (AST), and Rotation Preparation Tasks (RPT).[25] Each task received a task number keyed to the list it supported (Partial list located at Annex A).

Despite the accelerated decision-making process, the Army's own internal bureaucracy sometimes slowed things down. External forces, such as pressure from the media, often identified episodic or systemic problems and demanded immediate solutions (see Fig. 2).[26]

Individual Body Armor

Individual body armor provides an example of the shortcomings of the Army acquisition system. Maneuver troops and those involved with ground combat received both the outer tactical vests (OTV) with small arms protective insert (SAPI) ceramic plates. Support troops, however, did not receive them despite being exposed to the same degree of danger. The *New York Times* ran a story criticizing the Army's policy on body armor, and Cody, G3, moved immediately to fix the problem. He identified and fixed a reporting issue that caused the problem, and then ordered body armor to be issued to all Soldiers. The slow and antiquated procurement process took 145 days from Cody's order for the first Soldiers to receive sets, including forty-seven days to allocate funding. Coalition units participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom, however, required only twelve days to purchase the body armor from a Michigan company and issue the sets to Soldiers. By 2007, the delivery and acquisition process took only forty-five days, but a Government Accounting Office (GAO) revealed that "shortages in body armor were due to material shortages, production limitations and in-theater distribution problems."

Figure 2 - Individual Body Armor
Source: Michael Moss, "Many Missteps Tied to Delay in Armor for Troops in Iraq," *New York Times*, March 7, 2005.

Part of the acquisitions process for deploying units included identifying items that could be transferred from other units, or even other theaters. Up-Armored HMMWVs, for instance, were shifted from Korea and Kosovo to Kuwait for issue to deploying units. Some of these items were critical enough to track to the item level, and the numbers were validated every week at the ASPB.[27]

While the ASPB, chaired by the G3, addressed requirements as identified through ONS, resourcing of those requirements belonged to the G8. A natural tension existed between the G3 operators who saw the crucial need to support the Soldier in the field, and the G8 who saw the equally critical requirement to keep the system operating both legally and practically.[28] Griffin, DCS, G8, chaired a separate forum called the Setting the Force (STF) General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC), which met weekly to address the issues the current force faced and to prepare for follow on rotations of forces.[29] Sometimes the STF GOSC made decisions that conflicted with those of the ASPB, in which case the G3 adjudicated the matter as the final authority.

When Cody moved from DCS, G3, to be the Vice Chief of Staff, he combined the ASPB and the STF GOSC and called the new forum the Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B).[30] The AR2B featured a tri-chair arrangement known as the "three kings": the G3, the G8, and the Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the

Army (Financial Management and Comptroller). In function, the three kings made the coordinated decisions, but the VCSA had veto authority. In form, the system changed from "the G3 made the decision" to "the AR2B made the decision." This smoothed some of the working relationships among the Army Staff (ARSTAF).[31]

Movement to ASCP

The continued maturation of the requirement identification and resolution process merged with the myriad other tasks required for Army Transformation, as well as Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). The need to combine all requirements into one, enterprise-level program resulted in the development of the Army Strategic Campaign Plan (ASCP). The ASCP was divided into four lines of effort (LOE):

- Support to the Joint Warfighter
- Conduct Homeland Security
- Lead the Army at War
- Transform the Army

Within each LOE, the plan used three time horizons:

- Immediate: Now to 6 months
- Mid-term: Next 6 years
- Long-term: Next 15 years

Finally, the tasks were divided into three categories: decisive, shaping, and sustaining. The tasks themselves were categorized as common tasks, integrated strategic tasks, tasks to subordinate units, and other tasks. The tasks listed as "other" were probably the original list of tasks that began coming into the ASPB in the early days of the preparation for OIF 1. The G-3/5/7 staff maintained these tasks in the ASCP database on a classified server.

The importance of the original list of items the ASPB tracked, and its relevance to modern day planners, lies not in the specific detail on the list and what they tracked, but rather how the ARSTAF looked at the "Road to War" requirements. An examination of the Army end state in OIF provides a lens through which to view the Army's efforts to shift to a war footing. The list located on the classified server addresses the Army's requirements based on its evolving missions and the ongoing Army Transformation program.

II - Accelerating the Process

Gen. Jack Keane, VCSA, realized in late 2001 that the Army's acquisition system was too slow and cumbersome to support an expeditionary Army preparing to deploy on a short timeline. The acquisition laws and regulations, and the infrastructure and procedures they required, were better suited to a Cold War Army. He created two organizations in late 2001 to try to accelerate the process: the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) and the Rapid Equipping Force (REF).

The RFI focused on providing equipment that Soldiers and units were buying commercially. As units prepared to deploy to Afghanistan, and later to Iraq, Soldiers began buying commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items for personal use (see Annex B). These items included personal items such as ballistic goggles, kneepads, and protective gear for Soldiers and laser target locators and binoculars for units. Keane reasoned that if Soldiers needed these items for deployment, the Army should buy them and issue them. In addition to Soldiers' personal items, COTS solutions existed for unit equipment as well. The RFI identified these items and then purchased them for free issue to units and Soldiers quickly, dramatically reducing the time required for procurement. The RFI operated under Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier, and as it equipped the troops it also introduced the items into the supply system.[32] PEO Soldier gave the RFI the funding and manning it needed to be immediately effective. By 2007, every Soldier in the active Army and about 60 percent of those in the Reserve components had been issued an RFI kit.[33]

In order to accelerate the acquisitions and equipping process, Keane also created the Rapid Equipping Force (REF), under G3 with Army scientist Col. Bruce Jette, an Acquisitions Officer with a PhD in Materials Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), as its director. Jette was the Acquisitions Officer for the Objective Force Task Force advising the VCSA. With previous experience as Program Manager (PM) Land Warrior, Jette had developed small robotic systems to assist Soldiers. He had gained local renown in the Pentagon as the head of the Rapid Insertion of Robotics Systems (RIRS) initiative, which used off-the-shelf technology to solve an immediate Soldier problem (see Fig. 3).[34]

PackBots

PackBots are small, tracked, remotely controlled devices with an extender arm and attached camera. The first PackBot models were used in Afghanistan in 2002 to explore isolated enemy areas, including caves. Counterinsurgency and counter IED operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom required extensive use of PackBots. The manufacturer, iRobot, delivered its 3,000 unit to the Department of Defense in 2010.

Figure 3 - PackBots
Source: David Hoyt, Hayagreeva Rao, and Robert Sutton, "The Rapid Equipping Force: Customer-Focused Innovation in the U.S. Army" (Case Study L-20, Stanford University School of Business, February 4, 2014), 23.

The REF identified COTS and government off-the-shelf (GOTS) equipment and systems that could be quickly purchased to fill Army needs. CSA Shinseki gave Jette his initial guidance to do the following:

- **Equip** Soldiers with new tools that will help them in the field.
- **Insert** technologies that might be immature, but could be useful in a combat environment and further developed if they proved effective.
- **Assess** Army practices and operational needs and provide feedback to senior leaders.[35]

The REF mission received several refinements over the years, but can be defined as to "combine and integrate functions that cross the several Army staff elements and Army component commands for the purpose of accelerating material Solutions and Technology inserted to forces committed in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)."[36] Jette briefed Cody on September 2, 2003, on his progress in developing the organization and restated CSA guidance to:

- Operate in the zone between current and future forces.
- Solve immediate force needs.
- Experiment with technology and solutions for the future force in an operational environment.
- Inform stakeholders of the results.[37]

The REF not only identified quick solutions, it deployed teams to the field to issue the equipment and train Soldiers on its use. The REF placed field labs in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to more properly develop solutions. The REF also sent Forward Operational Assessment (FOA) teams to the field to check progress, determine if the solutions were working, and then report back to the ASPB on what should be either terminated or continued as a program of record (POR) (see Fig. 4).[38]

REF development of the "WellCam"

In March 2003, a REF support team in Afghanistan received a request for support from a unit for help in clearing wells. A REF field engineer made a camera to inspect the wells using spare parts from the local lab. The device found a large cache of weapons on its very first mission, and "WellCam" was born. By June 2004, units in Iraq and Afghanistan were using 5th generation Wireless Wellcams.

Figure 4 - REF development of the "WellCam"
Source: Paul Stoskus (Deputy Director, REF), "Department of the Army Rapid Equipping Force" (briefing to International Armaments Technology and Exhibition, June 16, 2004).

While the REF tackled a range of problems, its scope was deliberately limited. The primary criterion for REF action concerned whether or not the REF could have any effect in a timely manner. "Timely" was never officially defined, but Cody established ninety days as a target from requirement determination to fielding of the interim solution. The ASPB validated the urgency of the need, while the REF determined if the solution

could be purchased at a reasonable cost, and how durable it might be.[39] The REF's success indicated in Figure 5 is impressive, and grew to 550 pieces of equipment and 75,000 items by 2007. See Annex C for additional examples.

PROTECTING SOLDIERS

Area	One Year Ago		Today
Soldier body armor	Est. 12 percent OIF Soldiers equipped	→	On-hand — in OIF, enough body armor for all Army Soldiers
Armored HMMWVs	500 OEF/OIF HMMWVs	→	Over 3,700 OEF/OIF HMMWVs
State-of-the-art Soldier equipment through the Rapid Fielding Initiative	2 percent OEF/OIF Soldiers equipped	→	All OIF 2 Soldiers – June 2004
Armor kits for light-skinned vehicles	Contingency missions only	→	Over 6,700 OEF/OIF vehicles equipped
Stryker/Bradley add-on armor	Bradley plan only	→	100 percent Stryker armor 96 percent OIF 2 Bradley complete
Aircraft survivability equipment (ASE)	All OEF/OIF rotary wing aircraft equipped	→	All OEF/OIF rotary wing aircraft upgraded ASE
Rapid aerostat initial deployment (RAID)	3 OEF systems deployed (March 2003)	→	20 OEF/OIF systems deployed (March 2003)
Counter IED	None fielded	→	432 systems in theater
Tactical & small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)	None deployed to OEF/OIF	→	35 deployed to OEF/OIF Objective: 194

Figure 5 - Rapid Equipping Force (REF) successful improvements in 2004.
Source: 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, Figure 6-2.

Despite the success of the REF, the process was not without friction. Some of the decisions that assisted deploying units also affected other processes. Part of this tension grew out of the ARSTAF oversight of REF. Both the commanding general of Army Materiel Command and the ASA (ALT) agreed that the REF should belong to the acquisition community, since its primary function concerned acquisition. The REF existed for three years in bureaucratic limbo without a firm Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) or funding line, until Cody, then the CSA, severed the Gordian knot by directing the establishment of a TDA for the REF. He assigned the G8 responsibility for funding the REF in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and directed Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to address the full Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Material, Personnel and Facilities (DTLOMPF) implications of new capabilities. Cody also determined that the REF would remain under the control of the G3/5/7, reporting to the VCSA.[40]

The primary weakness of the REF system lay in the mechanism for "handing off" the newly-developed system or capability to the acquisitions community to be

developed as a POR. Some, such as the Buffalo Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and the TALON Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) robot were handed off, but others were not. The push to accelerate the system and fill urgent requirements ran counter to a system designed to make orderly and efficient fielding.[41]

Getting Left of the Boom

When IEDs became the most prevalent and deadly form of attack on U.S. forces, CENTCOM Commander Gen. John Abizaid asked the Pentagon for a "Manhattan Project" effort on neutralizing the IED threat. Cody ordered Col. Chris Hughes of his Army Initiatives Group (AIG) to form an IED Task Force (TF) and submit its requirements to the ASPB. Hughes formed a group of active and retired special operators and explosives experts, and Col. Bruce Jette. Jette grasped the problem immediately: "Right now we're attacking and trying to just protect ourselves from the blast. We've got to move left of the boom."[42] The team analyzed how the IEDs were financed, how they were made, and how and where they were placed.

Cody selected Brig. Gen. Joseph Votel to command the task force, and it deployed to Iraq to begin teaching Soldiers and units how to reduce or mitigate the threat. Cody also paired the IED TF with the REF, which completed necessary rapid acquisitions, and the IED TFs in-theater co-located with the REF teams.[43] The IED TF eventually merged with other service efforts to form the Joint IED TF in 2004, with the Army as Executive Agent.[44] REF continued to support the Joint IED TF until 2006, when DOD created the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).[45]

"Getting left of the boom" may also be considered a metaphor for the overall planning process for operations. Early on in the process, the ARSTAF planners began trying to shift to proactive, rather than reactive, planning. The list of tasks that began as urgent requests and ONS from deploying units gave the ARSTAF initial direction. The Army's Title 10 responsibilities, the Uniform Joint Task List (UJTL), and the Wartime Executive Agency Requirements (WEAR), provided the framework for more predictive staff work.

III - Competing Priorities

> ## Competing Priorities for HQDA Staff
>
> The multiple, competing priorities drove HQDA staff officers to focus below strategic level, doubtless in an effort to accomplish tasks that could be done and therefore have some results. One Army G-3/5/7 staff officer had summarized the situation best in a presentation in January 2002, listing what was being done and what was not being done:
>
> "We're almost totally focused on '100-300 meter targets' and are not spending appropriate time and effort on the '500 to 1000 meter targets,' which should be the main effort at HQDA level."

Figure 6 - Competing priorities for HQDA staff
Source: ODCS, G3, Directorate of Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization, "Priorities, Projects, Etc." (slide presentation, January 8, 2002).

The rush to prepare for war in Iraq did not reduce the Army's already heavy requirements. Strategic requirements, including ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan and the conversion of the Army from the traditional division-based force structure to a leaner, more agile "modular" or brigade-sized force complicated the planning for Iraq operations. Despite the operations, planning moved ahead for the move of Headquarters, U.S. Army South (USARSO) from Panama to CONUS; continued force protection of critical sites in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere; and security planning for the 2002 Olympics in Salt Lake City.[46]

Holes in the Yard

One of the many challenges the G3 faced during the early years of OIF was the large number of unfunded requirements that existed even before the war began. After the war began, there were even more unfunded requirements. These came to be known as the "holes in the yard." Before 9/11, the Army had experienced serious budget declines over the late 1990s, both in real terms and as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This caused the Army to lag behind in procurement of new systems, including M1 Abrams tanks, M2/3 (ODS) Bradley fighting vehicles, AH-64 Apache helicopters, UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, and other systems throughout the force. With the bill for these major systems reaching $32.5 billion, and additional $21.5 billion required for recapitalization and upgrades, the Army found itself in a $54 billion hole. Even when applying "in lieu of" substitutes for some of the combat and other systems, the Army still needed $41.7 billion to simply to fill all the "holes in the yard." After 9/11, operational needs for the GWOT, required an additional $14.5 billion. This $68.5 billion deficit only addressed purchases of major and items, equipment, and ammunition. It did not account for other requirements, such as training, transportation of forces, construction of bases and support areas in Kuwait, or any of the other requirements necessary to move the Army to war (see Annex D).[47]

Army Transformation

> *Our nation is at peace. Our economy is prosperous. We have strategic perspective and technological potential. This window of historic opportunity will grow narrower with each passing day. We can transform today and a time of peace and prosperity. Or we can try to change tomorrow on the eve of the next war, when the window has closed, our perspective has narrowed, and they are potential limited by the press of time and the constraints of resources.*
>
> *- General Eric Shinseki*
>
> *2000-2001 AUSA Green Book*

CSA Shinseki released the Army Transformation Campaign Plan in November 2001, launching the Army on a 30-year cycle to completely transform and modernize the force.[48] Cody had commanded the 101st Airborne Division and during that assignment had witnessed the downsides of an Army transforming itself while at war. As part of the Army Transformation plan, the Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) had required all Apache and Blackhawk helicopter battalions in the active Army divest a portion of their aircraft to be reissued to the National Guard. The Guard's aging fleet of AH-1 Cobras and UH-1 Hueys simply could not be economically maintained anymore. This was a reasonable peacetime decision. After the attacks on 9/11 and subsequent shift to combat operations in Afghanistan, however, the plan would have stripped active units of critical aircraft just when they were needed most. Cody was able to successfully argue to keep all his division's aircraft in place, but the other shifts happened according to plan.[49]

Given Shinseki's quote about transforming in peacetime, and all of the challenges the Army faced while prosecuting two simultaneous wars and all the other competing priorities, the decision to continue transformation is worthy of examination. There is an argument to be made that continuing transformation under such circumstances was at best foolhardy, and at worst, potentially dangerous. Further examination of the process may confirm that argument. In the context of the time, however, other pressures existed that made transformation necessary.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had long believed that the Army was too ponderous, slow, and hidebound by tradition to continue to be effective. He had long pushed for smaller, lighter forces that could be deployed more quickly. While relations between the Army and the Secretary of Defense were bumpy, Shinseki and Gen. Peter Schoomaker had earned Congressional respect and support for the transformation plan. The Army, once transformed, would regain some of the strategic relevance it had lost after the end of the Cold War. While delaying transformation might have made the process easier and less risky in the long run, the Army could not afford to lose the political and bureaucratic capital, with associated funding, that it had gained for the transformation process.

Killing Comanche

The Army experience with the RAH-66 Comanche attack helicopter system demonstrated an organization dedicated to research and development of future advanced systems, yet not so wedded to those systems that it could not shift focus when and where necessary. The Comanche system began in 1996, with full production beginning in 2006. The Comanche was designed to be a low observable attack aircraft replacement for the Apache. When delivered, this aircraft would revolutionize the Army's attack helicopter role. It featured state-of-the-art onboard maintenance diagnostics, and a two level maintenance design intended to make it easier to maintain. All that advanced technology, however, carried a huge price tag: the Comanche program was funded at $14.6 billion over seven years, which would buy 121 aircraft.

In 2004, the Army began relooking at some of the decisions made earlier. Remembering the ARI, Cody began studying the status of the aviation fleet across the Army. He realized that though the Comanche provided for the long-term future, the current fleet was both aging and being worn out due to combat use. He determined that canceling the Comanche program and reprogramming the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE) funds for maintenance, upgrades, and additional purchases would better suit the Army's requirements immediately and in the long-term future. The money saved from the Comanche program could be used to purchase 825 new aircraft, in addition to funding the Apache Block III conversion and investing in new technology such as fly-by-wire, common cockpit, upgraded munitions, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and allow the Army to begin work on a joint multi-role helicopter.

The Comanche, moreover, had become such a hyper optimized, expensive weapons platform that it would be cost-prohibitive to operate. Cody briefed President Bush on the recommendation to kill the Comanche program on February 20, 2004. The Army's senior, and most experienced, Aviation general officer recommended to the president that the Comanche program be killed. Cody emphasized to the president, however, that the only way the process would work is if the Army were allowed to keep the money from the Comanche RDTE effort, and reprogram it into current requirements. The president, and Rumsfeld, agreed, and in a somewhat unusual move, the Army kept its money (see Annex E).[50]

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) / Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS)

The Army also found itself in the midst of ongoing Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) processes that would see fourteen Army installations closed or realigned beginning in 2005.[51] The BRAC Commission recommended realigning or closing several Army installations beginning in 2005. With many of these occurring overseas, the Army's next challenge was to identify spaces in CONUS for returning units and to develop infrastructure to support the moves. When that round of BRAC was complete in 2011, the Army had closed 13 CONUS bases and realigned 53 bases, while also completing a global re-structuring that drastically reduced overseas presence. The units on those bases moved to other locations, many of which needed infrastructure improvements in order to accommodate the new units. Many schools, such as Transportation, Ordnance, Air Defense, Military Police, Chemical, and Armor, all closed at the installations they had occupied for decades and moved to new locations. Several major headquarters also moved, including four-star headquarters such as TRADOC and Forces Command. Though it was widely viewed as a successful cost-saving move, the BRAC must also be evaluated for the enormous costs involved in constructing the necessary facilities to house the units being moved. For a period of five years during the height of the BRAC, the Army was accepting several newly constructed buildings every Friday. In all, 90,000 new barracks rooms were constructed. There were also costs associated with shutting down the facilities and moving the actual units.

The Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) has had strategic impacts as well, and should be evaluated in terms of the effects of those moves on U.S. Army strategic capabilities A large part of IGPBS was retrenchment from Europe, and a resurgent Russia has made that reduction of forces alarming. The current rotation of forces allows limited strategic presence, but at increased costs in funding, Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO), and Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO). The re-stationing of units in CONUS has also placed a large number of units in a few areas, creating super bases that could be more vulnerable to attack.

IV - Lessons Learned?

The Army has a well-developed lessons learned collection process, but determining whether or not lessons have actually been learned can be difficult. There are insights to be gained, however.

Insight 1 (RC Units)*:* The big "winners" from the process were logistics units and Reserve Component (RC) units. Many of these units had been "left behind" in new equipment fielding. The urgent need to equip these units pushed their priorities higher than some active component units, and this sometimes caused friction. Likewise, the Army needed to adjust the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) to ensure that specific Reserve component units could deploy in time to support active duty units.[52] The "re-balancing" of Active Component (AC) and RC units has been positive, but the long-term effects remain to be seen. The RC has moved from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve, and while this worked through repetitive deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no guarantee that it will continue.

Insight 2 (Managing by PowerPoint)*:* The urgency of the requirements and the ASPB prioritizing and decision-making system accelerated provision of critical support to deploying units, but it also drove the Army toward managing priorities by PowerPoint. The press of time did not always allow for full staffing. An ONS from a combatant commander received the priority it deserved, but the lack of time available reduced the amount of synchronization possible. This management process also allowed for shifting priorities and policies in midstream, and this could be both good and bad.[53] The rush to war and the need for accelerated processing in so many different areas caused some issues to be overlooked, and some of them took two or more years to catch up. The Army also took risk and trained on some equipment and systems in order to quickly field the items.[54]

Insight 3 (BCT Conversion)*:* The conversion to the modular Army was successful in many ways. The BCTs are very powerful organizations and the BCT commander has a great deal of firepower at his disposal. There are problems, however, in support of those formations. The recent move to bring back the division artillery, is one example. In creating a BCT-centric Army, we have eroded that Army's ability to sustain itself in large-scale combat operations. The Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) force structure, especially in logistics units, has been gutted. While the BCTs themselves are powerful combat forces, the EAB force structure contains no spares, no maintenance capability, and no reconstitution capability.

Insight 4 (Contracting)*:* The move to contract as much as possible in order to reduce boots on the ground has exacerbated the logistics problem. While contracting has been with the Army since its earliest days, the Army is never before relied so heavily upon it. Assumptions about the availability of contracting and contractors reflects and unstated assumption that the Army will always deploy to a developed theater. There has been no adequate accounting for how much contracting has cost in last 15-30 years, so there is no way to know if it has actually been cost-effective. Most current plans assume a

robust contracting capability in the region where forces will operate, but this may not be possible. The recent devastation of Puerto Rico by a hurricane provides an example: with no electricity, no running water, no functioning civil or social services, the military moved in to help. Contracting was not an option because there was simply nothing to contract on the island.

Insight 5 (Joint Force)*:* The move toward joint operations in the three decades since the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been largely positive. One Third Army commander said that there would never be a Third Army fight, but it would be a joint fight. Army transformation, however, assumes a reliance on joint assets, so much so that long range artillery is now a significant weakness, as is short and medium range air defense. These assets were eliminated in the anticipation of a fully joint fight, yet doing so has dramatically reduced Army capabilities.

Insight 6 (REF/RFI Effectiveness v. Efficiency)*:* The REF was a dramatic and immediate success that showed quick results on the battlefield. In the long-term, however, that work-around system had to eventually be merged with the regular Acquisitions system. Despite good intentions, it became a point of friction with the normal Army Acquisitions infrastructure. The question going forward is how best to insert the good aspects of the REF system with the regular Acquisitions process so that it becomes faster and more responsive. The RFI experienced more and easier organizational success because it was established within the structure of PEO Soldier, which provided funding and manning. The REF, on the other hand, began as an ad hoc organization, funding intermittently through the ASPB. After Cody became VCSA, he formalized the REF by directing the G8 to put REF funding in the POM and directed TRADOC to address the full DTLOMPF implications of new capabilities.[55] Notably, this was not the Army's first experiment with accelerating acquisitions. The Army developed the Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) in 1996 to rapidly field emerging technological concepts and prototype equipment. WRAP was somewhat narrowly defined in order to specifically support the development of the digitized division and the Army Warfighting Experiment (AWE). This program was tightly controlled by Congress, and the Army faced difficulties with reprogramming WRAP funds to any other purpose unrelated to the digitized division, even new technology. Funding for the WRAP ended in 2003, after the creation of the REF. WRAP funds came directly from Congress and were therefore more difficult to use, while REF funding came out of the existing Army budget.[56]

Insight 7 (HQ Manning)*:* One of the challenges that the Army faced early on was proper manning of the Third Army headquarters. Post-Cold War reductions had reduced headquarters staffing across the board, and CENTCOM was particularly short. Its assigned strength when OEF began was 1,199 with a wartime authorized manning of 1,254. The headquarters required an additional augmentation of 1,246 in order to prosecute OEF, with another 150 added for OIF. By 2006, CENTCOM was also supervising Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in addition to OEF and OIF. The HQ had 1,599 on hand with an additional 962 augmentees. The system was designed to leave such headquarters at minimum manning, and then fill them to wartime efficient in theory, but reality reflects a great inefficiency. The Third Army,

functioning as both the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) and Combined Joint Force Land Component Commander, suffered even greater manning problems. (Annex F provides a snapshot of rapid growth in requirements from OEF to OIF).[57]

- The peacetime requirements for those headquarters are not reduced along with the manning level. The skeleton staff is still expected to continue to operate at full strength.

- The requirement for split-based operations greatly increases the requirements.

- There is no "bench" of staff officers in the Army, waiting to be deployed to an Army or other headquarters. The officers necessary to fill those slots must come out of other units. This reduces the readiness and cohesion of those units, and then adds strain when those units are also scheduled to deploy.

- Those personnel fills may also come from the reserve components, which have additional requirements for mobilization and deployment. Those officers and NCOs also suffer a steep learning curve if they have never operated at that headquarters level before. Even when the personnel tasking system is working at maximum efficiency, the time lag for filling all of the required slots in the headquarters is significant. All these issues seriously degrade the mission and effectiveness of the headquarters.

- One aspect of manning that has been overlooked is the additional requirement for General officers. In addition to the Third Army headquarters, the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) had additional requirements for general officers, and other officers and NCOs. These general officers were tasked from around the Army, and many of them left their commands to serve one year assignments on the CFLCC staff.

Insight 8 (Critical Tasks)*:* The original list of requirements focusses largely on the Army's Title 10 responsibilities, but these are not the only requirements. Annex F contains the list of the Army's Wartime Executive Agency Responsibilities (WEAR) and the Uniform Joint Task List (UJTL). Considering these responsibilities must be essential in any future planning for Army requirements.

Insight 9 (ISBs and RSOI)*:* Identifying an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) and Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) areas in the next theater are critical.

- When the U.S. Army deployed to Desert Shield, it also had the luxury of having a very supportive Saudi Arabia from which to stage. The Kingdom featured large expanses of land on which to build bases, and it offered its own bases as well. The next theater to which the Army deploys may not have an ally in the region. Or more likely, it may have an ally in region but that nation may not have the same amount of available land for staging large forces. Part of every deployment to an Allied country, especially one which we plan to use as a staging base, involves protection of the local population as well as protection of our own forces.

Deploying U.S. forces, especially ground troops, often puts our allies in greater danger then they would have been had we not deployed to the region.

- All of the requirements listed in Annex G will be necessary wherever the Army deploys, and there may be additional requirements based on terrain, threat, and climate. Most, if not all, of the RSOI tasks that needed to be addressed before the war in Iraq will need to be addressed in the event of another conflict. Much of the CONUS information may have changed due to BRAC realignment and closures of bases. Larger issues may arise in the deployed theater, however.

- Annex G contains a look at existing and developed RSOI infrastructure in the CENTCOM AOR. The United States was extremely fortunate to have Kuwait available as an ISB, left over from Desert Storm. Despite that, the deployment required significant construction in order to prepare bases for arriving units. Camp New York, Camp Pennsylvania, and Camp Virginia, needed to be built from the ground up, while Camp Arifjan and Udairi range needed to be greatly expanded.

- In addition to normal life support, huge efforts were required for large scale petroleum, ammunition, and other supply storage, including construction of a pipeline from the port to the various Class III bulk Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) issue points.

- Negotiations for the movement of these troops included overflight rights and transit rights through various countries. Despite overall good diplomatic relations with all European countries and most regional countries the U.S. still experienced difficulties with some of the movements.

V - RSOI at the Enterprise Level – An Assessment

The Army of 2017 differs remarkably from the Army of 2002, but that is true of almost any similar 15 year period in the Army's history. While that time is being examined as the longest period of sustained conflict in the nation's history, the institutional Army's efforts are equally worthy of study. The remarkable aspect of the decision-making structures such as the ASPB and AR2B is that they remain in place, somewhat in defiance of Army tradition. The tension between the "warfighters" and the "bureaucrats" remains, each holding a piece of the moral high ground. The warfighters want the best for the Soldiers immediately, and are unwilling to compromise speed and effectiveness for frugality and efficiency. They embrace innovation and anything that accelerates the process. The bureaucrats make the system work within the parameters of federal law and Army regulation. They support innovation, but seek to keep it within orderly bounds of development. Both attitudes are necessary for a properly functioning military. Using Shinseki's quote in a different context, now is the time to evaluate the actions and decisions of the past. Questioning those decisions is prudent and necessary.

- Was continuing transformation the right decision?

- Could it have been slowed or delayed to preserve combat power and reduce strain on the forces?

- Where have other force structure decisions taken us?

- How has global restructuring affected strategic and operational planning?

Assessing the Army's efforts before and during OIF/OEF is useful for determining present status. The context of the time provides insight as to why certain decisions were made, but the passage of time provides perspective. The challenges the Army enterprise addresses should be analyzed in one of six categories:

- Issues resolved because they were episodic: One-time solutions for one-time issues.

- Issues solved systemically. The REF initially solved some problems episodically, but moved to solving them systemically. Those systemic solutions should be monitored to ensure they are still working.

- Issues not solved because they were merged with another issue. Check and maintain visibility of these merged issues to make sure that they do not get lost.

- Issues not resolved due to lack of time, money, or changing situation. These should be very carefully evaluated to see which of them remain as issues.

- New issues that have arisen as a result of previous solutions, such developing Brigade Combat Teams but eroding the Army's support structure.

- Issues that are new and unique to the particular theater being considered.

Notes

[1] *The U.S. Army in the Iraq War*, a two volume study, was completed by the Iraq Study Group in 2016 and is now pending publication at the U.S. Army War College.

[2] Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Horlander (Director, Army Budget), "Status of the Defense and Army Budget" (slide presentation, presented in multiple venues, April 5, 2016).

[3] Gen. Richard A. Cody, interview by Brent Bankus, 3rd Interview, January 15, 2015, unpublished transcript (unedited), p. 15, Senior Officer Oral History Program (SOOHP), U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA (Hereafter, Cody, SOOHP, 3rd Interview). Department of the Army Historical Summary (DAHSUM), Fiscal Year 2002 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2011), 3. The HQDA reorganization became effective July 9, 2002, with Army staff section names returning to World War II-era general staff names, and aligned better with the Joint Staff. Contemporary sources often have a mix of old and new titles; the current title is used here for clarity.

[4] Cody, SOOHP, 3rd interview, p. 15.

[5] "OSD Request: Planning Guidance for Combat Operations against Iraq" (information paper, October 1, 2001), Richard A. Cody Papers (unprocessed), U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

[6] Figure as of September 30, 2001. DAHSUM, Fiscal Year 2002, 13.

[7] Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), "The Army" (slide presentation, presented in multiple venues, June 20, 2002).

[8] CSA, "The Army," Vice Chief of Staff, Army, slide presentation, "An Army at War and More, October 19, 2004, presented in multiple venues, Richard A. Cody Papers (unprocessed), U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

[9] Department of the Army, *AR 220-1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001), 15. *AR 220-1*, dated November 2001, used five "C" levels for measuring unit readiness. A unit reporting as C-1 had "the required resources [personnel and equipment] and is trained to undertake the full wartime mission for which it is . . . designed." C-5 units, conversely, were "not prepared, at this time to undertake . . . wartime mission(s)."

[10] Cody, SOOHP, 3rd interview p.15.

[11] Lt. Col. (P) Alan M. Mosher, Lt. Col. (P) Brian F Waters, and Lt. Col. (P) Robert C. Johnson, "Assumption Based Campaign Planning" (monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command And General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2002).

[12] Col. Christopher P. Hughes, *War on Two Fronts: An Infantry Commander's War in Iraq and the Pentagon* (Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2007), 211. Maj. Gen Chris Hughes (CG, Cadet Command), telephone interview notes, October 31, 2017. Then-Lt. Col. Chris Hughes from the Army Initiatives Group (AIG) represented Lt. Gen. Cody in day-to-day board activities.

[13] Col. (Ret.) Jim Greer, email to author, November 15, 2017. Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 59.

[14] Mark Averill (Deputy Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army), telephone interview notes, November 1, 2017. Col. Mark Averill ran the board for the DCS, G3, and Lt. Col. Stuart Pandza served as his deputy.

[15] Averill, telephone interview.

[16] Brig. Gen. Daniel P. Valcourt (DAMO-SS), email to Lt. Gen. Richard A. Cody (DCS-G3), November 10, 2002, subject: ASPB 7 NOV 2002, "Blue Notes," Richard A. Cody Papers (unprocessed), U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

[17] Gen. (Ret.) Richard A. Cody, interview by Dr. Michael E. Lynch, November 21, 2017, recording, Senior Officer Oral History Program (SOOHP), U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA. Hereafter, Cody, SOOHP, 4th Interview.

[18] Cody, SOOHP, 4th interview.

[19] Lt. Gen. Richard A. Cody (DCS-G3), email to Gen. Eric Shinseki (CSA), January 13, 2003, subject: Taskers from 7-10 January G3 Unit Visits, "Blue Notes," Richard A. Cody Papers (unprocessed), U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

[20] Cody, SOOHP, 4th interview.

[21] Col. (Ret.) Stuart Pandza, interview by Dr. Michael E. Lynch, interview notes, November 21, 2017.

[22] Cody, SOOHP, 4th interview.

[23] Lt. Gen Richard A. Cody (DCS-G3), email to Gen. Eric Shinseki (CSA), November 10, 2002, subject: ASPB 7 NOV 2002, "Blue Notes," Richard A. Cody Papers (unprocessed), U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

[24] Lt. Gen. Richard A. Cody (DCS-G3), email to Gen. Eric Shinseki (CSA), December 12, 2002, subject: Revised ASPB Update 12 DEC 2002, "Blue Notes," Richard A. Cody Papers (unprocessed), U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

[25] Lt. Gen. Richard A. Cody (DCS-G3), email to GEN Eric Shinseki (CSA), August 19, 2003, subject: ASPB Update 14 AUG 2003, "Blue Notes," Richard A. Cody Papers (unprocessed), U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

[26] Michael Moss, "Many Missteps Tied to Delay in Armor for Troops in Iraq," *New York Times*, March 7, 2005.

[27] Averill, telephone interview.

[28] Pandza, interview.

[29] John H. Dabolt IV, "Requirements and Resourcing Board: Rapid Reaction in an Area of Persistent Conflict," *The Oracle,* Quarterly Newsletter of the FA50 Proponency Office, vol. 4 (4th Quarter, FY08), 4.

[30] General Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees, "Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation of Army Truck Armor during the Current Wartime Operations," Attachment 1, "DOD Comments to the Recommendations," 62.

[31] Cody SOOHP 4th Interview. Pandza interview. U.S. Army, *How the Army Runs* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College), 246-274, Fig. 11-8.

[32] U.S. Army*, TRADOC Generating Force Study: Innovation and Adaptation in Support to Operations*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-1 (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2010), 83-84, 158n142.

[33] *TRADOC Generating Force Study,* 83.

[34] David Hoyt, Hayagreeva Rao, and Robert Sutton, "The Rapid Equipping Force: Customer-Focused Innovation in the U.S. Army" (Case Study L-20, Stanford University School of Business, February 4, 2014), 3.

[35] "The Rapid Equipping Force," 23. Paul Stoskus (Deputy Director, REF), "Department of the Army Rapid Equipping Force" (briefing to International Armaments Technology and Exhibition, June 16, 2004).

[36] "The Rapid Equipping Force," 23.

[37] Information Paper, Army Initiatives Group (DAMO-ZXG), Lt. Col. Christopher Hughes, September 2, 2003, Richard A. Cody Papers (unprocessed), U.S. Army

Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA. TRADOC had made a play to take over REF, but Col. Jette strongly recommend against it. Lt. Gen. Cody concurred, and kept the REF in DCS, G3. Col. Jette's initial budget estimate for REF was $199.4 million.

[38] Pandza, interview.

[39] *TRADOC Generating Force Study,* 75, 138n125.

[40] *TRADOC Generating Force Study*, 75-77.

[41] Stuart Pandza, email to Michael E. Lynch, subject: Holes in the Yard, December 5, 2017.

[42] Cody, SOOHP, 2nd interview, p. 30.

[43] *TRADOC Generating Force Study,* 75-77.

[44] Cody, SOOHP, 3rd interview. *War on Two Fronts,* 212-226.

[45] *TRADOC Generating Force Study,* 74.

[46] ODCS, G-3, Directorate of Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization, "Priorities, Projects, Etc." (slide presentation, January 8, 2002).

[47] Slide Presentation, "Holes in the Yard," December 5, 2005, Richard A. Cody Papers (unprocessed), U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

[48] Department of the Army Historical Summary (DAHSUM), Fiscal Year 2000 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2011), 41-43.

[49] Cody, SOOHP, 3rd interview, p. 10.

[50] Cody, SOOHP, 4th interview.

[51] Department of the Army Historical Summary (DAHSUM), Fiscal Year 2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2013), 51.

[52] Averill, telephone interview.

[53] Averill, telephone interview.

[54] Averill, telephone interview.

[55] *TRADOC Generating Force Study,* 75-77.

[56] *TRADOC Generating Force Study,* 74. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, National Security Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriation, House of Representatives, *Army Modernization: The Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program Needs More Specific Guidance* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, November 1998), 2-8.

[57] Frank J. Siltman, "Too Thin on Top: The Under Resourcing of Headquarters in Force Design" (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 10-11. Conrad C. Crane, *Final Report*: *The U.S. Army's Initial Impressions of Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle* (Carlisle, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 2002), 4.

Annex A

The genesis for this case study is a reference to a list of 485 items tracked by the Army staff, in the Army's official history, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom.* The search for that list did not produce a single definitive list, however, the list contained here in Annex A provides the best possible reconstruction of it. The items contained here come from email reports provided by then LTG Richard A. Cody, Army G-3, to the Army Chief of Staff. They are reports on the working of the Army Strategic Planning Board, (ASPB), specifically, the decisions that Cody made. These items cover meetings between November 2002 and November 2003. Additional classified research on Army G3 servers has revealed the Army Strategic Campaign Plan database, which contains many more tasks.

Annex A: ASPB Task Listing

Key: AST: Army Support Tasks; CCST: Combatant Commander's Support Tasks; RPT: Rotational Prepatory Tasks

Mtg Date	Task No.	Description	App	Disap	Remarks
20030123	ACC 007-17	Funding ($45.1M- OMA) to procure additional SAPI plates.	x		This decision supplements the 3 Jan 03 decision to fund ($29.86M- OMA) to restart accelerated body armor production
20030227	ACC 007-17	Additional funding ($19.0M-OMA) to continue SAPI production from Jul 03 to Jan 04 for Army wide requirments	x		
20030123	ACC 008-17	Permission for the 101st ABN to fund the installation of AN/ALE-47 Threat Adaptive Countermeasures Dispenser Systems for fifty (50) CH-47s. Unit will be reimbursed	x		
20030130	ACC 008-17	Revision of 23 Jan 03 decision to permit unit fuding of installation of AN/ALE-47 Threat Adaptive Countermeasures Dispenser Systems.	x		Revised decision authorizes unit-funded installation of 16 each for 101st ABN, B-159 AVN and A/5-159 AVN
20021107	ACC 009	Airfield Matting: Dep G3 approved $1.25M to ship matting from Sierra Army Depot to Kuwait	x		
20030116	ACC 009-17	Funding $3.0M to begin mvmt of 14 sets of XM19 airfield matting to Kuwait	x		
20021205	ACC 011	Reprioritization of fielding of one battalion's set (20) of the Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) to the 101st, then the 10th ID	x		
20021205	ACC 0119	Diversion of .50 Cal sniper rifles from SOF to 82d ABN and 1st CAV		x	"I'm preparing a response that will go through FORSCOM."
20030123	ACC 012-17	Revision to 19 Dec 02 decision for accelerated funding of 228 AN/AVS-6(V)3.	x		Distro: 101st ABN to receive 188 systems; C-159 AVN to receive 40 systems.
20021127	ACC 013, 070, 124, 125 and 023	Global Positioning System Shortages			Requirement back to FORSCOM for validation
20030116	ACC 013-17	Funding $421.8K and upgrade in priority of 1003V TPFDD units to repair 972 PLGRs	x		PLGRs currently in deferred maintenance status

Date	ACC	Description			Remarks
20030123	ACC 013-17	Funding ($347K- OMA) to repair an estimated 800 PLGRs that are in deferred maintenance status for FY 03	x		
20021127	ACC 060, 063 and 136	Distribution of Thermal Weapons Sights (TWS) to 3ID and 1AD	x		
20021107	ACC 069	Field TACSAT (AN/PSC-5), 3ID requested fill of shortages			Decision to tell FORSCOM that the Army does not have an answer for this. Must redistribute within commands. No production line working at this time. Decision made at fielding time not to field the divisions an ADMIN net. That is why only 49 of 67 fielded to each division.
20030116	ACC 081-17	Out of DAMPL fielding of five SMART-T terminals to V Corps (22 SIG BDE)	x		
20021205	ACC 082 and 015	The fielding of existing GSR/REMBASS assets to 82nd, 3ID, 1AD, and 101st.	x		
20021127	ACC 083	Accelerated fielding of AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder Radar to 1AD	x		Disapproved the $0.9M funding request. PM must pay the associated bill.
20030220	ACC 097-17/140-18	1AD request for 658 SINCGARS 'D' model radios		x	1AD is excess 111 SINCGARS 'C' and 'D' model radios based on FY03 requirements
20021205	ACC 125, 126 and 023	Distribution of 64 Mini Eye-safe Laser IR Observation Sets (MELIOS) to 3ACR and 79 to 1AD	x		
20021127	ACC 126a	Distribution of twenty-eight (28) MK-19 mounts to 1AD	x		
20021205	ACC 133	Recommendation not to field additional Triband Terminals to 1AD	x		
20021205	ACC 157 and 047	Revised fielding plan for Basic Body Armor based on TPFDD requirements	x		
20030904	AST 010	Funding ($3.4M- MIPA; $3.6M- OPA) in FY03 and $14.0M- MIPA, $5.0M- OPA in FY04 requirements for Viper Strike Armed UAV Components	x		

20030918	AST 031	Funding ($22.2M- FY04 OMA) for Defense Language Institute (DLI) requirement to sustain Foreign Language Center programs with fuding contingent upon OSD program to reimburse the Army as Executive Agent.			
20030904	AST 06-a	Transfer of 485 Up-Armored HMMWV from USAREUR to CFLCC	x		
20030918	AST 06-b	USAREUR request to retain 80 Up-Armored HMMWVs in the Balkans.	x		
20030703	AST 07	Funding ($194K) [Procurement Army Ammunition] requirement for Individual Riot Control Agent Dispenser (IRCAD)	x		
20030703	AST 07	12-gauge Non-Lethal Ammuntion requirement, but deferred execution pending request from CJTF-7	x		
20030703	AST 07	Funding ($12.552M) to perform Hellfire retrofit	x		
20030710	AST 07	Reaffirmed funding approval ($12.552M) to perform Hellfire retrofit	x		Directed supplemental appropriations to retrofit current Hellfire motors over purchase of new Hellfire prototypes
20030703	AST 09	Funding ($6.2M- OMA; $.38M-Army Working Capital Fund) for Helicopter Rotor Blade Erosion	x		
20030703	AST 10	Concept for Viper Strike Armed UAV pending receipt of Operational Needs Statement	x		
20030703	AST 11	Funding ($33M) for Hunter UAV Attrition Air Vehicles	x		
20030703	AST 12	Funding ($15M) for Shadow TUAV Replacement Air Vehicles	x		
20031106	AST 13	FY04 funding prioritization to replace or augment 356 SIG CO, 235 SIG CO, 63 SIG BN for OIF-2 w/ commercial systems	x		

20031106	AST 13	Funding requirement ($75.1 M- OPA; $284.1M- OMA) to sustain communication systems acquired in FY03, commercialize "red-lined" units, support theater network management, renew satellite and circuit leases, and fund theater FY04 operating costs.	x		
20031106	AST 13	Strategy to fulfill CFLCC Urgent Needs Statement for C4 Stabilization in Iraq by commercializing primary communications sites at Camp Victory and Balad and sourcing with Army signal units at designated sites.	x		
20030814	AST 13	Way ahead for Stabilization Force Communications	x		
20030731	AST 14	Funding ($1.78M- OMA) for Iraq Training Program CD	x		
20030821	AST 15	Funding ($2.83M- OMA) in FY04 for CBRN RADIAC Aerial Detector	x		
20030821	AST 15-a	Funding ($5.0M- OMA) for Army Airborne Command and Control System	x		
20030731	AST 16	Funding ($4.3M- OMA) for Combat ID Panels	x		
20030731	AST 17	Funding ($1.6M- OMA) for 3/2 ID (SBCT #1) Aviation TF Blue Force Tracking with priority to 24 Kiowa Warriors contingent upon assessment of PM replenishment objectives.	x		
20030814	AST 18	Funding ($675K- OMA) requirement for CJTF-7 Information Dominance Center (IDC) Fielding	x		
20030807	AST 19	Funding ($1.42M- FY03 OMA; $54.5M- FY04) requirment for Forward Repair Activities	x		Directed AMC to fund $1.42M in FY03 funding
20030814	AST 20	Funding ($2.8M- OMA; $0.3M- SSTS FY03 and $1.5M- APA FY04) requirement for C-23 Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE).	x		Directed that aircraft remain in theater
20030731	AST 21	Funding ($1.4M- OPA) for ASAS-L	x		

20030821	AST 23	Funding ($1.2M- OMA) for SINCGARS fielding to the 13th CM CO and directed immediate fielding with reimbursement in FY04	x		
20030821	AST 24	Funding ($578K- OMA) for Electronic Countermeasures for Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)	x		
20030904	AST 27	Funding ($22.2M- OPA) requirement for 120 Raven UAV systems	x		OIF-65; OEF-30; operational spares- 13; training sets-12.
20030918	AST 29	Funding ($6.7M- FY03 OMA and $1.8M- FY03 OPA) FORSCOM requirement for mobile MOUT buildings at NTC and JRTC	x		
20030918	AST 32	Funding ($15.0M- FY04 OMA) CFLCC requirement for Solar Shades	x		
20030918	AST 33	Funding ($4.9M- FY04 OMA) AMC requirment for five brigade IPE sets for CDE Go To War (GTW) program.	x		
20031106	AST 51	Requirement for 27 IHSTAMIDS to CJTF-180 and distro of 130 PSS-14 Handheld Mine Detectors to 1ID, 25ID, SBCT #1 and #2, 30 eSB, 39 eSB, 81 eSB and CJTF-7 TDA	x		
20031106	AST 52	Requirement for 4 Skid Steer Loader (SSL) Bobcats to 82 ABN, 90 SSLs for OIF-2 EAD units and 46 SSLs for 1st CAV, 1ID, 30 eSB, 30 eSB, and 81 eSB.	x		
20031113	AST 58	Requirement for 1st CAV Command Post of the Future with 1QTR $3M OMA funding only for ABCS Integration, Testing and Accreditation, Hardware and On-site support.	x		
20031113	AST 59	CFLCC requirement for Rapid Manufacturing System/Mobile Parts Hospital ($4.23M- OMA)	x		

20030227	BC ONS 7	Funding ($2.814M- OMA) for Theater Network Operations Security Center (TNOSC) for CFLCC	x		
20030227	CCST 001-c	Funding ($1.3M- MIPA) for Patriot Battery Command Post (BCP) Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) for 1003V units.	x		
20030227	CCST 001-d	Funding ($2.6M- MIPA) for Interim Contractor Depot Support (ICDS) for 1003V units	x		
20030724	CCST 001-d	Funding ($2.6M- OMA) from IFF appropriation be used on PAC-3 missile to reimburse PM for Depot support	x		
20030227	CCST 005	Additional funding ($18.5M- OMA) for Medical Materiel to medical units added to 1003V TPFDD	x		$13.9M of that $18.5M will temporarily be held by ABO pending a clarification by OTSG and CFLCC based on CFLCC's chem/bio reqts.
20030227	CCST 005	Funding ($9.05M- OPA) for Medical Materiel to medical units added to 1003V TPFDD	x		
20030131	CCST 008-b	Funding ($2.6M- OMA) for 200 M17A3 Tactical Decontamination systems to fulfill shortfalls only for units deploying to CENTCOM AOR	x		
20021202	CCST 009	Army units purchase Decontaminate Replacement with unit funds	x		
20030130	CCST 015-c	Funding ($2.0M) for equipment installation and integration for two (2) C2Vs to the 3ACR	x		
20030131	CCST 029	Funding ($637K- OMA) for leasing D9 Dozers	x		
20030206	CCST 029	Funding ($240K- OMA) for D-9 Dozer transportation costs, and rescinded 31 Jan 03 decision funding $637K to lease D9 Dozer	x		
20030123	CCST 032	Funding ($6.5M- OMA) to lease a second Ku-Band transponder to support increased flow of forces into the AOR	x		

20030130	CCST 035	Funding ($2.72M: $1.0M-RDTE; $1.72M- OMA) for procurement of an additional ten (10) Remote Control Reconnaissance Vehicles (PACKBOT) for 101 ABN	x		
20021202	CCST 036	FY03 funding ($604K- OPA) to purchase Pole Trucks for 249th EN BN	x		
20021202	CCST 039	FY03 Funding ($117K- OMA) for DAIG Biological Surety and Chemical Surety Inspections	x		
20030123	CCST 044	Funding ($1.946M- OMA) to enhance Crisis Action Team support to Army Component Commanders, MACOM Commanders and HQDA Senior Leadership	x		
20030130	CCST 051	Funding ($907k- OMA) for Army Strategic Planning Board Sustainment	x		
20030123	CCST 056	Funding ($611.1K- OMA) to field and ship six (6) Mine Clearing Armor Protection (MCAP) systems to V Corps	x		
20030206	CCST 057	Recommendation to partially field M25 Stabilization Binoculars to 1003V units.	x		
20030501	CCST 059	Funding ($41.1M) for Oil Industry Restoration- Iraq 3Q FY03	x		
20030130	CCST 060	Re-directing shipment of Dry Support Bridge intended for delivery to 4th DSB at Fort Hood to Kuwait	x		
20030130	CCST 060	Fielding two (2) Forward Engineer Support Teams for CFLCC	x		
20030131	CCST 060	Funding ($400K- OMA) for 47 MBRC Trailer Extensions	x		
20030130	CCST 060	PM filling shortages for 1003v deploying unit of Automated Integrated Survey Instruments	x		
20030130	CCST 060	Revision to 12 Dec 02 decision on distribution of Interim Vehicle Mounted Mine Detection (IVMMD)	x		New distro is limited to three (3) to Afghanistan and three (3) to Kuwait

20030130	CCST 062	Funding ($2.4M- RDTE) for procurement of five (5) platoon sets of RAVEN UAV systems	x		
20030130	CCST 063	Funding ($200K- OMA) to field 100 Shoot Around the Corner Sights to 101 ABN	x		
20030130	CCST 064	Funding ($7.5M: $4.5M- OMA; $3.0M- RDTE) to field 300 Thermal Vision Devices to 101 ABN			
20030206	CCST 065	Funding ($3.6M- OMA) for LSE supporting contractors on the battlefield.	x		
20030206	CCST 067	Fielding of two (2) prototype AH-64 Apache Rocket Pod Adapters with distribution of one (1) each to USAREUR and a CONUS AH-64 unit	x		
20030206	CCST 068	Funding ($4.3M- OMA/OMARNG) for 257 SINCGARS radios for CFLCC HMMWVs	x		
20030206	CCST 069	Unit funding by 82nd ABN to purchase MOUT Course of Action Training Tool (MCATT)	x		
20030220	CCST 077	Funding ($40K- OMA) to provide 173rd ABN BDE ten (10) 120mm Mortar systems and NET	x		
20030227	CCST 078	Funding ($9.6M- OMA) for Small Arms Sustainment in support of 1003V	x		
20030220	CCST 081-a	Validated USAR requirment for reimbursement of combat PLL			Status: Validated
20030220	CCST 084	Additional funding of ($25.1M- OMA) to provide an additional two (2) sets of DCUs to support 240K soldiers.	x		
20030227	CCST 085	Funding ($3.54M- MIPA) for Avenger Program and Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) for 1003V and Operation Clear Skies units	x		
20030220	CCST 086	1AD request for four (4) experienced OH58D Kiowa Warrior aviators based on projected flow of forces.		x	

			x		
20030220	CCST 087	Validated USAREUR Operational Need for Fuel System Supply Point (FSSP) and the release of eight (8) FSSPs from Red River Army Depot			Status: Validated
20030220	CCST 089	Issuing 410 Modular Integrated Communications Components (MICC) to the 101st ABN. Funding to be provided via the Rapid Fielding Initiative	x		
20030227	CCST 092	Funding ($1.6M- OMA) for 1003V automation equipment to 3D PERSCOM USAR and ARNG downtrace units	x		
20030731	CCST 112	Funding ($3.5M- OPA) for C4 Data Packages to V Corps	x		
20030508	CCST 114	Reconfirmed approval of funding ($2.35M) for CJTF-180 PRT radios	x		
20030424	CCST 120	Funding ($1.43M) AT-4 Confined Space- NATO Standard Munition and directed to include funding requirement in the Mid-Year Review for supplemental funds	x		
20021202	CENTCOM 14A	Funding ($2.5M) for Blue Force Tracking Satellite Coverage	x		
20030227	CENTCOM 14A	Additional funding ($1.474M-OPA) for 68 Blue Force Tracking (BFT) ground systems	x		Distro: 26 to 2/82 ABN; 16 to 75 FA Sensitive Site Exploitation Teams; 26 to BDAR Teams (PM Bradley/Abrams)
20021127	CFLCC ONS	Funding ($6.5M) for lease of one commercial 72 MHZ transponder	x		CFLCC Battle Command ONS; This is an initial expenditure, potential $13.0M bill remains for two additional transponders
20021227	CFLCC ONS	Funding of two Air Defense System Integrator Terminals (ADSI); includes system install and training for CFLCC FWD and REAR CPs	x		CFLCC BATTLE Command Urgent ONS
20021227	CFLCC ONS	Funding of $250K to provide Tactical Airspace Integration System, capability if CFLCC REAR CP	x		CFLCC BATTLE Command Urgent ONS

			x	x	
20021227	CFLCC ONS	Funding of $11.4M for 46 contractor personnel to provide tech assist and tng support to CFLCC MAIN and REAR for Battle Command Systems	x		CFLCC BATTLE Command Urgent ONS
20021227	CFLCC ONS	Funding of $165K for Automated Logistics Assistance Team (ALAT)	x		CFLCC BATTLE Command Urgent ONS
20021227	CFLCC ONS	Diversion of upgraded satellite kits from 10th MTN to 313 SC CO-FT Hood, TX	x		CFLCC BATTLE Command Urgent ONS
20030102	CFLCC ONS	Funding of $943.5K to purchase RF tags for ITV	x		CFLCC BATTLE Command Urgent ONS; deferred decision on remainder of ITV req until after 6 Jan 03 Req mtg at FT Hood
20030102	CFLCC ONS	Requirment for Logistical Common Operating Picture		x	CFLCC BATTLE Command Urgent ONS
20030116	CFLCC ONS	Funding ($6.56M) for C4I Network equip and support for 377 TSC	x		CFLCC Urgent ONS
20030116	CFLCC ONS	Funding ($240K) for 191 MTS systems for CS/CSS units to support BFT in 1003V	x		CFLCC Urgent ONS
20030123	CFLCC ONS	Out of DAMPL request for 191 Materiel Tracking Systems (MTS) to meet CFLCC Battle Command requirements.	x		CFLCC Battle Command ONS
20030130	CFLCC ONS	Funding ($4.46M- OMA) for Satellite Communications for Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARRS)	x		CFLCC Battle Command ONS
20030130	CFLCC ONS	Deployment of AMC Forward Repair Activities (FRA)	x		CFLCC Battle Command ONS; CFLCC will fund requirement
20030424	CJTF-180- 7	Help Desk approach to address Intransit Visibility problems with CJTF-180	x		
20030227	CJTF-180-1	Blue Force Tracking Policy to deinstall BFT equipment prior to current unit rotation and use current equipment as a rotational equipment base	x		
20030220	EUCOM 02	Funding ($12.0M- OMA) in compliance with OSD authorization, to prepare Sea Ports of Debarkation	x		

20030227	EUCOM 02	Additional funding ($40.5M-OMA), incompliance with OSD authorization to prepare Sea Ports of Debarkation	x		Total approved funding is now $52.5M
20030220	EUCOM 03	Funding ($15.8M- OMA) in compliance with OSD authorization, to construct a Logistics Support Area	x		
20030227	EUCOM 03	Additional funding ($48.3M-OMA), in compliance with OSD authorization to construct Logistics Support Area	x		Total approved funding is now $64.1M
20030220	EUCOM 04	Funding ($5.7M- OMA) in compliance with OSD authorization, to construct a Division/Corps Support Area	x		
20030227	EUCOM 04	Additional funding ($47.3M-OMA), in compliance with OSD authorization to construct a Division/Corps Support Area	x		Total approved funding is now $53.0M
20030220	EUCOM 05	Funding ($4.85M- OMA) in compliance with OSD authorization, to construct a Tactical Assembly Area	x		
20030227	EUCOM 05	Additional funding ($46.25M-OMA), in compliance with OSD authorization to construct a Tactical Assemby Area	x		Total approved funding is now $51.1M
20030220	EUCOM 06	Additional funding ($33.4M-OMA) in compliance with OSD funding authorization, (total approved funding is now $57.4M) to construct Force Beddown facilities/Infratstucture	x		
20030227	EUCOM 06	Additional funding ($31.8M-OMA), in compliance with OSD authorization to construct Force Beddown Facilities/Infrastructure	x		Total approved funding is now $89.2M

20030220	EUCOM 07	Additional funding ($10.85M-OMA) in compliance with OSD funding authorization, (total approved funding is now $19.75M) for Inter-Theater Visbility (ITV), contingent upon USAREUR G-6 validation of the information architecture	x		
20030220	EUCOM 10-a	Funding ($2.0M) for Pre-position 30 days of supply (Class V) for JSOTF-N	x		
20030220	EUCOM 10-b	Additional Funding ($1.9M-OMA) for pre-position 30 days of supply (Common Service Items) for JSOTF-N; Total approved funding now is $11.0M	x		
20030220	EUCOM 10-c	Funding ($0.9M) for pre-position 30 days of supply (Aerial Delivery equipment) for JSOTF-N; Total approved funding is now $3.9M	x		
20021205	EUCOM 11	Funding ($23.5M) repairing and pre-positioning of War Stock Bridge Equipment	x		
20021205	EUCOM 28	Funding ($4.4M) for Ku-band Transponders for EUCOM	x		
20021205	EUCOM 29	Funding ($70K) for Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange (CENTRIX) systems for EUCOM	x		
20021205	EUCOM 30	Funding ($4.0M) for two Commercial Satellite Points of Presence (PoPs) Terminals for EUCOM	x		
20021205	EUCOM 31	Funding ($225K) for Prime Voice Secure (PVS) Cards for EUCOM	x		
20021205	EUCOM 32	Funding ($180K) for Global Broadcast Services (GBS) for EUCOM	x		
20021107	GSC Tasker	COE rqeuirements. Dep G3 asked where we are at on this issue. Told RQ to go back to FORSCOM and ask how we are going to address this.			Status update

20021107	GSC Tasker	FP for ports. OD still reviewing options MPs/DA Police/Reserves/deploying units			Status update
20021107	GSC Tasker	Deployment criteria, two messages have been sent out for review. OD said that he would get the information to the G3 this weekend.			Status update
20021107	GSC Tasker	Operating assumptions- MTMC TEA is conducting the analysis. Timeline not discussed.			Status update
20030116	III Corps ONS	Funding ($672K) for III Corps MSC Light computer upgrades	x		
20030424	ONS 3	Return of Satellite Terminal Equipment authorized for 1st CAV to 10th MTN	x		
20021205	Rapid Equipping Force	Funding ($1.34M) for Mine Dog Detection Teams for JTF-180	x		
20021205	Rapid Equipping Force	Funding ($2.62M) for 10 PACKBOTS for JTF-180	x		
20030807	RPT 001	Adjustment to Army Acquisiton Objective to increase production for Up-Armored HMMWVs by approximately 1,307 HMMWVs in FY04 ($101.64M) and 697 in FY05 ($55.18M)	x		
20030807	RPT 001	Prioritization of HMMWV requirements with priority to OIF	x		
20030807	RPT 001	Transfer of 104 HMMWV from USAREUR to CJTF-7	x		
20030813	RPT 001	HMMWV Resourcing Plan to complete HMMWV requirements across the Army through FY04, including 1,233 HMMWV as Priority #1 for CJTF-7	x		
20031106	RPT 010	39 eSB requirement to establish a wartime repair parts ASL with materiel sourcing by AMC	x		
20030904	RPT 016	Post Deployment Stabilization Policy goals for WIAS ISO OIF/OEF	x		
20030904	RPT 02, 116	Early fielding of Non-Lethal Capability sets to CFLCC	x		

20030821	RPT 022	Funding ($4.6M- OMA) for Task Force 82 Blue Force Tracking for TF 82 vehicles and helicopters	x		
20030904	RPT 025	Civil Affairs Mobile Training Team for III Corps	x		
20030918	RPT 028	1/4 ID request to turn-in M1A1 tanks in theather and draw M1A2SEP tanks upon redeployment to Ft. Hood with cost contingent upon inspection results	x		
20030904	RPT 034	PERSCOM Management Assistance Team support to 1st CAV to mitigate TUAV Shadow personnel shortages.	x		
20030904	RPT 041	PEO LNO program to assist V Corps in addressing long order ship time for M1A2 SEP and M2A3 LRUs and SRUs	x		
20030904	RPT 042	Increasing production and repair capabilities to address Shortage of Selected Repair Parts for M88A2 Hercules for 1st CAV	x		
20030904	RPT 045	CLSA distro of 145 KY-68s to 1st CAV	x		
20030904	RPT 075	Rotate 10th MTN BFT systems to 25ID w/NETT Support prior to deployment and in country	x		
20031106	RPT 081	42 M107 Sniper Rifle requirement for 1st CAV, 1ID, 30 eSB, 39 eSB and 81 eSB.	x		
20031106	RPT 110	130 M14 Rifles requirement for 30 eSB and 81 eSB	x		
20031106	RPT 116-b	Requirement to release five battalion-sized Non-Lethal Capabilties Sets from Crane Depot for 1st CAV/39 eSB, 1ID/30 eSB, and CFLCC/81 eSB.	x		

20030918	RPT 133, 138	Funding ($37.0M- FY04 OMA) CFLCC requirement primarily for HMMWV contractor augmentation to Forward Repair Activities with funding contingent upon validation by CENTCOM J4	x		
20031106	RPT 140	Requirement for Theater Aviation Maintenance Program (TAMP) Special Tools & Test Equipment for the SWA TAMP and directed to remain as Stay Behind Equipment ($2.7M- OMA)	x		
20030918	RPT 151	USASOC Out-of-DAMPL request for BFT and MCS-L and diversion of 15 EPLRs radios from TRADOC for 3/2 SBCT	x		
20031106	RPT 153	1st CAV requirement for CI/HUMINT Management System (CHIMS) using theater Stay Behind Equipment	x		
20031106	RPT 156	1st CAV requirement for 12 ASAS-L systems using theater Stay Behind Equipment	x		
20031106	RPT 157	1,498 machine gun mounts requirement for 1st CAV, 1ID, 30 eSB, 39 eSB. ($1.836M- OMA)	x		
20031106	RPT 158	Requirement for 216 M4 rifles in lieu of M24 sniper rifles for 1ID and 39 eSB	x		
20031106	RPT 161	351 M4 carbines of 2,487 requirement, and 1,825 M16A2s in lieu of M4 carbines for 1st CAV ($1.209M)	x		
20031106	RPT 162	1,684 M6 pedestal mounts requirement for 1st CAV, 1ID, 30 eSB, 39 eSB and 81 eSB and requirement for quick fix platform to reinforce HMMWV bed. ($420K- PMA)	x		
20031106	RPT 163	1,113 shotguns requirement for 1st CAV, 1ID, 30 eSB and 81 eSB from depot stocks	x		

20031106	RPT 165	Thermal Weapons Sights AN/PAS-13 requirement for 10 BCTs from: 1st CAV, 1ID, 10 MTN, 25ID, 30 eSB, and 81 eSB using equitable distro of available assets with diversion from SBCT #2 or #3	x		
20031106	RPT 166	Establishment of Shop and Bench Stock PLL for 39 eSB with sourcing by FORSCOM.	x		
20031113	RPT 168	1st CAV request to fall in on 4ID HEMMT Load Handling Systems: 44 Load Handling Systems (LHS); 19 Palletized Load Handling Systems (PLS); 19 Forward Support Systems (SRS); 140 Container Roll-on/Roll-off Platforms (CROP); and 8 Palletized Loading System Trailers (PLS-T); and to field 4ID new equipment in July 04.	x		Load Handling Systems will be included in CFLCC Stay Behind Equipment
20031113	RPT 175	25ID requirement for BFT and A kits	x		
20031113	RPT 177	101 ABN requirement to replace existing 304 MK19 Grenade MG with MK19 with MWO from depot stocks. ($143K- OMA)	x		
20030508	RST 1	Funding ($21.2M) for Deployment Cycle Support	x		
20030508	RST 2	Funding ($12.0M) for payback to the CMS program from supplemental funds	x		
20030508	RST 3	Funding ($14.8M) for the Rapid Fielding Initiative for one BCT of the 10th MTN	x		
20030731	RST 3b	Reprioritization of 3/82 ABN ahead of the two 25ID BCTs for the Rapid Fielding Initiative	x		
20030206	V Corps C4 ONS 1	Funding ($1.253M- OPA) for INMARSAT Collaboration Newtork to support V Corps	x		
20030206	V Corps C4 ONS 4	Unit funding by V Corps of PRC-150 HF radios	x		

20021107		DECON equipment: should have an answer by next Thursday			Status update
20021107		Assess impact of EUCOM Prep Tasks. Issued to AO and working. Feedback next Thursday.			Status update
20021107		Combat loading of ships. MTMC taken issue to DOT and has a suspense of 25 Nov.			Status update
20021107		Hellfire Blast Deflectors: Dep G3 approved Recommendation 1 ($1.9M) and Recommendation 2 Phase 1 ($18.4M). The law permits only up to $10M thus a solution must be developed on how it will be accomplished.			Status update
20021107		G6/ABO reiterated that the $2.84M approved for C2V by the G3 was not double-counted			Status update
20021107		Distribution plan for IBA: Not enough for everyone, OD concern that commander's know this. Also a concern that flak vests will not be enough for the reserves. SSW has the lead to look into this issue.			Status update
20021107		Follow-on meeting on the Impacts of Funding for the WOT. ZR working briefing for senior leaders. Shows what OPA programs have been used to pay for WOT. Bottom line is if we don't receive a supplemental the Army will have to make serious choices about people, transformation and readiness			Status update
20021107		TPFDD units scheduled to deactivate. List reviewed by MACOM's and replaced units that have deactivated. Dep G3 asked that we check with MACOMs to ensure units are not at a level (i.e. C2/C3/C4) that will incur a major cost to take.			Status update

20021121		Distro plan allocating 25 Wolverines to 4 ID; distriubuted all available MLC-70 to TPFDD units; approved diversion 7 IDF AVLBs out of Anniston ($2.0M)	x		
20021121		Funding ($26.0M) for 14 Bde sets of JLIST; approved $135K to ship IPE War Reserves to CFLCC for forward stationing	x		
20021121		Re-prioritization of fielding for the Chem Bio protective shelters for medical TPFDD units; approved $460K for testing of DF 200 foam decontaminate	x		
20021121		Out-of-DAMPL and redistro plan that moves the newer AN/PVS-7D and AN/PVS-14 to TPFDD units and cascades the othet NVDs	x		
20021121		Funding ($15.0M) for the immediate purchase of Combat ID Panels for TPFDD units	x		
20021121		Immediate fielding of SMART-T (10 ea) to 1AD	x		
20021121		COTS purchase ($8.9M) of 12 ea D9 dozers with armored plating for V Corps. This was an ONS vetted thru TRADOC; we are working the NET and sustainment	x		Plan is to employ in urban environment.
20021121		Funding ($2.1M) for the fielding of Integrated Logistics Analysis Program (ILAP) for CFLCC/377TSC to provide strategic Log backbone and reachback capability.	x		

20021121		Directed repair and fwd mvmt of 167 Ribbon Bridge Pontoons in War Reserves; directed fielding of 2 add'l MGB sets out of Anniston to FORSCOM TPFDD EN BN; approved accelerated fielding of Improved Ribbon Bridge to the 74th, 814th and 502nd MRBC and a Dry Support Bridge set to the 74th ($0-OMA; will be SDT $)			Status Update
20021121		M2 ODS BFV- directed the out-of-DAMPL 'temporary' fielding of the 120 BFVs that are at Red River Army Depot for 3ACR ILO the original fielding in Aug 03 to 2ID. Have developed a plan to get these BFVs to 2ID six months after 3ACR returns at 0 miles.			Status Update
20021127		JSLIST distro plan so that we can implement when the suits are released from the temporary OSD freeze on distribution	x		
20021202		Redistribution of FORSCOM GBS Receivers	x		To V Corps, 3ID, 1AD
20021202		Distribution of 65 AN/PRC-112 radios to 3ID	x		
20021202		Distribution of 281 radios to 101st ABN, 1 AD, 2 ACR	x		Based on availabilty thru March 03
20021202		Maintain current fiedling of TUAV	x		
20021202		Distribution of 6 M707 Knight FSV to 1AD	x		
20021202		Maintain current fielding plan of Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS)	x		FY03 fielding to: 4ID, 2ID, 10th MTN, III Corps
20021202		FORSCOM cross-level of one OH58D Kiowa Warrior to 3ACR	x		
20021202		Cross level of OH58D from ARNG to 1AD	x		The ARSTAF is working with the ARNG to indentify the appropriate unit.
20021202		Pursue waiver allowing 101 ABN and 1st CAV to buy GRC-150 HF radios	x		
20021202		Fielding of 6 each GRM 122 radio test sets to 3ACR and 1st CAV	x		
20021202		Recommendation not to field AN/PRC 148 radios to 3ID	x		

20021202		Fielding of Backup Iron Sights to 101st ABN ahead of 82nd ABN and USASOC	x		Recommendation made by DAMPL
20021202		Fielding of HQDA Countermine Equipment	x		
20021205		Funding ($44.5M) for the first increment of WOT/1003V Linguist requirements.	x		"I've asked G-2 and FM to further review the reqts for subsequent increments."
20021205		Funding ($2.5M) for Mortuary Affairs Decontamination Collection Point Equipment	x		
20030102		Fielding of two High Volume Map Printer (HVMP) systems	x		555 EN CO (III Corps) and 100 EN CO (XVIII ABN Corps)
20030116		Funding ($1M) for Patriot Reliability Enhancement Program (PREP)	x		Complete 190 PAC-2 missiles to meet CENTCOM Reqt
20030116		Limited Mob of 650 RC Instructors for Phase I of a DMOSQ, Reclass and IET training plan	x		TRADOC to submit final cost estimate for Phase I by 28 Jan 03
20030116		Funding support for V Corps "Victory Scrimmage 03" CPX	x		Funding made on a reimbursable basis
20030116		Funding ($630K) and a distro plan for 7 tele-engineering equip kits to support 1003V	x		
20030116		Funding ($4.429M) to support fielding the ZEUS (HMMWV Laser Ordnance Neutralization) System	x		
20030116		Funding ($80K) for CMAG (100 round magazine testing)	x		
20030116		Funding ($7.5M) to procure 2 mobile MOUT sets and support for one year	x		Have asked TR to help work out a plan for post-war use
20030116		Distro of 6 Near Term Digital Radios for 1st CAV	x		1st CD request during my trip last week
20030116		Funding ($9.8M) for Logistics Common Operating Picture and ITV systems architecture ISO 1003V	x		
20030130		Priority of fielding for Soldier Modernization Kits (Rapid Fielding for Soldier Equipment) to the Division Ready Brigade, 82 ABN and then 101 ABN.	x		

20030131		Shipment of three (3) Non-Lethal Capability Sets (NLCS) to CFLCC	x		
20030227		Funding ($1.07M- OMA) for Document Exploitation Tactical Support Suite (DOCEX/TSS) for 1003V units	x		
20030605		Funding ($142K- OMA) for six INSMART terminals with equipment	x		Retained on CJTF-180 TDA
20030605		Funding ($2.54M- OPA, conditional to OPA funding availability) for 20 Counter Sniper Devices	x		Split between 101st ABN in Afghanistan and Iraq
20030605		Funding ($2.4M- OMA, conditional to OSD providing $14.8M to complete JCS J8 ONS reqt.) for CBRN TIC Detection Capability	x		
20030712		Retention of excess Apache and Blackhawk helicopters by 3ACR until completion of OIF mission			Status update
20031004		Resource JTF-HOA infantry mission			Status update: Possibly with Old Guard. Mission under review by JCS
20031004		ARCENT tasked to idenfity additional crew requirements for C23 aircraft for HQDA sourcing			Status update
20031004		CJTF-7 developing response to 81 eSB G3 regarding missions (i.e. FOB/fixed security, squad/CO level proficiency) and request for light capability with some vehicles			Status update
20031004		CJTF-7 to provide documentation through CENTCOM requesting an addiitonal 1,500 UAH.			Status Update: G8 conducting live fire test of bolt-on armor. Once production is approved, capacity is 650 sets/month
20031004		OSD Task Force providing addiitonal funding for Soldier protection initiatives (i.e. RAVEN UAV, JLENS, UAH, IBA, etc.)			Status update
20031004		CJTF-7 to provide documentation on aviation requirements in theater to determine what assets need to remain in theater			Status update

20031004		DAMO-ODR to conduct a mock USR on a redeploying unit to determine unit equipment status and reset requirements following redeployment.			Status update
20031104		Meeting with J4. CFLCC C-3 confirmed that 132K IBA covers only Army Soldiers and DoD civilains in Iraq. Requirement will increase due to new CENTCOM IBA standard.			Status Update
20031106		Requirement for 1,329 M240B machine guns for 1st CAV, 1ID, 30 eSB and 81 eSB using 500 overhalued machine guns ($1.8M- OMA) and 829 from depot stock.	x		
20031106		Additional Intel Stay Behind Equipment (SBE) requirements for OIF EAD units to include: ASAS-L, ASAS-Servers, CI&I Ops workstations, CI/HUMINT Analysis tools (CHATS), Individual Tactical Report Tools, Ground Surveillance Radar, Improved Remote Battlefield Sensors, Patent Hammer for Prophet.	x		
20031106		Additional Engineer Stay Behind Equipment (SBE) requirements for OIF to include: Bridge Park Equipment, Fire and Water Trucks, Quarry and Asphalt Plant, Countermine Equipment, High Volume Map Printer and Tele-Engineering kits.	x		Deferred decision on 4 Combat Heavy EN BNs, 4 Corps EN BNs, 2 CSE and 1 CSC EN CO assets pending input from ARNG, USAR, FORSCOM and USAREUR.

Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI)

System Descriptions

- Upgrades soldier capabilities with commercial technology
- Provides soldier mission essential equipment
  - Weapon enhancements & improved optics
  - Enhanced protection / mobility items
  - Improved soldier kit = boots & clothing items
- Being issued to all deploying soldiers
  - All receive "soldier kit"
  - Combat soldiers receive "lethality kit"
- Army objective is equip the operating force (840,000 men) by FY07

Production & Funding

- Purchased & shipped in Unit Sets (3500 kits/set)
- Will equip 120,000 men this fiscal year
- Priority for fielding is by deployment timeline
  - Reserve then active component
  - Combat soldier then support soldier
- 10 Unit Sets fielded for current operations
- Fielding on-going in CONUS & Kuwait
- Sustainment package established in theater
- Total Army Requirement: 840,000 sets
- UFR $3B = $445M (FY04) + $2.5B (FY05-07)

Status

- 81st , 30th , and 39th enhanced separate brigades, 2/1ID, 3/1ID Equipped
- Prepping to field to 3/25ID, 1/1CD, 3/1CD
- **All OIF-2 & OEF-5 Units - Complete by July 04**
- Reprogramming actions being worked to sustain production rates to equip operating force by end of FY07

B-1

Annex B: Rapid Fielding Initiative

What Soldiers Want/Buy

B-2

In Development

Sunglasses
8465-01-417-4004

Assault Pack
8465-01-287-8128

Hydration System
8465-01-465-2154

Socks   Modular Gloves

GPS
5825-01-374-6643

Lensatic Compass
GSA Catalog Item

Polypropylene Underwear
8415-01-227-9547

SEP Candidates

Space Blanket

Helmet Pad
8470-01-364-7074

Butt Pack
8465-00-935-6825

Multipurpose Tool
5110-01-430-5051

Cargo Belts   Compass

Army Could Free Issue These Items

Spiral Developments Division

What Units Want/Buy

B-3

Advanced Combat Helmet
5895-01-476-2521

Black Fleece & "Bear Suit"
8415-01-461-8341
8415-01-228-1358

Viper
1240-09-000-1994

USAF Desert Flight Boots
8430-01-483-9541

Interceptor Body Armor
8470-01-465-1926

Thermal Weapon Sight
5855-01-464-3150

MOLLE
8465-01-459-6572

M122/M122A1 Tripod
1005-00-710-5599/
1005-01-433-1617

M145 MG Optics
1240-01-411-6350

M68 Close Combat Optic
1240-01-411-1265

Army Could Free Issue To Units or Accelerate Fielding

Spiral Developments Division

FY05-07 Recommended RFI Equipment List
AROC APPROVED

Soldier Equipment

- Advanced Combat Helmet with accessories (ACH)
- Knee and Elbow Pads
- MOLLE Accessories
- Ballistic Protection Goggles
- Hydration system
- Glove System
- Cold Weather Cap
- AF Desert Flyers Boot (OEF)
- Standard Army Desert Boot (OIF)
- COTS Socks (4 Per)
- Moisture Wicking T-Shirts
- Combat Belt
- Moisture Wicking Sports Bra
- USSOCOM Silk Weight Underwear
- Black Fleece Bibs
- **Black Fleece Jacket**
- **Emergency Bandage (Israeli Pressure Dressing)**
- **Modular Sleeping System**
- ~~Individual Combat Shelter~~

● **Original FY 04 List**

● **Indicates recommended revisions**

— **Recommended deletions**

Unit Equipment

- MBITR
- Close Combat Optic (M68)
- TA 31F ACOG
- Machinegun Optic M145
- MICH Comms Systems
- M249 Ammo Soft pack
- M240B Combat Ammo Pack
- Weapon Light
- VIPER (VECTOR 21)/Mark VII
- 249 Rail
- 240B Rails
- Flex Cuff
- Helmet Repair Kit
- Small Binoculars (M24) (Reduce BOI)
- **IR Strobe/Glint Tape**
- **Visual/Language Translator Card**
- **One Handed Tourniquet**
- **Chitosan Dressing**
- **Back-up Iron Sight**
- **M249 Short Barrel**
- **M249 Collapsible Buttstock**
- **M249 Spare Barrel Bag**
- **M240B Spare Barrel Bag**
- **M122A1 Lightweight Tripod**
- **3 Point Sling**
- **Modular Weapon Sys Kit (Ind Rails for M16)**

Unit Equipment

- Modular Accessory Shotgun System (MASS)
- **Day/Night Sight (M203)**
- **Night Vision (PVS-14) Mono lock**
- **Improved Spotting Scope with Tripod**
- **Improved Cleaning Kit**
- **Improved Buttstock, M4**
- **Modular M9 Holster**
- **Fwd Grip Bipod**
- ~~Light Weight GPS~~
- ~~M4/M16 Magazines~~

MOUT Equipment

- Haligan Tool
- Grappling Hooks
- Door Ram
- Fiber Optic Viewer
- Tactical Assault Ladder
- Modular Entry Tool Kit
- ~~Battle Axe~~
- ~~Quickie Saw w/blades~~

Note: These capabilities were validated as Core Soldier and unit requirements. All Soldiers must be able to shoot, move, communicate, and fight in the full spectrum of Army, Joint, and Coalition operations. The SaaS ICT Working Group continues to identify and validate future Soldier capability requirements

B-4

Accelerating Force Protection Equipment to Soldiers

CALL TO DUTY
BOOTS ON THE GROUND

AREA	WHERE WE WERE IN 2003	WHERE WE ARE TODAY	WHERE ARE WE GOING?
Armored Security Vehicles (ASV)	No ASVs in theater	607 ASVs in theater	962 M1117 ASVs for Convoy Protection in theater by 1st Qtr FY08; five (5) M707 for Field Artillery Knight program by 4th Qtr FY07.
Route Clearance Vehicles	No systems deployed in theater	• 407 systems deployed in response to ONS. • We have added slat armor to the Buffalo.	• Additional force protection to be added to the ONS vehicles. • A Program of Record to activate 12 Clearance Companies between FY08-11.
Raven UAVs	15 systems deployed in theater	520 Systems in theater	1,900 Systems in theater
Shadow TUAVs	8 Platoons, 4 Air Vehicles each (32 total) 4 System at Training base, 16 Air Vehicles	45 Platoons, 4 Air Vehicles each (180 total) 6 System at Training base, 24 Air Vehicles	83 Platoons, 4 Air Vehicles each (332 total)
Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)	No fixed wing ASE; in process of upgrading Blackhawk and Chinook aircraft with basic ASE	All theater rotary wing (UH-60, CH-47, AH-64) and selected fix wing aircraft (RC/C-12) were upgraded with CMWS by mid - Aug 06. UH-60 and CH-47's have been provided with Ballistic Protection Systems (BAPS).	Army continues to procure and install CMWS on rotary and fix wing aircraft in the rotational base. IR (Heat) suppression systems to be procured for AH-64 and CH-47.
Counter – Rocket, Artillery & Mortar (C-RAM)	No systems deployed in theater	Sense & Warn capability operational at ten OIF sites, including one belonging to an Allied nation. Hostile round interception available at one site and installation underway at a second site	(FOUO) Fielding of Sense and Warn capability to 7 additional OIF sites planned. Also in progress is fielding of Intercept to a second site. Additional fielding of intercept capability pending Theater assessment of need. (FOUO)
Counter-Remote-Controlled IED Warfare Device	Minimal capability in theater	More than 38,809 systems in theater	45,724 Systems in theater

As of 21FEB07

	WHERE WE WERE IN 2003	WE ARE TODAY	WHERE ARE WE GOING
Up-Armored HMMWVS	500 Up-Armored HMMWVs in Iraq and Afghanistan	14,961 Up-Armored HMMWVs in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait	Satisfy the validated theater UAH requirement with June 2007 production.
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Add-on Armor Kits	Contingency mission only	More than 22,308 vehicles in theater have add-on-armor kits	The focus is no longer on AoA kits for TWV but on Additional protection on UAH via Frag Kits.
Frag Kit #1	No kits deployed in theater	Cut into M1114 production in Sep 2005 M1114: 13,992 in AOR; 11,823 installed M1151: 1513 in AOR; 1405 installed	M1114 kit production completed 26 Sep 06. M1151 production completed Aug 2006. Installation ongoing
Frag Kit #2	No kits deployed in theater	Cut into M1114 production in Mar 2006 M1114: 12,734 in AOR; 11,283 installed M1151: 98 in AOR; 98 installed	M1114 retrofit kit production complete 5 Oct 2006; installation ongoing. M1151 installation being done with objective Frag Kit #5.
Frag Kits #3 and #4	No kits deployed in theater	$111M requested in FY 07 Main Supplemental	Frag Kits #3 and #4 are redesigned into a single kit, called Frag Kit #4, Gen II with V shaped hull. Gen II kit failed proof of principle test on 14 Dec 06.
Frag Kit #5	No kits deployed in theater	Interim Kit: M1114: 6300 in AOR; 6300 installed M1151: None to be produced Objective Kit: M1114: Cut into production in Oct 2006; 7410 in AOR; 5026 installed M1151: Cut into production in Nov 2006 1579 in AOR; 1300 installed	M1114 Interim kit production completed Oct 2006; installation ongoing Objective Kit: M1114 retrofit kit production to be completed in Mar 2007 M1151: Production of retrofit kits to be completed in Apr 2007. Installation continues for both vehicles.
Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles (Brat)	140 sets delivered; acceleration plan in execution	989 sets sent to theater; 42 spares in CONUS being shipped forward, max production plan in execution. Overall AAO supports the surge; theater inventorying stocks to determine short term needs	ONS target was 1,025 sets in theater and 1,969 for the Army; goal to finish procurement is 4QFY10. Available tiles are sent forward IAW normal Class V processes to support the surge.
SLAT Armor	No kits deployed in theater	2 Stryker BCTs armored with 2" SLAT; 1BCT armored w/ 1" SLAT which is replacing 2" SLAT (same protection / lighter weight). 1st set of 3rd generation FP-- Stryker reactive armor tiles (SRAT)-- delivered Nov 06.	1st set of 1" SLAT being installed on 4/2. 2nd set due in Apr. 3rd set being contracted. 2 more sets of SRAT expected end 4QFY08 and end 2QFY10.

As of 21FEB07

C-2

	WHERE WE WERE IN 2003	WHERE WE ARE TODAY	WHERE ARE WE GOING
Body Armor	Estimated 10 percent of Soldiers in Iraq equipped	All Soldiers and DoD civilians in theater equipped with IBA; total of 966,000 OTVs, 520,000 and 462,000 ESAPI fielded; plus 271,000 Deltoid Axillary Protectors & 276,000 Ballistic Side Plates issued.	Pure fleet the Army with ESAPI by the end of FY08 (966K sets). Provide DAP and Ballistic Side Plates to the rest of the Army to complete the IBA ensemble by the end of FY08.
Bradley Urban Survivability Kit (BUSK) II	Not available in theater	Operational need for 525 identified and approved. 525 kits were fielded by January 2006. 308 partial replacement sets shipped to meet losses and reequip pre-surge force levels.	Have identified requirement / cost to equip surging force levels. Funding requested in the Surge Requirements datacall; PM has cash flowed to initiate some procurement but requires added $$.
Rapid Fielding Initiative	RFI program started in 2Qtr FY04.	830,800 sets of RFI have been fielded to Soldiers	The Army plans to issue 957,000 sets to Soldiers by the end of FY07. RFI is synchronizing its operations with the ARFORGEN Operating Cycle.
Thermal Weapon Sights (TWS)	6,791 systems in AOR	26,924 systems	126,000 systems in AOR
M240 Machine Guns	0 M240H for aircraft and 12,964 M240B for ground employment	34,170 M240 for ground and Aircraft	45,389 for ground and aircraft
Sniper Rifles, .50 Cal	798 Rifles in AOR	2,935 Rifles	3,832 Rifles in AOR
M4 Carbines	144,159 Carbines in AOR	216,572 Carbines	364,762 Carbines in AOR
Night Vision Goggles	193, 967 systems in AOR	325,100 systems	593,000 Systems in AOR
Tank Urban Survivability Kit (TUSK)	Not available in theater	Component procurement underway; 1st kits scheduled for Jul 07; working to accelerate delivery. Reactive tile component AAO increased based on BRAT experience.	Original ONS Target is for 505 kits in Theater. Fielding still on track to begin in Jul 07. Requested added funding in the surge datacall for additional BCT of items.

	WHERE WE WERE IN 2003	WHERE WE ARE TODAY	WHERE ARE WE GOING
Armored Gun Shields	N/A	660 fielded for Bradley Fighting Vehicles 996 fielded to M113 Family of Vehicles 505 planned for M1 Tanks (Tusk component) Need an additional 300 for surge requirement for Bradleys (see BUSK entry)	1st two operational needs met. Continue component replacement as required for TUSK and battle loss. Added requirement captured in surge funding datacall. (See BUSK entry)
Bridge Erection Boat (BEB) Add on Armor	N/A	In response to ONS we have built a prototype AoA kit that has been assembled, are awaiting engineering design review, stability and safety testing.	Armor the crew area (44 kit A) and possibly the weapons station (four per MRBC).
Handheld Mine Detector	Limited LRIP for Handheld Standoff Mine Detection	Reached Milestone C decision and Full Materiel Release on AN-PSS-14 in August 2006. Procuring 350 systems per month on initial contract.	Will have procured 12,500 out of the 15,200 systems required by the end of POM13
AoA Construction Equipment	N/A	Armor protection packages for 12 different vehicles in theatre: IHMEE, Light Loader, Grader, DEUCE, Dozer, HYEX, Crane, Heavy Loader, ATLAS, Vibe Roller, Scraper, Compactor.	Improving current kit configuration to meet changing threats. Two level of protection kits production; establishing theatre based CE AoA facility.
Low Collateral Damage Long Range Precision Munitions – GMLRS Unitary	N/A	In response to an urgent operational need the development of a Unitary variant of GMLRS was accelerated and 486 rockets deployed to theater where it routinely precisely supports troops in contact at ranges up to 70KM without endangering friendly troops and with low collateral damage and no UXO concerns. An additional 962 rockets are being deployed to theater where it has become the ground commander's 70KM sniper rifle!	GMLRS Unitary is scheduled to enter low rate initial production in the Spring 2007 with the addition of a tri-mode fuse (point detonating, delay and air burst) and trajectory shaping which will better enable the engagement of enemy forces in complex and urban terrain with extremely limited collateral damage and no UXO concerns

As of 21FEB07

Area	What We Did in FY06	Area	What We Did in FY06
Armored Security Vehicles (ASV)	• 346 ASVs produced • Ramped up production from 8/mo to 48/mo • Recovered from effects of Hurricane Katrina destruction of plants • Increased ASL which improved the OR rate from 82% to 92%	Up-Armored HMMWVS	Transitioned from the M1114 to the M1151A1 variant and began replacing level II AoA HMMWVs with level Up-Armored HMMWVs. Increased UAH count in Theater by 3,316 vehicles.
Route Clearance Vehicles	• Approved ONS in Dec 05 for procurement of 39 Buffalos, 39 IVMMD systems and 160 RG-31s • We have added slat armor to the Buffalo.	Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Add-on Armor Kits	Installed AoA kits on 2,452 vehicles. Began retrograding TWV from theater causing the number of vehicles with AoA kits to decline.
Raven UAVs	54 Raven-B Systems Fielded in FY06	Frag Kit #1	Cut into M1114 production in Sep 2005 M1114 kit production completed 26 Sep 06. Installed 8455 kits on M1114 and 1079 kits on M1151 vehicles.
Shadow TUAVs	Fielded 14 AC Platoons, 4 Air Vehicles each (56 total) fielded 2 System at the Training base, 8 Air Vehicles	Frag Kit #2	Cut into M1114 production in Mar 2006. Installed kits on 6171 M1114 vehicles.
Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)	• Ramped up production of CMWS B-kits from 15 / 20 per month to 40+ per month. • Completed fielding of CMWS to aircraft supporting OIF / OEF in Aug 06. • Tested and certified for future procurement, an IR (Heat) suppression system for CH-47 and AH-64's.	Frag Kits #3 and #4	Tested Gen I Frag Kits #3 and #4. Lessons learned applied to the design of Frag kit #4 GEN II.
Counter – Rocket, Artillery & Mortar (C-RAM)	(FOUO) Fielded Sense & Warn capability to six OIF sites. Completed fielding of one hostile round intercept capability. (FOUO)	Frag Kit #5	Interim Kit: Designed, tested, produced and installed in theater. Installed interim kits on 4394 M1114 vehicles. Objective Kit: M1114: Designed, tested, produced, and kit production began in Sep 06 M1151: Designed and tested
Counter-Remote-Controlled IED Warfare Device	Provided over 14,600 systems to in-theater OIF/OEF units	Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles (Brat)	380 sets of armor tile produced at two locations, 1 CONUS and 1 overseas. Overseas site production is ramped down as theater target is achieved, Began CONUS storage of spares not needed in theater.
		SLAT Armor	Tested 1" SLAT and procured funding. 1" SLAT is replacing 2" SLAT (same protection / lighter weight). Funded 1st set of SRAT which is 3rd generation FP.

Area	WHAT WE DID IN FY06	AREA	WHAT WE DID IN FY06
Body Armor	Provided deploying Soldiers to theater with 143,000 OTVs, 308,000 sets ESAPI; plus 70,000 sets of Deltoid Axillary Protectors & 243,080 Ballistic Side Plates.	Armored Gun Shields	Completed fielding to Bradley and M113 Bradley / M113 version adapted for M1 TUSK kit and tested. Fully funded the M88 buy.
Bradley Urban Survivability Kit (BUSK)	525 kits shipped to theater and installed in January 2006. That equipped every M2 in theater.	Handheld Mine Detector	Reached Milestone C decision and Full Materiel Release on AN-PSS-14 in August 2006. Procuring 350 systems per month on initial contract.
Rapid Fielding Initiative	Issued 320,600 sets of RFI in FY06.	AoA Construction Equipment	339 Armor protection kits produced, 101 vehicle up-armored: IHMEE, Light Loader, Grader, DEUCE, Dozer, HYEX, Crane, Heavy Loader, ATLAS, Vibe Roller, Scraper, Compactor.
Thermal Weapon Sights (TWS)	4,119 systems delivered to AOR	Hurricane Equipment Support OCONUS /CONUS	OCONUS: Provided 67 Truck Utility Cargo (HMMWV) 7 Ambulance 4 Litter (HMMWV) 3 Generator Sets 3KW CONUS: Provided 23 Ambulance 4 Litter (HMMWV) 232 Generator Sets (3KW,5KW, 30KW,60KW
M240 Machine Guns	Delivered 1,625 M240B to meet ground requirements and 1,800 M240H for aircraft replacing the older M60 MGs as helicopter door-guns.	Sniper Rifles, .50 Cal	1,153 M107s delivered to AOR
M4 Carbines	Increased production for the Army to 6,000 per month; delivered 50,881 M4s.	Night Vision Goggles	36,000 systems delivered to AOR.
Tank Urban Survivability Kit (TUSK)	Validated need, developed and tested components & prototypes and procured funding for production.		

"2001 MTOE Shortage Authorized vs OH (No Subs)"

2001 "HOLES IN THE YARD" (no-subs)

Consisted of:	
Major Systems	$22.7B
Other Systems	$9.8B
Recap/Upgrade	$21.5B
2001 Shortages	**$54.0B**

Bradleys $999M

Apaches $3,403M

C2 Systems $1,380M

AMMO $5,500M

Blackhawks $2,650M

Generators $256M

COMSEC $107M

SINCGARS $869M

Abrams $598M

HMMWV $2,417M

LLDR $146M

GPS $95M

FMTV $2,604M

Small Arms/Mtr $300M

Trailers $546M

U.S. Army 9/10/2001

HEMTT $801M

Recap/Upgrade $21,500M

Plus GWOT Related Operational Needs - $14.5B

ASV $763M

Soldier Kit $2,000M

Warlock $2,000M

SINCGARS $2,900M

AMMO $2,560M

JNN $2,000M

UAH $1,291M

Rte Clearance Vehs $387M

C-RAM $600M

2001 Shortages	$54.0B
GWOT Operational Needs	$14.5B
TOTAL	**$68.5B**

2001 "Holes in the Yard" (no Subs)

2001 MTOE Shortages (Existing Holes) + GWOT Operational Needs

Major Systems		(Qty)
Ammunition	$ 5,500 M	N/A
Blackhawk	$ 2,650 M	(302)
Apache	$ 3,403 M	(149)
HMMWV	$ 2,417 M	(22,840)*
C2 systems	$ 1,380 M	(11,202)*
FMTV	$ 2,604 M	(15,864)*
Abrams	$ 598 M	(250)
Bradley	$ 999 M	(398)
HEMTT	$ 801 M	(2,211)
SINCGARS	$ 869 M	(74,650)*
Trailers	$ 546 M	(16,585)*
Small Arms/Mtr	$ 300 M	(157,291)*
Generators	$ 256 M	(18,499)*
LLDR	$ 146 M	(1,165)
GPS	$ 95 M	(35,687)
COMSEC	$ 107 M	(41,235)*

Other Systems   **$ 9, 834 M**
(915 truck, PLS, TACSAT, etc.)
Recap/Upgrade   **$21,500 M**

2001 Shortages: **$ 54,006 M**

Ammunition	$ 2,560 M	N/A
SINCGARS	$ 2,900 M	(472,567)*
JNN	$ 2,000 M	(318)*
Soldier Kits	$ 2,000 M	(172,283)*
Warlock	$ 2,000 M	(22,054)*
UAH	$ 1,291 M	(10,194)
ASV	$ 763 M	(872)
C-RAM	$ 600 M	(27)*
Route Clearance	$ 387 M	(481)*

Major Systems: **$ 14,501 M**

* Consists of multiple equipment LINs

= TOTAL: $ 68,507 M

D-3

3

2001 "Holes in the Yard"

2001 MTOE Shortages (Existing Holes) **$41.7B**

Additional MTOE Shortages w/ no substitutes **$12.3B** } **$68.5B**

GWOT Operational Needs **$14.5B**

$95.9B

RDTE Shortfall **$2.1B**

Force XXI Tank and Bradley Fleet down by 25% (realized limited digitization) *MTOE Documents changed before Modernization occurred* **$7.5B** } **$27.4B**

Assumed Risk to Fund Initial Transformation
Not Documented as requirements on MTOE before reduction

Program Kills:	$13.9B
Other realignments:	$ 3.9B
Total:	$ 17.8B

$17.8B

2001 "Holes in the Yard"

"2001 MTOE Shortage Authorized vs OH (w/ Subs)"

Original Charts

2001 "HOLES IN THE YARD" (with subs)

Consisted of:	
Major Systems	$13.9B
Other Systems	$6.3B
Recap/Upgrade	$21.5B
2001 Shortages	**$41.7B**

Bradleys $500M

Apaches $1,217M

C2 Systems $1,024M

AMMO $5,500M

Blackhawks $1,432M

Generators $127M

COMSEC $86M

SINCGARS $404M

Abrams $653M

HMMWV $1,148M

LLDR $145M

GPS $94M

FMTV $668M

Small Arms/Mtr $162M

Trailers $366M

U.S. Army 9/10/2001

HEMTT $416M

Recap/Upgrade $21,500M

D-6

Plus GWOT Related Operational Needs - $14.5B

ASV $763M

Soldier Kit $2,000M

Warlock $2,000M

SINCGARS $2,900M

AMMO $2,560M

JNN $2,000M

UAH $1,291M

Rte Clearance Vehs $387M

C-RAM $600M

2001 Shortages	$41.7B
GWOT Operational Needs	$14.5B
TOTAL	**$56.2B**

2001 "Holes in the Yard" (with Subs)

2001 MTOE Shortages (Existing Holes) + GWOT Operational Needs

Major Systems (Qty)

Major Systems		(Qty)
Ammunition	$ 5,500 M	N/A
Blackhawk	$ 1,432 M	(242)
Apache	$ 1,217 M	(148)
HMMWV	$ 1,148 M	(11,445)*
C2 systems	$ 1,024 M	(23,890)*
FMTV	$ 668 M	(4,034)*
Abrams	$ 653 M	(273)
Bradley	$ 500 M	(292)
HEMTT	$ 416 M	(1,176)
SINCGARS	$ 404 M	(31,388)*
Trailers	$ 366 M	(14,117)*
Small Arms/Mtr	$ 162 M	(88,978)*
Generators	$ 127 M	(9,598)*
LLDR	$ 145 M	(1,176)
GPS	$ 94 M	(35,570)
COMSEC	$ 86 M	(35,336)*

Other Systems $ 6,293 M
(915 truck, PLS, TACSAT, etc.)

Recap/Upgrade $21,500 M

2001 Shortages: $ 41,735 M

GWOT Operational Needs		
Ammunition	$ 2,560 M	N/A
SINCGARS	$ 2,900 M	(472,567)*
JNN	$ 2,000 M	(318)*
Soldier Kits	$ 2,000 M	(172,283)*
Warlock	$ 2,000 M	(22,054)*
UAH	$ 1,291 M	(10,194)
ASV	$ 763 M	(872)
C-RAM	$ 600 M	(27)*
Route Clearance	$ 387 M	(481)*

Major Systems: $ 14,501 M

* Consists of multiple equipment LINs

= **TOTAL: $ 56,236 M**

2001 "Holes in the Yard"

Acronyms

ASV – armored security vehicle

C2 systems – command and control systems

COMSEC – communications security

C-RAM – counter rocket, artillery, and mortar

FMTV – family of medium tactical vehicles

GPS – global positioning system

HEMTT – heavy expanded mobility tactical truck

HMMWV - high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

JNN – joint node network

LLDR – lightweight laser designator rangefinder

LIN – line item number

Mtr – mortars

SINCGARS – single channel ground and airborne radio system

UAH – up-armored HMMWV

Fixing Army Aviation

Fixing Army Aviation Requires

Accelerate Aircraft Survivability Equipment
Fund Apache Block III Conversion
Buy Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter
Buy Light Utility Helicopter
Buy Blackhawks
Buy Chinooks
Buy Cargo Fixed Wing
Invest in Common Cockpit, Fly-by-Wire
Invest in Aviation Munitions
Initiate Joint Multi-Role Helicopter Program
Resource Army UAV requirements

$14.6B

FY 04-11

Comanche
121 Aircraft

Low Observable
On board Maintenance Diagnostics
Two Level Maintenance Design

Plus Billions ($) in Planned Upgrades

Buys 825 new aircraft

Facilitates Modularity

Joint Interoperable

Standardized Formations

Tailorable

Deployable

Sustainable

Multi-Functional Aviation Brigades

Reserve Component enhanced

Annex F: Wartime Executive Agent Responsibilities (WEAR)

1. Scenario: Two MTW scenarios

2. Requirements: more than 57,000 (CS/CSS) Soldiers

3. Executive Agency List:

   a. Inland Class I Support
   b. Class III Bulk and Package
   c. Operation of Common User Ocean Terminals
   d. Intermodal Container Management
   e. Common User Land Transportation in Theater
   f. Military Customs Inspection Program
   g. Military Troop Construction
   h. Airdrop Equipment and Supplies
   i. Power Generation Equipment and Supplies
   j. Land Based Water Resources
   k. Overland POL Support (Distribution)
   l. Military Postal Service
   m. DoD Enemy POW and Detainee Program
   n. Military Veterinary Support
   o. Medical Evacuation on the Battlefield
   p. Mortuary Services/Graves Registration
   q. Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition
   r. Chemical Munitions
   s. Chemical Protective Clothing and Equipment
   t. NBC Decontamination, Reconnaissance, and Detection
   u. Disposal of Waste Explosives and Munitions
   v. Medical Treatment for POWs and Civilians
   w. Communications Liaison Teams
   x. Civil Affairs Support
   y. Locomotive and Rail Management
   z. Traffic Regulation on Designated Routes
   aa. Contracting Support
   bb. Single Item Manager for Class VIII Support
   cc. Water Support for POWs, Refugees and Displaced Persons
   dd. Medical Support for Non-Combatant Operations
   ee. Civilian Personnel Program
   ff. Optical Fabrication and Repair

B. Current Army Executive Agent Responsibilities

1. DoD Level III Corrections
2. Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC)
3. Contracting for Operation NEW DAWN (OND)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)/Kuwait and Pakistan (Formerly Contracting for OIE/OEF; formerly Coalition Provisional Authority
4. DoD Combat Feeding Research and Engineering Program
5. Military Postal Service (MPS) and Official Mail Program (OMP)
6. Emergency Response to Transportation Mishaps Involving DoD Military Munitions (Explosives Safety Management)
7. Recruiting Facilities Program
8. Contract Linguists
9. DoD Support to United Nations Missions
10. DoD Civilian Police Officers and Physical Security; Physical Fitness
11. Unexploded Ordnance Center of Excellence (UXOCOE)
12. Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)
13. Law of War Program
14. Blast Injuries
15. DoD Detainee Operations Policy
16. Support for Non-Federal Entities Authorized to Operate on DoD Installations under OSD Review
17. Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST)
18. DoD Biometrics
19. Financial Disclosure Management (FDM) – Ethics Reporting System
20. Commander's Emergency Response Program
21. Establishment of a Department of Defense (DoD) Laboratory Presence in the Country of Georgia
22. Forensics
23. DoD Executive Agent for Operation of After Government Employment Advice Repository (AGEAR)
24. CREW Technology
25. DoD Biological Select Agent and Toxin (BSAT) Safety Program
26. Cyber Training Ranges
27. Recovered Chemical Warfare Material (RCWM) Program

Annex G: Theater Infrastructure and Requirements

1.   Existing Infrastructure/Assets
       a. Udari Range
       b. Kuwait Naval Base (SPOD)
       c. Al Shuaiba (SPOD)
       d. Ali Al Saleem (APOD)
       e. Kuwait City International Airport (APOD)
       f. Camp Doha
       g. Camp Arifjan
       h. APS-5

2.   Planned
       a. Camp Buehring
       b. Camp New Jersey
       c. Camp New York
       d. Camp Pennsylvania
       e. Camp Virginia
       f. Pipeline
       g. Bulk storage facilities

SOLDIERS DEPLOYED AND FORWARD STATIONED
193,510 SOLDIERS IN 122 COUNTRIES

AS OF 20 JUNE 02

MAJOR DEPLOYMENTS

KOSOVO
TF FALCON
4,620 SOLDIERS

MACEDONIA
TF FALCON-REAR
335 SOLDIERS

AFGHANISTAN,
8,365

SINAI
MFO
860 SOLDIERS

OTHER OPERATIONS
& EXERCISES
7,600 SOLDIERS

BOSNIA, CROATIA,
HUNGARY
JOINT FORGE
2,755 SOLDIERS

KUWAIT
DESERT SPRING
6,645 SOLDIERS

SAUDI ARABIA /
BAHRAIN
DESERT SPRING
840 SOLDIERS

CTC ROTATIONS
NTC / JRTC
14,525 SOLDIERS

UNITED STATES
NOBLE EAGLE
COUNTERDRUG
19,575 SOLDIERS

HONDURAS
JTF-BRAVO
140 SOLDIERS

OPERATIONS WITHIN THE U.S.	34,100
OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE U.S.	32,160
FORWARD STATIONED	127,250
TOTAL	193,510

Army Global Commitments

272,000 soldiers overseas in 120 countries

OEF – SAUDI ARABIA, BAHRAIN
150 SOLDIERS

OEF-AFGHANISTAN
15,000 SOLDIERS

OEF - PHILIPINES
200 SOLDIERS

BALKANS
2,500 SOLDIERS

OIF-IRAQ
90,000 SOLDIERS

OIF-KUWAIT
15,000 SOLDIERS

SINAI
700 SOLDIERS

JTF-GTMO
1,400 SOLDIERS

HOMELAND SECURITY
18,000 SOLDIERS

JTF-BRAVO
800 SOLDIERS

OTHER OPERATIONS & EXERCISES
2,100 SOLDIERS

Army Personnel Strength		
Component	Total	Currently Deployed
- Active:	495,000*	148,000
- Reserve:	207,000	38,000
- National Guard:	343,000	86,000
Total:	1,045,000	272,000

* Includes Stop/Loss

AC Forward Stationed 127,000

AS OF 19 OCT 2004

U.S. ARMY

AVERAGE U.S. FORCES IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, FY 2002-FY 2016

Note: For FY 2002-2007, the annual total is derived from average monthly troop levels. For FY 2008-2016, the annual total is derived from average quarterly troop levels. While the 2007 total (from monthly averages) in Iraq was 148,300 troops, troop levels surged to 165,607 in the fourth quarter. U.S. troop numbers in Iraq for FY 2012 (11,445) represent the number of troops in the first quarter: there were no U.S. troops in Iraq by the end of the second quarter beyond a residual force that remained to provide embassy security and other security cooperation assistance. Starting in June 2014, additional U.S. military personnel were sent to Iraq in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) to advise and train Iraqi forces and support U.S. military operations against the Islamic State.
Source: CRS, *Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost, and Other Potential Issues,* July 2, 2009, p. 9; CRS, *Department, of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2017,* April 28, 2017, pp.4-11; CRS, Overseas *Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status,* February 7, 2017, p. 19

Source: Equida Nekzor. "Reconstructing The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan."
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/iraq/doc/afgsigar.html#fig9 [accessed December 6, 2017]

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